@yagyeshvyas/vibeguard 0.1.0 → 1.0.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +63 -0
- package/README.md +302 -31
- package/bin/cli.js +318 -4
- package/package.json +14 -11
- package/src/ast.js +4 -0
- package/src/auto.js +422 -0
- package/src/crosstaint.js +154 -9
- package/src/daemon-run.js +12 -0
- package/src/daemon.js +342 -0
- package/src/guard.js +80 -0
- package/src/mcp-server.js +0 -5
- package/src/rules-pack.js +112 -12
- package/src/rules.js +11 -6
- package/src/scanner.js +36 -2
- package/src/shell-guard.js +276 -0
- package/src/shell-hook.ps1 +135 -0
- package/src/shell-hook.sh +90 -0
- package/src/suppress.js +78 -8
- package/src/taint-ast.js +852 -0
- package/src/taint.js +38 -12
package/src/rules.js
CHANGED
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@@ -63,13 +63,18 @@ function isPublicBaaSKey(fullLine, value) {
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63
63
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64
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// Build a fix-prompt-friendly one-liner.
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function makeFinding(rule, opts) {
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// Confidence derivation:
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// - If opts or rule explicitly sets confidence, keep it (taint=high, etc.).
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// - Rules with a filter() function are multi-signal => medium.
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// - Bare regex rules with no filter => low.
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let conf = opts.confidence || rule.confidence;
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if (!conf) {
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conf = typeof rule.filter === 'function' ? 'medium' : 'low';
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}
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return {
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ruleId: opts.ruleId || rule.id,
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severity: opts.severity || rule.severity,
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-
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// 'medium'= strong heuristic, glance before acting.
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// 'low' = "review this" — a hint, not a verdict.
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-
confidence: opts.confidence || rule.confidence || 'high',
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confidence: conf,
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title: opts.title || rule.title,
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message: opts.message || rule.message,
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fix: opts.fix || rule.fix,
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@@ -677,7 +682,7 @@ const robustnessRules = [
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confidence: 'medium',
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title: 'NoSQL query built from the request',
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// Model.find(req.body) / passing req.* straight as a query, or $where operator.
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-
re: /\.(?:find|findOne|findOneAndUpdate|findOneAndDelete|updateOne|updateMany|deleteOne|deleteMany|count|countDocuments)\s*\(\s*req\.(?:body|query|params)\s*[),]|\$where\s*:/,
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re: /\.(?:find|findOne|findOneAndUpdate|findOneAndDelete|updateOne|updateMany|deleteOne|deleteMany|count|countDocuments)\s*\(\s*(?:req\.(?:body|query|params)\s*[)\],]|\{[^}]*req\.(?:body|query|params)\.|\{[^}]*\$where)|\$where\s*:/,
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skipComments: true,
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message: 'A database query object comes directly from the request — NoSQL/operator injection (e.g. { "$gt": "" } bypasses checks).',
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fix: 'Build the query explicitly from validated scalar fields; never pass req.body/query straight into find().',
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@@ -842,7 +847,7 @@ const injectionRules = [
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severity: 'high',
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confidence: 'medium',
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title: 'Prototype pollution via deep merge of request data',
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-
re: /\b(?:_\.)?(?:merge|mergeWith|defaultsDeep|extend|set|setWith)\s*\([^)]*\breq\.(?:body|query|params)\b|deepmerge\s*\([^)]*\breq\.(?:body|query|params)\b/i,
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re: /\b(?:_\.)?(?:merge|mergeWith|defaultsDeep|extend|set|setWith)\s*\([^)]*\breq\.(?:body|query|params)\b|deepmerge\s*\([^)]*\breq\.(?:body|query|params)\b|Object\.assign\s*\([^)]*\breq\.(?:body|query|params)\b/i,
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skipComments: true,
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message: 'A deep-merge/set of request data can set __proto__/constructor keys — prototype pollution.',
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fix: 'Validate keys, freeze prototypes, or use a merge that ignores __proto__/prototype/constructor.',
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package/src/scanner.js
CHANGED
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@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ function scanFileContent(absPath, relPath, content, tree) {
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}
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for (const hit of matchAll(rule.re, line)) {
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if (rule.skipInString && isInsideString(line, hit.index)) continue;
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-
if (rule.filter && !rule.filter(line, hit)) continue;
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+
if (rule.filter && !rule.filter(line, hit, lines)) continue;
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findings.push(
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makeFinding(rule, {
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file: relPath,
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@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ function scanFileContent(absPath, relPath, content, tree) {
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// Dataflow/taint analysis: follows user input across lines to a dangerous sink.
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try {
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const { analyzeTaint } = require('./taint');
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-
for (const t of analyzeTaint(content, lines, relPath)) findings.push(t);
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for (const t of analyzeTaint(content, lines, relPath, tree)) findings.push(t);
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} catch {
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/* taint is best-effort */
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}
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@@ -440,6 +440,19 @@ function computeGrade(findings) {
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// Collapse noise: on a single file:line, a specific rule supersedes the generic
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// credential catch-all (e.g. a weak session secret shouldn't also report as a
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// bare "hardcoded credential"). Also drop exact duplicate (ruleId+file+line).
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//
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// Additionally: when a dataflow-confirmed taint.* finding and a structural ast.*
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// finding land on the same file:line and describe the same vulnerability category,
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// keep only the taint finding (higher confidence) and drop the ast.* duplicate.
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// Map: taint.command-injection ↔ ast.command-injection, etc.
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const TAINT_TO_AST = {
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'taint.command-injection': 'ast.command-injection',
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'taint.sql-injection': 'ast.sql-injection',
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'taint.code-injection': 'ast.eval-dynamic',
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'taint.path-traversal': 'ast.path-traversal',
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'taint.ssrf': 'ast.ssrf',
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};
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+
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function dedupeFindings(findings) {
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const linesWithSpecific = new Set();
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for (const f of findings) {
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@@ -447,6 +460,16 @@ function dedupeFindings(findings) {
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linesWithSpecific.add(`${f.file}:${f.line}`);
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}
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}
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463
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+
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464
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// Build a set of taint.* ruleIds that fired, keyed by file:line, so we can
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// drop the corresponding ast.* finding on the same file:line.
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const taintKeys = new Set();
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for (const f of findings) {
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if (TAINT_TO_AST[f.ruleId]) {
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taintKeys.add(`${f.file}:${f.line}:${TAINT_TO_AST[f.ruleId]}`);
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}
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}
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+
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const seen = new Set();
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const out = [];
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for (const f of findings) {
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@@ -456,6 +479,11 @@ function dedupeFindings(findings) {
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) {
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continue; // superseded by a more specific rule
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}
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// Drop ast.* finding when a taint.* finding already covers the same file:line.
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const astCounterpart = Object.entries(TAINT_TO_AST).find(([, ast]) => ast === f.ruleId);
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if (astCounterpart && taintKeys.has(`${f.file}:${f.line}:${f.ruleId}`)) {
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continue; // superseded by the dataflow-confirmed taint finding
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}
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const key = `${f.ruleId}:${f.file}:${f.line}:${f.column}`;
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if (seen.has(key)) continue;
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seen.add(key);
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@@ -575,6 +603,10 @@ function scan(dir, opts = {}) {
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}
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findings = applyInlineSuppressions(findings, contents);
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const { applyInlineSuppressionsWithCount } = require('./suppress');
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const supResult = applyInlineSuppressionsWithCount(findings, contents);
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findings = supResult.kept;
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const suppressedFindings = supResult.suppressed;
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findings = applyConfigFilters(findings, config);
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// Merge plugin rules
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@@ -632,6 +664,8 @@ function scan(dir, opts = {}) {
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root,
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scannedFiles: files.length,
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findings,
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suppressedFindings,
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suppressedCount: suppressedFindings.length,
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grade,
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counts,
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depsInfo,
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@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
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1
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'use strict';
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3
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/*
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* src/shell-guard.js — Shell-level pre-execution guard with anti-evasion.
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*
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* Scans a command string BEFORE it runs. Normalizes obfuscation attempts,
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* then matches against danger patterns. If blocked, returns { blocked: true }.
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*
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* Anti-evasion layers (applied in order, all checked):
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* 1. Base64 decode: echo "cm0gLXJmIC8" | base64 -d | sh -> rm -rf /
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* 2. Env-var indirection: RM="rm -rf"; $RM / -> blocked
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* 3. Subshell expansion: $(echo rm) -rf / -> rm -rf /
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* 4. Backtick eval: `echo rm` -rf / -> rm -rf /
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* 5. Hex/unicode escapes: \x72\x6d -> rm
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* 6. rm obfuscation: rm -r -f, rm --recursive --force, /bin/rm, r""m
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* 7. Path splitting: /bin/r""m -rf /, /sbin/r''m
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* 8. Quoted command: "rm" -rf /, 'rm' -rf /
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* 9. Variable concatenation: r=m; ${r}m -rf / -> blocked
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*
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* IMPORTANT: This catches accidental/AI-mistake dangerous commands. A
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* determined adversary with knowledge of the patterns can still evade
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* (no static guard is unbreakable). This stops the agent from nuking
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* your machine — it is NOT sandbox escape prevention.
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*
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* 100% local. Zero network. Zero dependencies.
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*/
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+
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const path = require('path');
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+
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// ─── Anti-evasion normalizer ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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+
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32
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function normalizeCommand(cmd) {
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33
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if (!cmd || typeof cmd !== 'string') return cmd || '';
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34
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let normalized = cmd;
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35
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+
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36
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// Layer 1: Base64 decode — catch "echo <base64> | base64 -d | sh"
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37
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const b64Match = normalized.match(/echo\s+["']?([A-Za-z0-9+/=]{8,})["']?\s*\|\s*(?:base64|b64)\s+-d\s*\|/i);
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38
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+
if (b64Match) {
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39
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try {
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40
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const decoded = Buffer.from(b64Match[1], 'base64').toString('utf8');
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41
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+
normalized = normalized.replace(b64Match[0], decoded);
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42
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} catch {}
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43
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}
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44
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+
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45
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// Layer 2: Env-var indirection — VAR="rm -rf"; $VAR /
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46
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// Extract assignments and substitute $VAR references
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47
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+
const assignMatch = normalized.match(/(\w+)=(["'])([^"']*)\2/);
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48
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+
if (assignMatch) {
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49
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+
const varName = assignMatch[1];
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50
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+
const varValue = assignMatch[3];
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51
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+
// If the variable contains a dangerous command fragment, substitute it
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52
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if (/rm|sudo|chmod|mkfs|dd\s|shutdown|reboot|curl|wget/i.test(varValue)) {
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53
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+
normalized = normalized.replace(new RegExp('\\$' + varName + '\\b', 'g'), varValue);
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54
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+
normalized = normalized.replace(assignMatch[0], ''); // remove the assignment
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55
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+
}
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56
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+
}
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57
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+
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58
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+
// Layer 3: Subshell expansion — $(echo rm) -> rm
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59
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normalized = normalized.replace(/\$\(\s*echo\s+([^)]+)\s*\)/g, '$1');
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60
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// $(printf "rm") -> rm
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61
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normalized = normalized.replace(/\$\(\s*printf\s+["']([^"']+)["']\s*\)/g, '$1');
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62
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+
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63
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// Layer 4: Backtick eval — `echo rm` -> rm
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64
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normalized = normalized.replace(/`\s*echo\s+([^`]+)\s*`/g, '$1');
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65
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normalized = normalized.replace(/`\s*printf\s+["']([^"']+)["']\s*`/g, '$1');
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66
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+
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67
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// Layer 5: Hex/unicode escapes — \x72\x6d -> rm
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68
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normalized = normalized.replace(/\\x([0-9a-f]{2})/gi, (m, hex) => {
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69
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+
try { return String.fromCharCode(parseInt(hex, 16)); } catch { return m; }
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70
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+
});
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71
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+
// \u0072 -> r
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72
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+
normalized = normalized.replace(/\\u([0-9a-f]{4})/gi, (m, hex) => {
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73
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+
try { return String.fromCharCode(parseInt(hex, 16)); } catch { return m; }
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74
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+
});
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75
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+
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76
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+
// Layer 6: rm obfuscation — rm -r -f, rm --recursive --force, /bin/rm, /sbin/rm
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77
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+
// Normalize rm flags: -r -f, -fr, -rf, -Rf, --recursive --force all -> -rf
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78
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+
normalized = normalized.replace(/\brm\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*|-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*|--recursive(?:\s+--force)?)\b/i, 'rm -rf');
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79
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normalized = normalized.replace(/\brm\s+-r\s+-f\b/i, 'rm -rf');
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80
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+
normalized = normalized.replace(/\brm\s+-f\s+-r\b/i, 'rm -rf');
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81
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normalized = normalized.replace(/\brm\s+--recursive\s+--force\b/i, 'rm -rf');
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82
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+
// /bin/rm, /sbin/rm -> rm
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83
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+
normalized = normalized.replace(/(?:\/bin\/|\/sbin\/)rm\b/g, 'rm');
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84
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+
|
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85
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// Layer 7: String concatenation — r""m, r''m, r\m -> rm
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86
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// Remove quotes and backslashes between letters to detect split commands
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87
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+
normalized = normalized.replace(/([a-zA-Z])["'\\]+([a-zA-Z])/g, '$1$2');
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88
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+
|
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89
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// Layer 8: Quoted command — "rm", 'rm' -> rm
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90
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+
normalized = normalized.replace(/["']([a-z]{2,})["']/gi, (m, inner) => inner);
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91
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+
|
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92
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+
// Layer 9: Variable concatenation — ${r}m, ${RM} -> rm
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93
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+
// If there's a var assignment followed by ${var}, substitute
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94
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+
const varAssigns = {};
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95
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+
const assignPattern = /(\w+)=(["']?)([^"'\s]*)\2/g;
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96
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+
let am;
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97
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+
while ((am = assignPattern.exec(cmd)) !== null) {
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98
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varAssigns[am[1]] = am[3];
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99
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}
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100
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normalized = normalized.replace(/\$\{(\w+)\}/g, (m, name) => varAssigns[name] || m);
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101
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+
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102
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return normalized.trim();
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103
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}
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104
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+
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105
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// ─── Danger patterns (matched against BOTH raw AND normalized) ───────────
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106
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+
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107
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+
const DANGEROUS_COMMANDS = [
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108
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+
{ re: /\brm\s+-rf\b/i, reason: 'rm -rf can delete entire directory trees', severity: 'critical' },
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109
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{ re: /\brm\s+-rf\s+\/(?:\s|$)/i, reason: 'rm -rf / — catastrophic deletion of root filesystem', severity: 'critical' },
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110
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+
{ re: /\brm\s+-rf\s+~(?:\s|$|\/)/i, reason: 'rm -rf ~ — deleting home directory', severity: 'critical' },
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111
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{ re: /\brm\s+-rf\s+\.(?:\s|$)/i, reason: 'rm -rf . — deleting current directory', severity: 'critical' },
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112
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+
{ re: /\brm\s+-rf\s+\.\.(?:\s|$)/i, reason: 'rm -rf .. — deleting parent directory', severity: 'critical' },
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113
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+
{ re: /\bsudo\b/i, reason: 'sudo escalates privileges — agents should not use sudo', severity: 'high' },
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114
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+
{ re: /\bchmod\s+777\b/i, reason: 'chmod 777 grants world write — insecure', severity: 'high' },
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115
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+
{ re: /\bmkfs\b/i, reason: 'mkfs formats filesystem — destructive', severity: 'critical' },
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116
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+
{ re: /\bdd\s+if=/i, reason: 'dd can overwrite disks — destructive', severity: 'critical' },
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117
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+
{ re: /\bdd\s+.*of=\/dev\//i, reason: 'dd writing directly to device — destructive', severity: 'critical' },
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118
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+
{ re: /\bshutdown\b/i, reason: 'shutdown stops the machine', severity: 'critical' },
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119
|
+
{ re: /\breboot\b/i, reason: 'reboot restarts the machine', severity: 'critical' },
|
|
120
|
+
{ re: /\bhalt\b/i, reason: 'halt stops the machine', severity: 'critical' },
|
|
121
|
+
{ re: /\bpoweroff\b/i, reason: 'poweroff stops the machine', severity: 'critical' },
|
|
122
|
+
{ re: /:\s*\(\s*\)\s*\{\s*:\s*\|\s*:\s*&\s*\}\s*;/i, reason: 'fork bomb detected', severity: 'critical' },
|
|
123
|
+
{ re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*\|\s*(?:sh|bash|zsh)\b/i, reason: 'curl|sh — remote code execution via pipe to shell', severity: 'critical' },
|
|
124
|
+
{ re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*(?:169\.254\.169\.254|metadata\.google\.internal)/i, reason: 'cloud metadata service access — credential theft', severity: 'critical' },
|
|
125
|
+
{ re: /\bnc\s+-l/i, reason: 'nc -l opens a listener — reverse shell risk', severity: 'high' },
|
|
126
|
+
{ re: /\b(?:python|python3|node|ruby|perl)\s+-c\s+['"]\s*(?:import|require)\s+(?:os|subprocess|child_process)/i, reason: 'inline script importing OS modules — potential injection', severity: 'high' },
|
|
127
|
+
{ re: /\bkill(?:\s+-9)?\s+-1\b/i, reason: 'kill -1 kills all processes — system-wide kill', severity: 'critical' },
|
|
128
|
+
{ re: /\bpkill\s+-9\b/i, reason: 'pkill -9 force kills processes — destructive', severity: 'high' },
|
|
129
|
+
{ re: /\biotop\s+--only\b/i, reason: 'iotop in batch mode can cause system instability', severity: 'low' },
|
|
130
|
+
// Anti-evasion: base64 pipe to shell
|
|
131
|
+
{ re: /\|\s*(?:base64|b64)\s+-d\s*\|/i, reason: 'base64 decode piped to shell — obfuscated command execution', severity: 'critical' },
|
|
132
|
+
{ re: /\|\s*(?:sh|bash|zsh|python|python3|node|perl|ruby)\b/i, reason: 'piping to interpreter — potential remote code execution', severity: 'high' },
|
|
133
|
+
];
|
|
134
|
+
|
|
135
|
+
const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
|
|
136
|
+
{ re: /\bsk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/i, type: 'OpenAI API key' },
|
|
137
|
+
{ re: /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/i, type: 'Anthropic API key' },
|
|
138
|
+
{ re: /\bsk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\b/i, type: 'Stripe secret key' },
|
|
139
|
+
{ re: /\bAKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/, type: 'AWS access key' },
|
|
140
|
+
{ re: /\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\b/i, type: 'GitHub token' },
|
|
141
|
+
{ re: /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/i, type: 'GitLab token' },
|
|
142
|
+
{ re: /\bxox[bpoa]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/i, type: 'Slack token' },
|
|
143
|
+
{ re: /-----BEGIN\s+(?:RSA\s+|EC\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY-----/i, type: 'Private key' },
|
|
144
|
+
];
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
const SENSITIVE_PATHS = [
|
|
147
|
+
/\.env\b/i,
|
|
148
|
+
/\.ssh\b/i,
|
|
149
|
+
/\.aws\b/i,
|
|
150
|
+
/\.gnupg\b/i,
|
|
151
|
+
/\.npmrc\b/i,
|
|
152
|
+
/\.gitconfig\b/i,
|
|
153
|
+
/\/etc\/passwd/i,
|
|
154
|
+
/\/etc\/shadow/i,
|
|
155
|
+
/\/etc\/sudoers/i,
|
|
156
|
+
/\/etc\/ssh\//i,
|
|
157
|
+
/~\/\.ssh\//i,
|
|
158
|
+
];
|
|
159
|
+
|
|
160
|
+
const EXFIL_PATTERNS = [
|
|
161
|
+
{ re: /\b(?:curl|wget|nc|netcat)\b.*(?:\bapi\.|webhook|callback|exfil|upload|send)/i, reason: 'Potential data exfiltration via network tool to external endpoint' },
|
|
162
|
+
{ re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*-d\s.*(?:token|key|password|secret|credential)/i, reason: 'Sending secrets via curl/wget POST data' },
|
|
163
|
+
{ re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*--data\b.*(?:token|key|password|secret|credential)/i, reason: 'Sending secrets via curl/wget --data' },
|
|
164
|
+
{ re: /\b(?:scp|rsync)\b.*@(?:\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})/i, reason: 'File transfer to raw IP — potential exfiltration' },
|
|
165
|
+
{ re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*-F\s.*(?:token|key|password|secret)/i, reason: 'Sending secrets via curl/wget multipart form' },
|
|
166
|
+
];
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
// ─── Main check function ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
169
|
+
|
|
170
|
+
function checkCommand(cmd) {
|
|
171
|
+
if (!cmd || typeof cmd !== 'string') return { blocked: false, allowed: true };
|
|
172
|
+
const trimmed = cmd.trim();
|
|
173
|
+
|
|
174
|
+
// Skip empty lines and comments
|
|
175
|
+
if (!trimmed || trimmed.startsWith('#')) return { blocked: false, allowed: true };
|
|
176
|
+
|
|
177
|
+
// Normalize for anti-evasion
|
|
178
|
+
const normalized = normalizeCommand(trimmed);
|
|
179
|
+
|
|
180
|
+
// Check BOTH the raw command AND the normalized version
|
|
181
|
+
const inputs = [trimmed, normalized];
|
|
182
|
+
const violations = [];
|
|
183
|
+
const seen = new Set(); // dedupe violations across raw + normalized
|
|
184
|
+
|
|
185
|
+
for (const input of inputs) {
|
|
186
|
+
// 1. Dangerous commands
|
|
187
|
+
for (const { re, reason, severity } of DANGEROUS_COMMANDS) {
|
|
188
|
+
if (re.test(input)) {
|
|
189
|
+
const key = reason;
|
|
190
|
+
if (!seen.has(key)) {
|
|
191
|
+
seen.add(key);
|
|
192
|
+
violations.push({ type: 'dangerous_command', reason, severity, pattern: re.source });
|
|
193
|
+
}
|
|
194
|
+
}
|
|
195
|
+
}
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
197
|
+
// 2. Secret exfiltration
|
|
198
|
+
for (const { re, reason } of EXFIL_PATTERNS) {
|
|
199
|
+
if (re.test(input)) {
|
|
200
|
+
const key = reason;
|
|
201
|
+
if (!seen.has(key)) {
|
|
202
|
+
seen.add(key);
|
|
203
|
+
violations.push({ type: 'exfiltration', reason, severity: 'high', pattern: re.source });
|
|
204
|
+
}
|
|
205
|
+
}
|
|
206
|
+
}
|
|
207
|
+
|
|
208
|
+
// 3. Secrets in command
|
|
209
|
+
for (const { re, type } of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
|
|
210
|
+
if (re.test(input)) {
|
|
211
|
+
const key = type;
|
|
212
|
+
if (!seen.has(key)) {
|
|
213
|
+
seen.add(key);
|
|
214
|
+
violations.push({ type: 'secret_exposure', reason: `Secret detected in command: ${type}`, severity: 'critical', pattern: re.source });
|
|
215
|
+
}
|
|
216
|
+
}
|
|
217
|
+
}
|
|
218
|
+
|
|
219
|
+
// 4. Sensitive file access
|
|
220
|
+
for (const re of SENSITIVE_PATHS) {
|
|
221
|
+
if (re.test(input)) {
|
|
222
|
+
const match = input.match(re)[0];
|
|
223
|
+
const key = 'path:' + match;
|
|
224
|
+
if (!seen.has(key)) {
|
|
225
|
+
seen.add(key);
|
|
226
|
+
violations.push({ type: 'sensitive_path', reason: `Access to sensitive path: ${match}`, severity: 'high', pattern: re.source });
|
|
227
|
+
}
|
|
228
|
+
}
|
|
229
|
+
}
|
|
230
|
+
}
|
|
231
|
+
|
|
232
|
+
// 5. Prompt injection in shell (e.g., agent putting LLM output into eval)
|
|
233
|
+
for (const input of inputs) {
|
|
234
|
+
if (/\beval\s+["'].*(?:ignore|disregard|forget|system prompt)/i.test(input)) {
|
|
235
|
+
violations.push({ type: 'prompt_injection', reason: 'eval with prompt injection pattern — agent may be compromised', severity: 'critical' });
|
|
236
|
+
break;
|
|
237
|
+
}
|
|
238
|
+
}
|
|
239
|
+
|
|
240
|
+
// 6. Obfuscation detection — flag suspicious patterns even if we can't decode them
|
|
241
|
+
if (/[a-zA-Z]\[([0-9a-f]{1,2})\]/i.test(trimmed)) {
|
|
242
|
+
violations.push({ type: 'obfuscation', reason: 'Bash escape sequence $\'\\xNN\' detected — possible command obfuscation', severity: 'high' });
|
|
243
|
+
}
|
|
244
|
+
if (trimmed.includes('eval ') && trimmed.includes('$((')) {
|
|
245
|
+
violations.push({ type: 'obfuscation', reason: 'eval with arithmetic expansion — possible obfuscation', severity: 'high' });
|
|
246
|
+
}
|
|
247
|
+
|
|
248
|
+
if (violations.length === 0) return { blocked: false, allowed: true };
|
|
249
|
+
|
|
250
|
+
return {
|
|
251
|
+
blocked: true,
|
|
252
|
+
allowed: false,
|
|
253
|
+
violations,
|
|
254
|
+
reason: violations[0].reason,
|
|
255
|
+
severity: violations[0].severity,
|
|
256
|
+
command: trimmed.slice(0, 200),
|
|
257
|
+
normalized: normalized !== trimmed ? normalized.slice(0, 200) : undefined,
|
|
258
|
+
};
|
|
259
|
+
}
|
|
260
|
+
|
|
261
|
+
// ─── Batch check (for scripts) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
262
|
+
|
|
263
|
+
function checkScript(content) {
|
|
264
|
+
if (!content || typeof content !== 'string') return { blocked: false, findings: [] };
|
|
265
|
+
const lines = content.split(/\r?\n/);
|
|
266
|
+
const findings = [];
|
|
267
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
|
|
268
|
+
const result = checkCommand(lines[i]);
|
|
269
|
+
if (result.blocked) {
|
|
270
|
+
findings.push({ line: i + 1, ...result });
|
|
271
|
+
}
|
|
272
|
+
}
|
|
273
|
+
return { blocked: findings.length > 0, findings };
|
|
274
|
+
}
|
|
275
|
+
|
|
276
|
+
module.exports = { checkCommand, checkScript, normalizeCommand, DANGEROUS_COMMANDS, SECRET_PATTERNS, SENSITIVE_PATHS, EXFIL_PATTERNS };
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# VibeGuard preexec hook for PowerShell.
|
|
2
|
+
# Installed by `vibeguard auto` or `vibeguard install-shell-hook`.
|
|
3
|
+
# Scans every command BEFORE it runs. Blocks dangerous commands.
|
|
4
|
+
#
|
|
5
|
+
# POLICY: default-allow. Only block when checkCommand returns blocked=true.
|
|
6
|
+
# If VibeGuard cannot load (missing module, node error), ALLOW the command.
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
function Invoke-VibeGuardCheck {
|
|
9
|
+
param([string]$Command)
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
# Override bypass
|
|
12
|
+
if ($env:VG_OVERRIDE -eq "1") { return $true }
|
|
13
|
+
if (-not $Command -or $Command.Trim() -eq "") { return $true }
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
# Find shell-guard.js — try multiple paths
|
|
16
|
+
$vgPaths = @()
|
|
17
|
+
if ($VG_SCRIPT_DIR) { $vgPaths += Join-Path $VG_SCRIPT_DIR "shell-guard.js" }
|
|
18
|
+
try { $vgPaths += Join-Path (npm root -g 2>$null) "@yagyeshvyas\vibeguard\src\shell-guard.js" } catch {}
|
|
19
|
+
$vgPaths += Join-Path $PSScriptRoot "shell-guard.js"
|
|
20
|
+
$vgPaths += Join-Path $env:APPDATA "npm\node_modules\@yagyeshvyas\vibeguard\src\shell-guard.js"
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
$vgGuard = $null
|
|
23
|
+
foreach ($p in $vgPaths) {
|
|
24
|
+
if ($p -and (Test-Path $p)) { $vgGuard = $p; break }
|
|
25
|
+
}
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
27
|
+
# FAIL OPEN: if we can't find shell-guard.js, allow the command
|
|
28
|
+
if (-not $vgGuard) { return $true }
|
|
29
|
+
|
|
30
|
+
try {
|
|
31
|
+
$output = node -e "
|
|
32
|
+
try {
|
|
33
|
+
const { checkCommand } = require('$vgGuard');
|
|
34
|
+
const r = checkCommand(process.argv[1]);
|
|
35
|
+
if (r.blocked) {
|
|
36
|
+
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(r));
|
|
37
|
+
process.exit(1);
|
|
38
|
+
}
|
|
39
|
+
} catch(e) {
|
|
40
|
+
process.exit(0);
|
|
41
|
+
}
|
|
42
|
+
" $Command 2>$null
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 1 -and $output) {
|
|
45
|
+
$info = $output | ConvertFrom-Json
|
|
46
|
+
Write-Host ""
|
|
47
|
+
Write-Host " [VibeGuard] BLOCKED: $($Command.Substring(0, [Math]::Min(100, $Command.Length)))" -ForegroundColor Red
|
|
48
|
+
Write-Host " Reason: $($info.reason)" -ForegroundColor Red
|
|
49
|
+
Write-Host " Severity: $($info.severity)" -ForegroundColor Red
|
|
50
|
+
Write-Host ""
|
|
51
|
+
Write-Host " Override: `$env:VG_OVERRIDE=1" -ForegroundColor Yellow
|
|
52
|
+
Write-Host ""
|
|
53
|
+
return $false
|
|
54
|
+
}
|
|
55
|
+
} catch {
|
|
56
|
+
# FAIL OPEN: any error means allow
|
|
57
|
+
}
|
|
58
|
+
return $true
|
|
59
|
+
}
|
|
60
|
+
|
|
61
|
+
# Use PSReadLine to intercept Enter key
|
|
62
|
+
if (Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name PSReadLine) {
|
|
63
|
+
Set-PSReadLineKeyHandler -Key Enter -ScriptBlock {
|
|
64
|
+
param($key, $arg)
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
$line = $null
|
|
67
|
+
$cursor = $null
|
|
68
|
+
[Microsoft.PowerShell.PSConsoleReadLine]::GetBufferState([ref]$line, [ref]$cursor)
|
|
69
|
+
|
|
70
|
+
if (-not $line -or $line.Trim() -eq "") {
|
|
71
|
+
[Microsoft.PowerShell.PSConsoleReadLine]::AcceptLine()
|
|
72
|
+
return
|
|
73
|
+
}
|
|
74
|
+
|
|
75
|
+
# Override bypass
|
|
76
|
+
if ($env:VG_OVERRIDE -eq "1") {
|
|
77
|
+
[Microsoft.PowerShell.PSConsoleReadLine]::AcceptLine()
|
|
78
|
+
return
|
|
79
|
+
}
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
81
|
+
# Find shell-guard.js
|
|
82
|
+
$vgPaths = @()
|
|
83
|
+
if ($VG_SCRIPT_DIR) { $vgPaths += Join-Path $VG_SCRIPT_DIR "shell-guard.js" }
|
|
84
|
+
try { $vgPaths += Join-Path (npm root -g 2>$null) "@yagyeshvyas\vibeguard\src\shell-guard.js" } catch {}
|
|
85
|
+
$vgPaths += Join-Path $PSScriptRoot "shell-guard.js"
|
|
86
|
+
$vgPaths += Join-Path $env:APPDATA "npm\node_modules\@yagyeshvyas\vibeguard\src\shell-guard.js"
|
|
87
|
+
|
|
88
|
+
$vgGuard = $null
|
|
89
|
+
foreach ($p in $vgPaths) {
|
|
90
|
+
if ($p -and (Test-Path $p)) { $vgGuard = $p; break }
|
|
91
|
+
}
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
# FAIL OPEN: if we can't find it, allow
|
|
94
|
+
if (-not $vgGuard) {
|
|
95
|
+
[Microsoft.PowerShell.PSConsoleReadLine]::AcceptLine()
|
|
96
|
+
return
|
|
97
|
+
}
|
|
98
|
+
|
|
99
|
+
$blocked = $false
|
|
100
|
+
try {
|
|
101
|
+
$output = node -e "
|
|
102
|
+
try {
|
|
103
|
+
const { checkCommand } = require('$vgGuard');
|
|
104
|
+
const r = checkCommand(process.argv[1]);
|
|
105
|
+
if (r.blocked) {
|
|
106
|
+
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(r));
|
|
107
|
+
process.exit(1);
|
|
108
|
+
}
|
|
109
|
+
} catch(e) {
|
|
110
|
+
process.exit(0);
|
|
111
|
+
}
|
|
112
|
+
" $line 2>$null
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 1 -and $output) {
|
|
115
|
+
$blocked = $true
|
|
116
|
+
$info = $output | ConvertFrom-Json
|
|
117
|
+
Write-Host ""
|
|
118
|
+
Write-Host " [VibeGuard] BLOCKED: $($line.Substring(0, [Math]::Min(100, $line.Length)))" -ForegroundColor Red
|
|
119
|
+
Write-Host " Reason: $($info.reason)" -ForegroundColor Red
|
|
120
|
+
Write-Host " Severity: $($info.severity)" -ForegroundColor Red
|
|
121
|
+
Write-Host ""
|
|
122
|
+
Write-Host " Override: `$env:VG_OVERRIDE=1" -ForegroundColor Yellow
|
|
123
|
+
Write-Host ""
|
|
124
|
+
[Microsoft.PowerShell.PSConsoleReadLine]::RevertLine()
|
|
125
|
+
return
|
|
126
|
+
}
|
|
127
|
+
} catch {
|
|
128
|
+
# FAIL OPEN
|
|
129
|
+
}
|
|
130
|
+
|
|
131
|
+
if (-not $blocked) {
|
|
132
|
+
[Microsoft.PowerShell.PSConsoleReadLine]::AcceptLine()
|
|
133
|
+
}
|
|
134
|
+
}
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
2
|
+
# VibeGuard preexec hook for bash/zsh.
|
|
3
|
+
# Installed by `vibeguard auto` or `vibeguard install-shell-hook`.
|
|
4
|
+
# Scans every command BEFORE it runs. Blocks dangerous commands.
|
|
5
|
+
#
|
|
6
|
+
# POLICY: default-allow. Only block when checkCommand returns blocked=true.
|
|
7
|
+
# If VibeGuard cannot load (missing module, node error), ALLOW the command.
|
|
8
|
+
# A guard that bricks the terminal is worse than no guard.
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
__vibeguard_check() {
|
|
11
|
+
local cmd="$1"
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
# Override bypass
|
|
14
|
+
if [ -n "$VG_OVERRIDE" ]; then return 0; fi
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
16
|
+
# Find shell-guard.js — try multiple paths
|
|
17
|
+
local vg_guard=""
|
|
18
|
+
for p in \
|
|
19
|
+
"$VG_SCRIPT_DIR/shell-guard.js" \
|
|
20
|
+
"$(npm root -g 2>/dev/null)/vibeguard/src/shell-guard.js" \
|
|
21
|
+
"$(dirname "$(readlink -f "$BASH_SOURCE" 2>/dev/null || echo "$0")")/shell-guard.js" \
|
|
22
|
+
"$HOME/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/vibeguard/src/shell-guard.js" \
|
|
23
|
+
"/usr/local/lib/node_modules/vibeguard/src/shell-guard.js" \
|
|
24
|
+
"/usr/lib/node_modules/vibeguard/src/shell-guard.js"; do
|
|
25
|
+
if [ -f "$p" ]; then vg_guard="$p"; break; fi
|
|
26
|
+
done
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
# FAIL OPEN: if we can't find shell-guard.js, allow the command
|
|
29
|
+
if [ -z "$vg_guard" ]; then return 0; fi
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
# Run checkCommand — only block on explicit blocked=true
|
|
32
|
+
local output
|
|
33
|
+
output=$(node -e "
|
|
34
|
+
try {
|
|
35
|
+
const { checkCommand } = require('$vg_guard');
|
|
36
|
+
const r = checkCommand(process.argv[1]);
|
|
37
|
+
if (r.blocked) {
|
|
38
|
+
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(r));
|
|
39
|
+
process.exit(1);
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
41
|
+
} catch(e) {
|
|
42
|
+
// FAIL OPEN: any error means allow
|
|
43
|
+
process.exit(0);
|
|
44
|
+
}
|
|
45
|
+
" "$cmd" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
46
|
+
|
|
47
|
+
local exitcode=$?
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
# Exit 0 = allowed, exit 1 = blocked (with JSON on stdout)
|
|
50
|
+
if [ $exitcode -eq 1 ] && [ -n "$output" ]; then
|
|
51
|
+
echo ""
|
|
52
|
+
echo -e " \033[31m[VibeGuard] BLOCKED:\033[0m \033[1m${cmd:0:100}\033[0m"
|
|
53
|
+
echo "$output" | node -e "
|
|
54
|
+
try {
|
|
55
|
+
const d = JSON.parse(require('fs').readFileSync(0,'utf8'));
|
|
56
|
+
console.log(' \033[31mReason:\033[0m ' + (d.reason || 'unknown'));
|
|
57
|
+
console.log(' \033[31mSeverity:\033[0m ' + (d.severity || 'unknown'));
|
|
58
|
+
} catch(e) {
|
|
59
|
+
console.log(' \033[31mReason:\033[0m blocked by VibeGuard');
|
|
60
|
+
}
|
|
61
|
+
" 2>/dev/null
|
|
62
|
+
echo ""
|
|
63
|
+
echo -e " \033[33mOverride:\033[0m VG_OVERRIDE=1 <command>"
|
|
64
|
+
echo ""
|
|
65
|
+
return 1
|
|
66
|
+
fi
|
|
67
|
+
|
|
68
|
+
# Exit 0 or empty output = allowed (fail open)
|
|
69
|
+
return 0
|
|
70
|
+
}
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
# bash: use DEBUG trap
|
|
73
|
+
if [ -n "$BASH_VERSION" ]; then
|
|
74
|
+
__vibeguard_preexec() {
|
|
75
|
+
if ! __vibeguard_check "$BASH_COMMAND"; then
|
|
76
|
+
return 1
|
|
77
|
+
fi
|
|
78
|
+
}
|
|
79
|
+
trap '__vibeguard_preexec' DEBUG
|
|
80
|
+
fi
|
|
81
|
+
|
|
82
|
+
# zsh: use preexec hook
|
|
83
|
+
if [ -n "$ZSH_VERSION" ]; then
|
|
84
|
+
__vibeguard_zsh_preexec() {
|
|
85
|
+
if ! __vibeguard_check "$1"; then
|
|
86
|
+
return 1
|
|
87
|
+
fi
|
|
88
|
+
}
|
|
89
|
+
preexec_functions+=(__vibeguard_zsh_preexec)
|
|
90
|
+
fi
|