@yagni-app/code-staging 0.3.0-staging.1079.1 → 0.3.0-staging.1081.1

package/dist/extension/redact.js

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * Heuristic secret redaction for Guardian storage events (YAG-510).
+ *
+ * Applied client-side, BEFORE anything leaves the machine, to both the
+ * command and the Guardian rationale (which routinely quotes the command) —
+ * and only on the raw storage tier; the base tier never transmits either.
+ *
+ * Honest scope: this catches the obvious, well-known secret shapes. A secret
+ * in a novel shape gets through — which is why raw-tier storage is an
+ * explicit-consent, per-workspace opt-in and never a default.
+ *
+ * Pure, no external deps (bundling constraint — see execPolicy.ts header).
+ */
+const REDACTED = "[REDACTED]";
+/** Exactly 40 hex chars = a git SHA; keep those readable for analysis. */
+function isGitSha(token) {
+    return /^[0-9a-f]{40}$/i.test(token);
+}
+const RULES = [
+    // Known token shapes (provider-prefixed credentials).
+    { re: /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g },
+    { re: /\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/g },
+    { re: /\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/g },
+    { re: /\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b/g },
+    { re: /\bxox[bpsaro]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/g },
+    { re: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,}(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)?\b/g }, // JWT
+    { re: /\bglsa_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/g },
+    { re: /\b(?:fly|glpat|npm)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b/g },
+    // Authorization headers: keep the scheme, redact the credential.
+    { re: /\b(Authorization:\s*(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\s+)[^\s"']+/gi, keepGroup1: true },
+    // key=value / --key value / --key=value with a secret-shaped key.
+    {
+        re: /((?:--?[A-Za-z0-9_-]*)?(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key|auth)[A-Za-z0-9_-]*\s*[=\s]\s*)[^\s"']+/gi,
+        keepGroup1: true,
+    },
+    // user:pass@ in URLs — redact the password only.
+    { re: /(\/\/[^\s/:@"']+:)[^\s@"']+(?=@)/g, keepGroup1: true },
+];
+/** High-entropy runs: 32+ base64/hex chars — except exact git SHAs. */
+const LONG_RUN_RE = /[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{32,}/g;
+/**
+ * Redact known secret shapes from a command or rationale string. Structure
+ * is preserved (only matched values become [REDACTED]) so the redacted text
+ * stays analyzable.
+ */
+export function redactCommand(text) {
+    let out = text;
+    for (const rule of RULES) {
+        out = out.replace(rule.re, (match, g1) => rule.keepGroup1 && typeof g1 === "string" ? `${g1}${REDACTED}` : REDACTED);
+    }
+    out = out.replace(LONG_RUN_RE, (match) => {
+        if (isGitSha(match))
+            return match;
+        if (match === REDACTED.slice(1, -1))
+            return match;
+        // Plain long words (paths, flags already handled above) that are all
+        // lowercase letters are more likely English than entropy; keep them.
+        if (/^[a-z]+$/.test(match) || /^[A-Z]+$/.test(match))
+            return match;
+        return REDACTED;
+    });
+    return out;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=redact.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@yagni-app/code-staging",
-  "version": "0.3.0-staging.1079.1",
+  "version": "0.3.0-staging.1081.1",
   "description": "YAGNI Code: a terminal coding agent that already knows your company. One YAGNI login routes the model and grounds the agent in your team's context.",
   "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
   "author": "YAGNI, Inc. <jack@yagni.app> (https://yagni.app)",
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@
     "@earendil-works/pi-tui": "0.84.1",
     "typebox": "^1.3.11"
   },
-  "yagniSourceSha": "a542e64e336db6c91e55455e9eb5d4cb584e012b"
+  "yagniSourceSha": "dd068fdb7b8bcb1207ff4f2fe803bf26b2e3eec3"
 }