@xzzpig/pi-subagents 0.15.1 → 0.16.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
1
1
  # Changelog
2
2
 
3
+ ## [0.16.0] - 2026-09-22
4
+
5
+ ### Changed
6
+
7
+ - **A child in a subdirectory of a trusted project inherits the sandbox trust
8
+ stamp** (OpenSpec change `add-project-scoped-profiles`). The launcher's
9
+ `PI_SUBAGENT_SANDBOX_PROJECT_TRUSTED` emission (`hasTrustedProfileProjectCwd`)
10
+ now treats a child cwd equal to or a descendant of the parent session's
11
+ trusted project cwd as trusted, matching the platform's
12
+ `findNearestTrustEntry` ancestor semantics, so a project's sandbox-profile
13
+ definitions apply from any subdirectory of a trusted project root instead of
14
+ only from the exact root cwd. The selection-side `projectScopedProfileTrustError`
15
+ guard keeps its exact-cwd matching unchanged.
16
+
3
17
  ## [0.15.1] - 2026-09-19
4
18
 
5
19
  ### Changed
package/docs/agents.md CHANGED
@@ -345,8 +345,8 @@ Field notes:
345
345
  | `allowNestedSubagents` | Set `true` to authorize the child-safe nested `subagent` runtime without making omitted `tools` an allowlist. Inherited depth and capability ceilings remain authoritative. |
346
346
  | `extensions` | Omitted means a background child loads the parent's ambient extensions; empty means no ambient extensions; list values load exactly those extensions. Foreground children never load ambient extensions, so for them only listed values apply. |
347
347
  | `subagentOnlyExtensions` | Extension paths loaded only in this agent's child sessions. Tools registered there are unavailable to the main agent unless also installed through normal Pi extension configuration. |
348
- | `sandbox` | Optional named `pi-sandbox` profile for a native Pi child. It must be a non-empty safe name defined in the user's global `<agentDir>/sandbox.json`; it is a selector only, never an inline network or filesystem policy. |
349
- | `permission-profile` | Optional named permission profile for a native Pi child. The name must be a non-empty safe identifier defined in the global `pi-permission-system` config's `profiles` registry; only the validated name is passed to the child. See [Permission profiles](fork-extensions.md#permission-profiles). |
348
+ | `sandbox` | Optional named `pi-sandbox` profile for a native Pi child. It must be a non-empty safe name defined in the global `<agentDir>/sandbox.json` or, when the project is trusted, in `<cwd>/.pi/sandbox.json`; it is a selector only, never an inline network or filesystem policy. |
349
+ | `permission-profile` | Optional named permission profile for a native Pi child. The name must be a non-empty safe identifier defined in the global `pi-permission-system` config's `profiles` registry or, when the project is trusted, in the project config's registry; only the validated name is passed to the child. See [Permission profiles](fork-extensions.md#permission-profiles). |
350
350
  | `model` | Default model. Bare ids prefer the current provider when possible, then unique registry matches. |
351
351
  | `thinking` | Appended as a `:level` suffix at runtime unless a suffix is already present. |
352
352
  | `systemPromptMode` | `replace` by default; `append` keeps Pi's base prompt. |
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ files stay byte-identical to upstream.
8
8
  ## Sandbox profiles
9
9
 
10
10
  Use `sandbox: <profile-name>` only for a native Pi child. The profile is resolved
11
- from the global `pi-sandbox` configuration, never from an agent file or a project
12
- profile registry:
11
+ from the global `pi-sandbox` configuration and, when the project is trusted,
12
+ from the project `.pi/sandbox.json` registry — never from an agent file:
13
13
 
14
14
  ```yaml
15
15
  ---
@@ -37,24 +37,28 @@ failure and never excludes the model from later runs.
37
37
  The field is rejected for `external-cli` and `external-job` runners because they
38
38
  do not host a Pi child extension. It also cannot be an object, `false`, an empty
39
39
  value, or an inline allow/deny policy. Define the actual network and filesystem
40
- rules in global `pi-sandbox` `profiles` instead.
40
+ rules in `pi-sandbox` `profiles` (global, or trusted project) instead.
41
41
 
42
42
  A profile chosen by a project-scoped agent or project override is used only when
43
43
  the host marks that project trusted. Otherwise the launch reports an actionable
44
- trust error. In a headless child, accesses outside the profile's preconfigured
45
- network/read/write rules are blocked; pi-sandbox does not use Permission System
46
- or supervisor forwarding to ask the parent for an approval. See
44
+ trust error. A project's own profile definitions likewise participate only for a
45
+ trusted project; an untrusted project's `profiles` registry is ignored with a
46
+ warning and never fails the launch. In a headless child, accesses outside the
47
+ profile's preconfigured network/read/write rules are blocked; pi-sandbox does not
48
+ use Permission System or supervisor forwarding to ask the parent for an approval.
49
+ See
47
50
  [`pi-sandbox`'s README](https://github.com/xzzpig/pi-extensions/tree/main/packages/pi-sandbox#named-profiles-for-subagents)
48
51
  for profile inheritance and merge rules.
49
52
 
50
53
  ## Permission profiles
51
54
 
52
55
  Use `permission-profile: <name>` to select a named policy profile from the
53
- **global-only** `profiles` registry in `pi-permission-system`'s config
54
- (`<agentDir>/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json`). It is a selector
55
- only — the actual rules (tool scalars, `bash`/`mcp`/`skill`/`external_directory`
56
- pattern maps, `'*'` fallback) live in that registry and always resolve from the
57
- child's own global config:
56
+ `profiles` registry in `pi-permission-system`'s config — the global file
57
+ (`<agentDir>/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json`) and, when the project
58
+ is trusted, the project file (`<cwd>/.pi/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json`).
59
+ It is a selector only — the actual rules (tool scalars, `bash`/`mcp`/`skill`/`external_directory`
60
+ pattern maps, `'*'` fallback) live in those registries and always resolve from the
61
+ child's own configuration:
58
62
 
59
63
  ```yaml
60
64
  ---
@@ -72,8 +76,8 @@ installed `pi-permission-system` extension into the child launch even when
72
76
  `extensions` is an explicit allowlist, so the child's permission system applies
73
77
  the selected profile. The env channel carries a bare validated name — raw
74
78
  policy is never transmitted — and the rules are always read from the child's
75
- own global config, so the profile means the same policy regardless of which
76
- host launches the agent. Selection precedence inside the permission system is
79
+ own config, so the profile means the same policy regardless of which host
80
+ launches the agent. Selection precedence inside the permission system is
77
81
  env > project agent file > global agent file.
78
82
 
79
83
  The launch fails closed when a profile is declared but `pi-permission-system`
@@ -88,8 +92,12 @@ its pre-change behavior exactly.
88
92
  The profile merges between the project config and the agent's own `permission:`
89
93
  block: patterns the profile does not mention keep the lower scopes' rules
90
94
  (global denies survive), and `permission:` overrides the profile per pattern.
91
- A profile selected by a **project** agent file participates only when the host
92
- marks that project trusted.
95
+ A same-named global and trusted-project profile merge per pattern (origins
96
+ `profile-global` / `profile-project`), so a global denial the project profile
97
+ does not mention survives. A profile selected by a **project** agent file
98
+ participates only when the host marks that project trusted; a project's
99
+ profile definitions are likewise applied only for a trusted project, and an
100
+ untrusted project's registry is ignored with a warning.
93
101
 
94
102
  ## Context injection
95
103
 
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@xzzpig/pi-subagents",
3
- "version": "0.15.1",
3
+ "version": "0.16.0",
4
4
  "description": "Pi extension for single-agent delegation and scripted multi-agent workflows",
5
5
  "author": "Nico Bailon",
6
6
  "license": "MIT",
@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ export interface ProfileLaunchEnvInput {
30
30
  permissionProfile?: string;
31
31
  /** Parent-authoritative trust state for profile-aware project config merging. */
32
32
  projectTrusted?: boolean;
33
- /** Exact trusted parent cwd; profile project config applies only when the child cwd matches it. */
33
+ /** Trusted project cwd; profile project config applies when the child cwd is within it
34
+ * (equal or a subdirectory), mirroring the platform's ancestor-inheriting trust decisions. */
34
35
  trustedProjectCwd?: string;
35
36
  host: "parent" | "runner";
36
37
  }
@@ -48,7 +49,14 @@ export interface ProfileLaunchEnv {
48
49
 
49
50
  function hasTrustedProfileProjectCwd(input: Pick<ProfileLaunchEnvInput, "cwd" | "projectTrusted" | "trustedProjectCwd">): boolean {
50
51
  if (input.projectTrusted !== true || !input.cwd || !input.trustedProjectCwd) return false;
51
- return path.resolve(input.cwd) === path.resolve(input.trustedProjectCwd);
52
+ // Platform trust is ancestor-inheriting (findNearestTrustEntry walks up from
53
+ // the child cwd): a child launched anywhere inside the trusted project tree —
54
+ // the project root or any subdirectory — inherits the trust decision observed
55
+ // at the trusted project cwd, so its project config participates without a
56
+ // separate trust decision (spec: 子目录启动继承信任).
57
+ const trusted = path.resolve(input.trustedProjectCwd);
58
+ const child = path.resolve(input.cwd);
59
+ return child === trusted || child.startsWith(`${trusted}${path.sep}`);
52
60
  }
53
61
 
54
62
  export function buildProfileLaunchEnv(input: ProfileLaunchEnvInput, toolPlan: Pick<PiLaunchToolPlan, "sandboxExtension">): ProfileLaunchEnv {