@xyne/workflow-sdk 2.1.1 → 2.2.0

package/dist/types/resume-payload.js

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * ResumePayload — the unified shape for resuming a paused execution.
- *
- * One contract for every pause type:
- * - Mid-execution agent pauses (tool approval, input required, user interrupted)
- * - Review gates (`onComplete: 'review'`)
- *
- * The router validates incoming bodies into this shape; persistence stores it
- * verbatim; the executor and step `onResume` handlers consume it.
- */
-export {};
-//# sourceMappingURL=resume-payload.js.map

package/dist/types/resume-payload.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/util/executable-check.d.ts

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Executable upload safety check.
- *
- * Allow-by-default with a deny-list of known dangerous types — covers the
- * common attack surface (native binaries, scripts that auto-run, installers,
- * macro-enabled Office docs) without forcing workflow authors to enumerate
- * every safe MIME type.
- *
- * Two checks run in parallel so spoofed MIME types alone can't bypass:
- *   1. MIME type matches the deny-list
- *   2. Filename extension matches the deny-list
- *
- * Either match blocks the upload. To accept executables (e.g. a security-
- * analysis workflow that intentionally examines binaries), the host opts
- * in via `RuntimeOptions.allowExecutableUploads = true`.
- */
-/**
- * MIME types treated as executable / unsafe (lowercase — input is also
- * lowercased before comparison).
- */
-export declare const BLOCKED_EXECUTABLE_MIME_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string>;
-/**
- * File extensions treated as executable / unsafe (case-insensitive, no dot).
- * The check uses the LAST extension so `report.exe.txt` is treated as text
- * (Windows shows the trailing extension, which is what the user actually sees).
- */
-export declare const BLOCKED_EXECUTABLE_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string>;
-/**
- * Extract the lowercase extension (no dot) from a filename, or '' if none.
- * A leading dot doesn't count — `.bashrc` has no extension, not "bashrc".
- */
-export declare function extensionOf(name: string): string;
-/**
- * Returns a human-readable reason if the file should be blocked as
- * executable, or `null` if it's safe.
- *
- * Always check both the MIME type and the filename — clients can spoof one
- * but rarely both. This is defense-in-depth, not authoritative malware
- * detection (run real AV at the storage layer for that).
- */
-export declare function isExecutable(mimeType: string, name: string): string | null;
-//# sourceMappingURL=executable-check.d.ts.map

package/dist/util/executable-check.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/util/executable-check.js

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Executable upload safety check.
- *
- * Allow-by-default with a deny-list of known dangerous types — covers the
- * common attack surface (native binaries, scripts that auto-run, installers,
- * macro-enabled Office docs) without forcing workflow authors to enumerate
- * every safe MIME type.
- *
- * Two checks run in parallel so spoofed MIME types alone can't bypass:
- *   1. MIME type matches the deny-list
- *   2. Filename extension matches the deny-list
- *
- * Either match blocks the upload. To accept executables (e.g. a security-
- * analysis workflow that intentionally examines binaries), the host opts
- * in via `RuntimeOptions.allowExecutableUploads = true`.
- */
-/**
- * MIME types treated as executable / unsafe (lowercase — input is also
- * lowercased before comparison).
- */
-export const BLOCKED_EXECUTABLE_MIME_TYPES = new Set([
-    // Native binaries
-    'application/x-msdownload',
-    'application/x-msdos-program',
-    'application/x-executable',
-    'application/x-mach-binary',
-    'application/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable',
-    'application/x-msi',
-    'application/x-ms-installer',
-    // Shell + Windows scripts
-    'application/x-sh',
-    'application/x-shellscript',
-    'application/x-bat',
-    'application/x-csh',
-    'application/x-cmd',
-    'application/x-msmetafile',
-    // JavaScript / ECMAScript
-    'text/javascript',
-    'application/javascript',
-    'application/ecmascript',
-    'application/x-javascript',
-    // Java / Flash
-    'application/java-archive',
-    'application/x-java-archive',
-    'application/x-java-jnlp-file',
-    'application/x-shockwave-flash',
-    // Installer / package formats that bundle executables
-    'application/vnd.android.package-archive',
-    'application/x-debian-package',
-    'application/x-rpm',
-    // Macro-enabled Office documents (lowercased — IANA tokens are case-insensitive)
-    'application/vnd.ms-word.document.macroenabled.12',
-    'application/vnd.ms-word.template.macroenabled.12',
-    'application/vnd.ms-excel.sheet.macroenabled.12',
-    'application/vnd.ms-excel.template.macroenabled.12',
-    'application/vnd.ms-excel.addin.macroenabled.12',
-    'application/vnd.ms-excel.sheet.binary.macroenabled.12',
-    'application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.presentation.macroenabled.12',
-    'application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.template.macroenabled.12',
-    'application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.addin.macroenabled.12',
-]);
-/**
- * File extensions treated as executable / unsafe (case-insensitive, no dot).
- * The check uses the LAST extension so `report.exe.txt` is treated as text
- * (Windows shows the trailing extension, which is what the user actually sees).
- */
-export const BLOCKED_EXECUTABLE_EXTENSIONS = new Set([
-    // Windows
-    'exe', 'msi', 'com', 'scr', 'cmd', 'bat', 'ps1', 'psm1',
-    'vbs', 'vbe', 'wsf', 'wsh', 'hta', 'cpl', 'lnk',
-    'dll', 'sys', 'drv', 'ocx',
-    // macOS / Unix
-    'app', 'dmg', 'pkg',
-    'sh', 'bash', 'zsh', 'fish', 'csh', 'ksh', 'command', 'tool',
-    // Java / Flash
-    'jar', 'war', 'jnlp', 'swf',
-    // Mobile installers
-    'apk', 'ipa', 'xap',
-    // Linux installers
-    'deb', 'rpm', 'run', 'bin',
-    // JavaScript (auto-executes in browser / Node contexts)
-    'js', 'mjs', 'cjs',
-    // Macro-enabled Office
-    'docm', 'dotm', 'xlsm', 'xltm', 'xlam', 'xlsb',
-    'pptm', 'potm', 'ppam', 'ppsm', 'sldm',
-]);
-/**
- * Extract the lowercase extension (no dot) from a filename, or '' if none.
- * A leading dot doesn't count — `.bashrc` has no extension, not "bashrc".
- */
-export function extensionOf(name) {
-    const dot = name.lastIndexOf('.');
-    if (dot <= 0 || dot === name.length - 1)
-        return '';
-    return name.slice(dot + 1).toLowerCase();
-}
-/**
- * Returns a human-readable reason if the file should be blocked as
- * executable, or `null` if it's safe.
- *
- * Always check both the MIME type and the filename — clients can spoof one
- * but rarely both. This is defense-in-depth, not authoritative malware
- * detection (run real AV at the storage layer for that).
- */
-export function isExecutable(mimeType, name) {
-    if (BLOCKED_EXECUTABLE_MIME_TYPES.has(mimeType.toLowerCase())) {
-        return `Executable MIME type "${mimeType}" is not allowed.`;
-    }
-    const ext = extensionOf(name);
-    if (ext && BLOCKED_EXECUTABLE_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) {
-        return `Files with .${ext} extension are not allowed.`;
-    }
-    return null;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=executable-check.js.map

package/dist/util/executable-check.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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