@xoxno/sdk-js 1.0.206 → 1.0.207

package/dist/cjs/sdk/stellar/admin.d.ts

@@ -124,9 +124,11 @@ export declare function buildStellarSetOracleToleranceTx(opts: StellarBuilderOpt
     lowerRatioBps?: number;
 }): BuiltStellarTx;
 /**
- * set_spoke_asset_flags(spoke_id, hub_asset, paused, frozen) — #[only_owner].
- * Flags-only listing edit; production callers route through the GUARDIAN-gated
- * governance forwarder (`buildStellarGovernanceSetSpokeAssetFlagsImmediateTx`).
+ * set_spoke_asset_flags(spoke_id, hub_asset, paused, frozen, no_seize) —
+ * #[only_owner]. Flags-only listing edit; production callers route through the
+ * GUARDIAN-gated governance forwarder
+ * (`buildStellarGovernanceSetSpokeAssetFlagsImmediateTx`). Every flag is a
+ * one-way ratchet here: clearing one requires the timelocked spoke-asset edit.
  */
 export declare function buildStellarSetSpokeAssetFlagsTx(opts: StellarBuilderOptions, args: {
     spokeId: number;
@@ -134,6 +136,8 @@ export declare function buildStellarSetSpokeAssetFlagsTx(opts: StellarBuilderOpt
     asset: string;
     paused: boolean;
     frozen: boolean;
+    /** Halts only the liquidation seizure leg for this listing (error 318). */
+    noSeize: boolean;
 }): BuiltStellarTx;
 /**
  * set_oracle_sanity_bounds(asset, min_wad, max_wad) — #[only_owner].

package/dist/cjs/sdk/stellar/events/id.d.ts

@@ -35,6 +35,16 @@ export declare function extractEventOrder(eventId: string): number;
 export declare function syntheticEventOrder(baseEventOrder: number, childIndex?: number): number;
 /**
  * Map a position-delta `action` symbol to its `XoxnoLendingActivity` value.
- * The tag list is authoritative in `rs-lending-xlm common/src/events.rs`.
+ * The tag list is authoritative in `rs-lending-xlm
+ * contracts/controller/src/events/mod.rs` (`PositionAction`).
+ *
+ * `liq_credit` is deliberately NOT `lendingLiquidateSeizeCollateral`. That
+ * activity renders as "Liquidated by / Liquidation", and a share-credit leg
+ * lands on the *liquidator's* receiving account, which was not liquidated —
+ * so it maps to the plain position update instead. It also keeps a
+ * protocol-wide sum over `lendingLiquidateSeizeCollateral` from
+ * double-counting the same seizure twice (gross on the liquidated account,
+ * net on the receiver). The raw `liq_credit` / `liq_seize` strings stay on
+ * the delta itself, so the two legs remain distinguishable downstream.
  */
 export declare function mapStellarPositionActivityType(action?: string): StellarLendingActivityType;

package/dist/cjs/sdk/stellar/governance.d.ts

@@ -49,10 +49,21 @@ export interface SpokeAssetArgs {
     asset: string;
     canCollateral: boolean;
     canBorrow: boolean;
-    /** ADR 0011 per-listing incident flag: blocks supply/borrow/withdraw/repay. */
+    /**
+     * ADR 0008 per-listing incident flag: blocks every *user* verb on the
+     * listing, including the debt leg of a liquidation that names this asset.
+     */
     paused: boolean;
-    /** ADR 0011 per-listing incident flag: blocks new supply/borrow, exits stay live. */
+    /** ADR 0008 per-listing incident flag: blocks new exposure, exits stay live. */
     frozen: boolean;
+    /**
+     * ADR 0008 per-listing incident flag: blocks only the liquidation *seizure*
+     * leg (`SpokeAssetSeizureHalted`, 318), and nothing else. Deliberately not
+     * folded into `paused`: seizure is pro-rata over an account's whole
+     * collateral, so gating it on a user-activity halt would turn one paused
+     * listing into a protocol-wide liquidation halt.
+     */
+    noSeize: boolean;
     ltv: number;
     threshold: number;
     bonus: number;
@@ -260,6 +271,8 @@ export interface SpokeAssetFlagsArgs {
     asset: string;
     paused: boolean;
     frozen: boolean;
+    /** Halts only the liquidation seizure leg for this listing (error 318). */
+    noSeize: boolean;
 }
 export interface OracleSanityBoundsArgs {
     asset: string;
@@ -269,10 +282,14 @@ export interface OracleSanityBoundsArgs {
     maxPriceWad: string;
 }
 /**
- * set_spoke_asset_flags(caller, spoke_id, hub_asset, paused, frozen) —
- * GUARDIAN-gated, immediate. Flags-only per-listing incident brake: no risk
- * params, caps, or oracle override travel with it. `caller = opts.caller`
- * must hold GUARDIAN and sign.
+ * set_spoke_asset_flags(caller, spoke_id, hub_asset, paused, frozen, no_seize)
+ * — GUARDIAN-gated, immediate. Flags-only per-listing incident brake: no risk
+ * params or caps travel with it. `caller = opts.caller` must hold GUARDIAN and
+ * sign.
+ *
+ * All three flags are one-way ratchets on this path — the guardian may only
+ * set them true. Clearing any of them requires the timelocked
+ * `EditAssetInSpoke` proposal.
  */
 export declare function buildStellarGovernanceSetSpokeAssetFlagsImmediateTx(opts: StellarBuilderOptions, args: SpokeAssetFlagsArgs): BuiltStellarTx;
 /**

package/dist/cjs/sdk/stellar/lending.d.ts

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
  */
 import { xdr } from '@stellar/stellar-sdk';
 import { type StellarNetwork } from './contracts';
-import { type StellarStrategySwapHopInput, type StellarStrategySwapInput, type StellarStrategySwapPathInput } from './scval-encode';
+import { type StellarSeizeModeInput, type StellarStrategySwapHopInput, type StellarStrategySwapInput, type StellarStrategySwapPathInput } from './scval-encode';
 /**
  * Stellar `G...` public key of the caller (tx source account).
  */
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ export interface BuiltStellarTx {
 export type StellarSwapStepsInput = StellarStrategySwapInput;
 export type StellarSwapHopInput = StellarStrategySwapHopInput;
 export type StellarSwapPathInput = StellarStrategySwapPathInput;
-export type { StellarSwapVenue } from './scval-encode';
+export type { StellarSeizeModeInput, StellarSwapVenue } from './scval-encode';
 /**
  * Assemble an unsigned XDR that invokes a single Soroban contract method.
  *
@@ -133,6 +133,13 @@ export interface StellarRepayBatchArgs {
 export interface StellarLiquidateArgs {
     accountNonce: number;
     debtPayments: ReadonlyArray<StellarHubAssetAmount>;
+    /**
+     * How the liquidator takes delivery of the seized collateral. Defaults to
+     * `'Transfer'` — the pool pays out underlying tokens, which is the only
+     * behaviour the pre-`SeizeMode` ABI had. `{ Credit: 0 }` opens a fresh
+     * receiving account; `{ Credit: id }` credits an existing one.
+     */
+    seizeMode?: StellarSeizeModeInput;
 }
 export interface StellarFlashLoanArgs extends StellarHubAsset {
     amount: string;
@@ -219,9 +226,25 @@ export declare function buildStellarRepayBatchTx(opts: StellarBuilderOptions, ar
 /** Single-asset `repay`. */
 export declare function buildStellarRepayTx(opts: StellarBuilderOptions, args: StellarRepayArgs): BuiltStellarTx;
 /**
- * liquidate(liquidator, account_id: u64, debt_payments: Vec<(HubAssetKey, i128)>)
+ * liquidate(liquidator, account_id: u64, debt_payments: Vec<(HubAssetKey, i128)>,
+ *           seize_mode: SeizeMode) -> u64
+ *
+ * The `u64` return is the account credited with the seized supply shares under
+ * `SeizeMode::Credit` (freshly opened when `Credit(0)` was passed), and `0`
+ * under `SeizeMode::Transfer`. Read it from the simulation / tx result with
+ * `decodeStellarLiquidateReturn`.
  */
 export declare function buildStellarLiquidateTx(opts: StellarBuilderOptions, args: StellarLiquidateArgs): BuiltStellarTx;
+/**
+ * Decode `liquidate`'s `u64` return value from its base64 XDR — the receiving
+ * account id, as a decimal string. `'0'` means `SeizeMode::Transfer` (the
+ * liquidator was paid in underlying tokens, no account was touched).
+ *
+ * Takes base64 XDR (as Soroban RPC delivers `returnValue` / `result.retval`)
+ * so no live `xdr.ScVal` crosses the consumer boundary — same contract as
+ * `decodeStellarLendingEvent`. Hold a parsed ScVal? Pass `toBase64Xdr(scv)`.
+ */
+export declare function decodeStellarLiquidateReturn(returnValueB64: string): string;
 /**
  * flash_loan(caller, asset: HubAssetKey, amount: i128, receiver, data: Bytes)
  */

package/dist/cjs/sdk/stellar/scval-encode.d.ts

@@ -118,6 +118,28 @@ export declare const tupleHubAssetAmountVec: (entries: Array<{
     asset: string;
     amount: string;
 }>) => xdr.ScVal;
+/**
+ * How a liquidator takes delivery of seized collateral — the Soroban
+ * `SeizeMode` enum.
+ *
+ *   - `'Transfer'` — the pool withdraws the collateral and pays the liquidator
+ *     in underlying tokens, withholding the protocol fee from the transfer.
+ *   - `{ Credit: accountId }` — the seized *supply shares* are credited to a
+ *     controller account instead. `0` opens a fresh account owned by the
+ *     liquidator and bound to the liquidated account's spoke; any other id must
+ *     already exist, be owned by (or delegated to) the liquidator, sit in the
+ *     same spoke, and be in `PositionMode::Normal`.
+ */
+export type StellarSeizeModeInput = 'Transfer' | {
+    Credit: number | string;
+};
+/**
+ * Encode `SeizeMode`. Soroban serializes a `#[contracttype]` enum as
+ * `scvVec([scvSymbol(Variant), ...payload])` — the void variant carries only
+ * the symbol, `Credit` appends its `u64`. Same shape as `OracleReadMode`
+ * (`Spot` / `Twap(u32)`) in `admin.ts`.
+ */
+export declare const seizeMode: (mode: StellarSeizeModeInput) => xdr.ScVal;
 /**
  * Encode a Soroban `struct` — at the XDR level, structs are maps with
  * `Symbol` keys in **lexicographic order** of field names.