@xochi/client 0.0.0-stage → 0.1.2

package/dist/cjs/machine/decisions.js

@@ -0,0 +1,665 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Intent lifecycle decision logic (pure).
+ *
+ * The fund-critical + behavior-defining decisions of the intent lifecycle, each
+ * a pure function of its inputs: no React, wagmi, network or clock coupling.
+ * `update` (machine.ts) maps each decision onto its state transitions and
+ * effects; these stay separately exported so each rule is assertable alone.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.LOADING_STATES = exports.POLL_CEILING_MAX_MS = exports.DEPOSIT_POLL_GRACE_MS = exports.STATUS_POLL_FLAT_CEILING_MS = exports.STATUS_POLL_FLAT_CEILING_ATTEMPTS = exports.STATUS_POLL_MS = exports.POLL_INFLIGHT_STATES = exports.WALLET_INTERRUPTIBLE_STATES = exports.ENDED_STATES = exports.ALLOCATABLE_STATES = exports.QUOTE_BUSY_STATES = void 0;
+exports.failureMayHaveMoved = failureMayHaveMoved;
+exports.unexecutedFinishAt = unexecutedFinishAt;
+exports.pollCeilingAttempts = pollCeilingAttempts;
+exports.canAdoptResumedIntent = canAdoptResumedIntent;
+exports.buildResumedState = buildResumedState;
+exports.normalizeTradeFields = normalizeTradeFields;
+exports.buildQuoteRequest = buildQuoteRequest;
+exports.quoteAccessDecision = quoteAccessDecision;
+exports.shouldUpgradePreviewQuote = shouldUpgradePreviewQuote;
+exports.canSignQuote = canSignQuote;
+exports.canAllocateDepositQuote = canAllocateDepositQuote;
+exports.computeRefreshDelayMs = computeRefreshDelayMs;
+exports.shouldRefreshQuote = shouldRefreshQuote;
+exports.shouldRefreshOnReturn = shouldRefreshOnReturn;
+exports.decideSignPreflight = decideSignPreflight;
+exports.decideExecuteResult = decideExecuteResult;
+exports.decideExecuteResend = decideExecuteResend;
+exports.executeDeadline = executeDeadline;
+exports.mapStatusUpdate = mapStatusUpdate;
+exports.mapStatusFrame = mapStatusFrame;
+exports.notFoundDriftWarning = notFoundDriftWarning;
+exports.mergeSameStatusReceipt = mergeSameStatusReceipt;
+const index_js_1 = require("../shared/index.js");
+const state_js_1 = require("./state.js");
+// ============================================================
+// Lifecycle state sets
+// ============================================================
+/** Quote requests are ignored while in one of these states (mid sign/execute). */
+exports.QUOTE_BUSY_STATES = [
+    "signing",
+    "awaiting_deposit",
+    "executing",
+    "bridging",
+    "settling",
+];
+/**
+ * States an explicit deposit-route allocation may start from: before any
+ * signature or deposit. Past them the trade has a ceremony, a swap or an
+ * outcome a fresh route would land on.
+ */
+exports.ALLOCATABLE_STATES = ["idle", "pending", "quoting", "quoted"];
+/** A delivered or returned trade: a late quote reply may not reopen it. */
+exports.ENDED_STATES = ["completed", "refunded"];
+/** A pre-execution quote is reset when the wallet context changes in these states. */
+exports.WALLET_INTERRUPTIBLE_STATES = [
+    "quoted",
+    "signing",
+    "expired",
+    "failed",
+];
+/**
+ * The status poll runs while in one of these in-flight states. Each follows an
+ * execute or a revealed deposit address, so a `failed` read from one is Retry
+ * only on the Worker's nothing-moved marker (`failureMayHaveMoved`): a deposit
+ * route's `failed` can follow a deposit the poll never saw.
+ */
+exports.POLL_INFLIGHT_STATES = [
+    "awaiting_deposit",
+    "executing",
+    "bridging",
+    "settling",
+];
+/**
+ * Whether a `failed` after an execute (or a revealed deposit address) may have
+ * moved funds: every one but the Worker's nothing-moved finish (`substatus`
+ * `NOT_EXECUTED_SUBSTATUS`, whose sources that constant lists). The machine
+ * shows it as the terminal "may have moved" view (no Retry, no poll, Reset
+ * only); rules: README "Fund safety".
+ */
+function failureMayHaveMoved(substatus) {
+    return substatus !== index_js_1.NOT_EXECUTED_SUBSTATUS;
+}
+/**
+ * The latest time (unix seconds) the Worker's read finish ends this quote's
+ * intent `failed` with `NOT_EXECUTED_SUBSTATUS` while it is still `quoted`
+ * with no execute claim (never claimed, or every claim undone): the next read
+ * past its signed deadline plus `QUOTED_EXPIRY_GRACE_SECS` (market rows only;
+ * the quote sweep usually ends an undone claim earlier). The signed deadline
+ * is the served `eip712` message's `deadline`; the later of it and the
+ * quote's `expiry` is taken, so the poll never stops short of the Worker's
+ * clock. Either alone is enough; null only without a quote or with neither
+ * readable.
+ */
+function unexecutedFinishAt(quote) {
+    if (!quote)
+        return null;
+    const expiryMs = new Date(quote.expiry).getTime();
+    const raw = quote.eip712Data?.message?.deadline;
+    const signed = typeof raw === "string" && /^\d+$/.test(raw) ? Number(raw) : raw;
+    const candidates = [
+        Number.isFinite(expiryMs) ? Math.floor(expiryMs / 1000) : NaN,
+        typeof signed === "number" ? signed : NaN,
+    ].filter((v) => Number.isFinite(v));
+    return candidates.length > 0 ? Math.max(...candidates) + index_js_1.QUOTED_EXPIRY_GRACE_SECS : null;
+}
+// ============================================================
+// Status poll cadence and ceilings
+// ============================================================
+/**
+ * In-flight status poll cadence. THE cadence: every client poll of
+ * `/api/intent/:id/status` runs on this, the machine's own and the activity
+ * feeds' (`useIntentStatusPoll`).
+ */
+exports.STATUS_POLL_MS = 4000;
+/**
+ * Hard ceiling on in-flight polling, counted in elapsed POLL INTERVALS -- the
+ * only ticks that are wall clock. The arming poll happens at elapsed zero and a
+ * foreground snap-forward is off-interval, so neither spends this. Counting
+ * every poll would let a user backgrounding and foregrounding through a wallet
+ * deep-link burn the whole budget in seconds, while the give-up warning
+ * asserts an elapsed ten minutes that never happened.
+ *
+ * It is a budget for NOTHING HAPPENING, not for polling: a poll reporting
+ * progress refills it. Past this cap the client stops polling a stuck solver
+ * and leaves resolution to reconciliation/webhooks.
+ *
+ * This is the ceiling for a phase whose duration WE control. `awaiting_deposit`
+ * is not one: the solver sets that window (Riddler defaults to 1800s), so its
+ * ceiling is derived from the attested deadline instead (`pollCeilingAttempts`).
+ */
+exports.STATUS_POLL_FLAT_CEILING_ATTEMPTS = 150;
+/**
+ * The flat ceiling as wall clock (10 min); see above for why the attempt count
+ * is the primary form and this is derived from it. `pollCeilingAttempts` takes
+ * the duration, because the deposit window it competes with is a duration too.
+ */
+exports.STATUS_POLL_FLAT_CEILING_MS = exports.STATUS_POLL_FLAT_CEILING_ATTEMPTS * exports.STATUS_POLL_MS;
+/**
+ * Keep polling this long past the deposit deadline.
+ *
+ * The deadline is when the solver stops FILLING, not when it stops reporting. A
+ * transfer broadcast just inside the window can confirm outside it, and a late
+ * one is refunded rather than filled -- both are status changes the user is
+ * waiting on, and both land after the countdown reads zero.
+ */
+exports.DEPOSIT_POLL_GRACE_MS = 10 * 60_000;
+/**
+ * Absolute ceiling, whatever a deadline claims. A malformed or hostile
+ * `deposit_deadline` far in the future must not turn the poll into a permanent
+ * background request loop.
+ */
+exports.POLL_CEILING_MAX_MS = 2 * 60 * 60_000;
+/**
+ * How many polls to run before giving up, for the phase being entered.
+ *
+ * `awaiting_deposit` is the one phase whose duration the SOLVER sets: Riddler's
+ * deposit window defaults to 1800s. The flat ~10 minute ceiling was written for
+ * a wedged solver on the EVM path, and applying it here stopped the poll at a
+ * third of the window. A deposit that landed after minute ten never advanced the
+ * modal, so a swap that had actually settled sat on a spinner, and the user was
+ * then told their funds were coming back and to start again.
+ *
+ * `executing` lasts at least until the Worker's latest finish of an intent no
+ * execute holds (`unexecutedFinishAt`, passed as `unexecutedFinishSecs`) plus
+ * one poll: an execute that never reached the Worker (a timeout, a refused
+ * redirect) or that this client stopped resending reads `quoted`, which is no
+ * progress, until the quote sweep (usually first for an un-claimed intent) or
+ * the read past the signed deadline finishes it `failed` with
+ * `NOT_EXECUTED_SUBSTATUS` and offers Retry.
+ *
+ * Bounded below by the flat ceiling (never poll less than before), and above by
+ * POLL_CEILING_MAX_MS.
+ */
+function pollCeilingAttempts(status, depositDeadlineSecs, nowMs, pollMs, flatCeilingMs, unexecutedFinishSecs) {
+    const flat = Math.ceil(flatCeilingMs / pollMs);
+    let windowMs = NaN;
+    if (status === "awaiting_deposit" && depositDeadlineSecs) {
+        windowMs = depositDeadlineSecs * 1000 - nowMs + exports.DEPOSIT_POLL_GRACE_MS;
+    }
+    else if (status === "executing" && unexecutedFinishSecs) {
+        windowMs = unexecutedFinishSecs * 1000 - nowMs + pollMs;
+    }
+    if (!Number.isFinite(windowMs) || windowMs <= 0)
+        return flat;
+    return Math.max(flat, Math.ceil(Math.min(windowMs, exports.POLL_CEILING_MAX_MS) / pollMs));
+}
+/**
+ * May a resumed intent (restored from the persisted activity log after a mobile
+ * tab eviction) be adopted into this state?
+ *
+ * Only from a clean slate. `resume` exists to restore a swap the machine has no
+ * memory of, so ANY live state means it is already tracking something --
+ * and overwriting that with a stale stored record would point the status poll,
+ * the modal, and the user's read of "what am I waiting on" at the wrong intent
+ * while a real one is mid-flight. Fails closed: unknown state means no adopt.
+ * See xochi#339.
+ */
+function canAdoptResumedIntent(state) {
+    return state.status === "idle" && !state.intentId;
+}
+/**
+ * The state to hold after adopting a resumed intent, or `prev` UNCHANGED when the
+ * adopt must be refused. The machine's `resume` message applies exactly this,
+ * so the whole rule is assertable on its own.
+ *
+ * Three things it has to get right, all of them fund- or privacy-relevant:
+ *
+ * - Refuse unless the hook is on a clean slate (`canAdoptResumedIntent`), so a
+ *   stale stored record can never clobber a real trade that is mid-flight.
+ * - Refuse an adopt with no `owner`. This is the only intent in the app whose
+ *   owner does not come from a quote made this session (it comes from the storage
+ *   key of the record), so without it the adopted state would be the only
+ *   intentId-bearing state with `quotedAddress: null` -- and the panel's
+ *   ownership fallback (`intent.quotedAddress ?? address`) silently becomes the
+ *   LIVE wallet, copying this swap's amounts and tx hashes into whichever account
+ *   the user switches to next.
+ * - Build from `INITIAL_INTENT_STATE`, not from `prev`. A spread of `prev` would
+ *   carry a stale quote, error or receipt hash into a swap it does not describe.
+ *
+ * `depositDeadline` is the one served fact that must come ACROSS, and it is not
+ * an exception to the rule above. No quote is synthesized, because a stale price
+ * shown as current would be a lie; a deadline does not go stale, it expires, and
+ * carrying it is what lets the poll say so. Omitting it left
+ * `pollCeilingAttempts` on its flat 10-minute ceiling while the restored deposit
+ * screen counted down the solver's real 30-minute window, so the poll stopped and
+ * announced it beside a countdown that disagreed. Null on every pull route.
+ *
+ * See xochi#339.
+ */
+function buildResumedState(prev, intentId, status, owner, depositDeadline = null) {
+    if (!intentId || !owner || !canAdoptResumedIntent(prev))
+        return prev;
+    return { ...state_js_1.INITIAL_INTENT_STATE, intentId, status, quotedAddress: owner, depositDeadline };
+}
+/** Statuses that render the panel as loading. */
+exports.LOADING_STATES = [
+    "quoting",
+    "signing",
+    "executing",
+    "bridging",
+    "settling",
+];
+/**
+ * The request fields the server reads through a normalisation: an empty
+ * `recipientAddress` or `refundAddress` is undefined (EVM routes settle to, and
+ * refund to, the connected wallet) and the stealth meta-address is sent ONLY
+ * on a stealth settlement. The machine's trade key reads the same values, so
+ * two forms that build one request are one trade.
+ */
+function normalizeTradeFields(input) {
+    return {
+        // Trimmed HERE, at the single point the request is built, because the
+        // deposit attestation rebuilds both of these from the same panel state and
+        // compares bytes. Sending " 0xabc" while rebuilding "0xabc" is a message
+        // that cannot recover, reported to the user as a route being unavailable.
+        // One deal, one encoding.
+        recipientAddress: input.recipientAddress?.trim() || undefined,
+        refundAddress: input.refundAddress?.trim() || undefined,
+        stealthMetaAddress: input.settlementPreference === "stealth"
+            ? (input.stealthMetaAddress ?? undefined)
+            : undefined,
+    };
+}
+/** Build the quote request body, with the trade fields normalised. */
+function buildQuoteRequest(input) {
+    return {
+        wallet: input.wallet,
+        preview: input.preview,
+        allocationKey: input.allocationKey,
+        fromChainId: input.fromChainId,
+        toChainId: input.toChainId,
+        fromToken: input.fromToken,
+        toToken: input.toToken,
+        fromAmount: input.fromAmount,
+        deadline: input.deadline,
+        slippageBps: input.slippageBps,
+        trustScore: input.trustScore,
+        settlementPreference: input.settlementPreference,
+        ...normalizeTradeFields(input),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Decide whether pricing is indicative or executable.
+ *
+ * Deposit-origin pricing is always a preview until the caller explicitly asks
+ * to allocate a route. That keeps amount editing side-effect free even for a
+ * connected wallet. Private settlement still needs wallet-derived keys.
+ */
+function quoteAccessDecision(input) {
+    if (input.settlementPreference !== "public") {
+        return input.connected ? "executable" : "needs_wallet";
+    }
+    if (input.isDepositOrigin) {
+        if (!input.allocateDepositRoute)
+            return "preview";
+        return input.connected ? "executable" : "needs_wallet";
+    }
+    return input.connected ? "executable" : "preview";
+}
+/**
+ * Replace a held preview with a wallet-bound executable quote?
+ *
+ * True exactly when a wallet is present while a preview is the quote on
+ * screen. The caller refreshes silently (the visible price must not flash back
+ * to "quoting" on connect) and force-refreshes (a preview prices at Standard
+ * tier and carries no signing material, so it must never be served from cache
+ * as an executable quote).
+ */
+function shouldUpgradePreviewQuote(input) {
+    return (!input.isDepositOrigin &&
+        input.connected &&
+        input.hasAmount &&
+        input.status === "quoted" &&
+        input.quoteIsPreview);
+}
+/**
+ * The signing gate. A preview is never signable whatever else it claims: the
+ * server strips its EIP-712 payload, so the wallet/session boundary stays at
+ * execution even though the price itself was served anonymously.
+ */
+function canSignQuote(status, quote) {
+    return status === "quoted" && quote !== null && quote.canSolve && !quote.preview;
+}
+/** True when the current indicative deposit price can be explicitly allocated. */
+function canAllocateDepositQuote(connected, isDepositOrigin, status, quote) {
+    return (connected &&
+        isDepositOrigin &&
+        status === "quoted" &&
+        quote !== null &&
+        quote.canSolve &&
+        quote.preview === true);
+}
+/**
+ * The pre-expiry auto-refresh delay in ms: how long until we should re-fetch to
+ * replace an expiring quote (`buffer` before expiry). A non-positive result means
+ * the quote is already inside the buffer window and no refresh is scheduled.
+ */
+function computeRefreshDelayMs(expiryIso, now, bufferMs) {
+    return new Date(expiryIso).getTime() - now - bufferMs;
+}
+/**
+ * Whether the expiry timer should re-quote.
+ *
+ * Indicative pricing is allocation-free on every origin and may stay live.
+ * Once a deposit address exists, its `deposit_deadline` owns the lifecycle; a
+ * 30-second price refresh must never replace or invalidate that route.
+ */
+function shouldRefreshQuote(input) {
+    if (input.status !== "quoted")
+        return false;
+    if (input.hidden)
+        return false;
+    return !input.hasAllocatedDeposit;
+}
+/**
+ * Whether returning to a foregrounded tab should re-quote.
+ *
+ * The confirm modal owns its own refresh. An allocated deposit route is also
+ * immutable until its deposit deadline; all other quoted/expired prices may be
+ * refreshed on return.
+ */
+function shouldRefreshOnReturn(input) {
+    if (input.paused || input.hasAllocatedDeposit)
+        return false;
+    return input.status === "quoted" || input.status === "expired";
+}
+const WALLET_CHANGED = {
+    kind: "reject",
+    to: "quoted",
+    refusal: { kind: "wallet_changed" },
+    error: "The wallet or network changed. Get a fresh quote.",
+};
+/**
+ * Decide whether a quote may be signed, in the exact precedence the hook
+ * enforces (all fail-closed, no funds move on a reject):
+ *   1. Deposit route (Tron origin) -> no signature; reveal the address.
+ *   2. No EIP-712 payload -> nothing to sign.
+ *   3. Wallet account changed since the quote -> re-quote (`quoted`).
+ *   4. Wallet not on the origin chain -> refuse (`quoted`); the domain binds it.
+ *   5. Wallet chain changed since the quote -> re-quote (`quoted`).
+ *   6. Quote already expired -> `expired`.
+ *   7. Otherwise proceed.
+ */
+function decideSignPreflight(input) {
+    if (input.hasDepositAddress)
+        return { kind: "awaitingDeposit" };
+    if (!input.hasEip712)
+        return { kind: "noQuote" };
+    const accountChanged = !input.address ||
+        (input.quotedAddress != null &&
+            input.address.toLowerCase() !== input.quotedAddress.toLowerCase());
+    if (accountChanged)
+        return WALLET_CHANGED;
+    // A signature from any other chain is one the solver rejects, and on a chain
+    // the wallet cannot serve it fails as an opaque wallet error. The panel
+    // prompts the switch before this is reachable; this is the backstop.
+    if (input.chainId !== input.originChainId) {
+        return {
+            kind: "reject",
+            to: "quoted",
+            refusal: { kind: "wrong_chain", chainId: input.originChainId },
+            error: `Switch the wallet to ${index_js_1.EXTENDED_CHAIN_NAMES[input.originChainId]} to sign.`,
+        };
+    }
+    const chainChanged = input.quotedChainId != null && input.chainId !== input.quotedChainId;
+    if (chainChanged)
+        return WALLET_CHANGED;
+    if (input.expiryMs && input.now >= input.expiryMs) {
+        return { kind: "reject", to: "expired", error: "Quote expired" };
+    }
+    return { kind: "proceed" };
+}
+/**
+ * Interpret an /execute response, preserving the in-doubt distinction (#226):
+ * the worker returns `{success:false}` for BOTH a genuine failure AND a
+ * fail-closed downgrade (the origin pull already moved funds but the
+ * settlement is unconfirmed inline, so IN-DOUBT). `reconciling` is the
+ * server's flag when it sends one, else on whenever the server withheld
+ * success (`reconciling ?? !success`). The verdicts, in order:
+ * - `failed` with `success: false` and `reconciling` off by that rule (the
+ *   server sent `reconciling: false`) is final: Retry only with the Worker's
+ *   nothing-moved marker, else "may have moved" (`failureMayHaveMoved`).
+ * - `completed` completes with reconciling off, whatever the reply says: a
+ *   completion leaves nothing to reconcile.
+ * - Any other `failed` (`success: true`, or `reconciling` on, the absent flag
+ *   included) is in doubt: it moves to the in-flight `executing` with
+ *   reconciling on, and the poll reads the final status.
+ * - Anything else advances to its status with reconciling by that rule, so a
+ *   withheld success shows the "Still confirming" path with no Retry (an
+ *   in-session retry of a funds-moved swap would be a double execution).
+ * `onExecuted` also shows an unmapped status in doubt.
+ */
+function decideExecuteResult(result) {
+    const reconciling = result.reconciling ?? !result.success;
+    if (result.status === "failed" && !result.success && !reconciling) {
+        return {
+            kind: "failed",
+            error: result.error || "Execution failed",
+            mayHaveMoved: failureMayHaveMoved(result.substatus),
+        };
+    }
+    const base = {
+        txHash: result.txHash || null,
+        receivingTxHash: result.receivingTxHash || null,
+        settlementTxHash: result.settlementTxHash || null,
+        settlementChainId: result.settlementChainId ?? null,
+    };
+    if (result.status === "completed") {
+        return { kind: "transition", status: "completed", updates: { ...base, reconciling: false } };
+    }
+    if (result.status === "failed") {
+        return { kind: "transition", status: "executing", updates: { ...base, reconciling: true } };
+    }
+    return { kind: "transition", status: result.status, updates: { ...base, reconciling } };
+}
+/**
+ * How far before `now` a not-accepted `retryAfter` may lie and still be read
+ * as the absolute target it must be. The transport rounds the target up from
+ * the moment it read the refusal, so a real one is never older than the
+ * report's dispatch delay; a minute is past any quote's life (30 s), so no
+ * resend is lost to it. An older value is a delta passed where the absolute
+ * target belongs (`retry_after: 7` read as 1970), which would resend at once
+ * and ignore the server's wait.
+ */
+const RETRY_AFTER_MAX_AGE_SECS = 60;
+/**
+ * After the server refused an execute before accepting anything, whether to
+ * send the SAME request again and when (rules: README "Fund safety").
+ * `retryAfter` and `deadline` are unix seconds, `now` the host's clock; a null
+ * `deadline` never resends, a `retryAfter` older than
+ * `RETRY_AFTER_MAX_AGE_SECS` gives up, and the wait is at least a second, so
+ * a slightly past `retryAfter` cannot spin. A give-up offers no Retry: the
+ * signed request stays executable until its deadline, so the machine shows
+ * "not sent yet" (`IntentState.notSent`) and polls until the Worker finishes
+ * the intent.
+ */
+function decideExecuteResend(input) {
+    if (input.resends >= index_js_1.MAX_EXECUTE_RESENDS)
+        return { kind: "give_up", reason: "exhausted" };
+    const { retryAfter, deadline } = input;
+    if (retryAfter === undefined || !Number.isFinite(retryAfter)) {
+        return { kind: "give_up", reason: "no_retry_after" };
+    }
+    if (retryAfter * 1000 < input.now - RETRY_AFTER_MAX_AGE_SECS * 1000) {
+        return { kind: "give_up", reason: "stale_retry_after" };
+    }
+    const sendAt = Math.max(retryAfter * 1000, input.now + 1000);
+    if (deadline === null || sendAt > (deadline - index_js_1.EXECUTE_RESEND_MARGIN_SECS) * 1000) {
+        return { kind: "give_up", reason: "deadline" };
+    }
+    return { kind: "resend", delayMs: sendAt - input.now };
+}
+/**
+ * The earliest deadline (unix seconds) a resent execute carries: the quote's
+ * expiry, the signed intent's `deadline` and the origin pull's `validBefore` /
+ * `deadline`. Null without a readable quote expiry, which never resends.
+ */
+function executeDeadline(quote) {
+    const expiryMs = quote ? new Date(quote.expiry).getTime() : NaN;
+    if (!quote || !Number.isFinite(expiryMs))
+        return null;
+    const signed = [
+        quote.eip712Data?.message?.deadline,
+        quote.pullAuthorization?.message?.validBefore,
+        quote.pullAuthorization?.message?.deadline,
+    ].flatMap((v) => {
+        const n = typeof v === "string" && /^\d+$/.test(v) ? Number(v) : v;
+        return typeof n === "number" && Number.isFinite(n) ? [n] : [];
+    });
+    return Math.min(Math.floor(expiryMs / 1000), ...signed);
+}
+// ============================================================
+// Status update (poll / message -> transition)
+// ============================================================
+/**
+ * Map an intent status message (from the poll) to the transition to apply. A
+ * refund is fund-safe and terminal: its reason rides `refundReason` (plain
+ * language), never `error`. Mirrors the poll's fail-closed handling.
+ */
+function mapStatusUpdate(msg) {
+    if (msg.status === "completed") {
+        return {
+            status: "completed",
+            updates: {
+                txHash: msg.txHash || null,
+                receivingTxHash: msg.receivingTxHash || null,
+                settlementTxHash: msg.settlementTxHash || null,
+                settlementChainId: msg.settlementChainId ?? null,
+                reconciling: false,
+            },
+        };
+    }
+    if (msg.status === "refunded") {
+        return {
+            status: "refunded",
+            updates: {
+                error: null,
+                reconciling: false,
+                refundReason: (0, index_js_1.getRefundReasonLabel)(msg.refundReason),
+            },
+        };
+    }
+    if (msg.status === "failed") {
+        return {
+            status: "failed",
+            updates: { error: msg.error || "Intent failed", reconciling: false },
+        };
+    }
+    return {
+        status: msg.status,
+        updates: {
+            receivingTxHash: msg.receivingTxHash || null,
+            settlementTxHash: msg.settlementTxHash || null,
+            settlementChainId: msg.settlementChainId ?? null,
+            substatus: msg.substatus ?? null,
+            reconciling: msg.reconciling ?? false,
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Read a lifecycle frame from the intent stream (`IntentStatusFrame`, the
+ * worker's `{ type: "status", intent_id, status, revision, ... }`, D5 5.9).
+ *
+ * Returns null for anything that is not a CURRENT status frame: a value that
+ * does not parse, or a frame at or below `lastRevision` (the relay replays its
+ * buffer to every (re)connecting subscriber and deferred publishes can land out
+ * of order, so a stale frame must not be read as the current status).
+ *
+ * Otherwise returns the frame's `revision`, which the caller records, and the
+ * status `message` for `handleStatusUpdate`, or a null message when the status
+ * is outside POLL_INFLIGHT_STATES (terminals included). The frame carries none
+ * of what the poll returns with a terminal (receipt hashes, the failure reason,
+ * the refund reason; `tx_hash` only on a public settlement), and a terminal
+ * status stops the poll. Applying one would pin the final view without its
+ * receipt link or real reason, so the poll delivers terminals, whole, within
+ * one interval. The stream accelerates the in-flight steps.
+ */
+function mapStatusFrame(value, lastRevision) {
+    const parsed = index_js_1.IntentStatusFrameSchema.safeParse(value);
+    if (!parsed.success)
+        return null;
+    const frame = parsed.data;
+    if (frame.revision !== null && lastRevision !== null && frame.revision <= lastRevision) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    if (!exports.POLL_INFLIGHT_STATES.includes(frame.status)) {
+        return { revision: frame.revision, message: null };
+    }
+    return {
+        revision: frame.revision,
+        message: {
+            type: "intent_status",
+            intentId: frame.intent_id,
+            status: frame.status,
+            txHash: frame.tx_hash,
+            timestamp: new Date(frame.ts).toISOString(),
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The drift warning to log when the in-flight status poll gets a definitive 404
+ * for a DISPATCHED intent id, or null when this id has already been reported.
+ *
+ * The poll's decision on that 404 is to HOLD (never terminalize; see the status
+ * poll in machine.ts for why), and a hold that emits nothing is indistinguishable from a
+ * healthy poll: the modal spins, the poll runs to its ~10 min cap, and no console
+ * line says which swap it is. So the first 404 per id carries a signal, in the
+ * same shape CLAUDE.md already relies on for `mapRiddlerStatus` drift (a warn
+ * carrying the intent id, catchable in logs).
+ *
+ * `reportedId` is the last id the caller reported, so the warning is one-shot:
+ * the poll runs every 4s and would otherwise emit ~150 identical lines per stuck
+ * swap. A different id reports again -- a second swap hitting this is a second
+ * data point, not a repeat.
+ *
+ * Distinct from the transport-level warn in `intentAPI.getIntentStatus`, which
+ * fires once per id for ANY 404, including the benign one the orphan-quote sweep
+ * produces for a pre-dispatch row (and can be spent on that benign case by
+ * whichever caller polls the id first). This one names the dispatched case, which
+ * is the bug.
+ */
+function notFoundDriftWarning(intentId, reportedId) {
+    if (!intentId || intentId === reportedId)
+        return null;
+    return `[useIntent] Status poll 404 for dispatched intent ${intentId}: holding, not failing. The worker has no row for a swap that was already dispatched; leaving the outcome to reconciliation.`;
+}
+/**
+ * Fields to merge from a poll whose status did NOT change, or null when the
+ * poll carries nothing new.
+ *
+ * The status-transition table has no self-edges, so a `settling -> settling`
+ * poll is an invalid move and `applyStatusTransition` discards the entire
+ * update, receipt hashes included. A stealth swap sits at `settling` for its
+ * whole life, so that edge is never valid and the fill hash the server returns
+ * on every 4s poll never reached the UI: the user was shown "Still confirming"
+ * with no transaction link while the settlement was on chain (xochi#353).
+ *
+ * Two deliberate omissions:
+ *
+ * - A field that did not ARRIVE is not applied. Blanking a hash we already hold
+ *   because a later poll omitted it would flicker the receipt link back off.
+ * - `reconciling` is never merged. The poll owns that flag on its own timer, and
+ *   re-applying `mapStatusUpdate`'s default `false` here would switch the
+ *   "safe to close" view off again on every tick.
+ *
+ * Returns null when nothing changed, so the caller can skip the setState and
+ * avoid a re-render per poll.
+ */
+function mergeSameStatusReceipt(prev, msg) {
+    const updates = {};
+    if (msg.substatus && msg.substatus !== prev.substatus) {
+        updates.substatus = msg.substatus;
+    }
+    if (msg.receivingTxHash && msg.receivingTxHash !== prev.receivingTxHash) {
+        updates.receivingTxHash = msg.receivingTxHash;
+    }
+    if (msg.settlementTxHash && msg.settlementTxHash !== prev.settlementTxHash) {
+        updates.settlementTxHash = msg.settlementTxHash;
+    }
+    if (msg.settlementChainId && msg.settlementChainId !== prev.settlementChainId) {
+        updates.settlementChainId = msg.settlementChainId;
+    }
+    return Object.keys(updates).length > 0 ? updates : null;
+}