@xgent-ai/skills 0.1.0 → 0.4.0

package/skills/security-audit/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: security-audit
+description: 'AI-powered codebase security scanner that reasons about code like a security researcher — tracing data flows, understanding component interactions, and catching vulnerabilities that pattern-matching tools miss. Use this skill when asked to scan code for security vulnerabilities, find bugs, check for SQL injection, XSS, command injection, exposed API keys, hardcoded secrets, insecure dependencies, access control issues, or any request like "is my code secure?", "review for security issues", "audit this codebase", or "check for vulnerabilities". Also use proactively for a security check of changed code before a commit or deployment — especially changes to auth, API, database, dependency, or config files. Covers the OWASP Top 10: injection flaws, authentication and access control bugs, secrets exposure, weak cryptography, security misconfiguration, insecure dependencies, and business logic issues across JavaScript, TypeScript, Python, Java, PHP, Go, Ruby, and Rust.'
+---
+
+# Security Review
+
+An AI-powered security scanner that reasons about your codebase the way a human security
+researcher would — tracing data flows, understanding component interactions, and catching
+vulnerabilities that pattern-matching tools miss.
+
+## When to Use This Skill
+
+Use this skill when the request involves:
+
+- Scanning a codebase or file for security vulnerabilities
+- Running a security review or vulnerability check
+- Checking changed code before a commit or deployment — especially auth, API, database,
+  dependency, or config changes
+- Checking for SQL injection, XSS, command injection, or other injection flaws
+- Finding exposed API keys, hardcoded secrets, or credentials in code
+- Auditing dependencies for known CVEs
+- Reviewing authentication, authorization, or access control logic
+- Detecting insecure cryptography or weak randomness
+- Performing a data flow analysis to trace user input to dangerous sinks
+- Any request phrasing like "is my code secure?", "scan this file", or "check my repo for vulnerabilities"
+- Running `/security-review` or `/security-review <path>`
+
+## How This Skill Works
+
+Unlike traditional static analysis tools that match patterns, this skill:
+1. **Reads code like a security researcher** — understanding context, intent, and data flow
+2. **Traces across files** — following how user input moves through your application
+3. **Self-verifies findings** — re-examines each result to filter false positives
+4. **Assigns severity ratings** — CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW / INFO
+5. **Proposes targeted patches** — every finding includes a concrete fix
+6. **Requires human approval** — nothing is auto-applied; you always review first
+
+## Execution Workflow
+
+Follow these steps **in order** every time:
+
+### Step 1 — Scope Resolution
+Determine what to scan:
+- If a path was provided (`/security-review src/auth/`), scan only that scope
+- If the request is about changes (a diff, staged files, a pre-commit or pre-deploy check),
+  scope to the changed files (`git diff`, `git diff --staged`). Still read the surrounding code
+  they call into or are called from — a change is often only exploitable in context. Run
+  Step 2 only if a dependency manifest or lock file changed
+- If no path given, scan the **entire project** starting from the root
+- Identify the language(s) and framework(s) in use (check package.json, requirements.txt,
+  go.mod, Cargo.toml, pom.xml, Gemfile, composer.json, etc.)
+- Read `references/language-patterns.md` to load language-specific vulnerability patterns
+
+### Step 2 — Dependency Audit
+Before scanning source code, audit dependencies first (fast wins):
+- **Node.js**: Check `package.json` + `package-lock.json` for known vulnerable packages
+- **Python**: Check `requirements.txt` / `pyproject.toml` / `Pipfile`
+- **Java**: Check `pom.xml` / `build.gradle`
+- **Ruby**: Check `Gemfile.lock`
+- **Rust**: Check `Cargo.toml`
+- **Go**: Check `go.sum`
+- If available, run the ecosystem's audit tool (`npm audit`, `pip-audit`, or equivalent) — it
+  reflects current advisories. These tools need network access to the package registry; if
+  it's unavailable, fall back to the watchlist below and say the audit was offline
+- Flag packages with known CVEs, deprecated crypto libs, or suspiciously old pinned versions
+- Read `references/vulnerable-packages.md` for a curated watchlist
+
+### Step 3 — Secrets & Exposure Scan
+Scan ALL files in scope (including config, env, CI/CD, Dockerfiles, IaC) for:
+- Hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys
+- `.env` files accidentally committed
+- Secrets in comments or debug logs
+- Cloud credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure, Stripe, Twilio, etc.)
+- Database connection strings with credentials embedded
+- Read `references/secret-patterns.md` for regex patterns and entropy heuristics to apply
+
+### Step 4 — Vulnerability Deep Scan
+This is the core scan. Reason about the code — don't just pattern-match.
+Read `references/vuln-categories.md` for full details on each category.
+
+**Injection Flaws**
+- SQL Injection: raw queries with string interpolation, ORM misuse, second-order SQLi
+- XSS: unescaped output, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, innerHTML, template injection
+- Command Injection: exec/spawn/system with user input
+- LDAP, XPath, Header, Log injection
+
+**Authentication & Access Control**
+- Missing authentication on sensitive endpoints
+- Broken object-level authorization (BOLA/IDOR)
+- JWT weaknesses (alg:none, weak secrets, no expiry validation)
+- Session fixation, missing CSRF protection
+- Session cookies missing `Secure` / `HttpOnly` / `SameSite`
+- Passwords stored in plaintext or with a fast hash; weak password policy; no MFA on
+  privileged accounts
+- Privilege escalation paths
+- Mass assignment / parameter pollution
+
+**Data Handling**
+- Sensitive data in logs, error messages, or API responses
+- Missing encryption at rest or in transit
+- Insecure deserialization
+- Path traversal / directory traversal
+- XXE (XML External Entity) processing
+- SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)
+
+**Cryptography**
+- Use of MD5, SHA1, DES for security purposes
+- Hardcoded IVs or salts
+- Weak random number generation (Math.random() for tokens)
+- Missing TLS certificate validation
+
+**Security Misconfiguration & Logging**
+- Permissive CORS, debug mode in production, missing security headers
+  (framework specifics in `references/language-patterns.md`)
+- Security events (failed logins, access-control denials, privilege changes) not logged,
+  leaving attacks undetectable
+
+**Business Logic**
+- Race conditions (TOCTOU)
+- Integer overflow in financial calculations
+- Missing rate limiting on sensitive endpoints
+- Predictable resource identifiers
+
+### Step 5 — Cross-File Data Flow Analysis
+After the per-file scan, perform a **holistic review**:
+- Trace user-controlled input from entry points (HTTP params, headers, body, file uploads)
+  all the way to sinks (DB queries, exec calls, HTML output, file writes)
+- Identify vulnerabilities that only appear when looking at multiple files together
+- Check for insecure trust boundaries between services or modules
+
+### Step 6 — Self-Verification Pass
+For EACH finding:
+1. Re-read the relevant code with fresh eyes
+2. Ask: "Is this actually exploitable, or is there sanitization I missed?"
+3. Check if a framework or middleware already handles this upstream
+4. Downgrade or discard findings that aren't genuine vulnerabilities
+5. Assign final severity: CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW / INFO
+
+### Step 7 — Generate Security Report
+Output the full report in the format defined in `references/report-format.md`.
+For a snippet or diff scope, drop sections that don't apply (e.g. the dependency audit when
+no manifest changed) rather than filling them with zeros.
+
+### Step 8 — Propose Patches
+For every CRITICAL and HIGH finding, generate a concrete patch:
+- Show the vulnerable code (before)
+- Show the fixed code (after)
+- Explain what changed and why
+- Preserve the original code style, variable names, and structure
+- Add a comment explaining the fix inline
+
+Explicitly state: **"Review each patch before applying. Nothing has been changed yet."**
+
+## Severity Guide
+
+| Severity | Meaning | Example |
+|----------|---------|---------|
+| 🔴 CRITICAL | Immediate exploitation risk, data breach likely | SQLi, RCE, auth bypass |
+| 🟠 HIGH | Serious vulnerability, exploit path exists | XSS, IDOR, hardcoded secrets |
+| 🟡 MEDIUM | Exploitable with conditions or chaining | CSRF, open redirect, weak crypto |
+| 🔵 LOW | Best practice violation, low direct risk | Verbose errors, missing headers |
+| ⚪ INFO | Observation worth noting, not a vulnerability | Outdated dependency (no CVE) |
+
+## Output Rules
+
+- **Always** produce a findings summary table first (counts by severity)
+- **Never** auto-apply any patch — present patches for human review only
+- **Always** include a confidence rating per finding (High / Medium / Low)
+- **Group findings** by category, not by file
+- **Be specific** — include file path, line number, and the exact vulnerable code snippet
+- **Explain the risk** in plain English — what could an attacker do with this?
+- If the codebase is clean, say so clearly: "No vulnerabilities found" with what was scanned
+
+## Reference Files
+
+For detailed detection guidance, load the following reference files as needed:
+
+- `references/vuln-categories.md` — Deep reference for every vulnerability category with detection signals, safe patterns, and escalation checkers
+  - Search patterns: `SQL injection`, `XSS`, `command injection`, `SSRF`, `BOLA`, `IDOR`, `JWT`, `CSRF`, `secrets`, `cryptography`, `race condition`, `path traversal`
+- `references/secret-patterns.md` — Regex patterns, entropy-based detection, and CI/CD secret risks
+  - Search patterns: `API key`, `token`, `private key`, `connection string`, `entropy`, `.env`, `GitHub Actions`, `Docker`, `Terraform`
+- `references/language-patterns.md` — Framework-specific vulnerability patterns for JavaScript, Python, Java, PHP, Go, Ruby, and Rust
+  - Search patterns: `Express`, `React`, `Next.js`, `Django`, `Flask`, `FastAPI`, `Spring Boot`, `PHP`, `Go`, `Rails`, `Rust`
+- `references/vulnerable-packages.md` — Curated CVE watchlist for npm, pip, Maven, Rubygems, Cargo, and Go modules
+  - Search patterns: `lodash`, `axios`, `jsonwebtoken`, `Pillow`, `log4j`, `nokogiri`, `CVE`
+- `references/report-format.md` — Structured output template for security reports with finding cards, dependency audit, secrets scan, and patch proposal formatting
+  - Search patterns: `report`, `format`, `template`, `finding`, `patch`, `summary`, `confidence`
+
+External references for each finding's Reference line:
+[OWASP Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/), [CWE Top 25](https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/)

package/skills/security-audit/references/language-patterns.md

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+# Language-Specific Vulnerability Patterns
+
+Load the relevant section during Step 1 (Scope Resolution) after identifying languages.
+
+---
+
+## JavaScript / TypeScript (Node.js, React, Next.js, Express)
+
+### Critical APIs/calls to flag
+```js
+eval()                    // arbitrary code execution
+Function('return ...')   // same as eval
+child_process.exec()     // command injection if user input reaches it
+fs.readFile              // path traversal if user controls path
+fs.writeFile             // path traversal if user controls path
+```
+
+### Express.js specific
+```js
+// Missing helmet (security headers)
+const app = express()
+// Should have: app.use(helmet())
+
+// Body size limits missing (DoS)
+app.use(express.json())
+// Should have: app.use(express.json({ limit: '10kb' }))
+
+// CORS misconfiguration
+app.use(cors({ origin: '*' }))  // too permissive
+app.use(cors({ origin: req.headers.origin }))  // reflects any origin
+
+// Trust proxy without validation
+app.set('trust proxy', true)  // only safe behind known proxy
+```
+
+### React specific
+```jsx
+<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userContent }} />  // XSS
+<a href={userUrl}>link</a>  // javascript: URL injection
+```
+
+### Next.js specific
+```js
+// Server Actions without auth
+export async function deleteUser(id) {   // missing: auth check
+  await db.users.delete(id)
+}
+
+// API Routes missing method validation
+export default function handler(req, res) {
+  // Should check: if (req.method !== 'POST') return res.status(405)
+  doSensitiveAction()
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Python (Django, Flask, FastAPI)
+
+### Django specific
+```python
+# Raw SQL
+User.objects.raw(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '{name}'")  # SQLi
+
+# Missing CSRF
+@csrf_exempt  # Only OK for APIs with token auth
+
+# Debug mode in production
+DEBUG = True  # in settings.py — exposes stack traces
+
+# SECRET_KEY
+SECRET_KEY = 'django-insecure-...'  # must be changed for production
+
+# ALLOWED_HOSTS
+ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']  # too permissive
+```
+
+### Flask specific
+```python
+# Debug mode
+app.run(debug=True)  # never in production
+
+# Secret key
+app.secret_key = 'dev'  # weak
+
+# eval/exec with user input
+eval(request.args.get('expr'))
+
+# render_template_string with user input (SSTI)
+render_template_string(f"Hello {name}")  # Server-Side Template Injection
+```
+
+### FastAPI specific
+```python
+# Missing auth dependency
+@app.delete("/users/{user_id}")  # No Depends(get_current_user)
+async def delete_user(user_id: int):
+    ...
+
+# Arbitrary file read
+@app.get("/files/{filename}")
+async def read_file(filename: str):
+    return FileResponse(f"uploads/{filename}")  # path traversal
+```
+
+---
+
+## Java (Spring Boot)
+
+### Spring Boot specific
+```java
+// SQL Injection
+String query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'";
+jdbcTemplate.query(query, ...);
+
+// XXE
+DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
+// Missing: dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true)
+
+// Deserialization
+ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(inputStream);
+Object obj = ois.readObject();  // only safe with allowlist
+
+// Spring Security — permitAll on sensitive endpoint
+.antMatchers("/admin/**").permitAll()
+
+// Actuator endpoints exposed
+management.endpoints.web.exposure.include=*  # in application.properties
+```
+
+---
+
+## PHP
+
+```php
+// Direct user input in queries
+$result = mysql_query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " . $_GET['id']);
+
+// File inclusion
+include($_GET['page'] . ".php");  // local/remote file inclusion
+
+// eval
+eval($_POST['code']);
+
+// extract() with user input
+extract($_POST);  // overwrites any variable
+
+// Loose comparison
+if ($password == "admin") {}  // use === instead
+
+// Unserialize
+unserialize($_COOKIE['data']);  // remote code execution
+```
+
+---
+
+## Go
+
+```go
+// Command injection
+exec.Command("sh", "-c", userInput)
+
+// SQL injection
+db.Query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'")
+
+// Path traversal
+filePath := filepath.Join("/uploads/", userInput)  // sanitize userInput first
+
+// Insecure TLS
+http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}}
+
+// Goroutine leak / missing context cancellation
+go func() {
+  // No done channel or context
+  for { ... }
+}()
+```
+
+---
+
+## Ruby on Rails
+
+```ruby
+# SQL injection (safe alternatives use placeholders)
+User.where("name = '#{params[:name]}'")  # VULNERABLE
+User.where("name = ?", params[:name])   # SAFE
+
+# Mass assignment without strong params
+@user.update(params[:user])  # should be params.require(:user).permit(...)
+
+# eval / send with user input
+eval(params[:code])
+send(params[:method])  # arbitrary method call
+
+# Redirect to user-supplied URL (open redirect)
+redirect_to params[:url]
+
+# YAML.load (allows arbitrary object creation)
+YAML.load(user_input)  # use YAML.safe_load instead
+```
+
+---
+
+## Rust
+
+```rust
+// Unsafe blocks — flag for manual review
+unsafe {
+    // Reason for unsafety should be documented
+}
+
+// Integer overflow (debug builds panic, release silently wraps)
+let result = a + b;  // use checked_add/saturating_add for financial math
+
+// Unwrap/expect in production code (panics on None/Err)
+let value = option.unwrap();  // prefer ? or match
+
+// Deserializing arbitrary types
+serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&user_input)  // generally safe
+// But: bincode::deserialize from untrusted input — can be exploited
+```

package/skills/security-audit/references/report-format.md

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+# Security Report Format
+
+Use this template for all `/security-review` output. Generated during Step 7.
+
+---
+
+## Report Structure
+
+### Header
+```
+╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
+║           🔐 SECURITY REVIEW REPORT                     ║
+║           Generated by: /security-review skill          ║
+╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
+
+Project: <project name or path>
+Scan Date: <today's date>
+Scope: <files/directories scanned>
+Languages Detected: <list>
+Frameworks Detected: <list>
+```
+
+---
+
+### Executive Summary Table
+
+Always show this first — at a glance overview:
+
+```
+┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│           FINDINGS SUMMARY                     │
+├──────────────┬──────────────────────────────── ┤
+│ 🔴 CRITICAL  │  <n> findings                  │
+│ 🟠 HIGH      │  <n> findings                  │
+│ 🟡 MEDIUM    │  <n> findings                  │
+│ 🔵 LOW       │  <n> findings                  │
+│ ⚪ INFO      │  <n> findings                  │
+├──────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
+│ TOTAL        │  <n> findings                  │
+└──────────────┴─────────────────────────────────┘
+
+Dependency Audit: <n> vulnerable packages found
+Secrets Scan: <n> exposed credentials found
+```
+
+---
+
+### Findings (Grouped by Category)
+
+For EACH finding, use this card format:
+
+```
+━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
+[SEVERITY EMOJI] [SEVERITY] — [VULNERABILITY TYPE]
+Confidence: HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW
+━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
+
+📍 Location:  src/routes/users.js, Line 47
+
+🔍 Vulnerable Code:
+  const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${req.params.id}`;
+  db.execute(query);
+
+⚠️  Risk:
+  An attacker can manipulate the `id` parameter to execute arbitrary
+  SQL commands, potentially dumping the entire database, bypassing
+  authentication, or deleting data.
+
+  Example attack: GET /users/1 OR 1=1--
+
+✅ Recommended Fix:
+  Use parameterized queries:
+
+  const query = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?';
+  db.execute(query, [req.params.id]);
+
+📚 Reference: OWASP A03:2021 – Injection
+━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
+```
+
+---
+
+### Dependency Audit Section
+
+```
+📦 DEPENDENCY AUDIT
+══════════════════
+
+🟠 HIGH — lodash@4.17.20 (package.json)
+  CVE-2021-23337: Prototype pollution via zipObjectDeep()
+  Fix: npm install lodash@4.17.21
+
+🟡 MEDIUM — axios@0.27.2 (package.json)
+  CVE-2023-45857: CSRF via withCredentials
+  Fix: npm install axios@1.6.0
+
+⚪ INFO — express@4.18.2
+  No known CVEs. Current version is 4.19.2 — consider updating.
+```
+
+---
+
+### Secrets Scan Section
+
+```
+🔑 SECRETS & EXPOSURE SCAN
+═══════════════════════════
+
+🔴 CRITICAL — Hardcoded API Key
+  File: src/config/database.js, Line 12
+  
+  Found: STRIPE_SECRET_KEY = "sk_live_FAKE_KEY_..."
+  
+  Action Required:
+  1. Rotate this key IMMEDIATELY at https://dashboard.stripe.com
+  2. Remove from source code
+  3. Add to .env file and load via process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY
+  4. Add .env to .gitignore
+  5. Audit git history — key may be in previous commits:
+     git log --all -p | grep "sk_live_"
+     Use git-filter-repo or BFG to purge from history if found.
+```
+
+---
+
+### Patch Proposals Section
+
+Only include for CRITICAL and HIGH findings:
+
+````
+🛠️  PATCH PROPOSALS
+══════════════════
+⚠️  REVIEW EACH PATCH BEFORE APPLYING — Nothing has been changed yet.
+
+─────────────────────────────────────────────
+Patch 1/3: SQL Injection in src/routes/users.js
+─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+BEFORE (vulnerable):
+```js
+// Line 47
+const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${req.params.id}`;
+db.execute(query);
+```
+
+AFTER (fixed):
+```js
+// Line 47 — Fixed: Use parameterized query to prevent SQL injection
+const query = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?';
+db.execute(query, [req.params.id]);
+```
+
+Apply this patch? (Review first — AI-generated patches may need adjustment)
+─────────────────────────────────────────────
+````
+
+---
+
+### Footer
+
+```
+══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+📋 SCAN COVERAGE
+  Files scanned:     <n>
+  Lines analyzed:    <n>
+  Scan duration:     <time>
+
+⚡ NEXT STEPS
+  1. Address all CRITICAL findings immediately
+  2. Schedule HIGH findings for current sprint
+  3. Add MEDIUM/LOW to your security backlog
+  4. Set up automated re-scanning in CI/CD pipelines
+
+💡 NOTE: This is a static analysis scan. It does not execute your
+   application and cannot detect all runtime vulnerabilities. Pair
+   with dynamic testing (DAST) for comprehensive coverage.
+
+══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+```
+
+---
+
+## Confidence Ratings Guide
+
+Apply to every finding:
+
+| Confidence | When to Use |
+|------------|-------------|
+| **HIGH** | Vulnerability is unambiguous. Sanitization is clearly absent. Exploitable as-is. |
+| **MEDIUM** | Vulnerability likely exists but depends on runtime context, config, or call path the agent couldn't fully trace. |
+| **LOW** | Suspicious pattern detected but could be a false positive. Flag for human review. |
+
+Never omit confidence — it helps developers prioritize their review effort.