@xemahq/kernel-contracts 0.22.2 → 0.23.0

package/src/execution-environment/lib/built-in-environments.ts

@@ -3,13 +3,12 @@ import { z } from 'zod';
 /**
  * Closed set of built-in Execution Environment kinds.
  *
- * Plan-of-record: v4.3 §2 vocabulary table (`Zone → Environment` row),
- * §3.4 (the eight built-in environments that cover every story we have
- * today), and §30.6 (`trusted-dev` environment — the developer escape
- * hatch).
+ * There are eight built-in environments that cover every story we have
+ * today, plus the `trusted-dev` environment — the developer escape
+ * hatch.
  *
  * v1 ships ONLY these built-ins; custom environments are an explicit v2
- * extension (plan §16). The downstream `ExecutionEnvironment.scope` type
+ * extension. The downstream `ExecutionEnvironment.scope` type
  * intentionally widens to `ExecutionEnvironmentKind | string` for future-
  * proofing, but at v1 the only legal scope values are members of this
  * enum — see `isExecutionEnvironmentKind`.
@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ export enum ExecutionEnvironmentKind {
   /** Biome inspected for publication; no real org data access. */
   StoreReview = 'store-review',
   /**
-   * Local-dev / personal-sandbox environment (plan §30.6). Inside it the
+   * Local-dev / personal-sandbox environment. Inside it the
    * Capability Gateway grants every capability the biome *declared* in
    * its manifest, no resource glob, no rate limit, no human approval.
    * Audit-log still records every call so devs can inspect what their
@@ -55,12 +54,11 @@ export const ExecutionEnvironmentKindSchema = z.nativeEnum(ExecutionEnvironmentK
 
 /**
  * Stable, ordered list of every built-in environment slug. Seeded at
- * boot by `authorization-api` / `object-registry-api` per plan §17.5
- * step 1.
+ * boot by `authorization-api` / `object-registry-api`.
  *
  * Ordering is intentional (system → org → project → app → session →
- * sandbox → public → store-review → trusted-dev) and matches the table
- * in §3.4 followed by the dev escape hatch from §30.6. Do not reorder
+ * sandbox → public → store-review → trusted-dev) — the built-in
+ * environments followed by the dev escape hatch. Do not reorder
  * without a coordinated migration of any consumer that relies on
  * positional iteration.
  */
@@ -79,7 +77,7 @@ export const BUILT_IN_ENVIRONMENT_SLUGS: readonly ExecutionEnvironmentKind[] = [
 /**
  * Narrowing guard: returns `true` iff `slug` is one of the built-in
  * environment slugs. Used by `ExecutionEnvironmentSchema` and the
- * authorization-api to refuse custom-scoped environments at v1 (plan §16
+ * authorization-api to refuse custom-scoped environments at v1 (a
  * non-goal).
  */
 export function isExecutionEnvironmentKind(

package/src/execution-environment/lib/execution-environment.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import {
 import { ApprovalRuleSchema, type ApprovalRule } from './approval-rule';
 
 /**
- * Canonical Execution Environment Reference grammar (plan §3.4):
+ * Canonical Execution Environment Reference grammar:
  *
  *   `environment:<slug>`
  *
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import { ApprovalRuleSchema, type ApprovalRule } from './approval-rule';
  * silently absorb a free-form string.
  *
  * v1 only mints refs whose slug is an `ExecutionEnvironmentKind` value
- * (plan §16 forbids custom environments). The type still validates the
+ * (custom environments are forbidden at v1). The type still validates the
  * *grammar* — semantic "built-in-only" enforcement lives one layer up
  * in `authorization-api`, which calls
  * `isExecutionEnvironmentKind(parseEnvironmentRef(ref).slug)`.
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ export const BUILT_IN_ENVIRONMENT_REFS: Record<
 );
 
 /**
- * Runtime budget caps the environment advertises to the gateway (plan §3.4
- * `ExecutionEnvironment.runtimeLimits`). All fields are optional — omitted means
+ * Runtime budget caps the environment advertises to the gateway
+ * (`ExecutionEnvironment.runtimeLimits`). All fields are optional — omitted means
  * "no cap from the environment", but the gateway may still apply org- or
  * grant-level caps. None of these fields fall back to a hidden default.
  */
@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ export const RuntimeLimitsSchema = z.object({
 }) as z.ZodType<RuntimeLimits>;
 
 /**
- * Allow-list of knowledge scope refs reachable from this environment (plan §3.4
- * `ExecutionEnvironment.allowedKnowledgeScopes`).
+ * Allow-list of knowledge scope refs reachable from this environment
+ * (`ExecutionEnvironment.allowedKnowledgeScopes`).
  *
  * v1 keeps the shape minimal — the ref string is sufficient for the
- * sandbox→prod boundary check that lands in Phase 4. Detailed per-scope
- * sub-schemas (e.g. spaces, page subtrees, redaction rules) are scheduled
- * for the knowledge-base-api Phase 4+ companion plan.
+ * planned sandbox→prod boundary check. Detailed per-scope
+ * sub-schemas (e.g. spaces, page subtrees, redaction rules) are deferred
+ * to a later phase.
  */
 export interface KnowledgePolicy {
   allowedRefs: readonly string[];
@@ -164,13 +164,13 @@ export const KnowledgePolicySchema = z.object({
 }) as z.ZodType<KnowledgePolicy>;
 
 /**
- * Allow-list of connector binding refs reachable from this environment (plan §3.4
- * `ExecutionEnvironment.allowedConnectors`).
+ * Allow-list of connector binding refs reachable from this environment
+ * (`ExecutionEnvironment.allowedConnectors`).
  *
  * v1 keeps the shape minimal — the ref string is sufficient for the
- * sandbox→prod boundary check that lands in Phase 4. Per-connector
+ * planned sandbox→prod boundary check. Per-connector
  * permission detail (per-repo globs, per-tracker projects, etc.) is
- * scheduled for the connector-gateway-api companion plan.
+ * deferred to a later phase.
  */
 export interface ConnectorPolicy {
   allowedRefs: readonly string[];
@@ -181,13 +181,13 @@ export const ConnectorPolicySchema = z.object({
 }) as z.ZodType<ConnectorPolicy>;
 
 /**
- * Allow-list of biome refs that may run inside this environment (plan §3.4
- * `ExecutionEnvironment.allowedBiomes`).
+ * Allow-list of biome refs that may run inside this environment
+ * (`ExecutionEnvironment.allowedBiomes`).
  *
  * v1 keeps the shape minimal — the ref string is sufficient for the
- * built-in-environment install policy that lands in Phase 4 / Phase 6. Lifecycle-
- * stage restrictions (draft / published / archived) are scheduled for the
- * biome-host-api companion plan.
+ * planned built-in-environment install policy. Lifecycle-
+ * stage restrictions (draft / published / archived) are deferred to a
+ * later phase.
  */
 export interface BiomePolicy {
   allowedRefs: readonly string[];
@@ -198,13 +198,12 @@ export const BiomePolicySchema = z.object({
 }) as z.ZodType<BiomePolicy>;
 
 /**
- * Allow-list of mount-source refs reachable from this environment (plan §3.4
- * `ExecutionEnvironment.allowedMounts`).
+ * Allow-list of mount-source refs reachable from this environment
+ * (`ExecutionEnvironment.allowedMounts`).
  *
  * v1 keeps the shape minimal — the ref string is sufficient for the
- * XVFS read/write boundary check that lands in Phase 4 / Phase 5. Per-mount
- * read/write splitting and path globs are scheduled for the xema-shell-api
- * companion plan.
+ * planned XVFS read/write boundary check. Per-mount
+ * read/write splitting and path globs are deferred to a later phase.
  */
 export interface MountPolicy {
   allowedRefs: readonly string[];
@@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ export const MountPolicySchema = z.object({
 }) as z.ZodType<MountPolicy>;
 
 /**
- * `ExecutionEnvironment` — the canonical permission-plane object (plan §3.4).
+ * `ExecutionEnvironment` — the canonical permission-plane object.
  *
  * An environment declares the capability surface, knowledge/connector/biome/mount
  * allow-lists, approval rules, and runtime budget that apply to every
@@ -232,7 +231,7 @@ export interface ExecutionEnvironment {
   /**
    * The environment's logical scope. v1 only accepts
    * `ExecutionEnvironmentKind` slugs; the string-side of the union is
-   * reserved for v2 custom environments (plan §16 non-goal at v1).
+   * reserved for v2 custom environments (a non-goal at v1).
    */
   scope: ExecutionEnvironmentKind | string;
   allowedCapabilities: CapabilityPolicy[];
@@ -250,7 +249,7 @@ export const ExecutionEnvironmentSchema = z.object({
     (s) => isExecutionEnvironmentKind(s),
     {
       message:
-        'ExecutionEnvironment.scope must be an ExecutionEnvironmentKind slug at v1; custom environments are a v2 extension (plan §16).',
+        'ExecutionEnvironment.scope must be an ExecutionEnvironmentKind slug at v1; custom environments are a v2 extension.',
     },
   ),
   allowedCapabilities: z.array(CapabilityPolicySchema),

package/src/inquiry/index.ts

@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@
 // kind-specific schema, aggregate per a policy, return a verdict."
 //
 // Runtime-agnostic. Pure types + Zod schemas. Zero framework / persistence /
-// workflow-runtime imports. The plan-of-record lives at
-// .claude/plans/i-think-what-we-ve-transient-zebra.md.
+// workflow-runtime imports.
 //
 // Per-kind prompt + reply Zod schemas live in their own contract packages
 // (`@xemahq/decision-gate-contracts`, `@xemahq/agent-tool-inquiry-

package/src/invocation/lib/invocation-mode.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import { z } from 'zod';
  * hint a mode via `ExecutionRequirements.mode`, but policy may override it.
  *
  * - `Sync` — the caller holds the request open until the composition produces
- *   its root structured output. The smallest correct slice (Phase 1).
+ *   its root structured output. The smallest correct slice.
  * - `Async` — the runtime returns immediately with a `Queued`/`Running`
  *   invocation; the caller polls the Invocation record for the terminal state.
  * - `Event` — the runtime returns without an `output`; the result is delivered

package/src/invocation/lib/invocation-record.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import {
  * per invocation. This is the source of truth for an invocation's lifecycle
  * (never the underlying session).
  *
- * `inputRef`/`outputRef` are blob/JSON references (inline JSON in Phase 1,
+ * `inputRef`/`outputRef` are blob/JSON references (inline JSON initially,
  * artifact-store refs once payloads grow). Timestamps are ISO-8601 strings.
  */
 export interface InvocationRecord {

package/src/invocation/lib/isolation-level.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import { z } from 'zod';
  *   default for mail (org+mailbox+emailThreadId): thread context is NEVER
  *   reused across unrelated emails.
  * - `PooledThread` — reuse a warm thread within the same `threadKey` (a warm
- *   session-pool optimization; future, Phase 3).
+ *   session-pool optimization; a future step).
  *
  * Closed set on purpose — both levels are honored by the runtime's pool/thread
  * management; adding a level is a coordinated kernel change.

package/src/kernel-state/lib/adapter-kind.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /**
- * KernelState adapter kinds (plan §6 Phase D.3 — locked decision L9).
+ * KernelState adapter kinds.
  *
- * The plan explicitly closes the set to TWO adapters. There is no
+ * The set is explicitly closed to TWO adapters. There is no
  * Postgres adapter for KernelState; Postgres is reserved for service
  * domain data. Two DB engines max in any deployment is a load-bearing
- * invariant — do NOT extend this enum without updating L9.
+ * invariant — do NOT extend this enum.
  *
  * - `Sqlite` — file at `~/.xema/dev/kernel-state.sqlite` (dev) or
  *   `/var/lib/xema/kernel-state.sqlite` (single-instance). Advisory

package/src/kernel-state/lib/kernel-state.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * KernelState client contract (plan §6 Phase D.3).
+ * KernelState client contract.
  *
  * KernelState is the kernel's single strongly-consistent KV / lease /
  * watch primitive. Every adapter (SQLite or etcd — see

package/src/kernel-state/lib/key-grammar.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * KernelState key grammar (plan §6 Phase D.4).
+ * KernelState key grammar.
  *
  * Every key written to KernelState MUST start with one of the prefixes
  * below. The boundary CI script `check-kernel-state-key-ownership.mjs`

package/src/mcp-tool/lib/tool-selection.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import { ToolProviderKind, toolProviderKindSchema } from './provider-kind';
  * or BiomeInstallation.id) depending on `providerKind`. Cross-org
  * misuse is blocked at every layer (selection PATCH validation,
  * resolver scope binding, bridge token scope, data-layer WHERE
- * clauses) — see `.claude/plans/we-have-integrations-as-swift-haven.md`.
+ * clauses).
  *
  * `toolName` is the canonical MCP tool name as exposed by the
  * provider's `listTools` (NOT a slug; the value MCP clients invoke).

package/src/object/lib/object-lifecycle.ts

@@ -4,8 +4,7 @@ import { z } from 'zod';
  * Lifecycle every versioned XemaObject moves through. Mirrors
  * `AgentLifecycle` from `@xemahq/agent-composition-contracts` —
  * the two enums MUST stay value-identical (one ownership model across
- * the four primitives + every other XemaObject kind, per
- * `.claude/rules/skills-and-composition.md`).
+ * the four primitives + every other XemaObject kind).
  *
  * - `Draft` — internal revision; never resolved, never installable,
  *   never referenced by a lockfile.

package/src/object/lib/xema-object-kind.ts

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ export enum XemaObjectKind {
   // Contribution registry (self-referential)
   ContributionEntry = 'contribution-entry',
 
-  // Concept registry — self-describing OS documentation objects (§31.3)
+  // Concept registry — self-describing OS documentation objects
   Concept = 'concept',
 }
 

package/src/object/lib/xema-object-ref.ts

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ import { SpaceRef, SpaceKind, spaceRefToPath } from '../../space';
 import { XemaObjectKind, XemaObjectKindSchema } from './xema-object-kind';
 
 /**
- * Stable wire shape for every XemaObject address (XSI plane 1, §3.1 +
- * §6.1 of the plan-of-record). The grammar is:
+ * Stable wire shape for every XemaObject address (XSI plane 1). The
+ * grammar is:
  *
  *   `xema://<scope-path>/<kind>/<slug>[@<version>]`
  *

package/src/org-database/lib/db-result-event.ts

@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ export interface DbColumnMeta {
 
 /**
  * Surface event payload emitted when the database explorer executes a SQL
- * statement on behalf of an agent tool call. Mirrors plan §12.4 verbatim.
+ * statement on behalf of an agent tool call.
  *
  * `rows` carries the actual row data — it MUST go to the frontend only and
  * MUST never be passed back into LLM context. Producers route it through
- * the agent-session SSE channel (in H5+) or return it inline to the
- * caller (in H1, when no SSE bridge exists yet).
+ * the agent-session SSE channel where available, or return it inline to the
+ * caller when no SSE bridge exists yet.
  *
  * `statement` is the SQL string the agent supplied. It is shown in the UI
  * as a reference for the user; it is NOT a secret. Audit logs hash the

package/src/policy/lib/obligations.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { z } from 'zod';
 import { DataClassificationSchema } from '../../space';
 
 /**
- * Closed obligation taxonomy (plan v4.3 §A.4).
+ * Closed obligation taxonomy.
  *
  * Every `PolicyObligation` carries one of these `kind` discriminants;
  * the wire payload is a discriminated union (see `PolicyObligation`).
@@ -33,8 +33,7 @@ export const PolicyObligationKindSchema = z.nativeEnum(PolicyObligationKind);
 
 /**
  * Closed runner-kind set referenced by `PolicyObligation`
- * (`require-runner-kind`) and by `RouteHint.preferredRunnerKind` (plan
- * v4.3 §2 / §A.4).
+ * (`require-runner-kind`) and by `RouteHint.preferredRunnerKind`.
  *
  * This is the canonical `RunnerKind` — the policy decision layer is its
  * primary author (policy selects on it to route an invocation), so it lives
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ export enum RunnerKind {
   Sandbox = 'sandbox',
   CI = 'ci',
   /**
-   * Phase H.3 — external MCP server bridged through `mcp-gateway-api`'s
+   * External MCP server bridged through `mcp-gateway-api`'s
    * external-bridge. The router resolves capability refs of the form
    * `<provider-slug>:<tool-name>@1` to this runner kind, then forwards
    * the invoke envelope to the bridge which translates back to an MCP
@@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ export const RunnerKindSchema = z.nativeEnum(RunnerKind);
 
 /**
  * Closed data-residency tag set referenced by `PolicyObligation`
- * (`data-residency`) (plan v4.3 §A.4).
+ * (`data-residency`).
  *
  * `customer-private` is the customer-edge tenancy class used when the
  * org runs its own runner in a private network. Add new regions by
@@ -195,7 +194,7 @@ export type EgressAllowlistObligation = z.infer<
 >;
 
 /**
- * `PolicyObligation` — closed discriminated union (plan v4.3 §A.4).
+ * `PolicyObligation` — closed discriminated union.
  *
  * Producers MUST construct one of the typed variants above; consumers
  * MUST switch on `kind` and handle every variant explicitly. The kernel

package/src/policy/lib/policy.ts

@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ import {
 import { RouteHintSchema, type RouteHint } from './route-hints';
 
 /**
- * Closed decision set (plan v4.3 §A.4).
+ * Closed decision set.
  *
  * `needs_approval` is its own outcome — never collapsed into `allow`
  * with an obligation; the router suspends the invocation when it sees
- * this kind and emits `approval.requested.v1` (plan §A.5).
+ * this kind and emits `approval.requested.v1`.
  */
 export enum PolicyDecisionKind {
   Allow = 'allow',
@@ -26,21 +26,30 @@ export const PolicyDecisionKindSchema = z.nativeEnum(PolicyDecisionKind);
 
 /**
  * Which precedence tier supplied the `credentialBindingId` on an `allow`
- * decision (plan §W4 / Pillar 3.2). Closed set — the PDP applies a fixed
+ * decision. Closed set — the PDP applies a fixed
  * priority ladder and records the winning tier so the Studio debugger (and
  * audit) can explain WHY a given binding was selected, without re-deriving it.
  *
  * Priority, highest wins:
  *   `explicit` (a grant names the binding) > `capability_default`
  *   (the descriptor's `defaultCredentialBindingRef`) > `project_default` >
- *   `org_default`. No match ⇒ the PDP emits NO binding and denies with
- *   `MISSING_CREDENTIAL_BINDING` (never a silent fallback).
+ *   `org_default` > `platform_default` (a deployment-wide default an org may
+ *   override — the Provider–Credential framework's platform tier). No match ⇒
+ *   the PDP emits NO binding and denies with `MISSING_CREDENTIAL_BINDING`
+ *   (never a silent fallback).
  */
 export enum CredentialPrecedenceSource {
   Explicit = 'explicit',
   CapabilityDefault = 'capability_default',
   ProjectDefault = 'project_default',
   OrgDefault = 'org_default',
+  /**
+   * A deployment-wide platform default provision (broadest tier, below org).
+   * An org-scoped default always overrides it. Used by `authorization-api`'s
+   * credential-precedence resolver once this kernel change is published +
+   * consumed.
+   */
+  PlatformDefault = 'platform_default',
 }
 
 export const CredentialPrecedenceSourceSchema = z.nativeEnum(
@@ -49,7 +58,7 @@ export const CredentialPrecedenceSourceSchema = z.nativeEnum(
 
 /**
  * `PolicyRequest` — the input shape `authorization-api.policyCheck`
- * accepts (plan v4.3 §A.4).
+ * accepts.
  *
  * Currently a type alias for `ExecutionContext` because every field
  * policy needs is already on the envelope. Kept as a separate name so a
@@ -63,7 +72,7 @@ export const PolicyRequestSchema: z.ZodType<PolicyRequest> =
 
 /**
  * `PolicyDecision` — the output shape `authorization-api.policyCheck`
- * returns (plan v4.3 §A.4).
+ * returns.
  *
  * `kind` is the verdict; `obligations` is a CLOSED discriminated union
  * (see `PolicyObligation`); `routeHints` carries runner-selection
@@ -77,7 +86,7 @@ export interface PolicyDecision {
   routeHints?: RouteHint;
   /**
    * The credential binding the executing gateway MUST use to resolve the
-   * external credential for this invocation (plan §W4 / Pillar 3.2). Present
+   * external credential for this invocation. Present
    * ONLY on an `allow` decision for a capability that declares an
    * `externalServiceRef`. The PDP is the single authority that selects it via
    * the deterministic precedence ladder; the router passes ONLY this opaque id

package/src/policy/lib/route-hints.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { RunnerKind, RunnerKindSchema } from './obligations';
 
 /**
  * `RouteHint` — runner-selection guidance emitted alongside a
- * `PolicyDecision` (plan v4.3 §A.4).
+ * `PolicyDecision`.
  *
  * The capability router consults this AFTER policy returns `allow`, to
  * pick a runner that satisfies all hints. Hints are PREFERENCES unless

package/src/provisioning/index.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 // @xemahq/provisioning-contracts — Workspace Provisioning wire contracts.
 //
-// Pure types + Zod schemas for the `provision` lifecycle phase (Epic A): the
+// Pure types + Zod schemas for the `provision` lifecycle phase: the
 // deterministic, guard-gated `SCAFFOLD` / `EQUIP` steps that prepare a
 // session's repo content. agent-session-api's `provisioning-plan-resolver`
 // RESOLVES a plan from biome manifests; workspace-proxy's

package/src/provisioning/lib/provisioning.ts

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ export type ProvisioningAgentInstruction = z.infer<
 >;
 
 /**
- * Presigned-URL pair for the content-addressed scaffold cache (Epic A §A4).
+ * Presigned-URL pair for the content-addressed scaffold cache.
  * agent-session-api mints these from a step's `cacheKey`; workspace-proxy
  * GETs `getUrl` to probe for a hit, and on a miss PUTs the built tar to
  * `putUrl` (write-through). `getHeaders` / `putHeaders` are the headers the
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ export const ResolvedProvisioningStepSchema = z
     targetDir: z.string().min(1),
     cacheKey: z.string().min(1).nullable(),
     /**
-     * Presigned scaffold-cache URLs derived from `cacheKey` (Epic A §A4).
+     * Presigned scaffold-cache URLs derived from `cacheKey`.
      * Present only on a cacheable step whose URLs were minted at resolve
      * time; absent ⇒ the executor builds locally with no cache.
      */
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ export type ResolvedProvisioningPlan = z.infer<
  * A `built` step that had a `cache` ref and is eligible for an out-of-band
  * cache write. The executor no longer writes the cache inline; instead it
  * surfaces the pending write here, and the caller (agent-session-api)
- * dispatches `writeScaffoldCacheWorkflow` per entry (Phase J §J3).
+ * dispatches `writeScaffoldCacheWorkflow` per entry.
  *
  * `cacheRef` is the SAME ref the plan carried in — re-passed to keep the
  * activity stateless (workspace-proxy doesn't have to retain a presigned
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ export const ProvisioningStepResultSchema = z
     /**
      * Non-empty only on a `built` step whose plan carried a `cache` ref.
      * The caller dispatches `writeScaffoldCacheWorkflow` per entry — the
-     * executor never writes the cache itself (Phase J §J3).
+     * executor never writes the cache itself.
      */
     pendingCacheWrite: ProvisioningPendingCacheWriteSchema.optional(),
   })

package/src/resource/lib/resource-ownership-contribution.ts

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ const RESOURCE_PRINCIPALS_MAX = 100;
 
 /**
  * `ResourceVisibilityPattern` — the closed set of ownership/visibility shapes a
- * biome may declare for a resource instance it contributes (plan §6 Phase 5).
+ * biome may declare for a resource instance it contributes.
  *
  * Precedence is NOT encoded here — this enum only names HOW a resource is
  * shared; the PDP in `authorization-api` derives the effective verdict from the
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ export const ExplicitShareRefSchema: z.ZodType<ExplicitShareRef> = z.object({
 
 /**
  * Manifest shape carried by every `ContributionKind.ResourceOwnership`
- * envelope (plan §6 Phase 5). One contribution = one resource instance's
+ * envelope. One contribution = one resource instance's
  * ownership/visibility declaration.
  *
  * Mirrors `CapabilityContributionManifest` precisely: a value-identical subset

package/src/runner/lib/dispatch.ts

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import {
 } from '../../execution-context';
 
 /**
- * CloudEvent type emitted on the dispatch fan-out channel (Phase F.3
- * Push transport). Pull-mode runners receive the same envelope as the
+ * CloudEvent type emitted on the dispatch fan-out channel (Push
+ * transport). Pull-mode runners receive the same envelope as the
  * body of `POST /runners/<id>/pull-work`.
  *
  * Constant, not enum — there is exactly one dispatch type today.
@@ -16,13 +16,13 @@ import {
 export const RUNNER_DISPATCH_CLOUDEVENT_TYPE = 'xema.runner.dispatch.v1' as const;
 
 /**
- * `RunnerDispatch` (Phase F.3) — superset of the legacy
+ * `RunnerDispatch` — superset of the legacy
  * `RunnerJobDispatch` shape. This v1 envelope carries the full
  * `ExecutionContext` so the runner can re-validate the policy decision
  * locally before invoking the capability.
  *
  * `tokenJwt` is the compact-JWS form of the RS256 `JobToken` minted by
- * the kernel-server (Phase F.5), aligned with `RunnerJobDispatch.tokenJwt`.
+ * the kernel-server, aligned with `RunnerJobDispatch.tokenJwt`.
  * The runner MUST verify the signature + claims against the kernel-server
  * JWKS before touching the dispatch.
  */
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ export interface RunnerDispatch {
   executionContext: ExecutionContext;
   /**
    * The capability invocation input, carried by value so the runner has the
-   * actual arguments to execute with (Phase F.7). The `ExecutionContext`
+   * actual arguments to execute with. The `ExecutionContext`
    * carries only an `inputHash` fingerprint — not the payload — so without
    * this field the runner could verify identity but had nothing to run.
    *

package/src/runner/lib/job-token.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import type { RunnerId } from './runner';
 
 /**
- * Signed job token (plan §6 Phase F.5).
+ * Signed job token.
  *
  * Kernel-server mints an RS256 token with a hard ceiling of 60 seconds
  * per invocation. The runner MUST verify signature + scope before
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ export interface JobToken {
   subjectId: string;
   /**
    * `canonicalCapabilityInputHash` of the dispatched invocation input
-   * (Phase F.7). Binds the unsigned `RunnerDispatch.input` to this signed
+   * Binds the unsigned `RunnerDispatch.input` to this signed
    * token so the runner can detect input tampering before executing.
    */
   inputHash: string;

package/src/runner/lib/runner-attestation.ts

@@ -12,14 +12,14 @@ export const RUNNER_ATTESTATION_REJECTED_CLOUDEVENT_TYPE =
   'xema.runner.attestation.rejected.v1' as const;
 
 /**
- * Runner attestation (plan §6 Phase F.4).
+ * Runner attestation.
  *
  * Carried by a runner on every `register` against the kernel-server.
  * The kernel-server validates:
  * - `identityJwt` is signed by the trusted Keycloak realm and the
  *   subject is a service-account claim of kind `runner`.
  * - `allowedEnvironments` is countersigned by an org-admin role
- *   (validated via OpenFGA / OPA — see Phase D).
+ *   (validated via OpenFGA / OPA).
  * - `signedAt` is within the configured attestation freshness window.
  *
  * Any validation failure is fail-fast — the runner is rejected and the

package/src/runner/lib/runner-job.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { z } from 'zod';
 
 /**
- * `RunnerJob` lifecycle state machine (plan §6 Phase F.7).
+ * `RunnerJob` lifecycle state machine.
  *
  *   Pending → Dispatched → Accepted → Running → Succeeded (terminal)
  *                                            ↘ Failed     (terminal)
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ export const RUNNER_JOB_COMPLETED_CLOUDEVENT_TYPE =
 
 /**
  * Report-back envelope a runner emits on accept / progress / completion
- * (Phase F.7). `workload-runtime` keys idempotent state transitions on
+ * `workload-runtime` keys idempotent state transitions on
  * `(jobId, state)`; `output` is present only on a `Succeeded` report and
  * `error` only on a `Failed` report.
  */

package/src/runner/lib/runner-mode.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Runner transport mode (plan §6 Phase F.3).
+ * Runner transport mode.
  *
  * - `Push` (cluster default) — kernel-server emits
  *   `xema.runner.dispatch.v1` CloudEvent; runner consumes via

package/src/runner/lib/runner-plane.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Runner-plane registry conventions (plan §6 Phase F.6).
+ * Runner-plane registry conventions.
  *
  * Runners do not have a bespoke registry; they publish ordinary
  * `ServiceDescriptor`s to the Service Registry under ONE well-known
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * the `ServiceDescriptor` type is in scope).
  *
  * Keeping the name + label keys here — in the kernel leaf both the
- * runner producers (Phase F.3/F.5) and the router selector consume —
+ * runner producers and the router selector consume —
  * guarantees producer/consumer agreement without a second contracts
  * package. Adding/renaming a key is a coordinated kernel change.
  */