@xanots/sdk 0.0.12 → 0.0.13

package/llms-full.txt

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# xanots v0.0.12
+# xanots v0.0.13
 
 > TypeScript SDK that compiles a typed Xano workspace into the importable packageExport JSON bundle.
 
@@ -336,10 +336,10 @@ Non-obvious authoring rules:
   `getPath()`/`verb`/`getUrl()`/`getChannel()` also pulls whatever its `stack` references:
   the `s.*`/`c.*` factory CALLS run at module load to BUILD it. Types are free.
   ⚠ A FLOOR — **~267 kB minified (~65 kB gzipped)** for the FIRST def; splitting modules
-  never removes it. The floor is the RUNTIME, not the def: a second def, or a much richer
-  one, adds ~2 kB — so reducing what a def does will not reduce it.
+  never removes it. The floor is the RUNTIME, not the def: a second or much richer def
+  adds ~2 kB, so trimming a def does not shrink it.
   Fix: `xanots routes <entry> --emit xano/routes.gen.ts` (`paths` is an accepted alias) — verbs, paths, and sockets as
-  plain data importing NOTHING, still compile-checked: `routePath("blog/{slug}", { slug })`,
+  plain data importing NOTHING, still compile-checked: `routePath("GET blog/{slug}", { slug })`
   `channelPath("rooms/{room_id}", { room_id })`, `socketUrl("chat", baseUrl)` (tenant base
   URLs lifted to `wss://h/ws/<tenant>:<canonical>`). A rename is a type error, not a 404.
 - **Intra-workspace imports use `.js` specifiers** (`../tables/links.js`), not
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ Non-obvious authoring rules:
   submission on bind, so `s.security.check_password` compares two different hashes
   and a correct password always fails (`ok:false` on a found row). Take the submitted
   password as `input.text()` on both signup and login and pass the plaintext straight
-  to `check_password` (which does the comparison hash itself).
+  to `check_password` (which does the comparison hash itself). `export()` warns.
 - **Agents authenticate with env vars — never `xanots login`.** `login` blocks on a
   browser consent no agent can complete. Set `$XANO_INSTANCE_URL` + `$XANO_WORKSPACE_ID`
   + `$XANO_META_TOKEN` and run `deploy`/`release` directly: no disk, no rotation, so it
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ The run is isolated in ways that make a correct test fail for reasons the failur
 
 - The run uses an EMPTY datasource, so **no `table({ seed })` rows exist while it runs** and every `db` read misses. A test that buys seeded row 1 fails with its own precondition message, which reads as a wrong id rather than an empty database. Create what the test needs INSIDE the test — typically a `defineFunction` fixture the stack calls first.
 - `s.api.call` does NOT raise when the endpoint answers with an error. It BINDS the error envelope (`{code, message}`) to its `as` and carries on, so a later `s.expect.to_be_defined({ expr: ref("r.field") })` reports the ASSERTION while the real failure was the call, four statements up. Assert on the envelope — `s.expect.to_contain({ expr: ref("r.code"), value: c.text("ERROR_CODE_INPUT_ERROR") })` — when a call may fail. `s.function.run` raises instead; the two disagree.
-- `s.expect.to_throw({ body, exception? })` runs `body` in an ISOLATED var stack, so a variable bound EARLIER in the test is not visible inside it — bind what the body needs inside the body. `exception` is a `Value` whose text the raised message must CONTAIN (`c.text("already exists")`, not a bare string); omit it to accept any error.
+- `s.expect.to_throw({ body, exception? })` runs `body` in an ISOLATED var stack, so a variable bound EARLIER in the test is not visible inside it — bind what the body needs inside the body. An outer one raises `Missing var entry: <name>` there, which the test reports as `to_throw` not matching (`export()` warns). `exception` is a `Value` whose text the raised message must CONTAIN (`c.text("already exists")`, not a bare string); omit it to accept any error.
 - `s.expect.to_throw` catches such a call only when the error carries a MESSAGE. `ERROR_CODE_ACCESS_DENIED` arrives with an empty one, so `to_throw` around an auth-refused call reports `to_throw failed - response is ok` — which reads as a broken auth gate on a gate that works.
 - An endpoint's `auth` gate is NOT enforced on `s.api.call`. A `query({ auth: users })` runs anyway and fails only where its stack dereferences `auth(...)`. A stack that never touches `auth(...)` runs unauthenticated and passes.
 - Neither `auth.token` nor an `Authorization` entry in `headers` authenticates the call — a token that answers 200 over real HTTP is refused here. To cover auth-gated logic, move the body into a `defineFunction` taking the user id and `s.function.call` that; the gate itself is not reachable from a workflow test.
@@ -700,11 +700,11 @@ The run is isolated in ways that make a correct test fail for reasons the failur
     - `deliverTo?`: `"channel"` (default) | `"sender"` | `"others"` | `"explicit"`. ⚠ `"explicit"` still delivers to NOBODY — nothing selects recipients from inside a handler, and `s.realtime.publish` (which originates an event INTO a channel) is not a substitute.
     - Only `"channel"`/`"others"` fan out AND are written to the `conversation` transcript — a `"sender"` response is invisible to every future joiner.
   - **Both input surfaces read as ordinary inputs:** `inp("body")` for a payload field, `inp("room_id")` for the channel's `{room_id}`. No session lookup, no frame parsing.
-    - A path param is bound ONCE at join and read from the connection thereafter, never from the frame — a sender cannot claim a room it did not join. The same values reach a channel `join`/`leave` trigger's stack.
+    - A path param is bound ONCE at join and read from the connection thereafter, never from the frame — a sender cannot claim a room it did not join.
   - `s.realtime.get_session({ as })` — the CALLER's realtime session for the current frame. FLAT shape:
     - `authenticated` bool · `client_id` text (the AUTHED ROW ID as text, `""` anonymous) · `dbo_id` int (the auth TABLE's id — NOT the user's row id; `0` anonymous — to look the caller up use `client_id`. `dbo_id` is an int in the same position and typechecks, so a gate that keys on it finds no user and refuses EVERYONE) · `socket_id` int (transport id) · `channel` text (resolved path, `""` in a server trigger) · `params` object (bound path params, `{}` when none — `ref("session.params.room_id")`) · `extras` object · `opened_at` decimal.
     - Works in a realtime MESSAGE stack and in CHANNEL and SERVER trigger stacks; off that path it degrades to an anonymous session.
-    - For a path param prefer `inp("room_id")`. Reach for the session when you need the CONNECTION (identity/extras) — "who is this sender" on an anonymous-client channel.
+    - For a path param prefer `inp("room_id")` in a MESSAGE; a lifecycle TRIGGER has only the session. Reach for the session when you need the CONNECTION (identity/extras) — "who is this sender" on an anonymous-client channel.
     - ⚠ THREE UNRELATED THINGS ARE CALLED A CLIENT ID: `session.client_id` (app-facing identity), `session.socket_id` (transport), and a frame's `options.client_id` (the at_least_once CURSOR handle). Conflating the first and last breaks at_least_once for anonymous clients.
   - `s.realtime.publish({ server, channel, data, message?, authTable?, authId? })` — the PUSH direction: originate a server-authored event onto a channel from ANY stack, no client frame first.
     - `server` is the handle or its NAME (resolved by name, not guid); `channel` is the FILLED-IN path (`channel.getChannel({ room_id: 42 })`), never the template — a constant still carrying `{param}` THROWS at author time, and a constant `server`/`channel` naming nothing this workspace registers WARNS at export.
@@ -772,8 +772,8 @@ realtimeChannelTrigger, mcpServerTrigger, agentTrigger, workspaceTrigger,
 errorTrigger}({ name, guid?, description?, active?, tags?, ... })`.
 
 - `tableTrigger({ name, table?, datasources?, actions?: {insert?,update?,delete?,truncate?}, stack })` — database/table trigger. `t.new` / `t.old` are the row **after** / **before** the change; `t.action` (`insert|update|delete|truncate`), `t.datasource`. Bind `table` to a `table()` handle and `t.new("col")` / `t.old("col")` are typed to that row (misspelled column = compile error). Nullability follows the enabled actions: insert → `old` is null, delete → `new` is null, update → both, truncate → neither. Config-only (no response).
-- `realtimeServerTrigger({ name, realtimeServer, actions?: {connect?,disconnect?}, stack?, response?, responseShape? })` — realtime SERVER lifecycle (a client connecting to / disconnecting from the server, not a message). Inputs: `t.action` (`connect|disconnect`), `t.realtime_server`, `t.client`. Bind `realtimeServer` to a `realtimeServer()` handle (or its name). `connect` GATES the connection — a denial sends an `error` and CLOSES the socket with code 4401 before it is ever ready, so it is a real front door, not an observer; same return shape as a channel `join` (`{ allowed: c.bool(true) }` or any truthy value admits, EMPTY/FALSY DENIES — INCLUDING a gating trigger with NO `response`, which returns nothing and so refuses every client). A CRASH DENIES too — the transport seeds a deny and keeps it on a throw. Both failure modes lock the door, so plan for a self-inflicted LOCKOUT (an unguarded drill into a null `db.get` raises → everyone refused), not a breach. Gating is OPT-IN: a server with no `connect` trigger accepts every connection. `disconnect` is OBSERVATIONAL (return ignored, throws swallowed — cleanup must always complete). Both are SERVER-scoped, so `s.realtime.get_session` works but carries no channel path and no bound params.
-- `realtimeChannelTrigger({ name, channel, actions?: {join?,leave?,deliver?}, stack?, response?, responseShape? })` — realtime CHANNEL lifecycle. Inputs: `t.action` (`join|leave|deliver`), `t.channel`, `t.client`. Bind `channel` to a `realtimeChannel()` handle — a bare path is NOT accepted (it is unique only within its server). The three actions have DIFFERENT postures, and the posture decides what the stack should return: `join` GATES the join (it runs BEFORE the client becomes a member, so a denial means it never sees a fan-out) — return `{ allowed: c.bool(true) }` (optional `reason` reaches the client) or any truthy value to admit, and an EMPTY OR FALSY RETURN DENIES, so a stack that just falls through — or a gating trigger with NO `response` — refuses everyone, and a CRASH DENIES too. That is the inverse of a normal message (a crashing message still delivers) and of `deliver` below (a gate that fails OPEN). `join`/`leave` bind the channel's typed path params as INPUTS, so `inp("room_id")` resolves and the gate decides per room; a SERVER connect/disconnect has no channel, the one place a path param cannot be read; `leave` is OBSERVATIONAL (return ignored, throws swallowed); `deliver` GATES delivery PER RECIPIENT — the per-viewer redaction tool and the most expensive action here (a stack per recipient per message), and it needs `delivery.perRecipient` on the channel to run at all — BOTH HALVES are required, so a `deliver` trigger on a channel without the flag NEVER RUNS and every subscriber receives the UNREDACTED payload (no error, no log line); `export()` warns on each half alone. **`deliver`'s RETURN VALUES DO NOT READ LIKE A FILTER:** ONLY an explicit NULL drops the message for that recipient; an OBJECT replaces that recipient's payload; ANYTHING ELSE — INCLUDING `false`, `0`, `""` — DELIVERS IT UNCHANGED, as does a crash. So `return false` from a yes/no redaction check SENDS the message it was written to suppress — return null instead. The delivered payload arrives NESTED, so read `inp("payload").<field>`, and `t.client` is the SENDER while `s.realtime.get_session` describes the RECIPIENT this run is for.
+- `realtimeServerTrigger({ name, realtimeServer, actions?: {connect?,disconnect?}, stack?, response?, responseShape? })` — realtime SERVER lifecycle (a client connecting to / disconnecting from the server, not a message). Inputs: `t.action` (`connect|disconnect`), `t.realtime_server`, `t.client`. Bind `realtimeServer` to a `realtimeServer()` handle (or its name). `connect` GATES the connection — a denial sends an `error` and CLOSES the socket with code 4401 before it is ever ready, so it is a real front door, not an observer; same return shape as a channel `join` below (EMPTY/FALSY DENIES — INCLUDING a gating trigger with NO `response`, which returns nothing and so refuses every client). A CRASH DENIES too — a gate that cannot answer must not admit. Both failure modes lock the door, so plan for a self-inflicted LOCKOUT (an unguarded drill into a null `db.get` raises → everyone refused), not a breach. Gating is OPT-IN: a server with no `connect` trigger accepts every connection. `disconnect` is OBSERVATIONAL (return ignored, throws swallowed — cleanup must always complete). Both are SERVER-scoped, so `s.realtime.get_session` works but carries no channel path and no bound params.
+- `realtimeChannelTrigger({ name, channel, actions?: {join?,leave?,deliver?}, stack?, response?, responseShape? })` — realtime CHANNEL lifecycle. Inputs: `t.action` (`join|leave|deliver`), `t.channel`, `t.payload`, `t.client`. Bind `channel` to a `realtimeChannel()` handle — a bare path is NOT accepted (it is unique only within its server). The three actions have DIFFERENT postures, and the posture decides what the stack should return: `join` GATES the join (it runs BEFORE the client becomes a member, so a denial means it never sees a fan-out) — return `{ allowed: c.bool(true) }` (optional `reason` reaches the client) or any truthy value to admit, and an EMPTY OR FALSY RETURN DENIES, so a stack that just falls through — or a gating trigger with NO `response` — refuses everyone, and a CRASH DENIES too. ONCE the object carries an `allowed` key admission needs STRICTLY `true` — a computed `1`/`"yes"` there DENIES. That is the inverse of a crashing message, which still delivers, and of `deliver` below. A lifecycle trigger's inputs are PINNED to those four, so a channel PATH PARAM is NOT among them — `inp("room_id")` RAISES, which crashes the gate and so REFUSES every client; take the param from `s.realtime.get_session` (`ref("session.params.room_id")`). A gate establishes NO auth, so `ref("auth.id")` reads 0 even when authenticated — identity is `t.client("permissions.dbo_id")` or the session. A SERVER connect/disconnect has no channel, so no params at all; `leave` is OBSERVATIONAL (return ignored, throws swallowed); `deliver` GATES delivery PER RECIPIENT — the per-viewer redaction tool and the most expensive action here (a stack per recipient per message), and it needs `delivery.perRecipient` on the channel to run at all — BOTH HALVES are required, so a `deliver` trigger on a channel without the flag NEVER RUNS and every subscriber receives the UNREDACTED payload (no error, no log line); `export()` warns on each half alone. **`deliver`'s RETURN VALUES DO NOT READ LIKE A FILTER:** ONLY an explicit NULL drops the message for that recipient; an OBJECT replaces that recipient's payload; ANYTHING ELSE — INCLUDING `false`, `0`, `""` — DELIVERS IT UNCHANGED, as does a crash. So `return false` from a yes/no redaction check SENDS the message it was written to suppress — return null instead. The delivered payload arrives NESTED, so read `t.payload("<field>")`, and `t.client` is the SENDER while `s.realtime.get_session` describes the RECIPIENT this run is for.
 - `mcpServerTrigger({ name, mcpServer, stack?, response?, responseShape? })` / `agentTrigger({ name, agent, stack?, response?, responseShape? })` — toolset connection. Bind with the `mcpServer()`/`agent()` def handle (or its name) — it resolves to the toolset guid at export. Raw numeric `objId` is the escape hatch, rarely right: ids are assigned at import, so a handle passed to `objId` is a type error, and binding nothing deploys a trigger that never fires. Inputs: `t.toolset` (`t.toolset("name")`), `t.tools`. Response-bearing; the default stack copies `toolset`/`tools` into vars and returns them.
 - `workspaceTrigger({ name, actions?: {branch_live?,branch_merge?,branch_new?}, stack? })` — branch lifecycle. Inputs: `t.to_branch`, `t.from_branch`, `t.action`. Config-only.
 - `errorTrigger({ name, stack? })` — error-signature trigger. Inputs: `t.event` (`new|regression|fixed`), `t.id`, `t.signature`, `t.error` (`t.error("code")`/`t.error("message")`), `t.caller`, `t.statement`, `t.actor`, `t.count`, `t.first_seen`, `t.last_seen`, `t.fixed_at`. Config-only.

package/llms.txt

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# xanots v0.0.12
+# xanots v0.0.13
 
 > TypeScript SDK that compiles a typed Xano workspace into the importable packageExport JSON bundle.
 
@@ -336,10 +336,10 @@ Non-obvious authoring rules:
   `getPath()`/`verb`/`getUrl()`/`getChannel()` also pulls whatever its `stack` references:
   the `s.*`/`c.*` factory CALLS run at module load to BUILD it. Types are free.
   ⚠ A FLOOR — **~267 kB minified (~65 kB gzipped)** for the FIRST def; splitting modules
-  never removes it. The floor is the RUNTIME, not the def: a second def, or a much richer
-  one, adds ~2 kB — so reducing what a def does will not reduce it.
+  never removes it. The floor is the RUNTIME, not the def: a second or much richer def
+  adds ~2 kB, so trimming a def does not shrink it.
   Fix: `xanots routes <entry> --emit xano/routes.gen.ts` (`paths` is an accepted alias) — verbs, paths, and sockets as
-  plain data importing NOTHING, still compile-checked: `routePath("blog/{slug}", { slug })`,
+  plain data importing NOTHING, still compile-checked: `routePath("GET blog/{slug}", { slug })`
   `channelPath("rooms/{room_id}", { room_id })`, `socketUrl("chat", baseUrl)` (tenant base
   URLs lifted to `wss://h/ws/<tenant>:<canonical>`). A rename is a type error, not a 404.
 - **Intra-workspace imports use `.js` specifiers** (`../tables/links.js`), not
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ Non-obvious authoring rules:
   submission on bind, so `s.security.check_password` compares two different hashes
   and a correct password always fails (`ok:false` on a found row). Take the submitted
   password as `input.text()` on both signup and login and pass the plaintext straight
-  to `check_password` (which does the comparison hash itself).
+  to `check_password` (which does the comparison hash itself). `export()` warns.
 - **Agents authenticate with env vars — never `xanots login`.** `login` blocks on a
   browser consent no agent can complete. Set `$XANO_INSTANCE_URL` + `$XANO_WORKSPACE_ID`
   + `$XANO_META_TOKEN` and run `deploy`/`release` directly: no disk, no rotation, so it

package/manifest.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "xanots",
-  "version": "0.0.12",
+  "version": "0.0.13",
   "description": "TypeScript SDK that compiles a typed Xano workspace into the importable packageExport JSON bundle.",
   "coverage": {
     "objectKinds": {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@xanots/sdk",
-  "version": "0.0.12",
+  "version": "0.0.13",
   "description": "XanoTS — your Xano backend as TypeScript. `xanots deploy` ships your typed workspace (and an optional static frontend) to a live, auto-expiring ephemeral environment and prints its URL. init → deploy → URL.",
   "keywords": [
     "xanots",