@x1id/resolve 0.8.0 → 0.9.0

package/dist/agent.js

@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ export function x402AcceptsFromManifest(manifest, opts) {
     // Mainnet has no such id yet — X1 mainnet doesn't exist — so a manifest
     // claiming network: "mainnet" without its own explicit x402.network gets
     // an honestly-provisional placeholder rather than a fabricated genesis hash.
-    const network = x402?.network ?? (manifest.x1id.network === "testnet" ? X1_TESTNET_NETWORK : "x1:mainnet-unassigned");
+    const network = x402?.network ?? (manifest.x1id.network === "testnet" ? X1_TESTNET_NETWORK : "solana:mainnet-unassigned");
     const payTo = opts?.payTo ?? manifest.payment?.addresses?.[0]?.address;
     return x402Endpoints.map((e) => {
         const hint = {

package/dist/base58.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
 export declare function encodeBase58(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
+/**
+ * Decode base58 to its exact bytes (standard leading-`1`→leading-zero-byte
+ * handling), or null for a character outside the alphabet. Unlike
+ * {@link decodeBase58_32} this preserves length, so it decodes a 64-byte
+ * ed25519 signature (`signin.ts`) as faithfully as a 32-byte key. Pass
+ * `expectedLen` to reject anything but that length up front.
+ */
+export declare function decodeBase58(s: string, expectedLen?: number): Uint8Array | null;
 /** Decode to exactly 32 bytes, or null if the input is not a valid address. */
 export declare function decodeBase58_32(s: string): Uint8Array | null;

package/dist/base58.js

@@ -16,6 +16,37 @@ export function encodeBase58(bytes) {
     }
     return out === "" ? "1" : out;
 }
+/**
+ * Decode base58 to its exact bytes (standard leading-`1`→leading-zero-byte
+ * handling), or null for a character outside the alphabet. Unlike
+ * {@link decodeBase58_32} this preserves length, so it decodes a 64-byte
+ * ed25519 signature (`signin.ts`) as faithfully as a 32-byte key. Pass
+ * `expectedLen` to reject anything but that length up front.
+ */
+export function decodeBase58(s, expectedLen) {
+    if (s.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    let zeros = 0;
+    while (zeros < s.length && s[zeros] === "1")
+        zeros++;
+    let n = 0n;
+    for (const c of s) {
+        const i = A.indexOf(c);
+        if (i === -1)
+            return null;
+        n = n * 58n + BigInt(i);
+    }
+    const tail = [];
+    while (n > 0n) {
+        tail.unshift(Number(n & 255n));
+        n >>= 8n;
+    }
+    const out = new Uint8Array(zeros + tail.length);
+    out.set(tail, zeros);
+    if (expectedLen !== undefined && out.length !== expectedLen)
+        return null;
+    return out;
+}
 /** Decode to exactly 32 bytes, or null if the input is not a valid address. */
 export function decodeBase58_32(s) {
     if (s.length === 0 || s.length > 44)

package/dist/gate.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/**
+ * Attestation-gated allowlists (#8316) — gate access to your app by whether an
+ * `@handle` holds a verified on-chain attestation (any signal, or a SPECIFIC
+ * platform like "verified GitHub"). A project reuses X1ID's blue-tick oracle as
+ * its allowlist instead of running its own KYC.
+ *
+ * The gate operates on the attestations {@link fetchAttestations} returns; the
+ * staleness rule (an attestation only counts for the CURRENT owner —
+ * `attested_at >= handle.registered_at`) is already baked into `HandleAttestation.stale`,
+ * and this module always ignores stale ones. Nothing here trusts an off-chain
+ * claim: every input is an on-chain, attestor-signed `Attestation` account.
+ */
+import { type HandleAttestation } from "./attestation.js";
+import type { RpcFn } from "./accounts.js";
+/** What a handle must prove to pass the gate:
+ *  - `"any-verified"` — at least one non-stale attestation of any kind.
+ *  - `{ kind }` — a non-stale attestation of exactly that kind.
+ *  - `{ anyOf }` — a non-stale attestation of any listed kind (e.g. X OR GitHub). */
+export type Gate = "any-verified" | {
+    readonly kind: number;
+} | {
+    readonly anyOf: readonly number[];
+};
+/** Named platform kinds, re-exported so callers gate without magic numbers. */
+export declare const GateKind: {
+    readonly dns: 0;
+    readonly social: 1;
+    readonly x: 2;
+    readonly discord: 3;
+    readonly github: 4;
+    readonly telegram: 5;
+};
+/** Pure check: do these (already-fetched) attestations satisfy the gate?
+ *  Stale attestations never count. */
+export declare function attestationsPassGate(attestations: readonly HandleAttestation[], gate: Gate): boolean;
+/** Fetch a handle's attestations and test the gate in one call. `handleAccount`,
+ *  `registeredAt` and `recordsClearedAt` come from the handle you resolved
+ *  (name → `deriveHandleAccount` → decode). Returns the pass/fail plus the
+ *  attestations so a caller can also render WHICH signals matched. */
+export declare function handlePassesGate(rpc: RpcFn, programId: string, handleAccount: string, registeredAt: bigint, recordsClearedAt: bigint, gate: Gate): Promise<{
+    readonly passed: boolean;
+    readonly attestations: HandleAttestation[];
+}>;

package/dist/gate.js

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/**
+ * Attestation-gated allowlists (#8316) — gate access to your app by whether an
+ * `@handle` holds a verified on-chain attestation (any signal, or a SPECIFIC
+ * platform like "verified GitHub"). A project reuses X1ID's blue-tick oracle as
+ * its allowlist instead of running its own KYC.
+ *
+ * The gate operates on the attestations {@link fetchAttestations} returns; the
+ * staleness rule (an attestation only counts for the CURRENT owner —
+ * `attested_at >= handle.registered_at`) is already baked into `HandleAttestation.stale`,
+ * and this module always ignores stale ones. Nothing here trusts an off-chain
+ * claim: every input is an on-chain, attestor-signed `Attestation` account.
+ */
+import { fetchAttestations, isHandleVerified, ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS, ATTESTATION_KIND_SOCIAL, ATTESTATION_KIND_X, ATTESTATION_KIND_DISCORD, ATTESTATION_KIND_GITHUB, ATTESTATION_KIND_TELEGRAM, } from "./attestation.js";
+/** Named platform kinds, re-exported so callers gate without magic numbers. */
+export const GateKind = {
+    dns: ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS,
+    social: ATTESTATION_KIND_SOCIAL,
+    x: ATTESTATION_KIND_X,
+    discord: ATTESTATION_KIND_DISCORD,
+    github: ATTESTATION_KIND_GITHUB,
+    telegram: ATTESTATION_KIND_TELEGRAM,
+};
+/** Pure check: do these (already-fetched) attestations satisfy the gate?
+ *  Stale attestations never count. */
+export function attestationsPassGate(attestations, gate) {
+    if (gate === "any-verified")
+        return isHandleVerified(attestations);
+    const kinds = "kind" in gate ? [gate.kind] : gate.anyOf;
+    return attestations.some((a) => !a.stale && kinds.includes(a.kind));
+}
+/** Fetch a handle's attestations and test the gate in one call. `handleAccount`,
+ *  `registeredAt` and `recordsClearedAt` come from the handle you resolved
+ *  (name → `deriveHandleAccount` → decode). Returns the pass/fail plus the
+ *  attestations so a caller can also render WHICH signals matched. */
+export async function handlePassesGate(rpc, programId, handleAccount, registeredAt, recordsClearedAt, gate) {
+    const attestations = await fetchAttestations(rpc, programId, handleAccount, registeredAt, recordsClearedAt);
+    return { passed: attestationsPassGate(attestations, gate), attestations };
+}

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -27,13 +27,14 @@
 export * from "./types.js";
 export { normalizeHandle, parseName, looksLikeName, type ParsedName } from "./parse.js";
 export { WasmResolver, type WasmTld } from "./wasm.js";
-export { encodeBase58, decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";
+export { encodeBase58, decodeBase58, decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";
 export { decodeRecord, liveRecords, chainForCoinType, valueToAddress, fetchRecords, RECORD_LEN, RECORD_DISC, type HandleRecord, } from "./records.js";
 export { buildControlChallenge, parseControlChallenge, generateControlNonce, createControlChallenge, verifyControlProof, verifyEd25519Strict, CONTROL_CHALLENGE_PREFIX, type ControlChallenge, type ControlConfig, type ControlProof, type ControlVerification, type ControlFailureReason, } from "./control.js";
 export * from "./delegate.js";
 export * from "./subname.js";
 export * from "./recordCount.js";
 export * from "./attestation.js";
+export * from "./gate.js";
 export * from "./textRecords.js";
 export * from "./lock.js";
 export * from "./integrator.js";
@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ export * from "./recordWrite.js";
 export * from "./clearRecords.js";
 export * from "./commitReveal.js";
 export * from "./pnftTransfer.js";
+export * from "./signin.js";
 import { type Chain, type Resolved } from "./types.js";
 import { WasmResolver } from "./wasm.js";
 import { type HandleRecord } from "./records.js";

package/dist/index.js

@@ -27,13 +27,14 @@
 export * from "./types.js";
 export { normalizeHandle, parseName, looksLikeName } from "./parse.js";
 export { WasmResolver } from "./wasm.js";
-export { encodeBase58, decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";
+export { encodeBase58, decodeBase58, decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";
 export { decodeRecord, liveRecords, chainForCoinType, valueToAddress, fetchRecords, RECORD_LEN, RECORD_DISC, } from "./records.js";
 export { buildControlChallenge, parseControlChallenge, generateControlNonce, createControlChallenge, verifyControlProof, verifyEd25519Strict, CONTROL_CHALLENGE_PREFIX, } from "./control.js";
 export * from "./delegate.js";
 export * from "./subname.js";
 export * from "./recordCount.js";
 export * from "./attestation.js";
+export * from "./gate.js";
 export * from "./textRecords.js";
 export * from "./lock.js";
 export * from "./integrator.js";
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ export * from "./recordWrite.js";
 export * from "./clearRecords.js";
 export * from "./commitReveal.js";
 export * from "./pnftTransfer.js";
+export * from "./signin.js";
 import { ResolveError, CHAIN_COIN_TYPE } from "./types.js";
 import { parseName } from "./parse.js";
 import { encodeBase58, decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";

package/dist/signin.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+/**
+ * "Sign in with X1ID" — a client-side, wallet-signature proof of @handle
+ * ownership (WP #8313). An OAuth-style login *primitive*, framework-agnostic,
+ * that any third-party app can drop in to let a user authenticate as their
+ * `@handle`.
+ *
+ * # What this is — and, honestly, what it is not
+ *
+ * X1ID's app is a static export and `@x1id/resolve` is a pure client library:
+ * there is **no server-side token exchange** here. This module is therefore
+ * the SIWE-style ("Sign-In With Ethereum", EIP-4361) shape adapted to X1:
+ *
+ *   1. the relying app builds a **domain-bound** challenge naming the wallet,
+ *      a fresh nonce, an issued-at and an expiry ({@link createSignInChallenge});
+ *   2. the wallet signs the raw UTF-8 bytes of that challenge (ed25519 — X1 and
+ *      Solana share the curve and key format);
+ *   3. the relying app verifies the signature ({@link verifySignIn}) and then
+ *      reverse-resolves the address to its primary `@handle` and verification
+ *      summary ({@link resolveIdentity}).
+ *
+ * A single verified sign-in proves exactly: **"this wallet, which *currently*
+ * owns @handle, signed this challenge for this domain, before it expired."** It
+ * is NOT a session and NOT a bearer token — the relying app MUST bind the
+ * verified identity to its own session (a cookie, a JWT it mints, ...). And
+ * handle ownership can change (a sale, a transfer, `clear_primary`), so a long-
+ * lived session should re-run {@link resolveIdentity} periodically rather than
+ * trust a handle captured at login forever.
+ *
+ * A full hosted OAuth *authorization-code server* (real token issuance, a
+ * `/authorize` + `/token` pair, refresh tokens) needs a backend and is
+ * deliberately **out of scope** — see the README's "What needs a server".
+ *
+ * # Reuse, not reinvention
+ *
+ * - Signature verification is the SDK's existing RFC-8032-strict
+ *   {@link import("./control.js").verifyEd25519Strict} (WebCrypto Ed25519),
+ *   the same primitive the control-proof flow relies on. No new crypto.
+ * - Identity resolution is the SDK's own {@link import("./index.js").createResolver}
+ *   `reverse()` (with all its staleness/authority trust rules) plus
+ *   {@link import("./attestation.js").fetchAttestations} — never a re-derived
+ *   PDA or a hand-rolled ownership check.
+ *
+ * # Cross-protocol separation
+ *
+ * A sign-in challenge is always a MULTI-LINE SIWE block (it contains `\n`).
+ * The record-verification challenge (`x1-handles:v1:...`) and the control-proof
+ * challenge (`x1-handles:ctl:v1:...`) are both single lines with no newline, so
+ * a signature obtained for one can never validate as another — the byte spaces
+ * are structurally disjoint.
+ */
+/** Why a verification or a convenience sign-in failed. Mirrors `ResolveError`'s
+ *  code-not-string style so a UI can branch on the cause. */
+export type SignInFailureReason = 
+/** The challenge string is not a well-formed sign-in challenge. */
+"invalid-challenge"
+/** The signature is malformed (not base58, or not 64 bytes). */
+ | "invalid-signature"
+/** The address argument is not a valid base58 X1 address. */
+ | "invalid-address"
+/** The address argument does not match the address bound in the challenge. */
+ | "address-mismatch"
+/** An `expectedDomain` was given and does not match the challenge's domain. */
+ | "domain-mismatch"
+/** An `expectedNonce` was given and does not match the challenge's nonce. */
+ | "nonce-mismatch"
+/** `now` is before the challenge's issued-at (minus skew) — clock problem
+ *  or a challenge minted for the future. */
+ | "not-yet-valid"
+/** `now` is past the challenge's expiry (plus skew). Replay window closed. */
+ | "expired"
+/** The signature does not verify over the challenge bytes for this address. */
+ | "bad-signature";
+/** Codes a thrown {@link SignInError} carries — every {@link SignInFailureReason}
+ *  plus the convenience-flow-only outcomes. */
+export type SignInErrorCode = SignInFailureReason | "no-handle" | "wallet-error" | "invalid-params";
+/**
+ * Thrown by {@link signInWithX1ID} (the convenience flow) and by the argument
+ * validation in {@link createSignInChallenge}. Pure verification via
+ * {@link verifySignIn} does NOT throw for a verification outcome — it returns
+ * `{ ok: false, reason }` — this class is for the throw-based login call.
+ */
+export declare class SignInError extends Error {
+    readonly code: SignInErrorCode;
+    readonly cause?: unknown | undefined;
+    constructor(code: SignInErrorCode, message: string, cause?: unknown | undefined);
+}
+export interface SignInChallengeParams {
+    /** The relying party's domain, e.g. `"app.example.com"`. Bound into the
+     *  challenge; a signature for one domain never validates for another. */
+    readonly domain: string;
+    /** The X1 wallet address (base58) that will sign. Bound into the challenge so
+     *  a signature cannot be lifted onto a different account's session. */
+    readonly address: string;
+    /** Optional human-readable statement shown to the user in their wallet. Single
+     *  line only (a newline would corrupt the challenge structure). */
+    readonly statement?: string;
+    /** Resource URI. Defaults to `https://<domain>`. */
+    readonly uri?: string;
+    /** Single-use nonce. Generated ({@link generateSignInNonce}) when omitted. */
+    readonly nonce?: string;
+    /** Issued-at, ms since epoch. Defaults to `Date.now()`. */
+    readonly issuedAt?: number;
+    /** Lifetime in seconds from issued-at. Defaults to 300 (5 minutes). */
+    readonly expiresInSec?: number;
+}
+/** A built challenge: the exact string to sign, plus its parsed fields for the
+ *  relying party to store (nonce single-use, expiry enforcement are the RP's). */
+export interface SignInChallenge {
+    /** The exact string whose raw UTF-8 bytes the wallet signs. */
+    readonly challenge: string;
+    readonly domain: string;
+    readonly address: string;
+    readonly uri: string;
+    readonly statement: string | null;
+    readonly nonce: string;
+    /** Issued-at, ms since epoch. */
+    readonly issuedAt: number;
+    /** Expiry, ms since epoch. */
+    readonly expiresAt: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Generate a single-use sign-in nonce: `bytes` bytes (>= 8) from the platform
+ * CSPRNG, hex-encoded to stay inside the nonce charset. SINGLE-USE — the
+ * relying party stores it with the issued challenge and rejects a second proof
+ * against it (client-side code cannot enforce single use; the RP must).
+ */
+export declare function generateSignInNonce(bytes?: number): string;
+/**
+ * Build a deterministic, human-readable SIWE-style sign-in challenge.
+ *
+ * The exact bytes signed are the UTF-8 encoding of this string (no wallet
+ * prefix — the wallet's `signMessage` signs the message as given):
+ *
+ *     <domain> wants you to sign in with your X1 account:
+ *     <address>
+ *
+ *     <statement>            ← omitted, with its blank line, when no statement
+ *
+ *     URI: <uri>
+ *     Version: 1
+ *     Chain: X1
+ *     Nonce: <nonce>
+ *     Issued At: <ISO-8601>
+ *     Expiration Time: <ISO-8601>
+ *
+ * @throws {SignInError} `invalid-params` for a bad domain, address, statement,
+ * nonce, or time.
+ */
+export declare function createSignInChallenge(params: SignInChallengeParams): SignInChallenge;
+/** The fields recovered from a challenge string. */
+export interface ParsedSignInChallenge {
+    readonly domain: string;
+    readonly address: string;
+    readonly uri: string;
+    readonly statement: string | null;
+    readonly nonce: string;
+    readonly issuedAt: number;
+    readonly expiresAt: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Parse a sign-in challenge string back to its fields, or null for anything
+ * that is not one — including a record-verification or control-proof challenge
+ * (both single-line, so they fail the header match). This is a pure structural
+ * parse; it proves nothing about the signature.
+ */
+export declare function parseSignInChallenge(challenge: string): ParsedSignInChallenge | null;
+export interface VerifySignInParams {
+    /** The challenge string the wallet signed (built by {@link createSignInChallenge}). */
+    readonly challenge: string;
+    /** The address that supposedly signed, base58. Must match the challenge's. */
+    readonly address: string;
+    /** The 64-byte ed25519 signature, base58-encoded (what a wallet's
+     *  `signMessage` output looks like once base58'd, the common wire form). */
+    readonly signatureBase58: string;
+    /** If given, require the challenge's domain to equal this — the relying
+     *  party's own domain. Strongly recommended: it turns the signed-in domain
+     *  binding into an *enforced* check against phishing. */
+    readonly expectedDomain?: string;
+    /** If given, require the challenge's nonce to equal this — the nonce the RP
+     *  issued and is about to burn. */
+    readonly expectedNonce?: string;
+    /** `Date.now()` override, ms — for tests and deterministic demos. */
+    readonly now?: number;
+    /** Allowed clock skew in seconds for issued-at/expiry. Default 60. */
+    readonly clockSkewSec?: number;
+    /** Ed25519 verifier override for runtimes whose WebCrypto lacks Ed25519.
+     *  Defaults to the SDK's RFC-8032-strict {@link verifyEd25519Strict}. */
+    readonly verifyEd25519?: (publicKey: Uint8Array, message: Uint8Array, signature: Uint8Array) => Promise<boolean>;
+}
+export type SignInVerification = {
+    readonly ok: true;
+    /** The verified signer, base58 (canonical spelling). */
+    readonly address: string;
+    readonly domain: string;
+    readonly nonce: string;
+    readonly issuedAt: number;
+    readonly expiresAt: number;
+} | {
+    readonly ok: false;
+    readonly reason: SignInFailureReason;
+    readonly message: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Verify a sign-in proof: the signature is a valid ed25519 signature over the
+ * exact challenge bytes for `address`, the address is the one bound in the
+ * challenge, and `now` is inside `[issuedAt, expiresAt]` (± skew). Optionally
+ * enforces `expectedDomain` / `expectedNonce`.
+ *
+ * Verification outcomes come back as `{ ok: false, reason }` — this function
+ * never throws for one. It does NOT touch the chain: it proves only that the
+ * wallet signed. Whether that wallet currently owns a handle is a separate,
+ * on-chain question answered by {@link resolveIdentity}.
+ *
+ * Replay protection is nonce + expiry, and both need the relying party: pass
+ * `expectedNonce` (and never accept the same nonce twice), and keep the expiry
+ * window short. The domain binding needs `expectedDomain` to become a check.
+ */
+export declare function verifySignIn(params: VerifySignInParams): Promise<SignInVerification>;
+/** One live "verified by [platform]" signal on the signed-in handle. */
+export interface IdentityVerification {
+    /** Platform slug (`"x"`, `"discord"`, `"github"`, `"telegram"`) or the legacy
+     *  `"dns"` / `"social"` kind names, or null for a kind this SDK does not know. */
+    readonly platform: string | null;
+    /** Raw attestation kind byte. */
+    readonly kind: number;
+    /** Unix seconds the attestation was (last) stamped. */
+    readonly attestedAt: number;
+}
+/** The friendly identity behind an address. */
+export interface ResolvedIdentity {
+    /** The address resolved, base58 (canonical). */
+    readonly address: string;
+    /** The address's primary `@handle` (canonical, no `@`), or null when it has
+     *  no trustworthy handle primary. An X1NS-only primary comes back as null
+     *  here — this is the @handle identity surface. */
+    readonly handle: string | null;
+    /** Ready-to-render label: `@<handle>` or null. */
+    readonly display: string | null;
+    /** Whether the handle carries at least one LIVE verification (the blue-tick
+     *  condition, #7145). False when there is no handle. Trust caveat: a true
+     *  means x1id's rotatable attestor key vouched for an off-chain review — read
+     *  it as "verified by x1id", not trustless proof. */
+    readonly verified: boolean;
+    /** The live verifications, if any. */
+    readonly verifications: readonly IdentityVerification[];
+}
+export interface IdentityConfig {
+    /** X1 RPC endpoint. */
+    readonly rpcUrl: string;
+    /** The WASM resolver the app already loaded (needed for PDA derivation). */
+    readonly wasm: import("./wasm.js").WasmResolver;
+    /** Optional fetch override for testing or custom transport. */
+    readonly fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
+    /** @handle registry program id. Defaults to the canonical X1 deployment. */
+    readonly handleProgramId?: string;
+    /** Resolver cache TTL in ms (passed through to `createResolver`). */
+    readonly cacheTtlMs?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Reverse-resolve an address to its primary `@handle` and verification summary.
+ *
+ * Reuses the SDK's own `createResolver().reverse()` — with every staleness and
+ * current-authority rule it enforces — for the handle, then
+ * {@link import("./attestation.js").fetchAttestations} for the "verified by"
+ * summary, read with the same epoch/`records_cleared_at` staleness rule the
+ * rest of the SDK applies. Nothing here re-derives a PDA or re-checks ownership
+ * by hand.
+ *
+ * @throws {import("./types.js").ResolveError} `rpc-error` for transport
+ * problems (a handle with no primary is not an error — `handle` is null).
+ */
+export declare function resolveIdentity(cfg: IdentityConfig, address: string): Promise<ResolvedIdentity>;
+export interface SignInWithX1IDParams extends IdentityConfig {
+    /** The connected wallet's `signMessage`: signs the raw message bytes and
+     *  returns the 64-byte ed25519 signature. Matches the X1ID app's wallet
+     *  adapter (`app/src/lib/wallet` normalizes every provider to this shape). */
+    readonly signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => Promise<Uint8Array>;
+    /** The connected wallet's address, base58 — known from wallet-connect before
+     *  signing, bound into the challenge and used to verify. */
+    readonly address: string;
+    /** The relying party's domain. */
+    readonly domain: string;
+    readonly statement?: string;
+    readonly uri?: string;
+    readonly nonce?: string;
+    readonly issuedAt?: number;
+    readonly expiresInSec?: number;
+    /** Throw `no-handle` when the wallet has no primary @handle. Default true —
+     *  "Sign in with X1ID" implies an X1ID. Set false to allow handle-less
+     *  sign-in (returns `handle: null`). */
+    readonly requireHandle?: boolean;
+    readonly clockSkewSec?: number;
+    readonly now?: number;
+    readonly verifyEd25519?: VerifySignInParams["verifyEd25519"];
+}
+export interface SignInIdentity extends ResolvedIdentity {
+    /** The exact challenge that was signed — store it with the session if you
+     *  want an audit trail of what the user agreed to. */
+    readonly challenge: string;
+    readonly nonce: string;
+    readonly issuedAt: number;
+    readonly expiresAt: number;
+}
+/**
+ * The whole flow in one call: build a domain-bound challenge, have the wallet
+ * sign it, verify the signature, and resolve the address to its `@handle`
+ * identity. Returns the resolved identity on success.
+ *
+ * The relying party still owns the *session*: bind the returned identity to
+ * your own session and re-check ownership periodically — this call proves the
+ * signature at THIS moment, nothing longer-lived.
+ *
+ * @throws {SignInError} `wallet-error` if the wallet rejects/fails signing, a
+ * verification `SignInFailureReason` code if the signature does not verify, or
+ * `no-handle` when `requireHandle` (default) and the wallet has no primary
+ * handle.
+ */
+export declare function signInWithX1ID(params: SignInWithX1IDParams): Promise<SignInIdentity>;

package/dist/x402.d.ts

@@ -14,19 +14,26 @@
  * 2026-09-22 — NOT invented. See `docs/x402.md` for the full design,
  * including what's explicitly OUT of scope here (a facilitator).
  *
- * # The one x1id-specific choice: the network identifier
+ * # The network identifier — CAIP-30, for OSS interop (#8325)
  *
- * x402's Solana networks use `"solana:<genesis-hash>"` (CAIP-2-shaped). X1
- * is SVM-compatible but its OWN chain — not Solana — so it gets its own
- * namespace under the identical convention: `"x1:<genesis-hash>"`. This is
- * NOT an x402-foundation-registered network; it's a principled extension of
- * their own pattern to a new SVM-compatible chain, not a claim of official
- * support. {@link X1_TESTNET_NETWORK} is the live testnet genesis hash,
- * verified against `getGenesisHash` 2026-09-22.
+ * x402's SVM networks use `"solana:<first-32-of-genesis>"` (CAIP-30: the
+ * `solana:` namespace + the first 32 base58 chars of the genesis hash). X1 is
+ * its own SVM chain, but `@x402/core`'s reference client/facilitator only route
+ * the `solana:*` scheme family — so to let ANY standard, unmodified x402 client
+ * or wallet pay an x1id agent out of the box, X1 testnet uses the CAIP-30 form
+ * keyed on X1's genesis. (Fortiswap's self-hosted X1 facilitator uses the
+ * identical id.) An earlier release used a principled `"x1:<full-genesis>"`
+ * extension; it was OSS-incompatible, so this migrated to CAIP-30 —
+ * {@link X1_LEGACY_TESTNET_NETWORK} is kept only for reading older manifests.
+ * Verified against `getGenesisHash` (full hash
+ * `C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho`).
  */
-/** X1 testnet's x402 network identifier (`"x1:<genesis-hash>"`, verified
- *  live 2026-09-22 via `getGenesisHash`). */
-export declare const X1_TESTNET_NETWORK = "x1:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho";
+/** X1 testnet's x402 network id — CAIP-30 `"solana:" + first 32 chars of the
+ *  genesis hash — so unmodified OSS x402 clients route to it (#8325). */
+export declare const X1_TESTNET_NETWORK = "solana:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWw";
+/** The pre-#8325 `"x1:<full-genesis>"` id. DEPRECATED — kept only so a reader
+ *  can still recognise manifests published before the CAIP-30 migration. */
+export declare const X1_LEGACY_TESTNET_NETWORK = "x1:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho";
 /** The x402 scheme x1id implements — "exact": pay a fixed amount of a named
  *  asset to a named recipient. (x402 also defines "upto" for usage-based
  *  pricing; not implemented here.) */

package/dist/x402.js

@@ -14,19 +14,26 @@
  * 2026-09-22 — NOT invented. See `docs/x402.md` for the full design,
  * including what's explicitly OUT of scope here (a facilitator).
  *
- * # The one x1id-specific choice: the network identifier
+ * # The network identifier — CAIP-30, for OSS interop (#8325)
  *
- * x402's Solana networks use `"solana:<genesis-hash>"` (CAIP-2-shaped). X1
- * is SVM-compatible but its OWN chain — not Solana — so it gets its own
- * namespace under the identical convention: `"x1:<genesis-hash>"`. This is
- * NOT an x402-foundation-registered network; it's a principled extension of
- * their own pattern to a new SVM-compatible chain, not a claim of official
- * support. {@link X1_TESTNET_NETWORK} is the live testnet genesis hash,
- * verified against `getGenesisHash` 2026-09-22.
+ * x402's SVM networks use `"solana:<first-32-of-genesis>"` (CAIP-30: the
+ * `solana:` namespace + the first 32 base58 chars of the genesis hash). X1 is
+ * its own SVM chain, but `@x402/core`'s reference client/facilitator only route
+ * the `solana:*` scheme family — so to let ANY standard, unmodified x402 client
+ * or wallet pay an x1id agent out of the box, X1 testnet uses the CAIP-30 form
+ * keyed on X1's genesis. (Fortiswap's self-hosted X1 facilitator uses the
+ * identical id.) An earlier release used a principled `"x1:<full-genesis>"`
+ * extension; it was OSS-incompatible, so this migrated to CAIP-30 —
+ * {@link X1_LEGACY_TESTNET_NETWORK} is kept only for reading older manifests.
+ * Verified against `getGenesisHash` (full hash
+ * `C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho`).
  */
-/** X1 testnet's x402 network identifier (`"x1:<genesis-hash>"`, verified
- *  live 2026-09-22 via `getGenesisHash`). */
-export const X1_TESTNET_NETWORK = "x1:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho";
+/** X1 testnet's x402 network id — CAIP-30 `"solana:" + first 32 chars of the
+ *  genesis hash — so unmodified OSS x402 clients route to it (#8325). */
+export const X1_TESTNET_NETWORK = "solana:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWw";
+/** The pre-#8325 `"x1:<full-genesis>"` id. DEPRECATED — kept only so a reader
+ *  can still recognise manifests published before the CAIP-30 migration. */
+export const X1_LEGACY_TESTNET_NETWORK = "x1:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho";
 /** The x402 scheme x1id implements — "exact": pay a fixed amount of a named
  *  asset to a named recipient. (x402 also defines "upto" for usage-based
  *  pricing; not implemented here.) */

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@x1id/resolve",
-  "version": "0.8.0",
+  "version": "0.9.0",
   "description": "Resolve @handles and X1NS names on X1. Never silently picks between namespaces.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
     "build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
     "test": "node --test test/*.test.js",
     "lint:package": "publint",
-    "prepublishOnly": "npm run build"
+    "prepublishOnly": "cargo build --release -p x1-resolve-wasm --target wasm32-unknown-unknown --manifest-path ../Cargo.toml && node ../web/verify-wasm.mjs wasm/x1_resolve_wasm.wasm ../target/wasm32-unknown-unknown/release/x1_resolve_wasm.wasm && npm run build"
   },
   "keywords": [
     "x1",
@@ -59,12 +59,5 @@
     "@solana/web3.js": {
       "optional": true
     }
-  },
-  "repository": {
-    "type": "git",
-    "url": "git+https://github.com/fortiblox/x1id-sdk.git"
-  },
-  "bugs": {
-    "url": "https://x1id.io"
   }
 }

package/LICENSE

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-MIT License
-
-Copyright (c) 2026 Fortiblox
-
-Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-
-The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
-copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-
-THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
-IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
-FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
-LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
-OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
-SOFTWARE.