@x1id/resolve 0.7.0 → 0.9.0

package/README.md

@@ -204,6 +204,76 @@ one: `ResolveError { code: "not-found", reason: "nft-burned" }`. The registry
 account's stale `owner` field is never returned for a tokenized handle, on any
 path.
 
+## Per-platform verification ("verified by [platform]")
+
+Beyond the per-chain `verification` above, a handle can carry **per-platform
+verifications** — the blue-tick signal that a handle proved control of an X,
+Discord, GitHub, Telegram account or a domain (#7145). A resolver that supplies
+them (the tools/api REST `/resolve` response) attaches an optional
+`verifications[]` to the `Resolved` result:
+
+```ts
+import { isVerified, verifiedPlatforms, isVerifiedOn } from "@x1id/resolve";
+
+// `resolved` is a Resolved carrying the resolver's `verifications[]`, e.g.
+//   verifications: [
+//     { platform: "x",      value: "@michelle",    verified: true, attested_at: 1730000000 },
+//     { platform: "github", value: "michelle",     verified: true, attested_at: 1730000100 },
+//     { platform: "domain", value: "michelle.com", verified: true, attested_at: 1730000200 },
+//   ]
+
+isVerified(resolved);                 // true  — show the blue tick (any live signal)
+verifiedPlatforms(resolved);          // ["x", "github", "domain"]
+isVerifiedOn(resolved, "github");     // true
+isVerifiedOn(resolved, "telegram");   // false
+```
+
+**Rendering a badge.** Light the tick when `isVerified(resolved)` is true; on
+hover/focus, list `verifiedPlatforms(resolved)`, and pull each platform's
+account handle from the paired `value` (`@michelle` for `x`, `michelle.com` for
+`domain`). Platform slugs are `x` / `discord` / `github` / `telegram`, plus
+legacy `domain` (DNS) and `social` (pre-per-platform, no attribution).
+
+All three helpers are **absence-tolerant**: an older resolver, the SDK's own
+on-chain `resolve()` (which does not populate the field — see below), or a
+handle with no live verifications all yield `false` / `[]`, never a throw. The
+field is optional and additive, so existing `Resolved` consumers are unaffected.
+
+> **Honest trust caveat — read before you render.** A verification is an
+> **off-chain review** (a DNS lookup, an OAuth completion, a human check) that
+> x1id's **attestor key** signed off on. It is **not** a trustless proof: that
+> key is admin-rotatable, so the anchor is "whoever the registry admin currently
+> designates". Verifications are also **epoch-bound** — the resolver emits an
+> entry only while the underlying attestation is live (`attested_at >=
+> registered_at` **and** `>= records_cleared_at`), so a previous owner's proof
+> never leaks through. Render it as **"verified by x1id"**, never as more.
+
+### Reading verification straight from chain
+
+The SDK's own on-chain `resolve()` does **not** populate `verifications` (it
+returns only what an RPC read proves). To compute the same signal from chain,
+read the `Attestation` accounts directly — this applies the staleness rule
+structurally:
+
+```ts
+import {
+  fetchAttestations, liveAttestations, isHandleVerified,
+  platformSlug, textRecordKeyFor,
+} from "@x1id/resolve";
+
+const atts = await fetchAttestations(rpc, programId, handleAccount, registeredAt, recordsClearedAt);
+isHandleVerified(atts);                                  // the #7145 tick, from chain
+for (const a of liveAttestations(atts)) {
+  platformSlug(a.kind);       // "x" | "discord" | "github" | "telegram" | null (legacy)
+  textRecordKeyFor(a.kind);   // "com.x" | ... | "website" | null — where the value lives
+}
+```
+
+`platformSlug` / `textRecordKeyFor` mirror the on-chain
+`Attestation::platform_slug` and the shared contract table exactly, so an
+integrator joining a live attestation to its paired text record reads the same
+mapping the program, resolver and app badge use.
+
 ## What works today
 
 | | Status |
@@ -300,7 +370,7 @@ Also shipped, same build → sign → relay shape:
 | Typed text records (website / avatar / socials) | `buildCreateTextRecordIx`, `buildUpdateTextRecordIx`, `buildCloseTextRecordIx` |
 | Register a handle | `buildRegisterIx` (+ `fetchConfigTreasury`) |
 | Verify a non-SVM address record | `buildCreateRecordIx`, `buildVerifyRecordEthIx`, `buildVerifyRecordSvmIx`, `buildVerifyRecordBtcIx` (+ `buildRecordChallenge`, `splitEthSignature`, `splitBtcSignature`) — see [Verifying a non-SVM address record](#verifying-a-non-svm-address-record) |
-| Domain / social attestations | `buildCreateAttestationIx`, `buildCloseAttestationIx` (+ `fetchAttestations`, `isHandleVerified`) |
+| Domain / social / per-platform attestations | `buildCreateAttestationIx` (kinds 0–5), `buildCloseAttestationIx` (+ `fetchAttestations`, `isHandleVerified`, `platformSlug`, `textRecordKeyFor`) — see [Per-platform verification](#per-platform-verification-verified-by-platform) |
 | Agent records (identity, manifest, x402 hints) | `validateManifest`, `agentVerificationLevel`, `x402AcceptsFromManifest`, `agentTextRecords` — see [Agent records](#agent-records) below |
 | Subname records / revoke | `buildRevokeSubnameIx`, `buildCreateSubnameRecordIx`, `buildUpdateSubnameRecordIx`, `buildCloseSubnameRecordIx` |
 | Voucher claim / refund | `buildClaimVoucherIx`, `buildRefundVoucherIx` |

package/dist/agent.js

@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ export function x402AcceptsFromManifest(manifest, opts) {
     // Mainnet has no such id yet — X1 mainnet doesn't exist — so a manifest
     // claiming network: "mainnet" without its own explicit x402.network gets
     // an honestly-provisional placeholder rather than a fabricated genesis hash.
-    const network = x402?.network ?? (manifest.x1id.network === "testnet" ? X1_TESTNET_NETWORK : "x1:mainnet-unassigned");
+    const network = x402?.network ?? (manifest.x1id.network === "testnet" ? X1_TESTNET_NETWORK : "solana:mainnet-unassigned");
     const payTo = opts?.payTo ?? manifest.payment?.addresses?.[0]?.address;
     return x402Endpoints.map((e) => {
         const hint = {

package/dist/attestation.d.ts

@@ -62,14 +62,35 @@
  */
 import type { AddressLike, BuiltInstruction } from "./delegate.js";
 import type { RpcFn } from "./accounts.js";
+import type { HandleVerification } from "./types.js";
 /** Seed prefix of an attestation PDA: `["attestation", handlePda, kindByte]`. */
 export declare const ATTESTATION_SEED = "attestation";
 /** Seed of the attestor-config singleton PDA: `["attestor_config"]`. */
 export declare const ATTESTOR_CONFIG_SEED = "attestor_config";
-/** `Attestation.kind` — domain control proven (DNS TXT challenge). */
+/** `Attestation.kind` — domain control proven (DNS TXT challenge). LEGACY-safe:
+ *  kept valid forever. Pairs with the `website` text record. */
 export declare const ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS = 0;
-/** `Attestation.kind` — social-account control proven. */
+/** `Attestation.kind` — generic social-account control proven. LEGACY: the
+ *  single pre-per-platform code, carrying no platform attribution. Kept valid
+ *  forever so existing accounts are never orphaned; new attestations should use
+ *  one of the per-platform codes below. */
 export declare const ATTESTATION_KIND_SOCIAL = 1;
+/** `Attestation.kind` — X (Twitter) control proven. Pairs with text record
+ *  `com.x`; platform slug `x`. */
+export declare const ATTESTATION_KIND_X = 2;
+/** `Attestation.kind` — Discord control proven. Pairs with text record
+ *  `com.discord`; platform slug `discord`. */
+export declare const ATTESTATION_KIND_DISCORD = 3;
+/** `Attestation.kind` — GitHub control proven. Pairs with text record
+ *  `com.github`; platform slug `github`. */
+export declare const ATTESTATION_KIND_GITHUB = 4;
+/** `Attestation.kind` — Telegram control proven. Pairs with text record
+ *  `org.telegram`; platform slug `telegram`. */
+export declare const ATTESTATION_KIND_TELEGRAM = 5;
+/** One past the highest valid `kind`. `create_attestation` refuses anything
+ *  `>=` this on-chain; the SDK's builder enforces the same bound. Mirrors
+ *  `Attestation::KIND_COUNT` (programs/x1-handles/src/state.rs). */
+export declare const ATTESTATION_KIND_COUNT = 6;
 /** Anchor account discriminator: `sha256("account:Attestation")[0..8]`.
  *  Pinned (this SDK is zero-dependency and cannot assume WebCrypto SHA-256
  *  everywhere it runs); asserted against a re-derivation in the test suite
@@ -90,19 +111,42 @@ export declare const CLOSE_ATTESTATION_DISCRIMINATOR: Uint8Array;
 export declare const ATTESTATION_LEN = 114;
 /** `AttestorConfig` account size: disc(8) + attestor(32) + bump(1). */
 export declare const ATTESTOR_CONFIG_LEN = 41;
+/** Human name an attestation `kind` byte carries. */
+export type AttestationKindName = "dns" | "social" | "x" | "discord" | "github" | "telegram";
 /** Which verification signal an attestation `kind` byte names, or null for a
- *  kind this SDK does not know (future program versions may add kinds). */
-export declare function attestationKindName(kind: number): "dns" | "social" | null;
+ *  kind this SDK does not know (future program versions may add kinds). For the
+ *  per-platform kinds this returns the platform slug; the two legacy kinds keep
+ *  their historical names (`dns`, `social`). */
+export declare function attestationKindName(kind: number): AttestationKindName | null;
+/**
+ * The canonical platform slug for a `kind`, or null for the two legacy codes
+ * (0 = dns, 1 = social — neither names a single platform) and for any unknown
+ * kind. Mirrors `Attestation::platform_slug` (programs/x1-handles/src/state.rs)
+ * exactly: `Some` only for the per-platform kinds 2..5.
+ */
+export declare function platformSlug(kind: number): string | null;
+/**
+ * The text-record key an attestation `kind` pairs with — where the actual
+ * account handle / domain for that platform lives — or null for the legacy
+ * generic-social kind (1) and any unknown kind. Mirrors the shared contract
+ * table: kind 0 → `website`, 2 → `com.x`, 3 → `com.discord`, 4 → `com.github`,
+ * 5 → `org.telegram`.
+ */
+export declare function textRecordKeyFor(kind: number): string | null;
 /** A decoded verification attestation, staleness already judged. */
 export interface HandleAttestation {
     /** The Attestation account's address, base58. */
     readonly account: string;
     /** The Handle account this attestation is for, base58. */
     readonly handle: string;
-    /** Raw kind byte (0 = dns, 1 = social). */
+    /** Raw kind byte (0 = dns, 1 = social, 2 = x, 3 = discord, 4 = github,
+     *  5 = telegram). */
     readonly kind: number;
-    /** Human name for `kind`, or null for an unknown kind. */
-    readonly kindName: "dns" | "social" | null;
+    /** Human name for `kind`, or null for an unknown kind. Per-platform kinds
+     *  resolve to their platform slug; see {@link platformSlug} /
+     *  {@link textRecordKeyFor} to map a kind to its slug and paired text-record
+     *  key. */
+    readonly kindName: AttestationKindName | null;
     /** `sha256` commitment to the off-chain verdict-inputs bundle. */
     readonly evidenceHash: Uint8Array;
     /** Unix seconds the attestation was (last) stamped. */
@@ -189,7 +233,11 @@ export interface CreateAttestationParams {
     /** The `["attestation", handle, kindByte]` PDA — derive per the module
      *  docs, with the SAME kind byte passed below. */
     readonly attestation: AddressLike;
-    /** {@link ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS} or {@link ATTESTATION_KIND_SOCIAL}. */
+    /** One of the `ATTESTATION_KIND_*` codes (0..{@link ATTESTATION_KIND_COUNT}
+     *  − 1): {@link ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS}, {@link ATTESTATION_KIND_SOCIAL}, or a
+     *  per-platform kind ({@link ATTESTATION_KIND_X},
+     *  {@link ATTESTATION_KIND_DISCORD}, {@link ATTESTATION_KIND_GITHUB},
+     *  {@link ATTESTATION_KIND_TELEGRAM}). */
     readonly kind: number;
     /** `sha256` of the off-chain verdict-inputs bundle (32 bytes) — a
      *  commitment, never the raw evidence. */
@@ -224,3 +272,31 @@ export interface CloseAttestationParams {
  * a rotated-away key's output).
  */
 export declare function buildCloseAttestationIx(p: CloseAttestationParams): BuiltInstruction;
+/** The minimal shape the verification helpers read — any {@link Resolved}
+ *  satisfies it, as does a bare `{ verifications }` an integrator assembles
+ *  from a raw REST payload. */
+export interface HasVerifications {
+    readonly verifications?: readonly HandleVerification[];
+}
+/**
+ * The platform slugs a handle is LIVE-verified on — e.g. `["x", "github"]` —
+ * de-duplicated, in first-seen order. Only entries with `verified === true`
+ * count. Returns `[]` when `verifications` is absent or empty.
+ */
+export declare function verifiedPlatforms(resolved: HasVerifications): string[];
+/**
+ * Whether a handle carries a live verification for a specific platform slug
+ * (`"x"`, `"discord"`, `"github"`, `"telegram"`, `"domain"`, `"social"`).
+ * False when `verifications` is absent.
+ */
+export declare function isVerifiedOn(resolved: HasVerifications, platform: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * The #7145 single-signal rule at the resolve layer: true when the handle has
+ * AT LEAST ONE live verification of any platform. This is the blue-tick
+ * condition. False when `verifications` is absent or empty.
+ *
+ * Trust caveat (see {@link HandleVerification}): a true here means x1id's
+ * rotatable attestor key signed off on an off-chain review that was still live
+ * at resolve time — render it as "verified by x1id", not as trustless proof.
+ */
+export declare function isVerified(resolved: HasVerifications): boolean;

package/dist/attestation.js

@@ -66,10 +66,30 @@ import { decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";
 export const ATTESTATION_SEED = "attestation";
 /** Seed of the attestor-config singleton PDA: `["attestor_config"]`. */
 export const ATTESTOR_CONFIG_SEED = "attestor_config";
-/** `Attestation.kind` — domain control proven (DNS TXT challenge). */
+/** `Attestation.kind` — domain control proven (DNS TXT challenge). LEGACY-safe:
+ *  kept valid forever. Pairs with the `website` text record. */
 export const ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS = 0;
-/** `Attestation.kind` — social-account control proven. */
+/** `Attestation.kind` — generic social-account control proven. LEGACY: the
+ *  single pre-per-platform code, carrying no platform attribution. Kept valid
+ *  forever so existing accounts are never orphaned; new attestations should use
+ *  one of the per-platform codes below. */
 export const ATTESTATION_KIND_SOCIAL = 1;
+/** `Attestation.kind` — X (Twitter) control proven. Pairs with text record
+ *  `com.x`; platform slug `x`. */
+export const ATTESTATION_KIND_X = 2;
+/** `Attestation.kind` — Discord control proven. Pairs with text record
+ *  `com.discord`; platform slug `discord`. */
+export const ATTESTATION_KIND_DISCORD = 3;
+/** `Attestation.kind` — GitHub control proven. Pairs with text record
+ *  `com.github`; platform slug `github`. */
+export const ATTESTATION_KIND_GITHUB = 4;
+/** `Attestation.kind` — Telegram control proven. Pairs with text record
+ *  `org.telegram`; platform slug `telegram`. */
+export const ATTESTATION_KIND_TELEGRAM = 5;
+/** One past the highest valid `kind`. `create_attestation` refuses anything
+ *  `>=` this on-chain; the SDK's builder enforces the same bound. Mirrors
+ *  `Attestation::KIND_COUNT` (programs/x1-handles/src/state.rs). */
+export const ATTESTATION_KIND_COUNT = 6;
 /** Anchor account discriminator: `sha256("account:Attestation")[0..8]`.
  *  Pinned (this SDK is zero-dependency and cannot assume WebCrypto SHA-256
  *  everywhere it runs); asserted against a re-derivation in the test suite
@@ -120,13 +140,69 @@ function toBase58(v, what) {
     return encodeBase58(toBytes32(v, what));
 }
 /** Which verification signal an attestation `kind` byte names, or null for a
- *  kind this SDK does not know (future program versions may add kinds). */
+ *  kind this SDK does not know (future program versions may add kinds). For the
+ *  per-platform kinds this returns the platform slug; the two legacy kinds keep
+ *  their historical names (`dns`, `social`). */
 export function attestationKindName(kind) {
-    if (kind === ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS)
-        return "dns";
-    if (kind === ATTESTATION_KIND_SOCIAL)
-        return "social";
-    return null;
+    switch (kind) {
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS:
+            return "dns";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_SOCIAL:
+            return "social";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_X:
+            return "x";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_DISCORD:
+            return "discord";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_GITHUB:
+            return "github";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_TELEGRAM:
+            return "telegram";
+        default:
+            return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The canonical platform slug for a `kind`, or null for the two legacy codes
+ * (0 = dns, 1 = social — neither names a single platform) and for any unknown
+ * kind. Mirrors `Attestation::platform_slug` (programs/x1-handles/src/state.rs)
+ * exactly: `Some` only for the per-platform kinds 2..5.
+ */
+export function platformSlug(kind) {
+    switch (kind) {
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_X:
+            return "x";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_DISCORD:
+            return "discord";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_GITHUB:
+            return "github";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_TELEGRAM:
+            return "telegram";
+        default:
+            return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The text-record key an attestation `kind` pairs with — where the actual
+ * account handle / domain for that platform lives — or null for the legacy
+ * generic-social kind (1) and any unknown kind. Mirrors the shared contract
+ * table: kind 0 → `website`, 2 → `com.x`, 3 → `com.discord`, 4 → `com.github`,
+ * 5 → `org.telegram`.
+ */
+export function textRecordKeyFor(kind) {
+    switch (kind) {
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS:
+            return "website";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_X:
+            return "com.x";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_DISCORD:
+            return "com.discord";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_GITHUB:
+            return "com.github";
+        case ATTESTATION_KIND_TELEGRAM:
+            return "org.telegram";
+        default:
+            return null;
+    }
 }
 /**
  * Decode one Attestation account.
@@ -250,8 +326,9 @@ export function buildSetAttestorIx(p) {
  * the (handle, kind) attestation.
  */
 export function buildCreateAttestationIx(p) {
-    if (!Number.isInteger(p.kind) || p.kind < 0 || p.kind > 1) {
-        throw new Error("kind must be 0 (dns) or 1 (social)");
+    if (!Number.isInteger(p.kind) || p.kind < 0 || p.kind >= ATTESTATION_KIND_COUNT) {
+        throw new Error(`kind must be an integer in 0..${ATTESTATION_KIND_COUNT - 1} ` +
+            "(0 dns, 1 social, 2 x, 3 discord, 4 github, 5 telegram)");
     }
     if (p.evidenceHash.length !== 32) {
         throw new Error("evidenceHash must be exactly 32 bytes (a sha256 digest)");
@@ -288,3 +365,36 @@ export function buildCloseAttestationIx(p) {
         data: CLOSE_ATTESTATION_DISCRIMINATOR.slice(),
     };
 }
+/**
+ * The platform slugs a handle is LIVE-verified on — e.g. `["x", "github"]` —
+ * de-duplicated, in first-seen order. Only entries with `verified === true`
+ * count. Returns `[]` when `verifications` is absent or empty.
+ */
+export function verifiedPlatforms(resolved) {
+    const out = [];
+    for (const v of resolved.verifications ?? []) {
+        if (v && v.verified && !out.includes(v.platform))
+            out.push(v.platform);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * Whether a handle carries a live verification for a specific platform slug
+ * (`"x"`, `"discord"`, `"github"`, `"telegram"`, `"domain"`, `"social"`).
+ * False when `verifications` is absent.
+ */
+export function isVerifiedOn(resolved, platform) {
+    return (resolved.verifications ?? []).some((v) => v && v.verified && v.platform === platform);
+}
+/**
+ * The #7145 single-signal rule at the resolve layer: true when the handle has
+ * AT LEAST ONE live verification of any platform. This is the blue-tick
+ * condition. False when `verifications` is absent or empty.
+ *
+ * Trust caveat (see {@link HandleVerification}): a true here means x1id's
+ * rotatable attestor key signed off on an off-chain review that was still live
+ * at resolve time — render it as "verified by x1id", not as trustless proof.
+ */
+export function isVerified(resolved) {
+    return (resolved.verifications ?? []).some((v) => v && v.verified);
+}

package/dist/base58.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
 export declare function encodeBase58(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
+/**
+ * Decode base58 to its exact bytes (standard leading-`1`→leading-zero-byte
+ * handling), or null for a character outside the alphabet. Unlike
+ * {@link decodeBase58_32} this preserves length, so it decodes a 64-byte
+ * ed25519 signature (`signin.ts`) as faithfully as a 32-byte key. Pass
+ * `expectedLen` to reject anything but that length up front.
+ */
+export declare function decodeBase58(s: string, expectedLen?: number): Uint8Array | null;
 /** Decode to exactly 32 bytes, or null if the input is not a valid address. */
 export declare function decodeBase58_32(s: string): Uint8Array | null;

package/dist/base58.js

@@ -16,6 +16,37 @@ export function encodeBase58(bytes) {
     }
     return out === "" ? "1" : out;
 }
+/**
+ * Decode base58 to its exact bytes (standard leading-`1`→leading-zero-byte
+ * handling), or null for a character outside the alphabet. Unlike
+ * {@link decodeBase58_32} this preserves length, so it decodes a 64-byte
+ * ed25519 signature (`signin.ts`) as faithfully as a 32-byte key. Pass
+ * `expectedLen` to reject anything but that length up front.
+ */
+export function decodeBase58(s, expectedLen) {
+    if (s.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    let zeros = 0;
+    while (zeros < s.length && s[zeros] === "1")
+        zeros++;
+    let n = 0n;
+    for (const c of s) {
+        const i = A.indexOf(c);
+        if (i === -1)
+            return null;
+        n = n * 58n + BigInt(i);
+    }
+    const tail = [];
+    while (n > 0n) {
+        tail.unshift(Number(n & 255n));
+        n >>= 8n;
+    }
+    const out = new Uint8Array(zeros + tail.length);
+    out.set(tail, zeros);
+    if (expectedLen !== undefined && out.length !== expectedLen)
+        return null;
+    return out;
+}
 /** Decode to exactly 32 bytes, or null if the input is not a valid address. */
 export function decodeBase58_32(s) {
     if (s.length === 0 || s.length > 44)

package/dist/gate.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/**
+ * Attestation-gated allowlists (#8316) — gate access to your app by whether an
+ * `@handle` holds a verified on-chain attestation (any signal, or a SPECIFIC
+ * platform like "verified GitHub"). A project reuses X1ID's blue-tick oracle as
+ * its allowlist instead of running its own KYC.
+ *
+ * The gate operates on the attestations {@link fetchAttestations} returns; the
+ * staleness rule (an attestation only counts for the CURRENT owner —
+ * `attested_at >= handle.registered_at`) is already baked into `HandleAttestation.stale`,
+ * and this module always ignores stale ones. Nothing here trusts an off-chain
+ * claim: every input is an on-chain, attestor-signed `Attestation` account.
+ */
+import { type HandleAttestation } from "./attestation.js";
+import type { RpcFn } from "./accounts.js";
+/** What a handle must prove to pass the gate:
+ *  - `"any-verified"` — at least one non-stale attestation of any kind.
+ *  - `{ kind }` — a non-stale attestation of exactly that kind.
+ *  - `{ anyOf }` — a non-stale attestation of any listed kind (e.g. X OR GitHub). */
+export type Gate = "any-verified" | {
+    readonly kind: number;
+} | {
+    readonly anyOf: readonly number[];
+};
+/** Named platform kinds, re-exported so callers gate without magic numbers. */
+export declare const GateKind: {
+    readonly dns: 0;
+    readonly social: 1;
+    readonly x: 2;
+    readonly discord: 3;
+    readonly github: 4;
+    readonly telegram: 5;
+};
+/** Pure check: do these (already-fetched) attestations satisfy the gate?
+ *  Stale attestations never count. */
+export declare function attestationsPassGate(attestations: readonly HandleAttestation[], gate: Gate): boolean;
+/** Fetch a handle's attestations and test the gate in one call. `handleAccount`,
+ *  `registeredAt` and `recordsClearedAt` come from the handle you resolved
+ *  (name → `deriveHandleAccount` → decode). Returns the pass/fail plus the
+ *  attestations so a caller can also render WHICH signals matched. */
+export declare function handlePassesGate(rpc: RpcFn, programId: string, handleAccount: string, registeredAt: bigint, recordsClearedAt: bigint, gate: Gate): Promise<{
+    readonly passed: boolean;
+    readonly attestations: HandleAttestation[];
+}>;

package/dist/gate.js

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/**
+ * Attestation-gated allowlists (#8316) — gate access to your app by whether an
+ * `@handle` holds a verified on-chain attestation (any signal, or a SPECIFIC
+ * platform like "verified GitHub"). A project reuses X1ID's blue-tick oracle as
+ * its allowlist instead of running its own KYC.
+ *
+ * The gate operates on the attestations {@link fetchAttestations} returns; the
+ * staleness rule (an attestation only counts for the CURRENT owner —
+ * `attested_at >= handle.registered_at`) is already baked into `HandleAttestation.stale`,
+ * and this module always ignores stale ones. Nothing here trusts an off-chain
+ * claim: every input is an on-chain, attestor-signed `Attestation` account.
+ */
+import { fetchAttestations, isHandleVerified, ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS, ATTESTATION_KIND_SOCIAL, ATTESTATION_KIND_X, ATTESTATION_KIND_DISCORD, ATTESTATION_KIND_GITHUB, ATTESTATION_KIND_TELEGRAM, } from "./attestation.js";
+/** Named platform kinds, re-exported so callers gate without magic numbers. */
+export const GateKind = {
+    dns: ATTESTATION_KIND_DNS,
+    social: ATTESTATION_KIND_SOCIAL,
+    x: ATTESTATION_KIND_X,
+    discord: ATTESTATION_KIND_DISCORD,
+    github: ATTESTATION_KIND_GITHUB,
+    telegram: ATTESTATION_KIND_TELEGRAM,
+};
+/** Pure check: do these (already-fetched) attestations satisfy the gate?
+ *  Stale attestations never count. */
+export function attestationsPassGate(attestations, gate) {
+    if (gate === "any-verified")
+        return isHandleVerified(attestations);
+    const kinds = "kind" in gate ? [gate.kind] : gate.anyOf;
+    return attestations.some((a) => !a.stale && kinds.includes(a.kind));
+}
+/** Fetch a handle's attestations and test the gate in one call. `handleAccount`,
+ *  `registeredAt` and `recordsClearedAt` come from the handle you resolved
+ *  (name → `deriveHandleAccount` → decode). Returns the pass/fail plus the
+ *  attestations so a caller can also render WHICH signals matched. */
+export async function handlePassesGate(rpc, programId, handleAccount, registeredAt, recordsClearedAt, gate) {
+    const attestations = await fetchAttestations(rpc, programId, handleAccount, registeredAt, recordsClearedAt);
+    return { passed: attestationsPassGate(attestations, gate), attestations };
+}

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -27,13 +27,14 @@
 export * from "./types.js";
 export { normalizeHandle, parseName, looksLikeName, type ParsedName } from "./parse.js";
 export { WasmResolver, type WasmTld } from "./wasm.js";
-export { encodeBase58, decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";
+export { encodeBase58, decodeBase58, decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";
 export { decodeRecord, liveRecords, chainForCoinType, valueToAddress, fetchRecords, RECORD_LEN, RECORD_DISC, type HandleRecord, } from "./records.js";
 export { buildControlChallenge, parseControlChallenge, generateControlNonce, createControlChallenge, verifyControlProof, verifyEd25519Strict, CONTROL_CHALLENGE_PREFIX, type ControlChallenge, type ControlConfig, type ControlProof, type ControlVerification, type ControlFailureReason, } from "./control.js";
 export * from "./delegate.js";
 export * from "./subname.js";
 export * from "./recordCount.js";
 export * from "./attestation.js";
+export * from "./gate.js";
 export * from "./textRecords.js";
 export * from "./lock.js";
 export * from "./integrator.js";
@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ export * from "./recordWrite.js";
 export * from "./clearRecords.js";
 export * from "./commitReveal.js";
 export * from "./pnftTransfer.js";
+export * from "./signin.js";
 import { type Chain, type Resolved } from "./types.js";
 import { WasmResolver } from "./wasm.js";
 import { type HandleRecord } from "./records.js";

package/dist/index.js

@@ -27,13 +27,14 @@
 export * from "./types.js";
 export { normalizeHandle, parseName, looksLikeName } from "./parse.js";
 export { WasmResolver } from "./wasm.js";
-export { encodeBase58, decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";
+export { encodeBase58, decodeBase58, decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";
 export { decodeRecord, liveRecords, chainForCoinType, valueToAddress, fetchRecords, RECORD_LEN, RECORD_DISC, } from "./records.js";
 export { buildControlChallenge, parseControlChallenge, generateControlNonce, createControlChallenge, verifyControlProof, verifyEd25519Strict, CONTROL_CHALLENGE_PREFIX, } from "./control.js";
 export * from "./delegate.js";
 export * from "./subname.js";
 export * from "./recordCount.js";
 export * from "./attestation.js";
+export * from "./gate.js";
 export * from "./textRecords.js";
 export * from "./lock.js";
 export * from "./integrator.js";
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ export * from "./recordWrite.js";
 export * from "./clearRecords.js";
 export * from "./commitReveal.js";
 export * from "./pnftTransfer.js";
+export * from "./signin.js";
 import { ResolveError, CHAIN_COIN_TYPE } from "./types.js";
 import { parseName } from "./parse.js";
 import { encodeBase58, decodeBase58_32 } from "./base58.js";

package/dist/signin.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+/**
+ * "Sign in with X1ID" — a client-side, wallet-signature proof of @handle
+ * ownership (WP #8313). An OAuth-style login *primitive*, framework-agnostic,
+ * that any third-party app can drop in to let a user authenticate as their
+ * `@handle`.
+ *
+ * # What this is — and, honestly, what it is not
+ *
+ * X1ID's app is a static export and `@x1id/resolve` is a pure client library:
+ * there is **no server-side token exchange** here. This module is therefore
+ * the SIWE-style ("Sign-In With Ethereum", EIP-4361) shape adapted to X1:
+ *
+ *   1. the relying app builds a **domain-bound** challenge naming the wallet,
+ *      a fresh nonce, an issued-at and an expiry ({@link createSignInChallenge});
+ *   2. the wallet signs the raw UTF-8 bytes of that challenge (ed25519 — X1 and
+ *      Solana share the curve and key format);
+ *   3. the relying app verifies the signature ({@link verifySignIn}) and then
+ *      reverse-resolves the address to its primary `@handle` and verification
+ *      summary ({@link resolveIdentity}).
+ *
+ * A single verified sign-in proves exactly: **"this wallet, which *currently*
+ * owns @handle, signed this challenge for this domain, before it expired."** It
+ * is NOT a session and NOT a bearer token — the relying app MUST bind the
+ * verified identity to its own session (a cookie, a JWT it mints, ...). And
+ * handle ownership can change (a sale, a transfer, `clear_primary`), so a long-
+ * lived session should re-run {@link resolveIdentity} periodically rather than
+ * trust a handle captured at login forever.
+ *
+ * A full hosted OAuth *authorization-code server* (real token issuance, a
+ * `/authorize` + `/token` pair, refresh tokens) needs a backend and is
+ * deliberately **out of scope** — see the README's "What needs a server".
+ *
+ * # Reuse, not reinvention
+ *
+ * - Signature verification is the SDK's existing RFC-8032-strict
+ *   {@link import("./control.js").verifyEd25519Strict} (WebCrypto Ed25519),
+ *   the same primitive the control-proof flow relies on. No new crypto.
+ * - Identity resolution is the SDK's own {@link import("./index.js").createResolver}
+ *   `reverse()` (with all its staleness/authority trust rules) plus
+ *   {@link import("./attestation.js").fetchAttestations} — never a re-derived
+ *   PDA or a hand-rolled ownership check.
+ *
+ * # Cross-protocol separation
+ *
+ * A sign-in challenge is always a MULTI-LINE SIWE block (it contains `\n`).
+ * The record-verification challenge (`x1-handles:v1:...`) and the control-proof
+ * challenge (`x1-handles:ctl:v1:...`) are both single lines with no newline, so
+ * a signature obtained for one can never validate as another — the byte spaces
+ * are structurally disjoint.
+ */
+/** Why a verification or a convenience sign-in failed. Mirrors `ResolveError`'s
+ *  code-not-string style so a UI can branch on the cause. */
+export type SignInFailureReason = 
+/** The challenge string is not a well-formed sign-in challenge. */
+"invalid-challenge"
+/** The signature is malformed (not base58, or not 64 bytes). */
+ | "invalid-signature"
+/** The address argument is not a valid base58 X1 address. */
+ | "invalid-address"
+/** The address argument does not match the address bound in the challenge. */
+ | "address-mismatch"
+/** An `expectedDomain` was given and does not match the challenge's domain. */
+ | "domain-mismatch"
+/** An `expectedNonce` was given and does not match the challenge's nonce. */
+ | "nonce-mismatch"
+/** `now` is before the challenge's issued-at (minus skew) — clock problem
+ *  or a challenge minted for the future. */
+ | "not-yet-valid"
+/** `now` is past the challenge's expiry (plus skew). Replay window closed. */
+ | "expired"
+/** The signature does not verify over the challenge bytes for this address. */
+ | "bad-signature";
+/** Codes a thrown {@link SignInError} carries — every {@link SignInFailureReason}
+ *  plus the convenience-flow-only outcomes. */
+export type SignInErrorCode = SignInFailureReason | "no-handle" | "wallet-error" | "invalid-params";
+/**
+ * Thrown by {@link signInWithX1ID} (the convenience flow) and by the argument
+ * validation in {@link createSignInChallenge}. Pure verification via
+ * {@link verifySignIn} does NOT throw for a verification outcome — it returns
+ * `{ ok: false, reason }` — this class is for the throw-based login call.
+ */
+export declare class SignInError extends Error {
+    readonly code: SignInErrorCode;
+    readonly cause?: unknown | undefined;
+    constructor(code: SignInErrorCode, message: string, cause?: unknown | undefined);
+}
+export interface SignInChallengeParams {
+    /** The relying party's domain, e.g. `"app.example.com"`. Bound into the
+     *  challenge; a signature for one domain never validates for another. */
+    readonly domain: string;
+    /** The X1 wallet address (base58) that will sign. Bound into the challenge so
+     *  a signature cannot be lifted onto a different account's session. */
+    readonly address: string;
+    /** Optional human-readable statement shown to the user in their wallet. Single
+     *  line only (a newline would corrupt the challenge structure). */
+    readonly statement?: string;
+    /** Resource URI. Defaults to `https://<domain>`. */
+    readonly uri?: string;
+    /** Single-use nonce. Generated ({@link generateSignInNonce}) when omitted. */
+    readonly nonce?: string;
+    /** Issued-at, ms since epoch. Defaults to `Date.now()`. */
+    readonly issuedAt?: number;
+    /** Lifetime in seconds from issued-at. Defaults to 300 (5 minutes). */
+    readonly expiresInSec?: number;
+}
+/** A built challenge: the exact string to sign, plus its parsed fields for the
+ *  relying party to store (nonce single-use, expiry enforcement are the RP's). */
+export interface SignInChallenge {
+    /** The exact string whose raw UTF-8 bytes the wallet signs. */
+    readonly challenge: string;
+    readonly domain: string;
+    readonly address: string;
+    readonly uri: string;
+    readonly statement: string | null;
+    readonly nonce: string;
+    /** Issued-at, ms since epoch. */
+    readonly issuedAt: number;
+    /** Expiry, ms since epoch. */
+    readonly expiresAt: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Generate a single-use sign-in nonce: `bytes` bytes (>= 8) from the platform
+ * CSPRNG, hex-encoded to stay inside the nonce charset. SINGLE-USE — the
+ * relying party stores it with the issued challenge and rejects a second proof
+ * against it (client-side code cannot enforce single use; the RP must).
+ */
+export declare function generateSignInNonce(bytes?: number): string;
+/**
+ * Build a deterministic, human-readable SIWE-style sign-in challenge.
+ *
+ * The exact bytes signed are the UTF-8 encoding of this string (no wallet
+ * prefix — the wallet's `signMessage` signs the message as given):
+ *
+ *     <domain> wants you to sign in with your X1 account:
+ *     <address>
+ *
+ *     <statement>            ← omitted, with its blank line, when no statement
+ *
+ *     URI: <uri>
+ *     Version: 1
+ *     Chain: X1
+ *     Nonce: <nonce>
+ *     Issued At: <ISO-8601>
+ *     Expiration Time: <ISO-8601>
+ *
+ * @throws {SignInError} `invalid-params` for a bad domain, address, statement,
+ * nonce, or time.
+ */
+export declare function createSignInChallenge(params: SignInChallengeParams): SignInChallenge;
+/** The fields recovered from a challenge string. */
+export interface ParsedSignInChallenge {
+    readonly domain: string;
+    readonly address: string;
+    readonly uri: string;
+    readonly statement: string | null;
+    readonly nonce: string;
+    readonly issuedAt: number;
+    readonly expiresAt: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Parse a sign-in challenge string back to its fields, or null for anything
+ * that is not one — including a record-verification or control-proof challenge
+ * (both single-line, so they fail the header match). This is a pure structural
+ * parse; it proves nothing about the signature.
+ */
+export declare function parseSignInChallenge(challenge: string): ParsedSignInChallenge | null;
+export interface VerifySignInParams {
+    /** The challenge string the wallet signed (built by {@link createSignInChallenge}). */
+    readonly challenge: string;
+    /** The address that supposedly signed, base58. Must match the challenge's. */
+    readonly address: string;
+    /** The 64-byte ed25519 signature, base58-encoded (what a wallet's
+     *  `signMessage` output looks like once base58'd, the common wire form). */
+    readonly signatureBase58: string;
+    /** If given, require the challenge's domain to equal this — the relying
+     *  party's own domain. Strongly recommended: it turns the signed-in domain
+     *  binding into an *enforced* check against phishing. */
+    readonly expectedDomain?: string;
+    /** If given, require the challenge's nonce to equal this — the nonce the RP
+     *  issued and is about to burn. */
+    readonly expectedNonce?: string;
+    /** `Date.now()` override, ms — for tests and deterministic demos. */
+    readonly now?: number;
+    /** Allowed clock skew in seconds for issued-at/expiry. Default 60. */
+    readonly clockSkewSec?: number;
+    /** Ed25519 verifier override for runtimes whose WebCrypto lacks Ed25519.
+     *  Defaults to the SDK's RFC-8032-strict {@link verifyEd25519Strict}. */
+    readonly verifyEd25519?: (publicKey: Uint8Array, message: Uint8Array, signature: Uint8Array) => Promise<boolean>;
+}
+export type SignInVerification = {
+    readonly ok: true;
+    /** The verified signer, base58 (canonical spelling). */
+    readonly address: string;
+    readonly domain: string;
+    readonly nonce: string;
+    readonly issuedAt: number;
+    readonly expiresAt: number;
+} | {
+    readonly ok: false;
+    readonly reason: SignInFailureReason;
+    readonly message: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Verify a sign-in proof: the signature is a valid ed25519 signature over the
+ * exact challenge bytes for `address`, the address is the one bound in the
+ * challenge, and `now` is inside `[issuedAt, expiresAt]` (± skew). Optionally
+ * enforces `expectedDomain` / `expectedNonce`.
+ *
+ * Verification outcomes come back as `{ ok: false, reason }` — this function
+ * never throws for one. It does NOT touch the chain: it proves only that the
+ * wallet signed. Whether that wallet currently owns a handle is a separate,
+ * on-chain question answered by {@link resolveIdentity}.
+ *
+ * Replay protection is nonce + expiry, and both need the relying party: pass
+ * `expectedNonce` (and never accept the same nonce twice), and keep the expiry
+ * window short. The domain binding needs `expectedDomain` to become a check.
+ */
+export declare function verifySignIn(params: VerifySignInParams): Promise<SignInVerification>;
+/** One live "verified by [platform]" signal on the signed-in handle. */
+export interface IdentityVerification {
+    /** Platform slug (`"x"`, `"discord"`, `"github"`, `"telegram"`) or the legacy
+     *  `"dns"` / `"social"` kind names, or null for a kind this SDK does not know. */
+    readonly platform: string | null;
+    /** Raw attestation kind byte. */
+    readonly kind: number;
+    /** Unix seconds the attestation was (last) stamped. */
+    readonly attestedAt: number;
+}
+/** The friendly identity behind an address. */
+export interface ResolvedIdentity {
+    /** The address resolved, base58 (canonical). */
+    readonly address: string;
+    /** The address's primary `@handle` (canonical, no `@`), or null when it has
+     *  no trustworthy handle primary. An X1NS-only primary comes back as null
+     *  here — this is the @handle identity surface. */
+    readonly handle: string | null;
+    /** Ready-to-render label: `@<handle>` or null. */
+    readonly display: string | null;
+    /** Whether the handle carries at least one LIVE verification (the blue-tick
+     *  condition, #7145). False when there is no handle. Trust caveat: a true
+     *  means x1id's rotatable attestor key vouched for an off-chain review — read
+     *  it as "verified by x1id", not trustless proof. */
+    readonly verified: boolean;
+    /** The live verifications, if any. */
+    readonly verifications: readonly IdentityVerification[];
+}
+export interface IdentityConfig {
+    /** X1 RPC endpoint. */
+    readonly rpcUrl: string;
+    /** The WASM resolver the app already loaded (needed for PDA derivation). */
+    readonly wasm: import("./wasm.js").WasmResolver;
+    /** Optional fetch override for testing or custom transport. */
+    readonly fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
+    /** @handle registry program id. Defaults to the canonical X1 deployment. */
+    readonly handleProgramId?: string;
+    /** Resolver cache TTL in ms (passed through to `createResolver`). */
+    readonly cacheTtlMs?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Reverse-resolve an address to its primary `@handle` and verification summary.
+ *
+ * Reuses the SDK's own `createResolver().reverse()` — with every staleness and
+ * current-authority rule it enforces — for the handle, then
+ * {@link import("./attestation.js").fetchAttestations} for the "verified by"
+ * summary, read with the same epoch/`records_cleared_at` staleness rule the
+ * rest of the SDK applies. Nothing here re-derives a PDA or re-checks ownership
+ * by hand.
+ *
+ * @throws {import("./types.js").ResolveError} `rpc-error` for transport
+ * problems (a handle with no primary is not an error — `handle` is null).
+ */
+export declare function resolveIdentity(cfg: IdentityConfig, address: string): Promise<ResolvedIdentity>;
+export interface SignInWithX1IDParams extends IdentityConfig {
+    /** The connected wallet's `signMessage`: signs the raw message bytes and
+     *  returns the 64-byte ed25519 signature. Matches the X1ID app's wallet
+     *  adapter (`app/src/lib/wallet` normalizes every provider to this shape). */
+    readonly signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => Promise<Uint8Array>;
+    /** The connected wallet's address, base58 — known from wallet-connect before
+     *  signing, bound into the challenge and used to verify. */
+    readonly address: string;
+    /** The relying party's domain. */
+    readonly domain: string;
+    readonly statement?: string;
+    readonly uri?: string;
+    readonly nonce?: string;
+    readonly issuedAt?: number;
+    readonly expiresInSec?: number;
+    /** Throw `no-handle` when the wallet has no primary @handle. Default true —
+     *  "Sign in with X1ID" implies an X1ID. Set false to allow handle-less
+     *  sign-in (returns `handle: null`). */
+    readonly requireHandle?: boolean;
+    readonly clockSkewSec?: number;
+    readonly now?: number;
+    readonly verifyEd25519?: VerifySignInParams["verifyEd25519"];
+}
+export interface SignInIdentity extends ResolvedIdentity {
+    /** The exact challenge that was signed — store it with the session if you
+     *  want an audit trail of what the user agreed to. */
+    readonly challenge: string;
+    readonly nonce: string;
+    readonly issuedAt: number;
+    readonly expiresAt: number;
+}
+/**
+ * The whole flow in one call: build a domain-bound challenge, have the wallet
+ * sign it, verify the signature, and resolve the address to its `@handle`
+ * identity. Returns the resolved identity on success.
+ *
+ * The relying party still owns the *session*: bind the returned identity to
+ * your own session and re-check ownership periodically — this call proves the
+ * signature at THIS moment, nothing longer-lived.
+ *
+ * @throws {SignInError} `wallet-error` if the wallet rejects/fails signing, a
+ * verification `SignInFailureReason` code if the signature does not verify, or
+ * `no-handle` when `requireHandle` (default) and the wallet has no primary
+ * handle.
+ */
+export declare function signInWithX1ID(params: SignInWithX1IDParams): Promise<SignInIdentity>;

package/dist/types.d.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,43 @@ export type Verification =
 "verified"
 /** Record exists but ownership was never proved. Show a warning. */
  | "unverified";
+/**
+ * One per-platform verification a handle carries — the "verified by
+ * [platform]" signal (#7145). Shape mirrors the resolver's REST `/resolve`
+ * `verifications[]` entries exactly (snake_case `attested_at`), so an
+ * integrator can drop a decoded REST array straight onto
+ * {@link Resolved.verifications} with no transformation.
+ *
+ * # What this proves — and, honestly, what it does not
+ *
+ * A verification is an off-chain review (a DNS lookup, an OAuth completion, a
+ * human check) that x1id's **attestor key** signed off on at `attested_at`.
+ * It is NOT a trustless proof: the attestor key is admin-rotatable, so the
+ * trust anchor is "whoever the registry admin currently designates". Entries
+ * are also epoch-bound — the resolver emits an entry only while the underlying
+ * attestation is LIVE (not stale): `attested_at >= handle.registered_at` AND
+ * `>= handle.records_cleared_at`. Render it as "verified by x1id", never as
+ * more than that.
+ */
+export interface HandleVerification {
+    /**
+     * Platform slug: `"x"`, `"discord"`, `"github"`, `"telegram"`, `"domain"`
+     * (legacy DNS/kind 0), or `"social"` (legacy generic/kind 1). Match this
+     * against {@link platformSlug}'s output when joining to an attestation kind.
+     */
+    readonly platform: string;
+    /**
+     * The paired text-record value for a live verification (e.g. `"@michelle"`
+     * for `x`, `"michelle.com"` for `domain`), or `null` when the text record
+     * is missing/stale or the platform carries none (legacy `social`).
+     */
+    readonly value: string | null;
+    /** Whether this verification is live. The resolver only emits live ones,
+     *  but readers must still honour the flag. */
+    readonly verified: boolean;
+    /** Unix seconds the attestation was (last) stamped. */
+    readonly attested_at: number;
+}
 /**
  * A successfully resolved name.
  *
@@ -31,6 +68,17 @@ export interface Resolved {
     readonly chain: Chain;
     /** Whether ownership of `address` was proved. */
     readonly verification: Verification;
+    /**
+     * Per-platform "verified by [platform]" signals for this handle (#7145),
+     * when the producing resolver supplies them (the tools/api REST `/resolve`
+     * response carries a `verifications[]` field; the SDK's own on-chain
+     * `resolve()` does not populate this — read attestations directly via
+     * {@link fetchAttestations}). **Optional and additive**: an older resolver,
+     * or a handle with no live verifications, omits it. Never index into it
+     * blindly — use {@link isVerified} / {@link verifiedPlatforms} /
+     * {@link isVerifiedOn}, which tolerate its absence.
+     */
+    readonly verifications?: readonly HandleVerification[];
 }
 /** Chains a handle can carry a record for. SLIP-44 based. */
 export type Chain = "X1" | "SOL" | "ETH" | "BTC";

package/dist/x402.d.ts

@@ -14,19 +14,26 @@
  * 2026-09-22 — NOT invented. See `docs/x402.md` for the full design,
  * including what's explicitly OUT of scope here (a facilitator).
  *
- * # The one x1id-specific choice: the network identifier
+ * # The network identifier — CAIP-30, for OSS interop (#8325)
  *
- * x402's Solana networks use `"solana:<genesis-hash>"` (CAIP-2-shaped). X1
- * is SVM-compatible but its OWN chain — not Solana — so it gets its own
- * namespace under the identical convention: `"x1:<genesis-hash>"`. This is
- * NOT an x402-foundation-registered network; it's a principled extension of
- * their own pattern to a new SVM-compatible chain, not a claim of official
- * support. {@link X1_TESTNET_NETWORK} is the live testnet genesis hash,
- * verified against `getGenesisHash` 2026-09-22.
+ * x402's SVM networks use `"solana:<first-32-of-genesis>"` (CAIP-30: the
+ * `solana:` namespace + the first 32 base58 chars of the genesis hash). X1 is
+ * its own SVM chain, but `@x402/core`'s reference client/facilitator only route
+ * the `solana:*` scheme family — so to let ANY standard, unmodified x402 client
+ * or wallet pay an x1id agent out of the box, X1 testnet uses the CAIP-30 form
+ * keyed on X1's genesis. (Fortiswap's self-hosted X1 facilitator uses the
+ * identical id.) An earlier release used a principled `"x1:<full-genesis>"`
+ * extension; it was OSS-incompatible, so this migrated to CAIP-30 —
+ * {@link X1_LEGACY_TESTNET_NETWORK} is kept only for reading older manifests.
+ * Verified against `getGenesisHash` (full hash
+ * `C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho`).
  */
-/** X1 testnet's x402 network identifier (`"x1:<genesis-hash>"`, verified
- *  live 2026-09-22 via `getGenesisHash`). */
-export declare const X1_TESTNET_NETWORK = "x1:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho";
+/** X1 testnet's x402 network id — CAIP-30 `"solana:" + first 32 chars of the
+ *  genesis hash — so unmodified OSS x402 clients route to it (#8325). */
+export declare const X1_TESTNET_NETWORK = "solana:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWw";
+/** The pre-#8325 `"x1:<full-genesis>"` id. DEPRECATED — kept only so a reader
+ *  can still recognise manifests published before the CAIP-30 migration. */
+export declare const X1_LEGACY_TESTNET_NETWORK = "x1:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho";
 /** The x402 scheme x1id implements — "exact": pay a fixed amount of a named
  *  asset to a named recipient. (x402 also defines "upto" for usage-based
  *  pricing; not implemented here.) */

package/dist/x402.js

@@ -14,19 +14,26 @@
  * 2026-09-22 — NOT invented. See `docs/x402.md` for the full design,
  * including what's explicitly OUT of scope here (a facilitator).
  *
- * # The one x1id-specific choice: the network identifier
+ * # The network identifier — CAIP-30, for OSS interop (#8325)
  *
- * x402's Solana networks use `"solana:<genesis-hash>"` (CAIP-2-shaped). X1
- * is SVM-compatible but its OWN chain — not Solana — so it gets its own
- * namespace under the identical convention: `"x1:<genesis-hash>"`. This is
- * NOT an x402-foundation-registered network; it's a principled extension of
- * their own pattern to a new SVM-compatible chain, not a claim of official
- * support. {@link X1_TESTNET_NETWORK} is the live testnet genesis hash,
- * verified against `getGenesisHash` 2026-09-22.
+ * x402's SVM networks use `"solana:<first-32-of-genesis>"` (CAIP-30: the
+ * `solana:` namespace + the first 32 base58 chars of the genesis hash). X1 is
+ * its own SVM chain, but `@x402/core`'s reference client/facilitator only route
+ * the `solana:*` scheme family — so to let ANY standard, unmodified x402 client
+ * or wallet pay an x1id agent out of the box, X1 testnet uses the CAIP-30 form
+ * keyed on X1's genesis. (Fortiswap's self-hosted X1 facilitator uses the
+ * identical id.) An earlier release used a principled `"x1:<full-genesis>"`
+ * extension; it was OSS-incompatible, so this migrated to CAIP-30 —
+ * {@link X1_LEGACY_TESTNET_NETWORK} is kept only for reading older manifests.
+ * Verified against `getGenesisHash` (full hash
+ * `C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho`).
  */
-/** X1 testnet's x402 network identifier (`"x1:<genesis-hash>"`, verified
- *  live 2026-09-22 via `getGenesisHash`). */
-export const X1_TESTNET_NETWORK = "x1:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho";
+/** X1 testnet's x402 network id — CAIP-30 `"solana:" + first 32 chars of the
+ *  genesis hash — so unmodified OSS x402 clients route to it (#8325). */
+export const X1_TESTNET_NETWORK = "solana:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWw";
+/** The pre-#8325 `"x1:<full-genesis>"` id. DEPRECATED — kept only so a reader
+ *  can still recognise manifests published before the CAIP-30 migration. */
+export const X1_LEGACY_TESTNET_NETWORK = "x1:C7ucgdDEhxLTpXHhWSZxavSVmaNTUJWwT5iTdeaviDho";
 /** The x402 scheme x1id implements — "exact": pay a fixed amount of a named
  *  asset to a named recipient. (x402 also defines "upto" for usage-based
  *  pricing; not implemented here.) */

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@x1id/resolve",
-  "version": "0.7.0",
+  "version": "0.9.0",
   "description": "Resolve @handles and X1NS names on X1. Never silently picks between namespaces.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
     "build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
     "test": "node --test test/*.test.js",
     "lint:package": "publint",
-    "prepublishOnly": "npm run build"
+    "prepublishOnly": "cargo build --release -p x1-resolve-wasm --target wasm32-unknown-unknown --manifest-path ../Cargo.toml && node ../web/verify-wasm.mjs wasm/x1_resolve_wasm.wasm ../target/wasm32-unknown-unknown/release/x1_resolve_wasm.wasm && npm run build"
   },
   "keywords": [
     "x1",
@@ -59,12 +59,5 @@
     "@solana/web3.js": {
       "optional": true
     }
-  },
-  "repository": {
-    "type": "git",
-    "url": "git+https://github.com/fortiblox/x1id-sdk.git"
-  },
-  "bugs": {
-    "url": "https://x1id.io"
   }
 }

package/LICENSE

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-MIT License
-
-Copyright (c) 2026 Fortiblox
-
-Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-
-The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
-copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-
-THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
-IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
-FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
-LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
-OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
-SOFTWARE.