@wrongstack/core 0.313.0 → 0.313.1

package/dist/chunk-2YU4WVBW.js

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+// src/chronicle/prompt-manifest.ts
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+function createChroniclePromptManifest(request) {
+  const roleCounts = {}, blockCounts = {};
+  const messages = request.messages.map((message, index) => messageSummary(message, index, roleCounts, blockCounts));
+  const systemText = (request.system ?? []).map((block) => block.text).join("\n");
+  const toolRecords = (request.tools ?? []).map((tool) => ({
+    name: tool.name,
+    schemaHash: hash(stable(tool.inputSchema)),
+    permission: tool.permission,
+    mutating: tool.mutating,
+    riskTier: tool.riskTier,
+    capabilities: tool.capabilities,
+    estimatedTokens: tool._estDefTokens ?? 0
+  }));
+  const core = {
+    systemHash: hash(systemText),
+    messages: messages.map(({ hash: contentHash, ...rest }) => ({ ...rest, contentHash })),
+    tools: toolRecords,
+    model: request.model,
+    maxTokens: request.maxTokens,
+    temperature: request.temperature,
+    topP: request.topP,
+    topK: request.topK,
+    seed: request.seed,
+    toolChoice: request.toolChoice,
+    reasoning: request.reasoning,
+    cache: request.cache,
+    responseFormat: request.responseFormat?.type
+  };
+  return {
+    manifestId: `prompt_${hash(stable(core))}`,
+    messageCount: messages.length,
+    estimatedMessageTokens: messages.reduce((sum, message) => sum + (message.estimatedTokens ?? 0), 0),
+    contentBytes: messages.reduce((sum, message) => sum + message.bytes, 0) + Buffer.byteLength(systemText),
+    roleCounts,
+    blockCounts,
+    system: { blockCount: request.system?.length ?? 0, bytes: Buffer.byteLength(systemText), hash: hash(systemText) },
+    messages,
+    tools: {
+      count: toolRecords.length,
+      estimatedDefinitionTokens: toolRecords.reduce((sum, tool) => sum + tool.estimatedTokens, 0),
+      manifestHash: hash(stable(toolRecords)),
+      names: toolRecords.map((tool) => tool.name),
+      mutating: toolRecords.filter((tool) => tool.mutating).length,
+      destructive: toolRecords.filter((tool) => tool.riskTier === "destructive").length
+    },
+    request: {
+      maxTokens: request.maxTokens,
+      temperature: request.temperature,
+      topP: request.topP,
+      topK: request.topK,
+      frequencyPenalty: request.frequencyPenalty,
+      presencePenalty: request.presencePenalty,
+      seed: request.seed,
+      candidateCount: request.candidateCount,
+      logprobs: request.logprobs,
+      topLogprobs: request.topLogprobs,
+      stopSequenceCount: request.stopSequences?.length ?? 0,
+      toolChoice: request.toolChoice,
+      reasoning: request.reasoning,
+      cache: request.cache,
+      responseFormat: request.responseFormat?.type,
+      safetySettingCount: request.safetySettings?.length ?? 0,
+      userHash: request.user ? hash(request.user) : void 0
+    }
+  };
+}
+function messageSummary(message, index, roles, totals) {
+  roles[message.role] = (roles[message.role] ?? 0) + 1;
+  const blocks = typeof message.content === "string" ? { text: 1 } : countBlocks(message.content);
+  for (const [type, count] of Object.entries(blocks)) totals[type] = (totals[type] ?? 0) + count;
+  const content = contentIdentity(message.content);
+  return {
+    index,
+    role: message.role,
+    bytes: content.bytes,
+    ...message._estTokens !== void 0 ? { estimatedTokens: message._estTokens } : {},
+    hash: content.hash,
+    blocks
+  };
+}
+function countBlocks(blocks) {
+  const counts = {};
+  for (const block of blocks) counts[block.type] = (counts[block.type] ?? 0) + 1;
+  return counts;
+}
+function hash(value) {
+  return createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
+}
+function contentIdentity(content) {
+  if (typeof content === "string") return { hash: hash(content), bytes: Buffer.byteLength(content) };
+  const digest = createHash("sha256");
+  let bytes = 0;
+  const add = (value) => {
+    if (!value) return;
+    digest.update(value);
+    bytes += Buffer.byteLength(value);
+  };
+  for (const block of content) {
+    add(block.type);
+    if (block.type === "text") add(block.text);
+    else if (block.type === "thinking") {
+      add(block.thinking);
+      add(block.signature);
+    } else if (block.type === "tool_use") {
+      add(block.id);
+      add(block.name);
+      add(stable(block.input));
+    } else if (block.type === "tool_result") {
+      add(block.tool_use_id);
+      add(block.name);
+      add(block.content);
+      add(String(block.is_error ?? false));
+    } else if (block.type === "image") {
+      add(block.source.type);
+      add(block.source.media_type);
+      add(block.source.url);
+      add(block.source.data);
+    }
+  }
+  return { hash: digest.digest("hex"), bytes };
+}
+function stable(value) {
+  if (value === void 0) return "undefined";
+  if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return JSON.stringify(value);
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(stable).join(",")}]`;
+  return `{${Object.entries(value).sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b)).map(([key, child]) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${stable(child)}`).join(",")}}`;
+}
+
+export {
+  createChroniclePromptManifest
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-2YU4WVBW.js.map

package/dist/chunk-3E244UDA.js

@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+// src/security/secret-scrubber.ts
+var JSON_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ANCHORS = [
+  'Key"',
+  'key"',
+  'KEY"',
+  'token"',
+  'Token"',
+  'TOKEN"',
+  'secret"',
+  'Secret"',
+  'SECRET"',
+  'password"',
+  'Password"',
+  'PASSWORD"',
+  'authorization"',
+  'Authorization"',
+  'bearer"',
+  'Bearer"'
+];
+var PATTERNS = [
+  // Anchored at the start where possible so partial matches inside larger
+  // strings don't trigger false positives.
+  {
+    type: "anthropic_key",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])sk-ant-api\d+-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "sk-ant-"
+  },
+  { type: "openai_key", regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])sk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g, anchor: "sk-" },
+  {
+    // `xai` is a first-class provider in this codebase, but its key shape was
+    // absent here — so the one credential format WrongStack itself hands users
+    // was the one the scrubber could not recognize (audit 2026-08-20).
+    type: "xai_key",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])xai-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "xai-"
+  },
+  { type: "github_pat", regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g, anchor: "ghp_" },
+  { type: "github_pat_v2", regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{50,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g, anchor: "github_pat_" },
+  { type: "aws_access_key", regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g, anchor: "AKIA" },
+  { type: "gcp_key", regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g, anchor: "AIza" },
+  { type: "slack_token", regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9-])xox[abpos]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}(?![A-Za-z0-9-])/g, anchor: "xox" },
+  {
+    type: "stripe_key",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])sk_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "sk_"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "twilio_sid",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])AC[a-f0-9]{32}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "AC"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "telegram_bot_token",
+    // Telegram tokens are of the form  bot<digits>:<alphanum>  in URL paths
+    regex: /\/bot\d+:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,
+    anchor: "/bot"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "jwt",
+    // Anchored: look for literal "eyJ" which is unambiguous for JWT header
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9/+=])eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}(?![A-Za-z0-9/+=])/g,
+    anchor: "eyJ"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "private_key",
+    // Anchored: start must be BEGIN, end must be END with no extra dashes after END
+    regex: /(?:^|\n)-----BEGIN (?:RSA|EC|OPENSSH|DSA|PGP)? ?PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END[^-]*-----(?:\n|$)/g,
+    anchor: "-----BEGIN"
+  },
+  { type: "mongodb_uri", regex: /mongodb(?:\+srv)?:\/\/[^\s"'`]+/g, anchor: "mongodb" },
+  { type: "postgres_uri", regex: /postgres(?:ql)?:\/\/[^\s"'`]+/g, anchor: "postgres" },
+  { type: "mysql_uri", regex: /mysql:\/\/[^\s"'`]+/g, anchor: "mysql://" },
+  { type: "redis_uri", regex: /redis:\/\/[^\s"'`]+/g, anchor: "redis://" },
+  // AI/ML provider keys — modern LLM services with well-known prefixes
+  {
+    type: "huggingface_token",
+    // HuggingFace tokens: hf_ followed by 34 alphanumeric chars
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{34}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "hf_"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "replicate_token",
+    // Replicate tokens: r8_ followed by 40+ alphanumeric chars
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])r8_[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "r8_"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "perplexity_key",
+    // Perplexity API keys: pplx- followed by 40+ alphanumeric chars
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])pplx-[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "pplx-"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "groq_key",
+    // Groq API keys: gsk_ followed by 40+ alphanumeric chars
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])gsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "gsk_"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "bearer_token",
+    // Anchored with alternation instead of negative lookahead — avoids V8
+    // backtracking risk on adversarial input. Bounded at 512 chars.
+    // Min 12 chars: some OAuth providers issue shorter-lived tokens (< 20
+    // chars). A 12-char base64 string has ~71 bits of entropy — above the
+    // threshold where random strings are unlikely to produce false matches.
+    // The trailing boundary is a NON-consuming lookahead: two adjacent bearer
+    // tokens sharing a single delimiter (`Bearer a… Bearer b…`) must both be
+    // redacted. A consuming trailing delimiter would eat the separator the
+    // next match needs for its leading anchor, leaking the second token.
+    regex: /(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_.~+/-])Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{12,512}=*(?=$|[^A-Za-z0-9_.~+/-])/g,
+    anchor: "Bearer"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "high_entropy_env",
+    // Anchored with alternation instead of lookbehind to avoid backtracking.
+    // Value bounded at 512 chars.
+    // The trailing boundary is a NON-consuming lookahead so two secrets
+    // separated by a single delimiter (one space OR one newline, e.g.
+    // `printenv` / `.env` dumps: `API_KEY=… \n SESSION_TOKEN=…`) are BOTH
+    // redacted. A consuming trailing `\s` would swallow the separator the
+    // next match needs for its leading anchor, so every other secret would
+    // leak in plaintext.
+    // The leading delimiter is CAPTURED (group 1) and re-emitted by the
+    // replacement so the separator between adjacent secrets is preserved
+    // rather than collapsed. Capture groups are therefore: 1=leading
+    // delimiter, 2=key name, 3=value.
+    regex: /(^|\s)([A-Z_]{4,}(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PWD|PASSPHRASE))\s*[:=]\s*['"]?([A-Za-z0-9_/+=-]{20,512})['"]?(?=\s|$)/g,
+    anchor: ["KEY", "TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "PWD", "PASSPHRASE"]
+  },
+  {
+    type: "json_credential_key",
+    // The JSON counterpart to `high_entropy_env`, and the pattern that the
+    // now-deleted `JSON_KEY_ANCHORS` list was written for. Without it those
+    // anchors only widened the cheap pre-scan — `hasCredentialAnchors` said
+    // "this text may hold a secret", every pattern then declined to match, and
+    // the value went out verbatim. `high_entropy_env` cannot cover these: it
+    // requires an UPPERCASE unquoted key (`API_KEY=…`), so `{"apiKey":"…"}`
+    // never matched.
+    //
+    // Tool results are routinely serialised as JSON, and a credential with no
+    // recognisable prefix (Azure, self-hosted gateways, Anthropic/Codex OAuth)
+    // has no other pattern that can catch it — this is the only thing standing
+    // between such a value and the session JSONL, chronicle, HQ broadcast and
+    // the model's own context.
+    //
+    // The key may carry a prefix (`"anthropicApiKey"`), but the credential word
+    // must END the key: `"tokenCount"` and `"maxTokens"` do not match, because
+    // the closing quote has to follow the word immediately.
+    // Value floor of 8 chars keeps enum-ish values (`"authorization":"none"`)
+    // out. Capture groups: 1=key + punctuation, 2=value, 3=closing quote.
+    regex: /("[A-Za-z0-9_]*(?:apiKey|api_key|token|secret|password|authorization|bearer|private_key|access_token|refresh_token|client_secret)"\s*:\s*")([^"\\]{8,512})(")/gi,
+    anchor: JSON_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ANCHORS
+  },
+  // ── Ported from packages/plugins credential-patterns.ts (WS-034) ─────────
+  // The plugin runtime carried 37 patterns while this scrubber — the one that
+  // guards session JSONL, chronicle, HQ broadcast, WebUI events and the auth
+  // audit — carried 22. The plugin side already had a parity test; it just did
+  // not cover core. Most consequential: WrongStack mints `gho_` tokens itself
+  // in the Copilot OAuth flow, and `gh[ousr]_` was absent here.
+  {
+    type: "github_oauth_token",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])gh[ousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: ["gho_", "ghu_", "ghs_", "ghr_"]
+  },
+  {
+    type: "gitlab_pat",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,
+    anchor: "glpat-"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "gitlab_runner_token",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])glrt-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,
+    anchor: "glrt-"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "npm_token",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "npm_"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "slack_app_token",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9-])xapp-\d-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}(?![A-Za-z0-9-])/g,
+    anchor: "xapp-"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "slack_webhook",
+    regex: /https:\/\/hooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\/B[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/g,
+    anchor: "hooks.slack.com"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "sendgrid_key",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,
+    anchor: "SG."
+  },
+  {
+    type: "digitalocean_token",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])dop_v1_[a-f0-9]{64}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "dop_v1_"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "doppler_token",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])dp\.(?:pt|st|sa|scim|audit)\.[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "dp."
+  },
+  {
+    type: "shopify_token",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])shp(?:at|ca|pa|ss)_[a-fA-F0-9]{32}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "shp"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "docker_pat",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])dckr_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,
+    anchor: "dckr_pat_"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "linear_key",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])lin_api_[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/g,
+    anchor: "lin_api_"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "atlassian_token",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])ATATT3[A-Za-z0-9_\-=]{40,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_\-=])/g,
+    anchor: "ATATT3"
+  },
+  {
+    type: "square_token",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:sq0(?:atp|csp)-|EAAA)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,
+    anchor: ["sq0atp-", "sq0csp-", "EAAA"]
+  },
+  {
+    type: "google_oauth_client_secret",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])GOCSPX-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,
+    anchor: "GOCSPX-"
+  }
+];
+var SIMPLE_PATTERNS = PATTERNS.filter(
+  (p) => p.type !== "high_entropy_env" && p.type !== "json_credential_key"
+);
+var COMBINED_REGEX = new RegExp(SIMPLE_PATTERNS.map((p) => `(${p.regex.source})`).join("|"), "g");
+var HIGH_ENTROPY_REGEX = PATTERNS.find((p) => p.type === "high_entropy_env").regex;
+var JSON_CREDENTIAL_REGEX = PATTERNS.find((p) => p.type === "json_credential_key").regex;
+var COMBINED_REPLACEMENTS = SIMPLE_PATTERNS.map((p) => `[REDACTED:${p.type}]`);
+var SCRUB_CHUNK_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
+var SCRUB_OVERLAP_BYTES = 1024;
+var PEM_PRIVATE_KEY_BEGIN_RE = /-----BEGIN (?:RSA|EC|OPENSSH|DSA|PGP)? ?PRIVATE KEY-----/;
+var PEM_END_MARKER = "-----END";
+var MAX_PEM_BLOCK_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
+var PEM_END_LINE_TOLERANCE = 64;
+function extendChunkBoundaryPastPem(text, chunkStart, proposedEnd) {
+  const head = text.slice(chunkStart, proposedEnd);
+  const lastBegin = head.lastIndexOf("-----BEGIN ");
+  if (lastBegin === -1) return proposedEnd;
+  const fromBegin = text.slice(chunkStart + lastBegin);
+  const marker = PEM_PRIVATE_KEY_BEGIN_RE.exec(fromBegin);
+  if (!marker || marker.index !== 0) return proposedEnd;
+  const bodyStart = marker[0].length;
+  const cap = Math.min(text.length, chunkStart + lastBegin + MAX_PEM_BLOCK_BYTES);
+  const closeIdx = fromBegin.indexOf(PEM_END_MARKER, bodyStart);
+  if (closeIdx === -1 || chunkStart + lastBegin + closeIdx >= cap + PEM_END_LINE_TOLERANCE) {
+    return proposedEnd;
+  }
+  const lineEnd = fromBegin.indexOf("\n", closeIdx);
+  const end = lineEnd === -1 ? text.length : chunkStart + lastBegin + lineEnd + 1;
+  return Math.max(proposedEnd, end);
+}
+var PATTERN_ANCHORS = [
+  ...new Set(
+    PATTERNS.flatMap(
+      (pattern) => typeof pattern.anchor === "string" ? [pattern.anchor] : [...pattern.anchor]
+    )
+  )
+];
+var ALL_ANCHORS = PATTERN_ANCHORS;
+function hasCredentialAnchors(text) {
+  for (const anchor of ALL_ANCHORS) {
+    if (text.includes(anchor)) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+var DefaultSecretScrubber = class {
+  scrub(text) {
+    if (!text) return text;
+    if (!hasCredentialAnchors(text)) return text;
+    if (text.length <= SCRUB_CHUNK_BYTES) {
+      return this.scrubOne(text);
+    }
+    const out = [];
+    let i = 0;
+    while (i < text.length) {
+      let end = Math.min(i + SCRUB_CHUNK_BYTES, text.length);
+      if (end < text.length) {
+        const limit = Math.min(end + SCRUB_OVERLAP_BYTES, text.length);
+        let safe = -1;
+        for (let j = end; j < limit; j++) {
+          const ch = text.charCodeAt(j);
+          if (ch === 32 || ch === 9 || ch === 10 || ch === 13) {
+            safe = j;
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+        end = safe === -1 ? end : safe + 1;
+        end = extendChunkBoundaryPastPem(text, i, end);
+      }
+      out.push(this.scrubOne(text.slice(i, end)));
+      i = end;
+    }
+    return out.join("");
+  }
+  scrubOne(text) {
+    if (!hasCredentialAnchors(text)) return text;
+    let out = text.replace(
+      COMBINED_REGEX,
+      (match, ...groups) => {
+        const idx = groups.findIndex((g) => g !== void 0);
+        if (idx < 0) return match;
+        const replacement = COMBINED_REPLACEMENTS[idx];
+        return replacement !== void 0 ? replacement : match;
+      }
+    );
+    out = out.replace(HIGH_ENTROPY_REGEX, (_match, lead, key, _value) => {
+      return `${lead}${key}=[REDACTED:high_entropy_env]`;
+    });
+    out = out.replace(JSON_CREDENTIAL_REGEX, (_match, keyPrefix, _value, closingQuote) => {
+      return `${keyPrefix}[REDACTED:json_credential_key]${closingQuote}`;
+    });
+    return out;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Recursively scrub every string value in an object/array graph. Secrets can
+   * appear under any key — a URL query param, an `authorization` header, an
+   * arbitrarily-named nested field — so we don't gate recursion on key names.
+   * The per-string `scrub()` fast-path (anchor pre-scan) keeps this cheap: any
+   * value without a credential anchor returns immediately without regex work.
+   */
+  scrubObject(obj) {
+    const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakSet();
+    const visit = (v) => {
+      if (typeof v === "string") return this.scrub(v);
+      if (v === null || typeof v !== "object") return v;
+      if (seen.has(v)) return v;
+      seen.add(v);
+      if (Array.isArray(v)) return v.map(visit);
+      const out = {};
+      for (const [k, val] of Object.entries(v)) {
+        out[k] = visit(val);
+      }
+      return out;
+    };
+    return visit(obj);
+  }
+};
+
+export {
+  DefaultSecretScrubber
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3E244UDA.js.map

package/dist/chunk-3XPVB7BA.js

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+// src/plugin/config.ts
+function resolvePluginConfig(input) {
+  const names = [.../* @__PURE__ */ new Set([...input.aliases ?? [], input.name])];
+  const options = { ...input.defaults ?? {} };
+  const sources = [];
+  let configured = false;
+  const merge = (value, source) => {
+    if (!isRecord(value)) return;
+    Object.assign(options, value);
+    configured = true;
+    if (!sources.includes(source)) sources.push(source);
+  };
+  const plugins = input.config?.plugins;
+  if (isRecord(plugins)) {
+    for (const name of names) merge(plugins[name], "legacy-plugin-map");
+  } else if (Array.isArray(plugins)) {
+    for (const candidate of plugins) {
+      if (!isPluginEntry(candidate) || !names.includes(candidate.name)) continue;
+      merge(candidate.options, "plugin-entry");
+    }
+  }
+  const extensions = input.config?.extensions;
+  for (const name of names) merge(extensions?.[name], "extension");
+  merge(input.explicitOptions, "explicit-options");
+  return { options, configured, sources };
+}
+function pluginEntryMatchesName(configuredName, name, aliases = []) {
+  for (const candidate of [name, ...aliases]) {
+    if (configuredName === candidate) return true;
+    if (configuredName === `@wrongstack/plugins/${candidate}`) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+function resolvePluginEnablement(input) {
+  if (input.config?.features?.plugins === false) {
+    return { enabled: false, source: "feature-flag" };
+  }
+  const names = [.../* @__PURE__ */ new Set([input.name, ...input.aliases ?? []])];
+  const matches = input.matches ?? ((configuredName) => pluginEntryMatchesName(configuredName, input.name, input.aliases ?? []));
+  const plugins = input.config?.plugins;
+  if (Array.isArray(plugins)) {
+    for (const candidate of plugins) {
+      if (typeof candidate === "string") {
+        if (matches(candidate)) return { enabled: true, source: "plugin-entry" };
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (!isPluginEntry(candidate) || !matches(candidate.name)) continue;
+      return { enabled: candidate.enabled !== false, source: "plugin-entry" };
+    }
+  }
+  for (const name of names) {
+    const enabled = input.config?.extensions?.[name]?.["enabled"];
+    if (typeof enabled === "boolean") return { enabled, source: "extension" };
+  }
+  return { enabled: input.defaultState === "active", source: "default" };
+}
+function resolvePluginManifestConfig(plugin, config, explicitOptions) {
+  return resolvePluginConfig({
+    name: plugin.name,
+    aliases: plugin.configAliases,
+    defaults: plugin.defaultConfig,
+    config,
+    explicitOptions
+  });
+}
+function diffPluginConfig(previous, next, fields) {
+  const keys = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([...Object.keys(previous), ...Object.keys(next)]);
+  const changes = [];
+  for (const key of keys) {
+    if (valuesEqual(previous[key], next[key])) continue;
+    const metadata = fields[key];
+    changes.push({
+      key,
+      lifecycle: metadata?.lifecycle ?? "immutable",
+      secret: metadata?.secret === true,
+      previous: metadata?.secret === true ? "[REDACTED]" : previous[key],
+      next: metadata?.secret === true ? "[REDACTED]" : next[key]
+    });
+  }
+  return changes;
+}
+function redactPluginConfig(options, fields) {
+  const redacted = { ...options };
+  for (const [key, metadata] of Object.entries(fields)) {
+    if (metadata.secret === true && key in redacted) redacted[key] = "[REDACTED]";
+  }
+  return redacted;
+}
+function validatePluginConfigMetadata(plugin) {
+  if (!plugin.configFields) return [];
+  const declared = plugin.configFields;
+  const expected = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+    ...Object.keys(plugin.configSchema?.properties ?? {}),
+    ...Object.keys(plugin.defaultConfig ?? {})
+  ]);
+  const issues = [];
+  for (const key of expected) {
+    if (!declared[key]) issues.push(`missing configFields metadata for "${key}"`);
+  }
+  for (const [key, metadata] of Object.entries(declared)) {
+    if (!["hot", "restart", "immutable"].includes(metadata.lifecycle)) {
+      issues.push(`invalid lifecycle for configFields."${key}"`);
+    }
+  }
+  return issues;
+}
+function isPluginEntry(value) {
+  return isRecord(value) && typeof value["name"] === "string";
+}
+function isRecord(value) {
+  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+function valuesEqual(left, right) {
+  if (Object.is(left, right)) return true;
+  if (Array.isArray(left) && Array.isArray(right)) {
+    return left.length === right.length && left.every((value, index) => valuesEqual(value, right[index]));
+  }
+  if (isRecord(left) && isRecord(right)) {
+    const leftKeys = Object.keys(left);
+    const rightKeys = Object.keys(right);
+    return leftKeys.length === rightKeys.length && leftKeys.every((key) => key in right && valuesEqual(left[key], right[key]));
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+export {
+  resolvePluginConfig,
+  pluginEntryMatchesName,
+  resolvePluginEnablement,
+  resolvePluginManifestConfig,
+  diffPluginConfig,
+  redactPluginConfig,
+  validatePluginConfigMetadata
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3XPVB7BA.js.map