@wrongstack/core 0.298.0 → 0.298.1

package/dist/defaults/index.js

@@ -29956,7 +29956,68 @@ function isClearlyDestructiveBashCommand(command, projectRoot) {
   return false;
 }
 
-// src/security/permission-policy.ts
+// src/security/auto-approve-policy.ts
+var AutoApprovePermissionPolicy = class _AutoApprovePermissionPolicy {
+  allowedCapabilities;
+  constructor(allowedCapabilities) {
+    this.allowedCapabilities = allowedCapabilities ?? [
+      ToolCapabilities.FS_READ,
+      ToolCapabilities.NET_OUTBOUND
+    ];
+  }
+  static isMcpTool(name) {
+    return name.startsWith("mcp__");
+  }
+  async evaluate(tool) {
+    const caps = tool.capabilities ?? [];
+    const hasAllowedCap = caps.some((c) => this.allowedCapabilities.includes(c));
+    const isMcp = _AutoApprovePermissionPolicy.isMcpTool(tool.name);
+    const mcpProxyAllowed = this.allowedCapabilities.includes(ToolCapabilities.MCP_PROXY);
+    const dangerousNotAllowed = getDangerousCapabilities(tool).filter(
+      (c) => !this.allowedCapabilities.includes(c)
+    );
+    const blocked = tool.permission === "deny" || isMcp && !mcpProxyAllowed || !hasAllowedCap || dangerousNotAllowed.length > 0;
+    if (blocked) {
+      const reason = isMcp && !mcpProxyAllowed ? `MCP tool ${tool.name} is not auto-approved for subagents \u2014 ask the leader to allow mcp.proxy explicitly` : tool.permission === "deny" ? "tool default deny" : dangerousNotAllowed.length > 0 ? `tool requires un-granted dangerous capability (needs: ${dangerousNotAllowed.join(", ")}, allowed: ${this.allowedCapabilities.join(", ")})` : `tool lacks allowed capability (has: ${caps.join(", ") || "none"}, allowed: ${this.allowedCapabilities.join(", ")})`;
+      return {
+        permission: "deny",
+        source: "subagent_guard",
+        reason
+      };
+    }
+    return { permission: "auto", source: "yolo" };
+  }
+  async trust() {
+  }
+  async deny() {
+  }
+  denyOnce() {
+  }
+  allowOnce() {
+  }
+  async explain(tool) {
+    const decision = await this.evaluate(tool);
+    return {
+      toolName: tool.name,
+      subject: null,
+      steps: [
+        {
+          rule: "subagent auto",
+          matched: decision.permission === "auto",
+          decision: decision.permission,
+          source: decision.source,
+          detail: decision.reason ?? `subagent policy: ${decision.permission}`
+        }
+      ],
+      winnerIndex: 0,
+      decision
+    };
+  }
+  async reload() {
+  }
+};
+
+// src/security/permission-helpers.ts
 function matchesTrust(patterns, subject) {
   return patterns.includes(subject) || matchAny(patterns, subject);
 }
@@ -30051,6 +30112,8 @@ function shellCommandReadsSensitivePath(command) {
   }
   return false;
 }
+
+// src/security/permission-policy.ts
 var DefaultPermissionPolicy = class {
   policy = {};
   loaded = false;
@@ -30793,65 +30856,6 @@ var DefaultPermissionPolicy = class {
     return void 0;
   }
 };
-var AutoApprovePermissionPolicy = class _AutoApprovePermissionPolicy {
-  allowedCapabilities;
-  constructor(allowedCapabilities) {
-    this.allowedCapabilities = allowedCapabilities ?? [
-      ToolCapabilities.FS_READ,
-      ToolCapabilities.NET_OUTBOUND
-    ];
-  }
-  static isMcpTool(name) {
-    return name.startsWith("mcp__");
-  }
-  async evaluate(tool) {
-    const caps = tool.capabilities ?? [];
-    const hasAllowedCap = caps.some((c) => this.allowedCapabilities.includes(c));
-    const isMcp = _AutoApprovePermissionPolicy.isMcpTool(tool.name);
-    const mcpProxyAllowed = this.allowedCapabilities.includes(ToolCapabilities.MCP_PROXY);
-    const dangerousNotAllowed = getDangerousCapabilities(tool).filter(
-      (c) => !this.allowedCapabilities.includes(c)
-    );
-    const blocked = tool.permission === "deny" || isMcp && !mcpProxyAllowed || !hasAllowedCap || dangerousNotAllowed.length > 0;
-    if (blocked) {
-      const reason = isMcp && !mcpProxyAllowed ? `MCP tool ${tool.name} is not auto-approved for subagents \u2014 ask the leader to allow mcp.proxy explicitly` : tool.permission === "deny" ? "tool default deny" : dangerousNotAllowed.length > 0 ? `tool requires un-granted dangerous capability (needs: ${dangerousNotAllowed.join(", ")}, allowed: ${this.allowedCapabilities.join(", ")})` : `tool lacks allowed capability (has: ${caps.join(", ") || "none"}, allowed: ${this.allowedCapabilities.join(", ")})`;
-      return {
-        permission: "deny",
-        source: "subagent_guard",
-        reason
-      };
-    }
-    return { permission: "auto", source: "yolo" };
-  }
-  async trust() {
-  }
-  async deny() {
-  }
-  denyOnce() {
-  }
-  allowOnce() {
-  }
-  async explain(tool) {
-    const decision = await this.evaluate(tool);
-    return {
-      toolName: tool.name,
-      subject: null,
-      steps: [
-        {
-          rule: "subagent auto",
-          matched: decision.permission === "auto",
-          decision: decision.permission,
-          source: decision.source,
-          detail: decision.reason ?? `subagent policy: ${decision.permission}`
-        }
-      ],
-      winnerIndex: 0,
-      decision
-    };
-  }
-  async reload() {
-  }
-};
 
 // src/security/secret-vault.ts
 import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes as randomBytes3, scryptSync } from "node:crypto";
@@ -31631,7 +31635,7 @@ var CONFIG_BEHAVIOR_DEFAULTS = {
     // DEFAULT_STATUSLINE_MODE (packages/tui/src/components/settings-picker-model.ts).
     statuslineMode: "minimum",
     thinkingWord: DEFAULT_TUI_THINKING_WORD,
-    showAgentSwarmPanel: true
+    showAgentSwarmPanel: "bottom"
   },
   circuitBreaker: { ...DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_CONFIG },
   modelRuntime: {

package/dist/index.js

@@ -3524,7 +3524,7 @@ var CONFIG_BEHAVIOR_DEFAULTS = {
     // DEFAULT_STATUSLINE_MODE (packages/tui/src/components/settings-picker-model.ts).
     statuslineMode: "minimum",
     thinkingWord: DEFAULT_TUI_THINKING_WORD,
-    showAgentSwarmPanel: true
+    showAgentSwarmPanel: "bottom"
   },
   circuitBreaker: { ...DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_CONFIG },
   modelRuntime: {
@@ -15021,6 +15021,49 @@ function quoteWin32CmdArg(arg) {
   return `"${arg}"`;
 }
 
+// src/utils/sage-output-block.ts
+var SAGE_INJECTOR_HEADINGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+  "--- SAGE: task-aware project knowledge (Memory Injector) ---",
+  "--- SAGE: related project knowledge (Memory Injector) ---"
+]);
+var SAGE_MEMORY_LINE = /^- \[[^\]]+\](?:\[[^\]]+\])* <memory id="[^"]+">.*<\/memory>(?: .*)?$/;
+var SAGE_MEMORY_LINE_TRUNCATED = /^- \[[^\]]+\](?:\[[^\]]+\])* <memory id="[^"]+">.*…$/;
+function splitSageOutputBlock(output) {
+  if (!output.includes("--- SAGE: ")) return { body: output, sageLines: [] };
+  const lines = output.split("\n");
+  for (let sageIdx = lines.length - 1; sageIdx >= 0; sageIdx--) {
+    if (!SAGE_INJECTOR_HEADINGS.has(lines[sageIdx] ?? "")) continue;
+    const candidate = lines.slice(sageIdx);
+    if (candidate.length < 2) continue;
+    const memoryLines = candidate.slice(1).filter((line) => line.trim().length > 0);
+    if (memoryLines.length === 0) continue;
+    const bodyOk = memoryLines.every(
+      (line, index) => SAGE_MEMORY_LINE.test(line) || index === memoryLines.length - 1 && SAGE_MEMORY_LINE_TRUNCATED.test(line)
+    );
+    if (!bodyOk) continue;
+    let end = candidate.length;
+    while (end > 1 && candidate[end - 1].trim().length === 0) end--;
+    return {
+      body: lines.slice(0, sageIdx).join("\n").trimEnd(),
+      sageLines: candidate.slice(0, end)
+    };
+  }
+  return { body: output, sageLines: [] };
+}
+function capSageLines(sageLines, maxChars) {
+  if (sageLines.length < 2) return [];
+  const header = sageLines[0];
+  if (header.length >= maxChars) return [];
+  const out = [header];
+  let used = header.length;
+  for (const line of sageLines.slice(1)) {
+    if (used + 1 + line.length > maxChars) break;
+    out.push(line);
+    used += 1 + line.length;
+  }
+  return out.length > 1 ? out : [];
+}
+
 // src/chronicle/sqlite-query.ts
 var MAX_LIMIT = 1e4;
 function encodeCursor2(cursor) {
@@ -50667,51 +50710,6 @@ ${text2}` : text2;
 
 // src/core/agent-tools.ts
 init_error();
-
-// src/utils/sage-output-block.ts
-var SAGE_INJECTOR_HEADINGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
-  "--- SAGE: task-aware project knowledge (Memory Injector) ---",
-  "--- SAGE: related project knowledge (Memory Injector) ---"
-]);
-var SAGE_MEMORY_LINE = /^- \[[^\]]+\](?:\[[^\]]+\])* <memory id="[^"]+">.*<\/memory>(?: .*)?$/;
-var SAGE_MEMORY_LINE_TRUNCATED = /^- \[[^\]]+\](?:\[[^\]]+\])* <memory id="[^"]+">.*…$/;
-function splitSageOutputBlock(output) {
-  if (!output.includes("--- SAGE: ")) return { body: output, sageLines: [] };
-  const lines = output.split("\n");
-  for (let sageIdx = lines.length - 1; sageIdx >= 0; sageIdx--) {
-    if (!SAGE_INJECTOR_HEADINGS.has(lines[sageIdx] ?? "")) continue;
-    const candidate = lines.slice(sageIdx);
-    if (candidate.length < 2) continue;
-    const memoryLines = candidate.slice(1).filter((line) => line.trim().length > 0);
-    if (memoryLines.length === 0) continue;
-    const bodyOk = memoryLines.every(
-      (line, index) => SAGE_MEMORY_LINE.test(line) || index === memoryLines.length - 1 && SAGE_MEMORY_LINE_TRUNCATED.test(line)
-    );
-    if (!bodyOk) continue;
-    let end = candidate.length;
-    while (end > 1 && candidate[end - 1].trim().length === 0) end--;
-    return {
-      body: lines.slice(0, sageIdx).join("\n").trimEnd(),
-      sageLines: candidate.slice(0, end)
-    };
-  }
-  return { body: output, sageLines: [] };
-}
-function capSageLines(sageLines, maxChars) {
-  if (sageLines.length < 2) return [];
-  const header = sageLines[0];
-  if (header.length >= maxChars) return [];
-  const out = [header];
-  let used = header.length;
-  for (const line of sageLines.slice(1)) {
-    if (used + 1 + line.length > maxChars) break;
-    out.push(line);
-    used += 1 + line.length;
-  }
-  return out.length > 1 ? out : [];
-}
-
-// src/core/agent-tools.ts
 var DIFF_TOOL_NAMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["edit", "write", "replace", "patch", "diff"]);
 var DIFF_TOOL_EVENT_PREVIEW_MAX = 16e3;
 var SAGE_EVENT_MAX = 2e3;
@@ -62589,7 +62587,68 @@ function isClearlyDestructiveBashCommand(command, projectRoot) {
   return false;
 }
 
-// src/security/permission-policy.ts
+// src/security/auto-approve-policy.ts
+var AutoApprovePermissionPolicy = class _AutoApprovePermissionPolicy {
+  allowedCapabilities;
+  constructor(allowedCapabilities) {
+    this.allowedCapabilities = allowedCapabilities ?? [
+      ToolCapabilities.FS_READ,
+      ToolCapabilities.NET_OUTBOUND
+    ];
+  }
+  static isMcpTool(name) {
+    return name.startsWith("mcp__");
+  }
+  async evaluate(tool) {
+    const caps = tool.capabilities ?? [];
+    const hasAllowedCap = caps.some((c) => this.allowedCapabilities.includes(c));
+    const isMcp = _AutoApprovePermissionPolicy.isMcpTool(tool.name);
+    const mcpProxyAllowed = this.allowedCapabilities.includes(ToolCapabilities.MCP_PROXY);
+    const dangerousNotAllowed = getDangerousCapabilities(tool).filter(
+      (c) => !this.allowedCapabilities.includes(c)
+    );
+    const blocked = tool.permission === "deny" || isMcp && !mcpProxyAllowed || !hasAllowedCap || dangerousNotAllowed.length > 0;
+    if (blocked) {
+      const reason = isMcp && !mcpProxyAllowed ? `MCP tool ${tool.name} is not auto-approved for subagents \u2014 ask the leader to allow mcp.proxy explicitly` : tool.permission === "deny" ? "tool default deny" : dangerousNotAllowed.length > 0 ? `tool requires un-granted dangerous capability (needs: ${dangerousNotAllowed.join(", ")}, allowed: ${this.allowedCapabilities.join(", ")})` : `tool lacks allowed capability (has: ${caps.join(", ") || "none"}, allowed: ${this.allowedCapabilities.join(", ")})`;
+      return {
+        permission: "deny",
+        source: "subagent_guard",
+        reason
+      };
+    }
+    return { permission: "auto", source: "yolo" };
+  }
+  async trust() {
+  }
+  async deny() {
+  }
+  denyOnce() {
+  }
+  allowOnce() {
+  }
+  async explain(tool) {
+    const decision = await this.evaluate(tool);
+    return {
+      toolName: tool.name,
+      subject: null,
+      steps: [
+        {
+          rule: "subagent auto",
+          matched: decision.permission === "auto",
+          decision: decision.permission,
+          source: decision.source,
+          detail: decision.reason ?? `subagent policy: ${decision.permission}`
+        }
+      ],
+      winnerIndex: 0,
+      decision
+    };
+  }
+  async reload() {
+  }
+};
+
+// src/security/permission-helpers.ts
 function matchesTrust(patterns, subject2) {
   return patterns.includes(subject2) || matchAny(patterns, subject2);
 }
@@ -62684,6 +62743,8 @@ function shellCommandReadsSensitivePath(command) {
   }
   return false;
 }
+
+// src/security/permission-policy.ts
 var DefaultPermissionPolicy = class {
   policy = {};
   loaded = false;
@@ -63426,65 +63487,6 @@ var DefaultPermissionPolicy = class {
     return void 0;
   }
 };
-var AutoApprovePermissionPolicy = class _AutoApprovePermissionPolicy {
-  allowedCapabilities;
-  constructor(allowedCapabilities) {
-    this.allowedCapabilities = allowedCapabilities ?? [
-      ToolCapabilities.FS_READ,
-      ToolCapabilities.NET_OUTBOUND
-    ];
-  }
-  static isMcpTool(name) {
-    return name.startsWith("mcp__");
-  }
-  async evaluate(tool) {
-    const caps = tool.capabilities ?? [];
-    const hasAllowedCap = caps.some((c) => this.allowedCapabilities.includes(c));
-    const isMcp = _AutoApprovePermissionPolicy.isMcpTool(tool.name);
-    const mcpProxyAllowed = this.allowedCapabilities.includes(ToolCapabilities.MCP_PROXY);
-    const dangerousNotAllowed = getDangerousCapabilities(tool).filter(
-      (c) => !this.allowedCapabilities.includes(c)
-    );
-    const blocked = tool.permission === "deny" || isMcp && !mcpProxyAllowed || !hasAllowedCap || dangerousNotAllowed.length > 0;
-    if (blocked) {
-      const reason = isMcp && !mcpProxyAllowed ? `MCP tool ${tool.name} is not auto-approved for subagents \u2014 ask the leader to allow mcp.proxy explicitly` : tool.permission === "deny" ? "tool default deny" : dangerousNotAllowed.length > 0 ? `tool requires un-granted dangerous capability (needs: ${dangerousNotAllowed.join(", ")}, allowed: ${this.allowedCapabilities.join(", ")})` : `tool lacks allowed capability (has: ${caps.join(", ") || "none"}, allowed: ${this.allowedCapabilities.join(", ")})`;
-      return {
-        permission: "deny",
-        source: "subagent_guard",
-        reason
-      };
-    }
-    return { permission: "auto", source: "yolo" };
-  }
-  async trust() {
-  }
-  async deny() {
-  }
-  denyOnce() {
-  }
-  allowOnce() {
-  }
-  async explain(tool) {
-    const decision = await this.evaluate(tool);
-    return {
-      toolName: tool.name,
-      subject: null,
-      steps: [
-        {
-          rule: "subagent auto",
-          matched: decision.permission === "auto",
-          decision: decision.permission,
-          source: decision.source,
-          detail: decision.reason ?? `subagent policy: ${decision.permission}`
-        }
-      ],
-      winnerIndex: 0,
-      decision
-    };
-  }
-  async reload() {
-  }
-};
 
 // src/storage/attachment-store.ts
 init_atomic_write();
@@ -75940,57 +75942,49 @@ function parseReviewSeverity(text2) {
   const result = { critical: 0, high: 0, medium: 0 };
   if (!text2) return result;
   for (const level of ["critical", "high", "medium"]) {
-    const countRe = new RegExp(`###\\s*${level}\\s*\\((\\d+)\\)`, "i");
-    const countMatch = text2.match(countRe);
+    const countMatch = text2.match(new RegExp(`###\\s*${level}\\s*\\((\\d+)\\)`, "i"));
     if (countMatch?.[1]) {
       result[level] = Number.parseInt(countMatch[1], 10);
       continue;
     }
-    const sectionRe = new RegExp(`###\\s*${level}[^\\n]*\\n([\\s\\S]*?)(?=###|$)`, "i");
-    const sectionMatch = text2.match(sectionRe);
-    if (sectionMatch?.[1]) {
-      const items = sectionMatch[1].match(/^\s*\d+\.\s/gm);
-      result[level] = items ? items.length : 0;
-    }
+    const section = text2.match(
+      new RegExp(`###\\s*${level}[^\\n]*\\n([\\s\\S]*?)(?=###|$)`, "i")
+    )?.[1];
+    result[level] = section?.match(/^\s*\d+\.\s/gm)?.length ?? 0;
   }
   return result;
 }
-var SECURITY_KEYWORDS = [
-  "injection",
-  "xss",
-  "csrf",
-  "ssrf",
-  "sql",
-  "secret",
-  "credential",
-  "password",
-  "api key",
-  "token",
-  "auth",
-  "shell injection",
-  "command injection",
-  "innerhtml",
-  "deserialization",
-  "path traversal",
-  "hardcoded",
-  "privilege",
-  "owasp"
-];
 function decideCascadeAgents(text2, severities) {
   const agents = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
-  if (severities.critical > 0 || severities.high > 0) {
-    agents.add("bug-hunter");
-  }
-  const lower = text2.toLowerCase();
-  const criticalHighRe = /###\s*(?:critical|high)[^\n]*\n([\s\S]*?)(?=###|$)/gi;
-  let section = criticalHighRe.exec(lower);
-  while (section !== null) {
+  if (severities.critical > 0 || severities.high > 0) agents.add("bug-hunter");
+  const securityKeywords = [
+    "injection",
+    "xss",
+    "csrf",
+    "ssrf",
+    "sql",
+    "secret",
+    "credential",
+    "password",
+    "api key",
+    "token",
+    "auth",
+    "shell injection",
+    "command injection",
+    "innerhtml",
+    "deserialization",
+    "path traversal",
+    "hardcoded",
+    "privilege",
+    "owasp"
+  ];
+  const criticalHighSections = text2.toLowerCase().matchAll(/###\s*(?:critical|high)[^\n]*\n([\s\S]*?)(?=###|$)/gi);
+  for (const section of criticalHighSections) {
     const body = section[1] ?? "";
-    if (SECURITY_KEYWORDS.some((kw) => body.includes(kw))) {
+    if (securityKeywords.some((keyword) => body.includes(keyword))) {
       agents.add("security-scanner");
       break;
     }
-    section = criticalHighRe.exec(lower);
   }
   return [...agents];
 }
@@ -76083,9 +76077,8 @@ function buildAutoReviewCommand(getConfig, getInFlightCount) {
       "Detects git-tracked file edits and dispatches review subagents",
       "with configurable provider/model/fallback.",
       "",
-      "When a review report contains findings at or above the cascadeOn",
-      "threshold, follow-up agents (security-scanner, bug-hunter) are",
-      "automatically spawned to investigate.",
+      "Reports are persisted and shown as passive notifications.",
+      "They never wake the leader or spawn mutating follow-up agents.",
       "",
       "Commands:",
       "  /auto-review           Show current status and config",
@@ -76100,11 +76093,8 @@ function buildAutoReviewCommand(getConfig, getInFlightCount) {
       "  debounceMs           debounce window (default 15000)",
       "  maxFilesPerBatch     max files per review (default 15)",
       "  maxConcurrentReviews max parallel reviews (default 2)",
-      '  cascadeOn            "off" | "critical" | "high" (default off)',
-      "                       Spawns security-scanner/bug-hunter when",
-      '                       findings reach this severity. "high" fires',
-      '                       on any High+ finding; "critical" only on Critical.',
-      "  maxCascadeDepth      max fix+re-review cycles (default 2, 0=off)"
+      "  cascadeOn            off | critical | high (default off)",
+      "  maxCascadeDepth      max fix+re-review cycles (default 2)"
     ].join("\n"),
     async run(args) {
       const cfg = getConfig();
@@ -76120,7 +76110,6 @@ function buildAutoReviewCommand(getConfig, getInFlightCount) {
         };
       }
       const inFlight = getInFlightCount();
-      const cascadeDesc = cfg.cascadeOn === "off" ? "disabled" : `on ${cfg.cascadeOn}+ \u2192 spawns security-scanner/bug-hunter`;
       return {
         message: [
           `\u{1F4CB} Auto Review \u2014 ${cfg.enabled ? "\u2705 enabled" : "\u23F8\uFE0F  disabled"}`,
@@ -76131,7 +76120,7 @@ function buildAutoReviewCommand(getConfig, getInFlightCount) {
           `  Debounce:       ${cfg.debounceMs} ms`,
           `  Max files:      ${cfg.maxFilesPerBatch}`,
           `  Max parallel:   ${cfg.maxConcurrentReviews}`,
-          `  Cascade:        ${cascadeDesc}`,
+          `  Cascade:        ${cfg.cascadeOn === "off" ? "off" : `on ${cfg.cascadeOn}+ \u2192 spawns security-scanner/bug-hunter`}`,
           `  Max depth:      ${cfg.maxCascadeDepth} re-review cycle(s)`,
           `  In-flight:      ${inFlight} review(s)`,
           "",
@@ -77439,7 +77428,9 @@ function createChimeraPlugin() {
             api.log.info("[chimera] skipped \u2014 changed files already have reviews in progress");
             return;
           }
-          api.log.info(`[chimera] emitted review_needed event (${emittedBundle.files.length} files)`);
+          api.log.info(
+            `[chimera] emitted review_needed event (${emittedBundle.files.length} files)`
+          );
         } catch (err) {
           api.log.warn(`[chimera] session.ended handler failed: ${toErrorMessage(err)}`);
         }
@@ -87978,6 +87969,7 @@ export {
   ReplayLogStore,
   ReplayProviderRunner,
   RunController,
+  SAGE_INJECTOR_HEADINGS,
   SECURITY_SCANNER_AGENT,
   SEMANTIC_TUNE_KNOBS,
   SESSION_MARKER_EVENT_TYPES,
@@ -88107,6 +88099,7 @@ export {
   buildWin32CmdShimInvocation,
   canCaptureNewLearned,
   canonicalProjectRoot,
+  capSageLines,
   captureLearnedFromAgentOutput,
   captureLearnedFromAgentOutputDetailed,
   checkConnectivity,
@@ -88688,6 +88681,7 @@ export {
   slugify2 as slugify,
   slugifyProjectAgentRole,
   smartDefaultFallbackChain,
+  splitSageOutputBlock,
   sqliteCachePragmas,
   sshManagerServer,
   stableStringify3 as stableStringify,

package/dist/infrastructure/index.js

@@ -3182,7 +3182,7 @@ var CONFIG_BEHAVIOR_DEFAULTS = {
     // DEFAULT_STATUSLINE_MODE (packages/tui/src/components/settings-picker-model.ts).
     statuslineMode: "minimum",
     thinkingWord: DEFAULT_TUI_THINKING_WORD,
-    showAgentSwarmPanel: true
+    showAgentSwarmPanel: "bottom"
   },
   circuitBreaker: { ...DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_CONFIG },
   modelRuntime: {