@wrongstack/core 0.275.0 → 0.276.2

package/dist/{secret-vault-C9leEMzr.d.ts → secret-vault-BUJ2d1gB.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { S as SecretScrubber } from './permission-CJR1qfOi.js';
+import { S as SecretScrubber } from './permission-BCbQDR2s.js';
 import { L as Logger } from './logger-B63L5bTg.js';
 import { R as RotatableSecretVault, S as SecretVault } from './secret-vault-BAKpgFw_.js';
 

package/dist/security/index.d.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-export { a as DefaultSecretScrubber, D as DefaultSecretVault, S as SecretVaultOptions, d as decryptConfigSecrets, e as encryptConfigSecrets, i as isSecretField, m as migratePlaintextSecrets, r as rewriteConfigEncrypted, b as rotateConfigKeys } from '../secret-vault-C9leEMzr.js';
-export { A as AutoApprovePermissionPolicy, D as DefaultPermissionPolicy, P as PermissionPolicyOptions } from '../permission-policy-DLVKKk4w.js';
-export { D as DANGEROUS_FOR_SUBAGENTS, T as ToolCapabilities, a as ToolCapability, g as getDangerousCapabilities, h as hasCapability, b as hasDangerousCapabilityForSubagents } from '../index-neOCEy6q.js';
-import '../permission-CJR1qfOi.js';
-import '../context-BrLe8pJy.js';
+export { a as DefaultSecretScrubber, D as DefaultSecretVault, S as SecretVaultOptions, d as decryptConfigSecrets, e as encryptConfigSecrets, i as isSecretField, m as migratePlaintextSecrets, r as rewriteConfigEncrypted, b as rotateConfigKeys } from '../secret-vault-BUJ2d1gB.js';
+export { A as AutoApprovePermissionPolicy, D as DefaultPermissionPolicy, P as PermissionPolicyOptions } from '../permission-policy-C0ikndX_.js';
+export { D as DANGEROUS_FOR_SUBAGENTS, T as ToolCapabilities, a as ToolCapability, g as getDangerousCapabilities, h as hasCapability, b as hasDangerousCapabilityForSubagents } from '../index-L4RZN9jJ.js';
+import '../permission-BCbQDR2s.js';
+import '../context-CLnUMW5g.js';
 import '../logger-B63L5bTg.js';
 import '../secret-vault-BAKpgFw_.js';
 import '../input-reader-E-ffP2ee.js';

package/dist/security/index.js

@@ -72,13 +72,27 @@ var PATTERNS = [
     // Min 12 chars: some OAuth providers issue shorter-lived tokens (< 20
     // chars). A 12-char base64 string has ~71 bits of entropy — above the
     // threshold where random strings are unlikely to produce false matches.
-    regex: /(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_.~+/-])Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{12,512}=*(?:$|[^A-Za-z0-9_.~+/-])/g
+    // The trailing boundary is a NON-consuming lookahead: two adjacent bearer
+    // tokens sharing a single delimiter (`Bearer a… Bearer b…`) must both be
+    // redacted. A consuming trailing delimiter would eat the separator the
+    // next match needs for its leading anchor, leaking the second token.
+    regex: /(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_.~+/-])Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{12,512}=*(?=$|[^A-Za-z0-9_.~+/-])/g
   },
   {
     type: "high_entropy_env",
     // Anchored with alternation instead of lookbehind to avoid backtracking.
     // Value bounded at 512 chars.
-    regex: /(?:^|\s)([A-Z_]{4,}(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PWD))\s*[:=]\s*['"]?([A-Za-z0-9_/+=-]{20,512})['"]?(?:\s|$)/g
+    // The trailing boundary is a NON-consuming lookahead so two secrets
+    // separated by a single delimiter (one space OR one newline, e.g.
+    // `printenv` / `.env` dumps: `API_KEY=… \n SESSION_TOKEN=…`) are BOTH
+    // redacted. A consuming trailing `\s` would swallow the separator the
+    // next match needs for its leading anchor, so every other secret would
+    // leak in plaintext.
+    // The leading delimiter is CAPTURED (group 1) and re-emitted by the
+    // replacement so the separator between adjacent secrets is preserved
+    // rather than collapsed. Capture groups are therefore: 1=leading
+    // delimiter, 2=key name, 3=value.
+    regex: /(^|\s)([A-Z_]{4,}(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PWD))\s*[:=]\s*['"]?([A-Za-z0-9_/+=-]{20,512})['"]?(?=\s|$)/g
   }
 ];
 var SIMPLE_PATTERNS = PATTERNS.filter((p) => p.type !== "high_entropy_env");
@@ -86,6 +100,7 @@ var COMBINED_REGEX = new RegExp(SIMPLE_PATTERNS.map((p) => `(${p.regex.source})`
 var HIGH_ENTROPY_REGEX = PATTERNS.find((p) => p.type === "high_entropy_env").regex;
 var COMBINED_REPLACEMENTS = SIMPLE_PATTERNS.map((p) => `[REDACTED:${p.type}]`);
 var SCRUB_CHUNK_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
+var SCRUB_OVERLAP_BYTES = 1024;
 function hasCredentialAnchors(text) {
   return text.includes("-----BEGIN") || // Private keys (most unique → cheap reject)
   text.includes("sk-") || // Anthropic + OpenAI keys
@@ -120,8 +135,16 @@ var DefaultSecretScrubber = class {
     while (i < text.length) {
       let end = Math.min(i + SCRUB_CHUNK_BYTES, text.length);
       if (end < text.length) {
-        const nl = text.lastIndexOf("\n", end);
-        if (nl > i + SCRUB_CHUNK_BYTES / 2) end = nl + 1;
+        const limit = Math.min(end + SCRUB_OVERLAP_BYTES, text.length);
+        let safe = -1;
+        for (let j = end; j < limit; j++) {
+          const ch = text.charCodeAt(j);
+          if (ch === 32 || ch === 9 || ch === 10 || ch === 13) {
+            safe = j;
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+        end = safe === -1 ? end : safe + 1;
       }
       out.push(this.scrubOne(text.slice(i, end)));
       i = end;
@@ -139,8 +162,8 @@ var DefaultSecretScrubber = class {
         return replacement !== void 0 ? replacement : match;
       }
     );
-    out = out.replace(HIGH_ENTROPY_REGEX, (_match, group1, _group2) => {
-      return `${group1}=[REDACTED:high_entropy_env]`;
+    out = out.replace(HIGH_ENTROPY_REGEX, (_match, lead, key, _value) => {
+      return `${lead}${key}=[REDACTED:high_entropy_env]`;
     });
     return out;
   }
@@ -496,6 +519,7 @@ var ERROR_CODES = {
   SDD_NOT_READY: "SDD_NOT_READY",
   // General
   VALIDATION_ERROR: "VALIDATION_ERROR",
+  PARSE_FAILED: "PARSE_FAILED",
   UNKNOWN: "UNKNOWN"
 };
 var WrongStackError = class extends Error {