@wowok/agent-mcp 3.4.3 → 3.4.4

package/dist/knowledge/baselines/rules/machine.json.good

@@ -0,0 +1,734 @@
+{
+  "comment": "Machine rule pack (R-M) — declarative form of the retired in-code Machine risk rules (44 rules across 5 dimensions). Facts are produced by the kernel extractor (machine-risk.ts, bound to MAX_NODE_COUNT and USER_DEFINED_PERM_INDEX_START); rules only reference fact names. Graph walks (entry/terminal/orphan scan, per-node pair counting, per-pair forward counting, duplicate names, unachievable-threshold classification, per-forward permission scans, published-object cross-checks) are sunk into the extractor as first-offender facts. Rules whose retired check had no runtime detection (design guidance only) are catalog stubs: they carry the full wording but a never-true condition, so the finding set matches the retired code exactly. Levels/wording can be retuned per rule and rules can be disabled (enabled=false, trace left) via the judgment document — factory rules can never be deleted or invented here.",
+  "facts": {
+    "has_entry": "At least one Pair has prev_node='' (the workflow entry point).",
+    "has_terminal": "At least one node has no outgoing Pair (a terminal exists).",
+    "terminal_nodes_display": "Stop nodes — nodes with NO outgoing Pair (never appear as prev_node), ', '-joined; orders rest here forever.",
+    "no_allocator_published": "The project context is allocator-aware (published_allocators provided) and the set is EMPTY — no Allocator published. Unknown (context without the set, e.g. design-time scans) never fires.",
+    "terminal_fund_exit_uncovered": "At least one stop node exists AND the allocator-aware project context shows no Allocator published — fund-exit coverage gap (R-M5-03).",
+    "first_orphaned_node_name": "First-offender — name of the first node with neither an entry/prev reference nor any incoming Pair (absent when none).",
+    "node_count": "Number of nodes in the Machine JSON.",
+    "node_count_over_limit": "node_count exceeds MAX_NODE_COUNT (chain-limit comparison sunk into the extractor).",
+    "max_node_count": "KERNEL CONSTANT — nodes per Machine cap (MAX_NODE_COUNT).",
+    "first_overpair_node_name": "First-offender — next_node of the first node owning more than 40 incoming Pairs (absent when none).",
+    "first_overpair_count": "That node's Pair count.",
+    "first_overforward_prev": "First-offender — prev_node of the first Pair with more than 20 Forwards (absent when none).",
+    "first_overforward_next": "That Pair's next_node.",
+    "first_overforward_count": "That Pair's Forward count.",
+    "duplicate_names_display": "Duplicated node names (deduped, first-occurrence order), ', '-joined — empty when names are unique.",
+    "unachievable_present": "At least one Pair's threshold exceeds the sum of its distinct forward weights (machine-topology analysis sunk into the extractor).",
+    "first_unachievable_is_multi": "The first unachievable Pair is the multi-operator variant (threshold > 1 with fewer distinct forwards than the threshold).",
+    "first_unachievable_detail": "Rendered first-offender detail for the unachievable Pair, including the topology reason.",
+    "first_missing_guard_forward_name": "First-offender — name of the first Forward referencing a Guard outside the published set (absent when none).",
+    "first_missing_guard_guard": "That Forward's Guard address.",
+    "first_retained_no_guard_forward_name": "First-offender — name of the first Forward carrying retained_submission without any Guard (absent when none).",
+    "first_noperm_forward_name": "First-offender — name of the first Forward with NONE of namedOperator, permissionIndex, or Guard (absent when none). Note: since N-8-B a Guard-only forward is rejected by the chain at CONSTRUCTION (forward_with_guard aborts E_FORWARD_NO_IDENTITY 21) and re-checked at publish — both constructors require namedOperator or permissionIndex on EVERY forward; treat Guard as a post-verification addition, never the sole binding.",
+    "first_noperm_prev": "That Forward's Pair prev_node.",
+    "first_noperm_next": "That Forward's Pair next_node.",
+    "first_both_forward_name": "First-offender — name of the first Forward with BOTH namedOperator and permissionIndex set (absent when none).",
+    "first_both_prev": "That Forward's Pair prev_node.",
+    "first_both_next": "That Forward's Pair next_node.",
+    "first_lowperm_forward_name": "First-offender — name of the first Forward whose permissionIndex is below USER_DEFINED_PERM_INDEX_START (absent when none).",
+    "first_lowperm_prev": "That Forward's Pair prev_node.",
+    "first_lowperm_next": "That Forward's Pair next_node.",
+    "first_lowperm_index": "That Forward's permissionIndex value.",
+    "min_perm_index": "KERNEL CONSTANT — first user-defined permission index (USER_DEFINED_PERM_INDEX_START).",
+    "mainnet_without_testnet": "Network is mainnet and the testnet test has not passed.",
+    "missing_guards_display": "Referenced Guard addresses missing from the published set, ', '-joined — empty when all are published.",
+    "first_trap_node_name": "First-offender — name of the first entry-reachable node with no forward path to any terminal (trap analysis: cycles are allowed on-chain, the flagged failure is a loop/dead chain without a cycle-breaking exit; absent when none).",
+    "trap_nodes_display": "All trapped nodes (entry-reachable, no path to a terminal), ', '-joined — empty when the graph is trap-free.",
+    "always_true": "Extractor sentinel — unconditionally true; marks catalog stubs (via eq false) and documentation."
+  },
+  "rules": [
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-01",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Check if any pair has prev_node === ''",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "has_entry", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "No entry point",
+          "description": "Machine has no Pair with prev_node='' (no entry point). Workflow cannot start.",
+          "mitigation": "Add at least one Pair with prev_node='' to serve as entry point.",
+          "evidence": "No Pair with prev_node='' found. Workflow cannot start.",
+          "exposure": {
+            "loss_parties": [
+              { "role": "buyer", "basis": "With no entry Pair the workflow can never start: escrowed order funds sit in the Allocation and can be neither distributed nor refunded." },
+              { "role": "merchant", "basis": "The merchant revenue share of the same unstartable orders freezes with them." }
+            ],
+            "gain_paths": []
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-02",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Check if any node has no outgoing Pair",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "has_terminal", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "No terminal node",
+          "description": "Machine has no terminal node (all nodes have outgoing Pairs). Workflow never completes.",
+          "mitigation": "Designate at least one node as terminal (no outgoing Pair) and bind Allocator to it.",
+          "evidence": "No terminal node found. Workflow never completes.",
+          "exposure": {
+            "loss_parties": [
+              { "role": "buyer", "basis": "With no terminal node the workflow never completes, so the terminal allocation never executes — escrowed order funds are frozen indefinitely." },
+              { "role": "merchant", "basis": "The merchant revenue share of the same never-completing orders freezes with them." }
+            ],
+            "gain_paths": []
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-03",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Find nodes with no outgoing Pair that are not intended terminals — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Dead-end node (non-terminal)",
+          "description": "Non-terminal node has no outgoing Pair. Workflow stalls at this node.",
+          "mitigation": "Add outgoing Pair or designate as terminal with Allocator."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-04",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Find non-entry nodes with no incoming Pair",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_orphaned_node_name", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Orphaned node",
+          "description": "Node has no incoming Pair (except entry). Unreachable.",
+          "mitigation": "Add Pair from existing node to this orphaned node, or remove it.",
+          "evidence": "Node \"${first_orphaned_node_name}\" is orphaned (no incoming Pair)."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-05",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Analyze threshold achievability across competing Pairs — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Dead branch (competing Pair always loses)",
+          "description": "A competing Pair's threshold can never be met because users always prefer another path.",
+          "mitigation": "Make thresholds balanced, or remove the dead branch."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-06",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Trap analysis — an entry-reachable node with no forward path to any terminal. Cycles themselves are ALLOWED on-chain (2026-10-16 ruling: the consensus layer stays minimal and a loop only advances when someone pays for it); the flagged failure is a loop (or dead chain) the entry can enter but that offers no cycle-breaking exit.",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_trap_node_name", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Trap: entry-reachable nodes with no exit path",
+          "description": "These nodes are reachable from the entry, but no sequence of forwards can ever reach a terminal node — typically a loop missing a cycle-breaking exit. Orders entering them loop forever (re-running the loop's forwards and their fund rails every lap) or strand. Advisory finding: the chain does not reject this graph; the risk is surfaced here so the merchant fixes it before buyers see it.",
+          "mitigation": "Add an exit Pair from inside the loop to a terminal (fulfilment / refund / cancel node), or make the loop conditional so at least one live exit exists on the path.",
+          "evidence": "Trapped nodes (entry-reachable, no path to a terminal): [${trap_nodes_display}]."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-07",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "nodes.length > ${max_node_count}",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "node_count_over_limit", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Exceeds MAX_NODE_COUNT (100)",
+          "description": "Node count exceeds on-chain limit. Publish will fail.",
+          "mitigation": "Reduce node count or split into multiple Machines.",
+          "evidence": "Node count ${node_count} exceeds MAX_NODE_COUNT (${max_node_count})."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-08",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Find node where pairs.length > 40",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_overpair_node_name", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Exceeds MAX_NODE_PAIR_COUNT (40)",
+          "description": "A single node's Pairs exceed on-chain limit. Publish will fail.",
+          "mitigation": "Split node or simplify branches to reduce Pair count per node.",
+          "evidence": "Node \"${first_overpair_node_name}\" has ${first_overpair_count} Pairs, exceeds MAX_NODE_PAIR_COUNT (40)."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-09",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Find Pair where forwards.length > 20",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_overforward_count", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Exceeds MAX_FORWARD_COUNT (20)",
+          "description": "A single Pair's Forwards exceed on-chain limit. Publish will fail.",
+          "mitigation": "Split Pair or merge Forwards to reduce Forward count per Pair.",
+          "evidence": "Pair (${first_overforward_prev} -> ${first_overforward_next}) has ${first_overforward_count} Forwards, exceeds MAX_FORWARD_COUNT (20)."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-10",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Find duplicate names in nodes array",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "duplicate_names_display", "op": "truthy" },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Duplicate node name",
+          "description": "Two nodes have the same name. On-chain will reject.",
+          "mitigation": "Rename one of the duplicates.",
+          "evidence": "Duplicate node names: ${duplicate_names_display}"
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-11",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Two-tier node-name match, single-sourced in knowledge/audit-rules.ts (ANTI_PATTERN_NODE_REGEX = DISPUTE_FAMILY_NODE_REGEX | FUND_TERMINAL_NODE_REGEX): /(^|_)(disputed?|arbitration|arb)(_|$)|^(refund|refunded|deposit_refunded|deposit_deducted|cancel|cancelled)$/i — dispute family matches any underscore segment (a dispute never lives inside the Machine); fund terminals match EXACT names only. Business states that ROUTE allocator refunds ('closed_cancel', 'cancel_requested', 'refund_requested', 'return_approved', 'returned') do NOT match. The template scanner's R-M1-11 adds one guard-anchored exemption: a fund-terminal node whose refund-track allocator row binds (guard_key) a guard that names that state downgrades to a LOW finding — the wrap publish gate (auditMachineNodes) stays strict. — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Dispute anti-pattern — machine illegally models dispute flow",
+          "description": "Machine contains nodes named 'disputed', 'refunded', 'arb', 'arbitration', 'dispute', or 'refund'. This is a CRITICAL design anti-pattern because dispute resolution is a SEPARATE system from the Machine workflow. Dispute flows through: Order → dispute filed on the Arbitration (Arb case created, dispute fee escrowed in the case) → arbitrator confirm → voting → ruling (indemnity capped at 3x order amount, enforced at award time) → compensation claim pays the awarded amount from the Service's compensation_fund to the ORDER OWNER (the call itself is permissionless — any keeper/agent can drive it, the recipient is hard-bound to the order owner) → the case fee is released to the Arbitration via arb_withdraw (permission 364, the arbitration operator — NOT the order holder). Arbitrators are configured in the Arbitration's voting_guard list, NOT in Permission. Merchants who model dispute in the machine (e.g., 'disputed → refunded' forward guarded by Permission index 1500) create dead-end paths because no one has Permission 1500 — arbitrators are NOT Permission holders.",
+          "mitigation": "Remove all dispute/refund nodes from the machine. Instead: (1) bind an Arbitration object to the Service via Service.arbitrations, (2) configure arbitrators via Arbitration.voting_guard_add, (3) deposit compensation_fund to the Service. Disputes are then filed against the order within the Arbitration object — completely independent of the machine workflow. BOUNDARY (design intent, never 'fix' it): Arbitration (compensation_fund payouts) and Allocator (escrow distribution) keep independent fund sources and lifecycles by design. Cross-system checks belong in allocator Guards as READ-ONLY evidence (order.claimed_by / arb.indemnity — see pattern.arb_status_escrow_holdback), NOT in arb-linked Machine nodes/forwards or protocol state sync — coupling the two systems opens the refund+compensation double-payout path."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-12",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "For each Pair compute sum(forward.weight) and compare with threshold; flag Pairs where sum < threshold (use machine-topology findUnachievableThresholds).",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "unachievable_present", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+            { "field": "first_unachievable_is_multi", "op": "eq", "value": false }
+          ] },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Unreachable threshold — Pair can never migrate",
+          "description": "A Pair's threshold exceeds the sum of its forward weights. Each forward contributes its weight AT MOST ONCE: it is locked by the first operator that accomplishes it (the session accomplishment), and a second operator re-executing the same forward aborts E_NOT_THE_HOLDER. The maximum achievable weight of a Pair is therefore the sum of its DISTINCT forward weights. When that sum < threshold, the transition can never migrate and the workflow is permanently stuck at this node.",
+          "mitigation": "Raise forward weights so sum(weights) >= threshold, or lower the threshold. For multi-operator cooperation add one DISTINCT forward per contributing operator (threshold N needs N distinct forwards, each weight ≥ 1).",
+          "evidence": "${first_unachievable_detail}",
+          "exposure": {
+            "loss_parties": [
+              { "role": "buyer", "basis": "The unachievable threshold means the transition can never migrate — orders stall at this node forever and their escrowed funds can be neither distributed nor refunded." },
+              { "role": "merchant", "basis": "The merchant revenue share of the same permanently stalled orders freezes with them." }
+            ],
+            "gain_paths": []
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M1-13",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "Flag Pairs where threshold > 1 and the count of distinct forwards < threshold (i.e. threshold cannot be met by that many different operators).",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "unachievable_present", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+            { "field": "first_unachievable_is_multi", "op": "eq", "value": true }
+          ] },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Single-forward multi-operator misuse — threshold > 1 with too few forwards",
+          "description": "A Pair with threshold > 1 has fewer distinct forwards than the threshold (with weight-1 forwards, or a single forward that can only ever be accomplished by ONE operator). Because a forward is single-operator-locked, N different people cannot all 'execute the same forward' — each contributor needs their OWN forward in the Pair. This either makes the transition unreachable or forces a single operator to control multiple forwards (defeating the cooperation design).",
+          "mitigation": "Model cooperation with parallel forwards: Pair { threshold: N, forwards: [begin_a (weight 1, operator A), begin_b (weight 1, operator B), ...] } — one distinct forward per contributing operator.",
+          "evidence": "${first_unachievable_detail}",
+          "exposure": {
+            "loss_parties": [
+              { "role": "buyer", "basis": "The transition is either unreachable or monopolized by one operator — orders that need this cooperative step stall here and their escrowed funds can be neither distributed nor refunded." },
+              { "role": "merchant", "basis": "The merchant revenue share of the same stalled cooperative orders freezes with them." }
+            ],
+            "gain_paths": []
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M2-01",
+      "dimension": "guard_integration",
+      "trigger": "Check forward.guard against published_guards set",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_missing_guard_forward_name", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Guard not created",
+          "description": "Forward references a Guard that is not yet created on-chain. Forward execution will fail Guard verification.",
+          "mitigation": "Create the Guard object before publishing this Machine.",
+          "evidence": "Forward \"${first_missing_guard_forward_name}\" references Guard \"${first_missing_guard_guard}\" not in published_guards.",
+          "exposure": {
+            "loss_parties": [
+              { "role": "buyer", "basis": "The affected forward fails Guard verification every time it is attempted — orders that route through this Pair stall here and their escrowed funds freeze." },
+              { "role": "merchant", "basis": "The merchant revenue share of the same stalled orders freezes with them." }
+            ],
+            "gain_paths": []
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M2-02",
+      "dimension": "guard_integration",
+      "trigger": "Check testnet test records for this Guard — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Guard not tested via gen_passport",
+          "description": "Guard has not been tested via gen_passport. Guard may have bugs, cannot be fixed after publish.",
+          "mitigation": "Run gen_passport on testnet before binding to Machine."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M2-03",
+      "dimension": "guard_integration",
+      "trigger": "Verify all Guards tested before Machine publish — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Guard + Machine immutability deadlock",
+          "description": "After Machine publish, a Guard bug is discovered. Guard is immutable (cannot be fixed), Machine is immutable (cannot be rebound).",
+          "mitigation": "Keep Machine unpublished until all Guards are verified."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M2-04",
+      "dimension": "guard_integration",
+      "trigger": "Cross-check forward.retained_submission against Guard table entries",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_retained_no_guard_forward_name", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "retained_submission index mismatch",
+          "description": "Forward's retained_submission key does not correspond to Guard table b_submission=true entry. Retained data fails or is incorrect.",
+          "mitigation": "Align retained_submission key with Guard table b_submission=true identifier.",
+          "evidence": "Forward \"${first_retained_no_guard_forward_name}\" has retained_submission but no Guard. retained_submission requires a Guard."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M2-05",
+      "dimension": "guard_integration",
+      "trigger": "For each Guard scene, verify anti-reentry Guard is configured (see Guard semantic layer R-X1-14) — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Guard reentry risk",
+          "description": "Guard lacks anti-reentry mechanism (see Guard R-X1-14). Risk of duplicate execution or vote manipulation.",
+          "mitigation": "Add anti-reentry Guard for each scenario (see Guard semantic layer R-X1-14)."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M2-06",
+      "dimension": "guard_integration",
+      "trigger": "Cross-check Guard scene against Forward business purpose — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Guard scene mismatch",
+          "description": "Forward's bound Guard scene does not match Forward's business (e.g., Forward uses a reward-claim guard instead of machine_forward_guard).",
+          "mitigation": "Use the correct Guard scene (machine_forward_guard)."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M2-07",
+      "dimension": "guard_integration",
+      "trigger": "Identify cross-Machine Guard references and detect cycles — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Cross-Machine Guard dependency cycle",
+          "description": "Machine A depends on Machine B (via Guard), B depends on A. Circular dependency.",
+          "mitigation": "Ensure cross-Machine dependencies are unidirectional."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M2-08",
+      "dimension": "guard_integration",
+      "trigger": "Cross-check Guard table object references against published objects set — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Guard references unpublished object",
+          "description": "Guard table references an object (e.g., Service) that is not yet published.",
+          "mitigation": "Use P16 circular reference pattern (name instead of address), or publish referenced objects first."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M3-01",
+      "dimension": "permission",
+      "trigger": "Check each forward has at least one executor binding: namedOperator, permissionIndex, or Guard (the chain rejects a Guard-only forward at construction and again at publish with E_FORWARD_NO_IDENTITY — Guard is a post-verification addition, never the sole binding)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_noperm_forward_name", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Forward without permission",
+          "description": "Forward has no executor binding at all — neither namedOperator, permissionIndex, nor Guard. Cannot be executed (the plain forward constructor aborts E_PERMISSION_NOT_DEFINED).",
+          "mitigation": "Set namedOperator='' for OrderHolder, or set permissionIndex. Binding a Guard alone is rejected (E_FORWARD_NO_IDENTITY aborts in both constructors and again at publish): a Guard is a post-verification addition on top of an identity field, never a replacement.",
+          "evidence": "Forward \"${first_noperm_forward_name}\" in Pair (${first_noperm_prev} -> ${first_noperm_next}) has no executor binding.",
+          "exposure": {
+            "loss_parties": [
+              { "role": "buyer", "basis": "The affected forward has no executor — orders that route through this Pair can never advance past it and their escrowed funds freeze." },
+              { "role": "merchant", "basis": "The merchant revenue share of the same unadvanceable orders freezes with them." }
+            ],
+            "gain_paths": []
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M3-02",
+      "dimension": "permission",
+      "trigger": "Check permission_index < Permission.indices.length — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "permissionIndex out of bounds",
+          "description": "Forward's permissionIndex >= Permission.indices.length. Execution will fail.",
+          "mitigation": "Use a valid permission index or extend Permission.indices."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M3-03",
+      "dimension": "permission",
+      "trigger": "Detect Permission object update that reorders indices — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Permission rotation failure",
+          "description": "Permission object updated, indices order changed. Original permissionIndex now points to wrong permission.",
+          "mitigation": "Use custom Permission; document index meanings; avoid frequent Permission updates."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M3-04",
+      "dimension": "permission",
+      "trigger": "Find Forwards with namedOperator='' on non-customer-operation nodes — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "OrderHolder misuse",
+          "description": "namedOperator='' used in non-customer-operation scenarios. Non-intended personnel gain operation permission.",
+          "mitigation": "Clarify ''=OrderHolder (customer), not 'anyone'. Use namedOperator for specific roles."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M3-05",
+      "dimension": "permission",
+      "trigger": "Verify progress_namedOperator is provided in Progress creation — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "NamedOperator not assigned at Progress creation",
+          "description": "Forward expects namedOperator role but Progress doesn't have it assigned. Note: MCP API layer supports progress_new.progress_namedOperator (SDK translates to namedOperator_add), but the Move layer's Progress creation does NOT accept it (see 06 §14.5).",
+          "mitigation": "Pass progress_namedOperator in progress_new, or call namedOperator_add separately."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M3-06",
+      "dimension": "permission",
+      "trigger": "Analyze permission distribution across parties — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Permission game imbalance",
+          "description": "One party has excessive permission, can unilaterally advance workflow. Game theory imbalance.",
+          "mitigation": "Use dual-signature (threshold=2 with two DISTINCT operator-bound forwards, each weight 1) or a multi-signature mechanism to balance power. Note: threshold=2 alone does not guarantee two different people — one forward of weight 2 passes alone, and permission admins hold every index."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M3-07",
+      "dimension": "permission",
+      "trigger": "Find Forwards with both namedOperator and permissionIndex set",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_both_forward_name", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Permission combination OR semantic misuse",
+          "description": "Both namedOperator and permissionIndex set, but OR semantic not understood. More people than expected can execute Forward.",
+          "mitigation": "Clarify that when both permissions are non-null, it is OR relation (either can execute).",
+          "evidence": "Forward \"${first_both_forward_name}\" in Pair (${first_both_prev} -> ${first_both_next}) has both namedOperator and permissionIndex (OR semantic)."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M3-08",
+      "dimension": "permission",
+      "trigger": "Check each forward with permission_index < 1000",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_lowperm_forward_name", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "permissionIndex below USER_DEFINED_PERM_INDEX_START (1000)",
+          "description": "Forward's permissionIndex < 1000. On-chain constant USER_DEFINED_PERM_INDEX_START = 1000 reserves indexes 0-999 for built-in permissions. Using index < 1000 causes confusion with built-in permissions and is a hard on-chain constraint (see doc 06 §4.4).",
+          "mitigation": "Use permission_index >= 1000 (e.g., 1000, 1001, 1002, ...). Reserve 0-999 for built-in permissions.",
+          "evidence": "Forward \"${first_lowperm_forward_name}\" in Pair (${first_lowperm_prev} -> ${first_lowperm_next}) has permission_index=${first_lowperm_index} < ${min_perm_index}. Indexes 0-999 are reserved for built-in permissions."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M4-01",
+      "dimension": "immutability",
+      "trigger": "Check backup_created flag — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "No backup before publish",
+          "description": "machineNode2file export not created before publish. Cannot restore if publish fails.",
+          "mitigation": "Run machineNode2file before publish to create backup."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M4-02",
+      "dimension": "immutability",
+      "trigger": "Check network === 'mainnet' && !testnet_test_passed",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "mainnet_without_testnet", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "No testnet verification before mainnet",
+          "description": "Directly publishing to mainnet without testnet verification. Potential bugs may cause fund loss.",
+          "mitigation": "Test on testnet first. Verify Progress runs end-to-end.",
+          "evidence": "Mainnet publish attempted without testnet test passing."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M4-03",
+      "dimension": "immutability",
+      "trigger": "Check if all required Guards are created and bound",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "missing_guards_display", "op": "truthy" },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Guards not all created before publish",
+          "description": "Some Forward.guard is still null, but design requires Guard. Cannot add Guard after publish (immutability deadlock).",
+          "mitigation": "Create and bind all Guards before publishing Machine.",
+          "evidence": "Guards not all created before publish. Missing: ${missing_guards_display}"
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M4-04",
+      "dimension": "immutability",
+      "trigger": "Verify dependency order: Permission → Machine(unpublished) → Guard → bind → publish — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Publish order incorrect",
+          "description": "Attempting to publish Machine before creating Guards. Guards cannot bind to already-published Machine.",
+          "mitigation": "Follow dependency order: Permission → Machine(unpublished) → Guard → bind → publish."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M4-05",
+      "dimension": "immutability",
+      "trigger": "Check if terminal nodes have Allocator mapping — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Allocation not configured",
+          "description": "Terminal node not mapped to Allocator. Funds cannot be distributed after workflow completes.",
+          "mitigation": "Configure Allocator for each terminal node."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M4-06",
+      "dimension": "immutability",
+      "trigger": "Check if machineNode2file backup created before clear operation — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "clear operation without backup",
+          "description": "Executing node clear before exporting backup. All node data lost, cannot recover.",
+          "mitigation": "Run machineNode2file backup before any clear operation."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M5-01",
+      "dimension": "environment",
+      "trigger": "Check if Service object is in published_services set — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Service not created",
+          "description": "Machine design complete but Service not created. Machine cannot bind to Service.",
+          "mitigation": "Create Service first, then design/publish Machine."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M5-02",
+      "dimension": "environment",
+      "trigger": "Cross-check Machine's Permission against Service's Permission — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Permission object mismatch",
+          "description": "Machine's Permission differs from Service's Permission. Permission organization inconsistent, may cause operation failure.",
+          "mitigation": "Use the same Permission for Machine and Service (or explicitly document different organizations)."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M5-03",
+      "dimension": "environment",
+      "trigger": "Check if Service.order_allocators is configured for each terminal node (stop-node fund-exit coverage)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "terminal_fund_exit_uncovered", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Allocation configuration incomplete",
+          "description": "Machine has stop nodes (no outgoing Pair) but no Allocator is published in the project. Funds at those nodes can be neither distributed nor refunded — and Machine + Allocator are immutable after publish (IMMUT-001), so an uncovered stop node strands escrowed funds permanently.",
+          "mitigation": "Before Service publish, bind Service.order_allocators fund-exit rules to EVERY stop node: withdrawal (release) AND refund paths. Review-dependent release is a TIME-GATE on the same exit (reviewed, OR unreviewed after T) — never a parallel edge or a separate node without its own exit.",
+          "evidence": "Stop nodes without allocation coverage: ${terminal_nodes_display} (no Allocator published).",
+          "exposure": {
+            "loss_parties": [
+              { "role": "buyer", "basis": "Escrowed order funds resting at an uncovered stop node can never be refunded to the buyer after publish (immutable topology)." },
+              { "role": "merchant", "basis": "The merchant release share at the same node can never be withdrawn." }
+            ],
+            "gain_paths": []
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M5-04",
+      "dimension": "environment",
+      "trigger": "Check if Reward object is in published_rewards set — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Reward object not created",
+          "description": "Reward incentive scenario referenced but Reward object not created.",
+          "mitigation": "Create Reward object first, then design Guard."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M5-05",
+      "dimension": "environment",
+      "trigger": "Check if Arbitration object is in published_arbitrations set — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Arbitration object not created",
+          "description": "Arbitration scenario referenced but Arbitration object not created.",
+          "mitigation": "Create Arbitration object first."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M5-06",
+      "dimension": "environment",
+      "trigger": "Check machine_ref against published_machines set — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Cross-Machine dependency not published",
+          "description": "Machine A depends on Machine B, but B is not published. Guard query for Machine B's Progress will fail. Dependency verification: indirect — Progress creation asserts the referenced Machine is published (see 06 §14.6).",
+          "mitigation": "Ensure upstream Machine is published first."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M5-07",
+      "dimension": "environment",
+      "trigger": "Check repository_ref against published repositories set — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Repository not created",
+          "description": "Guard references Repository but not created. Guard query will fail.",
+          "mitigation": "Create and publish Repository first. Note: consensus_repositories is declarative-only (see 06 §14.4)."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M5-08",
+      "dimension": "environment",
+      "trigger": "Scan project environment for missing object references",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "missing_guards_display", "op": "truthy" },
+          "level": "low",
+          "title": "Object dependency table incomplete",
+          "description": "Project object dependency table missing some objects. Design decisions based on incomplete information.",
+          "mitigation": "Use workflow-guidance.ts to scan complete project environment.",
+          "evidence": "Object dependency table incomplete. Missing Guards: ${missing_guards_display}"
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-M5-09",
+      "dimension": "environment",
+      "trigger": "Design-time review: allocator coverage over ALL stop nodes incl. review-gated and dispute exits — catalog stub: requires cross-object (Service x Machine) evaluation; enforced via publish schema guidance + pattern.fund_flow_stop_node_coverage",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Stop-node fund-exit coverage not reviewed",
+          "description": "Every node where an order can rest — terminal nodes AND waiting states such as review windows or open disputes — must have BOTH a withdrawal and a refund allocation rule evaluated at Service publish. Review-gated release is a time variant of the completed exit; dispute release is an arb.indemnity-gated edge (R-X1-16). The stop-node list is derived from THIS business's rest states, not a fixed vocabulary: wowok grows arbitrary commerce systems from Move-native primitives.",
+          "mitigation": "Run the coverage checklist of pattern.fund_flow_stop_node_coverage (guard-design-patterns) against the planned Machine before publishing Service; publish is irreversible (IMMUT-001)."
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}