@wowok/agent-mcp 3.2.7 → 3.3.0

package/dist/knowledge/baselines/rules/guard.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "comment": "Guard rule pack (R-C/R-X) — declarative form of the retired in-code Guard risk rules (the guard condition-tree lint pack: 35 rules over the serialized root, table classification and the scene ledger). Facts are produced by the kernel extractor (guard-risk.ts, bound to the GUARDQUERY invariant catalog, the witness chain table, the certain-outcome folder and the per-scene reentrancy specs); rules only reference fact names. Levels/wording can be retuned per rule and rules can be disabled (enabled=false, trace left) via the judgment document — factory rules can never be deleted or invented here.",
+  "comment": "Guard rule pack (R-C/R-X) — declarative form of the retired in-code Guard risk rules (the guard condition-tree lint pack: 39 rules over the serialized root, table classification and the scene ledger). Facts are produced by the kernel extractor (guard-risk.ts, bound to the GUARDQUERY invariant catalog, the witness chain table, the certain-outcome folder and the per-scene reentrancy specs); rules only reference fact names. Levels/wording can be retuned per rule and rules can be disabled (enabled=false, trace left) via the judgment document — factory rules can never be deleted or invented here.",
   "facts": {
     "has_signer_check": "KERNEL — the serialized root contains a context(Signer) check.",
     "has_clock_check": "KERNEL — the serialized root contains a context(Clock) node.",
@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@
     "rc2_04_has_conversion": "KERNEL — the root already uses a type-conversion node (convert_number_address / convert_address_number / convert_u256 / convert_string).",
     "rc2_04_conversion_note": "KERNEL — final description tail for the conversion-present vs conversion-missing branches.",
     "rc2_04_conversion_evidence": "KERNEL — final evidence for the conversion-present vs conversion-missing branches.",
+    "rc2_05_mismatch_count": "KERNEL — query prefixes that contradict their convert_witness target type (the witness matrix is directional; zrmn-261012 R-WITNESS-01).",
+    "rc2_05_evidence_lines": "KERNEL — the prefix-mismatch list rendered as '  - <detail>' lines, newline joined.",
+    "rc2_06_issue_count": "KERNEL — progress.* queries on a source without convert_witness that cannot be proven to be a Progress (no PROGRESS→ORDER reverse edge).",
+    "rc2_06_has_hard_mismatch": "KERNEL — at least one such source is explicitly annotated as a non-Progress (hard violation; unannotated sources grade soft).",
+    "rc2_06_evidence_lines": "KERNEL — the reverse-edge issue list rendered as '  - <detail>' lines, newline joined.",
+    "rc2_07_keys_where_count": "KERNEL — number of 'keys where' predicate occurrences in the serialized root (parameter-carrying forms abort natively, upw-mn-261012 F-28; the parameters-free 1177 Range-gte shape is the certified working path).",
     "has_submission": "KERNEL — the table has at least one b_submission=true entry.",
     "scene_present": "KERNEL — a binding scene was supplied.",
     "scene_id": "KERNEL — the binding scene id (e.g. service_order_allocators_guard).",
@@ -46,6 +52,7 @@
     "scene_binding_field": "KERNEL — the binding scene binding field (buy_guard/order_allocators/...).",
     "scene_mutable_after_publish": "KERNEL — whether the scene binding can be modified after the host object is published.",
     "rc3_01_sharing_exempt": "KERNEL — allocators scene with Entity/GuardIdentifier-only sharing (Signer binding advice does not apply; R-C3-06 owns the semantics).",
+    "rc3_01_order_anchored": "KERNEL — allocators scene where EVERY submission slot is unread by the root: submitted values cannot influence the verdict, and the chain binds GuardIdentifier recipients to the paying order via payment_info.for_object (ptrn-mn-261013 F-03).",
     "rc3_02_numeric_count": "KERNEL — submitted numeric table entries (U8..U256) in the voting_guard scene.",
     "rc3_02_numeric_list": "KERNEL — submitted numeric entries rendered as '#id(TYPE)', comma joined.",
     "rc3_03_submitted_addr_count": "KERNEL — submitted Address table entries (b_submission=true, value_type=Address).",
@@ -83,6 +90,8 @@
     "rx1_12_vague_csv": "KERNEL — unnamed entries rendered 'identifier=N, name=\"…\"', '; ' joined.",
     "rx1_13_detected": "KERNEL — a table Address constant's object_type equals the scene host object (circular reference pattern).",
     "rx1_13_identifier": "KERNEL — identifier of the circular-reference table entry.",
+    "rx1_19_order_query_count": "KERNEL — order.* query occurrences in a buy-scene guard root (the Order does not exist at buy time, zrmn-261012 R-BUY-GUARD-CIRCULAR).",
+    "rx1_19_evidence_csv": "KERNEL — the matched order.* query JSON fragments, comma-space joined.",
     "reentry_applicable": "KERNEL — the scene has a reentrancy spec (ALLOWED scenes stay silent).",
     "reentry_state": "KERNEL — anti-reentrancy protection state: 'protected' / 'pseudo' / 'absent'.",
     "reentry_scene_id": "KERNEL — reentrancy scene id from the spec table.",
@@ -143,6 +152,16 @@
           "evidence": "write_guard scene with no context(Signer) leaf in the root",
           "stakeholders": ["customer", "provider", "arbitrator"]
         },
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [{ "field": "scene_id", "op": "eq", "value": "arbitration_voting_guard" }, { "field": "tree_folds_always_true", "op": "eq", "value": true }] },
+          "level": "low",
+          "title": "Open-vote tautology on voting_guard — the declared voter universe, not a placeholder",
+          "description": "On the Arbitration voting slot an always-true guard is the SANCTIONED open-voting form: every Passport holder passes and votes at the row's FixedValue weight (tpl_voting_guard_open_vote). It matches the tautology signature R-X1-17 hunts, but here the alternative is the real hazard: an EMPTY voting_guard does not mean 'everyone may vote' — plain votes hard-require the vote permission (358), admin-only by default, and a dispute dead-locks when that admin is unresponsive (R-ARB-VOTE-LOCK blocks the service publish; crs9-F-36, mainnet-verified 2026-10-15).",
+          "scenario": "A merchant designs a public arbitration venue and binds the always-true voting guard; the tautology check must not scare them into leaving voting_guard empty",
+          "mitigation": "None needed — this is the declared intent. Confirm the weight row is FixedValue (flat one-voter-one-vote) or an intentional tier, and remember every vote call must carry the voting_guard payload once the field is set (a plain vote aborts with E_VOTING_GUARD_USED, abort 2). Weighted panels should use tpl_voting_guard_numeric_weight instead.",
+          "evidence": "Tautology: ${tree_folds_always_true_reason} (voting_guard scene — open-vote semantics)",
+          "stakeholders": ["customer", "provider", "arbitrator"]
+        },
         {
           "when": { "all": [{ "field": "tree_folds_always_true", "op": "eq", "value": true }, { "field": "write_guard_scene", "op": "eq", "value": false }] },
           "level": "high",
@@ -182,6 +201,23 @@
         }
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-X1-19",
+      "dimension": "logic_gap",
+      "trigger": "A buy-scene guard queries order.* — the Order does not exist at buy time (zrmn-261012 R-BUY-GUARD-CIRCULAR)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "rx1_19_order_query_count", "op": "gt", "value": 0 },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Buy guard queries order.* (${rx1_19_evidence_csv}) — the Order does not exist yet, creation aborts",
+          "description": "The buy guard evaluates BEFORE the Order object exists (it gates the transaction that creates it), so every order.* query inside it is circular and cannot resolve. The ziroom mainnet run (zrmn-261012) shipped exactly this shape: a buy guard querying order.item has / order.amount — creation failed at name resolution.",
+          "scenario": "Circular buy gate: guard creation or first purchase aborts because the queried Order is the one being created",
+          "mitigation": "1) Buy-time state lives on the SERVICE, not the Order: query service.* fields (e.g. service.paused) or use table constants;\n2) Post-purchase invariants (amount, item) belong on forward/allocator guards, which run after the Order exists;\n3) ${rx1_19_evidence_csv}",
+          "evidence": "order.* queries in buy-scene guard: ${rx1_19_evidence_csv}",
+          "stakeholders": ["provider"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "rule_id": "R-C1-01",
       "dimension": "data_source_trust",
@@ -319,6 +355,66 @@
         }
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-C2-05",
+      "dimension": "data_source_trust",
+      "trigger": "Guard uses convert_witness but the query path prefix does not live on the witness target type (zrmn-261012 R-WITNESS-01: 17 mainnet guards rejected)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "rc2_05_mismatch_count", "op": "gt", "value": 0 },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Query path contradicts the witness target type — the chain rejects this guard",
+          "description": "convert_witness resolves the object reference to the edge's TARGET type, and the query path prefix must exist on that type. The on-chain witness matrix (common.move) is directional and has NO reverse edges.\n${rc2_05_evidence_lines}\nThis shape aborts at guard creation (native verifier type check) or silently gates on nothing — both are deterministic failures.",
+          "scenario": "Witness misuse: convert to Progress then query order.* — type mismatch rejects the guard",
+          "mitigation": "1) Make the query prefix match the witness target: 100 OrderProgress→progress.*, 101 OrderMachine→machine.*, 102 OrderService→service.*, 103 ProgressMachine→machine.*, 104 ArbOrder→order.*, 105 ArbArbitration→arb.*, 106-108 Arb→progress./service./machine.*, 109 OrderAllocation→allocation.*;\n2) If you meant to read Order fields, DROP the convert_witness (query order.* directly on the submitted Order);\n3) Run analyze_guard_semantics before creation",
+          "evidence": "${rc2_05_evidence_lines}",
+          "stakeholders": ["provider"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-C2-06",
+      "dimension": "data_source_trust",
+      "trigger": "Guard queries progress.* without convert_witness on an object that is not a Progress (no PROGRESS→ORDER reverse edge)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [{ "field": "rc2_06_issue_count", "op": "gt", "value": 0 }, { "field": "rc2_06_has_hard_mismatch", "op": "eq", "value": true }] },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "progress.* queried on a non-Progress object without conversion — unresolvable on-chain",
+          "description": "The chain has NO PROGRESS→ORDER reverse edge: the only legal way to read progress fields from an Order submission is convert_witness 100 (OrderProgress).\n${rc2_06_evidence_lines}",
+          "scenario": "Reverse-edge misuse: order submitted, progress.current queried without conversion — query returns empty or aborts",
+          "mitigation": "1) Add convert_witness 100 (or the string name 'OrderProgress') to the query's object ref;\n2) Keep the query path as progress.* after conversion;\n3) Alternatively submit the Progress object itself and annotate object_type=Progress",
+          "evidence": "${rc2_06_evidence_lines}",
+          "stakeholders": ["provider"]
+        },
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [{ "field": "rc2_06_issue_count", "op": "gt", "value": 0 }, { "field": "rc2_06_has_hard_mismatch", "op": "eq", "value": false }] },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "progress.* queried on an annotated submission without object_type — verify the source type",
+          "description": "A query reads progress.* from a submission without convert_witness, and the table entry lacks an object_type annotation, so the source type cannot be validated statically.\n${rc2_06_evidence_lines}\nIf the submitted value is the ORDER address, the query is unresolvable (no PROGRESS→ORDER reverse edge).",
+          "scenario": "Unverifiable source type: progress query on an unannotated submission may target the Order",
+          "mitigation": "1) Annotate the table entry's object_type (Progress/Order/Arb);\n2) If the submission is the Order, add convert_witness 100 (OrderProgress);\n3) Verify with analyze_guard_semantics before creation",
+          "evidence": "${rc2_06_evidence_lines}",
+          "stakeholders": ["provider"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-C2-07",
+      "dimension": "data_source_trust",
+      "trigger": "Guard uses a repository.data 'keys where' predicate (upw-mn-261012 F-28: native verifier abort on ALL networks)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "rc2_07_keys_where_count", "op": "gt", "value": 0 },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "repository.data 'keys where' needs the parameters-free 1177 shape — parameter-carrying forms abort natively",
+          "description": "A parameter-carrying 'keys where' query node aborts with MovePrimitiveRuntimeError inside the native guard verifier (upw-mn-261012 F-28, live A/B verified). The CERTIFIED working shape is query 1177 (keys-where, Range-gte) with a parameters-free query node — the Range-gte predicate rides in the BCS conditions blob (batch-14 verified; this is the on-chain rating-floor path of LAYERED RATING-RANGE RULING). ${rc2_07_keys_where_count} occurrence(s) found.",
+          "scenario": "Native abort: guard creation or verification fails with MovePrimitiveRuntimeError when the keys-where node carries parameters",
+          "mitigation": "1) Use the certified 1177 shape: parameters-free query node; express the threshold (e.g. rating >= 4) as Range-gte inside the BCS conditions blob;\n2) keep candidate ids anchored to first-party objects (the order id itself — not validator-submitted id lists);\n3) See guard-design-patterns pattern.repository_data_check and LAYERED RATING-RANGE RULING in builtin-templates for the proven shape",
+          "stakeholders": ["provider", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "rule_id": "R-C3-01",
       "dimension": "submission_forgery",
@@ -333,6 +429,15 @@
           "mitigation": "1) If the submitted data should belong to the operator (e.g. the operator's address), it is still recommended to add context(Signer) binding;2) If the submitted data is a public credential (e.g. Merkle Root string), the current risk is acceptable;3) Use retained_submission to retain submitted data for later audit",
           "stakeholders": ["customer", "provider"]
         },
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [{ "field": "has_submission", "op": "eq", "value": true }, { "field": "rc3_01_order_anchored", "op": "eq", "value": true }, { "field": "rc3_01_sharing_exempt", "op": "eq", "value": false }, { "field": "has_signer_check", "op": "eq", "value": false }] },
+          "level": "info",
+          "title": "Order-anchored recipient slots — Signer binding is structurally inapplicable",
+          "description": "Every submission slot is unread by the condition tree, so submitted values cannot influence the verdict. In the order_allocators scene the only consumption is the chain-side GuardIdentifier recipient read, which payment_info.for_object hard-binds to the paying order: order-created allocations always bind, and submitted != for_object aborts (ERECIPIENT_NOT_FOR_OBJECT). Adding a Signer binding here would BREAK keeper/service-triggered rails — a merchant-triggered refund cannot satisfy Signer==recipient. Verified live on mainnet: a merchant-triggered refund still paid the buyer (ptrn-mn-261013 F-03).",
+          "scenario": "Order-anchored payout rails (refund / recovery / settlement allocators resolved through a GuardIdentifier recipient).",
+          "mitigation": "No change needed. Residual: only standalone (non-order) Allocation runs with an unbound payment_info let the passport builder choose the recipient — that surface is the allocation owner's policy decision, not a guard defect. If a submitted slot is later READ by the condition tree, the normal R-C3-01 binding rules resume.",
+          "stakeholders": ["provider", "customer"]
+        },
         {
           "when": { "all": [{ "field": "has_submission", "op": "eq", "value": true }, { "field": "scene_binding_field", "op": "neq", "value": "voting_guard" }, { "field": "rc3_01_sharing_exempt", "op": "eq", "value": false }, { "field": "has_signer_check", "op": "eq", "value": false }] },
           "level": "high",

package/dist/knowledge/baselines/rules/machine.json

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
     "min_perm_index": "KERNEL CONSTANT — first user-defined permission index (USER_DEFINED_PERM_INDEX_START).",
     "mainnet_without_testnet": "Network is mainnet and the testnet test has not passed.",
     "missing_guards_display": "Referenced Guard addresses missing from the published set, ', '-joined — empty when all are published.",
+    "first_trap_node_name": "First-offender — name of the first entry-reachable node with no forward path to any terminal (trap analysis: cycles are allowed on-chain, the flagged failure is a loop/dead chain without a cycle-breaking exit; absent when none).",
+    "trap_nodes_display": "All trapped nodes (entry-reachable, no path to a terminal), ', '-joined — empty when the graph is trap-free.",
     "always_true": "Extractor sentinel — unconditionally true; marks catalog stubs (via eq false) and documentation."
   },
   "rules": [
@@ -128,14 +130,15 @@
     {
       "rule_id": "R-M1-06",
       "dimension": "structural",
-      "trigger": "DFS cycle detection — catalog stub: the retired check was not implemented",
+      "trigger": "Trap analysis — an entry-reachable node with no forward path to any terminal. Cycles themselves are ALLOWED on-chain (2026-10-16 ruling: the consensus layer stays minimal and a loop only advances when someone pays for it); the flagged failure is a loop (or dead chain) the entry can enter but that offers no cycle-breaking exit.",
       "cases": [
         {
-          "when": { "field": "always_true", "op": "eq", "value": false },
-          "level": "critical",
-          "title": "Cycle in DAG",
-          "description": "Workflow has a cycle. Nodes reference each other circularly.",
-          "mitigation": "Break the cycle by removing one Pair."
+          "when": { "field": "first_trap_node_name", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Trap: entry-reachable nodes with no exit path",
+          "description": "These nodes are reachable from the entry, but no sequence of forwards can ever reach a terminal node — typically a loop missing a cycle-breaking exit. Orders entering them loop forever (re-running the loop's forwards and their fund rails every lap) or strand. Advisory finding: the chain does not reject this graph; the risk is surfaced here so the merchant fixes it before buyers see it.",
+          "mitigation": "Add an exit Pair from inside the loop to a terminal (fulfilment / refund / cancel node), or make the loop conditional so at least one live exit exists on the path.",
+          "evidence": "Trapped nodes (entry-reachable, no path to a terminal): [${trap_nodes_display}]."
         }
       ]
     },

package/dist/knowledge/baselines/rules/plan.json

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
     "has_repository": "Plan creates a repository object",
     "allocator_row_count": "Total allocator rows across service create param and order_allocators configure steps",
     "refund_row_count": "Allocator rows on the refund track",
-    "terminal_count": "Machine terminal nodes (never a non-entry prev_node)",
-    "terminal_nodes_display": "Comma-joined terminal node names",
-    "first_uncovered_terminal": "First terminal node no allocator guard accepts via progress.current equality (FUND-EXIT-01)",
+    "terminal_count": "Fund-bearing machine terminal nodes (never a non-entry prev_node); v32 optional pure-side-action leaves are exempt — order completion never routes through them and they never gate money (upw F-06, 6939_upwork-261016)",
+    "terminal_nodes_display": "Comma-joined fund-bearing terminal node names",
+    "first_uncovered_terminal": "First fund-bearing terminal node no allocator guard accepts via progress.current equality (FUND-EXIT-01; optional leaves exempt)",
     "first_refund_guard_missing_claimed_by": "First refund-track guard step id whose queries never read order.claimed_by (DUAL-RAIL-01, A-3)",
     "first_path_dependent_anchor": "First guard step id using a path-dependent time query (TIME-ANCHOR-01, E-10)",
     "path_sensitive": "The anchored node is reachable by more than one path, so the anchor can shift",
@@ -19,7 +19,11 @@
     "first_alloc_slot_missing": "First allocator {GuardIdentifier:N} leg whose bound guard table lacks slot N as a declared Address submission row (TASKBIND-02, N-K21: alloc abort with funds stranded)",
     "pending_allocator_guard_count": "Unresolved guard designs bound to allocator rows (compile-time judgment surface; >0 downgrades FUND-EXIT-01 from critical to medium)",
     "first_pending_fund_guard": "First unresolved guard design bound to an allocator row or machine edge (UNRESOLVED-GUARD-01) — publishing now ships that path UNGUARDED",
+    "pending_fund_guard_count": "Total unresolved guard designs bound to fund paths (allocator rows or machine edges)",
+    "pending_fund_guard_keys_display": "Comma-joined keys of ALL unresolved fund-path guard designs",
     "first_pending_buy_guard": "First unresolved guard design bound to the service buy path (UNRESOLVED-GUARD-01 warning tier)",
+    "pending_buy_guard_count": "Total unresolved guard designs bound to the service buy path",
+    "pending_buy_guard_keys_display": "Comma-joined keys of ALL unresolved buy-path guard designs",
     "has_return_rail": "The machine declares a return rail node (name matches /return/i) — the structural refund promise (PROMISE-ARB, L-01')",
     "return_rail_node": "First return-rail node name",
     "has_arbitration_binding": "The plan wires an arbitration venue into the Service (configure method 'arbitrations' with a non-empty object list, or the service create carries non-empty arbitrations)",
@@ -27,7 +31,11 @@
     "fund_topup_amount": "Sum of parseable (integer smallest-unit) top-up balances; absent when unparseable",
     "fund_ceiling_breach": "The top-up is below the award ceiling (MAX_INDEMNITY_MULTIPLE x highest SKU price) — judged ONLY when both sides parse (PLAN-K2)",
     "fund_ceiling_basis": "Human-readable basis used for the ceiling judgment",
-    "fund_ceiling_unverifiable": "A fund top-up exists but the ceiling could not be judged here (price or amount unparseable) — the publish-patch KL-K2 rule re-checks at the 3x largest-order basis (PLAN-K2 fallback, stated explicitly)"
+    "fund_ceiling_unverifiable": "A fund top-up exists but the ceiling could not be judged here (price or amount unparseable) — the publish-patch KL-K2 rule re-checks at the 3x largest-order basis (PLAN-K2 fallback, stated explicitly)",
+    "repo_policy_keys_display": "Comma-joined policy names declared by the plan's repository create steps (present only when at least one policy exists — the REPO-GATE-KEY-01 judgment gate)",
+    "repo_gate_key_unbacked_count": "Composite where-query scans over a plan-local repository whose static key no declared policy uses (REPO-GATE-KEY-01, ZR-32)",
+    "first_repo_gate_key_unbacked": "First unbacked gate key, rendered as 'key' in guard 'step-id'",
+    "repo_gate_key_unbacked_display": "Comma-joined list of ALL unbacked gate keys"
   },
   "rules": [
     {
@@ -76,17 +84,17 @@
         {
           "when": { "field": "first_pending_fund_guard", "op": "present" },
           "level": "critical",
-          "title": "Guard design '${first_pending_fund_guard}' is unresolved and bound to a fund path",
-          "description": "The allocator row or machine edge referencing this guard_key will carry NO guard at publish: the settlement/refund/forward it was designed to gate executes unconditionally. This is a publish-freeze blocker — the freeze gate refuses to go live with fund-path guards pending.",
-          "mitigation": "Resolve the guard design into a structured guard (guardResolutions with kind 'template' or 'inline'), or remove the binding.",
+          "title": "${pending_fund_guard_count} unresolved guard design(s) bound to fund paths, of ${pending_guard_total} pending in total (first: '${first_pending_fund_guard}')",
+          "description": "All unresolved fund-path guard keys: ${pending_fund_guard_keys_display}. Every allocator row or machine edge referencing one of these guard_keys will carry NO guard at publish: the settlement/refund/forward it was designed to gate executes unconditionally. This is a publish-freeze blocker — the freeze gate refuses to go live with fund-path guards pending.",
+          "mitigation": "Resolve EACH listed guard design into a structured guard (guardResolutions with kind 'template' or 'inline'), or remove the binding. Machine-host guards must declare the order-identifier slot {identifier: 254, b_submission: true, value_type: 'Address'} in their table (TASKBIND-01).",
           "stakeholders": ["merchant", "customer"]
         },
         {
           "when": { "field": "first_pending_buy_guard", "op": "present" },
           "level": "medium",
-          "title": "Buy-guard design '${first_pending_buy_guard}' is unresolved",
-          "description": "The service buy path was designed to screen purchasers, but the guard was never resolved; the service publishes without a buy_guard, so anyone can order.",
-          "mitigation": "Resolve the buy-guard design into a structured guard, or accept an unscreened buy path deliberately.",
+          "title": "${pending_buy_guard_count} unresolved buy-guard design(s), of ${pending_guard_total} pending in total (first: '${first_pending_buy_guard}')",
+          "description": "All unresolved buy-path guard keys: ${pending_buy_guard_keys_display}. The service buy path was designed to screen purchasers, but the guard was never resolved; the service publishes without a buy_guard, so anyone can order.",
+          "mitigation": "Resolve EACH listed buy-guard design into a structured guard, or accept an unscreened buy path deliberately.",
           "stakeholders": ["merchant"]
         }
       ]
@@ -109,22 +117,22 @@
     {
       "rule_id": "PLAN-K2",
       "dimension": "fund_flow",
-      "trigger": "Publish-front compensation-fund adequacy (KL-K2 family): an award is hard-capped at 3x the order amount at ruling time, so a fund below the ceiling turns a WON award into an unpayable one (the claim aborts and is NOT consumed). Preferred basis: 3x the highest SKU price on the plan's catalog; when no price is parseable the judgment is explicitly deferred to the publish-patch check (3x largest single order) instead of silently skipped.",
+      "trigger": "Compensation-fund sizing guidance (KL-K2 family, re-scoped by b6-11): an award is hard-capped at 3x the order amount at ruling time, so a fund below a planned case's ceiling turns a WON award into an unpayable one (the claim aborts and is NOT consumed). Per-order coverage is ENFORCED at buy time (each order is checked against 3x ITS OWN amount); the plan layer advises sizing on the typical single order instead of the priciest SKU — no cross-SKU subsidy.",
       "cases": [
         {
           "when": { "field": "fund_ceiling_breach", "op": "truthy" },
-          "level": "critical",
+          "level": "medium",
           "title": "Compensation fund tops up below the award ceiling (${fund_ceiling_basis})",
-          "description": "The plan tops the fund up to ${fund_topup_amount} (smallest units), but a ruling at the ceiling would abort the buyer's claim (E_COMPENSATION_NOT_MATCH) and the abort does NOT consume the claim — the buyer holds an unpayable win until a manual top-up, and the shop holds the reputational damage.",
-          "mitigation": "Raise the compensation_fund input to at least the ceiling (${fund_ceiling_basis}). Above the ceiling is optional (tolerance for CONCURRENT claims against the one per-Service pool); below it, a valid ruling cannot pay.",
+          "description": "The plan tops the fund up to ${fund_topup_amount} (smallest units), but a ruling at the ceiling would abort the buyer's claim (E_COMPENSATION_NOT_MATCH) and the abort does NOT consume the claim — the buyer holds an unpayable win until a manual top-up, and the shop holds the reputational damage. Disclosure, not a blocker: under-covered ORDERS are refused at buy time (per-order gate), so no buyer enters a knowingly unprotected order.",
+          "mitigation": "Raise the compensation_fund input toward the ceiling (${fund_ceiling_basis}). Sizing is per-order now: 3x the typical single order keeps any single ruling payable; above that only buys tolerance for CONCURRENT claims against the one per-Service pool.",
           "stakeholders": ["merchant", "customer"]
         },
         {
           "when": { "field": "fund_ceiling_unverifiable", "op": "truthy" },
           "level": "medium",
           "title": "Compensation-fund adequacy cannot be judged from the plan",
-          "description": "The plan carries a fund top-up, but the catalog price or the top-up amount is not machine-parseable here (display forms need token decimals the plan layer does not have), so the ceiling check is DEFERRED, not skipped: the publish patch re-runs it on the 3x largest-single-order basis and blocks publish when under.",
-          "mitigation": "Provide numeric smallest-unit sales prices and a numeric fund amount so the plan layer can verify the ceiling before materialization; otherwise expect the publish-patch check to judge it.",
+          "description": "The plan carries a fund top-up, but the catalog price or the top-up amount is not machine-parseable here (display forms need token decimals the plan layer does not have), so the plan-level judgment is DEFERRED, not skipped: the publish audit re-states the coverage as a disclosure warning, and the buy-time per-order gate enforces 3x each actual order.",
+          "mitigation": "Provide numeric smallest-unit sales prices and a numeric fund amount so the plan layer can advise on the ceiling before materialization; the buy-time gate judges every real order regardless.",
           "stakeholders": ["merchant"]
         }
       ]
@@ -139,7 +147,7 @@
           "level": "high",
           "title": "Refund guard '${first_refund_guard_missing_claimed_by}' does not check claimed_by",
           "description": "Chain semantics keep the allocation rail and the compensation rail independent (A-3, deliberate). A refund guard that does not assert claimed_by is none allows double payment: arbitration indemnity AND escrow refund.",
-          "mitigation": "Add a query on order.claimed_by (must be none) to the refund guard, or document an explicit double-compensation policy.",
+          "mitigation": "Add the order.claimed_by some == false query to the refund guard. This is a structural fund-safety invariant, not a documentation choice — a double-compensation policy note does not seal the rail and is NOT an accepted alternative. Pair the refund guard with the polarity-twin merchant-recovery allocator (guard asserts order.claimed_by some == true, pays Rate 10000 to the merchant Entity) so the escrow principal of an awarded order still exits: exactly one of the two legs can ever pass.",
           "stakeholders": ["merchant"]
         }
       ]
@@ -234,6 +242,21 @@
           "stakeholders": ["merchant"]
         }
       ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "REPO-GATE-KEY-01",
+      "dimension": "composition",
+      "trigger": "A guard's composite where-query scans a PLAN-LOCAL repository under a static policy key that no repository policy declares (ZR-32, ziroom-mn-261013: the review gate queried a key the write side never wrote — the count stayed 0 forever and the benefit was unreachable; policies freeze at repository creation, so the divergence is unrepairable post-publish). Runtime key rows and external repository addresses are unknowable at plan time and are judged by the chain-side round-trip (analyze_guard_semantics compare_with) instead.",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "repo_gate_key_unbacked_count", "op": "gt", "value": 0 },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Repository gate key ${first_repo_gate_key_unbacked} is written by no policy",
+          "description": "Unbacked scans: ${repo_gate_key_unbacked_display}. The plan declares these repository policies: ${repo_policy_keys_display}. A where-scan over an undeclared key reads an empty table forever — count/sum stay 0 and find/keys return empty — so the gated path can never pass. Policies freeze at repository creation and guards freeze at creation: the divergence cannot be repaired after publish.",
+          "mitigation": "Reconcile the two sides before publish: change the guard's static key row to a declared policy name (${repo_policy_keys_display}), or rename the repository policy to the queried key. After fixing, re-verify the resolved guard with analyze_guard_semantics compare_with after creation.",
+          "stakeholders": ["merchant", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
     }
   ]
 }

package/dist/knowledge/baselines/semantic-facts.js

@@ -1 +1 @@
-export const SEMANTIC_FACTS=[{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-01','subject':'Allocator\x20guard-matching\x20and\x20firing\x20semantics','authoritative':'A\x20distribution\x20call\x20submits\x20ONE\x20guard\x20address;\x20every\x20allocator\x20whose\x20bound\x20guard\x20equals\x20the\x20submitted\x20address\x20fires,\x20in\x20vector\x20order,\x20each\x20against\x20the\x20balance\x20left\x20by\x20the\x20previous\x20(allocation.move:366-368\x20—\x20the\x20loop\x20has\x20no\x20early\x20exit).\x20'+'Allocators\x20with\x20DIFFERENT\x20guards\x20are\x20alternative\x20paths\x20selected\x20by\x20the\x20caller\x27s\x20guard\x20choice,\x20not\x20by\x20list\x20position.\x20Mutual\x20exclusion\x20must\x20be\x20expressed\x20inside\x20the\x20guard\x20conditions.','falsehoods':['first-match-wins','first\x20Allocator\x20whose\x20Guard\x20returns\x20true','first\x20allocator\x20whose\x20guard\x20passes\x20wins','the\x20first\x20Allocator\x20whose\x20Guard\x20returns\x20true\x20wins','first-match\x20allocator\x20semantics','only\x20the\x20first\x20one','only\x20the\x20first\x20one\x20matches','duplicate\x20addresses\x20only\x20match\x20the\x20first','the\x20first\x20one\x20wins','the\x20first\x20allocator\x20whose\x20guard'],'harm':'Templates\x20built\x20on\x20\x27first-match\x27\x20semantics\x20silently\x20stack\x20distributions\x20or\x20leave\x20refund\x20paths\x20unreachable,\x20because\x20the\x20contract\x20fires\x20ALL\x20allocators\x20bound\x20to\x20the\x20submitted\x20guard.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-02','subject':'Surplus\x20semantics\x20—\x20drains\x20the\x20entire\x20remaining\x20pool','authoritative':'Surplus\x20mode\x20distributes\x20the\x20ENTIRE\x20remaining\x20balance\x20of\x20the\x20order\x27s\x20allocation\x20pool,\x20not\x20just\x20the\x20amount\x20earmarked\x20for\x20a\x20specific\x20track.\x20If\x20a\x20refund-path\x20allocator\x20uses\x20Surplus\x20while\x20the\x20settlement\x20path\x20has\x20unpaid\x20fixed-amount\x20legs,\x20the\x20Surplus\x20takes\x20everything,\x20including\x20the\x20settlement\x20money.','falsehoods':['Surplus\x20takes\x20only\x20what\x20is\x20left','Surplus\x20returns\x20the\x20remainder\x20after\x20other\x20tracks','Surplus\x20is\x20safe\x20because\x20it\x20only\x20takes\x20leftovers'],'harm':'A\x20refund/deposit\x20allocator\x20using\x20Surplus\x20will\x20over-refund\x20the\x20buyer\x20and\x20starve\x20the\x20merchant\x20when\x20the\x20settlement\x20track\x20has\x20not\x20yet\x20fired\x20(ziroom\x20T5:\x20585/525\x20WOW\x20fully\x20refunded,\x20merchant\x20received\x200).'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-03','subject':'Allocator\x20fix\x20semantics\x20—\x20computed\x20Amount-leg\x20total,\x20PAID,\x20never\x20a\x20holdback','authoritative':'fix\x20is\x20not\x20a\x20settable\x20parameter:\x20the\x20allocator-registration\x20call\x20computes\x20it\x20internally\x20as\x20the\x20sum\x20of\x20the\x20allocator\x27s\x20Amount-mode\x20legs\x20(allocation.move:399\x20fix:\x20total_amount),\x20and\x20alloc()\x20PAYS\x20every\x20Amount\x20leg\x20(allocation.move:540\x20balance::split)\x20while\x20subtracting\x20fix\x20only\x20from\x20the\x20net-Rate\x20base\x20(allocation.move:485\x20total_rates\x20=\x20balance\x20-\x20fix).\x20A\x20pure-Rate\x20allocator\x20therefore\x20has\x20fix=0\x20and\x20drains\x20100%\x20of\x20the\x20pool;\x20adding\x20Amount\x20legs\x20raises\x20outflow,\x20it\x20never\x20withholds.\x20The\x20allocator-registration\x20call\x20surface\x20takes\x20only\x20(guard,\x20sharing,\x20max)\x20—\x20no\x20fix\x20argument\x20at\x20all\x20—\x20so\x20a\x20template-side\x20fix\x20value\x20is\x20silently\x20dropped\x20before\x20the\x20transaction\x20is\x20built.\x20The\x20chain\x20has\x20NO\x20holdback/reserve\x20primitive;\x20the\x20only\x20way\x20to\x20leave\x20funds\x20in\x20a\x20pool\x20is\x20to\x20not\x20distribute\x20them\x20(no\x20allocator\x20fires,\x20or\x20a\x20max-capped\x20Surplus\x20stops\x20at\x20the\x20cap).','falsehoods':['the\x20reserve\x20never\x20leaves','reserve\x20never\x20leaves\x20the\x20pool','the\x20reserve\x20stays\x20in\x20the\x20pool','reserve\x20physically\x20stays\x20in\x20the\x20pool','the\x20fix\x20retains\x20the\x20reserve','fix-retained\x20claim\x20reserve','leaves\x20the\x20reserve\x20in\x20the\x20pool','fix=reserve','only\x20on-chain\x20holdback'],'harm':'Templates\x20that\x20declare\x20fix=reserve\x20ship\x20a\x20payout\x20rail\x20that\x20drains\x20100%\x20of\x20the\x20escrow\x20at\x20the\x20first\x20release;\x20the\x20claim/refund\x20legs\x20behind\x20it\x20are\x20dead\x20by\x20construction\x20and\x20the\x20money\x20is\x20gone\x20(airbnb\x20mainnet\x20audit\x202026-10-07:\x20ABNB_STAY_SERVICE\x20allocators[0]\x20fix=\x220\x22,\x20full\x20drain\x20at\x20payout_24h).'},{'fact_id':'FACT-GUARD-01','subject':'GuardIdentifier\x20recipient\x20+\x20for_object\x20binding','authoritative':'ERECIPIENT_NOT_FOR_OBJECT\x20is\x20enforced\x20ONLY\x20when\x20the\x20recipient\x20kind\x20is\x20GuardIdentifier\x20AND\x20payment_info.for_object\x20is\x20Some(binding).\x20Pure\x20Entity\x20recipients\x20and\x20unbound\x20GuardIdentifier\x20legs\x20skip\x20this\x20check\x20entirely\x20—\x20the\x20tooling\x20layer\x20(scanner,\x20template\x20compiler)\x20must\x20flag\x20them\x20(allocation.move:434-443).','falsehoods':['the\x20contract\x20checks\x20all\x20recipients\x20against\x20for_object','GuardIdentifier\x20recipients\x20are\x20always\x20safe','the\x20contract\x20validates\x20every\x20recipient\x20binding'],'harm':'An\x20unbound\x20GuardIdentifier\x20or\x20pure\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20can\x20redirect\x20funds\x20to\x20the\x20deploying\x20account\x20or\x20an\x20arbitrary\x20address\x20without\x20any\x20on-chain\x20error.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-MACHINE-01','subject':'Machine\x20edge\x20\x27from\x27\x20semantics','authoritative':'A\x20machine\x20edge\x20declares\x20a\x20single\x20source\x20node\x20in\x20its\x20\x27from\x27\x20field.\x20Multiple\x20edges\x20from\x20the\x20same\x20source\x20node\x20are\x20allowed\x20and\x20represent\x20alternative\x20paths;\x20they\x20are\x20NOT\x20merged.\x20An\x20edge\x20without\x20\x27from\x27\x20is\x20invalid\x20in\x20the\x20new\x20topology\x20format\x20and\x20causes\x20compile-time\x20blockers.','falsehoods':['edges\x20without\x20from\x20are\x20auto-derived','missing\x20from\x20means\x20any\x20node','from\x20is\x20optional\x20for\x20backward\x20compatibility'],'harm':'Old\x20flat\x20machine_shape\x20without\x20from\x20fields\x20compiles\x20into\x20an\x20incomplete\x20topology,\x20leaving\x20nodes\x20unreachable\x20and\x20fund\x20paths\x20missing.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ENTITY-01','subject':'Entity\x20recipient\x20fallback\x20to\x20deployer','authoritative':'When\x20an\x20Entity\x20recipient\x27s\x20name_or_address\x20is\x20empty,\x20omitted,\x20or\x20resolves\x20to\x20the\x20deploying\x20account,\x20the\x20share\x20is\x20paid\x20to\x20the\x20DEPLOYING\x20ACCOUNT\x20(allocation.move:434-443).\x20This\x20is\x20a\x20silent\x20fallback\x20—\x20no\x20error\x20is\x20raised.','falsehoods':['empty\x20Entity\x20names\x20are\x20rejected','the\x20contract\x20validates\x20Entity\x20recipients','an\x20unnamed\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20causes\x20an\x20abort'],'harm':'A\x20template\x20with\x20a\x20placeholder\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20silently\x20pays\x20the\x20share\x20to\x20whoever\x20deploys\x20the\x20service,\x20which\x20is\x20almost\x20never\x20the\x20intended\x20recipient.'}];export function scanContent(a,b){const c=[],d=b['toLowerCase']();for(const e of SEMANTIC_FACTS){for(const f of e['falsehoods']){const g=f['toLowerCase']();let h=0x0;while((h=d['indexOf'](g,h))!==-0x1){const i=d['slice'](Math['max'](0x0,h-0xc),h),j=/(?:^|[\s"'])not\s+$/['test'](i)||/never\s+$/['test'](i);!j&&c['push']({'fact_id':e['fact_id'],'phrasing':f}),h+=g['length'];}}}return c;}
+export const SEMANTIC_FACTS=[{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-01','subject':'Allocator\x20guard-matching\x20and\x20firing\x20semantics','authoritative':'A\x20distribution\x20call\x20submits\x20ONE\x20guard\x20address;\x20every\x20allocator\x20whose\x20bound\x20guard\x20equals\x20the\x20submitted\x20address\x20fires,\x20in\x20vector\x20order,\x20each\x20against\x20the\x20balance\x20left\x20by\x20the\x20previous\x20(allocation.move:366-368\x20—\x20the\x20loop\x20has\x20no\x20early\x20exit).\x20'+'ORDER\x20IS\x20PRIORITY\x20(SV-3,\x20az3-mn-261013):\x20within\x20one\x20guard,\x20multiple\x20FIX/RATE\x20entries\x20consume\x20the\x20pool\x20strictly\x20in\x20their\x20declared\x20row\x20order\x20(allocation.move:422-427)\x20—\x20a\x20row\x20that\x20under-rates\x20leaves\x20too\x20little\x20for\x20later\x20rows,\x20and\x20a\x20later\x20row\x20that\x20cannot\x20be\x20fully\x20filled\x20aborts\x20the\x20distribution\x20(EZERO,\x2014).\x20Author\x20multi-row\x20splits\x20POOL-DESCENDING\x20(largest\x20claimant\x20first)\x20and\x20verify\x20Σ(fix/rate\x20values)\x20<=\x20the\x20pool\x20the\x20guard\x20can\x20see\x20at\x20fire\x20time.\x20'+'Allocators\x20with\x20DIFFERENT\x20guards\x20are\x20alternative\x20paths\x20selected\x20by\x20the\x20caller\x27s\x20guard\x20choice,\x20not\x20by\x20list\x20position.\x20Mutual\x20exclusion\x20must\x20be\x20expressed\x20inside\x20the\x20guard\x20conditions.','falsehoods':['first-match-wins','first\x20Allocator\x20whose\x20Guard\x20returns\x20true','first\x20allocator\x20whose\x20guard\x20passes\x20wins','the\x20first\x20Allocator\x20whose\x20Guard\x20returns\x20true\x20wins','first-match\x20allocator\x20semantics','only\x20the\x20first\x20one','only\x20the\x20first\x20one\x20matches','duplicate\x20addresses\x20only\x20match\x20the\x20first','the\x20first\x20one\x20wins','the\x20first\x20allocator\x20whose\x20guard'],'harm':'Templates\x20built\x20on\x20\x27first-match\x27\x20semantics\x20silently\x20stack\x20distributions\x20or\x20leave\x20refund\x20paths\x20unreachable,\x20because\x20the\x20contract\x20fires\x20ALL\x20allocators\x20bound\x20to\x20the\x20submitted\x20guard.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-02','subject':'Surplus\x20semantics\x20—\x20drains\x20the\x20entire\x20remaining\x20pool','authoritative':'Surplus\x20mode\x20distributes\x20the\x20ENTIRE\x20remaining\x20balance\x20of\x20the\x20order\x27s\x20allocation\x20pool,\x20not\x20just\x20the\x20amount\x20earmarked\x20for\x20a\x20specific\x20track.\x20If\x20a\x20refund-path\x20allocator\x20uses\x20Surplus\x20while\x20the\x20settlement\x20path\x20has\x20unpaid\x20fixed-amount\x20legs,\x20the\x20Surplus\x20takes\x20everything,\x20including\x20the\x20settlement\x20money.','falsehoods':['Surplus\x20takes\x20only\x20what\x20is\x20left','Surplus\x20returns\x20the\x20remainder\x20after\x20other\x20tracks','Surplus\x20is\x20safe\x20because\x20it\x20only\x20takes\x20leftovers'],'harm':'A\x20refund/deposit\x20allocator\x20using\x20Surplus\x20will\x20over-refund\x20the\x20buyer\x20and\x20starve\x20the\x20merchant\x20when\x20the\x20settlement\x20track\x20has\x20not\x20yet\x20fired\x20(ziroom\x20T5:\x20585/525\x20WOW\x20fully\x20refunded,\x20merchant\x20received\x200).'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-03','subject':'Allocator\x20fix\x20semantics\x20—\x20computed\x20Amount-leg\x20total,\x20PAID,\x20never\x20a\x20holdback','authoritative':'fix\x20is\x20not\x20a\x20settable\x20parameter:\x20the\x20allocator-registration\x20call\x20computes\x20it\x20internally\x20as\x20the\x20sum\x20of\x20the\x20allocator\x27s\x20Amount-mode\x20legs\x20(allocation.move:399\x20fix:\x20total_amount),\x20and\x20alloc()\x20PAYS\x20every\x20Amount\x20leg\x20(allocation.move:540\x20balance::split)\x20while\x20subtracting\x20fix\x20only\x20from\x20the\x20net-Rate\x20base\x20(allocation.move:485\x20total_rates\x20=\x20balance\x20-\x20fix).\x20A\x20pure-Rate\x20allocator\x20therefore\x20has\x20fix=0\x20and\x20drains\x20100%\x20of\x20the\x20pool;\x20adding\x20Amount\x20legs\x20raises\x20outflow,\x20it\x20never\x20withholds.\x20The\x20allocator-registration\x20call\x20surface\x20takes\x20only\x20(guard,\x20sharing,\x20max)\x20—\x20no\x20fix\x20argument\x20at\x20all\x20—\x20so\x20a\x20template-side\x20fix\x20value\x20is\x20silently\x20dropped\x20before\x20the\x20transaction\x20is\x20built.\x20The\x20chain\x20has\x20NO\x20holdback/reserve\x20primitive;\x20the\x20only\x20way\x20to\x20leave\x20funds\x20in\x20a\x20pool\x20is\x20to\x20not\x20distribute\x20them\x20(no\x20allocator\x20fires,\x20or\x20a\x20max-capped\x20Surplus\x20stops\x20at\x20the\x20cap).','falsehoods':['the\x20reserve\x20never\x20leaves','reserve\x20never\x20leaves\x20the\x20pool','the\x20reserve\x20stays\x20in\x20the\x20pool','reserve\x20physically\x20stays\x20in\x20the\x20pool','the\x20fix\x20retains\x20the\x20reserve','fix-retained\x20claim\x20reserve','leaves\x20the\x20reserve\x20in\x20the\x20pool','fix=reserve','only\x20on-chain\x20holdback'],'harm':'Templates\x20that\x20declare\x20fix=reserve\x20ship\x20a\x20payout\x20rail\x20that\x20drains\x20100%\x20of\x20the\x20escrow\x20at\x20the\x20first\x20release;\x20the\x20claim/refund\x20legs\x20behind\x20it\x20are\x20dead\x20by\x20construction\x20and\x20the\x20money\x20is\x20gone\x20(airbnb\x20mainnet\x20audit\x202026-10-07:\x20ABNB_STAY_SERVICE\x20allocators[0]\x20fix=\x220\x22,\x20full\x20drain\x20at\x20payout_24h).'},{'fact_id':'FACT-GUARD-01','subject':'GuardIdentifier\x20recipient\x20+\x20for_object\x20binding','authoritative':'ERECIPIENT_NOT_FOR_OBJECT\x20is\x20enforced\x20ONLY\x20when\x20the\x20recipient\x20kind\x20is\x20GuardIdentifier\x20AND\x20payment_info.for_object\x20is\x20Some(binding).\x20Pure\x20Entity\x20recipients\x20and\x20unbound\x20GuardIdentifier\x20legs\x20skip\x20this\x20check\x20entirely\x20—\x20the\x20tooling\x20layer\x20(scanner,\x20template\x20compiler)\x20must\x20flag\x20them\x20(allocation.move:434-443).','falsehoods':['the\x20contract\x20checks\x20all\x20recipients\x20against\x20for_object','GuardIdentifier\x20recipients\x20are\x20always\x20safe','the\x20contract\x20validates\x20every\x20recipient\x20binding'],'harm':'An\x20unbound\x20GuardIdentifier\x20or\x20pure\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20can\x20redirect\x20funds\x20to\x20the\x20deploying\x20account\x20or\x20an\x20arbitrary\x20address\x20without\x20any\x20on-chain\x20error.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-MACHINE-01','subject':'Machine\x20edge\x20\x27from\x27\x20semantics','authoritative':'A\x20machine\x20edge\x20declares\x20a\x20single\x20source\x20node\x20in\x20its\x20\x27from\x27\x20field.\x20Multiple\x20edges\x20from\x20the\x20same\x20source\x20node\x20are\x20allowed\x20and\x20represent\x20alternative\x20paths;\x20they\x20are\x20NOT\x20merged.\x20An\x20edge\x20without\x20\x27from\x27\x20is\x20invalid\x20in\x20the\x20new\x20topology\x20format\x20and\x20causes\x20compile-time\x20blockers.','falsehoods':['edges\x20without\x20from\x20are\x20auto-derived','missing\x20from\x20means\x20any\x20node','from\x20is\x20optional\x20for\x20backward\x20compatibility'],'harm':'Old\x20flat\x20machine_shape\x20without\x20from\x20fields\x20compiles\x20into\x20an\x20incomplete\x20topology,\x20leaving\x20nodes\x20unreachable\x20and\x20fund\x20paths\x20missing.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ENTITY-01','subject':'Entity\x20recipient\x20fallback\x20to\x20deployer','authoritative':'When\x20an\x20Entity\x20recipient\x27s\x20name_or_address\x20is\x20empty,\x20omitted,\x20or\x20resolves\x20to\x20the\x20deploying\x20account,\x20the\x20share\x20is\x20paid\x20to\x20the\x20DEPLOYING\x20ACCOUNT\x20(allocation.move:434-443).\x20This\x20is\x20a\x20silent\x20fallback\x20—\x20no\x20error\x20is\x20raised.','falsehoods':['empty\x20Entity\x20names\x20are\x20rejected','the\x20contract\x20validates\x20Entity\x20recipients','an\x20unnamed\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20causes\x20an\x20abort'],'harm':'A\x20template\x20with\x20a\x20placeholder\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20silently\x20pays\x20the\x20share\x20to\x20whoever\x20deploys\x20the\x20service,\x20which\x20is\x20almost\x20never\x20the\x20intended\x20recipient.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-REWARD-01','subject':'Reward\x20replay\x20scope\x20(SV-2)\x20—\x20entry-stamped\x20+\x20order-scoped\x20where\x20is\x20the\x20primary\x20once-per-buyer-per-order\x20form','authoritative':'SV-2\x20(azx7-mn-261014\x20live\x20T8):\x20on\x20a\x20guard\x20whose\x20reward\x20claim\x20entry\x20carries\x20the\x20store_from_id\x20stamp,\x20the\x20ORDER-SCOPED\x20record\x20query\x20(where:{storeFromId:{identifier:0}})\x20is\x20live\x20—\x20once\x20per\x20buyer\x20per\x20order\x20(the\x20native\x20claim\x20key\x20is\x20recipient+guard+stamp).\x20Entry-stamped\x20+\x20empty\x20where\x20is\x20the\x20DELIBERATE\x20once-per-buyer-for-life\x20variant;\x20an\x20unstamped\x20entry\x20never\x20keys\x20its\x20claim\x20records,\x20which\x20is\x20the\x20only\x20context\x20where\x20the\x20old\x20\x27storeFromId\x20filter\x20no-ops\x27\x20verdict\x20ever\x20held.\x20knowledge/protocol-facts.ts\x20(SV2_REPLAY_GATE_CLAUSE)\x20is\x20the\x20single-source\x20teaching\x20text;\x20the\x20compile\x20REVIEW_REWARD_UNARMED\x20blocker\x20interpolates\x20its\x20prescription\x20from\x20there.','falsehoods':['the\x20EMPTY\x20where\x20is\x20MANDATORY','NEVER\x20the\x20storeFromId\x20query\x20filter','storeFromId-filtered\x20record\x20query\x20is\x20a\x20SILENT\x20NO-OP','empty-where\x20exists_where\x20gate\x20is\x20the\x20only\x20working\x20idiom','filter\x20is\x20a\x20silent\x20no-op\x20on\x20the\x20current\x20runtime','NEVER\x20bind\x20storeFromId,\x20that\x20filter\x20silently\x20evaluates'],'harm':'The\x20retracted\x20ofn-mn-261012\x20F-01\x20reading\x20(run-75747\x20F-31)\x20shipped\x20pools\x20gated\x20recipient-only-for-life\x20—\x20silently\x20killing\x20the\x20buyer\x27s\x20second\x20order\x20(upw-mn-261014\x20F-48)\x20—\x20while\x20the\x20auditor\x20that\x20should\x20have\x20caught\x20it\x20carried\x20the\x20same\x20stale\x20verdict.'}];export function scanContent(a,b){const c=[],d=b['toLowerCase']();for(const e of SEMANTIC_FACTS){for(const f of e['falsehoods']){const g=f['toLowerCase']();let h=0x0;while((h=d['indexOf'](g,h))!==-0x1){const i=d['slice'](Math['max'](0x0,h-0xc),h),j=/(?:^|[\s"'])not\s+$/['test'](i)||/never\s+$/['test'](i);!j&&c['push']({'fact_id':e['fact_id'],'phrasing':f}),h+=g['length'];}}}return c;}

package/dist/knowledge/builtin-templates.d.ts

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ export interface ArchetypeTemplate {
     };
     review_mode?: "none" | "review" | "review_reward";
 }
-export declare const BUILTIN_TEMPLATES_VERSION = 51;
+export declare const BUILTIN_TEMPLATES_VERSION = 77;
 export declare const BUILTIN_TEMPLATES: ArchetypeTemplate[];
 export declare const TEMPLATE_KEYWORDS: Record<string, string[]>;
 export declare function getBuiltinTemplate(id: string): ArchetypeTemplate | undefined;