@wowok/agent-mcp 3.2.6 → 3.2.9

package/dist/knowledge/baselines/rules/plan.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "comment": "Plan-domain rules (L1 composition kernel). Facts are produced by composition/audit.ts planFacts() from a Plan AST. These six rules exist because each one names a verified mainnet failure class from wiki/test/10 (TRAILHAVEN): zero allocator rows passing silently, prose guard logic, dual-rail double-pay, path-dependent settlement windows, write-only enforcement, dropped guard/repository hosts.",
+  "comment": "Plan-domain rules (L1 composition kernel). Facts are produced by composition/audit.ts planFacts() from a Plan AST. Each rule names a verified failure class (TRAILHAVEN wiki/test/10, booking-85981 + amz-7f3a2c91 audits): zero allocator rows passing silently, prose guard logic, dual-rail double-pay, path-dependent settlement windows, write-only enforcement, dropped guard/repository hosts, missing task-binding slot declarations and GuardIdentifier slot mismatches that strand escrow permanently.",
   "facts": {
     "has_service": "Plan creates a service object",
     "has_machine": "Plan creates a machine object",
@@ -15,9 +15,27 @@
     "first_write_only_unenforced_field": "First write-only param set with no guard query covering it (WRITE-ONLY-01, A-1/A-10)",
     "first_orphan_guard": "First guard step id never referenced by any host binding (HOST-GRAPH-01, B-2)",
     "first_repo_query_without_repository": "First guard step id querying repository.* while the plan creates no repository (HOST-GRAPH-01, B-2)",
+    "first_edge_guard_missing_254": "First guard step id bound on a machine forward whose table declares no {identifier: 254, b_submission: true} row (TASKBIND-01, N-K20: progress::assert_task_binding aborts code 11)",
+    "first_alloc_slot_missing": "First allocator {GuardIdentifier:N} leg whose bound guard table lacks slot N as a declared Address submission row (TASKBIND-02, N-K21: alloc abort with funds stranded)",
     "pending_allocator_guard_count": "Unresolved guard designs bound to allocator rows (compile-time judgment surface; >0 downgrades FUND-EXIT-01 from critical to medium)",
     "first_pending_fund_guard": "First unresolved guard design bound to an allocator row or machine edge (UNRESOLVED-GUARD-01) — publishing now ships that path UNGUARDED",
-    "first_pending_buy_guard": "First unresolved guard design bound to the service buy path (UNRESOLVED-GUARD-01 warning tier)"
+    "pending_fund_guard_count": "Total unresolved guard designs bound to fund paths (allocator rows or machine edges)",
+    "pending_fund_guard_keys_display": "Comma-joined keys of ALL unresolved fund-path guard designs",
+    "first_pending_buy_guard": "First unresolved guard design bound to the service buy path (UNRESOLVED-GUARD-01 warning tier)",
+    "pending_buy_guard_count": "Total unresolved guard designs bound to the service buy path",
+    "pending_buy_guard_keys_display": "Comma-joined keys of ALL unresolved buy-path guard designs",
+    "has_return_rail": "The machine declares a return rail node (name matches /return/i) — the structural refund promise (PROMISE-ARB, L-01')",
+    "return_rail_node": "First return-rail node name",
+    "has_arbitration_binding": "The plan wires an arbitration venue into the Service (configure method 'arbitrations' with a non-empty object list, or the service create carries non-empty arbitrations)",
+    "fund_topup_present": "The plan carries a compensation_fund_add step",
+    "fund_topup_amount": "Sum of parseable (integer smallest-unit) top-up balances; absent when unparseable",
+    "fund_ceiling_breach": "The top-up is below the award ceiling (MAX_INDEMNITY_MULTIPLE x highest SKU price) — judged ONLY when both sides parse (PLAN-K2)",
+    "fund_ceiling_basis": "Human-readable basis used for the ceiling judgment",
+    "fund_ceiling_unverifiable": "A fund top-up exists but the ceiling could not be judged here (price or amount unparseable) — the publish-patch KL-K2 rule re-checks at the 3x largest-order basis (PLAN-K2 fallback, stated explicitly)",
+    "repo_policy_keys_display": "Comma-joined policy names declared by the plan's repository create steps (present only when at least one policy exists — the REPO-GATE-KEY-01 judgment gate)",
+    "repo_gate_key_unbacked_count": "Composite where-query scans over a plan-local repository whose static key no declared policy uses (REPO-GATE-KEY-01, ZR-32)",
+    "first_repo_gate_key_unbacked": "First unbacked gate key, rendered as 'key' in guard 'step-id'",
+    "repo_gate_key_unbacked_display": "Comma-joined list of ALL unbacked gate keys"
   },
   "rules": [
     {
@@ -66,17 +84,55 @@
         {
           "when": { "field": "first_pending_fund_guard", "op": "present" },
           "level": "critical",
-          "title": "Guard design '${first_pending_fund_guard}' is unresolved and bound to a fund path",
-          "description": "The allocator row or machine edge referencing this guard_key will carry NO guard at publish: the settlement/refund/forward it was designed to gate executes unconditionally. This is a publish-freeze blocker — the freeze gate refuses to go live with fund-path guards pending.",
-          "mitigation": "Resolve the guard design into a structured guard (guardResolutions with kind 'template' or 'inline'), or remove the binding.",
+          "title": "${pending_fund_guard_count} unresolved guard design(s) bound to fund paths (first: '${first_pending_fund_guard}')",
+          "description": "All unresolved fund-path guard keys: ${pending_fund_guard_keys_display}. Every allocator row or machine edge referencing one of these guard_keys will carry NO guard at publish: the settlement/refund/forward it was designed to gate executes unconditionally. This is a publish-freeze blocker — the freeze gate refuses to go live with fund-path guards pending.",
+          "mitigation": "Resolve EACH listed guard design into a structured guard (guardResolutions with kind 'template' or 'inline'), or remove the binding. Machine-host guards must declare the order-identifier slot {identifier: 254, b_submission: true, value_type: 'Address'} in their table (TASKBIND-01).",
           "stakeholders": ["merchant", "customer"]
         },
         {
           "when": { "field": "first_pending_buy_guard", "op": "present" },
           "level": "medium",
-          "title": "Buy-guard design '${first_pending_buy_guard}' is unresolved",
-          "description": "The service buy path was designed to screen purchasers, but the guard was never resolved; the service publishes without a buy_guard, so anyone can order.",
-          "mitigation": "Resolve the buy-guard design into a structured guard, or accept an unscreened buy path deliberately.",
+          "title": "${pending_buy_guard_count} unresolved buy-guard design(s) (first: '${first_pending_buy_guard}')",
+          "description": "All unresolved buy-path guard keys: ${pending_buy_guard_keys_display}. The service buy path was designed to screen purchasers, but the guard was never resolved; the service publishes without a buy_guard, so anyone can order.",
+          "mitigation": "Resolve EACH listed buy-guard design into a structured guard, or accept an unscreened buy path deliberately.",
+          "stakeholders": ["merchant"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "PROMISE-ARB",
+      "dimension": "fund_flow",
+      "trigger": "The machine declares a return rail — that IS the refund promise — but the plan binds no Arbitration into the Service. After settlement the in-escrow refund track is dead topology, so the only on-chain remedy for a post-settlement return is an independent Arbitration ruling paid from the compensation fund (etsy-ln L-01: a live shop promised returns with no venue bound).",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [ { "field": "has_return_rail", "op": "truthy" }, { "field": "has_arbitration_binding", "op": "falsy" } ] },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Return-promising shop wires no Arbitration venue",
+          "description": "The machine's return rail ('${return_rail_node}') is a promise the chain cannot keep alone: once the settlement allocator drains the escrow, a post-settlement return can only be paid by an independent Arbitration ruling against the compensation fund. This plan binds no venue, so the promise is DECLARED but UNENFORCEABLE — the declared-but-not-enforced class. Blocking: the machine and guard freeze at publish; do not hand-build the wiring outside the plan (hand-built replicas silently drop the arbitration/fund steps).",
+          "mitigation": "Keep the arbitration create + service arbitration-binding steps in the plan (standard emission for arbitration_mode third_party). A shop that deliberately settles every dispute off-chain must remove the return rail instead of the venue — an unbacked promise is the one configuration the protocol cannot repair post-publish.",
+          "stakeholders": ["merchant", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "PLAN-K2",
+      "dimension": "fund_flow",
+      "trigger": "Publish-front compensation-fund adequacy (KL-K2 family): an award is hard-capped at 3x the order amount at ruling time, so a fund below the ceiling turns a WON award into an unpayable one (the claim aborts and is NOT consumed). Preferred basis: 3x the highest SKU price on the plan's catalog; when no price is parseable the judgment is explicitly deferred to the publish-patch check (3x largest single order) instead of silently skipped.",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "fund_ceiling_breach", "op": "truthy" },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Compensation fund tops up below the award ceiling (${fund_ceiling_basis})",
+          "description": "The plan tops the fund up to ${fund_topup_amount} (smallest units), but a ruling at the ceiling would abort the buyer's claim (E_COMPENSATION_NOT_MATCH) and the abort does NOT consume the claim — the buyer holds an unpayable win until a manual top-up, and the shop holds the reputational damage.",
+          "mitigation": "Raise the compensation_fund input to at least the ceiling (${fund_ceiling_basis}). Above the ceiling is optional (tolerance for CONCURRENT claims against the one per-Service pool); below it, a valid ruling cannot pay.",
+          "stakeholders": ["merchant", "customer"]
+        },
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "fund_ceiling_unverifiable", "op": "truthy" },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Compensation-fund adequacy cannot be judged from the plan",
+          "description": "The plan carries a fund top-up, but the catalog price or the top-up amount is not machine-parseable here (display forms need token decimals the plan layer does not have), so the ceiling check is DEFERRED, not skipped: the publish patch re-runs it on the 3x largest-single-order basis and blocks publish when under.",
+          "mitigation": "Provide numeric smallest-unit sales prices and a numeric fund amount so the plan layer can verify the ceiling before materialization; otherwise expect the publish-patch check to judge it.",
           "stakeholders": ["merchant"]
         }
       ]
@@ -134,6 +190,36 @@
         }
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "TASKBIND-01",
+      "dimension": "fund_flow",
+      "trigger": "A guard bound on a machine forward declares no {identifier: 254, b_submission: true} row — progress::assert_task_binding aborts code 11 on every guarded forward of an order-driven Progress, and Guard tables are frozen at creation (N-K20, booking-85981 + amz-7f3a2c91).",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_edge_guard_missing_254", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Forward guard '${first_edge_guard_missing_254}' lacks the protocol task-binding slot (254)",
+          "description": "Every guarded forward of a machine running on an order Progress requires the passport to carry a slot-254 (task binding) submission; the guard table declares none, so the forward aborts with code 11 on first traversal. Guard tables and machines freeze at publish — shipping now strands the path permanently, and no builder can patch the table afterwards.",
+          "mitigation": "Declare {identifier: 254, b_submission: true, value_type: 'Address'} in guard '${first_edge_guard_missing_254}' (protocol slot 254; the order address is written by order creation). The compile kernel auto-injects this row when the guard is edge-bound — a finding here means the guard is bound in a way the kernel could not see.",
+          "stakeholders": ["merchant", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "TASKBIND-02",
+      "dimension": "fund_flow",
+      "trigger": "An allocator {GuardIdentifier:N} leg names a slot the guard table never declares as a b_submission Address — allocation asserts the passport submission == payment_info.for_object and aborts (code 15) with funds already escrowed (N-K21, amz-7f3a2c91: 0.98991 WOW stranded).",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "first_alloc_slot_missing", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Allocator leg ${first_alloc_slot_missing} is undeclared",
+          "description": "The allocator row pays a recipient keyed by this guard slot, but the guard table has no b_submission Address declaration for it. At allocation time the passport lacks the slot, the assert fails, and the distribution aborts — escrowed funds stay stranded because the guard froze at publish and cannot gain the declaration later. A static Address slot in the same position passes the declaration window but fails the same assertion (N-11).",
+          "mitigation": "Declare slot N in the guard table as {identifier: N, b_submission: true, value_type: 'Address', object_type: 'Order'} so the passing order address is captured; the allocator then pays against payment_info.for_object.",
+          "stakeholders": ["merchant", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "rule_id": "HOST-GRAPH-01",
       "dimension": "composition",
@@ -156,6 +242,21 @@
           "stakeholders": ["merchant"]
         }
       ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "REPO-GATE-KEY-01",
+      "dimension": "composition",
+      "trigger": "A guard's composite where-query scans a PLAN-LOCAL repository under a static policy key that no repository policy declares (ZR-32, ziroom-mn-261013: the review gate queried a key the write side never wrote — the count stayed 0 forever and the benefit was unreachable; policies freeze at repository creation, so the divergence is unrepairable post-publish). Runtime key rows and external repository addresses are unknowable at plan time and are judged by the chain-side round-trip (analyze_guard_semantics compare_with) instead.",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "repo_gate_key_unbacked_count", "op": "gt", "value": 0 },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Repository gate key ${first_repo_gate_key_unbacked} is written by no policy",
+          "description": "Unbacked scans: ${repo_gate_key_unbacked_display}. The plan declares these repository policies: ${repo_policy_keys_display}. A where-scan over an undeclared key reads an empty table forever — count/sum stay 0 and find/keys return empty — so the gated path can never pass. Policies freeze at repository creation and guards freeze at creation: the divergence cannot be repaired after publish.",
+          "mitigation": "Reconcile the two sides before publish: change the guard's static key row to a declared policy name (${repo_policy_keys_display}), or rename the repository policy to the queried key. After fixing, re-verify the resolved guard with analyze_guard_semantics compare_with after creation.",
+          "stakeholders": ["merchant", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
     }
   ]
 }

package/dist/knowledge/baselines/semantic-facts.js

@@ -1 +1 @@
-export const SEMANTIC_FACTS=[{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-01','subject':'Allocator\x20guard-matching\x20and\x20firing\x20semantics','authoritative':'A\x20distribution\x20call\x20submits\x20ONE\x20guard\x20address;\x20every\x20allocator\x20whose\x20bound\x20guard\x20equals\x20the\x20submitted\x20address\x20fires,\x20in\x20vector\x20order,\x20each\x20against\x20the\x20balance\x20left\x20by\x20the\x20previous\x20(allocation.move:366-368\x20—\x20the\x20loop\x20has\x20no\x20early\x20exit).\x20'+'Allocators\x20with\x20DIFFERENT\x20guards\x20are\x20alternative\x20paths\x20selected\x20by\x20the\x20caller\x27s\x20guard\x20choice,\x20not\x20by\x20list\x20position.\x20Mutual\x20exclusion\x20must\x20be\x20expressed\x20inside\x20the\x20guard\x20conditions.','falsehoods':['first-match-wins','first\x20Allocator\x20whose\x20Guard\x20returns\x20true','first\x20allocator\x20whose\x20guard\x20passes\x20wins','the\x20first\x20Allocator\x20whose\x20Guard\x20returns\x20true\x20wins','first-match\x20allocator\x20semantics','only\x20the\x20first\x20one','only\x20the\x20first\x20one\x20matches','duplicate\x20addresses\x20only\x20match\x20the\x20first','the\x20first\x20one\x20wins','the\x20first\x20allocator\x20whose\x20guard'],'harm':'Templates\x20built\x20on\x20\x27first-match\x27\x20semantics\x20silently\x20stack\x20distributions\x20or\x20leave\x20refund\x20paths\x20unreachable,\x20because\x20the\x20contract\x20fires\x20ALL\x20allocators\x20bound\x20to\x20the\x20submitted\x20guard.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-02','subject':'Surplus\x20semantics\x20—\x20drains\x20the\x20entire\x20remaining\x20pool','authoritative':'Surplus\x20mode\x20distributes\x20the\x20ENTIRE\x20remaining\x20balance\x20of\x20the\x20order\x27s\x20allocation\x20pool,\x20not\x20just\x20the\x20amount\x20earmarked\x20for\x20a\x20specific\x20track.\x20If\x20a\x20refund-path\x20allocator\x20uses\x20Surplus\x20while\x20the\x20settlement\x20path\x20has\x20unpaid\x20fixed-amount\x20legs,\x20the\x20Surplus\x20takes\x20everything,\x20including\x20the\x20settlement\x20money.','falsehoods':['Surplus\x20takes\x20only\x20what\x20is\x20left','Surplus\x20returns\x20the\x20remainder\x20after\x20other\x20tracks','Surplus\x20is\x20safe\x20because\x20it\x20only\x20takes\x20leftovers'],'harm':'A\x20refund/deposit\x20allocator\x20using\x20Surplus\x20will\x20over-refund\x20the\x20buyer\x20and\x20starve\x20the\x20merchant\x20when\x20the\x20settlement\x20track\x20has\x20not\x20yet\x20fired\x20(ziroom\x20T5:\x20585/525\x20WOW\x20fully\x20refunded,\x20merchant\x20received\x200).'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-03','subject':'Allocator\x20fix\x20semantics\x20—\x20computed\x20Amount-leg\x20total,\x20PAID,\x20never\x20a\x20holdback','authoritative':'fix\x20is\x20not\x20a\x20settable\x20parameter:\x20the\x20allocator-registration\x20call\x20computes\x20it\x20internally\x20as\x20the\x20sum\x20of\x20the\x20allocator\x27s\x20Amount-mode\x20legs\x20(allocation.move:399\x20fix:\x20total_amount),\x20and\x20alloc()\x20PAYS\x20every\x20Amount\x20leg\x20(allocation.move:540\x20balance::split)\x20while\x20subtracting\x20fix\x20only\x20from\x20the\x20net-Rate\x20base\x20(allocation.move:485\x20total_rates\x20=\x20balance\x20-\x20fix).\x20A\x20pure-Rate\x20allocator\x20therefore\x20has\x20fix=0\x20and\x20drains\x20100%\x20of\x20the\x20pool;\x20adding\x20Amount\x20legs\x20raises\x20outflow,\x20it\x20never\x20withholds.\x20The\x20allocator-registration\x20call\x20surface\x20takes\x20only\x20(guard,\x20sharing,\x20max)\x20—\x20no\x20fix\x20argument\x20at\x20all\x20—\x20so\x20a\x20template-side\x20fix\x20value\x20is\x20silently\x20dropped\x20before\x20the\x20transaction\x20is\x20built.\x20The\x20chain\x20has\x20NO\x20holdback/reserve\x20primitive;\x20the\x20only\x20way\x20to\x20leave\x20funds\x20in\x20a\x20pool\x20is\x20to\x20not\x20distribute\x20them\x20(no\x20allocator\x20fires,\x20or\x20a\x20max-capped\x20Surplus\x20stops\x20at\x20the\x20cap).','falsehoods':['the\x20reserve\x20never\x20leaves','reserve\x20never\x20leaves\x20the\x20pool','the\x20reserve\x20stays\x20in\x20the\x20pool','reserve\x20physically\x20stays\x20in\x20the\x20pool','the\x20fix\x20retains\x20the\x20reserve','fix-retained\x20claim\x20reserve','leaves\x20the\x20reserve\x20in\x20the\x20pool','fix=reserve','only\x20on-chain\x20holdback'],'harm':'Templates\x20that\x20declare\x20fix=reserve\x20ship\x20a\x20payout\x20rail\x20that\x20drains\x20100%\x20of\x20the\x20escrow\x20at\x20the\x20first\x20release;\x20the\x20claim/refund\x20legs\x20behind\x20it\x20are\x20dead\x20by\x20construction\x20and\x20the\x20money\x20is\x20gone\x20(airbnb\x20mainnet\x20audit\x202026-10-07:\x20ABNB_STAY_SERVICE\x20allocators[0]\x20fix=\x220\x22,\x20full\x20drain\x20at\x20payout_24h).'},{'fact_id':'FACT-GUARD-01','subject':'GuardIdentifier\x20recipient\x20+\x20for_object\x20binding','authoritative':'ERECIPIENT_NOT_FOR_OBJECT\x20is\x20enforced\x20ONLY\x20when\x20the\x20recipient\x20kind\x20is\x20GuardIdentifier\x20AND\x20payment_info.for_object\x20is\x20Some(binding).\x20Pure\x20Entity\x20recipients\x20and\x20unbound\x20GuardIdentifier\x20legs\x20skip\x20this\x20check\x20entirely\x20—\x20the\x20tooling\x20layer\x20(scanner,\x20template\x20compiler)\x20must\x20flag\x20them\x20(allocation.move:434-443).','falsehoods':['the\x20contract\x20checks\x20all\x20recipients\x20against\x20for_object','GuardIdentifier\x20recipients\x20are\x20always\x20safe','the\x20contract\x20validates\x20every\x20recipient\x20binding'],'harm':'An\x20unbound\x20GuardIdentifier\x20or\x20pure\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20can\x20redirect\x20funds\x20to\x20the\x20deploying\x20account\x20or\x20an\x20arbitrary\x20address\x20without\x20any\x20on-chain\x20error.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-MACHINE-01','subject':'Machine\x20edge\x20\x27from\x27\x20semantics','authoritative':'A\x20machine\x20edge\x20declares\x20a\x20single\x20source\x20node\x20in\x20its\x20\x27from\x27\x20field.\x20Multiple\x20edges\x20from\x20the\x20same\x20source\x20node\x20are\x20allowed\x20and\x20represent\x20alternative\x20paths;\x20they\x20are\x20NOT\x20merged.\x20An\x20edge\x20without\x20\x27from\x27\x20is\x20invalid\x20in\x20the\x20new\x20topology\x20format\x20and\x20causes\x20compile-time\x20blockers.','falsehoods':['edges\x20without\x20from\x20are\x20auto-derived','missing\x20from\x20means\x20any\x20node','from\x20is\x20optional\x20for\x20backward\x20compatibility'],'harm':'Old\x20flat\x20machine_shape\x20without\x20from\x20fields\x20compiles\x20into\x20an\x20incomplete\x20topology,\x20leaving\x20nodes\x20unreachable\x20and\x20fund\x20paths\x20missing.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ENTITY-01','subject':'Entity\x20recipient\x20fallback\x20to\x20deployer','authoritative':'When\x20an\x20Entity\x20recipient\x27s\x20name_or_address\x20is\x20empty,\x20omitted,\x20or\x20resolves\x20to\x20the\x20deploying\x20account,\x20the\x20share\x20is\x20paid\x20to\x20the\x20DEPLOYING\x20ACCOUNT\x20(allocation.move:434-443).\x20This\x20is\x20a\x20silent\x20fallback\x20—\x20no\x20error\x20is\x20raised.','falsehoods':['empty\x20Entity\x20names\x20are\x20rejected','the\x20contract\x20validates\x20Entity\x20recipients','an\x20unnamed\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20causes\x20an\x20abort'],'harm':'A\x20template\x20with\x20a\x20placeholder\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20silently\x20pays\x20the\x20share\x20to\x20whoever\x20deploys\x20the\x20service,\x20which\x20is\x20almost\x20never\x20the\x20intended\x20recipient.'}];export function scanContent(a,b){const c=[],d=b['toLowerCase']();for(const e of SEMANTIC_FACTS){for(const f of e['falsehoods']){const g=f['toLowerCase']();let h=0x0;while((h=d['indexOf'](g,h))!==-0x1){const i=d['slice'](Math['max'](0x0,h-0xc),h),j=/(?:^|[\s"'])not\s+$/['test'](i)||/never\s+$/['test'](i);!j&&c['push']({'fact_id':e['fact_id'],'phrasing':f}),h+=g['length'];}}}return c;}
+export const SEMANTIC_FACTS=[{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-01','subject':'Allocator\x20guard-matching\x20and\x20firing\x20semantics','authoritative':'A\x20distribution\x20call\x20submits\x20ONE\x20guard\x20address;\x20every\x20allocator\x20whose\x20bound\x20guard\x20equals\x20the\x20submitted\x20address\x20fires,\x20in\x20vector\x20order,\x20each\x20against\x20the\x20balance\x20left\x20by\x20the\x20previous\x20(allocation.move:366-368\x20—\x20the\x20loop\x20has\x20no\x20early\x20exit).\x20'+'ORDER\x20IS\x20PRIORITY\x20(SV-3,\x20az3-mn-261013):\x20within\x20one\x20guard,\x20multiple\x20FIX/RATE\x20entries\x20consume\x20the\x20pool\x20strictly\x20in\x20their\x20declared\x20row\x20order\x20(allocation.move:422-427)\x20—\x20a\x20row\x20that\x20under-rates\x20leaves\x20too\x20little\x20for\x20later\x20rows,\x20and\x20a\x20later\x20row\x20that\x20cannot\x20be\x20fully\x20filled\x20aborts\x20the\x20distribution\x20(EZERO,\x2014).\x20Author\x20multi-row\x20splits\x20POOL-DESCENDING\x20(largest\x20claimant\x20first)\x20and\x20verify\x20Σ(fix/rate\x20values)\x20<=\x20the\x20pool\x20the\x20guard\x20can\x20see\x20at\x20fire\x20time.\x20'+'Allocators\x20with\x20DIFFERENT\x20guards\x20are\x20alternative\x20paths\x20selected\x20by\x20the\x20caller\x27s\x20guard\x20choice,\x20not\x20by\x20list\x20position.\x20Mutual\x20exclusion\x20must\x20be\x20expressed\x20inside\x20the\x20guard\x20conditions.','falsehoods':['first-match-wins','first\x20Allocator\x20whose\x20Guard\x20returns\x20true','first\x20allocator\x20whose\x20guard\x20passes\x20wins','the\x20first\x20Allocator\x20whose\x20Guard\x20returns\x20true\x20wins','first-match\x20allocator\x20semantics','only\x20the\x20first\x20one','only\x20the\x20first\x20one\x20matches','duplicate\x20addresses\x20only\x20match\x20the\x20first','the\x20first\x20one\x20wins','the\x20first\x20allocator\x20whose\x20guard'],'harm':'Templates\x20built\x20on\x20\x27first-match\x27\x20semantics\x20silently\x20stack\x20distributions\x20or\x20leave\x20refund\x20paths\x20unreachable,\x20because\x20the\x20contract\x20fires\x20ALL\x20allocators\x20bound\x20to\x20the\x20submitted\x20guard.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-02','subject':'Surplus\x20semantics\x20—\x20drains\x20the\x20entire\x20remaining\x20pool','authoritative':'Surplus\x20mode\x20distributes\x20the\x20ENTIRE\x20remaining\x20balance\x20of\x20the\x20order\x27s\x20allocation\x20pool,\x20not\x20just\x20the\x20amount\x20earmarked\x20for\x20a\x20specific\x20track.\x20If\x20a\x20refund-path\x20allocator\x20uses\x20Surplus\x20while\x20the\x20settlement\x20path\x20has\x20unpaid\x20fixed-amount\x20legs,\x20the\x20Surplus\x20takes\x20everything,\x20including\x20the\x20settlement\x20money.','falsehoods':['Surplus\x20takes\x20only\x20what\x20is\x20left','Surplus\x20returns\x20the\x20remainder\x20after\x20other\x20tracks','Surplus\x20is\x20safe\x20because\x20it\x20only\x20takes\x20leftovers'],'harm':'A\x20refund/deposit\x20allocator\x20using\x20Surplus\x20will\x20over-refund\x20the\x20buyer\x20and\x20starve\x20the\x20merchant\x20when\x20the\x20settlement\x20track\x20has\x20not\x20yet\x20fired\x20(ziroom\x20T5:\x20585/525\x20WOW\x20fully\x20refunded,\x20merchant\x20received\x200).'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ALLOC-03','subject':'Allocator\x20fix\x20semantics\x20—\x20computed\x20Amount-leg\x20total,\x20PAID,\x20never\x20a\x20holdback','authoritative':'fix\x20is\x20not\x20a\x20settable\x20parameter:\x20the\x20allocator-registration\x20call\x20computes\x20it\x20internally\x20as\x20the\x20sum\x20of\x20the\x20allocator\x27s\x20Amount-mode\x20legs\x20(allocation.move:399\x20fix:\x20total_amount),\x20and\x20alloc()\x20PAYS\x20every\x20Amount\x20leg\x20(allocation.move:540\x20balance::split)\x20while\x20subtracting\x20fix\x20only\x20from\x20the\x20net-Rate\x20base\x20(allocation.move:485\x20total_rates\x20=\x20balance\x20-\x20fix).\x20A\x20pure-Rate\x20allocator\x20therefore\x20has\x20fix=0\x20and\x20drains\x20100%\x20of\x20the\x20pool;\x20adding\x20Amount\x20legs\x20raises\x20outflow,\x20it\x20never\x20withholds.\x20The\x20allocator-registration\x20call\x20surface\x20takes\x20only\x20(guard,\x20sharing,\x20max)\x20—\x20no\x20fix\x20argument\x20at\x20all\x20—\x20so\x20a\x20template-side\x20fix\x20value\x20is\x20silently\x20dropped\x20before\x20the\x20transaction\x20is\x20built.\x20The\x20chain\x20has\x20NO\x20holdback/reserve\x20primitive;\x20the\x20only\x20way\x20to\x20leave\x20funds\x20in\x20a\x20pool\x20is\x20to\x20not\x20distribute\x20them\x20(no\x20allocator\x20fires,\x20or\x20a\x20max-capped\x20Surplus\x20stops\x20at\x20the\x20cap).','falsehoods':['the\x20reserve\x20never\x20leaves','reserve\x20never\x20leaves\x20the\x20pool','the\x20reserve\x20stays\x20in\x20the\x20pool','reserve\x20physically\x20stays\x20in\x20the\x20pool','the\x20fix\x20retains\x20the\x20reserve','fix-retained\x20claim\x20reserve','leaves\x20the\x20reserve\x20in\x20the\x20pool','fix=reserve','only\x20on-chain\x20holdback'],'harm':'Templates\x20that\x20declare\x20fix=reserve\x20ship\x20a\x20payout\x20rail\x20that\x20drains\x20100%\x20of\x20the\x20escrow\x20at\x20the\x20first\x20release;\x20the\x20claim/refund\x20legs\x20behind\x20it\x20are\x20dead\x20by\x20construction\x20and\x20the\x20money\x20is\x20gone\x20(airbnb\x20mainnet\x20audit\x202026-10-07:\x20ABNB_STAY_SERVICE\x20allocators[0]\x20fix=\x220\x22,\x20full\x20drain\x20at\x20payout_24h).'},{'fact_id':'FACT-GUARD-01','subject':'GuardIdentifier\x20recipient\x20+\x20for_object\x20binding','authoritative':'ERECIPIENT_NOT_FOR_OBJECT\x20is\x20enforced\x20ONLY\x20when\x20the\x20recipient\x20kind\x20is\x20GuardIdentifier\x20AND\x20payment_info.for_object\x20is\x20Some(binding).\x20Pure\x20Entity\x20recipients\x20and\x20unbound\x20GuardIdentifier\x20legs\x20skip\x20this\x20check\x20entirely\x20—\x20the\x20tooling\x20layer\x20(scanner,\x20template\x20compiler)\x20must\x20flag\x20them\x20(allocation.move:434-443).','falsehoods':['the\x20contract\x20checks\x20all\x20recipients\x20against\x20for_object','GuardIdentifier\x20recipients\x20are\x20always\x20safe','the\x20contract\x20validates\x20every\x20recipient\x20binding'],'harm':'An\x20unbound\x20GuardIdentifier\x20or\x20pure\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20can\x20redirect\x20funds\x20to\x20the\x20deploying\x20account\x20or\x20an\x20arbitrary\x20address\x20without\x20any\x20on-chain\x20error.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-MACHINE-01','subject':'Machine\x20edge\x20\x27from\x27\x20semantics','authoritative':'A\x20machine\x20edge\x20declares\x20a\x20single\x20source\x20node\x20in\x20its\x20\x27from\x27\x20field.\x20Multiple\x20edges\x20from\x20the\x20same\x20source\x20node\x20are\x20allowed\x20and\x20represent\x20alternative\x20paths;\x20they\x20are\x20NOT\x20merged.\x20An\x20edge\x20without\x20\x27from\x27\x20is\x20invalid\x20in\x20the\x20new\x20topology\x20format\x20and\x20causes\x20compile-time\x20blockers.','falsehoods':['edges\x20without\x20from\x20are\x20auto-derived','missing\x20from\x20means\x20any\x20node','from\x20is\x20optional\x20for\x20backward\x20compatibility'],'harm':'Old\x20flat\x20machine_shape\x20without\x20from\x20fields\x20compiles\x20into\x20an\x20incomplete\x20topology,\x20leaving\x20nodes\x20unreachable\x20and\x20fund\x20paths\x20missing.'},{'fact_id':'FACT-ENTITY-01','subject':'Entity\x20recipient\x20fallback\x20to\x20deployer','authoritative':'When\x20an\x20Entity\x20recipient\x27s\x20name_or_address\x20is\x20empty,\x20omitted,\x20or\x20resolves\x20to\x20the\x20deploying\x20account,\x20the\x20share\x20is\x20paid\x20to\x20the\x20DEPLOYING\x20ACCOUNT\x20(allocation.move:434-443).\x20This\x20is\x20a\x20silent\x20fallback\x20—\x20no\x20error\x20is\x20raised.','falsehoods':['empty\x20Entity\x20names\x20are\x20rejected','the\x20contract\x20validates\x20Entity\x20recipients','an\x20unnamed\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20causes\x20an\x20abort'],'harm':'A\x20template\x20with\x20a\x20placeholder\x20Entity\x20recipient\x20silently\x20pays\x20the\x20share\x20to\x20whoever\x20deploys\x20the\x20service,\x20which\x20is\x20almost\x20never\x20the\x20intended\x20recipient.'}];export function scanContent(a,b){const c=[],d=b['toLowerCase']();for(const e of SEMANTIC_FACTS){for(const f of e['falsehoods']){const g=f['toLowerCase']();let h=0x0;while((h=d['indexOf'](g,h))!==-0x1){const i=d['slice'](Math['max'](0x0,h-0xc),h),j=/(?:^|[\s"'])not\s+$/['test'](i)||/never\s+$/['test'](i);!j&&c['push']({'fact_id':e['fact_id'],'phrasing':f}),h+=g['length'];}}}return c;}

package/dist/knowledge/builtin-templates.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import type { Industry } from "../customer/index.js";
 import type { ModeMachineNode, ModeGuardRef, ModeAllocatorStrategy } from "./scenario-modes.js";
+export type TemplateArbitrationMode = "none" | "merchant_pick" | "mutual_pick" | "third_party";
 export interface ArchetypeTemplate {
     id: string;
     industry: Industry;
@@ -19,11 +20,25 @@ export interface ArchetypeTemplate {
     user_inputs: string[];
     key_risk: string;
     build_notes: string[];
+    evidence_refs?: string[];
     payment_model?: "milestone" | "subscription" | "escrow";
-    arbitration_mode?: "none" | "merchant_pick" | "mutual_pick" | "third_party";
+    arbitration_mode?: TemplateArbitrationMode;
     time_anchors?: Record<string, string>;
+    conditional_guards?: Array<{
+        guard_key: string;
+        param: string;
+        values: string[];
+        emit_value: string;
+        question: string;
+    }>;
+    reward_claim_policy?: {
+        kind: "once" | "periodic" | "capped";
+        min_claim_interval_ms?: number;
+        max_total_per_recipient?: string;
+    };
+    review_mode?: "none" | "review" | "review_reward";
 }
-export declare const BUILTIN_TEMPLATES_VERSION = 38;
+export declare const BUILTIN_TEMPLATES_VERSION = 61;
 export declare const BUILTIN_TEMPLATES: ArchetypeTemplate[];
 export declare const TEMPLATE_KEYWORDS: Record<string, string[]>;
 export declare function getBuiltinTemplate(id: string): ArchetypeTemplate | undefined;