@workerdeck/protocol 0.6.0 → 0.9.0

package/build/index.d.mts

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  * structurally (see {@link ApiMessage}) so clients don't need the Agent SDK to render transcripts.
  */
 /** Bumped on any breaking change to events, commands, or REST shapes. */
-declare const PROTOCOL_VERSION = 4;
+declare const PROTOCOL_VERSION = 6;
 /**
  * - `starting` — runner spawned, waiting for the SDK init handshake
  * - `running` — a turn is in progress
@@ -55,6 +55,29 @@ type UnknownBlock = {
   [key: string]: unknown;
 };
 type ContentBlock = TextBlock | ThinkingBlock | ToolUseBlock | ToolResultBlock | UnknownBlock;
+/**
+ * A file the user attached to a message — a photo, a screenshot, a document.
+ *
+ * The bytes never travel on this protocol. An attachment is uploaded first
+ * (`POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/attachments`), and the command that sends the
+ * message names it by id; what lands in the seq-numbered event log is this
+ * reference. That is deliberate: the log is replayed to every attaching client
+ * and captured into parking snapshots, so a few phone photos inlined as base64
+ * would be paid for on every attach, forever. Clients render a thumbnail by
+ * fetching `GET {basePath}/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId`.
+ *
+ * Lifetime is the session's, like `/files` — the store is in-memory and an
+ * attachment 404s after a server restart. The message itself is unaffected: the
+ * model saw the bytes at send time.
+ */
+type MessageAttachment = {
+  /** Server-assigned; the path segment of the download URL. */id: string; /** Display name from the file the user picked. A leaf name, never a path. */
+  name: string;
+  /** IANA media type, e.g. 'image/jpeg'. The server decides how it reaches the
+   * model (image block, document block, or inlined text) from this. */
+  mediaType: string;
+  bytes: number;
+};
 type ApiMessage = {
   role: 'user' | 'assistant';
   content: string | ContentBlock[];
@@ -69,7 +92,13 @@ type ApiMessage = {
     cache_read_input_tokens?: number;
   };
 };
-/** A tool call promoted into a pending approval by the runner's canUseTool hook. */
+/** A tool call promoted into a pending approval by the runner's canUseTool hook
+ * (Claude), or an engine ask-channel request surfaced by its runner (codex).
+ * The two do not share a tense: Claude asks BEFORE a tool runs; codex's command
+ * approval is usually an escalation AFTER its sandbox already ran and refused
+ * the command ("command failed; retry without sandbox?"). The runner authors
+ * `title`/`description`/`decisionReason` to say which — clients should render
+ * those fields rather than composing their own "X wants to run Y" sentence. */
 type PermissionRequest = {
   /** Server-assigned id; used by the `permission_decision` command. */id: string;
   toolName: string;
@@ -111,8 +140,21 @@ type QuestionBehavior = 'ask' | 'auto' | 'deny';
 /** A model the session can switch to (SDK ModelInfo mirror; fields it may grow stay unknown). */
 type ModelOption = {
   /** Model id for createSession.model / set_model. */value: string;
+  /** Wire model id this row resolves to ('sonnet' → 'claude-sonnet-5'). What a
+   * session actually reports as its model is the resolved form, so this is how a
+   * client matches the running model back to the row that names it. */
+  resolvedModel?: string;
   displayName: string;
   description?: string;
+  /** Whether this belongs in a picker's main list rather than behind a "more
+   * models" step: the newest model of each family. Derived server-side — the CLI
+   * reports one flat list — so that every client groups it the same way. */
+  primary?: boolean;
+  /** Reasoning efforts this model supports at create time (codex catalogs carry
+   * them, from the binary's own per-model list). Absent = the engine's default
+   * set ({@link EngineCapabilities.reasoningEfforts}) applies. Open strings —
+   * the binary's vocabulary outruns its SDK's union. */
+  reasoningEfforts?: readonly string[];
 };
 /** A slash command the CLI accepts as user-message text (SDK SlashCommand mirror). */
 type SlashCommandInfo = {
@@ -202,6 +244,11 @@ type SessionEventBody = /** SDK init handshake: what this session actually is. *
   type: 'capabilities';
   models: ModelOption[];
   commands: SlashCommandInfo[];
+  /** Wire id the session's *default* resolves to, from the CLI's own `default`
+   * row. Answers "what will this session answer as" before it has answered
+   * anything — `system_init` carries the model, but a promptless session gets
+   * no `system_init` until its first message. */
+  defaultModel?: string;
 } /** The session's model changed via `set_model`. `model` undefined = back to default. */ | {
   type: 'model_changed';
   model?: string;
@@ -214,6 +261,15 @@ type SessionEventBody = /** SDK init handshake: what this session actually is. *
 } /** Subscription rate-limit update for one window (see {@link RateLimitInfo}). */ | {
   type: 'rate_limit';
   info: RateLimitInfo;
+}
+/** Which claude.ai plan the rate-limit windows belong to: 'pro' | 'max' | 'team' |
+ * 'enterprise' — kept as string, the set may grow. Emitted from the same poll as
+ * `rate_limit`, once per change, and never for an API-key session (which has no
+ * plan). It names the windows; it does not size them — the tier suffix a
+ * subscription page shows ("Max 20x") is not in the data. */
+| {
+  type: 'plan_info';
+  subscriptionType: string;
 } | {
   type: 'assistant_message';
   message: ApiMessage; /** Set when the message was produced inside a subagent (Task tool). */
@@ -226,6 +282,10 @@ type SessionEventBody = /** SDK init handshake: what this session actually is. *
   parentToolUseId: string | null; /** True when replayed from a resumed session's history. */
   replay?: boolean; /** True for tool results and other synthetic user-role messages. */
   synthetic?: boolean;
+  /** Files sent with this message, by reference (see {@link MessageAttachment}).
+   * `message.content` carries the typed text only — the attachment bytes went
+   * to the model, not into this log. */
+  attachments?: MessageAttachment[];
   uuid?: string;
 }
 /** Raw Anthropic streaming event (message_start/content_block_delta/...); emitted only
@@ -316,6 +376,10 @@ type SessionEvent = SessionEventBody & {
 type SessionCommand = {
   type: 'user_message';
   text: string;
+  /** Ids from `POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/attachments`, in the order they
+   * should reach the model. Unknown ids fail the command rather than sending
+   * a message that quietly lost its picture. */
+  attachmentIds?: string[];
 } | {
   type: 'permission_decision';
   requestId: string;
@@ -414,16 +478,77 @@ type ProfileDefaults = {
  * auto-created from the operator's own config dir) — the API only reads them.
  */
 /**
- * Which engine a profile runs on.
+ * Which engine a profile runs on. A **closed union, deliberately**: both clients
+ * switch exhaustively, the Swift mirror ships in lockstep, and a closed set is
+ * what lets this package carry per-engine capability defaults
+ * ({@link ENGINE_CAPABILITIES}) browser-safe, with no server round-trip. Adding a
+ * member is a versioned protocol event.
+ *
  * - `claude` (default) — Claude Code via the Agent SDK, configured by a config dir.
- * - `provider` — a model-agnostic provider (OpenAI-compatible, Anthropic, Moonshot),
- *   configured by provider id and credentials from the operator's environment.
+ * - `codex` — OpenAI Codex over the codex CLI binary's `app-server` JSON-RPC
+ *   surface, configured by a CODEX_HOME (auth resolved by the binary itself,
+ *   like claude).
+ * - `provider` — a model-agnostic provider over the AI SDK, assembled by the
+ *   host's `createEngineRunner` hook.
+ */
+type ProfileEngine = 'claude' | 'codex' | 'provider';
+/**
+ * What an engine does and does not do — one axis per real difference, each field
+ * answering a concrete UI or gateway question. Clients render from this record
+ * instead of switching on the engine name: an absent capability means the
+ * affordance is *hidden*, never a control that silently does nothing.
+ *
+ * Reaches clients in two places, same shape: `ProfileInfo.capabilities` (stamped
+ * by the server; the create form's source) and `SessionInfo.capabilities`
+ * (reported by the runner; the session surface's source). When the field is
+ * absent — an older server — {@link ENGINE_CAPABILITIES} keyed by the engine
+ * name is the browser-safe default.
+ */
+type EngineCapabilities = {
+  /** PermissionRequest / permission_resolved can occur; approval UI is live.
+   * False: hide approval affordances entirely (and `questionBehavior` on jobs). */
+  interactiveApprovals: boolean;
+  /** Modes this engine can honor. A stored choice outside the set is coerced to
+   * {@link EngineCapabilities.defaultPermissionMode}, not submitted. */
+  permissionModes: readonly PermissionMode[]; /** Coercion target for a stored/unsupported mode choice (always ∈ permissionModes). */
+  defaultPermissionMode: PermissionMode; /** CreateSessionRequest.resume works (an engine session id continues). */
+  resume: boolean;
+  /** Resume replays prior history into the transcript (Claude's backfill).
+   * False + resume: show a "history predates this attach" notice instead of
+   * treating an empty transcript as a bug. */
+  resumeBackfill: boolean; /** GET /sdk-sessions offers a resume picker for this engine. */
+  listSessions: boolean; /** context_usage events can occur. False: render nothing — never a 0% ring. */
+  contextUsage: boolean; /** rate_limit / plan_info events can occur. False: render nothing. */
+  rateLimits: boolean; /** GET/POST /sessions/:id/mcp works (else 501). */
+  mcpStatus: boolean; /** A session request may bring its own mcpServers. */
+  sessionMcpServers: boolean; /** capabilities events carry slash commands (composer popover). */
+  slashCommands: boolean; /** settingSources / allowDangerouslySkipPermissions-style CLI options apply. */
+  settingSources: boolean; /** maxTurns / maxBudgetUsd are honored (else the gateway 400s them). */
+  budgets: boolean;
+  /** Attachment kinds sendMessage can deliver to the model. Filter the attach
+   * menu by kind; refuse locally before the server's 415. */
+  attachments: ReadonlyArray<'image' | 'pdf' | 'text'>;
+  /** Efforts offerable at create time; absent = not settable (hide the control).
+   * Open strings — Codex's own binary already outruns its SDK's union. */
+  reasoningEfforts?: readonly string[]; /** Sessions expose a scratch VFS (GET /sessions/:id/files, deliverables panel). */
+  vfs: boolean;
+  /** stream_delta granularity: per-token, coarse item updates (no typing
+   * cursor), or none. */
+  streaming: 'token' | 'item' | 'none';
+};
+/**
+ * The static capability record of each engine — the browser-safe default for
+ * `ProfileInfo.capabilities` / `SessionInfo.capabilities`, and the single place
+ * the values are written down. Core's adapters *reference* this record and a
+ * conformance test compares runner behaviour against it, so it cannot silently
+ * diverge from the code. When both a wire copy and this default exist, the wire
+ * copy wins.
  */
-type ProfileEngine = 'claude' | 'provider';
+declare const ENGINE_CAPABILITIES: Record<ProfileEngine, EngineCapabilities>;
 /**
- * Permission modes the model-agnostic provider engine understands. The rest of
- * {@link PermissionMode}'s vocabulary is Claude Code's: `acceptEdits`, `plan` and
- * `auto` name CLI-side behaviours a provider session has no equivalent of.
+ * Permission modes the model-agnostic provider engine understands.
+ * @deprecated Read `ENGINE_CAPABILITIES.provider.permissionModes` (this is an
+ * alias of it, kept for protocol-5 consumers).
  */
 declare const PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES: readonly PermissionMode[];
 /**
@@ -481,12 +606,37 @@ type ProfileInfo = {
    * written before provider support keep working unchanged. */
   engine?: ProfileEngine;
   /** Absolute path set as CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR for the session's CLI process.
-   * Required for 'claude' profiles; meaningless for 'provider' ones. */
-  configDir?: string; /** Provider wiring for 'provider' profiles. */
+   * Required for 'claude' profiles; meaningless for the other engines. */
+  configDir?: string;
+  /** Codex profiles: absolute path set as CODEX_HOME for the session's codex
+   * process (auth, config.toml, thread storage) — the `configDir` analogue,
+   * request-writable like it. Unset = the binary's own `~/.codex`. */
+  codexHome?: string; /** Provider wiring for 'provider' profiles. */
   provider?: ProviderConfig;
   description?: string;
   defaults?: ProfileDefaults; /** Provider-engine session grants (capabilities, MCP servers, instructions). */
   session?: ProfileSessionDefaults;
+  /** Response-only: the engine's model catalog, shipped with the release and
+   * served from the first request (no process spawned, no warm-up session).
+   * For provider profiles the ids come from `provider.models` instead. Never
+   * contains a 'default' sentinel row — forms add their own "Profile default"
+   * row mapping to an unset model. Ignored on the way in. */
+  models?: ModelOption[];
+  /** Response-only: what this profile's default model resolves to. For claude
+   * profiles this is the operator's CLI config — unknowable statically — so it
+   * is absent until a session on this profile reports it. */
+  defaultModel?: string;
+  /** Response-only: the engine's capability record (see {@link EngineCapabilities}).
+   * Absent = use ENGINE_CAPABILITIES[engine]. Ignored on the way in. */
+  capabilities?: EngineCapabilities;
+  /** Response-only: whether the profile's credentials probe as usable right now.
+   * Absent = unknown/unchecked — treat as available. **Display-only**: create
+   * against an unavailable profile still proceeds and fails with the engine's
+   * own error (the probe can be stale in both directions). */
+  available?: boolean;
+  /** Response-only: one operator-actionable line, present only when
+   * `available === false`. */
+  unavailableReason?: string;
   /** Response-only, computed by the server: this profile came from the profile
    * store and can be edited or deleted through the API. Profiles declared in
    * server options are absent/false — they are code. Ignored on the way in. */
@@ -528,6 +678,59 @@ type McpServerConfigWire = {
   url: string;
   headers?: Record<string, string>;
 };
+/** One tool an MCP server exposes, as the session's engine reports it.
+ * Parameters are deliberately absent: the CLI's status payload names and
+ * describes each tool but does not carry its input schema. */
+type McpServerToolInfo = {
+  name: string;
+  description?: string;
+  annotations?: {
+    readOnly?: boolean;
+    destructive?: boolean;
+    openWorld?: boolean;
+  };
+};
+/**
+ * Live status of one MCP server on a session — what `GET
+ * {basePath}/sessions/:id/mcp` answers with, and what the `/mcp` screens render.
+ *
+ * The connection *identity* is here (transport, command, url, scope) but never
+ * its secrets: the engine's config carries `env` for stdio servers and `headers`
+ * for HTTP/SSE ones, and both are dropped on the way out. A client that can read
+ * this is not thereby entitled to the tokens the operator configured.
+ */
+type McpServerStatusInfo = {
+  name: string;
+  /** 'connected' | 'failed' | 'needs-auth' | 'pending' | 'disabled' — kept open,
+   * the engine's set may grow. */
+  status: string; /** Where the server was configured: 'project' | 'user' | 'local' | 'dynamic' | … */
+  scope?: string; /** Present when `status` is 'failed'. */
+  error?: string; /** Name and version the server announced on connect. */
+  serverInfo?: {
+    name: string;
+    version: string;
+  };
+  transport?: 'stdio' | 'http' | 'sse' | 'sdk'; /** stdio only. */
+  command?: string;
+  /** stdio only. Secrets do occasionally ride argv; the operator's own client
+   * shows them, and hiding them here would only mislead. `env` is not exposed. */
+  args?: string[]; /** http/sse only. */
+  url?: string; /** Present when connected. */
+  tools?: McpServerToolInfo[];
+};
+type McpServersResponse = {
+  servers: McpServerStatusInfo[];
+};
+/** `POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/mcp/:name` — answers with the refreshed status. */
+type McpServerActionRequest = {
+  action: 'reconnect' | 'enable' | 'disable';
+};
+/** `POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/attachments?name=<name>` — the body is the raw
+ * file, the `content-type` header its media type. Answers with the reference to
+ * name on the next `user_message`. */
+type UploadAttachmentResponse = {
+  attachment: MessageAttachment;
+};
 type CreateSessionRequest = {
   /** Directory the session is rooted at. Required: `cwd` is per-query in the SDK
    * and the server re-pins it on every call. */
@@ -552,7 +755,11 @@ type CreateSessionRequest = {
   maxTurns?: number;
   maxBudgetUsd?: number; /** Resume an existing SDK session by id. */
   resume?: string; /** With `resume`: fork to a new session id instead of continuing. */
-  forkSession?: boolean; /** Emit `stream_delta` events for token-by-token rendering. Default true. */
+  forkSession?: boolean;
+  /** Reasoning effort for the session's model (codex engine). Open string —
+   * offerable values come from the profile's catalog/capability record. The
+   * gateway 400s it when the engine's record declares no `reasoningEfforts`. */
+  reasoningEffort?: string; /** Emit `stream_delta` events for token-by-token rendering. Default true. */
   includePartialMessages?: boolean; /** Per-session override of the server's permission-request timeout (ms). */
   approvalTimeoutMs?: number; /** AskUserQuestion handling (see {@link QuestionBehavior}). Default 'ask'. */
   questionBehavior?: QuestionBehavior;
@@ -572,8 +779,18 @@ type SessionInfo = {
    * session surface gate CLI-only affordances (permission modes, context usage,
    * rate limits) without looking the profile back up. Absent = 'claude'. */
   engine?: ProfileEngine;
+  /** The engine's capability record, reported by the runner like `engine`. The
+   * attach snapshot is the session-level source (no event carries it). Absent =
+   * ENGINE_CAPABILITIES[engine]. */
+  capabilities?: EngineCapabilities;
   model?: string;
-  permissionMode?: PermissionMode; /** See the `system_init` event; 'oauth' = claude.ai subscription credentials. */
+  permissionMode?: PermissionMode;
+  /** Whether this session may be switched into `bypassPermissions`. The CLI only
+   * allows it when the process was spawned for it, so it is decided at creation
+   * and never changes: a session that did not ask for bypass up front cannot
+   * gain it later. Lets a picker disable the mode instead of offering a switch
+   * the engine will refuse. Absent = unknown (an older server). */
+  canBypassPermissions?: boolean; /** See the `system_init` event; 'oauth' = claude.ai subscription credentials. */
   apiKeySource?: string;
   createdAt: number; /** Highest event seq emitted so far; attach with `afterSeq` to catch up. */
   lastSeq: number;
@@ -585,9 +802,15 @@ type SessionInfo = {
   lastActivityAt?: number;
 };
 /**
- * A session in the Agent SDK's on-disk store (independent of this server's registry).
- * Listed so hosts can offer "resume" across server restarts: feed `sessionId` to
- * CreateSessionRequest.resume. Mirrors the SDK's SDKSessionInfo, kept browser-safe.
+ * A session in an engine's on-disk store (independent of this server's registry):
+ * the Agent SDK's session files, or a codex profile's CODEX_HOME threads. Listed
+ * so hosts can offer "resume" across server restarts: feed `sessionId` to
+ * CreateSessionRequest.resume — under a profile of the SAME engine, since the id
+ * only means something to the store it came from. `GET {basePath}/sdk-sessions`
+ * takes an optional `profile` query parameter naming whose store to list; absent,
+ * the profile is resolved implicitly when the server declares exactly one, else
+ * the Claude engine's store is listed (the pre-engine-aware behavior). Mirrors
+ * the SDK's SDKSessionInfo shape, kept browser-safe.
  */
 type SdkSessionSummary = {
   sessionId: string; /** Custom title, auto summary, or first prompt — whichever the SDK has. */
@@ -680,6 +903,101 @@ type CreateProfileRequest = ProfileInfo;
 /** `PATCH {basePath}/profiles/:name` — merge into a managed profile. The name is
  * the route, not the body; pass `null` to clear an optional field. */
 type UpdateProfileRequest = Omit<Partial<ProfileInfo>, 'name'>;
+/**
+ * The **host's real project tree**, not a session's in-memory VFS — the two are
+ * unrelated despite both being "files". {@link SessionFileInfo} is a deliverable
+ * the agent produced inside a session; these routes read and write the operator's
+ * actual disk.
+ *
+ * That makes them **operator-privileged**: they are authorized by the server's auth
+ * key alone and deliberately sit outside the agent permission flow, because the
+ * caller *is* the operator, not the model. A client holding the key can already
+ * start a session with any allowed cwd; browsing that same tree grants it nothing
+ * new. Writing does, which is why writes are separately enabled server-side.
+ *
+ * The whole surface is opt-in and root-scoped: with no roots configured every route
+ * below 404s. There is no "unset means anything" default here — a phone on a tailnet
+ * must never be one request away from `~/.ssh`.
+ */
+type HostFileRoot = {
+  /** Absolute, canonical (symlinks resolved) path of the root. */path: string; /** Last path segment, for display — roots are not named by the operator. */
+  name: string;
+};
+/** `GET {basePath}/fs/roots` — where a client may start browsing. Empty `roots`
+ * never happens: the routes are absent entirely when none are configured. */
+type ListHostRootsResponse = {
+  roots: HostFileRoot[]; /** Whether `PUT /fs/write` is enabled here; lets a UI hide an editor it can't save from. */
+  canWrite: boolean;
+};
+/** One entry in a host directory listing. Classified with `lstat` semantics, so a
+ * `symlink` is reported as itself and never silently resolved — following it is the
+ * *next* request's problem, and that request is refused if it escapes the roots. */
+type HostDirEntry = {
+  name: string; /** Absolute path, ready to pass back as `?path=`. */
+  path: string;
+  type: 'file' | 'dir' | 'symlink' | 'other'; /** Regular files only. */
+  bytes?: number; /** Epoch ms mtime. */
+  modifiedAt?: number;
+};
+/** `GET {basePath}/fs/list?path=<abs>` — one directory, not recursive. */
+type ListHostDirResponse = {
+  /** Canonical path actually listed (the request's path after symlink resolution). */path: string; /** Directories first, then files, each alphabetical. */
+  entries: HostDirEntry[]; /** Set when the directory held more entries than the server will return. */
+  truncated?: boolean;
+};
+/** One hit from `GET {basePath}/fs/find`. */
+type HostFileMatch = {
+  /** Absolute path, for a follow-up read. */path: string; /** Path relative to the searched directory — what a picker shows and inserts. */
+  relative: string;
+};
+/**
+ * `GET {basePath}/fs/find?path=<dir>&q=<query>&limit=<n>` — recursive fuzzy file
+ * search under one directory, which is what an `@file` picker needs and
+ * `/fs/list` is not: listing answers "what is in this directory", this answers
+ * "which file in this tree did you mean".
+ *
+ * Subsequence matching (`seslist` finds `SessionListView.swift`), filename hits
+ * ranked above path hits, shallow files above deep ones. An empty `q` returns the
+ * shallowest files. Build directories (`.git`, `node_modules`, …) are skipped, as
+ * is anything behind a symlink — so every path returned is one `/fs/read` will
+ * accept.
+ */
+type FindHostFilesResponse = {
+  /** Canonical directory the search ran under; `relative` paths are relative to it. */base: string;
+  matches: HostFileMatch[]; /** More matched, or the tree was larger than the server would walk. */
+  truncated: boolean;
+};
+/** `GET {basePath}/fs/read?path=<abs>` — one file's contents. Binary files come back
+ * base64; 413 rather than a truncated read when the file exceeds the server's cap. */
+type ReadHostFileResponse = {
+  path: string;
+  content: string;
+  encoding: 'utf8' | 'base64';
+  bytes: number; /** sha256 (hex) of the bytes on disk. Pass it back as `expectedHash` to write. */
+  hash: string;
+  modifiedAt: number;
+};
+/**
+ * `PUT {basePath}/fs/write` — replace or create one file.
+ *
+ * The agent is editing this same tree, so a write is **conditional, always**:
+ * `expectedHash` must be the hash from the read this edit is based on, and the
+ * server 409s if the file has changed since. Omitting it means "create" and 409s
+ * if the path already exists — there is no unconditional overwrite, by design.
+ * Directories are never created implicitly: writing under a missing parent is a 404.
+ */
+type WriteHostFileRequest = {
+  path: string;
+  content: string; /** Default 'utf8'. */
+  encoding?: 'utf8' | 'base64'; /** Required to overwrite; omit only to create a new file. */
+  expectedHash?: string;
+};
+type WriteHostFileResponse = {
+  path: string;
+  bytes: number; /** Hash of what was just written — carry it into the next edit. */
+  hash: string;
+  modifiedAt: number;
+};
 type SaveProfileResponse = {
   profile: ProfileInfo;
 };
@@ -895,5 +1213,5 @@ type QueueStatsResponse = {
   stats: QueueStats;
 };
 //#endregion
-export { ApiMessage, AttachedFrame, ClientFrame, ContentBlock, ContextUsage, ContextUsageCategory, CreateJobRequest, CreateJobResponse, CreateProfileRequest, CreateSessionRequest, CreateSessionResponse, ErrorResponse, GetJobResponse, GetProfileResponse, GetSessionResponse, JobEvent, JobInfo, JobProgress, JobResult, JobStatus, JobUsage, ListJobsResponse, ListProfilesResponse, ListSdkSessionsResponse, ListSessionFilesResponse, ListSessionsResponse, McpServerConfigWire, ModelOption, PROTOCOL_VERSION, PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES, PermissionDecisionSource, PermissionMode, PermissionRequest, ProfileConfigSnapshot, ProfileDefaults, ProfileEngine, ProfileInfo, ProfileSessionDefaults, ProviderConfig, QuestionBehavior, QueueServerFrame, QueueStats, QueueStatsResponse, RateLimitInfo, ResolvePermissionRequest, ResolvePermissionResponse, SaveProfileResponse, SdkSessionSummary, ServerFrame, SessionCapability, SessionCommand, SessionEvent, SessionEventBody, SessionFileInfo, SessionInfo, SessionNotification, SessionNotificationType, SessionStatus, SessionWebhookConfig, SlashCommandInfo, SubmitExecutionResultRequest, SubmitExecutionResultResponse, TextBlock, ThinkingBlock, ToolCallRequestFrame, ToolExecutionBackend, ToolExecutionOutput, ToolExecutionStatus, ToolResultBlock, ToolUseBlock, UnknownBlock, UpdateProfileRequest, UserQuestion, UserQuestionOption, WebhookConfig, supportsPermissionMode };
+export { ApiMessage, AttachedFrame, ClientFrame, ContentBlock, ContextUsage, ContextUsageCategory, CreateJobRequest, CreateJobResponse, CreateProfileRequest, CreateSessionRequest, CreateSessionResponse, ENGINE_CAPABILITIES, EngineCapabilities, ErrorResponse, FindHostFilesResponse, GetJobResponse, GetProfileResponse, GetSessionResponse, HostDirEntry, HostFileMatch, HostFileRoot, JobEvent, JobInfo, JobProgress, JobResult, JobStatus, JobUsage, ListHostDirResponse, ListHostRootsResponse, ListJobsResponse, ListProfilesResponse, ListSdkSessionsResponse, ListSessionFilesResponse, ListSessionsResponse, McpServerActionRequest, McpServerConfigWire, McpServerStatusInfo, McpServerToolInfo, McpServersResponse, MessageAttachment, ModelOption, PROTOCOL_VERSION, PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES, PermissionDecisionSource, PermissionMode, PermissionRequest, ProfileConfigSnapshot, ProfileDefaults, ProfileEngine, ProfileInfo, ProfileSessionDefaults, ProviderConfig, QuestionBehavior, QueueServerFrame, QueueStats, QueueStatsResponse, RateLimitInfo, ReadHostFileResponse, ResolvePermissionRequest, ResolvePermissionResponse, SaveProfileResponse, SdkSessionSummary, ServerFrame, SessionCapability, SessionCommand, SessionEvent, SessionEventBody, SessionFileInfo, SessionInfo, SessionNotification, SessionNotificationType, SessionStatus, SessionWebhookConfig, SlashCommandInfo, SubmitExecutionResultRequest, SubmitExecutionResultResponse, TextBlock, ThinkingBlock, ToolCallRequestFrame, ToolExecutionBackend, ToolExecutionOutput, ToolExecutionStatus, ToolResultBlock, ToolUseBlock, UnknownBlock, UpdateProfileRequest, UploadAttachmentResponse, UserQuestion, UserQuestionOption, WebhookConfig, WriteHostFileRequest, WriteHostFileResponse, supportsPermissionMode };
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.mts.map

package/build/index.mjs

@@ -10,26 +10,123 @@
 * structurally (see {@link ApiMessage}) so clients don't need the Agent SDK to render transcripts.
 */
 /** Bumped on any breaking change to events, commands, or REST shapes. */
-const PROTOCOL_VERSION = 4;
+const PROTOCOL_VERSION = 6;
 /**
-* Permission modes the model-agnostic provider engine understands. The rest of
-* {@link PermissionMode}'s vocabulary is Claude Code's: `acceptEdits`, `plan` and
-* `auto` name CLI-side behaviours a provider session has no equivalent of.
+* The static capability record of each engine — the browser-safe default for
+* `ProfileInfo.capabilities` / `SessionInfo.capabilities`, and the single place
+* the values are written down. Core's adapters *reference* this record and a
+* conformance test compares runner behaviour against it, so it cannot silently
+* diverge from the code. When both a wire copy and this default exist, the wire
+* copy wins.
 */
-const PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES = [
-	"default",
-	"bypassPermissions",
-	"dontAsk"
-];
+const ENGINE_CAPABILITIES = {
+	claude: {
+		interactiveApprovals: true,
+		permissionModes: [
+			"default",
+			"acceptEdits",
+			"bypassPermissions",
+			"plan",
+			"dontAsk",
+			"auto"
+		],
+		defaultPermissionMode: "default",
+		resume: true,
+		resumeBackfill: true,
+		listSessions: true,
+		contextUsage: true,
+		rateLimits: true,
+		mcpStatus: true,
+		sessionMcpServers: true,
+		slashCommands: true,
+		settingSources: true,
+		budgets: true,
+		attachments: [
+			"image",
+			"pdf",
+			"text"
+		],
+		reasoningEfforts: [
+			"low",
+			"medium",
+			"high",
+			"xhigh",
+			"max"
+		],
+		vfs: false,
+		streaming: "token"
+	},
+	codex: {
+		interactiveApprovals: true,
+		permissionModes: [
+			"default",
+			"acceptEdits",
+			"bypassPermissions"
+		],
+		defaultPermissionMode: "default",
+		resume: true,
+		resumeBackfill: true,
+		listSessions: true,
+		contextUsage: true,
+		rateLimits: true,
+		mcpStatus: false,
+		sessionMcpServers: false,
+		slashCommands: false,
+		settingSources: false,
+		budgets: false,
+		attachments: ["image", "text"],
+		reasoningEfforts: [
+			"minimal",
+			"low",
+			"medium",
+			"high",
+			"xhigh"
+		],
+		vfs: false,
+		streaming: "token"
+	},
+	provider: {
+		interactiveApprovals: false,
+		permissionModes: [
+			"default",
+			"bypassPermissions",
+			"dontAsk"
+		],
+		defaultPermissionMode: "default",
+		resume: false,
+		resumeBackfill: false,
+		listSessions: false,
+		contextUsage: false,
+		rateLimits: false,
+		mcpStatus: false,
+		sessionMcpServers: false,
+		slashCommands: false,
+		settingSources: false,
+		budgets: false,
+		attachments: [
+			"image",
+			"pdf",
+			"text"
+		],
+		vfs: true,
+		streaming: "token"
+	}
+};
+/**
+* Permission modes the model-agnostic provider engine understands.
+* @deprecated Read `ENGINE_CAPABILITIES.provider.permissionModes` (this is an
+* alias of it, kept for protocol-5 consumers).
+*/
+const PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES = ENGINE_CAPABILITIES.provider.permissionModes;
 /**
 * Whether a profile's engine can run a permission mode. The single source of
 * truth for the restriction: create forms filter what they offer with it, the
 * gateway rejects with it. An absent `engine` means 'claude' (every mode).
 */
 function supportsPermissionMode(engine, mode) {
-	return engine === "provider" ? PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES.includes(mode) : true;
+	return ENGINE_CAPABILITIES[engine ?? "claude"].permissionModes.includes(mode);
 }
 //#endregion
-export { PROTOCOL_VERSION, PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES, supportsPermissionMode };
+export { ENGINE_CAPABILITIES, PROTOCOL_VERSION, PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES, supportsPermissionMode };
 
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.mjs.map

package/build/index.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @workerdeck/protocol — the wire protocol between a workerdeck server and its clients.\n *\n * One session = one ordered stream of {@link SessionEvent}s (each stamped with a monotonically\n * increasing `seq`) plus a small command set ({@link SessionCommand}). Clients attach over\n * WebSocket, optionally replaying from a known `seq`, and drive the session with commands.\n *\n * This package is dependency-free and browser-safe. Anthropic API message content is modeled\n * structurally (see {@link ApiMessage}) so clients don't need the Agent SDK to render transcripts.\n */\n\n/** Bumped on any breaking change to events, commands, or REST shapes. */\nexport const PROTOCOL_VERSION = 4\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Session lifecycle\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * - `starting` — runner spawned, waiting for the SDK init handshake\n * - `running` — a turn is in progress\n * - `awaiting_approval` — blocked on at least one pending permission request\n * - `idle` — between turns; accepting user messages\n * - `parked` — waiting on a deferred tool execution. The live runner has been torn\n *   down and the session's state persisted; delivering the execution's result\n *   (`POST {basePath}/executions/:executionId/result`) rehydrates it under the same\n *   id and the run continues. Not terminal.\n * - `failed` — the underlying query errored; terminal\n * - `closed` — closed by a client or the host; terminal\n */\nexport type SessionStatus =\n  | 'starting'\n  | 'running'\n  | 'awaiting_approval'\n  | 'idle'\n  | 'parked'\n  | 'failed'\n  | 'closed'\n\nexport type PermissionMode =\n  | 'default'\n  | 'acceptEdits'\n  | 'bypassPermissions'\n  | 'plan'\n  | 'dontAsk'\n  | 'auto'\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// API message content (structural mirror of Anthropic message shapes)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport type TextBlock = { type: 'text'; text: string }\nexport type ThinkingBlock = { type: 'thinking'; thinking: string }\nexport type ToolUseBlock = { type: 'tool_use'; id: string; name: string; input: unknown }\nexport type ToolResultBlock = {\n  type: 'tool_result'\n  tool_use_id: string\n  content?: string | Array<{ type: string; text?: string; [key: string]: unknown }>\n  is_error?: boolean\n}\n/** Forward-compatible fallback for block types this protocol version doesn't model. */\nexport type UnknownBlock = { type: string; [key: string]: unknown }\n\nexport type ContentBlock = TextBlock | ThinkingBlock | ToolUseBlock | ToolResultBlock | UnknownBlock\n\nexport type ApiMessage = {\n  role: 'user' | 'assistant'\n  content: string | ContentBlock[]\n  model?: string\n  stop_reason?: string | null\n  /** Per-API-call token usage when the message carries it (assistant messages do).\n   * Enables mid-run token accounting; result-message usage stays authoritative. */\n  usage?: {\n    input_tokens?: number\n    output_tokens?: number\n    cache_creation_input_tokens?: number\n    cache_read_input_tokens?: number\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Permission requests\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** A tool call promoted into a pending approval by the runner's canUseTool hook. */\nexport type PermissionRequest = {\n  /** Server-assigned id; used by the `permission_decision` command. */\n  id: string\n  toolName: string\n  input: Record<string, unknown>\n  toolUseId: string\n  /** Full prompt sentence from the SDK, e.g. \"Claude wants to read foo.txt\". */\n  title?: string\n  /** Short noun phrase for the tool action, e.g. \"Read file\". */\n  displayName?: string\n  /** Human-readable subtitle, e.g. \"Claude will have read access to ~/x\". */\n  description?: string\n  /** Why this permission request was triggered. */\n  decisionReason?: string\n  /** If raised from within a subagent, that subagent's id. */\n  agentId?: string\n  /** Epoch ms after which the server resolves it via its timeout policy. */\n  expiresAt?: number\n}\n\nexport type PermissionDecisionSource = 'client' | 'timeout' | 'policy'\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// User questions (the AskUserQuestion tool)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** One choice of an AskUserQuestion question (SDK tool-input mirror). */\nexport type UserQuestionOption = {\n  label: string\n  description?: string\n  /** Optional preview content (markdown unless the session configures html)\n   * rendered when the option is focused. */\n  preview?: string\n}\n\n/** One question from the AskUserQuestion tool's input. By the tool's convention the\n * first option is the model's recommended choice. */\nexport type UserQuestion = {\n  question: string\n  /** Short chip/tag label (max ~12 chars), e.g. \"Auth method\". */\n  header: string\n  options: UserQuestionOption[]\n  multiSelect?: boolean\n}\n\n/** How a session treats the AskUserQuestion tool:\n * - 'ask' (default) — a pending permission like any other: interactive UIs render the\n *   question form; job webhooks carry the full request so a remote controller can\n *   answer over REST (POST /sessions/:id/permissions/:requestId).\n * - 'auto' — resolved immediately with each question's first (recommended) option.\n * - 'deny' — the tool is refused with guidance to decide autonomously (unattended runs).\n * Answers ride a permission allow as `updatedInput.answers`: question text → chosen\n * option label(s), multi-select labels comma-joined — the shape the CLI's own UI uses. */\nexport type QuestionBehavior = 'ask' | 'auto' | 'deny'\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Session capabilities (models / slash commands the CLI reports)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** A model the session can switch to (SDK ModelInfo mirror; fields it may grow stay unknown). */\nexport type ModelOption = {\n  /** Model id for createSession.model / set_model. */\n  value: string\n  displayName: string\n  description?: string\n}\n\n/** A slash command the CLI accepts as user-message text (SDK SlashCommand mirror). */\nexport type SlashCommandInfo = {\n  /** Command name without the leading slash. */\n  name: string\n  description?: string\n  /** Hint for arguments, e.g. \"<file>\". */\n  argumentHint?: string\n  /** Alternate names resolving to this command. */\n  aliases?: string[]\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Usage telemetry (context window + subscription rate limits)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** One category row from the CLI's context-usage breakdown (system prompt, tools, ...). */\nexport type ContextUsageCategory = {\n  name: string\n  tokens: number\n  /** Color the CLI assigns the category. Often a CLI theme token name ('inactive',\n   * 'promptBorder', ...), not a CSS color — validate before styling with it. */\n  color: string\n}\n\n/** Context-window usage snapshot (SDK getContextUsage mirror), polled after each turn. */\nexport type ContextUsage = {\n  categories: ContextUsageCategory[]\n  totalTokens: number\n  maxTokens: number\n  /** Used share of the window, 0–100. */\n  percentage: number\n  /** Model the window sizing applies to. */\n  model?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * One rate-limit window snapshot (SDK SDKRateLimitInfo mirror). Emitted only for\n * claude.ai subscription sessions — API-key sessions may never produce one, so\n * clients must render nothing (not 0%) until data arrives.\n */\nexport type RateLimitInfo = {\n  /** 'allowed' | 'allowed_warning' | 'rejected' — kept as string, the SDK union may grow. */\n  status: string\n  /** Which window: 'five_hour' (session), 'seven_day' (weekly), 'seven_day_opus',\n   * 'seven_day_sonnet', 'overage', ... — kept as string, the SDK union may grow. */\n  rateLimitType?: string\n  /** Used share of the window, 0–100. The CLI omits it on some updates — treat\n   * absent as unknown, not 0. */\n  utilization?: number\n  /** Epoch **seconds** when the window resets (render countdowns client-side). */\n  resetsAt?: number\n  isUsingOverage?: boolean\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Tool execution (bridged, deferred, and remote)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Lifecycle of one tool execution, correlated by `executionId` end to end.\n *\n * - `pending` — dispatched, result not in yet (bridged to a client, or queued).\n * - `deferred` — parked beyond this turn/process; may outlive the session's\n *   liveness and be applied on rehydration.\n * - `settled` / `failed` — terminal. Results are applied idempotently by id, so\n *   a duplicate delivery is a no-op rather than a second application.\n */\nexport type ToolExecutionStatus = 'pending' | 'deferred' | 'settled' | 'failed'\n\n/** Where a tool execution ran (or is running). Advisory: for display and routing. */\nexport type ToolExecutionBackend = 'server' | 'browser' | 'managed' | 'remote'\n\n/** Result payload of a tool execution, by value — never a live host reference. */\nexport type ToolExecutionOutput =\n  | { type: 'text'; value: string }\n  | { type: 'json'; value: unknown }\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Session events (server -> client)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport type SessionEventBody =\n  /** SDK init handshake: what this session actually is. */\n  | {\n      type: 'system_init'\n      sdkSessionId: string\n      model: string\n      cwd: string\n      /** Where the session's Anthropic auth came from: 'oauth' means a claude.ai\n       * subscription login; other values ('user' | 'project' | 'org' | 'temporary')\n       * are API-key provenance. Kept as string — the SDK union may grow. */\n      apiKeySource: string\n      tools: string[]\n      skills: string[]\n      slashCommands: string[]\n      permissionMode: PermissionMode\n      claudeCodeVersion: string\n      mcpServers: Array<{ name: string; status: string }>\n    }\n  | { type: 'status_changed'; status: SessionStatus; detail?: string }\n  /** Models and slash commands available to this session; fetched from the CLI after\n   * init. Late attachers get it via replay like any other event. */\n  | { type: 'capabilities'; models: ModelOption[]; commands: SlashCommandInfo[] }\n  /** The session's model changed via `set_model`. `model` undefined = back to default. */\n  | { type: 'model_changed'; model?: string }\n  /** The session's permission mode changed via `set_permission_mode`. */\n  | { type: 'permission_mode_changed'; mode: PermissionMode }\n  /** Context-window usage snapshot; the runner polls it after each turn. */\n  | { type: 'context_usage'; usage: ContextUsage }\n  /** Subscription rate-limit update for one window (see {@link RateLimitInfo}). */\n  | { type: 'rate_limit'; info: RateLimitInfo }\n  | {\n      type: 'assistant_message'\n      message: ApiMessage\n      /** Set when the message was produced inside a subagent (Task tool). */\n      parentToolUseId: string | null\n      /** True when backfilled from a resumed session's history. */\n      replay?: boolean\n      uuid: string\n    }\n  | {\n      type: 'user_message'\n      message: ApiMessage\n      parentToolUseId: string | null\n      /** True when replayed from a resumed session's history. */\n      replay?: boolean\n      /** True for tool results and other synthetic user-role messages. */\n      synthetic?: boolean\n      uuid?: string\n    }\n  /** Raw Anthropic streaming event (message_start/content_block_delta/...); emitted only\n   * when the session was created with `includePartialMessages`. */\n  | {\n      type: 'stream_delta'\n      event: { type: string; [key: string]: unknown }\n      parentToolUseId: string | null\n      uuid: string\n    }\n  | {\n      type: 'turn_result'\n      subtype:\n        | 'success'\n        | 'error_during_execution'\n        | 'error_max_turns'\n        | 'error_max_budget_usd'\n        | 'error_max_structured_output_retries'\n      isError: boolean\n      durationMs: number\n      numTurns: number\n      totalCostUsd: number\n      /** Final text of the turn (success only). */\n      result?: string\n      errors?: string[]\n      usage?: unknown\n    }\n  | { type: 'permission_requested'; request: PermissionRequest }\n  | {\n      type: 'permission_resolved'\n      requestId: string\n      behavior: 'allow' | 'deny'\n      resolvedBy: PermissionDecisionSource\n      /** Denial message, when denied. */\n      message?: string\n    }\n  /** A tool execution was dispatched to a backend. For bridged executions this\n   * precedes the `tool_call_request` frame; for deferred ones it is the record\n   * that survives a teardown. */\n  | {\n      type: 'execution_dispatched'\n      executionId: string\n      toolName: string\n      backend: ToolExecutionBackend\n      /** True when the execution may outlive this turn or process. */\n      deferred?: boolean\n      /** Epoch ms after which the server applies its timeout policy. */\n      expiresAt?: number\n    }\n  /** A dispatched execution produced a result. Applied idempotently by `executionId`. */\n  | {\n      type: 'execution_result'\n      executionId: string\n      output: ToolExecutionOutput\n      /** Guest/agent-visible logs, if the backend captured any. */\n      logs?: string[]\n      durationMs?: number\n    }\n  /** A dispatched execution failed, timed out, or was orphaned. The failure is fed\n   * back into the loop as tool output so the agent can adapt — it is not a session error. */\n  | {\n      type: 'execution_failed'\n      executionId: string\n      /** Machine-readable cause: 'timeout' | 'oom' | 'exception' | 'orphaned' | backend-specific. */\n      reason: string\n      error: string\n      logs?: string[]\n      durationMs?: number\n    }\n  /** The agent handed over a file from its session scratch filesystem (the\n   * `deliver_file` tool). Download it via `GET {basePath}/sessions/:id/files/<path>`\n   * for as long as the session lives (the VFS is in-memory). */\n  | { type: 'file_delivered'; path: string; bytes: number; description?: string }\n  /** Any SDKMessage this protocol version doesn't model first-class (task progress,\n   * compaction boundaries, auth status, ...). Payload is the raw SDK message. */\n  | { type: 'sdk_event'; payload: { type: string; [key: string]: unknown } }\n  | { type: 'session_error'; message: string }\n  | { type: 'session_closed'; reason: 'client' | 'server' | 'error' }\n\nexport type SessionEvent = SessionEventBody & {\n  /** Monotonic per-session sequence number, starting at 1. */\n  seq: number\n  /** Epoch ms when the server emitted the event. */\n  ts: number\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Commands (client -> server)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport type SessionCommand =\n  | { type: 'user_message'; text: string }\n  | {\n      type: 'permission_decision'\n      requestId: string\n      behavior: 'allow' | 'deny'\n      /** allow only: modified tool input to run instead of the original. */\n      updatedInput?: Record<string, unknown>\n      /** deny only: reason surfaced to the model. */\n      message?: string\n      /** deny only: also interrupt the running turn. */\n      interrupt?: boolean\n    }\n  | { type: 'interrupt' }\n  | { type: 'set_permission_mode'; mode: PermissionMode }\n  /** Switch the model for subsequent responses; omit `model` for the default. */\n  | { type: 'set_model'; model?: string }\n  /**\n   * Result of a tool execution the server bridged to this client (see\n   * {@link ToolCallRequestFrame}). Unknown or already-settled `executionId`s are\n   * ignored — delivery is idempotent, and a late result after a timeout must not\n   * re-open a settled call.\n   *\n   * Browser-returned results are UNTRUSTED input: acceptable for the user's own\n   * data, never a source for server-authoritative state.\n   */\n  | {\n      type: 'tool_call_result'\n      executionId: string\n      output: ToolExecutionOutput\n      logs?: string[]\n    }\n  /** The client could not execute a bridged call (unsupported tool, guest error,\n   * tab closing). Fed back to the agent as tool output. */\n  | {\n      type: 'tool_call_error'\n      executionId: string\n      reason: string\n      error: string\n      logs?: string[]\n    }\n  | { type: 'close' }\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WebSocket frames\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** First frame the server sends after a successful attach. */\nexport type AttachedFrame = {\n  type: 'attached'\n  protocolVersion: number\n  session: SessionInfo\n  /** Events with seq > the client's `afterSeq` follow as `event` frames. */\n  replayingFrom: number\n}\n\n/**\n * Ask the attached client to execute a tool call in its own sandbox (browser\n * bridge). The client answers with `tool_call_result` or `tool_call_error`\n * carrying the same `executionId`.\n *\n * Only sandbox-benefiting tools are ever bridged. Authenticated/authoritative\n * tools (MCP, secret-bearing APIs) execute server-side and never appear here.\n */\nexport type ToolCallRequestFrame = {\n  type: 'tool_call_request'\n  executionId: string\n  toolName: string\n  input: unknown\n  /** Files to seed the client's scratch VFS with, path → contents. */\n  vfsSeed?: Record<string, string>\n  limits?: { timeoutMs?: number; memoryLimitBytes?: number }\n  /** Epoch ms after which the server gives up and fails the execution. */\n  expiresAt?: number\n}\n\nexport type ServerFrame =\n  | AttachedFrame\n  | { type: 'event'; event: SessionEvent }\n  | ToolCallRequestFrame\n  /** A bridged execution no longer needs an answer (turn interrupted, timed out,\n   * or the session closed) — the client should abandon it. */\n  | { type: 'tool_call_canceled'; executionId: string; reason: string }\n  | { type: 'protocol_error'; message: string }\n\nexport type ClientFrame = SessionCommand\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Profiles (named Claude Code config directories)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Per-profile fallbacks filled into session/job requests that leave the field\n * unset. Defaults, not enforced caps — an explicit request value always wins. */\nexport type ProfileDefaults = {\n  model?: string\n  permissionMode?: PermissionMode\n}\n\n/**\n * A named Claude Code config directory sessions can run under: the session's CLI\n * process gets it as CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, so the profile carries that directory's\n * settings, memory, skills, and whatever credentials the SDK/CLI resolves from it.\n * Profiles are declared in server options at startup (or a 'default' one is\n * auto-created from the operator's own config dir) — the API only reads them.\n */\n/**\n * Which engine a profile runs on.\n * - `claude` (default) — Claude Code via the Agent SDK, configured by a config dir.\n * - `provider` — a model-agnostic provider (OpenAI-compatible, Anthropic, Moonshot),\n *   configured by provider id and credentials from the operator's environment.\n */\nexport type ProfileEngine = 'claude' | 'provider'\n\n/**\n * Permission modes the model-agnostic provider engine understands. The rest of\n * {@link PermissionMode}'s vocabulary is Claude Code's: `acceptEdits`, `plan` and\n * `auto` name CLI-side behaviours a provider session has no equivalent of.\n */\nexport const PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES: readonly PermissionMode[] = [\n  'default',\n  'bypassPermissions',\n  'dontAsk',\n]\n\n/**\n * Whether a profile's engine can run a permission mode. The single source of\n * truth for the restriction: create forms filter what they offer with it, the\n * gateway rejects with it. An absent `engine` means 'claude' (every mode).\n */\nexport function supportsPermissionMode(\n  engine: ProfileEngine | undefined,\n  mode: PermissionMode,\n): boolean {\n  return engine === 'provider' ? PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES.includes(mode) : true\n}\n\n/**\n * A model provider a `provider` profile can run on. Credentials are ALWAYS\n * resolved from the operator's environment — never carried on the wire, never\n * stored here. `apiKeyEnv` names the variable to read, it does not hold a key.\n */\nexport type ProviderConfig = {\n  /** Provider adapter to use, e.g. 'anthropic' | 'openai' | 'moonshotai' |\n   * 'openai-compatible'. Kept as a string: the set is host-extensible. */\n  id: string\n  /** Default model id, e.g. 'kimi-k3'. Overridable per session. */\n  model?: string\n  /** Model ids this profile offers, for the dashboard's picker. Operator-declared\n   * rather than discovered: provider engines have no equivalent of the CLI's\n   * `supportedModels()`, and only the operator knows which ids their endpoint and\n   * key actually serve. Unset → the picker offers {@link ProviderConfig.model} alone. */\n  models?: string[]\n  /** Base URL for OpenAI-compatible providers. */\n  baseUrl?: string\n  /** Environment variable the operator put the key in. Never the key itself. */\n  apiKeyEnv?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * A grantable capability of the model-agnostic engine, named after the tool it\n * yields. The always-present tools (`fs_*`, `eval_script`) are not listed: they\n * are the engine's scratch filesystem and sandbox, not a grant.\n */\nexport type SessionCapability = 'web_search' | 'download' | 'web_fetch' | 'deliver_file'\n\n/**\n * What sessions under a `provider` profile get, declared by the operator. Meaning-\n * less for `claude` profiles, whose equivalents live in the config directory.\n *\n * MCP servers are named, never configured, here: a server's transport config can\n * carry credentials in its headers, and this type is served by `GET /profiles`.\n * The names refer to servers the host connected in `createEngineRunner`, which is\n * where the configs (and the credentials) stay.\n */\nexport type ProfileSessionDefaults = {\n  /** Capabilities granted to sessions under this profile. Absent = no\n   * declaration, so a session gets whatever backends the host wired. A session\n   * request may narrow this set, never widen it. */\n  capabilities?: SessionCapability[]\n  /** MCP servers, by name, whose tools sessions under this profile may use.\n   * Absent = no declaration (every server the host connected). */\n  mcpServers?: string[]\n  /** Prepended to the session's system prompt. */\n  instructions?: string\n}\n\nexport type ProfileInfo = {\n  /** Unique name, used as {@link CreateSessionRequest.profile}. */\n  name: string\n  /** Engine this profile runs on. Defaults to 'claude' when absent, so profiles\n   * written before provider support keep working unchanged. */\n  engine?: ProfileEngine\n  /** Absolute path set as CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR for the session's CLI process.\n   * Required for 'claude' profiles; meaningless for 'provider' ones. */\n  configDir?: string\n  /** Provider wiring for 'provider' profiles. */\n  provider?: ProviderConfig\n  description?: string\n  defaults?: ProfileDefaults\n  /** Provider-engine session grants (capabilities, MCP servers, instructions). */\n  session?: ProfileSessionDefaults\n  /** Response-only, computed by the server: this profile came from the profile\n   * store and can be edited or deleted through the API. Profiles declared in\n   * server options are absent/false — they are code. Ignored on the way in. */\n  managed?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Curated, read-only snapshot of what a profile's config directory contains —\n * the parts relevant to running worker sessions. Values that could carry secrets\n * (env var values) never leave the server; only names are listed.\n */\nexport type ProfileConfigSnapshot = {\n  /** From the config dir's settings.json; absent when missing or unparseable. */\n  settings?: {\n    /** Configured default model. */\n    model?: string\n    /** permissions.defaultMode — the CLI's default permission mode. */\n    defaultPermissionMode?: string\n    /** Rule counts from permissions.allow / ask / deny. */\n    permissionRules?: { allow: number; ask: number; deny: number }\n    /** Env var NAMES declared in settings.json env (values never included). */\n    envKeys?: string[]\n    /** Hook event names with at least one hook configured. */\n    hooks?: string[]\n  }\n  /** CLAUDE.md (user memory) present in the config dir. */\n  hasUserMemory: boolean\n  /** Skill names (skills/<name>/). */\n  skills: string[]\n  /** Agent names (agents/<name>.md). */\n  agents: string[]\n  /** Custom slash-command names (commands/<name>.md). */\n  commands: string[]\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// REST shapes\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport type McpServerConfigWire =\n  | { type?: 'stdio'; command: string; args?: string[]; env?: Record<string, string> }\n  | { type: 'http'; url: string; headers?: Record<string, string> }\n  | { type: 'sse'; url: string; headers?: Record<string, string> }\n\nexport type CreateSessionRequest = {\n  /** Directory the session is rooted at. Required: `cwd` is per-query in the SDK\n   * and the server re-pins it on every call. */\n  cwd: string\n  /** Profile (named Claude Code config dir) to run under. Required when the server\n   * declares more than one profile; implicit when exactly one exists. */\n  profile?: string\n  /** Optional initial prompt (may be a skill invocation like \"/verify-content 123\"). */\n  prompt?: string\n  permissionMode?: PermissionMode\n  /** Pre-authorize 'bypassPermissions' (the CLI's --dangerously-skip-permissions\n   * capability) so the mode can be switched on mid-session. Without it the CLI\n   * rejects `set_permission_mode: 'bypassPermissions'` on a running session.\n   * Implied when `permissionMode` is already 'bypassPermissions'. */\n  allowDangerouslySkipPermissions?: boolean\n  allowedTools?: string[]\n  disallowedTools?: string[]\n  mcpServers?: Record<string, McpServerConfigWire>\n  /** Which filesystem settings the session loads. Include 'project' to pick up the\n   * target repo's skills and CLAUDE.md (\"close-to-real\" fidelity). */\n  settingSources?: Array<'user' | 'project' | 'local'>\n  model?: string\n  maxTurns?: number\n  maxBudgetUsd?: number\n  /** Resume an existing SDK session by id. */\n  resume?: string\n  /** With `resume`: fork to a new session id instead of continuing. */\n  forkSession?: boolean\n  /** Emit `stream_delta` events for token-by-token rendering. Default true. */\n  includePartialMessages?: boolean\n  /** Per-session override of the server's permission-request timeout (ms). */\n  approvalTimeoutMs?: number\n  /** AskUserQuestion handling (see {@link QuestionBehavior}). Default 'ask'. */\n  questionBehavior?: QuestionBehavior\n  /** Provider engine only: run with fewer capabilities than the profile grants\n   * (see {@link ProfileSessionDefaults.capabilities}). Narrowing only — naming a\n   * capability the profile does not grant is a 400, not a silent upgrade. */\n  capabilities?: SessionCapability[]\n  /** Free-form metadata echoed back on SessionInfo (host app bookkeeping). */\n  meta?: Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\nexport type SessionInfo = {\n  /** Server-assigned id (stable across SDK session forks/resumes). */\n  id: string\n  /** Underlying Agent SDK session id, once known; use for `resume`. */\n  sdkSessionId?: string\n  status: SessionStatus\n  cwd: string\n  /** Profile the session runs under (resolved name, present even when implicit). */\n  profile?: string\n  /** Engine actually running this session, reported by the runner itself. Lets a\n   * session surface gate CLI-only affordances (permission modes, context usage,\n   * rate limits) without looking the profile back up. Absent = 'claude'. */\n  engine?: ProfileEngine\n  model?: string\n  permissionMode?: PermissionMode\n  /** See the `system_init` event; 'oauth' = claude.ai subscription credentials. */\n  apiKeySource?: string\n  createdAt: number\n  /** Highest event seq emitted so far; attach with `afterSeq` to catch up. */\n  lastSeq: number\n  pendingPermissionCount: number\n  meta?: Record<string, unknown>\n  /** Display title: `meta.title` if the host set one, else derived (e.g. first prompt). */\n  title?: string\n  /** Cumulative cost across all turns so far (sum of turn_result totals). */\n  totalCostUsd?: number\n  /** Cumulative turn count across the session. */\n  numTurns?: number\n  /** Epoch ms of the most recent emitted event. */\n  lastActivityAt?: number\n}\n\n/**\n * A session in the Agent SDK's on-disk store (independent of this server's registry).\n * Listed so hosts can offer \"resume\" across server restarts: feed `sessionId` to\n * CreateSessionRequest.resume. Mirrors the SDK's SDKSessionInfo, kept browser-safe.\n */\nexport type SdkSessionSummary = {\n  sessionId: string\n  /** Custom title, auto summary, or first prompt — whichever the SDK has. */\n  summary: string\n  /** Epoch ms of last modification. */\n  lastModified: number\n  createdAt?: number\n  customTitle?: string\n  firstPrompt?: string\n  gitBranch?: string\n  cwd?: string\n}\n\n/** One deliverable in the session's scratch filesystem (see the `file_delivered` event). */\nexport type SessionFileInfo = { path: string; bytes: number }\n/** `GET {basePath}/sessions/:id/files` — every file currently in the session's VFS.\n * `GET {basePath}/sessions/:id/files/<path>` downloads one (attachment disposition).\n * 404 when the session's engine exposes no VFS (Claude-engine sessions). */\nexport type ListSessionFilesResponse = { files: SessionFileInfo[] }\nexport type ListSessionsResponse = { sessions: SessionInfo[] }\nexport type CreateSessionResponse = { session: SessionInfo }\nexport type GetSessionResponse = { session: SessionInfo }\n\n/** Body of `POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/permissions/:requestId` — the REST counterpart\n * of the WS `permission_decision` command, for remote controllers without a socket\n * (e.g. answering a job's AskUserQuestion from a webhook consumer). 404 = the request\n * is unknown, already resolved, or expired. */\nexport type ResolvePermissionRequest =\n  | { behavior: 'allow'; updatedInput?: Record<string, unknown> }\n  | { behavior: 'deny'; message?: string; interrupt?: boolean }\nexport type ResolvePermissionResponse = { resolved: true }\n\n/**\n * Body of `POST {basePath}/executions/:executionId/result` — the way a deferred\n * executor (a remote worker, a batch job, a human) delivers the outcome of an\n * execution the session parked on. The session is rehydrated if its runner was\n * torn down, and the result is folded back into the agent loop; a `failed` result\n * is ordinary tool output the agent adapts to, not a session error.\n *\n * Applied **idempotently by `executionId`**: a duplicate or late delivery (one\n * racing the execution watchdog) answers 200 with `applied: false` rather than\n * erroring or applying twice. 404 means no session is parked on that id.\n */\nexport type SubmitExecutionResultRequest =\n  | { status: 'ok'; output: ToolExecutionOutput; logs?: string[] }\n  | { status: 'failed'; reason: string; error: string; logs?: string[] }\nexport type SubmitExecutionResultResponse = {\n  /** False when the id was already settled — the delivery was a no-op. */\n  applied: boolean\n  /** Session the execution belonged to. */\n  sessionId: string\n}\n\nexport type ListSdkSessionsResponse = { sdkSessions: SdkSessionSummary[] }\n/** `GET {basePath}/profiles` — filtered to the profiles the caller may use. */\nexport type ListProfilesResponse = {\n  profiles: ProfileInfo[]\n  /** Whether this caller may create profiles here — true only when the server has\n   * a profile store AND the principal carries `canManageProfiles`. Lets a UI hide\n   * controls that would always be refused. */\n  canManage?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * `POST {basePath}/profiles` — create a managed profile. Available only when the\n * server was given a profile store, and only to a principal with\n * `canManageProfiles`. Profiles declared in server options are code, not data:\n * they cannot be created, edited, or deleted through these routes.\n */\nexport type CreateProfileRequest = ProfileInfo\n\n/** `PATCH {basePath}/profiles/:name` — merge into a managed profile. The name is\n * the route, not the body; pass `null` to clear an optional field. */\nexport type UpdateProfileRequest = Omit<Partial<ProfileInfo>, 'name'>\n\nexport type SaveProfileResponse = { profile: ProfileInfo }\n/** `GET {basePath}/profiles/:name` — the profile plus a fresh config snapshot. */\nexport type GetProfileResponse = { profile: ProfileInfo; config: ProfileConfigSnapshot }\nexport type ErrorResponse = { error: string }\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Session notifications (the out-of-band \"something wants you\" channel)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * The moments in an *interactive* session a person needs to hear about when they\n * are not watching it — the whole point being that a phone cannot hold a\n * WebSocket open in the background, so the server has to reach out.\n *\n * Deliberately four: this is a human-attention channel, not an event mirror. The\n * event log stays on the session WS (attach with `afterSeq` to catch up); if you\n * want every assistant message, subscribe there instead.\n */\nexport type SessionNotificationType =\n  /** The agent is blocked on an approval — the one that matters most. */\n  | 'permission_requested'\n  /** A turn finished; the session is idle and waiting for the human. */\n  | 'turn_completed'\n  /** The session failed (`session_error`). */\n  | 'session_error'\n  /** The session ended (`session_closed`), whoever ended it. */\n  | 'session_closed'\n\n/** One delivery on the session-notification channel (JSON body of a webhook POST). */\nexport type SessionNotification = {\n  type: SessionNotificationType\n  sessionId: string\n  /** Snapshot at notification time — status, title, cwd, cost, `lastSeq`. */\n  session: SessionInfo\n  /** Seq of the event behind this notification; attach with `afterSeq: seq - 1` to\n   * land on it. */\n  seq: number\n  ts: number\n  /** One line fit for a notification body: the permission title, the turn's final\n   * text, the error message. */\n  preview?: string\n  /** `permission_requested` only: the full request, so a consumer can answer it via\n   * `POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/permissions/:requestId` — which is what makes an\n   * Approve/Deny action on a lock-screen notification possible. */\n  request?: PermissionRequest\n  /** `turn_completed` only. */\n  result?: { isError: boolean; durationMs: number; numTurns: number; totalCostUsd: number }\n  /** `session_closed` only. */\n  reason?: 'client' | 'server' | 'error'\n}\n\n/** Where session notifications are POSTed (JSON body = {@link SessionNotification}).\n * Server-wide, not per session: the point is to hear about sessions you did not\n * create yourself and are not attached to. */\nexport type SessionWebhookConfig = {\n  url: string\n  /** Extra headers sent with every delivery (auth tokens etc.). */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n  /** Types to deliver. Default: all of them. */\n  events?: SessionNotificationType[]\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Job queue (one-shot scheduled runs over the session runner)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * - `queued` — accepted, waiting for a concurrency slot (or the daily token budget)\n * - `running` — a session is executing the prompt\n * - `parked` — waiting on an external event (a deferred tool execution). Not\n *   terminal and not consuming a concurrency slot; resumes to `running` when the\n *   result arrives, or fails via the execution watchdog if it never does.\n * - `succeeded` / `failed` — terminal; `result` (and `error` on failure) are set\n * - `canceled` — terminal; canceled by a client before or during the run\n */\nexport type JobStatus = 'queued' | 'running' | 'parked' | 'succeeded' | 'failed' | 'canceled'\n\n/** Where job progress/completion deliveries are POSTed (JSON body = {@link JobEvent}). */\nexport type WebhookConfig = {\n  url: string\n  /** Extra headers sent with every delivery (auth tokens etc.). */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n  /** Delivery granularity: 'messages' also POSTs job_progress per assistant message /\n   * permission request; 'completion' only job_started + job_completed. Default 'messages'. */\n  progress?: 'messages' | 'completion'\n}\n\n/**\n * Schedule a one-shot run: the session executes `prompt` unattended and the job\n * completes with that run's result. `session.prompt` is the task and is required;\n * `resume`/`forkSession` are not supported for queued jobs.\n */\nexport type CreateJobRequest = {\n  session: CreateSessionRequest & { prompt: string }\n  webhook?: WebhookConfig\n  /** Per-job token cap; the effective cap is min(this, the server's sessionTokenLimit). */\n  maxTokens?: number\n  /** Per-job wall-clock cap; the effective cap is min(this, the server's maxJobDurationMs). */\n  maxDurationMs?: number\n  /** Total run attempts: failed (not canceled) runs re-queue until this many attempts\n   * have been made. Default 1 (no retries). */\n  attempts?: number\n  /** Delay before the first retry, doubled for each subsequent one. Default 5000. */\n  retryDelayMs?: number\n  /** Host bookkeeping echoed back on JobInfo. */\n  meta?: Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/** Cumulative resource usage of a job's run. `tokens` counts input + output +\n * cache-creation + cache-read tokens across all turns. */\nexport type JobUsage = {\n  tokens: number\n  totalCostUsd: number\n  numTurns: number\n}\n\n/** Terminal outcome of the job's run (mirrors the final turn_result). */\nexport type JobResult = {\n  subtype: string\n  isError: boolean\n  /** Final text of the run (success only). */\n  result?: string\n  errors?: string[]\n  durationMs: number\n}\n\nexport type JobInfo = {\n  id: string\n  status: JobStatus\n  cwd: string\n  /** Profile the run executes under (resolved name, present even when implicit). */\n  profile?: string\n  prompt: string\n  /** Server session id once started — attach via the sessions WS to watch the run live. */\n  sessionId?: string\n  sdkSessionId?: string\n  createdAt: number\n  startedAt?: number\n  finishedAt?: number\n  /** 1-based run attempt this info reflects. */\n  attempt?: number\n  /** Total attempts configured on the request (see CreateJobRequest.attempts). */\n  maxAttempts?: number\n  /** For a job re-queued by retry backoff: earliest time the next attempt may start. */\n  nextRunAt?: number\n  /** Set while `status` is 'parked': when the run parked, and the execution it is\n   * waiting on — the id to POST a result to. Cleared when it resumes. */\n  parkedAt?: number\n  parkedExecutionId?: string\n  /** Cumulative across attempts. */\n  usage: JobUsage\n  result?: JobResult\n  /** Failure or cancellation reason (for a queued retry: the previous attempt's error). */\n  error?: string\n  meta?: Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/** Latest mid-run activity, carried on job_progress deliveries. */\nexport type JobProgress = {\n  kind: 'assistant_text' | 'tool_use' | 'permission_requested' | 'permission_resolved'\n  /** Short human-readable preview (message excerpt, tool name, permission title). */\n  preview?: string\n  /** 'permission_requested' only: the full request (including AskUserQuestion input) so\n   * webhook consumers can answer via POST /sessions/:sessionId/permissions/:requestId. */\n  request?: PermissionRequest\n}\n\n/** Webhook delivery payload (also the queue's local event shape). `job_submitted` goes\n * to local observers and the queue WS only — the submitter already has the POST\n * response, so webhooks start at `job_started`. `job_retrying` marks a failed run that\n * was re-queued (`job.nextRunAt` says when); `job_completed` is always terminal. */\nexport type JobEvent =\n  | { type: 'job_submitted'; job: JobInfo; ts: number }\n  | { type: 'job_started'; job: JobInfo; ts: number }\n  | { type: 'job_progress'; job: JobInfo; progress: JobProgress; ts: number }\n  /** The run parked on a deferred execution; `executionId` says what it waits on —\n   * the id to POST a result to. The *work itself* (tool name, input, VFS seed) went\n   * to the executor's own dispatch hook, not over this channel: a webhook consumer\n   * learns that a run is waiting, the worker learns what to do. */\n  | { type: 'job_parked'; job: JobInfo; executionId: string; ts: number }\n  /** A parked run resumed because its execution result arrived. */\n  | { type: 'job_resumed'; job: JobInfo; executionId: string; ts: number }\n  | { type: 'job_retrying'; job: JobInfo; ts: number }\n  | { type: 'job_completed'; job: JobInfo; ts: number }\n\nexport type QueueStats = {\n  maxConcurrency: number\n  running: number\n  queued: number\n  /** Jobs waiting on a deferred execution. They hold no concurrency slot and\n   * their wall-clock budget is not ticking. */\n  parked: number\n  sessionTokenLimit?: number\n  dailyTokenLimit?: number\n  /** Tokens consumed by queue jobs in the current UTC day. */\n  dailyTokensUsed: number\n  /** True when the daily budget is exhausted and queued jobs are being held. */\n  paused: boolean\n}\n\n/** Frames sent on the queue WS (`{basePath}/queue/ws`). The stream is one-way\n * (server→client): every job's lifecycle as it happens, plus refreshed stats after\n * lifecycle changes. Clients send nothing; job mutations stay on REST. */\nexport type QueueServerFrame =\n  | { type: 'queue_attached'; protocolVersion: number; stats: QueueStats }\n  | { type: 'job_event'; event: JobEvent }\n  | { type: 'queue_stats'; stats: QueueStats }\n\nexport type CreateJobResponse = { job: JobInfo }\nexport type GetJobResponse = { job: JobInfo }\nexport type ListJobsResponse = { jobs: JobInfo[] }\nexport type QueueStatsResponse = { stats: QueueStats }\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;AAYA,MAAa,mBAAmB;;;;;;AA4dhC,MAAa,4BAAuD;CAClE;CACA;CACA;CACD;;;;;;AAOD,SAAgB,uBACd,QACA,MACS;AACT,QAAO,WAAW,aAAa,0BAA0B,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @workerdeck/protocol — the wire protocol between a workerdeck server and its clients.\n *\n * One session = one ordered stream of {@link SessionEvent}s (each stamped with a monotonically\n * increasing `seq`) plus a small command set ({@link SessionCommand}). Clients attach over\n * WebSocket, optionally replaying from a known `seq`, and drive the session with commands.\n *\n * This package is dependency-free and browser-safe. Anthropic API message content is modeled\n * structurally (see {@link ApiMessage}) so clients don't need the Agent SDK to render transcripts.\n */\n\n/** Bumped on any breaking change to events, commands, or REST shapes. */\nexport const PROTOCOL_VERSION = 6\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Session lifecycle\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * - `starting` — runner spawned, waiting for the SDK init handshake\n * - `running` — a turn is in progress\n * - `awaiting_approval` — blocked on at least one pending permission request\n * - `idle` — between turns; accepting user messages\n * - `parked` — waiting on a deferred tool execution. The live runner has been torn\n *   down and the session's state persisted; delivering the execution's result\n *   (`POST {basePath}/executions/:executionId/result`) rehydrates it under the same\n *   id and the run continues. Not terminal.\n * - `failed` — the underlying query errored; terminal\n * - `closed` — closed by a client or the host; terminal\n */\nexport type SessionStatus =\n  | 'starting'\n  | 'running'\n  | 'awaiting_approval'\n  | 'idle'\n  | 'parked'\n  | 'failed'\n  | 'closed'\n\nexport type PermissionMode =\n  | 'default'\n  | 'acceptEdits'\n  | 'bypassPermissions'\n  | 'plan'\n  | 'dontAsk'\n  | 'auto'\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// API message content (structural mirror of Anthropic message shapes)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport type TextBlock = { type: 'text'; text: string }\nexport type ThinkingBlock = { type: 'thinking'; thinking: string }\nexport type ToolUseBlock = { type: 'tool_use'; id: string; name: string; input: unknown }\nexport type ToolResultBlock = {\n  type: 'tool_result'\n  tool_use_id: string\n  content?: string | Array<{ type: string; text?: string; [key: string]: unknown }>\n  is_error?: boolean\n}\n/** Forward-compatible fallback for block types this protocol version doesn't model. */\nexport type UnknownBlock = { type: string; [key: string]: unknown }\n\nexport type ContentBlock = TextBlock | ThinkingBlock | ToolUseBlock | ToolResultBlock | UnknownBlock\n\n/**\n * A file the user attached to a message — a photo, a screenshot, a document.\n *\n * The bytes never travel on this protocol. An attachment is uploaded first\n * (`POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/attachments`), and the command that sends the\n * message names it by id; what lands in the seq-numbered event log is this\n * reference. That is deliberate: the log is replayed to every attaching client\n * and captured into parking snapshots, so a few phone photos inlined as base64\n * would be paid for on every attach, forever. Clients render a thumbnail by\n * fetching `GET {basePath}/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId`.\n *\n * Lifetime is the session's, like `/files` — the store is in-memory and an\n * attachment 404s after a server restart. The message itself is unaffected: the\n * model saw the bytes at send time.\n */\nexport type MessageAttachment = {\n  /** Server-assigned; the path segment of the download URL. */\n  id: string\n  /** Display name from the file the user picked. A leaf name, never a path. */\n  name: string\n  /** IANA media type, e.g. 'image/jpeg'. The server decides how it reaches the\n   * model (image block, document block, or inlined text) from this. */\n  mediaType: string\n  bytes: number\n}\n\nexport type ApiMessage = {\n  role: 'user' | 'assistant'\n  content: string | ContentBlock[]\n  model?: string\n  stop_reason?: string | null\n  /** Per-API-call token usage when the message carries it (assistant messages do).\n   * Enables mid-run token accounting; result-message usage stays authoritative. */\n  usage?: {\n    input_tokens?: number\n    output_tokens?: number\n    cache_creation_input_tokens?: number\n    cache_read_input_tokens?: number\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Permission requests\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** A tool call promoted into a pending approval by the runner's canUseTool hook\n * (Claude), or an engine ask-channel request surfaced by its runner (codex).\n * The two do not share a tense: Claude asks BEFORE a tool runs; codex's command\n * approval is usually an escalation AFTER its sandbox already ran and refused\n * the command (\"command failed; retry without sandbox?\"). The runner authors\n * `title`/`description`/`decisionReason` to say which — clients should render\n * those fields rather than composing their own \"X wants to run Y\" sentence. */\nexport type PermissionRequest = {\n  /** Server-assigned id; used by the `permission_decision` command. */\n  id: string\n  toolName: string\n  input: Record<string, unknown>\n  toolUseId: string\n  /** Full prompt sentence from the SDK, e.g. \"Claude wants to read foo.txt\". */\n  title?: string\n  /** Short noun phrase for the tool action, e.g. \"Read file\". */\n  displayName?: string\n  /** Human-readable subtitle, e.g. \"Claude will have read access to ~/x\". */\n  description?: string\n  /** Why this permission request was triggered. */\n  decisionReason?: string\n  /** If raised from within a subagent, that subagent's id. */\n  agentId?: string\n  /** Epoch ms after which the server resolves it via its timeout policy. */\n  expiresAt?: number\n}\n\nexport type PermissionDecisionSource = 'client' | 'timeout' | 'policy'\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// User questions (the AskUserQuestion tool)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** One choice of an AskUserQuestion question (SDK tool-input mirror). */\nexport type UserQuestionOption = {\n  label: string\n  description?: string\n  /** Optional preview content (markdown unless the session configures html)\n   * rendered when the option is focused. */\n  preview?: string\n}\n\n/** One question from the AskUserQuestion tool's input. By the tool's convention the\n * first option is the model's recommended choice. */\nexport type UserQuestion = {\n  question: string\n  /** Short chip/tag label (max ~12 chars), e.g. \"Auth method\". */\n  header: string\n  options: UserQuestionOption[]\n  multiSelect?: boolean\n}\n\n/** How a session treats the AskUserQuestion tool:\n * - 'ask' (default) — a pending permission like any other: interactive UIs render the\n *   question form; job webhooks carry the full request so a remote controller can\n *   answer over REST (POST /sessions/:id/permissions/:requestId).\n * - 'auto' — resolved immediately with each question's first (recommended) option.\n * - 'deny' — the tool is refused with guidance to decide autonomously (unattended runs).\n * Answers ride a permission allow as `updatedInput.answers`: question text → chosen\n * option label(s), multi-select labels comma-joined — the shape the CLI's own UI uses. */\nexport type QuestionBehavior = 'ask' | 'auto' | 'deny'\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Session capabilities (models / slash commands the CLI reports)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** A model the session can switch to (SDK ModelInfo mirror; fields it may grow stay unknown). */\nexport type ModelOption = {\n  /** Model id for createSession.model / set_model. */\n  value: string\n  /** Wire model id this row resolves to ('sonnet' → 'claude-sonnet-5'). What a\n   * session actually reports as its model is the resolved form, so this is how a\n   * client matches the running model back to the row that names it. */\n  resolvedModel?: string\n  displayName: string\n  description?: string\n  /** Whether this belongs in a picker's main list rather than behind a \"more\n   * models\" step: the newest model of each family. Derived server-side — the CLI\n   * reports one flat list — so that every client groups it the same way. */\n  primary?: boolean\n  /** Reasoning efforts this model supports at create time (codex catalogs carry\n   * them, from the binary's own per-model list). Absent = the engine's default\n   * set ({@link EngineCapabilities.reasoningEfforts}) applies. Open strings —\n   * the binary's vocabulary outruns its SDK's union. */\n  reasoningEfforts?: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/** A slash command the CLI accepts as user-message text (SDK SlashCommand mirror). */\nexport type SlashCommandInfo = {\n  /** Command name without the leading slash. */\n  name: string\n  description?: string\n  /** Hint for arguments, e.g. \"<file>\". */\n  argumentHint?: string\n  /** Alternate names resolving to this command. */\n  aliases?: string[]\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Usage telemetry (context window + subscription rate limits)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** One category row from the CLI's context-usage breakdown (system prompt, tools, ...). */\nexport type ContextUsageCategory = {\n  name: string\n  tokens: number\n  /** Color the CLI assigns the category. Often a CLI theme token name ('inactive',\n   * 'promptBorder', ...), not a CSS color — validate before styling with it. */\n  color: string\n}\n\n/** Context-window usage snapshot (SDK getContextUsage mirror), polled after each turn. */\nexport type ContextUsage = {\n  categories: ContextUsageCategory[]\n  totalTokens: number\n  maxTokens: number\n  /** Used share of the window, 0–100. */\n  percentage: number\n  /** Model the window sizing applies to. */\n  model?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * One rate-limit window snapshot (SDK SDKRateLimitInfo mirror). Emitted only for\n * claude.ai subscription sessions — API-key sessions may never produce one, so\n * clients must render nothing (not 0%) until data arrives.\n */\nexport type RateLimitInfo = {\n  /** 'allowed' | 'allowed_warning' | 'rejected' — kept as string, the SDK union may grow. */\n  status: string\n  /** Which window: 'five_hour' (session), 'seven_day' (weekly), 'seven_day_opus',\n   * 'seven_day_sonnet', 'overage', ... — kept as string, the SDK union may grow. */\n  rateLimitType?: string\n  /** Used share of the window, 0–100. The CLI omits it on some updates — treat\n   * absent as unknown, not 0. */\n  utilization?: number\n  /** Epoch **seconds** when the window resets (render countdowns client-side). */\n  resetsAt?: number\n  isUsingOverage?: boolean\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Tool execution (bridged, deferred, and remote)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Lifecycle of one tool execution, correlated by `executionId` end to end.\n *\n * - `pending` — dispatched, result not in yet (bridged to a client, or queued).\n * - `deferred` — parked beyond this turn/process; may outlive the session's\n *   liveness and be applied on rehydration.\n * - `settled` / `failed` — terminal. Results are applied idempotently by id, so\n *   a duplicate delivery is a no-op rather than a second application.\n */\nexport type ToolExecutionStatus = 'pending' | 'deferred' | 'settled' | 'failed'\n\n/** Where a tool execution ran (or is running). Advisory: for display and routing. */\nexport type ToolExecutionBackend = 'server' | 'browser' | 'managed' | 'remote'\n\n/** Result payload of a tool execution, by value — never a live host reference. */\nexport type ToolExecutionOutput =\n  | { type: 'text'; value: string }\n  | { type: 'json'; value: unknown }\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Session events (server -> client)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport type SessionEventBody =\n  /** SDK init handshake: what this session actually is. */\n  | {\n      type: 'system_init'\n      sdkSessionId: string\n      model: string\n      cwd: string\n      /** Where the session's Anthropic auth came from: 'oauth' means a claude.ai\n       * subscription login; other values ('user' | 'project' | 'org' | 'temporary')\n       * are API-key provenance. Kept as string — the SDK union may grow. */\n      apiKeySource: string\n      tools: string[]\n      skills: string[]\n      slashCommands: string[]\n      permissionMode: PermissionMode\n      claudeCodeVersion: string\n      mcpServers: Array<{ name: string; status: string }>\n    }\n  | { type: 'status_changed'; status: SessionStatus; detail?: string }\n  /** Models and slash commands available to this session; fetched from the CLI after\n   * init. Late attachers get it via replay like any other event. */\n  | {\n      type: 'capabilities'\n      models: ModelOption[]\n      commands: SlashCommandInfo[]\n      /** Wire id the session's *default* resolves to, from the CLI's own `default`\n       * row. Answers \"what will this session answer as\" before it has answered\n       * anything — `system_init` carries the model, but a promptless session gets\n       * no `system_init` until its first message. */\n      defaultModel?: string\n    }\n  /** The session's model changed via `set_model`. `model` undefined = back to default. */\n  | { type: 'model_changed'; model?: string }\n  /** The session's permission mode changed via `set_permission_mode`. */\n  | { type: 'permission_mode_changed'; mode: PermissionMode }\n  /** Context-window usage snapshot; the runner polls it after each turn. */\n  | { type: 'context_usage'; usage: ContextUsage }\n  /** Subscription rate-limit update for one window (see {@link RateLimitInfo}). */\n  | { type: 'rate_limit'; info: RateLimitInfo }\n  /** Which claude.ai plan the rate-limit windows belong to: 'pro' | 'max' | 'team' |\n   * 'enterprise' — kept as string, the set may grow. Emitted from the same poll as\n   * `rate_limit`, once per change, and never for an API-key session (which has no\n   * plan). It names the windows; it does not size them — the tier suffix a\n   * subscription page shows (\"Max 20x\") is not in the data. */\n  | { type: 'plan_info'; subscriptionType: string }\n  | {\n      type: 'assistant_message'\n      message: ApiMessage\n      /** Set when the message was produced inside a subagent (Task tool). */\n      parentToolUseId: string | null\n      /** True when backfilled from a resumed session's history. */\n      replay?: boolean\n      uuid: string\n    }\n  | {\n      type: 'user_message'\n      message: ApiMessage\n      parentToolUseId: string | null\n      /** True when replayed from a resumed session's history. */\n      replay?: boolean\n      /** True for tool results and other synthetic user-role messages. */\n      synthetic?: boolean\n      /** Files sent with this message, by reference (see {@link MessageAttachment}).\n       * `message.content` carries the typed text only — the attachment bytes went\n       * to the model, not into this log. */\n      attachments?: MessageAttachment[]\n      uuid?: string\n    }\n  /** Raw Anthropic streaming event (message_start/content_block_delta/...); emitted only\n   * when the session was created with `includePartialMessages`. */\n  | {\n      type: 'stream_delta'\n      event: { type: string; [key: string]: unknown }\n      parentToolUseId: string | null\n      uuid: string\n    }\n  | {\n      type: 'turn_result'\n      subtype:\n        | 'success'\n        | 'error_during_execution'\n        | 'error_max_turns'\n        | 'error_max_budget_usd'\n        | 'error_max_structured_output_retries'\n      isError: boolean\n      durationMs: number\n      numTurns: number\n      totalCostUsd: number\n      /** Final text of the turn (success only). */\n      result?: string\n      errors?: string[]\n      usage?: unknown\n    }\n  | { type: 'permission_requested'; request: PermissionRequest }\n  | {\n      type: 'permission_resolved'\n      requestId: string\n      behavior: 'allow' | 'deny'\n      resolvedBy: PermissionDecisionSource\n      /** Denial message, when denied. */\n      message?: string\n    }\n  /** A tool execution was dispatched to a backend. For bridged executions this\n   * precedes the `tool_call_request` frame; for deferred ones it is the record\n   * that survives a teardown. */\n  | {\n      type: 'execution_dispatched'\n      executionId: string\n      toolName: string\n      backend: ToolExecutionBackend\n      /** True when the execution may outlive this turn or process. */\n      deferred?: boolean\n      /** Epoch ms after which the server applies its timeout policy. */\n      expiresAt?: number\n    }\n  /** A dispatched execution produced a result. Applied idempotently by `executionId`. */\n  | {\n      type: 'execution_result'\n      executionId: string\n      output: ToolExecutionOutput\n      /** Guest/agent-visible logs, if the backend captured any. */\n      logs?: string[]\n      durationMs?: number\n    }\n  /** A dispatched execution failed, timed out, or was orphaned. The failure is fed\n   * back into the loop as tool output so the agent can adapt — it is not a session error. */\n  | {\n      type: 'execution_failed'\n      executionId: string\n      /** Machine-readable cause: 'timeout' | 'oom' | 'exception' | 'orphaned' | backend-specific. */\n      reason: string\n      error: string\n      logs?: string[]\n      durationMs?: number\n    }\n  /** The agent handed over a file from its session scratch filesystem (the\n   * `deliver_file` tool). Download it via `GET {basePath}/sessions/:id/files/<path>`\n   * for as long as the session lives (the VFS is in-memory). */\n  | { type: 'file_delivered'; path: string; bytes: number; description?: string }\n  /** Any SDKMessage this protocol version doesn't model first-class (task progress,\n   * compaction boundaries, auth status, ...). Payload is the raw SDK message. */\n  | { type: 'sdk_event'; payload: { type: string; [key: string]: unknown } }\n  | { type: 'session_error'; message: string }\n  | { type: 'session_closed'; reason: 'client' | 'server' | 'error' }\n\nexport type SessionEvent = SessionEventBody & {\n  /** Monotonic per-session sequence number, starting at 1. */\n  seq: number\n  /** Epoch ms when the server emitted the event. */\n  ts: number\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Commands (client -> server)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport type SessionCommand =\n  | {\n      type: 'user_message'\n      text: string\n      /** Ids from `POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/attachments`, in the order they\n       * should reach the model. Unknown ids fail the command rather than sending\n       * a message that quietly lost its picture. */\n      attachmentIds?: string[]\n    }\n  | {\n      type: 'permission_decision'\n      requestId: string\n      behavior: 'allow' | 'deny'\n      /** allow only: modified tool input to run instead of the original. */\n      updatedInput?: Record<string, unknown>\n      /** deny only: reason surfaced to the model. */\n      message?: string\n      /** deny only: also interrupt the running turn. */\n      interrupt?: boolean\n    }\n  | { type: 'interrupt' }\n  | { type: 'set_permission_mode'; mode: PermissionMode }\n  /** Switch the model for subsequent responses; omit `model` for the default. */\n  | { type: 'set_model'; model?: string }\n  /**\n   * Result of a tool execution the server bridged to this client (see\n   * {@link ToolCallRequestFrame}). Unknown or already-settled `executionId`s are\n   * ignored — delivery is idempotent, and a late result after a timeout must not\n   * re-open a settled call.\n   *\n   * Browser-returned results are UNTRUSTED input: acceptable for the user's own\n   * data, never a source for server-authoritative state.\n   */\n  | {\n      type: 'tool_call_result'\n      executionId: string\n      output: ToolExecutionOutput\n      logs?: string[]\n    }\n  /** The client could not execute a bridged call (unsupported tool, guest error,\n   * tab closing). Fed back to the agent as tool output. */\n  | {\n      type: 'tool_call_error'\n      executionId: string\n      reason: string\n      error: string\n      logs?: string[]\n    }\n  | { type: 'close' }\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WebSocket frames\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** First frame the server sends after a successful attach. */\nexport type AttachedFrame = {\n  type: 'attached'\n  protocolVersion: number\n  session: SessionInfo\n  /** Events with seq > the client's `afterSeq` follow as `event` frames. */\n  replayingFrom: number\n}\n\n/**\n * Ask the attached client to execute a tool call in its own sandbox (browser\n * bridge). The client answers with `tool_call_result` or `tool_call_error`\n * carrying the same `executionId`.\n *\n * Only sandbox-benefiting tools are ever bridged. Authenticated/authoritative\n * tools (MCP, secret-bearing APIs) execute server-side and never appear here.\n */\nexport type ToolCallRequestFrame = {\n  type: 'tool_call_request'\n  executionId: string\n  toolName: string\n  input: unknown\n  /** Files to seed the client's scratch VFS with, path → contents. */\n  vfsSeed?: Record<string, string>\n  limits?: { timeoutMs?: number; memoryLimitBytes?: number }\n  /** Epoch ms after which the server gives up and fails the execution. */\n  expiresAt?: number\n}\n\nexport type ServerFrame =\n  | AttachedFrame\n  | { type: 'event'; event: SessionEvent }\n  | ToolCallRequestFrame\n  /** A bridged execution no longer needs an answer (turn interrupted, timed out,\n   * or the session closed) — the client should abandon it. */\n  | { type: 'tool_call_canceled'; executionId: string; reason: string }\n  | { type: 'protocol_error'; message: string }\n\nexport type ClientFrame = SessionCommand\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Profiles (named Claude Code config directories)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Per-profile fallbacks filled into session/job requests that leave the field\n * unset. Defaults, not enforced caps — an explicit request value always wins. */\nexport type ProfileDefaults = {\n  model?: string\n  permissionMode?: PermissionMode\n}\n\n/**\n * A named Claude Code config directory sessions can run under: the session's CLI\n * process gets it as CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, so the profile carries that directory's\n * settings, memory, skills, and whatever credentials the SDK/CLI resolves from it.\n * Profiles are declared in server options at startup (or a 'default' one is\n * auto-created from the operator's own config dir) — the API only reads them.\n */\n/**\n * Which engine a profile runs on. A **closed union, deliberately**: both clients\n * switch exhaustively, the Swift mirror ships in lockstep, and a closed set is\n * what lets this package carry per-engine capability defaults\n * ({@link ENGINE_CAPABILITIES}) browser-safe, with no server round-trip. Adding a\n * member is a versioned protocol event.\n *\n * - `claude` (default) — Claude Code via the Agent SDK, configured by a config dir.\n * - `codex` — OpenAI Codex over the codex CLI binary's `app-server` JSON-RPC\n *   surface, configured by a CODEX_HOME (auth resolved by the binary itself,\n *   like claude).\n * - `provider` — a model-agnostic provider over the AI SDK, assembled by the\n *   host's `createEngineRunner` hook.\n */\nexport type ProfileEngine = 'claude' | 'codex' | 'provider'\n\n/**\n * What an engine does and does not do — one axis per real difference, each field\n * answering a concrete UI or gateway question. Clients render from this record\n * instead of switching on the engine name: an absent capability means the\n * affordance is *hidden*, never a control that silently does nothing.\n *\n * Reaches clients in two places, same shape: `ProfileInfo.capabilities` (stamped\n * by the server; the create form's source) and `SessionInfo.capabilities`\n * (reported by the runner; the session surface's source). When the field is\n * absent — an older server — {@link ENGINE_CAPABILITIES} keyed by the engine\n * name is the browser-safe default.\n */\nexport type EngineCapabilities = {\n  /** PermissionRequest / permission_resolved can occur; approval UI is live.\n   * False: hide approval affordances entirely (and `questionBehavior` on jobs). */\n  interactiveApprovals: boolean\n  /** Modes this engine can honor. A stored choice outside the set is coerced to\n   * {@link EngineCapabilities.defaultPermissionMode}, not submitted. */\n  permissionModes: readonly PermissionMode[]\n  /** Coercion target for a stored/unsupported mode choice (always ∈ permissionModes). */\n  defaultPermissionMode: PermissionMode\n  /** CreateSessionRequest.resume works (an engine session id continues). */\n  resume: boolean\n  /** Resume replays prior history into the transcript (Claude's backfill).\n   * False + resume: show a \"history predates this attach\" notice instead of\n   * treating an empty transcript as a bug. */\n  resumeBackfill: boolean\n  /** GET /sdk-sessions offers a resume picker for this engine. */\n  listSessions: boolean\n  /** context_usage events can occur. False: render nothing — never a 0% ring. */\n  contextUsage: boolean\n  /** rate_limit / plan_info events can occur. False: render nothing. */\n  rateLimits: boolean\n  /** GET/POST /sessions/:id/mcp works (else 501). */\n  mcpStatus: boolean\n  /** A session request may bring its own mcpServers. */\n  sessionMcpServers: boolean\n  /** capabilities events carry slash commands (composer popover). */\n  slashCommands: boolean\n  /** settingSources / allowDangerouslySkipPermissions-style CLI options apply. */\n  settingSources: boolean\n  /** maxTurns / maxBudgetUsd are honored (else the gateway 400s them). */\n  budgets: boolean\n  /** Attachment kinds sendMessage can deliver to the model. Filter the attach\n   * menu by kind; refuse locally before the server's 415. */\n  attachments: ReadonlyArray<'image' | 'pdf' | 'text'>\n  /** Efforts offerable at create time; absent = not settable (hide the control).\n   * Open strings — Codex's own binary already outruns its SDK's union. */\n  reasoningEfforts?: readonly string[]\n  /** Sessions expose a scratch VFS (GET /sessions/:id/files, deliverables panel). */\n  vfs: boolean\n  /** stream_delta granularity: per-token, coarse item updates (no typing\n   * cursor), or none. */\n  streaming: 'token' | 'item' | 'none'\n}\n\n/**\n * The static capability record of each engine — the browser-safe default for\n * `ProfileInfo.capabilities` / `SessionInfo.capabilities`, and the single place\n * the values are written down. Core's adapters *reference* this record and a\n * conformance test compares runner behaviour against it, so it cannot silently\n * diverge from the code. When both a wire copy and this default exist, the wire\n * copy wins.\n */\nexport const ENGINE_CAPABILITIES: Record<ProfileEngine, EngineCapabilities> = {\n  claude: {\n    interactiveApprovals: true,\n    permissionModes: ['default', 'acceptEdits', 'bypassPermissions', 'plan', 'dontAsk', 'auto'],\n    defaultPermissionMode: 'default',\n    resume: true,\n    resumeBackfill: true,\n    listSessions: true,\n    contextUsage: true,\n    rateLimits: true,\n    mcpStatus: true,\n    sessionMcpServers: true,\n    slashCommands: true,\n    settingSources: true,\n    budgets: true,\n    attachments: ['image', 'pdf', 'text'],\n    // The engine-wide set (SDK Options.effort); per-model narrowing rides the\n    // catalog rows, and the CLI silently downgrades an effort a model lacks.\n    reasoningEfforts: ['low', 'medium', 'high', 'xhigh', 'max'],\n    vfs: false,\n    streaming: 'token',\n  },\n  codex: {\n    // The app-server ask channels (server→client JSON-RPC requests: command\n    // escalations, file changes, permission grants, tool questions, MCP\n    // elicitations) are wired to the permission surface: they arrive as\n    // `permission_requested` and are answered by `permission_decision`.\n    // NOTE the semantic shift a client should not paper over: codex's command\n    // approval is usually an ESCALATION after the sandbox already refused the\n    // command (\"command failed; retry without sandbox?\"), not a gate before\n    // execution — the runner authors `title`/`decisionReason` from codex's own\n    // reason sentence, so render those rather than composing \"wants to use X\".\n    interactiveApprovals: true,\n    // 'default' = read-only sandbox + ask (a blocked action becomes a real\n    // question instead of a silent refusal); acceptEdits = workspace-write +\n    // ask (in-workspace writes sail through, escalations still ask); bypass =\n    // full access, asking nothing. plan/dontAsk/auto name CLI workflows codex\n    // cannot deliver.\n    permissionModes: ['default', 'acceptEdits', 'bypassPermissions'],\n    defaultPermissionMode: 'default',\n    resume: true,\n    // A resume replays the thread's prior turns from `thread/resume`'s\n    // `thread.turns` (topped up via `thread/read {includeTurns: true}` when the\n    // resume page is partial) as `replay: true` events — same contract as the\n    // Claude engine's backfill.\n    resumeBackfill: true,\n    // `GET /sdk-sessions?profile=<codex profile>` lists CODEX_HOME's threads\n    // over a short-lived `thread/list` connection; no live session required.\n    listSessions: true,\n    // From `thread/tokenUsage/updated.last` against `modelContextWindow`, after\n    // each turn. Its `categories` is always empty — codex publishes no\n    // breakdown — so a client must not draw an empty breakdown section.\n    contextUsage: true,\n    // From `account/rateLimits/updated`, which app-server pushes during a turn\n    // (no poll needed). Windows are positional there and named here by their\n    // measured duration — see `docs/GOTCHAS.md` §Codex.\n    rateLimits: true,\n    mcpStatus: false,\n    // MCP belongs to CODEX_HOME's config.toml; a session request cannot add servers.\n    sessionMcpServers: false,\n    slashCommands: false,\n    settingSources: false,\n    budgets: false,\n    // Images travel as localImage host paths, text is inlined into the prompt\n    // envelope; pdf has no representation and 415s at upload.\n    attachments: ['image', 'text'],\n    // The engine-wide floor; per-model supersets (max, ultra) ride\n    // ModelOption.reasoningEfforts from the catalog.\n    reasoningEfforts: ['minimal', 'low', 'medium', 'high', 'xhigh'],\n    vfs: false,\n    // item/agentMessage/delta and the reasoning deltas arrive token-by-token.\n    streaming: 'token',\n  },\n  provider: {\n    interactiveApprovals: false,\n    permissionModes: ['default', 'bypassPermissions', 'dontAsk'],\n    defaultPermissionMode: 'default',\n    resume: false,\n    resumeBackfill: false,\n    listSessions: false,\n    contextUsage: false,\n    rateLimits: false,\n    mcpStatus: false,\n    sessionMcpServers: false,\n    slashCommands: false,\n    settingSources: false,\n    budgets: false,\n    attachments: ['image', 'pdf', 'text'],\n    vfs: true,\n    streaming: 'token',\n  },\n}\n\n/**\n * Permission modes the model-agnostic provider engine understands.\n * @deprecated Read `ENGINE_CAPABILITIES.provider.permissionModes` (this is an\n * alias of it, kept for protocol-5 consumers).\n */\nexport const PROVIDER_PERMISSION_MODES: readonly PermissionMode[] =\n  ENGINE_CAPABILITIES.provider.permissionModes\n\n/**\n * Whether a profile's engine can run a permission mode. The single source of\n * truth for the restriction: create forms filter what they offer with it, the\n * gateway rejects with it. An absent `engine` means 'claude' (every mode).\n */\nexport function supportsPermissionMode(\n  engine: ProfileEngine | undefined,\n  mode: PermissionMode,\n): boolean {\n  return ENGINE_CAPABILITIES[engine ?? 'claude'].permissionModes.includes(mode)\n}\n\n/**\n * A model provider a `provider` profile can run on. Credentials are ALWAYS\n * resolved from the operator's environment — never carried on the wire, never\n * stored here. `apiKeyEnv` names the variable to read, it does not hold a key.\n */\nexport type ProviderConfig = {\n  /** Provider adapter to use, e.g. 'anthropic' | 'openai' | 'moonshotai' |\n   * 'openai-compatible'. Kept as a string: the set is host-extensible. */\n  id: string\n  /** Default model id, e.g. 'kimi-k3'. Overridable per session. */\n  model?: string\n  /** Model ids this profile offers, for the dashboard's picker. Operator-declared\n   * rather than discovered: provider engines have no equivalent of the CLI's\n   * `supportedModels()`, and only the operator knows which ids their endpoint and\n   * key actually serve. Unset → the picker offers {@link ProviderConfig.model} alone. */\n  models?: string[]\n  /** Base URL for OpenAI-compatible providers. */\n  baseUrl?: string\n  /** Environment variable the operator put the key in. Never the key itself. */\n  apiKeyEnv?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * A grantable capability of the model-agnostic engine, named after the tool it\n * yields. The always-present tools (`fs_*`, `eval_script`) are not listed: they\n * are the engine's scratch filesystem and sandbox, not a grant.\n */\nexport type SessionCapability = 'web_search' | 'download' | 'web_fetch' | 'deliver_file'\n\n/**\n * What sessions under a `provider` profile get, declared by the operator. Meaning-\n * less for `claude` profiles, whose equivalents live in the config directory.\n *\n * MCP servers are named, never configured, here: a server's transport config can\n * carry credentials in its headers, and this type is served by `GET /profiles`.\n * The names refer to servers the host connected in `createEngineRunner`, which is\n * where the configs (and the credentials) stay.\n */\nexport type ProfileSessionDefaults = {\n  /** Capabilities granted to sessions under this profile. Absent = no\n   * declaration, so a session gets whatever backends the host wired. A session\n   * request may narrow this set, never widen it. */\n  capabilities?: SessionCapability[]\n  /** MCP servers, by name, whose tools sessions under this profile may use.\n   * Absent = no declaration (every server the host connected). */\n  mcpServers?: string[]\n  /** Prepended to the session's system prompt. */\n  instructions?: string\n}\n\nexport type ProfileInfo = {\n  /** Unique name, used as {@link CreateSessionRequest.profile}. */\n  name: string\n  /** Engine this profile runs on. Defaults to 'claude' when absent, so profiles\n   * written before provider support keep working unchanged. */\n  engine?: ProfileEngine\n  /** Absolute path set as CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR for the session's CLI process.\n   * Required for 'claude' profiles; meaningless for the other engines. */\n  configDir?: string\n  /** Codex profiles: absolute path set as CODEX_HOME for the session's codex\n   * process (auth, config.toml, thread storage) — the `configDir` analogue,\n   * request-writable like it. Unset = the binary's own `~/.codex`. */\n  codexHome?: string\n  /** Provider wiring for 'provider' profiles. */\n  provider?: ProviderConfig\n  description?: string\n  defaults?: ProfileDefaults\n  /** Provider-engine session grants (capabilities, MCP servers, instructions). */\n  session?: ProfileSessionDefaults\n  /** Response-only: the engine's model catalog, shipped with the release and\n   * served from the first request (no process spawned, no warm-up session).\n   * For provider profiles the ids come from `provider.models` instead. Never\n   * contains a 'default' sentinel row — forms add their own \"Profile default\"\n   * row mapping to an unset model. Ignored on the way in. */\n  models?: ModelOption[]\n  /** Response-only: what this profile's default model resolves to. For claude\n   * profiles this is the operator's CLI config — unknowable statically — so it\n   * is absent until a session on this profile reports it. */\n  defaultModel?: string\n  /** Response-only: the engine's capability record (see {@link EngineCapabilities}).\n   * Absent = use ENGINE_CAPABILITIES[engine]. Ignored on the way in. */\n  capabilities?: EngineCapabilities\n  /** Response-only: whether the profile's credentials probe as usable right now.\n   * Absent = unknown/unchecked — treat as available. **Display-only**: create\n   * against an unavailable profile still proceeds and fails with the engine's\n   * own error (the probe can be stale in both directions). */\n  available?: boolean\n  /** Response-only: one operator-actionable line, present only when\n   * `available === false`. */\n  unavailableReason?: string\n  /** Response-only, computed by the server: this profile came from the profile\n   * store and can be edited or deleted through the API. Profiles declared in\n   * server options are absent/false — they are code. Ignored on the way in. */\n  managed?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Curated, read-only snapshot of what a profile's config directory contains —\n * the parts relevant to running worker sessions. Values that could carry secrets\n * (env var values) never leave the server; only names are listed.\n */\nexport type ProfileConfigSnapshot = {\n  /** From the config dir's settings.json; absent when missing or unparseable. */\n  settings?: {\n    /** Configured default model. */\n    model?: string\n    /** permissions.defaultMode — the CLI's default permission mode. */\n    defaultPermissionMode?: string\n    /** Rule counts from permissions.allow / ask / deny. */\n    permissionRules?: { allow: number; ask: number; deny: number }\n    /** Env var NAMES declared in settings.json env (values never included). */\n    envKeys?: string[]\n    /** Hook event names with at least one hook configured. */\n    hooks?: string[]\n  }\n  /** CLAUDE.md (user memory) present in the config dir. */\n  hasUserMemory: boolean\n  /** Skill names (skills/<name>/). */\n  skills: string[]\n  /** Agent names (agents/<name>.md). */\n  agents: string[]\n  /** Custom slash-command names (commands/<name>.md). */\n  commands: string[]\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// REST shapes\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport type McpServerConfigWire =\n  | { type?: 'stdio'; command: string; args?: string[]; env?: Record<string, string> }\n  | { type: 'http'; url: string; headers?: Record<string, string> }\n  | { type: 'sse'; url: string; headers?: Record<string, string> }\n\n/** One tool an MCP server exposes, as the session's engine reports it.\n * Parameters are deliberately absent: the CLI's status payload names and\n * describes each tool but does not carry its input schema. */\nexport type McpServerToolInfo = {\n  name: string\n  description?: string\n  annotations?: { readOnly?: boolean; destructive?: boolean; openWorld?: boolean }\n}\n\n/**\n * Live status of one MCP server on a session — what `GET\n * {basePath}/sessions/:id/mcp` answers with, and what the `/mcp` screens render.\n *\n * The connection *identity* is here (transport, command, url, scope) but never\n * its secrets: the engine's config carries `env` for stdio servers and `headers`\n * for HTTP/SSE ones, and both are dropped on the way out. A client that can read\n * this is not thereby entitled to the tokens the operator configured.\n */\nexport type McpServerStatusInfo = {\n  name: string\n  /** 'connected' | 'failed' | 'needs-auth' | 'pending' | 'disabled' — kept open,\n   * the engine's set may grow. */\n  status: string\n  /** Where the server was configured: 'project' | 'user' | 'local' | 'dynamic' | … */\n  scope?: string\n  /** Present when `status` is 'failed'. */\n  error?: string\n  /** Name and version the server announced on connect. */\n  serverInfo?: { name: string; version: string }\n  transport?: 'stdio' | 'http' | 'sse' | 'sdk'\n  /** stdio only. */\n  command?: string\n  /** stdio only. Secrets do occasionally ride argv; the operator's own client\n   * shows them, and hiding them here would only mislead. `env` is not exposed. */\n  args?: string[]\n  /** http/sse only. */\n  url?: string\n  /** Present when connected. */\n  tools?: McpServerToolInfo[]\n}\n\nexport type McpServersResponse = { servers: McpServerStatusInfo[] }\n\n/** `POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/mcp/:name` — answers with the refreshed status. */\nexport type McpServerActionRequest = { action: 'reconnect' | 'enable' | 'disable' }\n\n/** `POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/attachments?name=<name>` — the body is the raw\n * file, the `content-type` header its media type. Answers with the reference to\n * name on the next `user_message`. */\nexport type UploadAttachmentResponse = { attachment: MessageAttachment }\n\nexport type CreateSessionRequest = {\n  /** Directory the session is rooted at. Required: `cwd` is per-query in the SDK\n   * and the server re-pins it on every call. */\n  cwd: string\n  /** Profile (named Claude Code config dir) to run under. Required when the server\n   * declares more than one profile; implicit when exactly one exists. */\n  profile?: string\n  /** Optional initial prompt (may be a skill invocation like \"/verify-content 123\"). */\n  prompt?: string\n  permissionMode?: PermissionMode\n  /** Pre-authorize 'bypassPermissions' (the CLI's --dangerously-skip-permissions\n   * capability) so the mode can be switched on mid-session. Without it the CLI\n   * rejects `set_permission_mode: 'bypassPermissions'` on a running session.\n   * Implied when `permissionMode` is already 'bypassPermissions'. */\n  allowDangerouslySkipPermissions?: boolean\n  allowedTools?: string[]\n  disallowedTools?: string[]\n  mcpServers?: Record<string, McpServerConfigWire>\n  /** Which filesystem settings the session loads. Include 'project' to pick up the\n   * target repo's skills and CLAUDE.md (\"close-to-real\" fidelity). */\n  settingSources?: Array<'user' | 'project' | 'local'>\n  model?: string\n  maxTurns?: number\n  maxBudgetUsd?: number\n  /** Resume an existing SDK session by id. */\n  resume?: string\n  /** With `resume`: fork to a new session id instead of continuing. */\n  forkSession?: boolean\n  /** Reasoning effort for the session's model (codex engine). Open string —\n   * offerable values come from the profile's catalog/capability record. The\n   * gateway 400s it when the engine's record declares no `reasoningEfforts`. */\n  reasoningEffort?: string\n  /** Emit `stream_delta` events for token-by-token rendering. Default true. */\n  includePartialMessages?: boolean\n  /** Per-session override of the server's permission-request timeout (ms). */\n  approvalTimeoutMs?: number\n  /** AskUserQuestion handling (see {@link QuestionBehavior}). Default 'ask'. */\n  questionBehavior?: QuestionBehavior\n  /** Provider engine only: run with fewer capabilities than the profile grants\n   * (see {@link ProfileSessionDefaults.capabilities}). Narrowing only — naming a\n   * capability the profile does not grant is a 400, not a silent upgrade. */\n  capabilities?: SessionCapability[]\n  /** Free-form metadata echoed back on SessionInfo (host app bookkeeping). */\n  meta?: Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\nexport type SessionInfo = {\n  /** Server-assigned id (stable across SDK session forks/resumes). */\n  id: string\n  /** Underlying Agent SDK session id, once known; use for `resume`. */\n  sdkSessionId?: string\n  status: SessionStatus\n  cwd: string\n  /** Profile the session runs under (resolved name, present even when implicit). */\n  profile?: string\n  /** Engine actually running this session, reported by the runner itself. Lets a\n   * session surface gate CLI-only affordances (permission modes, context usage,\n   * rate limits) without looking the profile back up. Absent = 'claude'. */\n  engine?: ProfileEngine\n  /** The engine's capability record, reported by the runner like `engine`. The\n   * attach snapshot is the session-level source (no event carries it). Absent =\n   * ENGINE_CAPABILITIES[engine]. */\n  capabilities?: EngineCapabilities\n  model?: string\n  permissionMode?: PermissionMode\n  /** Whether this session may be switched into `bypassPermissions`. The CLI only\n   * allows it when the process was spawned for it, so it is decided at creation\n   * and never changes: a session that did not ask for bypass up front cannot\n   * gain it later. Lets a picker disable the mode instead of offering a switch\n   * the engine will refuse. Absent = unknown (an older server). */\n  canBypassPermissions?: boolean\n  /** See the `system_init` event; 'oauth' = claude.ai subscription credentials. */\n  apiKeySource?: string\n  createdAt: number\n  /** Highest event seq emitted so far; attach with `afterSeq` to catch up. */\n  lastSeq: number\n  pendingPermissionCount: number\n  meta?: Record<string, unknown>\n  /** Display title: `meta.title` if the host set one, else derived (e.g. first prompt). */\n  title?: string\n  /** Cumulative cost across all turns so far (sum of turn_result totals). */\n  totalCostUsd?: number\n  /** Cumulative turn count across the session. */\n  numTurns?: number\n  /** Epoch ms of the most recent emitted event. */\n  lastActivityAt?: number\n}\n\n/**\n * A session in an engine's on-disk store (independent of this server's registry):\n * the Agent SDK's session files, or a codex profile's CODEX_HOME threads. Listed\n * so hosts can offer \"resume\" across server restarts: feed `sessionId` to\n * CreateSessionRequest.resume — under a profile of the SAME engine, since the id\n * only means something to the store it came from. `GET {basePath}/sdk-sessions`\n * takes an optional `profile` query parameter naming whose store to list; absent,\n * the profile is resolved implicitly when the server declares exactly one, else\n * the Claude engine's store is listed (the pre-engine-aware behavior). Mirrors\n * the SDK's SDKSessionInfo shape, kept browser-safe.\n */\nexport type SdkSessionSummary = {\n  sessionId: string\n  /** Custom title, auto summary, or first prompt — whichever the SDK has. */\n  summary: string\n  /** Epoch ms of last modification. */\n  lastModified: number\n  createdAt?: number\n  customTitle?: string\n  firstPrompt?: string\n  gitBranch?: string\n  cwd?: string\n}\n\n/** One deliverable in the session's scratch filesystem (see the `file_delivered` event). */\nexport type SessionFileInfo = { path: string; bytes: number }\n/** `GET {basePath}/sessions/:id/files` — every file currently in the session's VFS.\n * `GET {basePath}/sessions/:id/files/<path>` downloads one (attachment disposition).\n * 404 when the session's engine exposes no VFS (Claude-engine sessions). */\nexport type ListSessionFilesResponse = { files: SessionFileInfo[] }\nexport type ListSessionsResponse = { sessions: SessionInfo[] }\nexport type CreateSessionResponse = { session: SessionInfo }\nexport type GetSessionResponse = { session: SessionInfo }\n\n/** Body of `POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/permissions/:requestId` — the REST counterpart\n * of the WS `permission_decision` command, for remote controllers without a socket\n * (e.g. answering a job's AskUserQuestion from a webhook consumer). 404 = the request\n * is unknown, already resolved, or expired. */\nexport type ResolvePermissionRequest =\n  | { behavior: 'allow'; updatedInput?: Record<string, unknown> }\n  | { behavior: 'deny'; message?: string; interrupt?: boolean }\nexport type ResolvePermissionResponse = { resolved: true }\n\n/**\n * Body of `POST {basePath}/executions/:executionId/result` — the way a deferred\n * executor (a remote worker, a batch job, a human) delivers the outcome of an\n * execution the session parked on. The session is rehydrated if its runner was\n * torn down, and the result is folded back into the agent loop; a `failed` result\n * is ordinary tool output the agent adapts to, not a session error.\n *\n * Applied **idempotently by `executionId`**: a duplicate or late delivery (one\n * racing the execution watchdog) answers 200 with `applied: false` rather than\n * erroring or applying twice. 404 means no session is parked on that id.\n */\nexport type SubmitExecutionResultRequest =\n  | { status: 'ok'; output: ToolExecutionOutput; logs?: string[] }\n  | { status: 'failed'; reason: string; error: string; logs?: string[] }\nexport type SubmitExecutionResultResponse = {\n  /** False when the id was already settled — the delivery was a no-op. */\n  applied: boolean\n  /** Session the execution belonged to. */\n  sessionId: string\n}\n\nexport type ListSdkSessionsResponse = { sdkSessions: SdkSessionSummary[] }\n/** `GET {basePath}/profiles` — filtered to the profiles the caller may use. */\nexport type ListProfilesResponse = {\n  profiles: ProfileInfo[]\n  /** Whether this caller may create profiles here — true only when the server has\n   * a profile store AND the principal carries `canManageProfiles`. Lets a UI hide\n   * controls that would always be refused. */\n  canManage?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * `POST {basePath}/profiles` — create a managed profile. Available only when the\n * server was given a profile store, and only to a principal with\n * `canManageProfiles`. Profiles declared in server options are code, not data:\n * they cannot be created, edited, or deleted through these routes.\n */\nexport type CreateProfileRequest = ProfileInfo\n\n/** `PATCH {basePath}/profiles/:name` — merge into a managed profile. The name is\n * the route, not the body; pass `null` to clear an optional field. */\nexport type UpdateProfileRequest = Omit<Partial<ProfileInfo>, 'name'>\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Host filesystem (`{basePath}/fs/*`)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * The **host's real project tree**, not a session's in-memory VFS — the two are\n * unrelated despite both being \"files\". {@link SessionFileInfo} is a deliverable\n * the agent produced inside a session; these routes read and write the operator's\n * actual disk.\n *\n * That makes them **operator-privileged**: they are authorized by the server's auth\n * key alone and deliberately sit outside the agent permission flow, because the\n * caller *is* the operator, not the model. A client holding the key can already\n * start a session with any allowed cwd; browsing that same tree grants it nothing\n * new. Writing does, which is why writes are separately enabled server-side.\n *\n * The whole surface is opt-in and root-scoped: with no roots configured every route\n * below 404s. There is no \"unset means anything\" default here — a phone on a tailnet\n * must never be one request away from `~/.ssh`.\n */\nexport type HostFileRoot = {\n  /** Absolute, canonical (symlinks resolved) path of the root. */\n  path: string\n  /** Last path segment, for display — roots are not named by the operator. */\n  name: string\n}\n\n/** `GET {basePath}/fs/roots` — where a client may start browsing. Empty `roots`\n * never happens: the routes are absent entirely when none are configured. */\nexport type ListHostRootsResponse = {\n  roots: HostFileRoot[]\n  /** Whether `PUT /fs/write` is enabled here; lets a UI hide an editor it can't save from. */\n  canWrite: boolean\n}\n\n/** One entry in a host directory listing. Classified with `lstat` semantics, so a\n * `symlink` is reported as itself and never silently resolved — following it is the\n * *next* request's problem, and that request is refused if it escapes the roots. */\nexport type HostDirEntry = {\n  name: string\n  /** Absolute path, ready to pass back as `?path=`. */\n  path: string\n  type: 'file' | 'dir' | 'symlink' | 'other'\n  /** Regular files only. */\n  bytes?: number\n  /** Epoch ms mtime. */\n  modifiedAt?: number\n}\n\n/** `GET {basePath}/fs/list?path=<abs>` — one directory, not recursive. */\nexport type ListHostDirResponse = {\n  /** Canonical path actually listed (the request's path after symlink resolution). */\n  path: string\n  /** Directories first, then files, each alphabetical. */\n  entries: HostDirEntry[]\n  /** Set when the directory held more entries than the server will return. */\n  truncated?: boolean\n}\n\n/** One hit from `GET {basePath}/fs/find`. */\nexport type HostFileMatch = {\n  /** Absolute path, for a follow-up read. */\n  path: string\n  /** Path relative to the searched directory — what a picker shows and inserts. */\n  relative: string\n}\n\n/**\n * `GET {basePath}/fs/find?path=<dir>&q=<query>&limit=<n>` — recursive fuzzy file\n * search under one directory, which is what an `@file` picker needs and\n * `/fs/list` is not: listing answers \"what is in this directory\", this answers\n * \"which file in this tree did you mean\".\n *\n * Subsequence matching (`seslist` finds `SessionListView.swift`), filename hits\n * ranked above path hits, shallow files above deep ones. An empty `q` returns the\n * shallowest files. Build directories (`.git`, `node_modules`, …) are skipped, as\n * is anything behind a symlink — so every path returned is one `/fs/read` will\n * accept.\n */\nexport type FindHostFilesResponse = {\n  /** Canonical directory the search ran under; `relative` paths are relative to it. */\n  base: string\n  matches: HostFileMatch[]\n  /** More matched, or the tree was larger than the server would walk. */\n  truncated: boolean\n}\n\n/** `GET {basePath}/fs/read?path=<abs>` — one file's contents. Binary files come back\n * base64; 413 rather than a truncated read when the file exceeds the server's cap. */\nexport type ReadHostFileResponse = {\n  path: string\n  content: string\n  encoding: 'utf8' | 'base64'\n  bytes: number\n  /** sha256 (hex) of the bytes on disk. Pass it back as `expectedHash` to write. */\n  hash: string\n  modifiedAt: number\n}\n\n/**\n * `PUT {basePath}/fs/write` — replace or create one file.\n *\n * The agent is editing this same tree, so a write is **conditional, always**:\n * `expectedHash` must be the hash from the read this edit is based on, and the\n * server 409s if the file has changed since. Omitting it means \"create\" and 409s\n * if the path already exists — there is no unconditional overwrite, by design.\n * Directories are never created implicitly: writing under a missing parent is a 404.\n */\nexport type WriteHostFileRequest = {\n  path: string\n  content: string\n  /** Default 'utf8'. */\n  encoding?: 'utf8' | 'base64'\n  /** Required to overwrite; omit only to create a new file. */\n  expectedHash?: string\n}\n\nexport type WriteHostFileResponse = {\n  path: string\n  bytes: number\n  /** Hash of what was just written — carry it into the next edit. */\n  hash: string\n  modifiedAt: number\n}\n\nexport type SaveProfileResponse = { profile: ProfileInfo }\n/** `GET {basePath}/profiles/:name` — the profile plus a fresh config snapshot. */\nexport type GetProfileResponse = { profile: ProfileInfo; config: ProfileConfigSnapshot }\nexport type ErrorResponse = { error: string }\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Session notifications (the out-of-band \"something wants you\" channel)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * The moments in an *interactive* session a person needs to hear about when they\n * are not watching it — the whole point being that a phone cannot hold a\n * WebSocket open in the background, so the server has to reach out.\n *\n * Deliberately four: this is a human-attention channel, not an event mirror. The\n * event log stays on the session WS (attach with `afterSeq` to catch up); if you\n * want every assistant message, subscribe there instead.\n */\nexport type SessionNotificationType =\n  /** The agent is blocked on an approval — the one that matters most. */\n  | 'permission_requested'\n  /** A turn finished; the session is idle and waiting for the human. */\n  | 'turn_completed'\n  /** The session failed (`session_error`). */\n  | 'session_error'\n  /** The session ended (`session_closed`), whoever ended it. */\n  | 'session_closed'\n\n/** One delivery on the session-notification channel (JSON body of a webhook POST). */\nexport type SessionNotification = {\n  type: SessionNotificationType\n  sessionId: string\n  /** Snapshot at notification time — status, title, cwd, cost, `lastSeq`. */\n  session: SessionInfo\n  /** Seq of the event behind this notification; attach with `afterSeq: seq - 1` to\n   * land on it. */\n  seq: number\n  ts: number\n  /** One line fit for a notification body: the permission title, the turn's final\n   * text, the error message. */\n  preview?: string\n  /** `permission_requested` only: the full request, so a consumer can answer it via\n   * `POST {basePath}/sessions/:id/permissions/:requestId` — which is what makes an\n   * Approve/Deny action on a lock-screen notification possible. */\n  request?: PermissionRequest\n  /** `turn_completed` only. */\n  result?: { isError: boolean; durationMs: number; numTurns: number; totalCostUsd: number }\n  /** `session_closed` only. */\n  reason?: 'client' | 'server' | 'error'\n}\n\n/** Where session notifications are POSTed (JSON body = {@link SessionNotification}).\n * Server-wide, not per session: the point is to hear about sessions you did not\n * create yourself and are not attached to. */\nexport type SessionWebhookConfig = {\n  url: string\n  /** Extra headers sent with every delivery (auth tokens etc.). */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n  /** Types to deliver. Default: all of them. */\n  events?: SessionNotificationType[]\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Job queue (one-shot scheduled runs over the session runner)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * - `queued` — accepted, waiting for a concurrency slot (or the daily token budget)\n * - `running` — a session is executing the prompt\n * - `parked` — waiting on an external event (a deferred tool execution). Not\n *   terminal and not consuming a concurrency slot; resumes to `running` when the\n *   result arrives, or fails via the execution watchdog if it never does.\n * - `succeeded` / `failed` — terminal; `result` (and `error` on failure) are set\n * - `canceled` — terminal; canceled by a client before or during the run\n */\nexport type JobStatus = 'queued' | 'running' | 'parked' | 'succeeded' | 'failed' | 'canceled'\n\n/** Where job progress/completion deliveries are POSTed (JSON body = {@link JobEvent}). */\nexport type WebhookConfig = {\n  url: string\n  /** Extra headers sent with every delivery (auth tokens etc.). */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n  /** Delivery granularity: 'messages' also POSTs job_progress per assistant message /\n   * permission request; 'completion' only job_started + job_completed. Default 'messages'. */\n  progress?: 'messages' | 'completion'\n}\n\n/**\n * Schedule a one-shot run: the session executes `prompt` unattended and the job\n * completes with that run's result. `session.prompt` is the task and is required;\n * `resume`/`forkSession` are not supported for queued jobs.\n */\nexport type CreateJobRequest = {\n  session: CreateSessionRequest & { prompt: string }\n  webhook?: WebhookConfig\n  /** Per-job token cap; the effective cap is min(this, the server's sessionTokenLimit). */\n  maxTokens?: number\n  /** Per-job wall-clock cap; the effective cap is min(this, the server's maxJobDurationMs). */\n  maxDurationMs?: number\n  /** Total run attempts: failed (not canceled) runs re-queue until this many attempts\n   * have been made. Default 1 (no retries). */\n  attempts?: number\n  /** Delay before the first retry, doubled for each subsequent one. Default 5000. */\n  retryDelayMs?: number\n  /** Host bookkeeping echoed back on JobInfo. */\n  meta?: Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/** Cumulative resource usage of a job's run. `tokens` counts input + output +\n * cache-creation + cache-read tokens across all turns. */\nexport type JobUsage = {\n  tokens: number\n  totalCostUsd: number\n  numTurns: number\n}\n\n/** Terminal outcome of the job's run (mirrors the final turn_result). */\nexport type JobResult = {\n  subtype: string\n  isError: boolean\n  /** Final text of the run (success only). */\n  result?: string\n  errors?: string[]\n  durationMs: number\n}\n\nexport type JobInfo = {\n  id: string\n  status: JobStatus\n  cwd: string\n  /** Profile the run executes under (resolved name, present even when implicit). */\n  profile?: string\n  prompt: string\n  /** Server session id once started — attach via the sessions WS to watch the run live. */\n  sessionId?: string\n  sdkSessionId?: string\n  createdAt: number\n  startedAt?: number\n  finishedAt?: number\n  /** 1-based run attempt this info reflects. */\n  attempt?: number\n  /** Total attempts configured on the request (see CreateJobRequest.attempts). */\n  maxAttempts?: number\n  /** For a job re-queued by retry backoff: earliest time the next attempt may start. */\n  nextRunAt?: number\n  /** Set while `status` is 'parked': when the run parked, and the execution it is\n   * waiting on — the id to POST a result to. Cleared when it resumes. */\n  parkedAt?: number\n  parkedExecutionId?: string\n  /** Cumulative across attempts. */\n  usage: JobUsage\n  result?: JobResult\n  /** Failure or cancellation reason (for a queued retry: the previous attempt's error). */\n  error?: string\n  meta?: Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/** Latest mid-run activity, carried on job_progress deliveries. */\nexport type JobProgress = {\n  kind: 'assistant_text' | 'tool_use' | 'permission_requested' | 'permission_resolved'\n  /** Short human-readable preview (message excerpt, tool name, permission title). */\n  preview?: string\n  /** 'permission_requested' only: the full request (including AskUserQuestion input) so\n   * webhook consumers can answer via POST /sessions/:sessionId/permissions/:requestId. */\n  request?: PermissionRequest\n}\n\n/** Webhook delivery payload (also the queue's local event shape). `job_submitted` goes\n * to local observers and the queue WS only — the submitter already has the POST\n * response, so webhooks start at `job_started`. `job_retrying` marks a failed run that\n * was re-queued (`job.nextRunAt` says when); `job_completed` is always terminal. */\nexport type JobEvent =\n  | { type: 'job_submitted'; job: JobInfo; ts: number }\n  | { type: 'job_started'; job: JobInfo; ts: number }\n  | { type: 'job_progress'; job: JobInfo; progress: JobProgress; ts: number }\n  /** The run parked on a deferred execution; `executionId` says what it waits on —\n   * the id to POST a result to. The *work itself* (tool name, input, VFS seed) went\n   * to the executor's own dispatch hook, not over this channel: a webhook consumer\n   * learns that a run is waiting, the worker learns what to do. */\n  | { type: 'job_parked'; job: JobInfo; executionId: string; ts: number }\n  /** A parked run resumed because its execution result arrived. */\n  | { type: 'job_resumed'; job: JobInfo; executionId: string; ts: number }\n  | { type: 'job_retrying'; job: JobInfo; ts: number }\n  | { type: 'job_completed'; job: JobInfo; ts: number }\n\nexport type QueueStats = {\n  maxConcurrency: number\n  running: number\n  queued: number\n  /** Jobs waiting on a deferred execution. They hold no concurrency slot and\n   * their wall-clock budget is not ticking. */\n  parked: number\n  sessionTokenLimit?: number\n  dailyTokenLimit?: number\n  /** Tokens consumed by queue jobs in the current UTC day. */\n  dailyTokensUsed: number\n  /** True when the daily budget is exhausted and queued jobs are being held. */\n  paused: boolean\n}\n\n/** Frames sent on the queue WS (`{basePath}/queue/ws`). The stream is one-way\n * (server→client): every job's lifecycle as it happens, plus refreshed stats after\n * lifecycle changes. Clients send nothing; job mutations stay on REST. */\nexport type QueueServerFrame =\n  | { type: 'queue_attached'; protocolVersion: number; stats: QueueStats }\n  | { type: 'job_event'; event: JobEvent }\n  | { type: 'queue_stats'; stats: QueueStats }\n\nexport type CreateJobResponse = { job: JobInfo }\nexport type GetJobResponse = { job: JobInfo }\nexport type ListJobsResponse = { jobs: JobInfo[] }\nexport type QueueStatsResponse = { stats: QueueStats }\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;AAYA,MAAa,mBAAmB;;;;;;;;;AAsmBhC,MAAa,sBAAiE;CAC5E,QAAQ;EACN,sBAAsB;EACtB,iBAAiB;GAAC;GAAW;GAAe;GAAqB;GAAQ;GAAW;GAAO;EAC3F,uBAAuB;EACvB,QAAQ;EACR,gBAAgB;EAChB,cAAc;EACd,cAAc;EACd,YAAY;EACZ,WAAW;EACX,mBAAmB;EACnB,eAAe;EACf,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;EACT,aAAa;GAAC;GAAS;GAAO;GAAO;EAGrC,kBAAkB;GAAC;GAAO;GAAU;GAAQ;GAAS;GAAM;EAC3D,KAAK;EACL,WAAW;EACZ;CACD,OAAO;EAUL,sBAAsB;EAMtB,iBAAiB;GAAC;GAAW;GAAe;GAAoB;EAChE,uBAAuB;EACvB,QAAQ;EAKR,gBAAgB;EAGhB,cAAc;EAId,cAAc;EAId,YAAY;EACZ,WAAW;EAEX,mBAAmB;EACnB,eAAe;EACf,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;EAGT,aAAa,CAAC,SAAS,OAAO;EAG9B,kBAAkB;GAAC;GAAW;GAAO;GAAU;GAAQ;GAAQ;EAC/D,KAAK;EAEL,WAAW;EACZ;CACD,UAAU;EACR,sBAAsB;EACtB,iBAAiB;GAAC;GAAW;GAAqB;GAAU;EAC5D,uBAAuB;EACvB,QAAQ;EACR,gBAAgB;EAChB,cAAc;EACd,cAAc;EACd,YAAY;EACZ,WAAW;EACX,mBAAmB;EACnB,eAAe;EACf,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;EACT,aAAa;GAAC;GAAS;GAAO;GAAO;EACrC,KAAK;EACL,WAAW;EACZ;CACF;;;;;;AAOD,MAAa,4BACX,oBAAoB,SAAS;;;;;;AAO/B,SAAgB,uBACd,QACA,MACS;AACT,QAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,UAAU,gBAAgB,SAAS,KAAK"}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@workerdeck/protocol",
-  "version": "0.6.0",
+  "version": "0.9.0",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "The WorkerDeck wire protocol: typed session events, commands, and REST shapes shared by server and clients. Dependency-free, browser-safe. This protocol is the product boundary — versioned from day one.",
   "license": "MIT",