@workerdeck/core 0.18.0 → 0.19.0

package/build/index.d.mts

@@ -1645,7 +1645,15 @@ declare const codexAdapter: EngineAdapter;
  *     const c=JSON.parse(d.slice(s,i));
  *     for(const m of c.models) console.log(m.slug, m.display_name,
  *       m.visibility, m.supported_reasoning_levels.map(l=>l.effort).join(","))'\
- *     "$(node -p 'require.resolve("@openai/codex-darwin-arm64/package.json").replace("package.json","vendor/aarch64-apple-darwin/bin/codex")')"
+ *     "$(node -p 'const{createRequire}=require("module");
+ *       const w=require.resolve("@openai/codex/package.json");
+ *       createRequire(w).resolve("@openai/codex-darwin-arm64/package.json")
+ *         .replace("package.json","vendor/aarch64-apple-darwin/bin/codex")')"
+ *
+ * The two-hop resolve is NOT optional: under pnpm's strict layout the platform
+ * package is a dependency of `@openai/codex`, so it resolves only from that
+ * wrapper's location, never from the repo root. Resolving it directly throws
+ * MODULE_NOT_FOUND — the same two hops `resolveBundledCodexExecutable` makes.
  *
  * Mapping decisions:
  * - the internal `codex-auto-review` row is dropped (the codex analogue of

package/build/index.mjs

@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ import { getSessionInfo, getSessionMessages, listSessions, query } from "@anthro
 import { ENGINE_CAPABILITIES, PROTOCOL_VERSION, SUBAGENT_HISTORY, TOOL_RESULT_HEAD_CHARS, contextReading, imagePartRef, replayCoalesceKey, replayRetains, snapshotRetains, transcriptActivity, transcriptContent } from "@workerdeck/protocol";
 import { ToolLoopAgent, generateText, isStepCount, tool } from "ai";
 import { execFile, spawn } from "node:child_process";
-import { appendFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, realpathSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { appendFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, realpathSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { createVfs, runScript } from "@workerdeck/sandbox";
 import { z } from "zod";
 import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises";
-import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
-import { join } from "node:path";
+import { homedir, tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { dirname, join, resolve, sep } from "node:path";
 //#region src/lib/attachments.ts
 /** The four the Anthropic API accepts. Notably absent: image/heic — an iPhone's
 * native photo format, which clients must transcode before upload. */
@@ -4117,6 +4117,330 @@ var CodexAgentTracker = class {
 	}
 };
 //#endregion
+//#region src/engines/codex/trust.ts
+/**
+* Codex project trust: will this session's cwd get its `.codex/config.toml`?
+*
+* Codex only layers a project's `.codex/config.toml` onto the operator's base
+* config when the project is *trusted* (a `[projects."<path>"]
+* trust_level = "trusted"` entry in `$CODEX_HOME/config.toml`), and the
+* app-server surface has no trust prompt — that lives in the TUI. So under
+* WorkerDeck an untrusted project's config, MCP servers included, is silently
+* ignored: no error, no notice, servers just missing. The runner asks this
+* module at session start whether that is about to happen, so the transcript
+* can say so.
+*
+* Semantics, all measured against both the bundled 0.146.0 and 0.149.0
+* (2026-08-22, via `codex mcp list` from probe cwds and via `thread/start` +
+* `mcpServerStatus/list` on the app-server surface — identical answers):
+*
+* - **Discovery**: config layers come from the cwd and its ancestors up to and
+*   including the nearest directory containing `.git` (dir or file). With no
+*   git anywhere above, the cwd alone is consulted. Directories above the
+*   nearest git root never contribute, trusted or not.
+* - **Trust per layer**: an exact entry for the layer's own canonical path
+*   decides (an explicit `"untrusted"` beats inherited trust); without one the
+*   layer inherits from the chain's git root — trusted iff the git root has a
+*   trusted entry, where a linked worktree's root also counts its main
+*   repository's entry (the `.git` file's gitdir names it). A trusted
+*   mid-chain directory does NOT trust its children, and plain path
+*   containment without git confers nothing.
+* - **Canonical paths**: codex matches entries against the canonicalized cwd —
+*   a macOS `/tmp/...` entry never matches the `/private/tmp/...` it points
+*   at, while the reverse spelling works (and the app-server canonicalizes its
+*   `cwd` param too). Both sides here are realpath'd, which can only err
+*   toward silence.
+* - **The gate is sandbox-scoped**: `thread/start` under `workspace-write` or
+*   `danger-full-access` (permission modes `acceptEdits`/`bypassPermissions`)
+*   WRITES the trust entry itself and loads the config — only `read-only`
+*   (mode `default`) leaves the project untrusted and the config ignored. A
+*   later `turn/start` with a wider sandboxPolicy does not heal the thread
+*   (measured): the caller probes `default`-mode sessions only, and the notice
+*   stays true for the session it opens.
+* - `trust_level`'s vocabulary is exactly `trusted`/`untrusted`; any other
+*   value fails codex's bootstrap outright ("unknown variant"), so a config
+*   carrying one probes silent — that session announces its own failure.
+*
+* The correctness bar for every degrade path: a FALSE notice — warning about a
+* project codex actually trusts — is worse than a missed one. The narrow TOML
+* reader below refuses (→ silence) anything it cannot interpret with
+* certainty, rather than guessing.
+*/
+const BARE_KEY = /[A-Za-z0-9_-]/;
+function skipWs(text, pos) {
+	let i = pos;
+	while (i < text.length && (text[i] === " " || text[i] === "	")) i++;
+	return i;
+}
+/** One-line TOML basic string starting at `pos` (which must be `"`). Undefined
+* on an escape TOML doesn't define or a close quote that never comes — the
+* caller refuses the file rather than guessing what codex would read. */
+function parseBasicString(text, pos) {
+	let out = "";
+	let i = pos + 1;
+	while (i < text.length) {
+		const ch = text[i];
+		if (ch === "\"") return {
+			value: out,
+			end: i + 1
+		};
+		if (ch === "\\") {
+			const esc = text[i + 1];
+			if (esc === "b") out += "\b";
+			else if (esc === "t") out += "	";
+			else if (esc === "n") out += "\n";
+			else if (esc === "f") out += "\f";
+			else if (esc === "r") out += "\r";
+			else if (esc === "\"") out += "\"";
+			else if (esc === "\\") out += "\\";
+			else if (esc === "u" || esc === "U") {
+				const width = esc === "u" ? 4 : 8;
+				const hex = text.slice(i + 2, i + 2 + width);
+				if (hex.length !== width || !/^[0-9A-Fa-f]+$/.test(hex)) return void 0;
+				const code = Number.parseInt(hex, 16);
+				if (code > 1114111) return void 0;
+				out += String.fromCodePoint(code);
+				i += width;
+			} else return void 0;
+			i += 2;
+			continue;
+		}
+		out += ch;
+		i++;
+	}
+}
+/** One-line TOML literal string starting at `pos` (which must be `'`). */
+function parseLiteralString(text, pos) {
+	const close = text.indexOf("'", pos + 1);
+	if (close === -1) return void 0;
+	return {
+		value: text.slice(pos + 1, close),
+		end: close + 1
+	};
+}
+/** A dotted key path — bare, `"basic"` and `'literal'` keys, whitespace around
+* the dots — as found in table headers and on the left of assignments. */
+function parseKeyPath(text, pos) {
+	const keys = [];
+	let i = pos;
+	for (;;) {
+		i = skipWs(text, i);
+		const ch = text[i];
+		if (ch === "\"" || ch === "'") {
+			const str = ch === "\"" ? parseBasicString(text, i) : parseLiteralString(text, i);
+			if (!str) return void 0;
+			keys.push(str.value);
+			i = str.end;
+		} else if (ch !== void 0 && BARE_KEY.test(ch)) {
+			let end = i;
+			while (end < text.length && BARE_KEY.test(text[end])) end++;
+			keys.push(text.slice(i, end));
+			i = end;
+		} else return;
+		i = skipWs(text, i);
+		if (text[i] !== ".") return {
+			value: keys,
+			end: i
+		};
+		i++;
+	}
+}
+/**
+* Scan an assignment's value (or the continuation line of a multi-line array),
+* confirming where it ends. Returns the bracket depth carried onto the next
+* line (0 = the value is complete) plus the string itself when the whole value
+* was one plain one-line string. Undefined refuses the file: multi-line
+* strings are where a line reader starts misreading string *content* as
+* sections and entries — the exact mistake that could flip a real trust entry
+* — so they are not parsed around, they end the attempt.
+*/
+function scanValueLine(text, pos, depth) {
+	let i = skipWs(text, pos);
+	if (depth === 0 && (text[i] === "\"" || text[i] === "'")) {
+		if (text.startsWith("\"\"\"", i) || text.startsWith("'''", i)) return void 0;
+		const str = text[i] === "\"" ? parseBasicString(text, i) : parseLiteralString(text, i);
+		if (!str) return void 0;
+		const rest = skipWs(text, str.end);
+		if (rest < text.length && text[rest] !== "#") return void 0;
+		return {
+			depth: 0,
+			value: str.value
+		};
+	}
+	while (i < text.length) {
+		const ch = text[i];
+		if (ch === "#") break;
+		if (ch === "\"" || ch === "'") {
+			if (text.startsWith("\"\"\"", i) || text.startsWith("'''", i)) return void 0;
+			const str = ch === "\"" ? parseBasicString(text, i) : parseLiteralString(text, i);
+			if (!str) return void 0;
+			i = str.end;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (ch === "[" || ch === "{") depth++;
+		else if (ch === "]" || ch === "}") {
+			depth--;
+			if (depth < 0) return void 0;
+		}
+		i++;
+	}
+	return { depth };
+}
+/**
+* The `[projects."<path>"] trust_level = "..."` entries of a codex
+* `config.toml`, by a deliberately narrow reader (core takes no TOML
+* dependency for this). Handles what codex itself writes plus the reasonable
+* hand-edits — comments, CRLF, whitespace, quoted keys with escapes, literal
+* and bare keys, `[projects]`-with-dotted-keys and top-level dotted forms,
+* single-line inline tables, multi-line arrays — and returns **undefined for
+* anything else it meets anywhere in the file** (multi-line strings,
+* `projects` as an inline table, array-of-tables, junk): the caller treats
+* undefined as "cannot know" and stays silent. Conflicting duplicate entries
+* also refuse — invalid for TOML, and guessing wrong is a false notice.
+*/
+function parseProjectTrustEntries(source) {
+	const entries = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	let section = [];
+	let carryDepth = 0;
+	for (const rawLine of source.split("\n")) {
+		const line = rawLine.endsWith("\r") ? rawLine.slice(0, -1) : rawLine;
+		if (carryDepth > 0) {
+			const scanned = scanValueLine(line, 0, carryDepth);
+			if (!scanned) return void 0;
+			carryDepth = scanned.depth;
+			continue;
+		}
+		const start = skipWs(line, 0);
+		if (start >= line.length || line[start] === "#") continue;
+		if (line[start] === "[") {
+			const array = line.startsWith("[[", start);
+			const path = parseKeyPath(line, start + (array ? 2 : 1));
+			if (!path) return void 0;
+			const close = array ? "]]" : "]";
+			if (!line.startsWith(close, path.end)) return void 0;
+			const rest = skipWs(line, path.end + close.length);
+			if (rest < line.length && line[rest] !== "#") return void 0;
+			if (array && path.value[0] === "projects") return void 0;
+			section = path.value;
+			continue;
+		}
+		const key = parseKeyPath(line, start);
+		if (!key) return void 0;
+		if (line[key.end] !== "=") return void 0;
+		const scanned = scanValueLine(line, key.end + 1, 0);
+		if (!scanned) return void 0;
+		carryDepth = scanned.depth;
+		const full = [...section, ...key.value];
+		if (full[0] !== "projects") continue;
+		if (full.length < 3) return void 0;
+		if (full.length === 3 && full[2] === "trust_level") {
+			if (carryDepth !== 0 || scanned.value === void 0) return void 0;
+			const project = full[1];
+			const existing = entries.get(project);
+			if (existing !== void 0 && existing !== scanned.value) return void 0;
+			entries.set(project, scanned.value);
+		}
+	}
+	if (carryDepth > 0) return void 0;
+	return entries;
+}
+/**
+* A linked worktree inherits trust from its main repository's entry (measured:
+* trusting the main repo path loads the worktree's project config). The
+* worktree's `.git` is a FILE whose `gitdir:` line names
+* `<main>/.git/worktrees/<name>`; the directory owning that `.git` is the
+* anchor to look up. Anything unreadable or shaped differently resolves false
+* — this route can only ADD trust, i.e. silence, never a false notice.
+*/
+function mainRepositoryTrusted(gitRootDir, canonical) {
+	const gitPath = join(gitRootDir, ".git");
+	try {
+		if (!statSync(gitPath).isFile()) return false;
+		const match = /^gitdir:[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*$/m.exec(readFileSync(gitPath, "utf8"));
+		if (!match) return false;
+		const gitdir = resolve(gitRootDir, match[1]);
+		const at = gitdir.lastIndexOf(`${sep}.git${sep}`);
+		if (at <= 0) return false;
+		let main = gitdir.slice(0, at);
+		try {
+			main = realpathSync(main);
+		} catch {}
+		return canonical.get(main) === "trusted";
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+/**
+* The notice for a codex session about to run on a cwd whose
+* `.codex/config.toml` codex will ignore, or undefined when there is nothing
+* to say — no project config anywhere codex would look, the project is
+* trusted, or the situation cannot be established with certainty. Read-only
+* throughout: WorkerDeck never writes trust entries (adjacent to the auth red
+* lines — trusting a directory is the operator's decision, made in codex's
+* own prompt or by their own hand).
+*/
+function untrustedProjectNotice(options) {
+	let cwd;
+	try {
+		cwd = realpathSync(options.cwd);
+	} catch {
+		return;
+	}
+	let home = resolve(options.codexHome);
+	try {
+		home = realpathSync(options.codexHome);
+	} catch {}
+	const chain = [];
+	let dir = cwd;
+	for (;;) {
+		chain.push(dir);
+		if (existsSync(join(dir, ".git"))) break;
+		const parent = dirname(dir);
+		if (parent === dir) break;
+		dir = parent;
+	}
+	const anchor = chain[chain.length - 1];
+	const gitRoot = existsSync(join(anchor, ".git")) ? anchor : void 0;
+	const layers = (gitRoot ? chain : [cwd]).filter((layer) => {
+		if (!existsSync(join(layer, ".codex", "config.toml"))) return false;
+		try {
+			return realpathSync(join(layer, ".codex")) !== home;
+		} catch {
+			return false;
+		}
+	});
+	if (layers.length === 0) return void 0;
+	const homeConfigPath = join(options.codexHome, "config.toml");
+	let source = "";
+	try {
+		source = readFileSync(homeConfigPath, "utf8");
+	} catch (error) {
+		if (error.code !== "ENOENT") return void 0;
+	}
+	const entries = parseProjectTrustEntries(source);
+	if (!entries) return void 0;
+	for (const value of entries.values()) if (value !== "trusted" && value !== "untrusted") return void 0;
+	const canonical = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	for (const [key, value] of entries) {
+		let path = key;
+		try {
+			path = realpathSync(key);
+		} catch {}
+		if (canonical.get(path) === "trusted") continue;
+		canonical.set(path, value);
+	}
+	const rootTrusted = gitRoot !== void 0 && (canonical.get(gitRoot) === "trusted" || mainRepositoryTrusted(gitRoot, canonical));
+	const ignored = layers.filter((layer) => {
+		const entry = canonical.get(layer);
+		if (entry !== void 0) return entry !== "trusted";
+		return !rootTrusted;
+	});
+	if (ignored.length === 0) return void 0;
+	const trustDir = gitRoot ?? cwd;
+	const configs = ignored.map((layer) => join(layer, ".codex", "config.toml"));
+	return `codex does not trust this directory, so ${configs.length === 1 ? `its project config (${configs[0]}) is` : `its project configs (${configs.join(", ")}) are`} being ignored — MCP servers and settings declared there will be missing from this session. To trust it, run codex once in ${trustDir} and accept the trust prompt, or add [projects."${trustDir}"] with trust_level = "trusted" to ${homeConfigPath}.`;
+}
+//#endregion
 //#region src/engines/codex/runner.ts
 /**
 * thread/start's sandbox axis (string form) — our permission modes as codex
@@ -4124,16 +4448,30 @@ var CodexAgentTracker = class {
 * the OS sandbox and — with the ask policy below — escalates to a real
 * question), `acceptEdits` → workspace-write (in-workspace writes sail
 * through, the acceptEdits grant), `bypassPermissions` → danger-full-access.
+* `auto` rides the SAME sandbox as acceptEdits — it is not a wider grant, it
+* only moves *who answers* the approvals (see {@link APPROVALS_REVIEWER_BY_MODE}).
 */
 const THREAD_SANDBOX_BY_MODE = {
 	default: "read-only",
 	acceptEdits: "workspace-write",
+	auto: "workspace-write",
 	bypassPermissions: "danger-full-access"
 };
-/** turn/start's sandboxPolicy axis (object form — same policy, second shape). */
+/**
+* turn/start's sandboxPolicy axis (object form — same policy, second shape).
+*
+* The `workspaceWrite` entries here are a SHAPE, not the whole policy: every
+* unstated field of that variant is serde-defaulted by the app-server, so
+* sending it bare silently overrides the operator's `[sandbox_workspace_write]`
+* — `network_access` back to false, `writable_roots` back to empty — on every
+* turn. {@link CodexRunner.#turnSandboxPolicy} restates those fields from
+* `config/read`; nothing else may send this map's `workspaceWrite` entries
+* directly.
+*/
 const TURN_SANDBOX_BY_MODE = {
 	default: { type: "readOnly" },
 	acceptEdits: { type: "workspaceWrite" },
+	auto: { type: "workspaceWrite" },
 	bypassPermissions: { type: "dangerFullAccess" }
 };
 /**
@@ -4177,8 +4515,33 @@ const THREAD_SCOPED_NOTIFICATIONS = new Set([
 const APPROVAL_POLICY_BY_MODE = {
 	default: GRANULAR_ASK,
 	acceptEdits: GRANULAR_ASK,
+	auto: GRANULAR_ASK,
 	bypassPermissions: GRANULAR_NEVER
 };
+/**
+* The THIRD approval axis — *who reviews*, independent of the sandbox axis and
+* the ask axis above. Codex's `approvalsReviewer` (thread/start and turn/start,
+* present since 0.146.0) routes every approval request either to the user
+* (`'user'`, codex's own default) or to `'auto_review'`: a prompted subagent
+* that gathers context and applies a risk framework before allowing or denying.
+* That is codex's "Approve for me" preset, and our `auto` mode is exactly it.
+*
+* Sent explicitly for EVERY mode rather than omitted for the default — a thread
+* inherits `approvalsReviewer` across turns ("this turn and subsequent turns"),
+* so leaving it unset would let a stale reviewer from an earlier turn survive a
+* mode switch back to a user-reviewed mode. Stating it every time makes the
+* mode the single source of truth.
+*
+* NOTE the asymmetry with the Claude engine's `auto`: that classifier is
+* operator-configurable (`autoMode.environment`, allow/soft_deny/hard_deny);
+* this reviewer has no configuration surface at all.
+*/
+const APPROVALS_REVIEWER_BY_MODE = {
+	default: "user",
+	acceptEdits: "user",
+	auto: "auto_review",
+	bypassPermissions: "user"
+};
 /** Fallback timeout for a pending approval nobody answers — the SessionRunner
 * default, so unattended codex sessions land the same way Claude ones do. */
 const DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e5;
@@ -4596,6 +4959,8 @@ var CodexRunner = class {
 	#turnChain = Promise.resolve();
 	#activeTurn;
 	#connection;
+	/** Per-child, from `config/read`; undefined = read failed, send the bare shape. */
+	#workspaceWrite;
 	#threadLoaded = false;
 	#numTurns = 0;
 	#totalCostUsd;
@@ -4723,6 +5088,7 @@ var CodexRunner = class {
 	start() {
 		if (this.#started) return this.#turnChain;
 		this.#started = true;
+		this.#warnUntrustedProject();
 		if (this.#config.resume && this.#config.backfillHistory !== false) {
 			this.#backfillPending = true;
 			this.#turnChain = this.#turnChain.then(() => this.#backfillHistory());
@@ -4732,6 +5098,37 @@ var CodexRunner = class {
 		return this.#turnChain;
 	}
 	/**
+	* One-time transcript notice for the codex trust gap: a `default`-mode
+	* session (read-only sandbox) on an untrusted cwd has its
+	* `.codex/config.toml` — MCP servers included — silently ignored, and the
+	* app-server surface has no trust prompt to say so (the TUI's prompt is
+	* where the entry normally gets written). `acceptEdits`/`bypassPermissions`
+	* sessions are exempt because their `thread/start` (workspace-write /
+	* danger-full-access sandbox) writes the trust entry itself and loads the
+	* config — measured against 0.146.0 and 0.149.0; a notice there would be
+	* false. Emitted as `session_error`, which both clients render as an inline
+	* notice while the session keeps running (the backfill-history precedent),
+	* so nothing new rides the wire. Every degrade path is silence: a false
+	* warning on a trusted project is worse than a missed one.
+	*/
+	#warnUntrustedProject() {
+		if (this.#permissionMode !== "default") return;
+		try {
+			const env = this.#childEnv();
+			const pin = env.CODEX_HOME;
+			if (pin !== void 0 && pin.length === 0) return;
+			const codexHome = pin ?? join(env.HOME ?? homedir(), ".codex");
+			const message = untrustedProjectNotice({
+				cwd: this.#cwd,
+				codexHome
+			});
+			if (message) this.#emit({
+				type: "session_error",
+				message
+			});
+		} catch {}
+	}
+	/**
 	* List skills over a **throwaway** connection, for a session with nothing else
 	* to do yet.
 	*
@@ -4940,6 +5337,48 @@ var CodexRunner = class {
 		this.#turnChain = this.#turnChain.then(() => this.#runTurn());
 	}
 	/**
+	* Read `[sandbox_workspace_write]` as codex resolves it for this session's
+	* cwd, once per child, so {@link CodexRunner.#turnSandboxPolicy} can restate
+	* it verbatim.
+	*
+	* Why this exists at all: `turn/start`'s object-form sandbox policy is
+	* serde-defaulted field by field, so `{type: 'workspaceWrite'}` bare means
+	* `networkAccess: false, writableRoots: []` NO MATTER what the operator
+	* configured — and we must keep sending the object every turn, because
+	* restating it is what makes a between-turns permission-mode switch take
+	* effect. Measured against 0.149.0 with `network_access = true` set: the
+	* bare object produced `curl: (6) Could not resolve host`, the fully-stated
+	* object and an omitted policy both produced `200`. `read-only` is not
+	* affected — the setting is scoped to workspace-write, as its name says, and
+	* a read-only sandbox has no network either way.
+	*
+	* A failure here is not fatal: `#workspaceWrite` stays undefined and we send
+	* the bare shape, which is exactly the behaviour that shipped before.
+	*/
+	async #readWorkspaceWrite(connection) {
+		this.#workspaceWrite = void 0;
+		try {
+			const block = (await connection.request("config/read", { cwd: this.#cwd }))?.config?.sandbox_workspace_write;
+			if (!block) return;
+			const roots = block.writable_roots;
+			this.#workspaceWrite = {
+				writableRoots: Array.isArray(roots) ? roots.filter((r) => typeof r === "string") : [],
+				networkAccess: block.network_access === true,
+				excludeTmpdirEnvVar: block.exclude_tmpdir_env_var === true,
+				excludeSlashTmp: block.exclude_slash_tmp === true
+			};
+		} catch {}
+	}
+	/** The mode's turn-level sandbox policy, with the operator's workspace-write settings intact. */
+	#turnSandboxPolicy() {
+		const policy = TURN_SANDBOX_BY_MODE[this.#permissionMode];
+		if (policy?.type !== "workspaceWrite" || !this.#workspaceWrite) return policy;
+		return {
+			type: "workspaceWrite",
+			...this.#workspaceWrite
+		};
+	}
+	/**
 	* The session's live connection with its thread loaded, (re)building both as
 	* needed: spawn + `initialize`/`initialized` on a fresh child, then
 	* `thread/start` (new) or `thread/resume` (a create-request `resume`, or a
@@ -4983,12 +5422,14 @@ var CodexRunner = class {
 				throw error;
 			}
 			connection.notify("initialized");
+			await this.#readWorkspaceWrite(connection);
 		}
 		if (!this.#threadLoaded) {
 			const options = {
 				cwd: this.#cwd,
 				approvalPolicy: APPROVAL_POLICY_BY_MODE[this.#permissionMode],
-				sandbox: THREAD_SANDBOX_BY_MODE[this.#permissionMode]
+				sandbox: THREAD_SANDBOX_BY_MODE[this.#permissionMode],
+				approvalsReviewer: APPROVALS_REVIEWER_BY_MODE[this.#permissionMode]
 			};
 			if (this.#model) options.model = this.#model;
 			const resuming = this.#sdkSessionId !== void 0;
@@ -5231,7 +5672,8 @@ var CodexRunner = class {
 				input: turn.input,
 				cwd: this.#cwd,
 				approvalPolicy: APPROVAL_POLICY_BY_MODE[this.#permissionMode],
-				sandboxPolicy: TURN_SANDBOX_BY_MODE[this.#permissionMode]
+				sandboxPolicy: this.#turnSandboxPolicy(),
+				approvalsReviewer: APPROVALS_REVIEWER_BY_MODE[this.#permissionMode]
 			};
 			const model = this.#model ?? this.#resolvedModel;
 			if (model) params.model = model;
@@ -5965,7 +6407,15 @@ var CodexRunner = class {
 *     const c=JSON.parse(d.slice(s,i));
 *     for(const m of c.models) console.log(m.slug, m.display_name,
 *       m.visibility, m.supported_reasoning_levels.map(l=>l.effort).join(","))'\
-*     "$(node -p 'require.resolve("@openai/codex-darwin-arm64/package.json").replace("package.json","vendor/aarch64-apple-darwin/bin/codex")')"
+*     "$(node -p 'const{createRequire}=require("module");
+*       const w=require.resolve("@openai/codex/package.json");
+*       createRequire(w).resolve("@openai/codex-darwin-arm64/package.json")
+*         .replace("package.json","vendor/aarch64-apple-darwin/bin/codex")')"
+*
+* The two-hop resolve is NOT optional: under pnpm's strict layout the platform
+* package is a dependency of `@openai/codex`, so it resolves only from that
+* wrapper's location, never from the repo root. Resolving it directly throws
+* MODULE_NOT_FOUND — the same two hops `resolveBundledCodexExecutable` makes.
 *
 * Mapping decisions:
 * - the internal `codex-auto-review` row is dropped (the codex analogue of
@@ -5977,7 +6427,7 @@ var CodexRunner = class {
 *   `max`/`ultra` beyond the SDK union; trust the binary, keep strings open.
 */
 const CODEX_CATALOG = {
-	provenance: "embedded model presets of @openai/codex@0.146.0 (darwin-arm64 binary), extracted 2026-08-05",
+	provenance: "embedded model presets of @openai/codex@0.149.0 (darwin-arm64 binary), extracted 2026-08-22",
 	models: [
 		{
 			value: "gpt-5.6-sol",