@wlfi-agent/cli 1.4.13 → 1.4.15

package/crates/vault-transport-unix/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,1640 @@
+//! Unix-domain socket transport for daemon RPC calls.
+//!
+//! This transport is intended for local long-running daemon deployments where
+//! CLIs/SDK clients communicate with a separate process over a filesystem
+//! socket path.
+
+#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
+
+use std::collections::BTreeSet;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use thiserror::Error;
+use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
+use tokio::net::{UnixListener, UnixStream};
+use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
+use uuid::Uuid;
+use vault_daemon::{
+    DaemonError, DaemonRpcRequest, DaemonRpcResponse, InMemoryDaemon, KeyManagerDaemonApi,
+};
+use vault_domain::{
+    AdminSession, AgentCredentials, Lease, ManualApprovalDecision, ManualApprovalRequest,
+    NonceReleaseRequest, NonceReservation, NonceReservationRequest, PolicyAttachment, RelayConfig,
+    SignRequest, Signature, SpendingPolicy, VaultKey,
+};
+use vault_policy::{PolicyEvaluation, PolicyExplanation};
+use vault_signer::{KeyCreateRequest, SignerError, VaultSignerBackend};
+use zeroize::Zeroize;
+
+const MAX_WIRE_BODY_BYTES: usize = 256 * 1024;
+
+/// Validates that a client daemon socket path is an existing trusted unix socket in a secure directory.
+pub fn assert_trusted_daemon_socket_path(path: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
+    if path.as_os_str().is_empty() {
+        return Err("daemon socket path must not be empty".to_string());
+    }
+
+    if is_symlink(path)? {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "socket path '{}' must not be a symlink",
+            path.display()
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let Some(parent) = path.parent() else {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "socket path '{}' must have a parent directory",
+            path.display()
+        ));
+    };
+    if parent.as_os_str().is_empty() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "socket path '{}' must have a parent directory",
+            path.display()
+        ));
+    }
+    if is_symlink(parent)? {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "socket directory '{}' must not be a symlink",
+            parent.display()
+        ));
+    }
+    ensure_secure_socket_directory(parent)?;
+
+    let metadata = std::fs::symlink_metadata(path)
+        .map_err(|err| format!("failed to inspect socket path '{}': {err}", path.display()))?;
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::{FileTypeExt, MetadataExt};
+
+        if !metadata.file_type().is_socket() {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "socket path '{}' must be a unix socket",
+                path.display()
+            ));
+        }
+        let uid = metadata.uid();
+        let allowed = allowed_owner_uids()?;
+        if !allowed.contains(&uid) {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "socket path '{}' must be owned by current user, sudo caller, or root (found uid {uid})",
+                path.display(),
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(path.to_path_buf())
+}
+
+/// Validates that a client daemon socket path is an existing root-owned unix socket in a secure directory.
+pub fn assert_root_owned_daemon_socket_path(path: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
+    let resolved = assert_trusted_daemon_socket_path(path)?;
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;
+
+        let metadata = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&resolved).map_err(|err| {
+            format!(
+                "failed to inspect socket path '{}': {err}",
+                resolved.display()
+            )
+        })?;
+        if metadata.uid() != 0 {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "socket path '{}' must be owned by root",
+                resolved.display()
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(resolved)
+}
+
+/// Errors returned by unix socket transport.
+#[derive(Debug, Error)]
+pub enum UnixTransportError {
+    /// Message serialization or deserialization failed.
+    #[error("serialization error: {0}")]
+    Serialization(String),
+    /// Protocol-level failure.
+    #[error("protocol error: {0}")]
+    Protocol(String),
+    /// Underlying daemon returned an error.
+    #[error("daemon error: {0}")]
+    Daemon(#[from] DaemonError),
+    /// Filesystem/socket operation failed.
+    #[error("io error: {0}")]
+    Io(String),
+    /// Timed out waiting for I/O.
+    #[error("transport timeout")]
+    Timeout,
+    /// Client process is not authorized by daemon peer-euid policy.
+    #[error("unauthorized peer euid (allowed {allowed:?}, got {actual})")]
+    UnauthorizedPeerEuid { allowed: Vec<u32>, actual: u32 },
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct WireRequest {
+    body_json: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct WireResponse {
+    ok: bool,
+    body_json: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(tag = "kind", content = "data")]
+enum WireDaemonError {
+    AuthenticationFailed,
+    UnknownLease,
+    InvalidLease,
+    TooManyActiveLeases,
+    UnknownVaultKey(Uuid),
+    UnknownAgentKey(Uuid),
+    UnknownPolicy(Uuid),
+    UnknownManualApprovalRequest(Uuid),
+    AgentAuthenticationFailed,
+    PayloadActionMismatch,
+    PayloadTooLarge {
+        max_bytes: usize,
+    },
+    InvalidRequestTimestamps,
+    RequestExpired,
+    RequestReplayDetected,
+    InvalidPolicyAttachment(String),
+    InvalidNonceReservation(String),
+    UnknownNonceReservation(Uuid),
+    MissingNonceReservation {
+        chain_id: u64,
+        nonce: u64,
+    },
+    InvalidPolicy(String),
+    InvalidRelayConfig(String),
+    ManualApprovalRequired {
+        approval_request_id: Uuid,
+        relay_url: Option<String>,
+        frontend_url: Option<String>,
+    },
+    ManualApprovalRejected {
+        approval_request_id: Uuid,
+    },
+    Policy(vault_policy::PolicyError),
+    Signer(SignerError),
+    PasswordHash(String),
+    InvalidConfig(String),
+    LockPoisoned,
+    Transport(String),
+    Persistence(String),
+}
+
+impl From<DaemonError> for WireDaemonError {
+    fn from(value: DaemonError) -> Self {
+        match value {
+            DaemonError::AuthenticationFailed => Self::AuthenticationFailed,
+            DaemonError::UnknownLease => Self::UnknownLease,
+            DaemonError::InvalidLease => Self::InvalidLease,
+            DaemonError::TooManyActiveLeases => Self::TooManyActiveLeases,
+            DaemonError::UnknownVaultKey(id) => Self::UnknownVaultKey(id),
+            DaemonError::UnknownAgentKey(id) => Self::UnknownAgentKey(id),
+            DaemonError::UnknownPolicy(id) => Self::UnknownPolicy(id),
+            DaemonError::UnknownManualApprovalRequest(id) => Self::UnknownManualApprovalRequest(id),
+            DaemonError::AgentAuthenticationFailed => Self::AgentAuthenticationFailed,
+            DaemonError::PayloadActionMismatch => Self::PayloadActionMismatch,
+            DaemonError::PayloadTooLarge { max_bytes } => Self::PayloadTooLarge { max_bytes },
+            DaemonError::InvalidRequestTimestamps => Self::InvalidRequestTimestamps,
+            DaemonError::RequestExpired => Self::RequestExpired,
+            DaemonError::RequestReplayDetected => Self::RequestReplayDetected,
+            DaemonError::InvalidPolicyAttachment(msg) => Self::InvalidPolicyAttachment(msg),
+            DaemonError::InvalidNonceReservation(msg) => Self::InvalidNonceReservation(msg),
+            DaemonError::UnknownNonceReservation(id) => Self::UnknownNonceReservation(id),
+            DaemonError::MissingNonceReservation { chain_id, nonce } => {
+                Self::MissingNonceReservation { chain_id, nonce }
+            }
+            DaemonError::InvalidPolicy(msg) => Self::InvalidPolicy(msg),
+            DaemonError::InvalidRelayConfig(msg) => Self::InvalidRelayConfig(msg),
+            DaemonError::ManualApprovalRequired {
+                approval_request_id,
+                relay_url,
+                frontend_url,
+            } => Self::ManualApprovalRequired {
+                approval_request_id,
+                relay_url,
+                frontend_url,
+            },
+            DaemonError::ManualApprovalRejected {
+                approval_request_id,
+            } => Self::ManualApprovalRejected {
+                approval_request_id,
+            },
+            DaemonError::Policy(err) => Self::Policy(err),
+            DaemonError::Signer(err) => Self::Signer(err),
+            DaemonError::PasswordHash(msg) => Self::PasswordHash(msg),
+            DaemonError::InvalidConfig(msg) => Self::InvalidConfig(msg),
+            DaemonError::LockPoisoned => Self::LockPoisoned,
+            DaemonError::Transport(msg) => Self::Transport(msg),
+            DaemonError::Persistence(msg) => Self::Persistence(msg),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl WireDaemonError {
+    fn into_daemon_error(self) -> DaemonError {
+        match self {
+            WireDaemonError::AuthenticationFailed => DaemonError::AuthenticationFailed,
+            WireDaemonError::UnknownLease => DaemonError::UnknownLease,
+            WireDaemonError::InvalidLease => DaemonError::InvalidLease,
+            WireDaemonError::TooManyActiveLeases => DaemonError::TooManyActiveLeases,
+            WireDaemonError::UnknownVaultKey(id) => DaemonError::UnknownVaultKey(id),
+            WireDaemonError::UnknownAgentKey(id) => DaemonError::UnknownAgentKey(id),
+            WireDaemonError::UnknownPolicy(id) => DaemonError::UnknownPolicy(id),
+            WireDaemonError::UnknownManualApprovalRequest(id) => {
+                DaemonError::UnknownManualApprovalRequest(id)
+            }
+            WireDaemonError::AgentAuthenticationFailed => DaemonError::AgentAuthenticationFailed,
+            WireDaemonError::PayloadActionMismatch => DaemonError::PayloadActionMismatch,
+            WireDaemonError::PayloadTooLarge { max_bytes } => {
+                DaemonError::PayloadTooLarge { max_bytes }
+            }
+            WireDaemonError::InvalidRequestTimestamps => DaemonError::InvalidRequestTimestamps,
+            WireDaemonError::RequestExpired => DaemonError::RequestExpired,
+            WireDaemonError::RequestReplayDetected => DaemonError::RequestReplayDetected,
+            WireDaemonError::InvalidPolicyAttachment(msg) => {
+                DaemonError::InvalidPolicyAttachment(msg)
+            }
+            WireDaemonError::InvalidNonceReservation(msg) => {
+                DaemonError::InvalidNonceReservation(msg)
+            }
+            WireDaemonError::UnknownNonceReservation(id) => {
+                DaemonError::UnknownNonceReservation(id)
+            }
+            WireDaemonError::MissingNonceReservation { chain_id, nonce } => {
+                DaemonError::MissingNonceReservation { chain_id, nonce }
+            }
+            WireDaemonError::InvalidPolicy(msg) => DaemonError::InvalidPolicy(msg),
+            WireDaemonError::InvalidRelayConfig(msg) => DaemonError::InvalidRelayConfig(msg),
+            WireDaemonError::ManualApprovalRequired {
+                approval_request_id,
+                relay_url,
+                frontend_url,
+            } => DaemonError::ManualApprovalRequired {
+                approval_request_id,
+                relay_url,
+                frontend_url,
+            },
+            WireDaemonError::ManualApprovalRejected {
+                approval_request_id,
+            } => DaemonError::ManualApprovalRejected {
+                approval_request_id,
+            },
+            WireDaemonError::Policy(err) => DaemonError::Policy(err),
+            WireDaemonError::Signer(err) => DaemonError::Signer(err),
+            WireDaemonError::PasswordHash(msg) => DaemonError::PasswordHash(msg),
+            WireDaemonError::InvalidConfig(msg) => DaemonError::InvalidConfig(msg),
+            WireDaemonError::LockPoisoned => DaemonError::LockPoisoned,
+            WireDaemonError::Transport(msg) => DaemonError::Transport(msg),
+            WireDaemonError::Persistence(msg) => DaemonError::Persistence(msg),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Client adapter backed by unix-domain socket transport.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct UnixDaemonClient {
+    socket_path: PathBuf,
+    timeout: Duration,
+    expected_server_euid: u32,
+}
+
+impl UnixDaemonClient {
+    /// Creates a unix transport client.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn new(socket_path: PathBuf, timeout: Duration) -> Self {
+        Self::new_with_expected_server_euid(socket_path, timeout, nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw())
+    }
+
+    /// Creates a unix transport client with explicit expected daemon euid.
+    ///
+    /// This allows hardened callers to pin daemon identity (for example `0` for root daemon).
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn new_with_expected_server_euid(
+        socket_path: PathBuf,
+        timeout: Duration,
+        expected_server_euid: u32,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            socket_path,
+            timeout,
+            expected_server_euid,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Performs a single daemon RPC call.
+    pub async fn call_rpc(
+        &self,
+        request: DaemonRpcRequest,
+    ) -> Result<DaemonRpcResponse, UnixTransportError> {
+        let mut request = request;
+        let mut stream = tokio::time::timeout(self.timeout, UnixStream::connect(&self.socket_path))
+            .await
+            .map_err(|_| UnixTransportError::Timeout)?
+            .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Io(err.to_string()))?;
+        let peer_euid = peer_euid(&stream).map_err(UnixTransportError::Io)?;
+        if peer_euid != self.expected_server_euid {
+            return Err(UnixTransportError::UnauthorizedPeerEuid {
+                allowed: vec![self.expected_server_euid],
+                actual: peer_euid,
+            });
+        }
+
+        let body_json = serde_json::to_string(&request)
+            .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Serialization(err.to_string()));
+        request.zeroize_secrets();
+        let mut body_json = body_json?;
+        if body_json.len() > MAX_WIRE_BODY_BYTES {
+            body_json.zeroize();
+            return Err(UnixTransportError::Protocol(format!(
+                "wire request body exceeds max bytes ({MAX_WIRE_BODY_BYTES})"
+            )));
+        }
+        let mut wire_request = WireRequest { body_json };
+        let write_result = write_frame(&mut stream, &wire_request, self.timeout).await;
+        wire_request.body_json.zeroize();
+        write_result?;
+
+        let mut response: WireResponse = read_frame(&mut stream, self.timeout).await?;
+        if response.ok {
+            let parsed = serde_json::from_str::<DaemonRpcResponse>(&response.body_json)
+                .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Serialization(err.to_string()));
+            response.body_json.zeroize();
+            parsed
+        } else {
+            let daemon_error = match serde_json::from_str::<WireDaemonError>(&response.body_json) {
+                Ok(err) => Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err.into_daemon_error())),
+                Err(_) => Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(DaemonError::Transport(
+                    response.body_json.clone(),
+                ))),
+            };
+            response.body_json.zeroize();
+            daemon_error
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Unix daemon socket server bound to a local path.
+pub struct UnixDaemonServer {
+    listener: UnixListener,
+    socket_path: PathBuf,
+    allowed_admin_peer_euids: BTreeSet<u32>,
+    allowed_agent_peer_euids: BTreeSet<u32>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+enum RpcAccessLevel {
+    Admin,
+    Agent,
+}
+
+fn rpc_access_level(request: &DaemonRpcRequest) -> RpcAccessLevel {
+    match request {
+        DaemonRpcRequest::IssueLease { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::AddPolicy { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::ListPolicies { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::DisablePolicy { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::CreateVaultKey { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::CreateAgentKey { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::ExportVaultPrivateKey { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::RotateAgentAuthToken { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::RevokeAgentKey { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::ListManualApprovalRequests { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::DecideManualApprovalRequest { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::SetRelayConfig { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::GetRelayConfig { .. } => RpcAccessLevel::Admin,
+        DaemonRpcRequest::EvaluateForAgent { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::ExplainForAgent { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::ReserveNonce { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::ReleaseNonce { .. }
+        | DaemonRpcRequest::SignForAgent { .. } => RpcAccessLevel::Agent,
+    }
+}
+
+fn validate_allowed_peer_euids(
+    label: &str,
+    values: &BTreeSet<u32>,
+) -> Result<(), UnixTransportError> {
+    if values.is_empty() {
+        return Err(UnixTransportError::Protocol(format!(
+            "allowed {label} peer euid set must not be empty"
+        )));
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn socket_mode_for_allowed_peer_euids(
+    allowed_admin_peer_euids: &BTreeSet<u32>,
+    allowed_agent_peer_euids: &BTreeSet<u32>,
+) -> u32 {
+    let only_root_admin =
+        allowed_admin_peer_euids.len() == 1 && allowed_admin_peer_euids.contains(&0);
+    let only_root_agent =
+        allowed_agent_peer_euids.len() == 1 && allowed_agent_peer_euids.contains(&0);
+
+    if only_root_admin && only_root_agent {
+        0o600
+    } else {
+        0o666
+    }
+}
+
+fn combined_allowed_peer_euids(
+    allowed_admin_peer_euids: &BTreeSet<u32>,
+    allowed_agent_peer_euids: &BTreeSet<u32>,
+) -> BTreeSet<u32> {
+    allowed_admin_peer_euids
+        .union(allowed_agent_peer_euids)
+        .copied()
+        .collect()
+}
+
+impl UnixDaemonServer {
+    /// Binds server to `socket_path` and restricts clients to `allowed_peer_euids`.
+    pub async fn bind(
+        socket_path: PathBuf,
+        allowed_peer_euids: BTreeSet<u32>,
+    ) -> Result<Self, UnixTransportError> {
+        Self::bind_with_allowed_peer_euids(
+            socket_path,
+            allowed_peer_euids.clone(),
+            allowed_peer_euids,
+        )
+        .await
+    }
+
+    /// Binds server to `socket_path` with separate admin and agent peer-euid allowlists.
+    pub async fn bind_with_allowed_peer_euids(
+        socket_path: PathBuf,
+        allowed_admin_peer_euids: BTreeSet<u32>,
+        allowed_agent_peer_euids: BTreeSet<u32>,
+    ) -> Result<Self, UnixTransportError> {
+        validate_allowed_peer_euids("admin", &allowed_admin_peer_euids)?;
+        validate_allowed_peer_euids("agent", &allowed_agent_peer_euids)?;
+
+        ensure_socket_parent(&socket_path).map_err(UnixTransportError::Io)?;
+        remove_existing_socket_file(&socket_path).map_err(UnixTransportError::Io)?;
+
+        let listener = UnixListener::bind(&socket_path)
+            .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Io(err.to_string()))?;
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        {
+            use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+            let socket_mode = socket_mode_for_allowed_peer_euids(
+                &allowed_admin_peer_euids,
+                &allowed_agent_peer_euids,
+            );
+            std::fs::set_permissions(&socket_path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(socket_mode))
+                .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Io(err.to_string()))?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            listener,
+            socket_path,
+            allowed_admin_peer_euids,
+            allowed_agent_peer_euids,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Runs accept loop until `shutdown` resolves.
+    pub async fn run_until_shutdown<B, S>(
+        self,
+        daemon: Arc<InMemoryDaemon<B>>,
+        shutdown: S,
+    ) -> Result<(), UnixTransportError>
+    where
+        B: VaultSignerBackend + 'static,
+        S: std::future::Future<Output = ()>,
+    {
+        tokio::pin!(shutdown);
+        let mut workers: Vec<JoinHandle<()>> = Vec::new();
+        loop {
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = &mut shutdown => {
+                    break;
+                }
+                accept_result = self.listener.accept() => {
+                    let (stream, _) = accept_result
+                        .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Io(err.to_string()))?;
+                    let daemon = daemon.clone();
+                    let allowed_admin_peer_euids = self.allowed_admin_peer_euids.clone();
+                    let allowed_agent_peer_euids = self.allowed_agent_peer_euids.clone();
+                    workers.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
+                        let _ = handle_connection(
+                            stream,
+                            daemon,
+                            allowed_admin_peer_euids,
+                            allowed_agent_peer_euids,
+                        )
+                        .await;
+                    }));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        for worker in workers {
+            let _ = worker.await;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Returns bound socket path.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn socket_path(&self) -> &Path {
+        &self.socket_path
+    }
+}
+
+impl Drop for UnixDaemonServer {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&self.socket_path);
+    }
+}
+
+async fn handle_connection<B>(
+    mut stream: UnixStream,
+    daemon: Arc<InMemoryDaemon<B>>,
+    allowed_admin_peer_euids: BTreeSet<u32>,
+    allowed_agent_peer_euids: BTreeSet<u32>,
+) -> Result<(), UnixTransportError>
+where
+    B: VaultSignerBackend + 'static,
+{
+    let peer_euid = peer_euid(&stream).map_err(UnixTransportError::Io)?;
+    let globally_allowed_peer_euids =
+        combined_allowed_peer_euids(&allowed_admin_peer_euids, &allowed_agent_peer_euids);
+    if !globally_allowed_peer_euids.contains(&peer_euid) {
+        return Err(UnixTransportError::UnauthorizedPeerEuid {
+            allowed: globally_allowed_peer_euids.into_iter().collect(),
+            actual: peer_euid,
+        });
+    }
+
+    let mut request: WireRequest = read_frame(&mut stream, Duration::from_secs(10)).await?;
+    if request.body_json.len() > MAX_WIRE_BODY_BYTES {
+        request.body_json.zeroize();
+        return Err(UnixTransportError::Protocol(format!(
+            "wire request body exceeds max bytes ({MAX_WIRE_BODY_BYTES})"
+        )));
+    }
+
+    let daemon_request = serde_json::from_str(&request.body_json)
+        .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Serialization(err.to_string()));
+    request.body_json.zeroize();
+    let mut daemon_request: DaemonRpcRequest = daemon_request?;
+    let allowed_peer_euids = match rpc_access_level(&daemon_request) {
+        RpcAccessLevel::Admin => &allowed_admin_peer_euids,
+        RpcAccessLevel::Agent => &allowed_agent_peer_euids,
+    };
+    if !allowed_peer_euids.contains(&peer_euid) {
+        daemon_request.zeroize_secrets();
+        return Err(UnixTransportError::UnauthorizedPeerEuid {
+            allowed: allowed_peer_euids.iter().copied().collect(),
+            actual: peer_euid,
+        });
+    }
+
+    let response = match daemon.handle_rpc(daemon_request).await {
+        Ok(success) => {
+            let mut success = success;
+            let body_json = serde_json::to_string(&success)
+                .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Serialization(err.to_string()));
+            success.zeroize_secrets();
+            WireResponse {
+                ok: true,
+                body_json: body_json?,
+            }
+        }
+        Err(err) => WireResponse {
+            ok: false,
+            body_json: serde_json::to_string(&WireDaemonError::from(err))
+                .map_err(|ser| UnixTransportError::Serialization(ser.to_string()))?,
+        },
+    };
+    let mut response = response;
+    let write_result = write_frame(&mut stream, &response, Duration::from_secs(10)).await;
+    response.body_json.zeroize();
+    write_result?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn write_frame<T: Serialize>(
+    stream: &mut UnixStream,
+    value: &T,
+    timeout: Duration,
+) -> Result<(), UnixTransportError> {
+    let mut payload = serde_json::to_vec(value)
+        .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Serialization(err.to_string()))?;
+    if payload.len() > MAX_WIRE_BODY_BYTES {
+        payload.zeroize();
+        return Err(UnixTransportError::Protocol(format!(
+            "wire body exceeds max bytes ({MAX_WIRE_BODY_BYTES})"
+        )));
+    }
+    let len = payload.len() as u32;
+    let result = async {
+        tokio::time::timeout(timeout, stream.write_all(&len.to_be_bytes()))
+            .await
+            .map_err(|_| UnixTransportError::Timeout)?
+            .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Io(err.to_string()))?;
+        tokio::time::timeout(timeout, stream.write_all(&payload))
+            .await
+            .map_err(|_| UnixTransportError::Timeout)?
+            .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Io(err.to_string()))?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    .await;
+    payload.zeroize();
+    result
+}
+
+async fn read_frame<T: for<'de> Deserialize<'de>>(
+    stream: &mut UnixStream,
+    timeout: Duration,
+) -> Result<T, UnixTransportError> {
+    let mut len_buf = [0u8; 4];
+    tokio::time::timeout(timeout, stream.read_exact(&mut len_buf))
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| UnixTransportError::Timeout)?
+        .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Io(err.to_string()))?;
+    let len = u32::from_be_bytes(len_buf) as usize;
+    if len > MAX_WIRE_BODY_BYTES {
+        return Err(UnixTransportError::Protocol(format!(
+            "wire frame exceeds max bytes ({MAX_WIRE_BODY_BYTES})"
+        )));
+    }
+
+    let mut payload = vec![0u8; len];
+    let result = async {
+        tokio::time::timeout(timeout, stream.read_exact(&mut payload))
+            .await
+            .map_err(|_| UnixTransportError::Timeout)?
+            .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Io(err.to_string()))?;
+        serde_json::from_slice::<T>(&payload)
+            .map_err(|err| UnixTransportError::Serialization(err.to_string()))
+    }
+    .await;
+    payload.zeroize();
+    result
+}
+
+fn ensure_socket_parent(path: &Path) -> Result<(), String> {
+    if is_symlink(path)? {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "socket path '{}' must not be a symlink",
+            path.display()
+        ));
+    }
+    if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
+        if !parent.as_os_str().is_empty() {
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).map_err(|err| {
+                format!(
+                    "failed to create socket directory '{}': {err}",
+                    parent.display()
+                )
+            })?;
+            if is_symlink(parent)? {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "socket directory '{}' must not be a symlink",
+                    parent.display()
+                ));
+            }
+            ensure_secure_socket_directory(parent)?;
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
+fn ensure_secure_socket_directory(path: &Path) -> Result<(), String> {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;
+
+    const GROUP_OTHER_WRITE_MODE_MASK: u32 = 0o022;
+    const STICKY_BIT_MODE: u32 = 0o1000;
+
+    fn allowed_owner_uids() -> Result<BTreeSet<u32>, String> {
+        let mut allowed = BTreeSet::new();
+        allowed.insert(nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw());
+        if nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw() == 0 {
+            if let Some(raw) = std::env::var_os("SUDO_UID") {
+                let rendered = raw.to_string_lossy();
+                let parsed = rendered
+                    .parse::<u32>()
+                    .map_err(|_| format!("invalid SUDO_UID value '{rendered}'"))?;
+                allowed.insert(parsed);
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(allowed)
+    }
+
+    fn validate_directory(
+        path: &Path,
+        metadata: &std::fs::Metadata,
+        allow_sticky_group_other_write: bool,
+    ) -> Result<(), String> {
+        if !metadata.is_dir() {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "socket directory '{}' must be a directory",
+                path.display()
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let uid = metadata.uid();
+        if uid != 0 {
+            let allowed = allowed_owner_uids()?;
+            if !allowed.contains(&uid) {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "socket directory '{}' must be owned by current user, sudo caller, or root (found uid {uid})",
+                    path.display()
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+
+        let mode = metadata.mode() & 0o7777;
+        if mode & GROUP_OTHER_WRITE_MODE_MASK != 0
+            && !(allow_sticky_group_other_write && mode & STICKY_BIT_MODE != 0)
+        {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "socket directory '{}' must not be writable by group/other",
+                path.display()
+            ));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    let metadata = std::fs::metadata(path).map_err(|err| {
+        format!(
+            "failed to inspect socket directory '{}': {err}",
+            path.display()
+        )
+    })?;
+    validate_directory(path, &metadata, false)?;
+
+    let canonical = std::fs::canonicalize(path).map_err(|err| {
+        format!(
+            "failed to canonicalize socket directory '{}': {err}",
+            path.display()
+        )
+    })?;
+    for ancestor in canonical.ancestors().skip(1) {
+        let metadata = std::fs::metadata(ancestor).map_err(|err| {
+            format!(
+                "failed to inspect ancestor socket directory '{}': {err}",
+                ancestor.display()
+            )
+        })?;
+        validate_directory(ancestor, &metadata, true)?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
+fn allowed_owner_uids() -> Result<BTreeSet<u32>, String> {
+    let mut allowed = BTreeSet::new();
+    allowed.insert(nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw());
+    allowed.insert(0);
+    if nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw() == 0 {
+        if let Some(raw) = std::env::var_os("SUDO_UID") {
+            let rendered = raw.to_string_lossy();
+            let parsed = rendered
+                .parse::<u32>()
+                .map_err(|_| format!("invalid SUDO_UID value '{rendered}'"))?;
+            allowed.insert(parsed);
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(allowed)
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(unix))]
+fn ensure_secure_socket_directory(_path: &Path) -> Result<(), String> {
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn remove_existing_socket_file(path: &Path) -> Result<(), String> {
+    if !path.exists() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let metadata = std::fs::symlink_metadata(path)
+        .map_err(|err| format!("failed to inspect socket path '{}': {err}", path.display()))?;
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::FileTypeExt;
+        if !metadata.file_type().is_socket() {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "socket path '{}' exists and is not a unix socket",
+                path.display()
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+    std::fs::remove_file(path)
+        .map_err(|err| format!("failed to remove stale socket '{}': {err}", path.display()))
+}
+
+fn is_symlink(path: &Path) -> Result<bool, String> {
+    match std::fs::symlink_metadata(path) {
+        Ok(metadata) => Ok(metadata.file_type().is_symlink()),
+        Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(false),
+        Err(err) => Err(format!(
+            "failed to inspect metadata for '{}': {err}",
+            path.display()
+        )),
+    }
+}
+
+fn peer_euid(stream: &UnixStream) -> Result<u32, String> {
+    let creds = stream.peer_cred().map_err(|err| err.to_string())?;
+    Ok(creds.uid())
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl KeyManagerDaemonApi for UnixDaemonClient {
+    async fn issue_lease(&self, vault_password: &str) -> Result<Lease, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::IssueLease {
+                vault_password: vault_password.to_string(),
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::Lease(lease)) => Ok(lease),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn add_policy(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+        policy: SpendingPolicy,
+    ) -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::AddPolicy {
+                session: session.clone(),
+                policy,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::Unit) => Ok(()),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn list_policies(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<SpendingPolicy>, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::ListPolicies {
+                session: session.clone(),
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::Policies(policies)) => Ok(policies),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn disable_policy(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+        policy_id: Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::DisablePolicy {
+                session: session.clone(),
+                policy_id,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::Unit) => Ok(()),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn create_vault_key(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+        request: KeyCreateRequest,
+    ) -> Result<VaultKey, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::CreateVaultKey {
+                session: session.clone(),
+                request,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::VaultKey(key)) => Ok(key),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn create_agent_key(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+        vault_key_id: Uuid,
+        attachment: PolicyAttachment,
+    ) -> Result<AgentCredentials, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::CreateAgentKey {
+                session: session.clone(),
+                vault_key_id,
+                attachment,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::AgentCredentials(agent_credentials)) => Ok(agent_credentials),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn export_vault_private_key(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+        vault_key_id: Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<Option<String>, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::ExportVaultPrivateKey {
+                session: session.clone(),
+                vault_key_id,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::PrivateKey(private_key)) => Ok(private_key),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn rotate_agent_auth_token(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+        agent_key_id: Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<String, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::RotateAgentAuthToken {
+                session: session.clone(),
+                agent_key_id,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::AuthToken(token)) => Ok(token),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn revoke_agent_key(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+        agent_key_id: Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::RevokeAgentKey {
+                session: session.clone(),
+                agent_key_id,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::Unit) => Ok(()),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn list_manual_approval_requests(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<ManualApprovalRequest>, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::ListManualApprovalRequests {
+                session: session.clone(),
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::ManualApprovalRequests(requests)) => Ok(requests),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn decide_manual_approval_request(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+        approval_request_id: Uuid,
+        decision: ManualApprovalDecision,
+        rejection_reason: Option<String>,
+    ) -> Result<ManualApprovalRequest, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::DecideManualApprovalRequest {
+                session: session.clone(),
+                approval_request_id,
+                decision,
+                rejection_reason,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::ManualApprovalRequest(request)) => Ok(request),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn set_relay_config(
+        &self,
+        session: &AdminSession,
+        relay_url: Option<String>,
+        frontend_url: Option<String>,
+    ) -> Result<RelayConfig, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::SetRelayConfig {
+                session: session.clone(),
+                relay_url,
+                frontend_url,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::RelayConfig(relay_config)) => Ok(relay_config),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn get_relay_config(&self, session: &AdminSession) -> Result<RelayConfig, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::GetRelayConfig {
+                session: session.clone(),
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::RelayConfig(relay_config)) => Ok(relay_config),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn evaluate_for_agent(
+        &self,
+        request: SignRequest,
+    ) -> Result<PolicyEvaluation, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::EvaluateForAgent { request })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::PolicyEvaluation(evaluation)) => Ok(evaluation),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn explain_for_agent(
+        &self,
+        request: SignRequest,
+    ) -> Result<PolicyExplanation, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::ExplainForAgent { request })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::PolicyExplanation(explanation)) => Ok(explanation),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn reserve_nonce(
+        &self,
+        request: NonceReservationRequest,
+    ) -> Result<NonceReservation, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::ReserveNonce { request })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::NonceReservation(reservation)) => Ok(reservation),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn release_nonce(&self, request: NonceReleaseRequest) -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::ReleaseNonce { request })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::Unit) => Ok(()),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn sign_for_agent(&self, request: SignRequest) -> Result<Signature, DaemonError> {
+        match self
+            .call_rpc(DaemonRpcRequest::SignForAgent { request })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(DaemonRpcResponse::Signature(sig)) => Ok(sig),
+            Ok(_) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(
+                "unexpected response type".to_string(),
+            )),
+            Err(UnixTransportError::Daemon(err)) => Err(err),
+            Err(err) => Err(DaemonError::Transport(err.to_string())),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::{
+        assert_root_owned_daemon_socket_path, combined_allowed_peer_euids, ensure_socket_parent,
+        handle_connection, read_frame, rpc_access_level, socket_mode_for_allowed_peer_euids,
+        write_frame, RpcAccessLevel, UnixDaemonClient, UnixDaemonServer, UnixTransportError,
+        WireRequest, WireResponse,
+    };
+    use std::collections::BTreeSet;
+    use std::path::Path;
+    use std::sync::Arc;
+    use std::time::Duration;
+    use time::OffsetDateTime;
+    use tokio::net::UnixStream;
+    use uuid::Uuid;
+    use vault_daemon::{DaemonConfig, InMemoryDaemon, KeyManagerDaemonApi};
+    use vault_domain::{AgentAction, SignRequest};
+    use vault_signer::SoftwareSignerBackend;
+
+    fn unique_socket_path(label: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
+        std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
+            "wlfi-{}-{}-{}.sock",
+            label,
+            std::process::id(),
+            &uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string()[..8]
+        ))
+    }
+
+    fn singleton_allowed_set(euid: u32) -> BTreeSet<u32> {
+        let mut set = BTreeSet::new();
+        set.insert(euid);
+        set
+    }
+
+    fn dummy_agent_request() -> SignRequest {
+        SignRequest {
+            request_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
+            agent_key_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
+            agent_auth_token: "agent-secret".to_string(),
+            payload: vec![1, 2, 3],
+            action: AgentAction::TransferNative {
+                chain_id: 1,
+                to: "0x2222222222222222222222222222222222222222"
+                    .parse()
+                    .expect("recipient"),
+                amount_wei: 1,
+            },
+            requested_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
+            expires_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::minutes(1),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn socket_mode(path: &Path) -> u32 {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+
+        std::fs::metadata(path)
+            .expect("socket metadata")
+            .permissions()
+            .mode()
+            & 0o777
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn ensure_socket_parent_rejects_group_writable_ancestor_directory() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+
+        let root = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
+            "wlfi-socket-parent-ancestor-{}-{}",
+            std::process::id(),
+            uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()
+        ));
+        let shared = root.join("shared");
+        let nested = shared.join("nested");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&nested).expect("create nested directory");
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&shared, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o777))
+            .expect("set insecure ancestor permissions");
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&nested, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))
+            .expect("set nested permissions");
+
+        let path = nested.join("daemon.sock");
+        let err = ensure_socket_parent(&path).expect_err("must reject");
+        assert!(err.contains("must not be writable by group/other"));
+
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&shared, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))
+            .expect("restore cleanup permissions");
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root).expect("cleanup");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn assert_root_owned_daemon_socket_path_rejects_symlink() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+
+        let root = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
+            "wlfi-client-socket-symlink-{}-{}",
+            std::process::id(),
+            uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()
+        ));
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).expect("create root directory");
+
+        let target = root.join("daemon.sock.target");
+        std::fs::write(&target, "not a socket").expect("write target");
+        let linked = root.join("daemon.sock");
+        symlink(&target, &linked).expect("create symlink");
+
+        let err = assert_root_owned_daemon_socket_path(&linked).expect_err("must reject");
+        assert!(err.contains("must not be a symlink"));
+
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root).expect("cleanup");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn assert_root_owned_daemon_socket_path_rejects_non_socket_files() {
+        let root = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
+            "wlfi-client-socket-file-{}-{}",
+            std::process::id(),
+            uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()
+        ));
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).expect("create root directory");
+
+        let file = root.join("daemon.sock");
+        std::fs::write(&file, "not a socket").expect("write file");
+
+        let err = assert_root_owned_daemon_socket_path(&file).expect_err("must reject");
+        assert!(err.contains("must be a unix socket"));
+
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root).expect("cleanup");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
+    async fn unix_round_trip_for_issue_lease() {
+        let socket_path = unique_socket_path("lease");
+        let daemon = Arc::new(
+            InMemoryDaemon::new(
+                "vault-password",
+                SoftwareSignerBackend::default(),
+                DaemonConfig::default(),
+            )
+            .expect("daemon"),
+        );
+        let server = UnixDaemonServer::bind(
+            socket_path.clone(),
+            singleton_allowed_set(nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("server");
+        let server_task = tokio::spawn({
+            let daemon = daemon.clone();
+            async move {
+                server
+                    .run_until_shutdown(daemon, async {
+                        std::future::pending::<()>().await;
+                    })
+                    .await
+            }
+        });
+
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
+        let client = UnixDaemonClient::new(socket_path.clone(), Duration::from_secs(2));
+        let lease = client.issue_lease("vault-password").await.expect("lease");
+        assert_eq!(lease.lease_id.get_version_num(), 4);
+
+        server_task.abort();
+        let _ = server_task.await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
+    async fn client_rejects_unexpected_daemon_euid() {
+        let socket_path = unique_socket_path("peer-euid");
+        let daemon = Arc::new(
+            InMemoryDaemon::new(
+                "vault-password",
+                SoftwareSignerBackend::default(),
+                DaemonConfig::default(),
+            )
+            .expect("daemon"),
+        );
+        let allowed_euid = nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw();
+        let server =
+            UnixDaemonServer::bind(socket_path.clone(), singleton_allowed_set(allowed_euid))
+                .await
+                .expect("server");
+        let server_task = tokio::spawn({
+            let daemon = daemon.clone();
+            async move {
+                server
+                    .run_until_shutdown(daemon, async {
+                        std::future::pending::<()>().await;
+                    })
+                    .await
+            }
+        });
+
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
+        let mismatched_expected_euid = allowed_euid.saturating_add(1);
+        let client = UnixDaemonClient::new_with_expected_server_euid(
+            socket_path.clone(),
+            Duration::from_secs(2),
+            mismatched_expected_euid,
+        );
+        let err = client
+            .issue_lease("vault-password")
+            .await
+            .expect_err("must fail");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("unauthorized peer euid"),
+            "unexpected error: {err}"
+        );
+
+        server_task.abort();
+        let _ = server_task.await;
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rpc_access_level_classifies_admin_and_agent_requests() {
+        let admin_request = vault_daemon::DaemonRpcRequest::IssueLease {
+            vault_password: "vault-password".to_string(),
+        };
+        let agent_request = vault_daemon::DaemonRpcRequest::EvaluateForAgent {
+            request: dummy_agent_request(),
+        };
+
+        assert_eq!(rpc_access_level(&admin_request), RpcAccessLevel::Admin);
+        assert_eq!(rpc_access_level(&agent_request), RpcAccessLevel::Agent);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn socket_mode_is_private_only_when_both_allowlists_are_root_only() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            socket_mode_for_allowed_peer_euids(
+                &singleton_allowed_set(0),
+                &singleton_allowed_set(0)
+            ),
+            0o600
+        );
+
+        let current_euid = nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw();
+        assert_eq!(
+            socket_mode_for_allowed_peer_euids(
+                &singleton_allowed_set(0),
+                &singleton_allowed_set(current_euid)
+            ),
+            0o666
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn combined_allowed_peer_euids_deduplicates_split_allowlists() {
+        let current_euid = nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw();
+        let combined = combined_allowed_peer_euids(
+            &BTreeSet::from([0, current_euid]),
+            &BTreeSet::from([current_euid, current_euid.saturating_add(1)]),
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            combined,
+            BTreeSet::from([0, current_euid, current_euid.saturating_add(1)])
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
+    async fn handle_connection_rejects_admin_requests_from_agent_only_peers() {
+        let daemon = Arc::new(
+            InMemoryDaemon::new(
+                "vault-password",
+                SoftwareSignerBackend::default(),
+                DaemonConfig::default(),
+            )
+            .expect("daemon"),
+        );
+        let current_euid = nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw();
+        let (mut client_stream, server_stream) = UnixStream::pair().expect("stream pair");
+        let wire_request = WireRequest {
+            body_json: serde_json::to_string(&vault_daemon::DaemonRpcRequest::IssueLease {
+                vault_password: "vault-password".to_string(),
+            })
+            .expect("serialize request"),
+        };
+        write_frame(&mut client_stream, &wire_request, Duration::from_secs(2))
+            .await
+            .expect("write request");
+
+        let err = handle_connection(
+            server_stream,
+            daemon,
+            singleton_allowed_set(current_euid.saturating_add(1)),
+            singleton_allowed_set(current_euid),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect_err("must reject admin request");
+
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, UnixTransportError::UnauthorizedPeerEuid { actual, .. } if actual == current_euid)
+        );
+        assert!(
+            read_frame::<WireResponse>(&mut client_stream, Duration::from_millis(50))
+                .await
+                .is_err()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
+    async fn handle_connection_rejects_globally_unauthorized_peer_without_frame_read() {
+        let daemon = Arc::new(
+            InMemoryDaemon::new(
+                "vault-password",
+                SoftwareSignerBackend::default(),
+                DaemonConfig::default(),
+            )
+            .expect("daemon"),
+        );
+        let current_euid = nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw();
+        let (_client_stream, server_stream) = UnixStream::pair().expect("stream pair");
+
+        let result = tokio::time::timeout(
+            Duration::from_millis(200),
+            handle_connection(
+                server_stream,
+                daemon,
+                singleton_allowed_set(current_euid.saturating_add(1)),
+                singleton_allowed_set(current_euid.saturating_add(2)),
+            ),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("globally unauthorized peer should be rejected before read timeout");
+
+        let err = result.expect_err("must reject globally unauthorized peer");
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, UnixTransportError::UnauthorizedPeerEuid { actual, .. } if actual == current_euid)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
+    async fn handle_connection_prioritizes_unauthorized_over_deserialization_for_globally_unauthorized_peer(
+    ) {
+        let daemon = Arc::new(
+            InMemoryDaemon::new(
+                "vault-password",
+                SoftwareSignerBackend::default(),
+                DaemonConfig::default(),
+            )
+            .expect("daemon"),
+        );
+        let current_euid = nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw();
+        let (mut client_stream, server_stream) = UnixStream::pair().expect("stream pair");
+        let wire_request = WireRequest {
+            body_json: "{not-json".to_string(),
+        };
+        write_frame(&mut client_stream, &wire_request, Duration::from_secs(2))
+            .await
+            .expect("write malformed request");
+
+        let err = handle_connection(
+            server_stream,
+            daemon,
+            singleton_allowed_set(current_euid.saturating_add(1)),
+            singleton_allowed_set(current_euid.saturating_add(2)),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect_err("must reject globally unauthorized peer");
+
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, UnixTransportError::UnauthorizedPeerEuid { actual, .. } if actual == current_euid)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
+    async fn handle_connection_rejects_agent_requests_from_admin_only_peers() {
+        let daemon = Arc::new(
+            InMemoryDaemon::new(
+                "vault-password",
+                SoftwareSignerBackend::default(),
+                DaemonConfig::default(),
+            )
+            .expect("daemon"),
+        );
+        let current_euid = nix::unistd::geteuid().as_raw();
+        let (mut client_stream, server_stream) = UnixStream::pair().expect("stream pair");
+        let wire_request = WireRequest {
+            body_json: serde_json::to_string(&vault_daemon::DaemonRpcRequest::EvaluateForAgent {
+                request: dummy_agent_request(),
+            })
+            .expect("serialize request"),
+        };
+        write_frame(&mut client_stream, &wire_request, Duration::from_secs(2))
+            .await
+            .expect("write request");
+
+        let err = handle_connection(
+            server_stream,
+            daemon,
+            singleton_allowed_set(current_euid),
+            singleton_allowed_set(current_euid.saturating_add(1)),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect_err("must reject agent request");
+
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, UnixTransportError::UnauthorizedPeerEuid { actual, .. } if actual == current_euid)
+        );
+        assert!(
+            read_frame::<WireResponse>(&mut client_stream, Duration::from_millis(50))
+                .await
+                .is_err()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
+    async fn bind_with_split_allowlists_keeps_root_only_socket_private() {
+        let socket_path = unique_socket_path("split-root-only-mode");
+        let server = UnixDaemonServer::bind_with_allowed_peer_euids(
+            socket_path.clone(),
+            singleton_allowed_set(0),
+            singleton_allowed_set(0),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("server");
+
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        assert_eq!(socket_mode(&socket_path), 0o600);
+
+        drop(server);
+    }
+}