@wkgeo/cli 1.0.0 → 1.1.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (42) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +249 -203
  2. package/README.md +151 -19
  3. package/SKILL.md +108 -27
  4. package/lib/args.mjs +2 -2
  5. package/lib/asset-role.mjs +68 -0
  6. package/lib/cms.mjs +2 -2
  7. package/lib/commands/billing.mjs +56 -10
  8. package/lib/commands/cms.mjs +49 -13
  9. package/lib/commands/content.mjs +108 -0
  10. package/lib/commands/crawl.mjs +219 -0
  11. package/lib/commands/geo.mjs +1673 -0
  12. package/lib/commands/index.mjs +640 -528
  13. package/lib/commands/member.mjs +930 -0
  14. package/lib/commands/seo.mjs +1386 -0
  15. package/lib/commands/siteops.mjs +3 -3
  16. package/lib/commands/sites.mjs +21 -125
  17. package/lib/commands/template.mjs +1474 -0
  18. package/lib/config.mjs +16 -13
  19. package/lib/content-apply.mjs +664 -0
  20. package/lib/content-check.mjs +887 -0
  21. package/lib/content-contract.mjs +957 -0
  22. package/lib/errors.mjs +6 -0
  23. package/lib/format.mjs +5 -1
  24. package/lib/manifest-apply.mjs +1499 -0
  25. package/lib/manifest-schema.json +476 -0
  26. package/lib/manifest.mjs +1082 -0
  27. package/lib/oauth-urls.mjs +1 -1
  28. package/lib/runtime.mjs +5 -1
  29. package/lib/site-create.mjs +536 -0
  30. package/lib/tar.mjs +207 -0
  31. package/lib/template-anim.mjs +1338 -0
  32. package/lib/template-animation.mjs +232 -0
  33. package/lib/template-capture.mjs +700 -0
  34. package/lib/template-gen.mjs +1204 -0
  35. package/lib/template-pack.mjs +206 -0
  36. package/lib/template-package.mjs +522 -0
  37. package/lib/template-publish.mjs +733 -0
  38. package/lib/template-score.mjs +865 -0
  39. package/lib/template-validate.mjs +368 -0
  40. package/lib/template-verify.mjs +434 -0
  41. package/lib/templates-sync.mjs +616 -0
  42. package/package.json +2 -2
package/lib/tar.mjs ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
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+ /**
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+ * 极简 tar.gz 读取器(node 内置 zlib,**零第三方依赖**)。
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+ *
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+ * 为什么手写:`wkgeo template init` 要从 registry 下 `.tgz` 并解包,而 CLI 的硬约定是
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+ * **零依赖**(见 cli/README)。tar 格式本身只有 512 字节定长头 + 512 对齐的数据块,
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+ * 只需要支持 npm pack 实际会产出的三种记录:
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+ * * `0` / `\0` —— 普通文件
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+ * * `5` —— 目录
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+ * * `x` / `g` / `L` / `K` —— PAX 扩展头 / GNU 长名(npm 打包长路径时会出现)
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+ * 符号链接 / 硬链接 / 设备文件**一律拒绝**(防止压缩包把文件写到目标目录外面去)。
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+ *
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+ * 安全边界都收在 `safeEntryPath()` 一处:绝对路径、盘符(`C:`)、任何 `..` 段、
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+ * 反斜杠路径穿越,统统抛错;解包时再 `resolve()` 复核一次目标仍在根目录内。
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+ */
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+
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+ import fs from 'node:fs';
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+ import path from 'node:path';
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+ import zlib from 'node:zlib';
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+
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+ const BLOCK = 512;
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+
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+ function cstr(buf, off, len) {
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+ const slice = buf.subarray(off, off + len);
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+ const end = slice.indexOf(0);
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+ return slice.toString('utf8', 0, end === -1 ? slice.length : end);
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+ }
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+
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+ function octal(buf, off, len) {
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+ const raw = cstr(buf, off, len).trim();
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+ if (!raw) return 0;
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+ // base-256(大文件用):首字节最高位为 1
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+ if (buf[off] & 0x80) {
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+ let n = 0;
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+ for (let i = off + 1; i < off + len; i += 1) n = n * 256 + buf[i];
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+ return n;
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+ }
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+ const n = parseInt(raw.replace(/[^0-7]/g, ''), 8);
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+ return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;
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+ }
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+
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+ /** PAX 记录:`<len> <key>=<value>\n` 串联 */
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+ function parsePax(data) {
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+ const out = {};
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+ let pos = 0;
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+ while (pos < data.length) {
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+ const sp = data.indexOf(0x20, pos);
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+ if (sp === -1) break;
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+ const len = parseInt(data.toString('latin1', pos, sp), 10);
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+ if (!Number.isFinite(len) || len <= 0) break;
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+ const record = data.toString('utf8', sp + 1, pos + len - 1); // 去掉尾部 \n
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+ const eq = record.indexOf('=');
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+ if (eq > 0) out[record.slice(0, eq)] = record.slice(eq + 1);
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+ pos += len;
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+ }
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+ return out;
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * 读 tar.gz,返回条目数组(**只含普通文件与目录**,带数据)。
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+ * @param {Buffer} gzBuffer .tgz 原始字节
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+ * @returns {Array<{path:string,type:'file'|'dir',mode:number,size:number,data:Buffer|null}>}
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+ */
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+ export function readTarGz(gzBuffer) {
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+ const buf = zlib.gunzipSync(gzBuffer);
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+ const entries = [];
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+ let pos = 0;
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+ let pendingLongName = null;
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+ let pendingPax = null;
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+
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+ while (pos + BLOCK <= buf.length) {
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+ const header = buf.subarray(pos, pos + BLOCK);
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+ // 全零块 = 结束(正常会有两块,一块也照停)
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+ if (header.every((b) => b === 0)) break;
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+
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+ const name = cstr(header, 0, 100);
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+ const mode = octal(header, 100, 8);
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+ const size = octal(header, 124, 12);
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+ const typeflag = String.fromCharCode(header[156] || 0x30);
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+ const prefix = cstr(header, 345, 155);
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+ const dataStart = pos + BLOCK;
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+ const dataEnd = dataStart + size;
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+
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+ // 校验和(只用来发现"这不是 tar",不用于安全)
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+ let sum = 0;
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+ for (let i = 0; i < BLOCK; i += 1) sum += i >= 148 && i < 156 ? 0x20 : header[i];
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+ const want = octal(header, 148, 8);
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+ if (want && sum !== want) {
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+ throw new Error(`tar 头校验和不符(偏移 ${pos}):可能是文件损坏,拒绝解包`);
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+ }
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+
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+ const data = buf.subarray(dataStart, Math.min(dataEnd, buf.length));
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+ const next = dataStart + Math.ceil(size / BLOCK) * BLOCK;
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+
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+ if (typeflag === 'x' || typeflag === 'g') {
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+ pendingPax = { ...(pendingPax || {}), ...parsePax(data) };
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+ pos = next;
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ if (typeflag === 'L') {
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+ pendingLongName = cstr(data, 0, data.length);
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+ pos = next;
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ if (typeflag === 'K') {
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+ // GNU longlink:目标名,只在链接条目上有意义 —— 链接本身下面会被拒
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+ pos = next;
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+
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+ let entryPath = pendingPax?.path || pendingLongName || (prefix ? `${prefix}/${name}` : name);
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+ pendingPax = null;
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+ pendingLongName = null;
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+
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+ if (typeflag === '0' || typeflag === '\0' || typeflag === '7') {
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+ entries.push({ path: entryPath, type: 'file', mode, size, data });
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+ } else if (typeflag === '5') {
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+ entries.push({ path: entryPath.replace(/\/+$/, ''), type: 'dir', mode, size: 0, data: null });
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+ } else if (typeflag === '1' || typeflag === '2') {
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+ throw new Error(
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+ `压缩包含符号/硬链接条目(${entryPath}),已拒绝解包(防止越界写入)。` +
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+ '正常 npm 包里不会有链接,这通常意味着包被篡改。',
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+ );
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+ } else {
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+ throw new Error(`压缩包含不支持的条目类型 ${JSON.stringify(typeflag)}(${entryPath}),已拒绝解包`);
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+ }
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+ pos = next;
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+ }
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+ return entries;
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * 把条目路径变成安全的相对路径(**所有越界判定只在这里**)。
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+ * @param {string} raw tar 里的路径
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+ * @param {string} [stripPrefix] 去掉的前缀(npm 包是 `package/`)
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+ */
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+ export function safeEntryPath(raw, stripPrefix = '') {
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+ let p = String(raw || '');
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+ if (stripPrefix && p.startsWith(stripPrefix)) p = p.slice(stripPrefix.length);
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+ p = p.replace(/^\.\//, '');
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+ if (!p) return '';
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+ if (p.includes('\\')) throw new Error(`压缩包路径含反斜杠(${raw}),拒绝解包`);
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+ if (/^[a-zA-Z]:/.test(p)) throw new Error(`压缩包路径含盘符(${raw}),拒绝解包`);
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+ if (p.startsWith('/')) throw new Error(`压缩包路径是绝对路径(${raw}),拒绝解包`);
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+ const parts = p.split('/');
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+ if (parts.some((s) => s === '..')) throw new Error(`压缩包路径含 ..(${raw}),拒绝解包`);
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+ if (parts.some((s) => s === '.' && parts.length > 1) || parts.includes('')) {
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+ // 空的中间段(`a//b`)只是写法怪,抹平即可,不算攻击
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+ p = parts.filter((s) => s && s !== '.').join('/');
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+ }
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+ return p;
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * 解包到目录。**先校验全部条目再落盘**:一个坏条目都不写。
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+ * @returns {{files:number,dirs:number,bytes:number}}
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+ */
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+ export function extractTarGz(gzBuffer, destDir, { stripPrefix = 'package/', allowTop = null } = {}) {
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+ const entries = readTarGz(gzBuffer);
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+ const root = path.resolve(destDir);
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+ const allow = Array.isArray(allowTop) ? new Set(allowTop) : null;
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+ const plan = [];
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+ const skipped = [];
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+ let bytes = 0;
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+ let fileCount = 0;
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+
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+ for (const one of entries) {
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+ const rel = safeEntryPath(one.path, stripPrefix);
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+ if (!rel) continue;
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+ if (allow) {
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+ const top = rel.split('/')[0];
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+ if (!allow.has(top)) {
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+ // 白名单外的东西**不落盘**,但记下来(报告里要能看见"包里多了什么")
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+ skipped.push(rel);
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ const abs = path.resolve(root, rel);
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+ if (abs !== root && !abs.startsWith(root + path.sep)) {
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+ throw new Error(`压缩包条目越界(${one.path}),拒绝解包`);
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+ }
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+ if (one.type === 'file') {
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+ bytes += one.size;
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+ fileCount += 1;
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+ }
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+ plan.push({ ...one, rel, abs });
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+ }
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+
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+ fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
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+ let dirCount = 0;
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+ for (const one of plan) {
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+ if (one.type === 'dir') {
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+ fs.mkdirSync(one.abs, { recursive: true });
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+ dirCount += 1;
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(one.abs), { recursive: true });
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+ fs.writeFileSync(one.abs, one.data);
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+ if (one.mode) {
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+ try {
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+ fs.chmodSync(one.abs, one.mode & 0o777);
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+ } catch {
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+ /* Windows 上 chmod 基本无效,忽略 */
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+ return { files: fileCount, dirs: dirCount, bytes, skipped };
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+ }