@wix/entity-advanced-permissions 1.1421.0 → 1.1422.0

package/dist/statics/entity-advanced-permissions.umd.js

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@@ -34455,6 +34489,54 @@ var __WEBPACK_AMD_DEFINE_ARRAY__, __WEBPACK_AMD_DEFINE_RESULT__;/*!
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+/******/ 				script.onerror = script.onload = null;
+/******/ 				clearTimeout(timeout);
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@@ -34595,6 +34677,101 @@ var __WEBPACK_AMD_DEFINE_ARRAY__, __WEBPACK_AMD_DEFINE_RESULT__;/*!
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 /******/ 	
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@@ -34606,7 +34783,7 @@ var __webpack_exports__ = {};
 (() => {
 "use strict";
 /*!********************************!*\
-  !*** ./index.ts + 566 modules ***!
+  !*** ./index.ts + 565 modules ***!
   \********************************/
 // ESM COMPAT FLAG
 __webpack_require__.r(__webpack_exports__);
@@ -35533,7 +35710,7 @@ if(false /* HMR */) // removed by dead control flow
 {}
 
 ;// ../../../node_modules/@wix/design-system/dist/esm/utils/versionedNamespace.js
-const placeholder = 'wds_1_331_0';
+const placeholder = 'wds_1_334_0';
 const versionedNamespace = placeholder.startsWith('wds_')
     ? placeholder
     : '';
@@ -40556,7 +40733,7 @@ class PopoverComponent extends external_React_.PureComponent {
         if (theme) {
             deprecationLog_deprecationLog('<Popover/> - theme prop is deprecated and will be removed in next major version, please use skin instead');
         }
-        return external_React_default().createElement(PopoverCore, { timeout: timeout, ...rest, skin: skin || theme });
+        return (external_React_default().createElement(PopoverCore, { timeout: timeout, ...rest, skin: skin || theme || 'light' }));
     }
 }
 PopoverComponent.displayName = 'Popover';
@@ -40564,7 +40741,6 @@ PopoverComponent.Element = PopoverCore.Element;
 PopoverComponent.Content = PopoverCore.Content;
 PopoverComponent.defaultProps = {
     appendTo: 'parent',
-    theme: 'light', // TODO: add default skin value once theme is removed
     animate: false,
     interactive: true,
 };
@@ -40778,7 +40954,7 @@ const Tooltip = (0,external_React_.forwardRef)((componentProps, ref) => {
         // @ts-ignore
         external_React_default().createElement(RawText, { dataHook: constants_dataHooks.tooltipText, size: textSize, light: true, className: Tooltip_classes_classes.text(), renderChildren: ({ text }) => text, renderElement: ({ element }) => element }, content)) : (content)));
     }, [content, textAlign, size]);
-    return (external_React_default().createElement(Popover, { role: "tooltip", showArrow: size !== 'small', className: Tooltip_classes_classes.root({ size, inline }, className), placement: placement, shown: isDisabled ? false : shown, onPointerEnter: trackPointerType, onPointerLeave: trackPointerType, onMouseEnter: isDisabled ? undefined : openFromHover, onMouseLeave: closeFromHover, onPointerDown: onTriggerPointerDown, onClick: onTriggerClick, onContentClick: onContentClick, onClickOutside: close, onEscPress: close, onShow: handleShow, onHide: handleHide, "data-size": size, hideDelay: exitDelay, showDelay: enterDelay, moveBy: moveBy, moveArrowTo: moveArrowTo, appendTo: appendTo, id: ariaLabelledBy || ariaDescribedBy, flip: flip, fixed: fixed, maxWidth: maxWidth, fluid: fluid, disableClickOutsideWhenClosed: true, zIndex: zIndex, interactive: interactive, ...rest, theme: "dark", timeout: TIMEOUT },
+    return (external_React_default().createElement(Popover, { role: "tooltip", showArrow: size !== 'small', className: Tooltip_classes_classes.root({ size, inline }, className), placement: placement, shown: isDisabled ? false : shown, onPointerEnter: trackPointerType, onPointerLeave: trackPointerType, onMouseEnter: isDisabled ? undefined : openFromHover, onMouseLeave: closeFromHover, onPointerDown: onTriggerPointerDown, onClick: onTriggerClick, onContentClick: onContentClick, onClickOutside: close, onEscPress: close, onShow: handleShow, onHide: handleHide, "data-size": size, hideDelay: exitDelay, showDelay: enterDelay, moveBy: moveBy, moveArrowTo: moveArrowTo, appendTo: appendTo, id: ariaLabelledBy || ariaDescribedBy, flip: flip, fixed: fixed, maxWidth: maxWidth, fluid: fluid, disableClickOutsideWhenClosed: true, zIndex: zIndex, interactive: interactive, ...rest, skin: "dark", timeout: TIMEOUT },
         external_React_default().createElement(Popover.Element, null, triggerElement),
         external_React_default().createElement(Popover.Content, null,
             external_React_default().createElement("div", { ref: contentRef, style: { maxWidth } }, contentElement))));
@@ -59152,6 +59328,7 @@ const APPEND_TO = {
     scrollParent: 'scrollParent',
     parent: 'parent',
 };
+const DEFAULT_BOUNDARY_PADDING = 5;
 const PopoverNext_constants_placements = (/* unused pure expression or super */ null && ([
     'top',
     'top-start',
@@ -59267,7 +59444,16 @@ const utils_getByPredicate = (predicate, element) => {
 
 
 
-const usePositioning = ({ flip = true, fixed = false, placement, appendTo, rootRef, }) => {
+const resolveBoundaryPadding = (boundaryPadding = DEFAULT_BOUNDARY_PADDING) => typeof boundaryPadding === 'number'
+    ? boundaryPadding
+    : {
+        top: DEFAULT_BOUNDARY_PADDING,
+        right: DEFAULT_BOUNDARY_PADDING,
+        bottom: DEFAULT_BOUNDARY_PADDING,
+        left: DEFAULT_BOUNDARY_PADDING,
+        ...boundaryPadding,
+    };
+const usePositioning = ({ flip = true, fixed = false, placement, appendTo, rootRef, boundaryPadding, }) => {
     const [portalRoot, setPortalRoot] = (0,external_React_.useState)(null);
     // TODO: check if a rerender can be avoided
     // https://github.com/wix-private/wix-design-systems/pull/14279#discussion_r1842099301
@@ -59311,6 +59497,7 @@ const usePositioning = ({ flip = true, fixed = false, placement, appendTo, rootR
         }
     };
     const flipPlacement = isFlipPlacement(placement) ? placement : undefined;
+    const padding = resolveBoundaryPadding(boundaryPadding);
     const getFallbackPlacements = (placement) => {
         if (fixed) {
             return flip ? undefined : [placement];
@@ -59323,20 +59510,20 @@ const usePositioning = ({ flip = true, fixed = false, placement, appendTo, rootR
                 flip: {
                     fallbackAxisSideDirection: 'end',
                     mainAxis: isMainAxis || (flip && !fixed),
-                    padding: 5,
+                    padding,
                     crossAxis: false,
                     fallbackPlacements: getFallbackPlacements(flipPlacement),
                 },
             }
             : {
                 autoPlacement: {
-                    padding: 5,
+                    padding,
                     autoAlignment: false,
                     alignment: getAutoPlacement(placement),
                 },
             }),
         shift: {
-            padding: 5,
+            padding,
             crossAxis: shouldShiftByCrossAxis,
             mainAxis: !fixed,
         },
@@ -59499,7 +59686,7 @@ const getFloatingWidthStyles = ({ appendTo, width, minWidth, maxWidth, dynamicWi
 
 
 const ANIMATED_DURATION = { open: 150, close: 100 };
-function usePopover({ dataHook, open = false, onOpenChange, focusManagerEnabled = true, appendTo = APPEND_TO.parent, dynamicWidth = false, zIndex = ZIndex.popover, width, minWidth, maxWidth, excludeClass, moveBy, flip: shouldFlip = true, placement = 'bottom', fixed = false, rootRef, showDelay, hideDelay, timeout: duration, skin, transitionSettings, onClickOutside, overlay = false, role, tabIndex, 'aria-label': ariaLabel, 'aria-labelledby': ariaLabelledBy, 'aria-describedby': ariaDescribedBy, id, style, onClick, animate, showArrow = false, customArrow, contentClassName, onMouseEnter, onMouseLeave, autoUpdateOptions, }) {
+function usePopover({ dataHook, open = false, onOpenChange, focusManagerEnabled = true, appendTo = APPEND_TO.parent, dynamicWidth = false, zIndex = ZIndex.popover, width, minWidth, maxWidth, excludeClass, moveBy, flip: shouldFlip = true, placement = 'bottom', fixed = false, boundaryPadding, rootRef, showDelay, hideDelay, timeout: duration, skin, transitionSettings, onClickOutside, overlay = false, role, tabIndex, 'aria-label': ariaLabel, 'aria-labelledby': ariaLabelledBy, 'aria-describedby': ariaDescribedBy, id, style, onClick, animate, showArrow = false, customArrow, contentClassName, onMouseEnter, onMouseLeave, autoUpdateOptions, }) {
     const { contextClassName } = (0,external_React_.useContext)(WixDesignSystemContext);
     const isHoverMode = Boolean(onMouseEnter && onMouseLeave);
     const isHybridMode = Boolean(onMouseEnter) !== Boolean(onMouseLeave);
@@ -59523,6 +59710,7 @@ function usePopover({ dataHook, open = false, onOpenChange, focusManagerEnabled
         placement,
         appendTo,
         rootRef,
+        boundaryPadding,
     });
     const { getArrowProps, arrowMiddleware, getContentWithArrowStyles } = useArrow(showArrow);
     const { context, middlewareData, floatingStyles, placement: floatingPlacement, } = floating_ui_react_useFloating({
@@ -64052,2743 +64240,15 @@ function withErrorBoundary(component, errorBoundaryProps) {
 
 
 
-;// ../../../node_modules/@wix/wix-ui-icons-common/node_modules/dompurify/dist/purify.es.mjs
-/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.15 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.15/LICENSE */
-
-function _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
-  (null == a || a > r.length) && (a = r.length);
-  for (var e = 0, n = Array(a); e < a; e++) n[e] = r[e];
-  return n;
-}
-function _arrayWithHoles(r) {
-  if (Array.isArray(r)) return r;
-}
-function _iterableToArrayLimit(r, l) {
-  var t = null == r ? null : "undefined" != typeof Symbol && r[Symbol.iterator] || r["@@iterator"];
-  if (null != t) {
-    var e,
-      n,
-      i,
-      u,
-      a = [],
-      f = true,
-      o = false;
-    try {
-      if (i = (t = t.call(r)).next, 0 === l) ; else for (; !(f = (e = i.call(t)).done) && (a.push(e.value), a.length !== l); f = !0);
-    } catch (r) {
-      o = true, n = r;
-    } finally {
-      try {
-        if (!f && null != t.return && (u = t.return(), Object(u) !== u)) return;
-      } finally {
-        if (o) throw n;
-      }
-    }
-    return a;
-  }
-}
-function _nonIterableRest() {
-  throw new TypeError("Invalid attempt to destructure non-iterable instance.\nIn order to be iterable, non-array objects must have a [Symbol.iterator]() method.");
-}
-function _slicedToArray(r, e) {
-  return _arrayWithHoles(r) || _iterableToArrayLimit(r, e) || _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, e) || _nonIterableRest();
-}
-function _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, a) {
-  if (r) {
-    if ("string" == typeof r) return _arrayLikeToArray(r, a);
-    var t = {}.toString.call(r).slice(8, -1);
-    return "Object" === t && r.constructor && (t = r.constructor.name), "Map" === t || "Set" === t ? Array.from(r) : "Arguments" === t || /^(?:Ui|I)nt(?:8|16|32)(?:Clamped)?Array$/.test(t) ? _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) : void 0;
-  }
-}
-
-const entries = Object.entries,
-  setPrototypeOf = Object.setPrototypeOf,
-  isFrozen = Object.isFrozen,
-  getPrototypeOf = Object.getPrototypeOf,
-  getOwnPropertyDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
-let freeze = Object.freeze,
-  seal = Object.seal,
-  create = Object.create; // eslint-disable-line import/no-mutable-exports
-let _ref = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect,
-  apply = _ref.apply,
-  construct = _ref.construct;
-if (!freeze) {
-  freeze = function freeze(x) {
-    return x;
-  };
-}
-if (!seal) {
-  seal = function seal(x) {
-    return x;
-  };
-}
-if (!apply) {
-  apply = function apply(func, thisArg) {
-    for (var _len = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len > 2 ? _len - 2 : 0), _key = 2; _key < _len; _key++) {
-      args[_key - 2] = arguments[_key];
-    }
-    return func.apply(thisArg, args);
-  };
-}
-if (!construct) {
-  construct = function construct(Func) {
-    for (var _len2 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len2 > 1 ? _len2 - 1 : 0), _key2 = 1; _key2 < _len2; _key2++) {
-      args[_key2 - 1] = arguments[_key2];
-    }
-    return new Func(...args);
-  };
-}
-const arrayForEach = unapply(Array.prototype.forEach);
-const arrayLastIndexOf = unapply(Array.prototype.lastIndexOf);
-const arrayPop = unapply(Array.prototype.pop);
-const arrayPush = unapply(Array.prototype.push);
-const arraySplice = unapply(Array.prototype.splice);
-const arrayIsArray = Array.isArray;
-const stringToLowerCase = unapply(String.prototype.toLowerCase);
-const stringToString = unapply(String.prototype.toString);
-const stringMatch = unapply(String.prototype.match);
-const stringReplace = unapply(String.prototype.replace);
-const stringIndexOf = unapply(String.prototype.indexOf);
-const stringTrim = unapply(String.prototype.trim);
-const numberToString = unapply(Number.prototype.toString);
-const booleanToString = unapply(Boolean.prototype.toString);
-const bigintToString = typeof BigInt === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(BigInt.prototype.toString);
-const symbolToString = typeof Symbol === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(Symbol.prototype.toString);
-const objectHasOwnProperty = unapply(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty);
-const objectToString = unapply(Object.prototype.toString);
-const regExpTest = unapply(RegExp.prototype.test);
-const typeErrorCreate = unconstruct(TypeError);
-/**
- * Creates a new function that calls the given function with a specified thisArg and arguments.
- *
- * @param func - The function to be wrapped and called.
- * @returns A new function that calls the given function with a specified thisArg and arguments.
- */
-function unapply(func) {
-  return function (thisArg) {
-    if (thisArg instanceof RegExp) {
-      thisArg.lastIndex = 0;
-    }
-    for (var _len3 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len3 > 1 ? _len3 - 1 : 0), _key3 = 1; _key3 < _len3; _key3++) {
-      args[_key3 - 1] = arguments[_key3];
-    }
-    return apply(func, thisArg, args);
-  };
-}
-/**
- * Creates a new function that constructs an instance of the given constructor function with the provided arguments.
- *
- * @param func - The constructor function to be wrapped and called.
- * @returns A new function that constructs an instance of the given constructor function with the provided arguments.
- */
-function unconstruct(Func) {
-  return function () {
-    for (var _len4 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len4), _key4 = 0; _key4 < _len4; _key4++) {
-      args[_key4] = arguments[_key4];
-    }
-    return construct(Func, args);
-  };
-}
-/**
- * Add properties to a lookup table
- *
- * @param set - The set to which elements will be added.
- * @param array - The array containing elements to be added to the set.
- * @param transformCaseFunc - An optional function to transform the case of each element before adding to the set.
- * @returns The modified set with added elements.
- */
-function addToSet(set, array) {
-  let transformCaseFunc = arguments.length > 2 && arguments[2] !== undefined ? arguments[2] : stringToLowerCase;
-  if (setPrototypeOf) {
-    // Make 'in' and truthy checks like Boolean(set.constructor)
-    // independent of any properties defined on Object.prototype.
-    // Prevent prototype setters from intercepting set as a this value.
-    setPrototypeOf(set, null);
-  }
-  if (!arrayIsArray(array)) {
-    return set;
-  }
-  let l = array.length;
-  while (l--) {
-    let element = array[l];
-    if (typeof element === 'string') {
-      const lcElement = transformCaseFunc(element);
-      if (lcElement !== element) {
-        // Config presets (e.g. tags.js, attrs.js) are immutable.
-        if (!isFrozen(array)) {
-          array[l] = lcElement;
-        }
-        element = lcElement;
-      }
-    }
-    set[element] = true;
-  }
-  return set;
-}
-/**
- * Clean up an array to harden against CSPP
- *
- * @param array - The array to be cleaned.
- * @returns The cleaned version of the array
- */
-function cleanArray(array) {
-  for (let index = 0; index < array.length; index++) {
-    const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(array, index);
-    if (!isPropertyExist) {
-      array[index] = null;
-    }
-  }
-  return array;
-}
-/**
- * Shallow clone an object
- *
- * @param object - The object to be cloned.
- * @returns A new object that copies the original.
- */
-function clone(object) {
-  const newObject = create(null);
-  for (const _ref2 of entries(object)) {
-    var _ref3 = _slicedToArray(_ref2, 2);
-    const property = _ref3[0];
-    const value = _ref3[1];
-    const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(object, property);
-    if (isPropertyExist) {
-      if (arrayIsArray(value)) {
-        newObject[property] = cleanArray(value);
-      } else if (value && typeof value === 'object' && value.constructor === Object) {
-        newObject[property] = clone(value);
-      } else {
-        newObject[property] = value;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return newObject;
-}
-/**
- * Convert non-node values into strings without depending on direct property access.
- *
- * @param value - The value to stringify.
- * @returns A string representation of the provided value.
- */
-function stringifyValue(value) {
-  switch (typeof value) {
-    case 'string':
-      {
-        return value;
-      }
-    case 'number':
-      {
-        return numberToString(value);
-      }
-    case 'boolean':
-      {
-        return booleanToString(value);
-      }
-    case 'bigint':
-      {
-        return bigintToString ? bigintToString(value) : '0';
-      }
-    case 'symbol':
-      {
-        return symbolToString ? symbolToString(value) : 'Symbol()';
-      }
-    case 'undefined':
-      {
-        return objectToString(value);
-      }
-    case 'function':
-    case 'object':
-      {
-        if (value === null) {
-          return objectToString(value);
-        }
-        const valueAsRecord = value;
-        const valueToString = lookupGetter(valueAsRecord, 'toString');
-        if (typeof valueToString === 'function') {
-          const stringified = valueToString(valueAsRecord);
-          return typeof stringified === 'string' ? stringified : objectToString(stringified);
-        }
-        return objectToString(value);
-      }
-    default:
-      {
-        return objectToString(value);
-      }
-  }
-}
-/**
- * This method automatically checks if the prop is function or getter and behaves accordingly.
- *
- * @param object - The object to look up the getter function in its prototype chain.
- * @param prop - The property name for which to find the getter function.
- * @returns The getter function found in the prototype chain or a fallback function.
- */
-function lookupGetter(object, prop) {
-  while (object !== null) {
-    const desc = getOwnPropertyDescriptor(object, prop);
-    if (desc) {
-      if (desc.get) {
-        return unapply(desc.get);
-      }
-      if (typeof desc.value === 'function') {
-        return unapply(desc.value);
-      }
-    }
-    object = getPrototypeOf(object);
-  }
-  function fallbackValue() {
-    return null;
-  }
-  return fallbackValue;
-}
-function isRegex(value) {
-  try {
-    regExpTest(value, '');
-    return true;
-  } catch (_unused) {
-    return false;
-  }
-}
-
-const html$1 = freeze(['a', 'abbr', 'acronym', 'address', 'area', 'article', 'aside', 'audio', 'b', 'bdi', 'bdo', 'big', 'blink', 'blockquote', 'body', 'br', 'button', 'canvas', 'caption', 'center', 'cite', 'code', 'col', 'colgroup', 'content', 'data', 'datalist', 'dd', 'decorator', 'del', 'details', 'dfn', 'dialog', 'dir', 'div', 'dl', 'dt', 'element', 'em', 'fieldset', 'figcaption', 'figure', 'font', 'footer', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'head', 'header', 'hgroup', 'hr', 'html', 'i', 'img', 'input', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend', 'li', 'main', 'map', 'mark', 'marquee', 'menu', 'menuitem', 'meter', 'nav', 'nobr', 'ol', 'optgroup', 'option', 'output', 'p', 'picture', 'pre', 'progress', 'q', 'rp', 'rt', 'ruby', 's', 'samp', 'search', 'section', 'select', 'shadow', 'slot', 'small', 'source', 'spacer', 'span', 'strike', 'strong', 'style', 'sub', 'summary', 'sup', 'table', 'tbody', 'td', 'template', 'textarea', 'tfoot', 'th', 'thead', 'time', 'tr', 'track', 'tt', 'u', 'ul', 'var', 'video', 'wbr']);
-const svg$1 = freeze(['svg', 'a', 'altglyph', 'altglyphdef', 'altglyphitem', 'animatecolor', 'animatemotion', 'animatetransform', 'circle', 'clippath', 'defs', 'desc', 'ellipse', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'filter', 'font', 'g', 'glyph', 'glyphref', 'hkern', 'image', 'inputmode', 'line', 'lineargradient', 'marker', 'mask', 'metadata', 'mpath', 'part', 'path', 'pattern', 'polygon', 'polyline', 'radialgradient', 'rect', 'stop', 'style', 'switch', 'symbol', 'text', 'textpath', 'title', 'tref', 'tspan', 'view', 'vkern']);
-const svgFilters = freeze(['feBlend', 'feColorMatrix', 'feComponentTransfer', 'feComposite', 'feConvolveMatrix', 'feDiffuseLighting', 'feDisplacementMap', 'feDistantLight', 'feDropShadow', 'feFlood', 'feFuncA', 'feFuncB', 'feFuncG', 'feFuncR', 'feGaussianBlur', 'feImage', 'feMerge', 'feMergeNode', 'feMorphology', 'feOffset', 'fePointLight', 'feSpecularLighting', 'feSpotLight', 'feTile', 'feTurbulence']);
-// List of SVG elements that are disallowed by default.
-// We still need to know them so that we can do namespace
-// checks properly in case one wants to add them to
-// allow-list.
-const svgDisallowed = freeze(['animate', 'color-profile', 'cursor', 'discard', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'foreignobject', 'hatch', 'hatchpath', 'mesh', 'meshgradient', 'meshpatch', 'meshrow', 'missing-glyph', 'script', 'set', 'solidcolor', 'unknown', 'use']);
-const mathMl$1 = freeze(['math', 'menclose', 'merror', 'mfenced', 'mfrac', 'mglyph', 'mi', 'mlabeledtr', 'mmultiscripts', 'mn', 'mo', 'mover', 'mpadded', 'mphantom', 'mroot', 'mrow', 'ms', 'mspace', 'msqrt', 'mstyle', 'msub', 'msup', 'msubsup', 'mtable', 'mtd', 'mtext', 'mtr', 'munder', 'munderover', 'mprescripts']);
-// Similarly to SVG, we want to know all MathML elements,
-// even those that we disallow by default.
-const mathMlDisallowed = freeze(['maction', 'maligngroup', 'malignmark', 'mlongdiv', 'mscarries', 'mscarry', 'msgroup', 'mstack', 'msline', 'msrow', 'semantics', 'annotation', 'annotation-xml', 'mprescripts', 'none']);
-const purify_es_text = freeze(['#text']);
-
-const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
-const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'pointer-events', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'vector-effect', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
-const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
-const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
-
-const MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/{{[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*}}/g);
-const ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*%>/g);
-const TMPLIT_EXPR = seal(/\${[\w\W]*/g);
-const purify_es_DATA_ATTR = seal(/^data-[\-\w.\u00B7-\uFFFF]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
-const ARIA_ATTR = seal(/^aria-[\-\w]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
-const IS_ALLOWED_URI = seal(/^(?:(?:(?:f|ht)tps?|mailto|tel|callto|sms|cid|xmpp|matrix):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
-);
-const IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA = seal(/^(?:\w+script|data):/i);
-const ATTR_WHITESPACE = seal(/[\u0000-\u0020\u00A0\u1680\u180E\u2000-\u2029\u205F\u3000]/g // eslint-disable-line no-control-regex
-);
-const DOCTYPE_NAME = seal(/^html$/i);
-const CUSTOM_ELEMENT = seal(/^[a-z][.\w]*(-[.\w]+)+$/i);
-// Markup-significant character probes used by _sanitizeElements.
-// Shared module-level instances are safe despite the sticky /g flags:
-// unapply() resets lastIndex for RegExp receivers before every call.
-const ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w!]/g);
-const COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w]/g);
-const FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE = seal(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i);
-const SELF_CLOSING_TAG = seal(/\/>/i);
-
-// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
-const NODE_TYPE = {
-  element: 1,
-  attribute: 2,
-  text: 3,
-  cdataSection: 4,
-  entityReference: 5,
-  // Deprecated
-  entityNode: 6,
-  // Deprecated
-  processingInstruction: 7,
-  comment: 8,
-  document: 9,
-  documentType: 10,
-  documentFragment: 11,
-  notation: 12 // Deprecated
-};
-/* HTML-namespace elements whose child text nodes are serialized *literally*
-   (unescaped) by the HTML fragment-serialization algorithm. Two reparse-mXSS
-   shapes ride on that literal serialization:
-     (a) an element child - a tree the HTML parser can never build, but the DOM
-         API and an XML/XHTML parse can - after which a `</tag>`-bearing text
-         sibling breaks the element open on reparse; and
-     (b) text-only content that already carries the element's OWN end tag, e.g.
-         `<style>...</style><img onerror=x>` built as a node, which the literal
-         serializer emits verbatim for the HTML parser to re-open.
-   Shape (a) is handled by the firstElementChild branch in _isUnsafeNode; shape
-   (b) by the LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE probe. Both read textContent (the raw-serialized
-   form for these elements) rather than innerHTML, because an XML/XHTML working
-   document serializes innerHTML with `<` escaped, which silently blinds the
-   innerHTML-based probes (rule 1's second probe and FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE) there.
-   `script` is never allow-listed, but is kept here so the guard matches the
-   serializer's own literal-text list exactly. */
-const LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES = ['style', 'script', 'xmp', 'iframe', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'plaintext', 'noscript'];
-const LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS = freeze(addToSet({}, LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES));
-/* Per-element end-tag matcher. On an HTML reparse the ONLY token that
-   terminates a literal-text element's raw content is its own end tag; a foreign
-   literal-text close (e.g. `</xmp>` sitting inside `<style>`) does not break
-   out, so matching is per-element, not a shared alternation. The lookahead
-   requires an HTML tag-name terminator (whitespace, `/` or `>`) so a longer
-   name such as `</styles` is not mistaken for `</style`. */
-const LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE = function () {
-  const map = {};
-  arrayForEach(LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES, name => {
-    map[name] = seal(new RegExp('</' + name + '(?=[\\t\\n\\f\\r />])', 'i'));
-  });
-  return freeze(map);
-}();
-const getGlobal = function getGlobal() {
-  return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
-};
-/**
- * Creates a no-op policy for internal use only.
- * Don't export this function outside this module!
- * @param trustedTypes The policy factory.
- * @param purifyHostElement The Script element used to load DOMPurify (to determine policy name suffix).
- * @return The policy created (or null, if Trusted Types
- * are not supported or creating the policy failed).
- */
-const _createTrustedTypesPolicy = function _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, purifyHostElement) {
-  if (typeof trustedTypes !== 'object' || typeof trustedTypes.createPolicy !== 'function') {
-    return null;
-  }
-  // Allow the callers to control the unique policy name
-  // by adding a data-tt-policy-suffix to the script element with the DOMPurify.
-  // Policy creation with duplicate names throws in Trusted Types.
-  let suffix = null;
-  const ATTR_NAME = 'data-tt-policy-suffix';
-  if (purifyHostElement && purifyHostElement.hasAttribute(ATTR_NAME)) {
-    suffix = purifyHostElement.getAttribute(ATTR_NAME);
-  }
-  const policyName = 'dompurify' + (suffix ? '#' + suffix : '');
-  try {
-    return trustedTypes.createPolicy(policyName, {
-      createHTML(html) {
-        return html;
-      },
-      createScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
-        return scriptUrl;
-      }
-    });
-  } catch (_) {
-    // Policy creation failed (most likely another DOMPurify script has
-    // already run). Skip creating the policy, as this will only cause errors
-    // if TT are enforced.
-    console.warn('TrustedTypes policy ' + policyName + ' could not be created.');
-    return null;
-  }
-};
-const _createHooksMap = function _createHooksMap() {
-  return {
-    afterSanitizeAttributes: [],
-    afterSanitizeElements: [],
-    afterSanitizeShadowDOM: [],
-    beforeSanitizeAttributes: [],
-    beforeSanitizeElements: [],
-    beforeSanitizeShadowDOM: [],
-    uponSanitizeAttribute: [],
-    uponSanitizeElement: [],
-    uponSanitizeShadowNode: []
-  };
-};
-/**
- * Resolve a set-valued configuration option: a fresh set built from
- * cfg[key] when it is an own array property (seeded with a clone of
- * options.base when given, case-normalized via options.transform),
- * the fallback set otherwise.
- *
- * @param cfg the cloned, prototype-free configuration object
- * @param key the configuration property to read
- * @param fallback the set to use when the option is absent or not an array
- * @param options transform and optional base set to merge into
- * @returns the resolved set
- */
-const _resolveSetOption = function _resolveSetOption(cfg, key, fallback, options) {
-  return objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) && arrayIsArray(cfg[key]) ? addToSet(options.base ? clone(options.base) : {}, cfg[key], options.transform) : fallback;
-};
-/**
- * Resolve an object-valued configuration option: a prototype-free clone
- * of cfg[key] when it is an own, truthy object property, else a fresh
- * fallback built by makeFallback (fresh on every parse, so a previous
- * parse can never leak state into the next one).
- *
- * @param cfg the cloned, prototype-free configuration object
- * @param key the configuration property to read
- * @param makeFallback builds the fallback value when the option is absent
- * @returns the resolved object
- */
-const _resolveObjectOption = function _resolveObjectOption(cfg, key, makeFallback) {
-  const value = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) ? cfg[key] : undefined;
-  return value && typeof value === 'object' ? clone(value) : makeFallback();
-};
-function createDOMPurify() {
-  let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
-  const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
-  DOMPurify.version = '3.4.15';
-  DOMPurify.removed = [];
-  if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
-    // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
-    // so that you can pass your own Window
-    DOMPurify.isSupported = false;
-    return DOMPurify;
-  }
-  let document = window.document;
-  const originalDocument = document;
-  const currentScript = originalDocument.currentScript;
-  window.DocumentFragment;
-    const HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
-    Node = window.Node,
-    Element = window.Element,
-    NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter,
-    _window$NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap;
-    _window$NamedNodeMap === void 0 ? window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap : _window$NamedNodeMap;
-    window.HTMLFormElement;
-    const DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
-    trustedTypes = window.trustedTypes;
-  const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
-  const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
-  const remove = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'remove');
-  // Clobber-safe Attr-node removal. On an HTMLFormElement a descendant named
-  // "removeAttributeNode" shadows the prototype method via
-  // [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so element.removeAttributeNode(attr) throws.
-  // Calling the cached Element.prototype method with the element as the
-  // receiver removes the exact live Attr node regardless of the shadowing.
-  const removeAttributeNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'removeAttributeNode');
-  const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
-  const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
-  const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
-  const getShadowRoot = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'shadowRoot');
-  const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
-  const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
-  const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
-  const getOwnerDocument = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'ownerDocument') : null;
-  /* Clobber-safe nodeType / nodeName reads through the cached Node.prototype
-     getters, with a direct-property fallback for environments that lack
-     Node.prototype. Sites that need a different fallback (e.g. _isClobbered
-     returns early on a null name) intentionally keep their own reads. */
-  const _readNodeType = function _readNodeType(node) {
-    return getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
-  };
-  const _readNodeName = function _readNodeName(node) {
-    return getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : node.nodeName;
-  };
-  // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
-  // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
-  // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
-  // a new empty registry is used when creating a template contents owner
-  // document, so we use that as our parent document to ensure nothing
-  // is inherited.
-  if (typeof HTMLTemplateElement === 'function') {
-    const template = document.createElement('template');
-    if (template.content && template.content.ownerDocument) {
-      document = template.content.ownerDocument;
-    }
-  }
-  let trustedTypesPolicy;
-  let emptyHTML = '';
-  // The instance's own internal Trusted Types policy. Unlike a caller-supplied
-  // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY`, this is created at most once — Trusted Types throws
-  // on duplicate policy names — and is the only policy allowed to persist
-  // across configurations and survive `clearConfig()`.
-  let defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
-  let defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = false;
-  // Tracks whether we are already inside a call to the configured Trusted Types
-  // policy (`createHTML` or `createScriptURL`). If a supplied policy callback
-  // itself calls `DOMPurify.sanitize` (the cause of #1422), `sanitize` would
-  // re-enter the policy and recurse until the stack overflows. We detect that
-  // re-entry and throw a clear, actionable error instead. The guard is shared
-  // across both callbacks, because either one re-entering `sanitize` triggers
-  // the same unbounded recursion.
-  let IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY = 0;
-  const _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy = function _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy() {
-    if (IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY > 0) {
-      throw typeErrorCreate('A configured TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY callback (createHTML or ' + 'createScriptURL) must not call DOMPurify.sanitize, as that causes ' + 'infinite recursion. Do not pass a policy whose callbacks wrap ' + 'DOMPurify as TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY; see the "DOMPurify and Trusted ' + 'Types" section of the README.');
-    }
-  };
-  const _createTrustedHTML = function _createTrustedHTML(html) {
-    _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
-    IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
-    try {
-      return trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(html);
-    } finally {
-      IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
-    }
-  };
-  const _createTrustedScriptURL = function _createTrustedScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
-    _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
-    IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
-    try {
-      return trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(scriptUrl);
-    } finally {
-      IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
-    }
-  };
-  // Lazily resolve (and cache) the instance's internal default policy.
-  // Resolution is attempted at most once: a successful `createPolicy` cannot be
-  // repeated (Trusted Types throws on duplicate names), and a failed or
-  // unsupported attempt must not be retried on every parse.
-  const _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy = function _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy() {
-    if (!defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved) {
-      defaultTrustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
-      defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = true;
-    }
-    return defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
-  };
-  const _document = document,
-    implementation = _document.implementation,
-    createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
-    createDocumentFragment = _document.createDocumentFragment,
-    getElementsByTagName = _document.getElementsByTagName;
-  const importNode = originalDocument.importNode;
-  let hooks = _createHooksMap();
-  /**
-   * Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
-   */
-  DOMPurify.isSupported = typeof entries === 'function' && typeof getParentNode === 'function' && implementation && implementation.createHTMLDocument !== undefined;
-  const MUSTACHE_EXPR$1 = MUSTACHE_EXPR,
-    ERB_EXPR$1 = ERB_EXPR,
-    TMPLIT_EXPR$1 = TMPLIT_EXPR,
-    DATA_ATTR$1 = purify_es_DATA_ATTR,
-    ARIA_ATTR$1 = ARIA_ATTR,
-    IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1 = IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
-    ATTR_WHITESPACE$1 = ATTR_WHITESPACE,
-    CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1 = CUSTOM_ELEMENT;
-  let IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = IS_ALLOWED_URI;
-  /**
-   * We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally
-   * don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.
-   */
-  /* allowed element names */
-  let ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
-  const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...html$1, ...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...mathMl$1, ...purify_es_text]);
-  /* Allowed attribute names */
-  let ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
-  const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR = addToSet({}, [...html, ...svg, ...mathMl, ...xml]);
-  /*
-   * Configure how DOMPurify should handle custom elements and their attributes as well as customized built-in elements.
-   * @property {RegExp|Function|null} tagNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any custom elements)
-   * @property {RegExp|Function|null} attributeNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any attributes not on the allow list)
-   * @property {boolean} allowCustomizedBuiltInElements allow custom elements derived from built-ins if they pass CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck. Default: `false`.
-   */
-  let CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(create(null, {
-    tagNameCheck: {
-      writable: true,
-      configurable: false,
-      enumerable: true,
-      value: null
-    },
-    attributeNameCheck: {
-      writable: true,
-      configurable: false,
-      enumerable: true,
-      value: null
-    },
-    allowCustomizedBuiltInElements: {
-      writable: true,
-      configurable: false,
-      enumerable: true,
-      value: false
-    }
-  }));
-  /* Explicitly forbidden tags (overrides ALLOWED_TAGS/ADD_TAGS) */
-  let FORBID_TAGS = null;
-  /* Explicitly forbidden attributes (overrides ALLOWED_ATTR/ADD_ATTR) */
-  let FORBID_ATTR = null;
-  /* Config object to store ADD_TAGS/ADD_ATTR functions (when used as functions) */
-  const EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(create(null, {
-    tagCheck: {
-      writable: true,
-      configurable: false,
-      enumerable: true,
-      value: null
-    },
-    attributeCheck: {
-      writable: true,
-      configurable: false,
-      enumerable: true,
-      value: null
-    }
-  }));
-  /* Decide if ARIA attributes are okay */
-  let ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = true;
-  /* Decide if custom data attributes are okay */
-  let ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = true;
-  /* Decide if unknown protocols are okay */
-  let ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = false;
-  /* Decide if self-closing tags in attributes are allowed.
-   * Usually removed due to a mXSS issue in jQuery 3.0 */
-  let ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = true;
-  /* Output should be safe for common template engines.
-   * This means, DOMPurify removes data attributes, mustaches and ERB
-   */
-  let SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = false;
-  /* Output should be safe even for XML used within HTML and alike.
-   * This means, DOMPurify removes comments when containing risky content.
-   */
-  let SAFE_FOR_XML = true;
-  /* Decide if document with <html>... should be returned */
-  let WHOLE_DOCUMENT = false;
-  /* Track whether config is already set on this instance of DOMPurify. */
-  let SET_CONFIG = false;
-  /* Pristine allowlist bindings captured at setConfig() time. On the
-   * persistent-config path sanitize() restores the sets from these before
-   * the per-walk hook clone-guard, so a hook's in-call widening cannot
-   * carry across calls. Null until setConfig() is called; reset by
-   * clearConfig(). */
-  let SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
-  let SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
-  /* Decide if all elements (e.g. style, script) must be children of
-   * document.body. By default, browsers might move them to document.head */
-  let FORCE_BODY = false;
-  /* Decide if a DOM `HTMLBodyElement` should be returned, instead of a html
-   * string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported).
-   * If `WHOLE_DOCUMENT` is enabled a `HTMLHtmlElement` will be returned instead
-   */
-  let RETURN_DOM = false;
-  /* Decide if a DOM `DocumentFragment` should be returned, instead of a html
-   * string  (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported) */
-  let RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = false;
-  /* Try to return a Trusted Type object instead of a string, return a string in
-   * case Trusted Types are not supported  */
-  let RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = false;
-  /* Output should be free from DOM clobbering attacks?
-   * This sanitizes markups named with colliding, clobberable built-in DOM APIs.
-   */
-  let SANITIZE_DOM = true;
-  /* Achieve full DOM Clobbering protection by isolating the namespace of named
-   * properties and JS variables, mitigating attacks that abuse the HTML/DOM spec rules.
-   *
-   * HTML/DOM spec rules that enable DOM Clobbering:
-   *   - Named Access on Window (§7.3.3)
-   *   - DOM Tree Accessors (§3.1.5)
-   *   - Form Element Parent-Child Relations (§4.10.3)
-   *   - Iframe srcdoc / Nested WindowProxies (§4.8.5)
-   *   - HTMLCollection (§4.2.10.2)
-   *
-   * Namespace isolation is implemented by prefixing `id` and `name` attributes
-   * with a constant string, i.e., `user-content-`
-   */
-  let SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = false;
-  const SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX = 'user-content-';
-  /* Keep element content when removing element? */
-  let KEEP_CONTENT = true;
-  /* If a `Node` is passed to sanitize(), then performs sanitization in-place instead
-   * of importing it into a new Document and returning a sanitized copy */
-  let IN_PLACE = false;
-  /* Allow usage of profiles like html, svg and mathMl */
-  let USE_PROFILES = {};
-  /* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */
-  let FORBID_CONTENTS = null;
-  const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'audio', 'colgroup', 'desc', 'foreignobject', 'head', 'iframe', 'math', 'mi', 'mn', 'mo', 'ms', 'mtext', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript', 'plaintext', 'script',
-  // <selectedcontent> mirrors the selected <option>'s subtree, cloned by
-  // the UA (customizable <select>) — including any on* handlers — and the
-  // engine re-mirrors synchronously whenever a removal changes which
-  // option/selectedcontent is current, even inside DOMPurify's inert
-  // DOMParser document. Hoisting its children on removal re-inserts a fresh
-  // mirror target ahead of the walk, which the engine refills, looping
-  // forever (DoS) and amplifying output. Dropping its content on removal
-  // (rather than hoisting) breaks that cascade; the content is a duplicate
-  // of the option, which is sanitized on its own. See campaign-3 F1/F6.
-  'selectedcontent', 'style', 'svg', 'template', 'thead', 'title', 'video', 'xmp']);
-  /* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */
-  let DATA_URI_TAGS = null;
-  const DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, ['audio', 'video', 'img', 'source', 'image', 'track']);
-  /* Attributes safe for values like "javascript:" */
-  let URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = null;
-  const DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = addToSet({}, ['alt', 'class', 'for', 'id', 'label', 'name', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'role', 'summary', 'title', 'value', 'style', 'xmlns']);
-  const MATHML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML';
-  const SVG_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg';
-  const HTML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml';
-  /* Document namespace */
-  let NAMESPACE = HTML_NAMESPACE;
-  let IS_EMPTY_INPUT = false;
-  /* Allowed XHTML+XML namespaces */
-  let ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = null;
-  const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = addToSet({}, [MATHML_NAMESPACE, SVG_NAMESPACE, HTML_NAMESPACE], stringToString);
-  const DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']);
-  let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
-  const DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['annotation-xml']);
-  let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
-  // Certain elements are allowed in both SVG and HTML
-  // namespace. We need to specify them explicitly
-  // so that they don't get erroneously deleted from
-  // HTML namespace.
-  const COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS = addToSet({}, ['title', 'style', 'font', 'a', 'script']);
-  /* Parsing of strict XHTML documents */
-  let PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = null;
-  const SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES = ['application/xhtml+xml', 'text/html'];
-  const DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = 'text/html';
-  let transformCaseFunc = null;
-  /* Keep a reference to config to pass to hooks */
-  let CONFIG = null;
-  /* Ideally, do not touch anything below this line */
-  /* ______________________________________________ */
-  const formElement = document.createElement('form');
-  const isRegexOrFunction = function isRegexOrFunction(testValue) {
-    return testValue instanceof RegExp || testValue instanceof Function;
-  };
-  /**
-   * _parseConfig
-   *
-   * @param cfg optional config literal
-   */
-  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
-  const _parseConfig = function _parseConfig() {
-    let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
-    if (CONFIG && CONFIG === cfg) {
-      return;
-    }
-    /* Shield configuration object from tampering */
-    if (!cfg || typeof cfg !== 'object') {
-      cfg = {};
-    }
-    /* Shield configuration object from prototype pollution */
-    cfg = clone(cfg);
-    PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE =
-    // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
-    SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES.indexOf(cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE) === -1 ? DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE : cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE;
-    // HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.
-    transformCaseFunc = PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' ? stringToString : stringToLowerCase;
-    /* Set configuration parameters */
-    ALLOWED_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, {
-      transform: transformCaseFunc
-    });
-    ALLOWED_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, {
-      transform: transformCaseFunc
-    });
-    ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, {
-      transform: stringToString
-    });
-    URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR', DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, {
-      transform: transformCaseFunc,
-      base: DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES
-    });
-    DATA_URI_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS', DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS, {
-      transform: transformCaseFunc,
-      base: DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS
-    });
-    FORBID_CONTENTS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS', DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS, {
-      transform: transformCaseFunc
-    });
-    FORBID_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS', clone({}), {
-      transform: transformCaseFunc
-    });
-    FORBID_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR', clone({}), {
-      transform: transformCaseFunc
-    });
-    USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES && typeof cfg.USE_PROFILES === 'object' ? clone(cfg.USE_PROFILES) : cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
-    ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
-    ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
-    ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false
-    ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR !== false; // Default true
-    SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = cfg.SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES || false; // Default false
-    SAFE_FOR_XML = cfg.SAFE_FOR_XML !== false; // Default true
-    WHOLE_DOCUMENT = cfg.WHOLE_DOCUMENT || false; // Default false
-    RETURN_DOM = cfg.RETURN_DOM || false; // Default false
-    RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = cfg.RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT || false; // Default false
-    RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = cfg.RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE || false; // Default false
-    FORCE_BODY = cfg.FORCE_BODY || false; // Default false
-    SANITIZE_DOM = cfg.SANITIZE_DOM !== false; // Default true
-    SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = cfg.SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS || false; // Default false
-    KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true
-    IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
-    IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP) ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP : IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp
-    NAMESPACE = typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace
-    MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS', () => addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) // Default built-in map
-    );
-    HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS', () => addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) // Default built-in map
-    );
-    const customElementHandling = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING', () => create(null));
-    CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);
-    if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)) {
-      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = customElementHandling.tagNameCheck; // Default undefined
-    }
-    if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'attributeNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck)) {
-      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck = customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck; // Default undefined
-    }
-    if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'allowCustomizedBuiltInElements') && typeof customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
-      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements; // Default undefined
-    }
-    seal(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING);
-    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-      ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
-    }
-    if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
-      RETURN_DOM = true;
-    }
-    /* Parse profile info */
-    if (USE_PROFILES) {
-      ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, purify_es_text);
-      ALLOWED_ATTR = create(null);
-      if (USE_PROFILES.html === true) {
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, html$1);
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, html);
-      }
-      if (USE_PROFILES.svg === true) {
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, svg$1);
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, svg);
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
-      }
-      if (USE_PROFILES.svgFilters === true) {
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, svgFilters);
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, svg);
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
-      }
-      if (USE_PROFILES.mathMl === true) {
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, mathMl$1);
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, mathMl);
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
-      }
-    }
-    /* Always reset function-based ADD_TAGS / ADD_ATTR checks to prevent
-     * leaking across calls when switching from function to array config */
-    EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = null;
-    EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = null;
-    /* Merge configuration parameters */
-    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_TAGS')) {
-      if (typeof cfg.ADD_TAGS === 'function') {
-        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = cfg.ADD_TAGS;
-      } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_TAGS)) {
-        if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
-          ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
-        }
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS, transformCaseFunc);
-      }
-    }
-    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_ATTR')) {
-      if (typeof cfg.ADD_ATTR === 'function') {
-        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = cfg.ADD_ATTR;
-      } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_ATTR)) {
-        if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
-          ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
-        }
-        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
-      }
-    }
-    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
-      if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
-        FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
-      }
-      addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
-    }
-    /* Add #text in case KEEP_CONTENT is set to true */
-    if (KEEP_CONTENT) {
-      ALLOWED_TAGS['#text'] = true;
-    }
-    /* Add html, head and body to ALLOWED_TAGS in case WHOLE_DOCUMENT is true */
-    if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT) {
-      addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['html', 'head', 'body']);
-    }
-    /* Add tbody to ALLOWED_TAGS in case tables are permitted, see #286, #365 */
-    if (ALLOWED_TAGS.table) {
-      addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);
-      delete FORBID_TAGS.tbody;
-    }
-    // Re-derive the active Trusted Types policy from this configuration on
-    // every parse. The active policy must never be sticky closure state that
-    // outlives the config that set it: a caller-supplied policy left in place
-    // after `clearConfig()` — or after a later call that supplied none, or
-    // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null` — could sign a subsequent "default"
-    // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` result with a foreign, possibly unsafe policy.
-    // See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
-    if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY) {
-      if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML !== 'function') {
-        throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createHTML" hook.');
-      }
-      if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createScriptURL !== 'function') {
-        throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.');
-      }
-      // A caller-supplied policy applies to this configuration only.
-      const previousTrustedTypesPolicy = trustedTypesPolicy;
-      trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
-      // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`. If the supplied policy's
-      // `createHTML` is circular (i.e. it calls `DOMPurify.sanitize`), this
-      // throws via the re-entrancy guard. Restore the previous policy first so
-      // the instance is not left in a poisoned state. See #1422.
-      try {
-        emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
-      } catch (error) {
-        trustedTypesPolicy = previousTrustedTypesPolicy;
-        throw error;
-      }
-    } else if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY === null) {
-      // Explicit opt-out for this call: perform no Trusted Types signing and
-      // create nothing (so a strict `trusted-types` CSP that disallows a
-      // `dompurify` policy can still call `sanitize` from inside its own
-      // policy — see #1422). Resetting to `undefined` rather than a sticky
-      // `null` also drops any previously retained caller policy, so it cannot
-      // resurface on a later call, while still allowing the next config-less
-      // call to restore the internal default policy. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
-      trustedTypesPolicy = undefined;
-      emptyHTML = '';
-    } else {
-      // No policy supplied: keep the currently active policy if one is set — a
-      // previously supplied policy is intentionally sticky across config-less
-      // calls — otherwise fall back to the instance's own internal policy,
-      // created at most once. (A policy supplied for a *single* call still
-      // lingers by design; what must not linger is a policy whose configuration
-      // has been torn down via `clearConfig()`, which restores the default.)
-      if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
-        trustedTypesPolicy = _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy();
-      }
-      // Sign internal variables only when a policy is active. A falsy policy
-      // (Trusted Types unsupported, creation failed, or an explicit opt-out)
-      // leaves `emptyHTML` as a plain string, so we never call `.createHTML` on
-      // a non-policy and throw. See #1422.
-      if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
-        emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
-      }
-    }
-    // Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
-    // Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
-    if (freeze) {
-      freeze(cfg);
-    }
-    CONFIG = cfg;
-  };
-  /* Keep track of all possible SVG and MathML tags
-   * so that we can perform the namespace checks
-   * correctly. */
-  const ALL_SVG_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...svgDisallowed]);
-  const ALL_MATHML_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...mathMl$1, ...mathMlDisallowed]);
-  /**
-   * Namespace rules for an element in the SVG namespace.
-   *
-   * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
-   * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
-   * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
-   * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
-   */
-  const _checkSvgNamespace = function _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
-    // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
-    // is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
-    // it should be killed.
-    if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-      return tagName === 'svg';
-    }
-    // The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via <svg>
-    // if the parent is either <annotation-xml> or a MathML
-    // text integration point.
-    if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
-      return tagName === 'svg' && (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]);
-    }
-    // We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
-    // spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
-    return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
-  };
-  /**
-   * Namespace rules for an element in the MathML namespace.
-   *
-   * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
-   * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
-   * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
-   * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
-   */
-  const _checkMathMlNamespace = function _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
-    // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
-    // is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
-    // it should be killed.
-    if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-      return tagName === 'math';
-    }
-    // The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
-    // <math> and HTML integration points
-    if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
-      return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
-    }
-    // We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
-    // spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
-    return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
-  };
-  /**
-   * Namespace rules for an element in the HTML namespace.
-   *
-   * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
-   * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
-   * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
-   * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
-   */
-  const _checkHtmlNamespace = function _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
-    // The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
-    // HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
-    // is via MathML text integration points
-    if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE && !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE && !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    // We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
-    // or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
-    return !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] && (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
-  };
-  /**
-   * @param element a DOM element whose namespace is being checked
-   * @returns Return false if the element has a
-   *  namespace that a spec-compliant parser would never
-   *  return. Return true otherwise.
-   */
-  const _checkValidNamespace = function _checkValidNamespace(element) {
-    let parent = getParentNode(element);
-    // In JSDOM, if we're inside shadow DOM, then parentNode
-    // can be null. We just simulate parent in this case.
-    if (!parent || !parent.tagName) {
-      parent = {
-        namespaceURI: NAMESPACE,
-        tagName: 'template'
-      };
-    }
-    const tagName = stringToLowerCase(element.tagName);
-    const parentTagName = stringToLowerCase(parent.tagName);
-    if (!ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (element.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
-      return _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
-    }
-    if (element.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
-      return _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
-    }
-    if (element.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-      return _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
-    }
-    // For XHTML and XML documents that support custom namespaces
-    if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    // The code should never reach this place (this means
-    // that the element somehow got namespace that is not
-    // HTML, SVG, MathML or allowed via ALLOWED_NAMESPACES).
-    // Return false just in case.
-    return false;
-  };
-  /**
-   * _forceRemove
-   *
-   * @param node a DOM node
-   */
-  const _forceRemove = function _forceRemove(node) {
-    arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
-      element: node
-    });
-    try {
-      // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
-      getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);
-    } catch (_) {
-      /* The normal detach failed — this is reached for a parentless node
-         (getParentNode() is null, so .removeChild throws). Element.prototype
-         .remove() is itself a spec no-op on a parentless node, so a recorded
-         "removal" would otherwise hand the caller back an intact,
-         payload-bearing node (e.g. a detached IN_PLACE root the mXSS canary or
-         the style-with-element-child rule decided to kill). Fail closed by
-         throwing — exactly as a clobbered root does at the IN_PLACE entry —
-         rather than trying to "neutralize" the node via its own methods.
-         Neutralizing would mean calling getAttributeNames()/removeAttribute()
-         on the node, both of which a <form> root can clobber via a named child
-         (and _isClobbered does not even probe getAttributeNames), so the
-         neutralize step could itself be silently defeated, leaving the payload
-         intact. A throw touches only the cached, clobber-safe remove() and
-         getParentNode(). Generalizes GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676 (clobbered-form root)
-         to every root-kill reason. REPORT-3.
-                This lives inside the catch, so it never fires for a normally-removed
-         in-tree node: those have a parent, removeChild() succeeds, and the
-         catch is not entered. Only a kept (parentless) root reaches here. */
-      remove(node);
-      if (!getParentNode(node)) {
-        throw typeErrorCreate('a node selected for removal could not be detached from its tree ' + 'and cannot be safely returned; refusing to sanitize in place');
-      }
-    }
-  };
-  /**
-   * _stripAttributeNode
-   *
-   * Remove a single Attr node case/namespace-exactly on an attribute-teardown
-   * path. Name-based removeAttribute() ASCII-lowercases its lookup key for an
-   * HTML element in an HTML document and so silently misses a case-preserved
-   * handler (e.g. `ONERROR` off an XML/XHTML import) - the same defect
-   * _removeAttribute() was fixed for, which a name-based call would reintroduce
-   * on these IN_PLACE teardown paths. Unlike _removeAttribute this does not
-   * record into DOMPurify.removed: the neutralize passes intentionally do not
-   * book-keep. A clobbered/detached node falls back to best-effort name-based
-   * removal.
-   *
-   * @param element the element to strip the attribute from
-   * @param attribute the Attr node to remove
-   * @param name the attribute's name, for the fallback path
-   */
-  const _stripAttributeNode = function _stripAttributeNode(element, attribute, name) {
-    try {
-      removeAttributeNode(element, attribute);
-    } catch (_) {
-      try {
-        element.removeAttribute(name);
-      } catch (_) {}
-    }
-  };
-  /**
-   * _neutralizeRoot
-   *
-   * Fail-closed teardown of an in-place root after the sanitize walk aborts
-   * (campaign-3 F2). An internal throw mid-walk — e.g. a page-registered
-   * custom element's reaction detaches a node so `_forceRemove`'s deliberate
-   * parentless guard throws, or any other re-entrant engine mutation — would
-   * otherwise leave the caller's *live* tree half-sanitized, with everything
-   * after the abort point still carrying its handlers. There is no safe way
-   * to resume the walk (the tree mutated under us), so we strip the root bare:
-   * remove every child and every attribute, then let the caller's catch see
-   * the original error. Clobber-safe (cached `remove`/`childNodes`/`attributes`
-   * getters; the root was already clobber-pre-flighted at the IN_PLACE entry).
-   *
-   * @param root the in-place root to empty
-   */
-  const _neutralizeRoot = function _neutralizeRoot(root) {
-    /* Strip every disallowed attribute (on* handlers included) off the whole
-       subtree BEFORE detaching anything. Detaching first would hand back
-       handler-bearing originals (e.g. an already-loading `<img onerror>`)
-       whose queued resource event still fires in page scope after we throw.
-       Clobber-safe reads; a doomed clobbered node's own attributes are
-       irrelevant while its non-clobbered descendants are reached and scrubbed. */
-    _neutralizeSubtree(root);
-    const childNodes = getChildNodes(root);
-    if (childNodes) {
-      const snapshot = [];
-      arrayForEach(childNodes, child => {
-        arrayPush(snapshot, child);
-      });
-      arrayForEach(snapshot, child => {
-        try {
-          remove(child);
-        } catch (_) {
-          /* Best-effort teardown; a still-attached child is handled below */
-        }
-      });
-    }
-    const attributes = getAttributes(root);
-    if (attributes) {
-      for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-        const attribute = attributes[i];
-        const name = attribute && attribute.name;
-        if (typeof name === 'string') {
-          _stripAttributeNode(root, attribute, name);
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  };
-  /**
-   * _removeAttribute
-   *
-   * Name-based getAttributeNode()/removeAttribute() ASCII-lowercase their
-   * lookup key for HTML elements in an HTML document, so they silently miss an
-   * attribute whose stored qualified name still contains uppercase ASCII
-   * letters. That happens when the node came from a case-preserving source
-   * (an XML/XHTML document imported via importNode(), or createAttributeNS()),
-   * where e.g. `ONERROR` survives the walk: the policy check lowercases to
-   * `onerror` and rejects it, but `removeAttribute('ONERROR')` looks up
-   * `onerror` and finds nothing. Remove the exact Attr node instead, which is
-   * case- and namespace-exact, and fall back to name-based removal only when
-   * the caller could not supply the node.
-   *
-   * @param name an Attribute name
-   * @param element a DOM node
-   * @param attr the exact Attr node to remove, when the caller has it
-   */
-  const _removeAttribute = function _removeAttribute(name, element, attr) {
-    if (!attr) {
-      try {
-        attr = element.getAttributeNode(name);
-      } catch (_) {
-        attr = null;
-      }
-    }
-    arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
-      attribute: attr || null,
-      from: element
-    });
-    try {
-      if (attr) {
-        removeAttributeNode(element, attr);
-      } else {
-        element.removeAttribute(name);
-      }
-    } catch (_) {
-      /* Clobbered or already-detached node - best-effort fall back to a
-         name-based removal so the "is" handling below still runs. Note this
-         fallback ASCII-lowercases its lookup key in an HTML document and so
-         cannot reach a case-preserved attribute name; the cached
-         removeAttributeNode() above is what removes those, and a clobbered
-         form is already removed wholesale by _isClobbered() before reaching
-         here. */
-      try {
-        element.removeAttribute(name);
-      } catch (_) {}
-    }
-    // We void attribute values for unremovable "is" attributes
-    if (name === 'is') {
-      if (RETURN_DOM || RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
-        try {
-          _forceRemove(element);
-        } catch (_) {}
-      } else {
-        try {
-          element.setAttribute(name, '');
-        } catch (_) {}
-      }
-    }
-  };
-  /**
-   * _stripDisallowedAttributes
-   *
-   * Removes every attribute the active configuration does not allow from a
-   * single element, using the same allowlist as the main attribute pass (so
-   * `on*` handlers go, but no `/^on/` blocklist is introduced). Used only to
-   * neutralise nodes that are being discarded from an in-place tree.
-   *
-   * @param element the element to strip
-   */
-  const _stripDisallowedAttributes = function _stripDisallowedAttributes(element) {
-    const attributes = getAttributes(element);
-    if (!attributes) {
-      return;
-    }
-    for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-      const attribute = attributes[i];
-      const name = attribute && attribute.name;
-      if (typeof name !== 'string' || ALLOWED_ATTR[transformCaseFunc(name)]) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      _stripAttributeNode(element, attribute, name);
-    }
-  };
-  /**
-   * _neutralizeSubtree
-   *
-   * Completes the audit-5 F1 fix across every removal path. The KEEP_CONTENT
-   * move-hoist neutralises only disallowed-tag removals; clobber, mXSS-canary,
-   * namespace, comment, processing-instruction and KEEP_CONTENT:false removals
-   * all drop their subtree wholesale via `_forceRemove`. On the IN_PLACE path
-   * those dropped nodes are detached from the caller's LIVE tree but a
-   * handler-bearing original among them (an `<img onerror>`/`<video>` that was
-   * loading) keeps its queued resource event, which fires in page scope after
-   * sanitize returns. This walks a removed subtree and strips every attribute
-   * the active configuration does not allow — so `on*` handlers are cancelled
-   * through the SAME allowlist that governs kept nodes, not a separate `/^on/`
-   * blocklist. Run synchronously before sanitize returns, i.e. before any
-   * queued event can fire. Hook-free by design: these nodes leave the output,
-   * so firing attribute hooks for them would be surprising. Clobber-safe reads;
-   * a doomed clobbered node may shadow `removeAttribute` (its own attributes are
-   * irrelevant — it is discarded — while its non-clobbered descendants, e.g.
-   * the `<img>`, are reached and scrubbed).
-   *
-   * @param root the root of a removed subtree to neutralise
-   */
-  const _neutralizeSubtree = function _neutralizeSubtree(root) {
-    const stack = [root];
-    while (stack.length > 0) {
-      const node = stack.pop();
-      const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
-      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
-        _stripDisallowedAttributes(node);
-      }
-      const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
-      if (childNodes) {
-        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-          stack.push(childNodes[i]);
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  };
-  /**
-   * _neutralizePatchLinkage
-   *
-   * IN_PLACE entry pre-pass (declarative-partial-updates / streaming
-   * hardening, https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
-   *
-   * The main walk strips patch linkage (`for`/`patchsrc`) and removes range
-   * markers (PIs / markup comments) node-by-node, in document order, AS it
-   * reaches each node. On a live in-place root that leaves a window: from the
-   * moment the root is connected until the walk arrives at a given node, that
-   * node's linkage is live. A patch applied on connection/stream can fire as
-   * a microtask during the walk and inject or teleport an unsanitized DOM
-   * range into a region the iterator has already passed and will not revisit,
-   * so the post-return "tree is sanitized" contract is violated. Sweep the
-   * whole tree once up front and sever every linkage before the walk begins,
-   * closing that window.
-   *
-   * This CANNOT undo a patch that already fired before sanitize ran — that is
-   * the irreducible "do not IN_PLACE a live-connected attacker tree" caveat —
-   * but it closes everything from sanitize-start onward. Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML
-   * to group with the rest of the declarative-partial-updates handling and
-   * stay overridable, consistent with the codebase.
-   *
-   * Clobber-safe traversal (cached childNodes getter); per-node try/catch so a
-   * clobbered root cannot defeat the sweep of its non-clobbered descendants.
-   *
-   * NOTE (pending real-Chrome confirmation, see test/declarative-patch-probe
-   * .html Q1): this mirrors the existing policy of keeping `for` on
-   * <label>/<output>. If the shipping feature can drive a patch through a
-   * surviving `for`-on-label/output + `id` pair, this pre-pass and the
-   * attribute check at _isBasicCustomElement's caller must additionally drop
-   * that pair on the IN_PLACE path. Left as-is until the taxonomy is verified.
-   *
-   * @param root the in-place root to sweep
-   */
-  /**
-   * Central policy for declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes,
-   * shared by the _neutralizePatchLinkage pre-pass and _isValidAttribute so
-   * the two sites cannot drift: `patchsrc` always links, `for` links
-   * everywhere except on <label>/<output>, and the whole policy is gated on
-   * SAFE_FOR_XML (see the rationale block in _isValidAttribute).
-   *
-   * @param lcName the transformCaseFunc'd attribute name
-   * @param lcTag the transformCaseFunc'd tag name of the carrying element
-   * @return true if the attribute is patch linkage and must be dropped
-   */
-  const _isPatchLinkageAttribute = function _isPatchLinkageAttribute(lcName, lcTag) {
-    if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (lcName === 'patchsrc') {
-      return true;
-    }
-    return lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output';
-  };
-  const _neutralizePatchLinkage = function _neutralizePatchLinkage(root) {
-    if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
-      return;
-    }
-    const stack = [root];
-    while (stack.length > 0) {
-      const node = stack.pop();
-      const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
-      /* Remove range markers (the target side of a patch linkage): every
-         processing instruction, and any markup-bearing comment. */
-      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction || nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, node.data)) {
-        try {
-          remove(node);
-        } catch (_) {
-          /* Best-effort */
-        }
-        continue;
-      }
-      /* Strip patch-source attributes (the source side) off elements. */
-      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
-        const element = node;
-        const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(_readNodeName(node));
-        try {
-          if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('patchsrc')) {
-            element.removeAttribute('patchsrc');
-          }
-          if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') && _isPatchLinkageAttribute('for', lcTag)) {
-            element.removeAttribute('for');
-          }
-        } catch (_) {
-          /* Clobbered removeAttribute/hasAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
-        }
-      }
-      const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
-      if (childNodes) {
-        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-          stack.push(childNodes[i]);
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  };
-  /**
-   * _initDocument
-   *
-   * @param dirty - a string of dirty markup
-   * @return a DOM, filled with the dirty markup
-   */
-  const _initDocument = function _initDocument(dirty) {
-    /* Create a HTML document */
-    let doc = null;
-    let leadingWhitespace = null;
-    if (FORCE_BODY) {
-      dirty = '<remove></remove>' + dirty;
-    } else {
-      /* If FORCE_BODY isn't used, leading whitespace needs to be preserved manually */
-      const matches = stringMatch(dirty, /^[\r\n\t ]+/);
-      leadingWhitespace = matches && matches[0];
-    }
-    if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-      // Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
-      dirty = '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' + dirty + '</body></html>';
-    }
-    const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
-    /*
-     * Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
-     * DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
-     */
-    if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-      try {
-        doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(dirtyPayload, PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE);
-      } catch (_) {}
-    }
-    /* Use createHTMLDocument in case DOMParser is not available */
-    if (!doc || !doc.documentElement) {
-      doc = implementation.createDocument(NAMESPACE, 'template', null);
-      try {
-        doc.documentElement.innerHTML = IS_EMPTY_INPUT ? emptyHTML : dirtyPayload;
-      } catch (_) {
-        // Syntax error if dirtyPayload is invalid xml
-      }
-    }
-    const body = doc.body || doc.documentElement;
-    if (dirty && leadingWhitespace) {
-      body.insertBefore(document.createTextNode(leadingWhitespace), body.childNodes[0] || null);
-    }
-    /* Work on whole document or just its body */
-    if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-      return getElementsByTagName.call(doc, WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? 'html' : 'body')[0];
-    }
-    return WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? doc.documentElement : body;
-  };
-  /**
-   * Creates a NodeIterator object that you can use to traverse filtered lists of nodes or elements in a document.
-   *
-   * @param root The root element or node to start traversing on.
-   * @return The created NodeIterator
-   */
-  const _createNodeIterator = function _createNodeIterator(root) {
-    /* Read ownerDocument through the cached Node.prototype getter, never the
-       direct property. HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so a
-       clobbering child (<input name="ownerDocument"> or a form-associated
-       external input) shadows the prototype getter and makes a direct read
-       return that <input>. createNodeIterator.call(<input>, ...) then throws
-       "Illegal invocation", and on the IN_PLACE path that throw lands before
-       the walk's fail-closed barrier - leaving the caller's live tree, with
-       any already-armed handler in it, un-neutralized. The cached getter
-       returns the real Document regardless of the clobber. */
-    const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(root) : root.ownerDocument;
-    return createNodeIterator.call(doc || root, root,
-    // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
-    NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
-  };
-  /**
-   * Replace template expression syntax (mustache, ERB, template
-   * literal) with a space; shared by all SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES scrub
-   * sites. Order matters: mustache, then ERB, then template literal.
-   *
-   * @param value the string to scrub
-   * @returns the scrubbed string
-   */
-  const _stripTemplateExpressions = function _stripTemplateExpressions(value) {
-    value = stringReplace(value, MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ' ');
-    value = stringReplace(value, ERB_EXPR$1, ' ');
-    value = stringReplace(value, TMPLIT_EXPR$1, ' ');
-    return value;
-  };
-  /**
-   * Strip template-engine expressions ({{...}}, ${...}, <%...%>) from the
-   * character data of an element subtree. Used as the final safety net for
-   * SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES on every DOM-returning code path so that expressions
-   * which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across
-   * stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework.
-   *
-   * Walks text/comment/CDATA/processing-instruction nodes and mutates `.data`
-   * in place rather than round-tripping through innerHTML. This preserves
-   * descendant node references (important for IN_PLACE callers), avoids a
-   * serialize/reparse cycle, and reads literal character data — which means
-   * `<%...%>` in text content matches the ERB regex against its real bytes
-   * instead of the HTML-entity-escaped form innerHTML would produce.
-   *
-   * Attribute values are not visited here; SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES handling for
-   * attributes is performed during the per-node `_sanitizeAttributes` pass.
-   *
-   * @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
-   */
-  const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
-    var _node$querySelectorAl;
-    node.normalize();
-    /* Clobber-safe ownerDocument read, same reasoning as _createNodeIterator:
-       under SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES this runs on the live IN_PLACE root, which may
-       carry a form-named-getter override of ownerDocument. */
-    const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(node) : node.ownerDocument;
-    const walker = createNodeIterator.call(doc || node, node,
-    // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
-    NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
-    let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
-    while (currentNode) {
-      currentNode.data = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.data);
-      currentNode = walker.nextNode();
-    }
-    // NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content per the DOM spec,
-    // so we must explicitly recurse into each template's content fragment,
-    // mirroring the approach used by _sanitizeShadowDOM.
-    const templates = (_node$querySelectorAl = node.querySelectorAll) === null || _node$querySelectorAl === void 0 ? void 0 : _node$querySelectorAl.call(node, 'template');
-    if (templates) {
-      arrayForEach(templates, tmpl => {
-        if (_isDocumentFragment(tmpl.content)) {
-          _scrubTemplateExpressions2(tmpl.content);
-        }
-      });
-    }
-  };
-  /**
-   * _isClobbered
-   *
-   * Detect DOM-clobbering on HTMLFormElement nodes. Form is the only HTML
-   * interface with [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]; a descendant element with a
-   * `name` attribute matching a prototype property shadows that property
-   * on direct reads. We use this check at the IN_PLACE entry-point and
-   * during attribute sanitization to refuse clobbered forms.
-   *
-   * @param element element to check for clobbering attacks
-   * @return true if clobbered, false if safe
-   */
-  const _isClobbered = function _isClobbered(element) {
-    // Realm-independent tag-name probe. If we can't determine the tag
-    // name at all, we can't reason about clobbering — return false
-    // (the caller's other defences still apply).
-    const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
-    if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
-      return false;
-    }
-    return typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' ||
-    // Realm-safe NamedNodeMap detection: equality against the cached
-    // prototype getter. Clobbered .attributes (e.g. <input name="attributes">)
-    // makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
-    // (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
-    // canonical NamedNodeMap.
-    element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' ||
-    // A form descendant named "removeAttributeNode" or "getAttributeNode"
-    // shadows these Attr-node methods via [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns].
-    // _removeAttribute() / _stripAttributeNode() reach for
-    // element.removeAttributeNode(attr) first; when it is shadowed the call
-    // throws and the name-based fallback element.removeAttribute(name)
-    // ASCII-lowercases its lookup key in an HTML document, silently missing
-    // a case-preserved event-handler attribute (e.g. an ONANIMATIONSTART
-    // that reached the sanitizer through an XML/XHTML parse). Flag the form
-    // so it is removed wholesale, exactly as for the other shadowed methods.
-    typeof element.removeAttributeNode !== 'function' || typeof element.getAttributeNode !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
-    // NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
-    // returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
-    // read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
-    // the named child element. Cheap addition — nodeType is read from
-    // an internal slot, no serialization cost — and removes a residual
-    // clobbering surface used by several mXSS / PI / comment branches
-    // in _sanitizeElements that compare currentNode.nodeType directly.
-    element.nodeType !== getNodeType(element) ||
-    // HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]: a descendant named
-    // "childNodes" shadows the prototype getter. Direct reads of
-    // form.childNodes from a clobbered form return the named child
-    // instead of the real NodeList, so any walk that reads it directly
-    // skips the form's real children. Compare the direct read to the
-    // cached Node.prototype getter — when the form's named-property
-    // getter intercepts the read, the two values differ and we flag
-    // the form. This catches every clobbering child type (input,
-    // select, etc.) regardless of whether the named child happens to
-    // carry a numeric .length, which a typeof-based probe would miss
-    // (e.g. HTMLSelectElement.length is a defined unsigned-long).
-    element.childNodes !== getChildNodes(element);
-  };
-  /**
-   * Checks whether the given value is a DocumentFragment from any realm.
-   *
-   * The realm-independent replacement reads `nodeType` through the cached
-   * Node.prototype getter and compares to the DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE
-   * constant (11). nodeType is a numeric value resolved from the node's
-   * internal slot, identical across realms for the same kind of node.
-   *
-   * @param value object to check
-   * @return true if value is a DocumentFragment-shaped node from any realm
-   */
-  const _isDocumentFragment = function _isDocumentFragment(value) {
-    if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    try {
-      return getNodeType(value) === NODE_TYPE.documentFragment;
-    } catch (_) {
-      return false;
-    }
-  };
-  /**
-   * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node, including nodes that
-   * originate from a different window/realm (e.g. an iframe's
-   * contentDocument). The previous `value instanceof Node` check was
-   * realm-bound: nodes from a different window failed it, causing
-   * sanitize() to silently stringify them and reset IN_PLACE to false,
-   * returning the original node unsanitized. See GHSA-4w3q-35jp-p934.
-   *
-   * @param value object to check whether it's a DOM node
-   * @return true if value is a DOM node from any realm
-   */
-  const _isNode = function _isNode(value) {
-    if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    try {
-      return typeof getNodeType(value) === 'number';
-    } catch (_) {
-      return false;
-    }
-  };
-  function _executeHooks(hooks, currentNode, data) {
-    if (hooks.length === 0) {
-      return;
-    }
-    arrayForEach(hooks, hook => {
-      hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);
-    });
-  }
-  /**
-   * Structural-threat checks that condemn a node regardless of the
-   * allowlists: mXSS via namespace confusion, risky CSS construction,
-   * processing instructions, markup-bearing comments. Pure predicate;
-   * the caller removes. Check order is load-bearing.
-   *
-   * @param currentNode the node to inspect
-   * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
-   * @return true if the node must be removed
-   */
-  const _isUnsafeNode = function _isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName) {
-    /* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
-    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.textContent) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Remove rawtext/literal-text elements whose literal serialization
-       re-opens markup on an HTML reparse - shapes (a) and (b) documented at
-       LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS. Both are invisible to rule 1 above (which
-       self-disables once there is an element child, and whose second probe
-       reads the innerHTML an XML/XHTML document serializes escaped), which
-       is why both probes here read textContent instead. Previously only
-       `style`-with-element-child was covered; every element in
-       LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS shares this literal serialization and is
-       equally affected. */
-    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS[tagName] && (_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) || typeof currentNode.textContent === 'string' && regExpTest(LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE[tagName], currentNode.textContent))) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
-    if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */
-    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.data)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    return false;
-  };
-  /**
-   * Evaluate a CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING check (a RegExp or a predicate
-   * function, per the validation in _parseConfig) against a name.
-   * Additional arguments are forwarded to predicate functions - the
-   * attributeNameCheck predicate receives the tag name as its second
-   * argument. A null/absent check never matches.
-   *
-   * @param check the configured tagNameCheck / attributeNameCheck value
-   * @param name the name to test
-   * @param args extra arguments forwarded to a predicate function
-   * @return true if the check matches the name
-   */
-  const _matchesNameCheck = function _matchesNameCheck(check, name) {
-    if (check instanceof RegExp) {
-      return regExpTest(check, name);
-    }
-    if (check instanceof Function) {
-      for (var _len = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len > 2 ? _len - 2 : 0), _key = 2; _key < _len; _key++) {
-        args[_key - 2] = arguments[_key];
-      }
-      return Boolean(check(name, ...args));
-    }
-    return false;
-  };
-  /**
-   * Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
-   * allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
-   * early - the namespace and fallback-tag removal checks are
-   * intentionally skipped for kept custom elements), else hoist
-   * content per KEEP_CONTENT and remove.
-   *
-   * A kept custom element is the ONLY case in which this function
-   * returns false, so the caller uses that return value to run the
-   * afterSanitizeElements hook on the kept element and keep the
-   * element-hook lifecycle consistent with normal allowlisted
-   * elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4).
-   *
-   * @param currentNode the disallowed node
-   * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
-   * @return true if the node was removed, false if kept
-   */
-  const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root) {
-    /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
-    if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
-         Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
-         had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
-         fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
-         value (or null for a real parent-less node), so the fallback
-         path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
-         ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
-         parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
-    if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
-      const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
-      const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
-      if (childNodes && parentNode) {
-        const childCount = childNodes.length;
-        /* Hoist by moving each child up one level rather than deep-cloning
-             it. Moving transfers every descendant exactly once, so a chain of
-             nested disallowed elements costs O(n) instead of the O(n^2) that
-             re-cloning the shrinking subtree at each level produced; it also
-             empties the removed original, so `DOMPurify.removed` no longer
-             pins whole subtrees. Moving preserves the in-place guarantee too:
-             an original carrying already-queued resource events (`<img
-             onerror>`, `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …) is
-             relocated and sanitised rather than left detached but still armed.
-                      The sole case that must clone is removing the walk root itself.
-             The result is serialised from the root's subtree, so a restrictive
-             ALLOWED_TAGS that strips the root (`body` on the string path) must
-             leave the content inside it, which only cloning does. In IN_PLACE
-             the root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never removed
-             here, so that path always takes the move branch.
-                      `childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
-             valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
-             the list intact). */
-        for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-          const hoisted = currentNode === root ? cloneNode(childNodes[i], true) : childNodes[i];
-          parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    _forceRemove(currentNode);
-    return true;
-  };
-  /**
-   * Fork a hook-mutable allowlist off its shared binding the first time a
-   * (possibly lazily-installed) uponSanitize* hook is about to see it, so the
-   * hook cannot widen the per-instance default or the setConfig binding by
-   * reference and leak past the call. Returns the set unchanged once it is
-   * already call-local, so repeated calls across elements are idempotent.
-   *
-   * @param hookList the uponSanitize* hook array for this event
-   * @param set the current ALLOWED_TAGS / ALLOWED_ATTR binding
-   * @param defaultSet the per-instance DEFAULT_ALLOWED_* constant
-   * @param setConfigSet the captured setConfig() binding, or null
-   * @return a call-local clone if a hook is present and set is still shared,
-   *   else set unchanged
-   */
-  const _forkSharedAllowlist = function _forkSharedAllowlist(hookList, set, defaultSet, setConfigSet) {
-    if (hookList.length === 0) {
-      return set;
-    }
-    return set === defaultSet || set === setConfigSet ? clone(set) : set;
-  };
-  /**
-   * Shared guard for a node that a hook has detached from the walk tree,
-   * used after each element-hook site in _sanitizeElements. Detaching is a
-   * long-standing user pattern (issue #469; draw.io-style foreignObject
-   * filtering). Per the cached, unclobberable parentNode getter the node is
-   * genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
-   * output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
-   * processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace checks
-   * would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit the REPORT-3
-   * fail-closed throw — which exists for nodes DOMPurify wants gone but
-   * *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the opposite of a node
-   * that is already safely gone. The walk root is exempt: a detached
-   * IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still be fully sanitized,
-   * and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the REPORT-3 throw.
-   *
-   * Nodes detached by hooks stay the hook's responsibility for placement:
-   * they are not recorded in DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE
-   * pass (which iterates DOMPurify.removed) does not reach them. But a
-   * hook-detached subtree can still hold a queued resource-event handler -
-   * e.g. an <img onload> that began loading when the caller built the live
-   * tree - which fires in page scope after sanitize returns even though the
-   * handler never reached the returned tree. That is the audit-5 F1 hazard,
-   * and the documented node.remove() hook pattern walks straight into it.
-   * So on the IN_PLACE path we neutralize the detached subtree inline,
-   * stripping its non-allow-listed attributes before returning, exactly as
-   * the post-walk pass does for _forceRemove'd subtrees.
-   *
-   * @param currentNode the node a hook may have detached
-   * @param root the current walk root
-   * @return true if the node is detached and now handled, false otherwise
-   */
-  const _handleHookDetachedNode = function _handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root) {
-    if (currentNode === root || getParentNode(currentNode) !== null) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (IN_PLACE) {
-      _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
-    }
-    return true;
-  };
-  /**
-   * _sanitizeElements
-   *
-   * @protect nodeName
-   * @protect textContent
-   * @protect removeChild
-   * @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
-   * @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
-   */
-  const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode, root) {
-    /* Execute a hook if present */
-    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
-    /* A hook may have detached the node - treat it as removed (see
-       _handleHookDetachedNode for the full rationale). */
-    if (_handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
-    if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
-      _forceRemove(currentNode);
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
-    const tagName = transformCaseFunc(_readNodeName(currentNode));
-    /* Close the pre-walk clone-guard's timing gap: an uponSanitizeElement
-       hook may have been installed after that guard sampled the hook arrays
-       (e.g. lazily from beforeSanitizeElements), leaving ALLOWED_TAGS still
-       aliasing a shared binding that a widening hook would mutate by
-       reference. Fork it before exposing it to the hook. */
-    ALLOWED_TAGS = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, ALLOWED_TAGS, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS);
-    /* Execute a hook if present */
-    _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
-      tagName,
-      allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
-    });
-    /* The uponSanitizeElement hook may have detached the node, exactly as
-       above (see _handleHookDetachedNode for the full rationale). */
-    if (_handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
-    if (_isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName)) {
-      _forceRemove(currentNode);
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
-    if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
-      const removed = _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root);
-      /* A false return means the node is a custom element kept via
-         CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING - the only keep path through
-         _sanitizeDisallowedNode. Run afterSanitizeElements on it so the
-         element-hook lifecycle matches normal allowlisted elements: a
-         security policy applied in this hook (e.g. stripping an attribute
-         from every surviving element) must not silently skip kept custom
-         elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4). This mirrors the normal-element
-         tail below - the hook runs, then the walker's subsequent
-         _sanitizeAttributes pass sanitizes the element's attributes. The
-         deliberately skipped namespace and fallback-tag removal checks stay
-         skipped; they are removal decisions, not the hook contract. */
-      if (removed === false) {
-        _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
-      }
-      return removed;
-    }
-    /* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
-       Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
-       nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
-       bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
-       realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
-       slip past the namespace check entirely. */
-    const nt = _readNodeType(currentNode);
-    if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
-      _forceRemove(currentNode);
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */
-    if ((tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
-      _forceRemove(currentNode);
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */
-    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
-      /* Get the element's text content */
-      const content = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.textContent);
-      if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
-        arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
-          element: currentNode.cloneNode()
-        });
-        currentNode.textContent = content;
-      }
-    }
-    /* Execute a hook if present */
-    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
-    return false;
-  };
-  /**
-   * _isValidAttribute
-   *
-   * @param lcTag Lowercase tag name of containing element.
-   * @param lcName Lowercase attribute name.
-   * @param value Attribute value.
-   * @return Returns true if `value` is valid, otherwise false.
-   */
-  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
-  const _isValidAttribute = function _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value) {
-    /* FORBID_ATTR must always win, even if ADD_ATTR predicate would allow it */
-    if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    /* Reject declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes
-       (https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
-            Empirical note (Chrome 150, verified — see
-       test/declarative-patch-probe-v3.html): expansion is NOT applied after
-       sanitization. For the string path it fires during sanitize()'s own
-       parse, so the walk sees and sanitizes the fully materialized expanded
-       tree — teleports into MathML/SVG integration points included; a
-       weaponized `<template for>`->`<img onerror>` comes back with the handler
-       stripped. For the IN_PLACE path it fires on connection, before the walk.
-       Either way DOMPurify is NOT blind to the patch.
-            This removal is therefore defense-in-depth rather than the sole barrier:
-       it prevents live linkage from surviving into the OUTPUT and re-expanding
-       in the caller's context, and keeps behaviour deterministic if a future
-       engine defers expansion. `for` is legitimate only on <label>/<output>;
-       anywhere else (notably <template for>) it links the element to a patch
-       target and teleports or removes an arbitrary DOM range by id/marker name.
-       `patchsrc` fetches remote markup and is treated as a script-loading
-       mechanism (CSP). Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML so the removal groups with the
-       other structural-threat checks and stays overridable, consistent with
-       the rest of the codebase. PI range markers are already removed by
-       _isUnsafeNode. */
-    if (_isPatchLinkageAttribute(lcName, lcTag)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    /* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
-    if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    const nameIsPermitted = ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag);
-    /* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after "-"
-        (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
-        XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
-        We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
-    if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Allow valid aria-* attributes, the value is always URI safe */
-    if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* A name outside the allowlist is acceptable on custom-element terms
-       only. The value checks below are intentionally skipped in that case:
-       if the user supplied a tagNameCheck we also allow derived custom
-       elements using the same test, and attributes passing the configured
-       attributeNameCheck are allowed as custom elements define these at
-       their own discretion. */
-    if (!nameIsPermitted) {
-      return (
-        // Condition a) covers a basically valid custom element tag name whose
-        // tag passes the configured tagNameCheck and whose attribute name
-        // passes the configured attributeNameCheck ...
-        _isBasicCustomElement(lcTag) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, lcTag) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck, lcName, lcTag) ||
-        // Condition b) covers an `is` attribute whose value passes the
-        // configured tagNameCheck while customized built-in elements are
-        // allowed.
-        lcName === 'is' && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, value)
-      );
-    }
-    /* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
-    if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Check no script, data or unknown possibly unsafe URI
-        unless we know URI values are safe for that attribute */
-    if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Keep image data URIs alive if src/xlink:href is allowed */
-    /* Further prevent gadget XSS for dynamically built script tags */
-    if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Allow unknown protocols: This provides support for links that
-        are handled by protocol handlers which may be unknown ahead of
-        time, e.g. fb:, spotify: */
-    if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    /* Only an empty (binary) value remains safe at this point;
-       anything else is presumed unsafe, do not add it back */
-    return !value;
-  };
-  /* Names the HTML spec reserves from valid-custom-element-name; these must
-   * never be treated as basic custom elements even when a permissive
-   * CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck is configured. */
-  const RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'color-profile', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'missing-glyph']);
-  /**
-   * _isBasicCustomElement
-   * checks if at least one dash is included in tagName, and it's not the first char
-   * for more sophisticated checking see https://github.com/sindresorhus/validate-element-name
-   *
-   * @param tagName name of the tag of the node to sanitize
-   * @returns Returns true if the tag name meets the basic criteria for a custom element, otherwise false.
-   */
-  const _isBasicCustomElement = function _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) {
-    return !RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES[stringToLowerCase(tagName)] && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1, tagName);
-  };
-  /**
-   * Wrap an attribute value in the matching Trusted Types object when
-   * the active policy requires it. Namespaced attributes pass through
-   * unchanged (no TT support yet, see
-   * https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1305293).
-   *
-   * @param lcTag lowercase tag name of the containing element
-   * @param lcName lowercase attribute name
-   * @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
-   * @param value the attribute value to wrap
-   * @return the value, wrapped when Trusted Types demand it
-   */
-  const _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute = function _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value) {
-    if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof trustedTypes === 'object' && typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function' && !namespaceURI) {
-      switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
-        case 'TrustedHTML':
-          {
-            return _createTrustedHTML(value);
-          }
-        case 'TrustedScriptURL':
-          {
-            return _createTrustedScriptURL(value);
-          }
-      }
-    }
-    return value;
-  };
-  /**
-   * Write a modified attribute value back onto the element. On
-   * success, re-probe for clobbering introduced by the new value and
-   * remove the element when found; otherwise, when this writeback is the
-   * recreate half of the SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS remove-and-recreate, pop the
-   * removal entry that path recorded so it does not show as removed. On
-   * failure, remove the attribute instead.
-   *
-   * Returns true only on a clean write (the value was set and the new value
-   * introduced no clobbering). The caller uses that, together with its own
-   * knowledge of whether this attribute pushed a DOMPurify.removed record, to
-   * decide whether to pop that record. The pop must happen ONLY for the
-   * named-prop remove-and-recreate; popping on any other value change (trim,
-   * template scrubbing, Trusted Types) would consume an unrelated _forceRemove
-   * subtree-cleanup record and let that detached subtree keep a live event
-   * handler through the IN_PLACE neutralization pass (SO-001).
-   *
-   * @param currentNode the element carrying the attribute
-   * @param name the attribute name as present on the element
-   * @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
-   * @param value the new attribute value
-   * @return true if the value was written without introducing clobbering
-   */
-  const _setAttributeValue = function _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value) {
-    try {
-      if (namespaceURI) {
-        currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
-      } else {
-        /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
-        currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
-      }
-      if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
-        _forceRemove(currentNode);
-        return false;
-      }
-      return true;
-    } catch (_) {
-      _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
-      return false;
-    }
-  };
-  /**
-   * _sanitizeAttributes
-   *
-   * @protect attributes
-   * @protect nodeName
-   * @protect removeAttribute
-   * @protect setAttribute
-   *
-   * @param currentNode to sanitize
-   */
-  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
-  const _sanitizeAttributes = function _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode) {
-    /* Execute a hook if present */
-    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
-    const attributes = currentNode.attributes;
-    /* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
-    if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
-      return;
-    }
-    /* Same lazy-install guard as uponSanitizeElement (see there): fork the
-       attribute allowlist off its shared binding before a hook can see it. */
-    ALLOWED_ATTR = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, ALLOWED_ATTR, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR);
-    const hookEvent = {
-      attrName: '',
-      attrValue: '',
-      keepAttr: true,
-      allowedAttributes: ALLOWED_ATTR,
-      forceKeepAttr: undefined
-    };
-    let l = attributes.length;
-    const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
-    /* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
-    while (l--) {
-      const attr = attributes[l];
-      const name = attr.name,
-        namespaceURI = attr.namespaceURI,
-        attrValue = attr.value;
-      const lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);
-      const initValue = attrValue;
-      let value = name === 'value' ? initValue : stringTrim(initValue);
-      /* Tracks whether this specific attribute pushed a DOMPurify.removed
-         record that a later _setAttributeValue() writeback is expected to pop
-         back off (the SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS remove-and-recreate below is the
-         only path that does). A value that merely changed via trim, template
-         scrubbing, or Trusted Types pushes no such record, so its writeback
-         must NOT pop — otherwise it consumes an unrelated _forceRemove subtree
-         record and that detached subtree escapes the IN_PLACE handler-
-         neutralization pass (SO-001). */
-      let recreatedNamedProp = false;
-      /* Execute a hook if present */
-      hookEvent.attrName = lcName;
-      hookEvent.attrValue = value;
-      hookEvent.keepAttr = true;
-      hookEvent.forceKeepAttr = undefined; // Allows developers to see this is a property they can set
-      _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, currentNode, hookEvent);
-      value = hookEvent.attrValue;
-      /* Full DOM Clobbering protection via namespace isolation,
-       * Prefix id and name attributes with `user-content-`
-       */
-      if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && stringIndexOf(value, SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX) !== 0) {
-        // Remove the attribute with this value
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
-        // Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
-        value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
-        // This attribute owns the record just pushed; its recreate writeback
-        // is the one allowed to pop it back off.
-        recreatedNamedProp = true;
-      }
-      // Else: already prefixed, leave the attribute alone — the prefix is
-      // itself the clobbering protection, and re-applying it is incorrect.
-      /* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */
-      if (SAFE_FOR_XML && regExpTest(/((--!?|])>)|<\/(style|script|title|xmp|textarea|noscript|iframe|noembed|noframes)/i, value)) {
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
-        continue;
-      }
-      /* Make sure we cannot easily use animated hrefs, even if animations are allowed */
-      if (lcName === 'attributename' && stringMatch(value, 'href')) {
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
-        continue;
-      }
-      /* Did the hooks force-keep the attribute? */
-      if (hookEvent.forceKeepAttr) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
-      if (!hookEvent.keepAttr) {
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
-        continue;
-      }
-      /* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
-      if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(SELF_CLOSING_TAG, value)) {
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
-        continue;
-      }
-      /* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
-      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-        value = _stripTemplateExpressions(value);
-      }
-      /* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
-      if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
-        continue;
-      }
-      /* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
-      value = _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value);
-      /* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */
-      if (value !== initValue) {
-        const cleanWrite = _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value);
-        /* Only the named-prop remove-and-recreate owns a DOMPurify.removed
-           record to pop; a plain trim/template/Trusted-Types writeback owns
-           none, so popping here would drop an unrelated subtree's cleanup
-           record (SO-001). */
-        if (cleanWrite && recreatedNamedProp) {
-          arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    /* Execute a hook if present */
-    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
-  };
-  /**
-   * _sanitizeShadowDOM
-   *
-   * @param fragment to iterate over recursively
-   */
-  const _sanitizeShadowDOM2 = function _sanitizeShadowDOM(fragment) {
-    let shadowNode = null;
-    const shadowIterator = _createNodeIterator(fragment);
-    /* Execute a hook if present */
-    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
-    while (shadowNode = shadowIterator.nextNode()) {
-      /* Execute a hook if present */
-      _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeShadowNode, shadowNode, null);
-      /* Sanitize tags and elements */
-      _sanitizeElements(shadowNode, fragment);
-      /* Check attributes next */
-      _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
-      /* Deep shadow DOM detected.
-         Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType against the
-         DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE constant rather than instanceof, so we
-         recurse into <template>.content from foreign realms too. */
-      if (_isDocumentFragment(shadowNode.content)) {
-        _sanitizeShadowDOM2(shadowNode.content);
-      }
-      /* An element iterated here may itself host an attached
-         shadow root. The default NodeIterator does not enter shadow
-         trees, so a shadow root nested inside template.content was
-         previously reached by no walk at all (the pre-pass at
-         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots descends via childNodes, which
-         doesn't enter template.content; the template-content recursion
-         above iterates the content but never inspected shadowRoot).
-         Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
-         shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
-         iterator also surfaces. */
-      if (_readNodeType(shadowNode) === NODE_TYPE.element) {
-        const innerSr = getShadowRoot(shadowNode);
-        if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
-          _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(innerSr);
-          _sanitizeShadowDOM2(innerSr);
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    /* Execute a hook if present */
-    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
-  };
-  /**
-   * _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots
-   *
-   * Walks `root` and feeds every attached shadow root we encounter into
-   * the existing _sanitizeShadowDOM pipeline. The default node iterator
-   * does not descend into shadow trees, so nodes inside an attached
-   * shadow root would otherwise be skipped entirely.
-   *
-   * Two real input paths put attached shadow roots in front of us:
-   *   1. IN_PLACE on a DOM node that already has shadow roots attached.
-   *   2. DOM-node input where importNode(dirty, true) deep-clones the
-   *      shadow root because it was created with `clonable: true`.
-   *
-   * This pass runs once, up front, so the main iteration loop (and the
-   * existing _sanitizeShadowDOM template-content recursion) stay
-   * untouched — string-input paths are not affected.
-   *
-   * @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
-   */
-  const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
-    /* Iterative (explicit stack) rather than per-child recursion. DOM APIs
-       impose no depth cap, so an attacker-shaped tree (JSON/CRDT/editor data
-       built straight into the DOM — the IN_PLACE surface) deeper than the JS
-       call-stack budget would otherwise overflow native recursion here and
-       throw at the IN_PLACE entry pre-pass, before a single node is
-       sanitized, leaving the caller's live tree untouched (fail-open). See
-       campaign-3 F4. A heap stack keeps depth off the call stack.
-            Each work item is either a node to descend into, or a deferred
-       `_sanitizeShadowDOM` for an already-walked shadow root. The deferred
-       form preserves the original post-order discipline: a shadow root's
-       nested shadow roots are discovered before the outer shadow is
-       sanitized (which may remove hosts). Pushes are in reverse of the
-       desired processing order (LIFO): template content, then children, then
-       the shadow-sanitize, then the shadow walk — so the order matches the
-       previous recursion exactly. */
-    const stack = [{
-      node: root,
-      shadow: null
-    }];
-    while (stack.length > 0) {
-      const item = stack.pop();
-      /* Deferred shadow-DOM sanitisation: runs after its subtree was walked. */
-      if (item.shadow) {
-        _sanitizeShadowDOM2(item.shadow);
-        continue;
-      }
-      const node = item.node;
-      const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
-      const isElement = nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element;
-      /* (pushed last → processed first) Children, snapshotted in reverse so
-         the first child is processed first. Snapshotting matters because a
-         hook may detach siblings mid-walk. */
-      const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
-      if (childNodes) {
-        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-          stack.push({
-            node: childNodes[i],
-            shadow: null
-          });
-        }
-      }
-      /* (pushed before children → processed after them, matching the old
-         "template content last" order) When the node is a <template>,
-         descend into its content. */
-      if (isElement) {
-        const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : null;
-        if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
-          const content = node.content;
-          if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
-            stack.push({
-              node: content,
-              shadow: null
-            });
-          }
-        }
-      }
-      /* Shadow root (processed first): walk its subtree, then sanitise it.
-         Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
-         rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is realm-bound and
-         silently skipped foreign-realm shadow roots (e.g.
-         iframe.contentDocument attachShadow). */
-      if (isElement) {
-        const sr = getShadowRoot(node);
-        if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
-          /* Push the deferred sanitise first so it pops after the shadow
-             walk we push next, i.e. nested shadow roots are discovered
-             before this one is sanitised. */
-          stack.push({
-            node: null,
-            shadow: sr
-          }, {
-            node: sr,
-            shadow: null
-          });
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  };
-  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
-  DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty) {
-    let cfg = arguments.length > 1 && arguments[1] !== undefined ? arguments[1] : {};
-    let body = null;
-    let importedNode = null;
-    let currentNode = null;
-    let returnNode = null;
-    /* Make sure we have a string to sanitize.
-      DO NOT return early, as this will return the wrong type if
-      the user has requested a DOM object rather than a string */
-    IS_EMPTY_INPUT = !dirty;
-    if (IS_EMPTY_INPUT) {
-      dirty = '<!-->';
-    }
-    /* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */
-    if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {
-      dirty = stringifyValue(dirty);
-      if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
-        throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
-      }
-    }
-    /* Return dirty HTML if DOMPurify cannot run */
-    if (!DOMPurify.isSupported) {
-      return dirty;
-    }
-    /* Assign config vars */
-    if (SET_CONFIG) {
-      /* Persistent setConfig() path: _parseConfig is skipped, so the sets are
-       * not re-derived per call. Restore them from the pristine bindings
-       * captured at setConfig() time so a previous call's hook clone (mutated
-       * below) does not carry over. */
-      ALLOWED_TAGS = SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS;
-      ALLOWED_ATTR = SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR;
-    } else {
-      _parseConfig(cfg);
-    }
-    /* Clone the hook-mutable allowlists before the walk whenever an
-     * uponSanitize* hook is registered. The hook event exposes ALLOWED_TAGS
-     * and ALLOWED_ATTR by reference (as allowedTags / allowedAttributes), so
-     * a hook that widens them would otherwise mutate the shared set
-     * permanently: across later calls and across every element. Cloning per
-     * walk keeps documented in-call widening working while scoping it to the
-     * call. A single guard for both config paths - the per-call path rebinds
-     * the sets in _parseConfig each call, the persistent path restores them
-     * from the captured bindings just above - so the two cannot diverge. */
-    if (hooks.uponSanitizeElement.length > 0 || hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) {
-      ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
-    }
-    if (hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) {
-      ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
-    }
-    /* Clean up removed elements */
-    DOMPurify.removed = [];
-    /* Resolve IN_PLACE for this call without mutating persistent config.
-       Writing the IN_PLACE closure variable here leaks under setConfig(),
-       where _parseConfig is skipped on later calls: a single string call would
-       disable in-place mode for every subsequent node call, returning a
-       sanitized copy while leaving the caller's node — which in-place callers
-       keep using and whose return value they ignore — unsanitized. REPORT-2. */
-    const inPlace = IN_PLACE && typeof dirty !== 'string' && _isNode(dirty);
-    if (inPlace) {
-      /* Declarative-partial-updates / streaming pre-pass: sever every patch
-         linkage across the live tree BEFORE the walk, so no patch can fire
-         mid-walk and inject into an already-processed region. Runs first, so
-         it also covers the forbidden/clobbered roots that throw below. */
-      _neutralizePatchLinkage(dirty);
-      /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
-         Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
-         child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
-         the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
-         validation entirely. */
-      const nn = _readNodeName(dirty);
-      if (typeof nn === 'string') {
-        const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
-        if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
-          /* Fail closed on a live root: neutralize handlers/children before
-             throwing, exactly as the mid-walk abort path does. */
-          _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
-          throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
-        }
-      }
-      /* Pre-flight the root through _isClobbered. The iterator-driven
-         removal path can not detach a parent-less root: _forceRemove
-         falls through to Element.prototype.remove(), which per spec
-         is a no-op on a node with no parent. A clobbered root would
-         then survive the main loop with its attributes uninspected,
-         because _sanitizeAttributes early-returns on _isClobbered. The
-         result would be an attacker-controlled form, complete with any
-         event-handler attributes the caller passed in, handed back to
-         the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
-         the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
-      if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
-        /* Fail closed on a live clobbered root before throwing.
-           _neutralizeRoot's reads are clobber-safe (cached getters); the
-           form's non-clobbered descendants, e.g. an armed <img>, are scrubbed. */
-        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
-        throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
-      }
-      /* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
-         The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. Same fail-closed
-         barrier as the main walk (campaign-3 F2): a custom-element reaction
-         inside a shadow root could abort this pre-pass before the walk runs,
-         which would otherwise leave the entire live tree unsanitized. */
-      try {
-        _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(dirty);
-      } catch (error) {
-        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
-        throw error;
-      }
-    } else if (_isNode(dirty)) {
-      /* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
-         elements being stripped by the parser */
-      body = _initDocument('<!---->');
-      importedNode = body.ownerDocument.importNode(dirty, true);
-      if (importedNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element && importedNode.nodeName === 'BODY') {
-        /* Node is already a body, use as is */
-        body = importedNode;
-      } else if (importedNode.nodeName === 'HTML') {
-        body = importedNode;
-      } else {
-        // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
-        body.appendChild(importedNode);
-      }
-      /* Clonable shadow roots are deep-cloned by importNode(); sanitize
-         them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
-         descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
-         cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
-         cannot hide a shadow host from this pass.
-                Traverse from `body`, not `importedNode`: when importedNode is a
-         DocumentFragment, the appendChild() above moves its children into
-         `body` and leaves the fragment empty, so walking importedNode would
-         scan nothing and miss every attached shadow host now under `body`
-         (SO-003). In the BODY/HTML branches `body === importedNode`, so this
-         is equivalent there; in the element branch `body` contains the
-         appended element and its descendants. `body` covers all three. */
-      _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(body);
-    } else {
-      /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
-      if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
-      // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
-      dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
-        return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
-      }
-      /* Initialize the document to work on */
-      body = _initDocument(dirty);
-      /* Check we have a DOM node from the data */
-      if (!body) {
-        return RETURN_DOM ? null : RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? emptyHTML : '';
-      }
-    }
-    /* Remove first element node (ours) if FORCE_BODY is set */
-    if (body && FORCE_BODY) {
-      _forceRemove(body.firstChild);
-    }
-    /* Get node iterator */
-    const walkRoot = inPlace ? dirty : body;
-    /* Now start iterating over the created document.
-       The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
-       engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
-       `_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
-       barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
-       unvisited tail still armed. _createNodeIterator itself is inside the
-       barrier too: constructing the iterator dereferences the root's document,
-       and any failure there (e.g. an exotic/clobbered root) must still fail
-       closed rather than skip the neutralize. On any throw we fail closed -
-       strip the in-place root bare - then rethrow so the existing throw
-       contract is preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial
-       body, so the propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
-    try {
-      const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(walkRoot);
-      while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
-        /* Sanitize tags and elements */
-        _sanitizeElements(currentNode, walkRoot);
-        /* Check attributes next */
-        _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
-        /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
-           Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
-           instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
-           walked correctly. */
-        if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
-          _sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
-        }
-      }
-    } catch (error) {
-      if (inPlace) {
-        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
-        /* Nodes _forceRemove'd earlier in the aborted walk are already
-           detached from the root, so _neutralizeRoot's subtree pass does not
-           reach them. Defuse them too, mirroring the success-path loop below. */
-        arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
-          if (entry.element) {
-            _neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
-          }
-        });
-      }
-      throw error;
-    }
-    /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
-    if (inPlace) {
-      /* Fail-closed completion of the audit-5 F1 fix: every node removed from
-         the caller's live tree is detached but may still hold a queued
-         resource-event handler that fires in page scope after we return. The
-         move-hoist covers only disallowed-tag KEEP_CONTENT removals; strip the
-         non-allow-listed attributes off every other removed subtree (clobber,
-         mXSS, namespace, comments, KEEP_CONTENT:false, …) so those handlers are
-         cancelled before any event can fire. Runs synchronously, pre-return. */
-      arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
-        if (entry.element) {
-          _neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
-        }
-      });
-      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-        _scrubTemplateExpressions2(dirty);
-      }
-      return dirty;
-    }
-    /* Return sanitized string or DOM */
-    if (RETURN_DOM) {
-      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-        _scrubTemplateExpressions2(body);
-      }
-      if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
-        returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
-        while (body.firstChild) {
-          // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
-          returnNode.appendChild(body.firstChild);
-        }
-      } else {
-        returnNode = body;
-      }
-      if (ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowroot || ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowrootmode) {
-        /*
-          AdoptNode() is not used because internal state is not reset
-          (e.g. the past names map of a HTMLFormElement), this is safe
-          in theory but we would rather not risk another attack vector.
-          The state that is cloned by importNode() is explicitly defined
-          by the specs.
-        */
-        returnNode = importNode.call(originalDocument, returnNode, true);
-      }
-      return returnNode;
-    }
-    let serializedHTML = WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? body.outerHTML : body.innerHTML;
-    /* Serialize doctype if allowed */
-    if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT && ALLOWED_TAGS['!doctype'] && body.ownerDocument && body.ownerDocument.doctype && body.ownerDocument.doctype.name && regExpTest(DOCTYPE_NAME, body.ownerDocument.doctype.name)) {
-      serializedHTML = '<!DOCTYPE ' + body.ownerDocument.doctype.name + '>\n' + serializedHTML;
-    }
-    /* Sanitize final string template-safe */
-    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-      serializedHTML = _stripTemplateExpressions(serializedHTML);
-    }
-    return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
-  };
-  DOMPurify.setConfig = function () {
-    let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
-    _parseConfig(cfg);
-    SET_CONFIG = true;
-    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = ALLOWED_TAGS;
-    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = ALLOWED_ATTR;
-  };
-  DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {
-    CONFIG = null;
-    SET_CONFIG = false;
-    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
-    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
-    // Drop any caller-supplied Trusted Types policy so it cannot poison later
-    // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output. The internal default policy (cached, and
-    // never recreated — Trusted Types throws on duplicate names) is restored by
-    // the next `_parseConfig`. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
-    trustedTypesPolicy = defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
-    emptyHTML = '';
-  };
-  DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {
-    /* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */
-    if (!CONFIG) {
-      _parseConfig({});
-    }
-    const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(tag);
-    const lcName = transformCaseFunc(attr);
-    return _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value);
-  };
-  DOMPurify.addHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
-    if (typeof hookFunction !== 'function') {
-      return;
-    }
-    /* Reject unknown entry points. Without this, a non-hook key (e.g.
-     * '__proto__') indexes off the prototype chain rather than a real
-     * hook array, and arrayPush then writes to Object.prototype. Guard
-     * with an own-property check against the known hook names. */
-    if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
-      return;
-    }
-    arrayPush(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
-  };
-  DOMPurify.removeHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
-    if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
-      return undefined;
-    }
-    if (hookFunction !== undefined) {
-      const index = arrayLastIndexOf(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
-      return index === -1 ? undefined : arraySplice(hooks[entryPoint], index, 1)[0];
-    }
-    return arrayPop(hooks[entryPoint]);
-  };
-  DOMPurify.removeHooks = function (entryPoint) {
-    if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
-      return;
-    }
-    hooks[entryPoint] = [];
-  };
-  DOMPurify.removeAllHooks = function () {
-    hooks = _createHooksMap();
-  };
-  return DOMPurify;
-}
-var purify = createDOMPurify();
-
-
-//# sourceMappingURL=purify.es.mjs.map
-
 ;// ../../../node_modules/@wix/wix-ui-icons-common/dist/esm/core/fetcher.js
-
 const ABORT_SIGNAL_TIMEOUT = 5e3;
-const SVG_NAMESPACE = "http://www.w3.org/2000/svg";
-function sanitizeSvgContent(content) {
-  if (typeof content !== "string" || !purify.isSupported) {
-    return "";
-  }
-  return purify.sanitize(content, {
-    USE_PROFILES: { svg: true, svgFilters: true },
-    NAMESPACE: SVG_NAMESPACE
-  });
-}
+let sanitizer;
+const loadSanitizer = () => sanitizer ?? (sanitizer = __webpack_require__.e(/*! import() */ 500).then(__webpack_require__.bind(__webpack_require__, /*! ./sanitize.js */ 7500)).catch((error) => {
+  sanitizer = void 0;
+  throw error;
+}));
+loadSanitizer().catch(() => {
+});
 const isTransientError = (error) => error instanceof Error && (error.name === "TimeoutError" || error.name === "AbortError");
 function createTimeoutSignal(timeout) {
   if (typeof AbortSignal.timeout === "function") {
@@ -66847,7 +64307,7 @@ class IconContentFetcher {
         throw error;
       }
     };
-    const request = fetchContent(2).then((data) => {
+    const request = Promise.all([fetchContent(2), loadSanitizer()]).then(([data, { sanitizeSvgContent }]) => {
       this.cache.set(cacheKey, sanitizeSvgContent(data.content));
       this.pendingRequests.delete(cacheKey);
     }).catch((error) => {
@@ -68907,12 +66367,12 @@ function _objectWithoutProperties(e, t) {
 }
 
 ;// ../../../node_modules/@babel/runtime/helpers/esm/arrayWithHoles.js
-function arrayWithHoles_arrayWithHoles(r) {
+function _arrayWithHoles(r) {
   if (Array.isArray(r)) return r;
 }
 
 ;// ../../../node_modules/@babel/runtime/helpers/esm/iterableToArrayLimit.js
-function iterableToArrayLimit_iterableToArrayLimit(r, l) {
+function _iterableToArrayLimit(r, l) {
   var t = null == r ? null : "undefined" != typeof Symbol && r[Symbol.iterator] || r["@@iterator"];
   if (null != t) {
     var e,
@@ -68941,7 +66401,7 @@ function iterableToArrayLimit_iterableToArrayLimit(r, l) {
 }
 
 ;// ../../../node_modules/@babel/runtime/helpers/esm/arrayLikeToArray.js
-function arrayLikeToArray_arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
+function _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
   (null == a || a > r.length) && (a = r.length);
   for (var e = 0, n = Array(a); e < a; e++) n[e] = r[e];
   return n;
@@ -68949,16 +66409,16 @@ function arrayLikeToArray_arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
 
 ;// ../../../node_modules/@babel/runtime/helpers/esm/unsupportedIterableToArray.js
 
-function unsupportedIterableToArray_unsupportedIterableToArray(r, a) {
+function _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, a) {
   if (r) {
-    if ("string" == typeof r) return arrayLikeToArray_arrayLikeToArray(r, a);
+    if ("string" == typeof r) return _arrayLikeToArray(r, a);
     var t = {}.toString.call(r).slice(8, -1);
-    return "Object" === t && r.constructor && (t = r.constructor.name), "Map" === t || "Set" === t ? Array.from(r) : "Arguments" === t || /^(?:Ui|I)nt(?:8|16|32)(?:Clamped)?Array$/.test(t) ? arrayLikeToArray_arrayLikeToArray(r, a) : void 0;
+    return "Object" === t && r.constructor && (t = r.constructor.name), "Map" === t || "Set" === t ? Array.from(r) : "Arguments" === t || /^(?:Ui|I)nt(?:8|16|32)(?:Clamped)?Array$/.test(t) ? _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) : void 0;
   }
 }
 
 ;// ../../../node_modules/@babel/runtime/helpers/esm/nonIterableRest.js
-function nonIterableRest_nonIterableRest() {
+function _nonIterableRest() {
   throw new TypeError("Invalid attempt to destructure non-iterable instance.\nIn order to be iterable, non-array objects must have a [Symbol.iterator]() method.");
 }
 
@@ -68967,14 +66427,14 @@ function nonIterableRest_nonIterableRest() {
 
 
 
-function slicedToArray_slicedToArray(r, e) {
-  return arrayWithHoles_arrayWithHoles(r) || iterableToArrayLimit_iterableToArrayLimit(r, e) || unsupportedIterableToArray_unsupportedIterableToArray(r, e) || nonIterableRest_nonIterableRest();
+function _slicedToArray(r, e) {
+  return _arrayWithHoles(r) || _iterableToArrayLimit(r, e) || _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, e) || _nonIterableRest();
 }
 
 ;// ../../../node_modules/@babel/runtime/helpers/esm/arrayWithoutHoles.js
 
 function _arrayWithoutHoles(r) {
-  if (Array.isArray(r)) return arrayLikeToArray_arrayLikeToArray(r);
+  if (Array.isArray(r)) return _arrayLikeToArray(r);
 }
 
 ;// ../../../node_modules/@babel/runtime/helpers/esm/iterableToArray.js
@@ -68993,7 +66453,7 @@ function _nonIterableSpread() {
 
 
 function _toConsumableArray(r) {
-  return _arrayWithoutHoles(r) || _iterableToArray(r) || unsupportedIterableToArray_unsupportedIterableToArray(r) || _nonIterableSpread();
+  return _arrayWithoutHoles(r) || _iterableToArray(r) || _unsupportedIterableToArray(r) || _nonIterableSpread();
 }
 
 ;// ../../../node_modules/@babel/runtime/helpers/esm/classCallCheck.js
@@ -70928,14 +68388,14 @@ var createFilter = function createFilter(config) {
 
 function Select_e1cf49ae_browser_esm_EMOTION_STRINGIFIED_CSS_ERROR_() { return "You have tried to stringify object returned from `css` function. It isn't supposed to be used directly (e.g. as value of the `className` prop), but rather handed to emotion so it can handle it (e.g. as value of `css` prop)."; }
 
-var Select_e1cf49ae_browser_esm_ref =  true ? {
+var _ref =  true ? {
   name: "1laao21-a11yText",
   styles: "label:a11yText;z-index:9999;border:0;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);height:1px;width:1px;position:absolute;overflow:hidden;padding:0;white-space:nowrap;"
 } : 0;
 
 var A11yText = function A11yText(props) {
   return core_browser_esm_jsx("span", _extends({
-    css: Select_e1cf49ae_browser_esm_ref
+    css: _ref
   }, props));
 };
 
@@ -72439,12 +69899,12 @@ var Select = /*#__PURE__*/function (_Component) {
 
     _this.buildMenuOptions = memoize_one_esm(_this.buildMenuOptions, function (newArgs, lastArgs) {
       var _ref6 = newArgs,
-          _ref7 = slicedToArray_slicedToArray(_ref6, 2),
+          _ref7 = _slicedToArray(_ref6, 2),
           newProps = _ref7[0],
           newSelectValue = _ref7[1];
 
       var _ref8 = lastArgs,
-          _ref9 = slicedToArray_slicedToArray(_ref8, 2),
+          _ref9 = _slicedToArray(_ref8, 2),
           lastProps = _ref9[0],
           lastSelectValue = _ref9[1];
 
@@ -80547,9 +78007,8 @@ const formatPx = (maxWidth) => maxWidth === undefined
     : typeof maxWidth === 'string'
         ? maxWidth
         : `${maxWidth}px`;
-const Tag = ({ id, onClick, onRemove, maxWidth, dataHook, size = Tag_constants_SIZE.small, type = TYPE.solid, theme = Tag_constants_SKIN.standard, // TODO: add default value for skin once theme is removed
-removable = true, disabled, thumb, ellipsisProps, className, children, closeButtonRef, ...props }) => {
-    const skin = props.skin || theme;
+const Tag = ({ id, onClick, onRemove, maxWidth, dataHook, size = Tag_constants_SIZE.small, type = TYPE.solid, theme, removable = true, disabled, thumb, ellipsisProps, className, children, closeButtonRef, ...props }) => {
+    const skin = props.skin || theme || Tag_constants_SKIN.standard;
     (0,external_React_.useEffect)(() => {
         if (theme) {
             deprecationLog_deprecationLog('<Tag/> - theme prop is deprecated and will be removed in next major version, please use skin instead');