@wix/auto_sdk_connectors_connectors 1.0.6 → 1.0.7

package/build/internal/cjs/index.typings.d.ts

@@ -37,29 +37,6 @@ interface Connector extends ConnectorRegistrationOneOf {
      * @immutable
      */
     connectorSlug?: string;
-    /**
-     * The provider-side subject this connection is about, and the value inbound webhook deliveries are
-     * attributed by: it must be byte-identical to what a delivery carries at the pointer the connector's
-     * WebhookConfig.provider_tenant_id_json_pointer names. Which value that is follows from where
-     * OAuthConfig.identity_operation.response_id_json_pointer points, so aim that pointer at whatever the
-     * provider's webhooks are about -- usually a workspace, team or installation rather than the individual
-     * user who consented. This PII also participates in the account-local uniqueness constraint.
-     *
-     * For a connector whose WebhookConfig declares verification_source = CONNECTOR_WIDE, a non-empty
-     * provider_tenant_id_json_pointer, and unique_callback_path = false, that byte-identity is a hard
-     * contract, not advice: connectors-webhooks uses this value as the provider tenant identity when it
-     * builds the shared-delivery fan-out route for this connector, so a mismatch means the account's
-     * deliveries verify but resolve no route and are refused. Config validation enforces the
-     * precondition of that contract: such a connector is rejected unless it also names
-     * OAuthConfig.identity_operation.response_id_json_pointer, because a connector that names no
-     * identity pointer produces no external id for a delivery to be matched against. The equivalence
-     * itself stays unvalidated and remains the responsibility of whoever configures the two pointers:
-     * they address different documents -- the provider's identity response and an inbound delivery
-     * body -- so only a live delivery can show that they select the same value.
-     * @internal
-     * @maxLength 200
-     */
-    connectorExternalId?: string;
     /**
      * Wix user who consented to this private Connector. Required when exposure is USER.
      * @internal
@@ -148,12 +125,12 @@ interface Connector extends ConnectorRegistrationOneOf {
      * AccessKeyBindingPushed the same way as credential_state and granted_scopes -- see credential_state's
      * comment for the full advisory rule, which applies identically here. A human-readable label from the
      * provider (an org, workspace, or account name) that helps a user recognize which connection this is --
-     * NEVER an identity. The identity is connector_external_id, which is immutable and INTERNAL precisely
-     * because it is the identity; this field can lag, be blank, or go stale like every other advisory
-     * projection, and must never be used as an authorization input or a dedup key.
+     * NEVER an identity. The provider identity is the shared access key's external_provider_id; this field
+     * can lag, be blank, or go stale like every other advisory projection, and must never be used as an
+     * authorization input or a dedup key.
      *
-     * Deliberately NOT field_exposure = INTERNAL, unlike its neighbours connector_external_id and
-     * consenting_user_id -- this field exists specifically so the callers this feature serves can read it.
+     * Deliberately NOT field_exposure = INTERNAL, unlike its neighbour consenting_user_id -- this field
+     * exists specifically so the callers this feature serves can read it.
      * credential_state carries the same explicit choice for the same reason. On a USER-exposed Connector,
      * ConnectorsService additionally omits this field from a read response to any caller other than the
      * consenting user, including a service identity admitted by mayRead's identities.service.nonEmpty

package/build/internal/cjs/meta.d.ts

@@ -37,29 +37,6 @@ interface Connector extends ConnectorRegistrationOneOf {
      * @immutable
      */
     connectorSlug?: string;
-    /**
-     * The provider-side subject this connection is about, and the value inbound webhook deliveries are
-     * attributed by: it must be byte-identical to what a delivery carries at the pointer the connector's
-     * WebhookConfig.provider_tenant_id_json_pointer names. Which value that is follows from where
-     * OAuthConfig.identity_operation.response_id_json_pointer points, so aim that pointer at whatever the
-     * provider's webhooks are about -- usually a workspace, team or installation rather than the individual
-     * user who consented. This PII also participates in the account-local uniqueness constraint.
-     *
-     * For a connector whose WebhookConfig declares verification_source = CONNECTOR_WIDE, a non-empty
-     * provider_tenant_id_json_pointer, and unique_callback_path = false, that byte-identity is a hard
-     * contract, not advice: connectors-webhooks uses this value as the provider tenant identity when it
-     * builds the shared-delivery fan-out route for this connector, so a mismatch means the account's
-     * deliveries verify but resolve no route and are refused. Config validation enforces the
-     * precondition of that contract: such a connector is rejected unless it also names
-     * OAuthConfig.identity_operation.response_id_json_pointer, because a connector that names no
-     * identity pointer produces no external id for a delivery to be matched against. The equivalence
-     * itself stays unvalidated and remains the responsibility of whoever configures the two pointers:
-     * they address different documents -- the provider's identity response and an inbound delivery
-     * body -- so only a live delivery can show that they select the same value.
-     * @internal
-     * @maxLength 200
-     */
-    connectorExternalId?: string;
     /**
      * Wix user who consented to this private Connector. Required when exposure is USER.
      * @internal
@@ -148,12 +125,12 @@ interface Connector extends ConnectorRegistrationOneOf {
      * AccessKeyBindingPushed the same way as credential_state and granted_scopes -- see credential_state's
      * comment for the full advisory rule, which applies identically here. A human-readable label from the
      * provider (an org, workspace, or account name) that helps a user recognize which connection this is --
-     * NEVER an identity. The identity is connector_external_id, which is immutable and INTERNAL precisely
-     * because it is the identity; this field can lag, be blank, or go stale like every other advisory
-     * projection, and must never be used as an authorization input or a dedup key.
+     * NEVER an identity. The provider identity is the shared access key's external_provider_id; this field
+     * can lag, be blank, or go stale like every other advisory projection, and must never be used as an
+     * authorization input or a dedup key.
      *
-     * Deliberately NOT field_exposure = INTERNAL, unlike its neighbours connector_external_id and
-     * consenting_user_id -- this field exists specifically so the callers this feature serves can read it.
+     * Deliberately NOT field_exposure = INTERNAL, unlike its neighbour consenting_user_id -- this field
+     * exists specifically so the callers this feature serves can read it.
      * credential_state carries the same explicit choice for the same reason. On a USER-exposed Connector,
      * ConnectorsService additionally omits this field from a read response to any caller other than the
      * consenting user, including a service identity admitted by mayRead's identities.service.nonEmpty

package/build/internal/es/index.typings.d.mts

@@ -37,29 +37,6 @@ interface Connector extends ConnectorRegistrationOneOf {
      * @immutable
      */
     connectorSlug?: string;
-    /**
-     * The provider-side subject this connection is about, and the value inbound webhook deliveries are
-     * attributed by: it must be byte-identical to what a delivery carries at the pointer the connector's
-     * WebhookConfig.provider_tenant_id_json_pointer names. Which value that is follows from where
-     * OAuthConfig.identity_operation.response_id_json_pointer points, so aim that pointer at whatever the
-     * provider's webhooks are about -- usually a workspace, team or installation rather than the individual
-     * user who consented. This PII also participates in the account-local uniqueness constraint.
-     *
-     * For a connector whose WebhookConfig declares verification_source = CONNECTOR_WIDE, a non-empty
-     * provider_tenant_id_json_pointer, and unique_callback_path = false, that byte-identity is a hard
-     * contract, not advice: connectors-webhooks uses this value as the provider tenant identity when it
-     * builds the shared-delivery fan-out route for this connector, so a mismatch means the account's
-     * deliveries verify but resolve no route and are refused. Config validation enforces the
-     * precondition of that contract: such a connector is rejected unless it also names
-     * OAuthConfig.identity_operation.response_id_json_pointer, because a connector that names no
-     * identity pointer produces no external id for a delivery to be matched against. The equivalence
-     * itself stays unvalidated and remains the responsibility of whoever configures the two pointers:
-     * they address different documents -- the provider's identity response and an inbound delivery
-     * body -- so only a live delivery can show that they select the same value.
-     * @internal
-     * @maxLength 200
-     */
-    connectorExternalId?: string;
     /**
      * Wix user who consented to this private Connector. Required when exposure is USER.
      * @internal
@@ -148,12 +125,12 @@ interface Connector extends ConnectorRegistrationOneOf {
      * AccessKeyBindingPushed the same way as credential_state and granted_scopes -- see credential_state's
      * comment for the full advisory rule, which applies identically here. A human-readable label from the
      * provider (an org, workspace, or account name) that helps a user recognize which connection this is --
-     * NEVER an identity. The identity is connector_external_id, which is immutable and INTERNAL precisely
-     * because it is the identity; this field can lag, be blank, or go stale like every other advisory
-     * projection, and must never be used as an authorization input or a dedup key.
+     * NEVER an identity. The provider identity is the shared access key's external_provider_id; this field
+     * can lag, be blank, or go stale like every other advisory projection, and must never be used as an
+     * authorization input or a dedup key.
      *
-     * Deliberately NOT field_exposure = INTERNAL, unlike its neighbours connector_external_id and
-     * consenting_user_id -- this field exists specifically so the callers this feature serves can read it.
+     * Deliberately NOT field_exposure = INTERNAL, unlike its neighbour consenting_user_id -- this field
+     * exists specifically so the callers this feature serves can read it.
      * credential_state carries the same explicit choice for the same reason. On a USER-exposed Connector,
      * ConnectorsService additionally omits this field from a read response to any caller other than the
      * consenting user, including a service identity admitted by mayRead's identities.service.nonEmpty

package/build/internal/es/meta.d.mts

@@ -37,29 +37,6 @@ interface Connector extends ConnectorRegistrationOneOf {
      * @immutable
      */
     connectorSlug?: string;
-    /**
-     * The provider-side subject this connection is about, and the value inbound webhook deliveries are
-     * attributed by: it must be byte-identical to what a delivery carries at the pointer the connector's
-     * WebhookConfig.provider_tenant_id_json_pointer names. Which value that is follows from where
-     * OAuthConfig.identity_operation.response_id_json_pointer points, so aim that pointer at whatever the
-     * provider's webhooks are about -- usually a workspace, team or installation rather than the individual
-     * user who consented. This PII also participates in the account-local uniqueness constraint.
-     *
-     * For a connector whose WebhookConfig declares verification_source = CONNECTOR_WIDE, a non-empty
-     * provider_tenant_id_json_pointer, and unique_callback_path = false, that byte-identity is a hard
-     * contract, not advice: connectors-webhooks uses this value as the provider tenant identity when it
-     * builds the shared-delivery fan-out route for this connector, so a mismatch means the account's
-     * deliveries verify but resolve no route and are refused. Config validation enforces the
-     * precondition of that contract: such a connector is rejected unless it also names
-     * OAuthConfig.identity_operation.response_id_json_pointer, because a connector that names no
-     * identity pointer produces no external id for a delivery to be matched against. The equivalence
-     * itself stays unvalidated and remains the responsibility of whoever configures the two pointers:
-     * they address different documents -- the provider's identity response and an inbound delivery
-     * body -- so only a live delivery can show that they select the same value.
-     * @internal
-     * @maxLength 200
-     */
-    connectorExternalId?: string;
     /**
      * Wix user who consented to this private Connector. Required when exposure is USER.
      * @internal
@@ -148,12 +125,12 @@ interface Connector extends ConnectorRegistrationOneOf {
      * AccessKeyBindingPushed the same way as credential_state and granted_scopes -- see credential_state's
      * comment for the full advisory rule, which applies identically here. A human-readable label from the
      * provider (an org, workspace, or account name) that helps a user recognize which connection this is --
-     * NEVER an identity. The identity is connector_external_id, which is immutable and INTERNAL precisely
-     * because it is the identity; this field can lag, be blank, or go stale like every other advisory
-     * projection, and must never be used as an authorization input or a dedup key.
+     * NEVER an identity. The provider identity is the shared access key's external_provider_id; this field
+     * can lag, be blank, or go stale like every other advisory projection, and must never be used as an
+     * authorization input or a dedup key.
      *
-     * Deliberately NOT field_exposure = INTERNAL, unlike its neighbours connector_external_id and
-     * consenting_user_id -- this field exists specifically so the callers this feature serves can read it.
+     * Deliberately NOT field_exposure = INTERNAL, unlike its neighbour consenting_user_id -- this field
+     * exists specifically so the callers this feature serves can read it.
      * credential_state carries the same explicit choice for the same reason. On a USER-exposed Connector,
      * ConnectorsService additionally omits this field from a read response to any caller other than the
      * consenting user, including a service identity admitted by mayRead's identities.service.nonEmpty

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@wix/auto_sdk_connectors_connectors",
-  "version": "1.0.6",
+  "version": "1.0.7",
   "license": "MIT",
   "publishConfig": {
     "registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org/",
@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@
       "fqdn": "wix.connectors.v1.connector"
     }
   },
-  "falconPackageHash": "44b028a7be5f950097e0130f7253697b02841ad3f790647414dedbf8"
+  "falconPackageHash": "386efae2374e4453b01b973fe7d8b08af46e4bde6f67c571c1285fd7"
 }