@wipcomputer/wip-ldm-os 0.4.85-alpha.2 → 0.4.85-alpha.4

package/src/hosted-mcp/server.mjs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // server.mjs: Hosted MCP server for wip.computer
 // MCP Streamable HTTP transport at /mcp, health check at /health.
-// Auth: Bearer ck-... API key maps to an agent ID.
+// Auth: Bearer ck-... API key maps to an immutable tenant ID.
 // OAuth 2.0: Minimal flow for Claude iOS custom connector.
 // WebAuthn: Passkey-based signup/login (replaces agent name text form).
 
@@ -27,6 +27,31 @@ import { parse as parseUrlQs } from "node:querystring";
 // ── Settings ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 const PORT = parseInt(process.env.MCP_PORT || "18800", 10);
+// Dev mode: opt-in to JSON-file fallbacks for the data layer and to
+// reading tokens/passkeys from local JSON files. Production must run
+// without this flag set (production fails closed when Prisma is
+// unavailable, and never reads/writes the local JSON token files).
+// Tracked by ai/product/bugs/security/2026-04-28--cc-mini--vps-hosted-mcp-audit.md (F-002, F-005a).
+const DEV_MODE = process.env.LDM_HOSTED_MCP_DEV_MODE === "1";
+// WebSocket Origin allowlist (F-003 in the VPS hosted-mcp audit).
+// Browser-borne web WS upgrades must present an Origin from this list.
+// Comma-separated env var; default is the production origin.
+// Daemon WS upgrades (CLI / agent connections) are NOT gated on Origin
+// because they do not send a browser Origin header.
+const WS_ORIGIN_ALLOWLIST = (process.env.LDM_HOSTED_MCP_WS_ORIGIN_ALLOWLIST || "https://wip.computer")
+  .split(",")
+  .map(s => s.trim())
+  .filter(Boolean);
+
+function isWsOriginAllowed(origin) {
+  if (!origin) return false;
+  return WS_ORIGIN_ALLOWLIST.includes(origin);
+}
+// F-001: WS URL-token fallback (browser sends ?token=ck-... on upgrade).
+// Default off in production. Set LDM_HOSTED_MCP_ALLOW_WS_URL_TOKEN=1 to
+// allow the legacy back-compat path. Independent of any other dev flag
+// so that this can be toggled without enabling other dev-mode behavior.
+const ALLOW_WS_URL_TOKEN = process.env.LDM_HOSTED_MCP_ALLOW_WS_URL_TOKEN === "1";
 const SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000;
 const SESSION_CLEANUP_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
 const OAUTH_CODE_EXPIRY_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
@@ -44,18 +69,19 @@ const RP_ORIGIN = "https://wip.computer";
 
 // ── Data layer ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 //
-// Primary: Postgres via Prisma (production).
-// Fallback: JSON files (if DATABASE_URL is not set, e.g. local dev without Postgres).
+// Production: Postgres via Prisma is the canonical store. If Prisma
+// cannot connect, the server refuses to start (F-005a).
 //
-// The demo and all API endpoints use the db.* functions below.
-// They try Prisma first, fall back to JSON if Prisma isn't available.
+// Dev mode (LDM_HOSTED_MCP_DEV_MODE=1): JSON files are used as a
+// fallback for tokens and passkeys when Prisma is unavailable, and
+// are also seeded into the in-memory cache on boot. Production must
+// not set this flag.
 
 const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
 const TOKEN_FILE = join(__dirname, "tokens.json");
 const PASSKEY_FILE = join(__dirname, "passkeys.json");
 const WALLET_FILE_LEGACY = join(__dirname, "wallets.json");
 
-// Initialize Prisma (may fail if DATABASE_URL not set)
 let prisma = null;
 let usePrisma = false;
 try {
@@ -64,30 +90,105 @@ try {
   usePrisma = true;
   console.log("Database: Postgres via Prisma");
 } catch (err) {
-  console.log("Database: JSON files (Prisma not available: " + err.message + ")");
+  if (!DEV_MODE) {
+    console.error("FATAL: Prisma unavailable; refusing to start.");
+    console.error("Cause: " + err.message);
+    console.error("Set LDM_HOSTED_MCP_DEV_MODE=1 to allow the JSON fallback (dev only).");
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  console.warn("Database: JSON files (DEV MODE; Prisma not available: " + err.message + ")");
 }
 
 // ── API Keys ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Hardcoded production defaults removed (F-002). Production keys live
+// in the Postgres ApiKey table and are loaded on boot. In DEV_MODE,
+// the local tokens.json file is also seeded into the in-memory cache.
 
-// Hardcoded defaults (always available, even without DB)
-const DEFAULT_API_KEYS = {
-  "ck-test-001": "test-agent",
-  "ck-e04df46877aa3672e21c4e33149bacc4": "cc-mini",
-  "ck-f1986e957e21cbb40dc100bc05dc78ec": "lesa",
-  "ck-c2849eef903407c877bc6e79bf8794aa": "parker",
-};
+const API_KEYS = {};
+const API_KEY_HANDLES = {};
+const ACCOUNT_TENANT_PREFIX = "acct:";
+const LEGACY_API_KEY_TENANT_PREFIX = "key:";
+const OAUTH_API_KEY_TENANT_PREFIX = "oauth:";
+const RESERVED_AGENT_HANDLES = new Set([
+  "parker-smoke-test",
+]);
+
+function isInternalTenantId(id) {
+  return typeof id === "string"
+    && (id.startsWith(ACCOUNT_TENANT_PREFIX)
+      || id.startsWith(LEGACY_API_KEY_TENANT_PREFIX)
+      || id.startsWith(OAUTH_API_KEY_TENANT_PREFIX));
+}
+
+function accountTenantIdForUserId(userId) {
+  return ACCOUNT_TENANT_PREFIX + userId;
+}
+
+function legacyTenantIdForApiKey(key) {
+  return LEGACY_API_KEY_TENANT_PREFIX + createHash("sha256").update(key).digest("base64url").slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+function oauthTenantIdForApiKey(key) {
+  return OAUTH_API_KEY_TENANT_PREFIX + createHash("sha256").update(key).digest("base64url").slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+function rememberApiKeyInMemory(key, tenantId, handle = null) {
+  API_KEYS[key] = tenantId;
+  if (handle) API_KEY_HANDLES[key] = handle;
+  else delete API_KEY_HANDLES[key];
+}
+
+function rememberLoadedApiKey(key, storedAgentId) {
+  const tenantId = isInternalTenantId(storedAgentId) ? storedAgentId : legacyTenantIdForApiKey(key);
+  const handle = isInternalTenantId(storedAgentId) ? null : storedAgentId;
+  rememberApiKeyInMemory(key, tenantId, handle);
+}
 
-// In-memory cache (populated from DB or JSON on boot)
-const API_KEYS = { ...DEFAULT_API_KEYS };
+function identityForApiKey(key) {
+  const tenantId = API_KEYS[key];
+  if (!tenantId) return null;
+  return {
+    agentId: tenantId,
+    tenantId,
+    handle: API_KEY_HANDLES[key] || tenantId,
+    apiKey: key,
+  };
+}
 
-// Load from JSON (fallback)
 function loadTokensFromFile() {
-  try { return JSON.parse(readFileSync(TOKEN_FILE, "utf8")); } catch { return {}; }
+  let rows = {};
+  try { rows = JSON.parse(readFileSync(TOKEN_FILE, "utf8")); } catch { return; }
+  for (const [key, storedAgentId] of Object.entries(rows)) {
+    rememberLoadedApiKey(key, storedAgentId);
+  }
 }
-Object.assign(API_KEYS, loadTokensFromFile());
 
-async function saveApiKey(key, agentId) {
-  API_KEYS[key] = agentId;
+async function loadApiKeysFromDb() {
+  if (!usePrisma) return;
+  try {
+    const rows = await prisma.apiKey.findMany();
+    for (const row of rows) rememberLoadedApiKey(row.key, row.agentId);
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (!DEV_MODE) {
+      console.error("FATAL: Prisma loadApiKeys failed; refusing to start.");
+      console.error("Cause: " + err.message);
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+    console.error("Prisma loadApiKeys error (DEV_MODE):", err.message);
+  }
+}
+
+if (DEV_MODE) {
+  loadTokensFromFile();
+}
+await loadApiKeysFromDb();
+
+async function saveApiKey(key, agentId, { handle = null } = {}) {
+  // Persist before advertising in memory: a newly issued key must not
+  // become valid in the in-memory cache if the canonical store did not
+  // accept it. Otherwise the key would work for the lifetime of the
+  // process and disappear on restart.
   if (usePrisma) {
     try {
       await prisma.apiKey.upsert({
@@ -97,10 +198,17 @@ async function saveApiKey(key, agentId) {
       });
     } catch (err) {
       console.error("Prisma saveApiKey error:", err.message);
+      if (!DEV_MODE) throw new Error("saveApiKey persistence failed: " + err.message);
     }
+  } else if (!DEV_MODE) {
+    // Production should never reach here (boot exits if Prisma is
+    // unavailable), but guard explicitly.
+    throw new Error("saveApiKey called without Prisma in production");
+  }
+  rememberApiKeyInMemory(key, agentId, handle);
+  if (DEV_MODE) {
+    try { writeFileSync(TOKEN_FILE, JSON.stringify(API_KEYS, null, 2) + "\n"); } catch {}
   }
-  // Always write JSON as backup
-  try { writeFileSync(TOKEN_FILE, JSON.stringify(API_KEYS, null, 2) + "\n"); } catch {}
 }
 
 // ── Passkeys ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -113,33 +221,72 @@ function loadPasskeysFromFile() {
 }
 
 async function loadPasskeysFromDb() {
-  if (!usePrisma) return loadPasskeysFromFile();
+  if (!usePrisma) {
+    return DEV_MODE ? loadPasskeysFromFile() : [];
+  }
   try {
     const creds = await prisma.credential.findMany({ include: { user: true } });
-    return creds.map(c => ({
-      credentialId: c.id,
-      publicKey: Buffer.from(c.publicKey).toString("base64url"),
-      counter: c.counter,
-      userId: c.userId,
-      agentId: c.user?.name ? "passkey-" + c.user.name.slice(0, 12) : "unknown",
-      createdAt: c.createdAt.toISOString(),
-      transports: c.transports || [],
-    }));
+    const handleUserIds = new Map();
+    for (const c of creds) {
+      const handle = c.user?.name || (c.userId ? "user-" + c.userId.slice(0, 8) : "unknown");
+      if (!handleUserIds.has(handle)) handleUserIds.set(handle, new Set());
+      handleUserIds.get(handle).add(c.userId);
+    }
+    const out = [];
+    for (const c of creds) {
+      const handle = c.user?.name || (c.userId ? "user-" + c.userId.slice(0, 8) : "unknown");
+      const agentId = accountTenantIdForUserId(c.userId);
+      let apiKey = null;
+      for (const [key, tenantId] of Object.entries(API_KEYS)) {
+        if (tenantId === agentId || (handleUserIds.get(handle)?.size === 1 && API_KEY_HANDLES[key] === handle)) {
+          apiKey = key;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+      if (apiKey) {
+        API_KEY_HANDLES[apiKey] = handle;
+        if (API_KEYS[apiKey] !== agentId) {
+          try {
+            await saveApiKey(apiKey, agentId, { handle });
+            console.log("loadPasskeysFromDb: migrated API key tenant for handle '" + handle + "' to immutable account id");
+          } catch (err) {
+            console.error("loadPasskeysFromDb: failed to migrate API key tenant for handle '" + handle + "':", err.message);
+            if (!DEV_MODE) throw err;
+          }
+        }
+      } else if (handle !== "unknown") {
+        console.warn("loadPasskeysFromDb: no ApiKey row for account tenant '" + agentId + "'; auth-verify will mint on next successful login");
+      }
+      out.push({
+        credentialId: c.id,
+        publicKey: Buffer.from(c.publicKey).toString("base64url"),
+        counter: c.counter,
+        userId: c.userId,
+        agentId,
+        handle,
+        apiKey,
+        createdAt: c.createdAt.toISOString(),
+        transports: c.transports || [],
+      });
+    }
+    return out;
   } catch (err) {
     console.error("Prisma loadPasskeys error:", err.message);
-    return loadPasskeysFromFile();
+    return DEV_MODE ? loadPasskeysFromFile() : [];
   }
 }
 
 async function savePasskey(entry) {
-  passkeys.push(entry);
+  // Persist before pushing to in-memory: a passkey must not exist in
+  // memory if it was never persisted, or it would authenticate for the
+  // lifetime of the process and disappear on restart.
   if (usePrisma) {
     try {
       // Ensure user exists
       let user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: entry.userId } });
       if (!user) {
         user = await prisma.user.create({
-          data: { id: entry.userId, name: entry.agentId || "user" },
+          data: { id: entry.userId, name: entry.handle || "user" },
         });
       }
       await prisma.credential.create({
@@ -153,15 +300,22 @@ async function savePasskey(entry) {
       });
     } catch (err) {
       console.error("Prisma savePasskey error:", err.message);
+      if (!DEV_MODE) throw new Error("savePasskey persistence failed: " + err.message);
     }
+  } else if (!DEV_MODE) {
+    throw new Error("savePasskey called without Prisma in production");
+  }
+  passkeys.push(entry);
+  if (DEV_MODE) {
+    try { writeFileSync(PASSKEY_FILE, JSON.stringify(passkeys, null, 2) + "\n"); } catch {}
   }
-  // Always write JSON as backup
-  try { writeFileSync(PASSKEY_FILE, JSON.stringify(passkeys, null, 2) + "\n"); } catch {}
 }
 
 async function updatePasskeyCounter(credentialId, newCounter) {
-  const entry = passkeys.find(p => p.credentialId === credentialId);
-  if (entry) entry.counter = newCounter;
+  // Persist before updating in-memory. The counter is the WebAuthn
+  // replay-protection state; advancing it in memory while the DB row
+  // stays behind would let a replayed assertion validate after a
+  // restart re-loaded the stale counter.
   if (usePrisma) {
     try {
       await prisma.credential.update({
@@ -170,9 +324,16 @@ async function updatePasskeyCounter(credentialId, newCounter) {
       });
     } catch (err) {
       console.error("Prisma updateCounter error:", err.message);
+      if (!DEV_MODE) throw new Error("updatePasskeyCounter persistence failed: " + err.message);
     }
+  } else if (!DEV_MODE) {
+    throw new Error("updatePasskeyCounter called without Prisma in production");
+  }
+  const entry = passkeys.find(p => p.credentialId === credentialId);
+  if (entry) entry.counter = newCounter;
+  if (DEV_MODE) {
+    try { writeFileSync(PASSKEY_FILE, JSON.stringify(passkeys, null, 2) + "\n"); } catch {}
   }
-  try { writeFileSync(PASSKEY_FILE, JSON.stringify(passkeys, null, 2) + "\n"); } catch {}
 }
 
 // Boot: load passkeys
@@ -219,7 +380,7 @@ function authenticate(req) {
   const auth = req.headers["authorization"];
   if (!auth?.startsWith("Bearer ")) return null;
   const key = auth.slice(7).trim();
-  return API_KEYS[key] ? { agentId: API_KEYS[key], apiKey: key } : null;
+  return identityForApiKey(key);
 }
 
 function readBody(req) {
@@ -275,6 +436,85 @@ function parseUrl(reqUrl) {
   return new URL(reqUrl, "http://localhost");
 }
 
+// ── Rate limiting (F-008 in the VPS hosted-mcp audit) ───────────────
+//
+// Per-IP, per-bucket fixed-window counter. In-process Map; resets on
+// restart. nginx-side limit_req would be more durable but harder to
+// scope per route; in-process keeps the policy with the code that
+// mints/validates the auth tokens. Defaults are conservative; tune via
+// env. Stale entries are pruned periodically so memory stays bounded.
+//
+// Buckets:
+//   mint     ... endpoints that issue a credential or ticket
+//   validate ... endpoints that consume / verify a credential
+//   status   ... poll-friendly endpoints (higher limit)
+
+const RATE_LIMIT_BUCKETS = {
+  mint:     { limit: parseInt(process.env.LDM_HOSTED_MCP_RL_MINT     || "30",  10), windowMs: 60_000 },
+  validate: { limit: parseInt(process.env.LDM_HOSTED_MCP_RL_VALIDATE || "60",  10), windowMs: 60_000 },
+  status:   { limit: parseInt(process.env.LDM_HOSTED_MCP_RL_STATUS   || "120", 10), windowMs: 60_000 },
+};
+
+const rateLimitState = new Map(); // key: "<bucket>:<ip>" -> { count, windowStart }
+
+function getClientIp(req) {
+  // Prefer X-Real-IP (nginx overwrites on proxy hop, harder to spoof
+  // through the proxy). Fall back to the LAST entry in X-Forwarded-For
+  // (nginx appends $remote_addr via proxy_add_x_forwarded_for, so the
+  // last entry is the real client IP from nginx's perspective; the
+  // first entries are attacker-controlled). Last fallback: socket.
+  const xRealIp = req.headers["x-real-ip"];
+  if (typeof xRealIp === "string" && xRealIp.length > 0) return xRealIp.trim();
+  const xff = req.headers["x-forwarded-for"];
+  if (typeof xff === "string" && xff.length > 0) {
+    const parts = xff.split(",").map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+    if (parts.length > 0) return parts[parts.length - 1];
+  }
+  return req.socket?.remoteAddress || "unknown";
+}
+
+function rateLimitCheck(req, bucket) {
+  const config = RATE_LIMIT_BUCKETS[bucket];
+  if (!config) return { ok: true };
+  const ip = getClientIp(req);
+  const key = bucket + ":" + ip;
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const entry = rateLimitState.get(key);
+  if (!entry || now - entry.windowStart > config.windowMs) {
+    rateLimitState.set(key, { count: 1, windowStart: now });
+    return { ok: true };
+  }
+  entry.count += 1;
+  if (entry.count > config.limit) {
+    const retryAfterSec = Math.max(1, Math.ceil((config.windowMs - (now - entry.windowStart)) / 1000));
+    return { ok: false, retryAfterSec };
+  }
+  return { ok: true };
+}
+
+// Returns true if the request is allowed. If limited, writes 429 and
+// returns false; the caller must `return` immediately on false.
+function applyRateLimit(req, res, bucket) {
+  const result = rateLimitCheck(req, bucket);
+  if (!result.ok) {
+    res.setHeader("Retry-After", String(result.retryAfterSec));
+    json(res, 429, { error: "rate_limit_exceeded", error_description: "Too many requests. Retry after " + result.retryAfterSec + "s." });
+    console.warn("rate-limit hit:", bucket, getClientIp(req), req.method, req.url?.split("?")[0]);
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Keep memory bounded: drop entries older than 2 windows.
+setInterval(() => {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  for (const [key, entry] of rateLimitState) {
+    if (now - entry.windowStart > 2 * 60_000) {
+      rateLimitState.delete(key);
+    }
+  }
+}, 5 * 60_000).unref();
+
 function esc(s) {
   return s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/"/g, "&quot;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
 }
@@ -285,6 +525,15 @@ function sanitizeUsername(raw) {
   return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : null;
 }
 
+async function isUsernameTaken(username) {
+  if (!username) return false;
+  if (usePrisma) {
+    const existing = await prisma.user.findFirst({ where: { name: username } });
+    return !!existing;
+  }
+  return passkeys.some((entry) => entry.handle === username || entry.agentId === username);
+}
+
 // ---------- Session cleanup ----------
 
 function touchSession(sid) {
@@ -408,6 +657,14 @@ async function handleRegisterOptions(req, res) {
 
   // Accept optional username from request body
   const username = sanitizeUsername(body?.username);
+  if (username && RESERVED_AGENT_HANDLES.has(username)) {
+    json(res, 409, { error: "reserved_handle", error_description: "This handle is reserved." });
+    return;
+  }
+  if (username && await isUsernameTaken(username)) {
+    json(res, 409, { error: "handle_taken", error_description: "This handle is already in use." });
+    return;
+  }
 
   const userId = randomBytes(16);
   const userIdB64 = userId.toString("base64url");
@@ -495,8 +752,16 @@ async function handleRegisterVerify(req, res) {
 
   const { credential: cred, credentialDeviceType, credentialBackedUp } = verification.registrationInfo;
 
-  // Use provided username as agentId, or fall back to passkey-<id>
-  const agentId = stored.username || ("passkey-" + stored.userId.slice(0, 12));
+  // Internal tenancy is the immutable WebAuthn user id. The chosen
+  // username is display metadata only and never owns a relay namespace.
+  const agentId = accountTenantIdForUserId(stored.userId);
+  // credentialLabel matches the userName passed to
+  // generateRegistrationOptions in handleRegisterOptions, which is what
+  // iOS Passwords / 1Password show next to the saved passkey. The
+  // welcome view should display this, not agentId. Auth semantics are
+  // unchanged; only the user-facing label is aligned with the saved
+  // credential.
+  const credentialLabel = stored.username || ("user-" + stored.userId.slice(0, 8));
   const apiKey = generateApiKey();
 
   const entry = {
@@ -505,18 +770,25 @@ async function handleRegisterVerify(req, res) {
     counter: cred.counter,
     userId: stored.userId,
     agentId,
+    handle: credentialLabel,
     apiKey,
     deviceType: credentialDeviceType,
     backedUp: credentialBackedUp,
     transports: credential.response?.transports || [],
     createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
   };
-  await savePasskey(entry);
-  await saveApiKey(apiKey, agentId);
+  try {
+    await savePasskey(entry);
+    await saveApiKey(apiKey, agentId, { handle: credentialLabel });
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error("Persistence failure during passkey registration:", err.message);
+    json(res, 500, { error: "persistence_failure", error_description: "Could not persist credentials. Try again." });
+    return;
+  }
 
-  console.log("WebAuthn: registered passkey for agent '" + agentId + "' (credId: " + cred.id.slice(0, 16) + "...)");
+  console.log("WebAuthn: registered passkey for tenant '" + agentId + "' handle '" + credentialLabel + "' (credId: " + cred.id.slice(0, 16) + "...)");
 
-  json(res, 200, { success: true, agentId, apiKey });
+  json(res, 200, { success: true, agentId: credentialLabel, tenantId: agentId, apiKey, credentialLabel });
 }
 
 // POST /webauthn/auth-options
@@ -602,12 +874,53 @@ async function handleAuthVerify(req, res) {
     return;
   }
 
-  entry.counter = verification.authenticationInfo.newCounter;
-  await updatePasskeyCounter(entry.credentialId, entry.counter);
+  // Persist new counter before mutating in-memory entry. updatePasskeyCounter
+  // performs the in-memory update only on success, so the in-memory counter
+  // stays consistent with the DB and replay protection holds across restarts.
+  try {
+    await updatePasskeyCounter(entry.credentialId, verification.authenticationInfo.newCounter);
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error("Persistence failure during passkey counter update:", err.message);
+    json(res, 500, { error: "persistence_failure", error_description: "Could not persist counter. Try again." });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  let credentialLabel = entry.handle;
+  if (!credentialLabel && entry.agentId && entry.agentId.startsWith("passkey-")) {
+    credentialLabel = (typeof entry.userId === "string" && entry.userId.length >= 8)
+      ? "user-" + entry.userId.slice(0, 8)
+      : entry.agentId;
+  } else if (!credentialLabel && !isInternalTenantId(entry.agentId)) {
+    credentialLabel = entry.agentId;
+  } else if (!credentialLabel && typeof entry.userId === "string" && entry.userId.length >= 8) {
+    credentialLabel = "user-" + entry.userId.slice(0, 8);
+  } else if (!credentialLabel) {
+    credentialLabel = "you";
+  }
+
+  // Recovery path: a passkey reloaded from Postgres after a restart may
+  // have entry.apiKey = null if no ApiKey row was found for its agent
+  // at boot. Mint a fresh ck- now so the login response always carries
+  // a usable token. Without this, the browser would store
+  // sessionStorage.wip_api_key = null and Remote Control would 401 on
+  // /bootstrap and /ws-ticket.
+  if (!entry.apiKey) {
+    const newKey = generateApiKey();
+    try {
+      await saveApiKey(newKey, entry.agentId, { handle: credentialLabel });
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error("Persistence failure minting recovery key for tenant '" + entry.agentId + "':", err.message);
+      json(res, 500, { error: "persistence_failure", error_description: "Could not mint API key. Try again." });
+      return;
+    }
+    entry.apiKey = newKey;
+    entry.handle = credentialLabel;
+    console.log("WebAuthn: minted recovery key for tenant '" + entry.agentId + "' (key: " + newKey.slice(0, 10) + "...)");
+  }
 
-  console.log("WebAuthn: authenticated agent '" + entry.agentId + "'");
+  console.log("WebAuthn: authenticated tenant '" + entry.agentId + "' handle '" + credentialLabel + "'");
 
-  json(res, 200, { success: true, agentId: entry.agentId, apiKey: entry.apiKey });
+  json(res, 200, { success: true, agentId: credentialLabel, tenantId: entry.agentId, apiKey: entry.apiKey, credentialLabel });
 }
 
 // ---------- Page handlers ----------
@@ -1018,19 +1331,18 @@ async function handleOAuthToken(req, res) {
     }
   }
 
-  // Check if agent already has an API key (from passkey registration)
-  const agentId = stored.agent_name || "oauth-user";
-  let apiKey;
-
-  const existingKey = Object.entries(API_KEYS).find(([k, v]) => v === agentId);
-  if (existingKey) {
-    apiKey = existingKey[0];
-  } else {
-    apiKey = generateApiKey();
-    await saveApiKey(apiKey, agentId);
+  const agentHandle = stored.agent_name || "oauth-user";
+  const apiKey = generateApiKey();
+  const agentId = oauthTenantIdForApiKey(apiKey);
+  try {
+    await saveApiKey(apiKey, agentId, { handle: agentHandle });
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error("Persistence failure during OAuth token issuance:", err.message);
+    json(res, 500, { error: "server_error", error_description: "Could not issue token. Try again." });
+    return;
   }
 
-  console.log("OAuth: issued token for agent '" + agentId + "' (key: " + apiKey.slice(0, 10) + "...)");
+  console.log("OAuth: issued token for tenant '" + agentId + "' handle '" + agentHandle + "' (key: " + apiKey.slice(0, 10) + "...)");
 
   json(res, 200, {
     access_token: apiKey,
@@ -1383,12 +1695,53 @@ function handleAgentAuthApprove(req, res) {
 
 // ---------- QR Login (Chrome fallback) ----------
 
+// `next` whitelist for the QR login flow. Two shapes are allowed; both
+// land the user on a known phone-side surface after successful sign-in.
+// Anything else is silently dropped. `next` is NOT a general redirect
+// primitive.
+//
+// 1. PAIR_NEXT_REGEX: /pair/<CODE> using the daemon's real alphabet
+//    (CODEX_PAIR_ALPHABET, length 6, L IS included; I/O/0/1 excluded).
+//    See plan ai/product/plans-prds/codex-remote-control/
+//    2026-04-30--cc-mini--pair-via-login-qr-flow.md constraints C1,
+//    C8, and round-5. Per C8 the URL fallback for this shape is
+//    mobile-only (desktop must not become the pairing authority).
+//
+// 2. REMOTE_CONTROL_NEXT_REGEX: /codex-remote-control/<UUID> for the
+//    Kaleidoscope phone-side remote-control thread surface. Standard
+//    ?next semantics; allowed on both desktop and mobile (this is
+//    navigation continuation, not authority transfer).
+const PAIR_NEXT_REGEX = /^\/pair\/[ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789]{6}$/;
+const REMOTE_CONTROL_NEXT_REGEX = /^\/codex-remote-control\/[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
+
+function sanitizeCrcPairNext(raw) {
+  if (typeof raw !== "string") return null;
+  // Single decode; reject if a second decode would still differ.
+  let decoded;
+  try { decoded = decodeURIComponent(raw); } catch { return null; }
+  // Catch double-encoded payloads.
+  if (decoded !== raw && /%/.test(decoded)) return null;
+  if (!PAIR_NEXT_REGEX.test(decoded) && !REMOTE_CONTROL_NEXT_REGEX.test(decoded)) return null;
+  return decoded;
+}
+
 // POST /api/qr-login ... create a QR login session
 async function handleQrLoginStart(req, res) {
   cleanupExpiredChallenges();
   const body = await readBody(req).catch(() => ({}));
   const handle = ((body && body.handle) || "").trim().toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9-]/g, "").slice(0, 30);
   const mode = ((body && body.mode) || "register") === "signin" ? "signin" : "register";
+  // Validate `next` strictly. Invalid next is silently dropped, not
+  // 400'd, so legacy callers still work.
+  //
+  // Only /pair/<CODE> next triggers pair-mode (C6 strip on desktop
+  // status, C8 desktop-no-redirect, the "phone is the actor" model).
+  // /codex-remote-control/<UUID> is a normal post-login continuation:
+  // desktop status returns the full login response (apiKey, handle,
+  // next) so the desktop poll can authenticate and redirect on its
+  // own. The phone also gets next via approve, so both ends can act.
+  const next = sanitizeCrcPairNext(body && body.next);
+  const purpose = (next && PAIR_NEXT_REGEX.test(next)) ? "pair" : null;
   const sessionId = randomUUID();
   const loginUrl = ISSUER_URL + "/login?s=" + sessionId + "&m=" + mode + (handle ? "&h=" + encodeURIComponent(handle) : "");
   const qrBuffer = await QRCode.toBuffer(loginUrl, { type: "png", width: 400, margin: 2 });
@@ -1399,8 +1752,10 @@ async function handleQrLoginStart(req, res) {
     apiKey: null,
     handle: handle || null,
     expires: Date.now() + QR_LOGIN_EXPIRY_MS,
+    purpose,           // "pair" | null
+    next: next || null, // sanitized `/pair/<CODE>` or null
   };
-  console.log("QR login: created session " + sessionId.slice(0, 8) + "...");
+  console.log("QR login: created session " + sessionId.slice(0, 8) + "..." + (purpose === "pair" ? " (pair-mode)" : ""));
   json(res, 200, { sessionId, qrUrl: "/api/qr-login/qr?s=" + sessionId });
 }
 
@@ -1418,6 +1773,12 @@ function handleQrLoginQR(req, res) {
 }
 
 // GET /api/qr-login/status?s=XXX ... poll for completion
+//
+// Response shape depends on `purpose`:
+//   - Pair-mode (purpose === "pair"): {status, agentId} only on approved.
+//     NEVER returns apiKey or next to the desktop. Phone receives next via
+//     /api/qr-login/approve. Per plan C6 round 4.
+//   - Legacy login mode: {status, agentId, apiKey} on approved (unchanged).
 function handleQrLoginStatus(req, res) {
   const url = parseUrl(req.url);
   const s = url.searchParams.get("s");
@@ -1427,7 +1788,28 @@ function handleQrLoginStatus(req, res) {
     return;
   }
   if (entry.status === "approved") {
-    json(res, 200, { status: "approved", agentId: entry.agentId, apiKey: entry.apiKey });
+    if (entry.purpose === "pair") {
+      // Pair-mode (purpose === "pair", next === /pair/<CODE>):
+      // desktop gets ONLY a display label. No apiKey. No next. Plan
+      // C6 round 4. Desktop never becomes the pairing authority.
+      json(res, 200, { status: "approved", agentId: entry.agentId });
+    } else {
+      // Legacy login mode OR codex-remote-control continuation
+      // (purpose === null). Desktop gets full identity to render the
+      // welcome view OR redirect to next on its own poll.
+      // credentialLabel matches the saved-passkey label (see
+      // register-verify / auth-verify). next is included only if a
+      // sanitized non-pair-mode next was set on the session
+      // (currently /codex-remote-control/<UUID>); legacy login
+      // sessions without next get next === null.
+      json(res, 200, {
+        status: "approved",
+        agentId: entry.agentId,
+        apiKey: entry.apiKey,
+        credentialLabel: entry.credentialLabel || null,
+        next: entry.next || null,
+      });
+    }
     delete qrLoginSessions[s]; // one-time use
   } else {
     json(res, 200, { status: "pending" });
@@ -1435,9 +1817,13 @@ function handleQrLoginStatus(req, res) {
 }
 
 // POST /api/qr-login/approve ... phone calls after passkey created
+//
+// In pair-mode, the response includes the sanitized `next` so the phone
+// can location.replace(next) into /pair/<CODE>. Legacy login mode returns
+// {ok: true} unchanged.
 function handleQrLoginApprove(req, res) {
   readBody(req).then(function(body) {
-    const { sessionId, agentId, apiKey } = body || {};
+    const { sessionId, agentId, apiKey, credentialLabel } = body || {};
     const entry = qrLoginSessions[sessionId];
     if (!entry || Date.now() > entry.expires) {
       json(res, 404, { error: "Session not found or expired" });
@@ -1450,8 +1836,21 @@ function handleQrLoginApprove(req, res) {
     entry.status = "approved";
     entry.agentId = agentId;
     entry.apiKey = apiKey;
-    console.log("QR login: approved session " + sessionId.slice(0, 8) + "... for '" + agentId + "'");
-    json(res, 200, { ok: true });
+    // Phone-side passes the label it received from register-verify /
+    // auth-verify so the desktop can show the same string the user
+    // just saved on their phone. Optional for back-compat.
+    entry.credentialLabel = (typeof credentialLabel === "string" && credentialLabel.length <= 64) ? credentialLabel : null;
+    console.log("QR login: approved session " + sessionId.slice(0, 8) + "... for '" + agentId + "'" + (entry.purpose === "pair" ? " (pair-mode)" : (entry.next ? " (next=" + entry.next + ")" : "")));
+    // Phone receives next on approve regardless of purpose, so the
+    // phone can redirect to either /pair/<CODE> (pair-mode, phone is
+    // the actor) or /codex-remote-control/<UUID> (continuation, phone
+    // can act). Desktop's separate behavior (strip vs full response)
+    // is handled in handleQrLoginStatus.
+    if (entry.next) {
+      json(res, 200, { ok: true, next: entry.next });
+    } else {
+      json(res, 200, { ok: true });
+    }
   }).catch(function() {
     json(res, 400, { error: "Invalid request" });
   });
@@ -1876,13 +2275,28 @@ const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
   }
 
   if (req.method === "GET" && (path === "/login" || path === "/login/")) {
-    // Serve the new app/ login (two-path: this device or QR-from-phone).
+    // Production /login owns its own file at app/kaleidoscope-login.html.
+    //
+    // Earlier this route served demo/login.html, which made production
+    // auth depend on a file under demo/. That coupling is wrong: demo/
+    // is the demo site's domain, not production. The canonical
+    // Kaleidoscope login HTML now lives under app/, where production
+    // owns it.
+    //
+    // Fallback chain (defense in depth):
+    //   1. app/kaleidoscope-login.html  ... canonical production file.
+    //   2. demo/login.html               ... legacy fallback during the
+    //      transition; will be removed in a follow-up once the
+    //      production file is verified live.
+    //   3. handleLoginPage               ... server-rendered last resort.
+    //
+    // /login/app continues to serve the developed app/login.html flow
+    // (see the next handler).
     try {
-      const loginHtml = readFileSync(join(__dirname, "app", "login.html"), "utf8");
+      const html = readFileSync(join(__dirname, "app", "kaleidoscope-login.html"), "utf8");
       res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8" });
-      res.end(loginHtml);
+      res.end(html);
     } catch {
-      // Fallback to legacy demo login, then server-rendered.
       try {
         const legacy = readFileSync(join(__dirname, "demo", "login.html"), "utf8");
         res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8" });
@@ -1894,6 +2308,22 @@ const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
     return;
   }
 
+  if (req.method === "GET" && (path === "/login/app" || path === "/login/app/")) {
+    // Explicit non-primary route for the app/login.html flow (the
+    // newer two-path "this device or QR-from-phone" copy). This
+    // exists so the developed flow stays reachable without hijacking
+    // /login. If app/login.html is not present, return 404 rather
+    // than silently falling back to the canonical /login page.
+    try {
+      const loginHtml = readFileSync(join(__dirname, "app", "login.html"), "utf8");
+      res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8" });
+      res.end(loginHtml);
+    } catch {
+      json(res, 404, { error: "Not found" });
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
   // --- Legal pages ---
 
   if (req.method === "GET" && (path === "/legal/privacy/en-ww/" || path === "/legal/privacy/en-ww")) {
@@ -1917,21 +2347,25 @@ const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
   // --- WebAuthn API ---
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/webauthn/register-options") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "mint")) return;
     await handleRegisterOptions(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/webauthn/register-verify") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "validate")) return;
     await handleRegisterVerify(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/webauthn/auth-options") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "mint")) return;
     await handleAuthOptions(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/webauthn/auth-verify") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "validate")) return;
     await handleAuthVerify(req, res);
     return;
   }
@@ -1949,6 +2383,7 @@ const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
   }
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/oauth/register") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "mint")) return;
     await handleOAuthRegister(req, res);
     return;
   }
@@ -1959,11 +2394,13 @@ const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
   }
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/oauth/authorize/submit") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "validate")) return;
     await handleOAuthAuthorizeSubmit(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/oauth/token") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "mint")) return;
     await handleOAuthToken(req, res);
     return;
   }
@@ -1971,21 +2408,25 @@ const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
   // --- Agent QR Auth ---
 
   if (req.method === "GET" && path === "/demo/api/agent-auth") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "mint")) return;
     await handleAgentAuthStart(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "GET" && path === "/demo/api/agent-auth/qr") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "status")) return;
     handleAgentAuthQR(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "GET" && path === "/demo/api/agent-auth/status") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "status")) return;
     handleAgentAuthStatus(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/demo/api/agent-auth/approve") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "validate")) return;
     handleAgentAuthApprove(req, res);
     return;
   }
@@ -2017,21 +2458,25 @@ const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
   // --- QR Login (Chrome fallback) ---
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/api/qr-login") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "mint")) return;
     await handleQrLoginStart(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "GET" && path === "/api/qr-login/qr") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "status")) return;
     handleQrLoginQR(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "GET" && path === "/api/qr-login/status") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "status")) return;
     handleQrLoginStatus(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/api/qr-login/approve") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "validate")) return;
     handleQrLoginApprove(req, res);
     return;
   }
@@ -2094,32 +2539,38 @@ const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
   // --- Codex Relay (codex-daemon ↔ phone) ---
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/api/codex-relay/pair-init") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "mint")) return;
     await handleCodexPairInit(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "GET" && path.startsWith("/api/codex-relay/pair-status/")) {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "status")) return;
     handleCodexPairStatus(req, res, path.slice("/api/codex-relay/pair-status/".length));
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/api/codex-relay/pair-complete") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "validate")) return;
     await handleCodexPairComplete(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "GET" && path === "/api/codex-relay/state") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "status")) return;
     handleCodexRelayState(req, res);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "GET" && path.startsWith("/api/codex-relay/bootstrap/")) {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "mint")) return;
     const tid = decodeURIComponent(path.slice("/api/codex-relay/bootstrap/".length));
     handleCodexBootstrap(req, res, tid);
     return;
   }
 
   if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/api/codex-relay/ws-ticket") {
+    if (!applyRateLimit(req, res, "mint")) return;
     await handleCodexWsTicket(req, res);
     return;
   }
@@ -2131,6 +2582,13 @@ const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
     return;
   }
 
+  // /pair/<CODE> ... URL-first pair flow. Per plan C1 + round 5: real daemon
+  // alphabet [ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789]{6}, length 6, L IS included.
+  if (req.method === "GET" && /^\/pair\/[ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789]{6}$/.test(path)) {
+    serveAppFile(res, "pair.html");
+    return;
+  }
+
   // /:handle/codex-remote-control/:threadId
   const remoteControlMatch = path.match(/^\/([^/]+)\/codex-remote-control\/([^/]+)\/?$/);
   if (req.method === "GET" && remoteControlMatch) {
@@ -2151,21 +2609,22 @@ const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
 // ---------- Codex Relay (codex-daemon ↔ phone) ----------
 //
 // In-memory state. Pairing codes: 6-char, 5-min TTL. Daemons indexed by
-// agentId (one daemon per agentId; new daemon kicks the old one). Web clients
-// indexed by `agentId:threadId`. Server is a transparent passthrough between
+// immutable tenant id (one daemon per tenant; new daemon kicks the old one). Web clients
+// indexed by `tenantId:threadId`. Server is a transparent passthrough between
 // the daemon and the matching web client(s); thread routing is enforced
 // purely client-side via session.send/sessionId payloads.
 
 const CODEX_PAIR_EXPIRY_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
 const CODEX_PAIR_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789";
-const codexPairings = {};       // pairing_id -> { code, status, expires, daemon_info, apiKey?, agentId?, daemon_public_key?, crypto_versions? }
+const codexPairings = {};       // pairing_id -> { code, status, expires, daemon_info, apiKey?, agentId?, handle?, daemon_public_key?, crypto_versions? }
 const codexPairingByCode = {};  // code -> pairing_id (only while pending)
 const codexDaemons = new Map(); // agentId -> ws
-const codexWebClients = new Map(); // `${agentId}:${threadId}` -> ws
+const codexWebClients = new Map(); // `${agentId}:${threadId}` -> Set<ws>
+const codexE2eeSessionRoutes = new Map(); // `${agentId}:${e2eeSession}` -> { threadId, webKey, ws }
 
 // E2EE substrate (Phase 2.5).
 //
-// codexDaemonPubkeys: per agentId, the most recently paired daemon's
+// codexDaemonPubkeys: per tenant id, the most recently paired daemon's
 //   public key (P-256 SPKI base64url) + supported crypto versions +
 //   registration timestamp. This is what the browser fetches via
 //   bootstrap before opening an encrypted session.
@@ -2174,10 +2633,67 @@ const codexWebClients = new Map(); // `${agentId}:${threadId}` -> ws
 //   ?token=ck-... in the browser WebSocket URL. Bound to a specific
 //   (agentId, threadId) so a leaked ticket cannot drive a different
 //   route, even by the same authenticated user.
-const codexDaemonPubkeys = new Map();   // agentId -> { pubkey, crypto_versions, registered_at }
+const codexDaemonPubkeys = new Map();   // tenantId -> { pubkey, crypto_versions, registered_at }
 const codexRelayTickets = new Map();    // ticket -> { agentId, threadId, expires, used }
 const CODEX_RELAY_TICKET_TTL_MS = 60 * 1000; // 60s; browser must connect immediately
 
+function codexRelayKey(agentId, id) {
+  return agentId + ":" + id;
+}
+
+function isCodexE2eeEnvelope(envelope) {
+  return !!(envelope && typeof envelope.type === "string" && envelope.type.startsWith("e2ee."));
+}
+
+function registerCodexE2eeSessionRoute(agentId, e2eeSession, threadId, ws) {
+  if (typeof e2eeSession !== "string" || !e2eeSession) return;
+  if (typeof threadId !== "string" || !threadId) return;
+  const webKey = codexRelayKey(agentId, threadId);
+  codexE2eeSessionRoutes.set(codexRelayKey(agentId, e2eeSession), { threadId, webKey, ws });
+}
+
+function addCodexWebClient(webKey, ws) {
+  let clients = codexWebClients.get(webKey);
+  if (!clients) {
+    clients = new Set();
+    codexWebClients.set(webKey, clients);
+  }
+  clients.add(ws);
+  return clients.size;
+}
+
+function removeCodexWebClient(webKey, ws) {
+  const clients = codexWebClients.get(webKey);
+  if (!clients) return 0;
+  clients.delete(ws);
+  if (clients.size === 0) {
+    codexWebClients.delete(webKey);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return clients.size;
+}
+
+function openCodexWebClientsForKey(webKey) {
+  const clients = codexWebClients.get(webKey);
+  if (!clients) return [];
+  return [...clients].filter((webWs) => webWs.readyState === webWs.OPEN);
+}
+
+function resolveCodexWebClientsForDaemonFrame(agentId, routeId) {
+  const routed = codexE2eeSessionRoutes.get(codexRelayKey(agentId, routeId));
+  if (routed && routed.ws && routed.ws.readyState === routed.ws.OPEN) return [routed.ws];
+  return openCodexWebClientsForKey(codexRelayKey(agentId, routeId));
+}
+
+function removeCodexE2eeRoutesForWeb(agentId, threadId, ws) {
+  const webKey = codexRelayKey(agentId, threadId);
+  for (const [routeKey, route] of codexE2eeSessionRoutes) {
+    if (route.webKey === webKey && (!ws || route.ws === ws)) {
+      codexE2eeSessionRoutes.delete(routeKey);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
 function generateCodexPairingCode() {
   for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 100; attempt += 1) {
     let code = "";
@@ -2216,10 +2732,13 @@ async function handleCodexPairInit(req, res) {
       : null,
   };
   codexPairingByCode[code] = pairingId;
+  // Per plan: web_url goes through /login first so the existing Kaleidoscope
+  // QR + phone-passkey ceremony handles auth. After phone passkey, phone
+  // (not desktop) redirects to /pair/<CODE> and completes pair-complete.
   json(res, 200, {
     code,
     pairing_id: pairingId,
-    web_url: ISSUER_URL + "/pair",
+    web_url: ISSUER_URL + "/login?next=" + encodeURIComponent("/pair/" + code),
     expires_at: new Date(expires).toISOString(),
   });
 }
@@ -2232,7 +2751,7 @@ function handleCodexPairStatus(req, res, pairingId) {
     if (codexPairingByCode[p.code] === pairingId) delete codexPairingByCode[p.code];
   }
   if (p.status === "completed") {
-    json(res, 200, { status: "completed", api_key: p.apiKey, handle: p.agentId });
+    json(res, 200, { status: "completed", api_key: p.apiKey, handle: p.handle || p.agentId });
   } else {
     json(res, 200, { status: p.status });
   }
@@ -2245,6 +2764,14 @@ async function handleCodexPairComplete(req, res) {
   try { body = await readBody(req); } catch { json(res, 400, { error: "bad request" }); return; }
   const code = (body && typeof body.code === "string") ? body.code.trim().toUpperCase() : "";
   if (!code) { json(res, 400, { error: "missing code" }); return; }
+  // Defensive: reject codes that don't match the daemon's alphabet up front,
+  // before the map lookup, so probe attempts get one uniform reject path
+  // instead of leaking timing/shape info between "wrong-alphabet" and "valid
+  // shape but unknown code." Per plan C3 + round 5.
+  if (!/^[ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789]{6}$/.test(code)) {
+    json(res, 404, { error: "invalid or already-used code" });
+    return;
+  }
   const pairingId = codexPairingByCode[code];
   if (!pairingId) { json(res, 404, { error: "invalid or already-used code" }); return; }
   const p = codexPairings[pairingId];
@@ -2255,6 +2782,7 @@ async function handleCodexPairComplete(req, res) {
   p.status = "completed";
   p.apiKey = identity.apiKey;
   p.agentId = identity.agentId;
+  p.handle = identity.handle;
   // Phase 2.5: register the daemon's E2EE public key against the
   // authenticated handle. Replaces any previous key for this handle
   // (rotate-key implicitly happens here on a re-pair).
@@ -2267,15 +2795,15 @@ async function handleCodexPairComplete(req, res) {
     console.log("codex-relay: registered E2EE pubkey for " + identity.agentId);
   }
   delete codexPairingByCode[code];
-  console.log("codex-relay: paired daemon for " + identity.agentId);
-  json(res, 200, { ok: true, handle: identity.agentId });
+  console.log("codex-relay: paired daemon for tenant " + identity.agentId + " handle " + identity.handle);
+  json(res, 200, { ok: true, handle: identity.handle });
 }
 
 function handleCodexRelayState(req, res) {
   const identity = authenticate(req);
   if (!identity) { json(res, 401, { error: "Unauthorized" }); return; }
   json(res, 200, {
-    handle: identity.agentId,
+    handle: identity.handle,
     daemon_online: codexDaemons.has(identity.agentId),
   });
 }
@@ -2291,7 +2819,7 @@ function handleCodexBootstrap(req, res, threadId) {
   const daemonOnline = codexDaemons.has(identity.agentId);
   const daemonKey = codexDaemonPubkeys.get(identity.agentId) || null;
   json(res, 200, {
-    handle: identity.agentId,
+    handle: identity.handle,
     thread_id: threadId,
     daemon_online: daemonOnline,
     daemon_public_key: daemonKey ? daemonKey.pubkey : null,
@@ -2318,6 +2846,7 @@ async function handleCodexWsTicket(req, res) {
   const expires = Date.now() + CODEX_RELAY_TICKET_TTL_MS;
   codexRelayTickets.set(ticket, {
     agentId: identity.agentId,
+    handle: identity.handle,
     threadId,
     expires,
     used: false,
@@ -2342,7 +2871,7 @@ function consumeCodexRelayTicket(ticket, threadId) {
   if (Date.now() > entry.expires) { codexRelayTickets.delete(ticket); return null; }
   if (entry.threadId !== threadId) return null; // bound to specific route
   entry.used = true;
-  return { agentId: entry.agentId };
+  return { agentId: entry.agentId, handle: entry.handle || entry.agentId };
 }
 
 function serveAppFile(res, relPath) {
@@ -2368,23 +2897,64 @@ function serveAppFile(res, relPath) {
   }
 }
 
-function authenticateWs(req) {
+// authenticateWs verifies a WS upgrade request against the API_KEYS
+// map. Default behavior is HEADER ONLY: Authorization: Bearer ck-...
+// is accepted; ?token=ck-... in the URL is ignored.
+//
+// Set { allowQueryToken: true } only on the explicit web-side
+// back-compat branch that runs inside ALLOW_WS_URL_TOKEN. Daemon
+// connections never enable this; CLI clients can always set
+// Authorization, and a daemon accepting URL-token would be a needless
+// attack surface (URL leaks via referrer / log scrape are not relevant
+// for daemons, but the asymmetry of "header-only on the daemon path"
+// keeps the policy clean and auditable).
+function authenticateWs(req, { allowQueryToken = false } = {}) {
   const auth = req.headers["authorization"];
   if (auth && auth.startsWith("Bearer ")) {
     const key = auth.slice(7).trim();
-    if (API_KEYS[key]) return { agentId: API_KEYS[key], apiKey: key };
+    const identity = identityForApiKey(key);
+    if (identity) return identity;
   }
-  // Browsers can't set Authorization on WebSocket(): accept ?token= fallback.
+  if (!allowQueryToken) return null;
+
+  // Web back-compat path only. Browsers cannot set Authorization on a
+  // WebSocket() handshake, so legacy clients put ck- in the URL.
+  // parseUrl returns a WHATWG URL, which has no .query getter (only
+  // .search/.searchParams). Strip the leading "?" off .search and
+  // parse with querystring so the array/string handling below works.
   const u = parseUrl(req.url);
-  const qs = u.query ? parseUrlQs(u.query) : {};
+  const qs = u.search ? parseUrlQs(u.search.slice(1)) : {};
   const tokenParam = Array.isArray(qs.token) ? qs.token[0] : qs.token;
-  if (typeof tokenParam === "string" && API_KEYS[tokenParam]) {
-    return { agentId: API_KEYS[tokenParam], apiKey: tokenParam };
+  if (typeof tokenParam === "string") {
+    return identityForApiKey(tokenParam);
   }
   return null;
 }
 
-const codexRelayWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });
+// F-001: subprotocol-based WS auth for the codex-relay surface. The web
+// client sends Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: ldm-codex-relay.v1, ticket.<v>.
+// Server echoes only the protocol name (not the ticket-bearing entry).
+// Daemon connections do not use a subprotocol, so empty Sets pass.
+const codexRelayWss = new WebSocketServer({
+  noServer: true,
+  handleProtocols: (protocols /*, request */) => {
+    if (!protocols || protocols.size === 0) return undefined;
+    if (protocols.has("ldm-codex-relay.v1")) return "ldm-codex-relay.v1";
+    return false;
+  },
+});
+
+function getTicketFromSubprotocol(req) {
+  const header = req.headers["sec-websocket-protocol"];
+  if (!header) return null;
+  const tokens = header.split(",").map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+  for (const t of tokens) {
+    if (t.startsWith("ticket.")) {
+      return t.slice("ticket.".length);
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
 
 httpServer.on("upgrade", (req, socket, head) => {
   const u = parseUrl(req.url);
@@ -2393,21 +2963,64 @@ httpServer.on("upgrade", (req, socket, head) => {
   const isWeb = path.startsWith("/api/codex-relay/web/");
   if (!isDaemon && !isWeb) return; // let other listeners (or default) handle it
 
+  // F-003: enforce Origin allowlist for browser-borne web upgrades.
+  // Runs BEFORE ticket consumption / authenticateWs so a request from
+  // a disallowed origin cannot burn a valid one-time ticket or trigger
+  // an auth check side effect. Daemon path is exempt because CLI
+  // clients do not send a browser Origin header. Requires nginx to
+  // pass the Origin header through unchanged on the upgrade hop;
+  // verified in Lane B B2 of the audit doc.
+  if (isWeb) {
+    const origin = req.headers["origin"];
+    if (!isWsOriginAllowed(origin)) {
+      console.warn("WS upgrade rejected: bad origin (" + (origin || "<none>") + ") for " + path);
+      socket.write("HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n");
+      socket.destroy();
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
   // Daemon side keeps the existing Bearer ck- token auth.
-  // Web side: prefer single-use ?ticket= bound to the route; fall back
-  // to ?token=ck- for back-compat with the pre-2.5 alpha.
+  // Web side: prefer ticket via Sec-WebSocket-Protocol (F-001), fall
+  // back to ?ticket= query string. The legacy ?token=ck- URL fallback
+  // is gated behind LDM_HOSTED_MCP_ALLOW_WS_URL_TOKEN=1; production
+  // does not accept it.
   let identity = null;
   if (isDaemon) {
-    identity = authenticateWs(req);
+    // Daemon connections must use Authorization: Bearer ck-. URL-token
+    // is never accepted on the daemon path (allowQueryToken: false).
+    identity = authenticateWs(req, { allowQueryToken: false });
   } else {
     const threadId = decodeURIComponent(path.slice("/api/codex-relay/web/".length));
-    const qs = u.query ? parseUrlQs(u.query) : {};
-    const ticketParam = Array.isArray(qs.ticket) ? qs.ticket[0] : qs.ticket;
-    if (typeof ticketParam === "string" && ticketParam) {
-      const consumed = consumeCodexRelayTicket(ticketParam, threadId);
-      if (consumed) identity = { agentId: consumed.agentId, viaTicket: true };
+
+    // Preferred path: ticket carried in Sec-WebSocket-Protocol. Avoids
+    // URL/log/referrer exposure of the ticket value.
+    const subTicket = getTicketFromSubprotocol(req);
+    if (subTicket) {
+      const consumed = consumeCodexRelayTicket(subTicket, threadId);
+      if (consumed) identity = { agentId: consumed.agentId, handle: consumed.handle, viaTicket: true };
+    }
+
+    // Back-compat: ?ticket= query string. Same single-use binding.
+    if (!identity) {
+      // parseUrl returns a WHATWG URL with .search/.searchParams, no
+      // .query. Strip the leading "?" off .search and parse with
+      // querystring so the array/string handling below still works.
+      const qs = u.search ? parseUrlQs(u.search.slice(1)) : {};
+      const ticketParam = Array.isArray(qs.ticket) ? qs.ticket[0] : qs.ticket;
+      if (typeof ticketParam === "string" && ticketParam) {
+        const consumed = consumeCodexRelayTicket(ticketParam, threadId);
+        if (consumed) identity = { agentId: consumed.agentId, handle: consumed.handle, viaTicket: true };
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Legacy ?token=ck- URL fallback: dev/back-compat only. Production
+    // refuses long-lived bearer in WS URLs (gate condition 2). The
+    // URL-token branch in authenticateWs is gated by allowQueryToken,
+    // and we only set it true here, only when ALLOW_WS_URL_TOKEN is on.
+    if (!identity && ALLOW_WS_URL_TOKEN) {
+      identity = authenticateWs(req, { allowQueryToken: true });
     }
-    if (!identity) identity = authenticateWs(req);
   }
 
   if (!identity) {
@@ -2422,14 +3035,58 @@ httpServer.on("upgrade", (req, socket, head) => {
       if (previous && previous !== ws) try { previous.close(4000, "replaced"); } catch {}
       codexDaemons.set(identity.agentId, ws);
       console.log("codex-relay: daemon online for " + identity.agentId);
+      // F-001 per-thread isolation. Daemon -> web routing must NOT
+      // fan out every frame to every same-agent web socket; that
+      // breaks isolation when one user has multiple threads open.
+      // Parse the OUTER envelope only to read the routing field
+      // (session/sessionId). The encrypted ciphertext (or any inner
+      // session.* payload) is never inspected, so gate 3a still
+      // holds: the relay sees only routing metadata on the envelope.
+      // No-session frames are an explicit allowlist (control/presence
+      // types) or are dropped with a redacted warning. We never
+      // broadcast unknown frames.
+      const BROADCAST_TYPES = new Set([
+        "presence",
+        "presence.web",
+        "presence.daemon",
+        "daemon.online",
+        "daemon.offline",
+      ]);
       ws.on("message", (data) => {
         const text = data.toString();
-        const prefix = identity.agentId + ":";
-        for (const [key, webWs] of codexWebClients) {
-          if (key.startsWith(prefix) && webWs.readyState === webWs.OPEN) {
-            webWs.send(text);
+        let envelope = null;
+        try { envelope = JSON.parse(text); } catch {}
+        const sessionId = envelope?.session || envelope?.sessionId || envelope?.threadId;
+        if (sessionId) {
+          const targets = resolveCodexWebClientsForDaemonFrame(identity.agentId, sessionId);
+          for (const target of targets) {
+            target.send(text);
+          }
+          // No matching web client: drop silently. Daemon-emitted
+          // frames for a thread the user has not opened in any browser
+          // are not interesting to fan out elsewhere.
+          return;
+        }
+        const type = envelope?.type;
+        if (type && BROADCAST_TYPES.has(type)) {
+          // Allowlisted agent-level frame (presence, online status).
+          // Fan out within agent, never across agents.
+          const prefix = identity.agentId + ":";
+          for (const [key, webClients] of codexWebClients) {
+            if (key.startsWith(prefix)) {
+              for (const webWs of webClients) {
+                if (webWs.readyState === webWs.OPEN) webWs.send(text);
+              }
+            }
           }
+          return;
         }
+        // Parse failed, missing session, or unknown type: drop. Log a
+        // redacted notice so the operator can see if a daemon is
+        // emitting unrouteable frames. We never log envelope/payload
+        // bytes; only the agent and the type (or "no-type").
+        const typeMarker = type ? String(type).slice(0, 32) : "no-type";
+        console.warn("codex-relay: dropped unroutable daemon frame for " + identity.agentId + " (type=" + typeMarker + ")");
       });
       ws.on("close", () => {
         if (codexDaemons.get(identity.agentId) === ws) {
@@ -2452,21 +3109,26 @@ httpServer.on("upgrade", (req, socket, head) => {
     return;
   }
   codexRelayWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {
-    const key = identity.agentId + ":" + threadId;
-    const previous = codexWebClients.get(key);
-    if (previous && previous !== ws) try { previous.close(4000, "replaced"); } catch {}
-    codexWebClients.set(key, ws);
-    console.log("codex-relay: web online " + key);
+    const key = codexRelayKey(identity.agentId, threadId);
+    const clientCount = addCodexWebClient(key, ws);
+    console.log("codex-relay: web online " + key + " clients=" + clientCount);
     ws.on("message", (data) => {
+      const text = data.toString();
+      let envelope = null;
+      try { envelope = JSON.parse(text); } catch {}
+      if (isCodexE2eeEnvelope(envelope) && envelope.session) {
+        registerCodexE2eeSessionRoute(identity.agentId, envelope.session, threadId, ws);
+      }
       const daemonWs = codexDaemons.get(identity.agentId);
       if (daemonWs && daemonWs.readyState === daemonWs.OPEN) {
-        daemonWs.send(data.toString());
+        daemonWs.send(text);
       } else {
         try { ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: "error", message: "daemon offline" })); } catch {}
       }
     });
     ws.on("close", () => {
-      if (codexWebClients.get(key) === ws) codexWebClients.delete(key);
+      removeCodexE2eeRoutesForWeb(identity.agentId, threadId, ws);
+      removeCodexWebClient(key, ws);
     });
     ws.on("error", (err) => {
       console.error("codex-relay web ws error:", err.message);
@@ -2476,6 +3138,7 @@ httpServer.on("upgrade", (req, socket, head) => {
 
 httpServer.listen(PORT, SERVER_BIND, () => {
   console.log(SERVER_NAME + " v" + SERVER_VERSION + " listening on " + SERVER_BIND + ":" + PORT);
+  console.log("WS origin allowlist: " + WS_ORIGIN_ALLOWLIST.join(", "));
   console.log("Health:        http://localhost:" + PORT + "/health");
   console.log("MCP:           http://localhost:" + PORT + "/mcp");
   console.log("OAuth:         http://localhost:" + PORT + "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server");