@wildo-ai/saas-technical-doc 1.1.5 → 1.1.7

package/dist/esm/companion/technical-documentation-diagram-materializer.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/companion/technical-documentation-placeholder-materializer.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/companion/zod-to-openapi.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/companion-exports.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/config/define-tech-doc-config.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/config/index.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/config/wildo-tech-doc-config.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/content/application-consumer-documentation-content-manifest.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/content/application-consumer-documentation-content.techdoc.d.ts

@@ -96,12 +96,12 @@ export declare const APPLICATION_CONSUMER_DOCUMENTATION_AUTHORED_CONTENT_V1: rea
     readonly managedPath: "access-and-identity/api-keys-lifecycle.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/api-keys-lifecycle";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/api-keys-lifecycle", "source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Rotate, expire or deactivate an API key\n\nReplace a machine credential without losing control of which secret works. Use\nrotation for a planned, bounded handover; use immediate rotation or deactivation\nfor suspected exposure; and use expiry when access has a known end date.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| Identify the key by its non-secret prefix, owner, workload, scope, roles and deployed instances; have an approved secrets-manager destination | Every intended instance uses the replacement, the previous secret stops at the chosen time, expected access still works and unrelated access remains refused |\n\nThe key presentation identifies its scope, not its authority:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#markdown}}\n\nConfirm that you are changing the intended organization or application key\nbefore reissuing any secret. A prefix is safe to use for identification, but it\nis not enough on its own: compare the owner, workload and environment too.\n\n## Choose the lifecycle action\n\n| Situation | Action | Important consequence |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Planned replacement with a short deployment window | **Rotate** with an explicit future invalidation time | Current and previous secrets can overlap only until that chosen time |\n| Suspected disclosure and the workload can switch now | **Rotate immediately** | Immediate rotation is the default when no future invalidation time is chosen; the previous secret stops working at cutover |\n| Suspected disclosure and workload ownership is uncertain | **Deactivate** | Neither the current nor retained previous secret can authenticate while the key is inactive |\n| Workload is permanently retired | **Deactivate** and remove its deployed secret | The key remains identifiable for review but cannot authenticate |\n| Temporary credential has a known end | Set an **expiry** at creation; extend it only after a documented review | Once expired, the key cannot be reactivated; replace it if access is approved again |\n| An intentional open-ended overlap is truly required | **Regenerate**, with a separately controlled follow-up rotation | The previous secret remains valid until a later reissue; regeneration does not contain a leaked credential |\n\n## Know the maintained lifecycle operations\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#statusMarkdown}}\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#lifecycleMarkdown}}\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Choose the safe API-key lifecycle action\n  accDescr: A planned handover uses rotation and verification. Suspected compromise requires prompt old-secret invalidation or deactivation. Finished access is deactivated, while a time-bounded credential is allowed to expire.\n  reason{\"Why must access change?\"}\n  reason -->|\"Planned replacement\"| rotate[\"Rotate with explicit handover\"]\n  reason -->|\"Suspected exposure\"| contain[\"Invalidate old secret promptly or deactivate\"]\n  reason -->|\"Workload retired\"| deactivate[\"Deactivate key\"]\n  reason -->|\"Known end time\"| expiry[\"Set or extend explicit expiry\"]\n~~~\n\n## Run a planned rotation\n\nRotation keeps the same credential record, owner, scope and roles while issuing\na new complete secret. The outgoing secret moves into a single previous-secret\nslot and remains usable only until the selected invalidation time. If no future\ntime is selected, the operation defaults to **now**, which is an immediate\ncutover.\n\n1. Inventory every production instance, scheduled job and deployment that reads\n   this key. Do not rotate while ownership is unknown.\n2. Choose the shortest practical invalidation time. Record the reason, owner\n   and planned end of overlap.\n3. Perform the rotation and move the one-time replacement directly into the\n   approved secrets-manager entry. Never paste it into the change record.\n4. Roll out the new secret to every known instance and verify a safe operation\n   in the intended environment and scope.\n5. Before the deadline, confirm every instance reports the replacement version\n   and no deployment still depends on the outgoing secret.\n6. After invalidation, verify that the replacement still succeeds and that the\n   previous secret is refused. Record only prefixes, times, outcomes and\n   correlation evidence.\n\nIf an instance cannot move before the chosen time, stop and make a conscious\navailability-versus-exposure decision. Do not silently extend an overlap whose\nowner or purpose is unclear.\n\n## Understand regeneration before using it\n\n> **Regeneration is not incident containment.** An open-ended regenerate\n> operation leaves the previous secret valid until a later reissue replaces the\n> overlap state. If the key may be compromised, deactivate it or rotate with\n> prompt invalidation.\n\nRegeneration can support a deliberately staged migration when the old secret\ncannot yet have a bounded end time, but it creates two live secrets. Before\nusing it, document why a normal bounded rotation is impossible, who owns the\nfollow-up cutover and when the later rotation will occur. Verify both the new\ndeployment and the eventual rejection of the previous secret; issuing a new\nsecret is not completion.\n\n## Contain suspected exposure\n\nWhen a complete secret may have reached source control, a browser bundle, a\nticket, an ordinary log or an unauthorized person:\n\n1. Preserve non-secret time, environment, prefix and workload evidence.\n2. Deactivate the key when deployment ownership is uncertain, or rotate with\n   immediate invalidation when the approved workload can switch safely.\n3. Remove the exposed value from every deployment and storage location. Treat\n   source-history or log cleanup as a separate containment task; rotation alone\n   does not remove copied material.\n4. Review the application audit trail and workload/provider logs for the\n   affected period, using the key identifier, prefix, operation and correlation\n   evidence—not the complete secret. Do not infer inactivity from the current\n   per-key usage-statistics response.\n5. Restore only the minimum intended roles and operations with a protected\n   replacement. Verify an expected refusal as well as a successful request.\n\n## Handle status and expiry\n\nAn inactive key cannot authenticate, including through a retained previous\nsecret. Reactivation is permitted only for an **Inactive** key; an **Expired**\nkey is terminal and cannot be reactivated. If access is approved again after\nexpiry, create a new least-privilege credential with a new review decision.\n\nExpiry is enforced when the key authenticates. Treat the key as unusable after\nthat time even if a list view has not yet changed its stored status label.\nExtend an existing expiry only when the same owner, workload, scope, roles and\nbusiness need have been reviewed. Extension changes the time boundary; it does\nnot rotate secret material or repair an ownerless key.\n\n## Close the change with evidence\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#usageStatisticsLimitationMarkdown}}\n\nUntil per-key tracking exists, prove deployment and retirement from controlled\nrequests, application audit evidence and the workload's own secret-access and\nexecution logs. A page of zero counters is not a safe deletion decision.\n\nRetain a non-secret lifecycle record containing:\n\n- key identifier or visible prefix, scope, owner and workload;\n- action taken, reason, approver and environment;\n- replacement deployment time and every affected instance;\n- chosen previous-secret invalidation time;\n- successful expected operation and expected refusal;\n- confirmation that the previous secret no longer authenticates; and\n- incident or change correlation identifier and next review date.\n\nNever attach the current or previous complete secret, Authorization header or\nsecrets-manager value to lifecycle evidence.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Rotate, expire or deactivate an API key\n\nReplace a machine credential without losing control of which secret works. Use\nrotation for a planned, bounded handover; use immediate rotation or deactivation\nfor suspected exposure; and use expiry when access has a known end date.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| Identify the key by its non-secret prefix, owner, workload, scope, roles and deployed instances; have an approved secrets-manager destination | Every intended instance uses the replacement, the previous secret stops at the chosen time, expected access still works and unrelated access remains refused |\n\nThe key presentation identifies its scope, not its authority:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#markdown}}\n\nConfirm that you are changing the intended organization or application key\nbefore reissuing any secret. A prefix is safe to use for identification, but it\nis not enough on its own: compare the owner, workload and environment too.\n\n## Choose the lifecycle action\n\n| Situation | Action | Important consequence |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Planned replacement with a short deployment window | **Rotate** with an explicit future invalidation time | Current and previous secrets can overlap only until that chosen time |\n| Suspected disclosure and the workload can switch now | **Rotate immediately** | Immediate rotation is the default when no future invalidation time is chosen; the previous secret stops working at cutover |\n| Suspected disclosure and workload ownership is uncertain | **Deactivate** | Neither the current nor retained previous secret can authenticate while the key is inactive |\n| Workload is permanently retired | **Deactivate** and remove its deployed secret | The key remains identifiable for review but cannot authenticate |\n| Temporary credential has a known end | Set an **expiry** at creation; extend it only after a documented review | Once expired, the key cannot be reactivated; replace it if access is approved again |\n| An intentional open-ended overlap is truly required | **Regenerate**, with a separately controlled follow-up rotation | The previous secret remains valid until a later reissue; regeneration does not contain a leaked credential |\n\n## Know the maintained lifecycle operations\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#statusMarkdown}}\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#lifecycleMarkdown}}\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Choose the safe API-key lifecycle action\n  accDescr: A planned handover uses rotation and verification. Suspected compromise requires prompt old-secret invalidation or deactivation. Finished access is deactivated, while a time-bounded credential is allowed to expire.\n  reason{\"Why must access change?\"}\n  reason -->|\"Planned replacement\"| rotate[\"Rotate with explicit handover\"]\n  reason -->|\"Suspected exposure\"| contain[\"Invalidate old secret promptly or deactivate\"]\n  reason -->|\"Workload retired\"| deactivate[\"Deactivate key\"]\n  reason -->|\"Known end time\"| expiry[\"Set or extend explicit expiry\"]\n~~~\n\n## Run a planned rotation\n\nRotation keeps the same credential record, owner, scope and roles while issuing\na new complete secret. The outgoing secret moves into a single previous-secret\nslot and remains usable only until the selected invalidation time. If no future\ntime is selected, the operation defaults to **now**, which is an immediate\ncutover.\n\n1. Inventory every production instance, scheduled job and deployment that reads\n   this key. Do not rotate while ownership is unknown.\n2. Choose the shortest practical invalidation time. Record the reason, owner\n   and planned end of overlap.\n3. Perform the rotation and move the one-time replacement directly into the\n   approved secrets-manager entry. Never paste it into the change record.\n4. Roll out the new secret to every known instance and verify a safe operation\n   in the intended environment and scope.\n5. Before the deadline, confirm every instance reports the replacement version\n   and no deployment still depends on the outgoing secret.\n6. After invalidation, verify that the replacement still succeeds and that the\n   previous secret is refused. Record only prefixes, times, outcomes and\n   correlation evidence.\n\nIf an instance cannot move before the chosen time, stop and make a conscious\navailability-versus-exposure decision. Do not silently extend an overlap whose\nowner or purpose is unclear.\n\n## Understand regeneration before using it\n\n> **Regeneration is not incident containment.** An open-ended regenerate\n> operation leaves the previous secret valid until a later reissue replaces the\n> overlap state. If the key may be compromised, deactivate it or rotate with\n> prompt invalidation.\n\nRegeneration can support a deliberately staged migration when the old secret\ncannot yet have a bounded end time, but it creates two live secrets. Before\nusing it, document why a normal bounded rotation is impossible, who owns the\nfollow-up cutover and when the later rotation will occur. Verify both the new\ndeployment and the eventual rejection of the previous secret; issuing a new\nsecret is not completion.\n\n## Contain suspected exposure\n\nWhen a complete secret may have reached source control, a browser bundle, a\nticket, an ordinary log or an unauthorized person:\n\n1. Preserve non-secret time, environment, prefix and workload evidence.\n2. Deactivate the key when deployment ownership is uncertain, or rotate with\n   immediate invalidation when the approved workload can switch safely.\n3. Remove the exposed value from every deployment and storage location. Treat\n   source-history or log cleanup as a separate containment task; rotation alone\n   does not remove copied material.\n4. Review the application audit trail and workload/provider logs for the\n   affected period, using the key identifier, prefix, operation and correlation\n   evidence—not the complete secret. Do not infer inactivity from the current\n   per-key usage-statistics response.\n5. Restore only the minimum intended roles and operations with a protected\n   replacement. Verify an expected refusal as well as a successful request.\n\n## Handle status and expiry\n\nAn inactive key cannot authenticate, including through a retained previous\nsecret. Reactivation is permitted only for an **Inactive** key; an **Expired**\nkey is terminal and cannot be reactivated. If access is approved again after\nexpiry, create a new least-privilege credential with a new review decision.\n\nExpiry is enforced when the key authenticates. Treat the key as unusable after\nthat time even if a list view has not yet changed its stored status label.\nExtend an existing expiry only when the same owner, workload, scope, roles and\nbusiness need have been reviewed. Extension changes the time boundary; it does\nnot rotate secret material or repair an ownerless key.\n\n## Close the change with evidence\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#usageStatisticsMarkdown}}\n\nAfter a rotation, the new key should show accepted requests and a recent\nlast-accepted time, and the key it replaced should stop being accepted. The\ncounters cover a rolling week, so a key a workload uses less often than weekly\ncan show none: read its last-accepted time before calling it unused, and confirm\nwith the owning workload before deleting a key that time does not settle.\n\nRetain a non-secret lifecycle record containing:\n\n- key identifier or visible prefix, scope, owner and workload;\n- action taken, reason, approver and environment;\n- replacement deployment time and every affected instance;\n- chosen previous-secret invalidation time;\n- successful expected operation and expected refusal;\n- confirmation that the previous secret no longer authenticates; and\n- incident or change correlation identifier and next review date.\n\nNever attach the current or previous complete secret, Authorization header or\nsecrets-manager value to lifecycle evidence.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "access-and-identity/api-keys-troubleshoot.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/api-keys-troubleshoot";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/api-keys-troubleshoot", "source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Troubleshoot an API key\n\nDiagnose the failed decision in order: transport, credential lifecycle, scope,\nrole and operation policy. Do not rotate or broaden a credential before you\nknow which decision failed.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| Preserve the environment, operation, approximate time, correlation details and non-secret key prefix | One narrow correction makes a safe request succeed, and the workload still cannot exceed its intended scope |\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Diagnose an API key from transport to operation access\n  accDescr: The integration owner confirms the environment and authorization header, matches the non-secret prefix to an active unexpired key, verifies organization or application scope and assigned roles, and finally checks whether the exact operation accepts API-key authentication.\n  symptom[\"Request is refused or resource is missing\"] --> environment[\"Confirm environment and operation\"]\n  environment --> transport{\"Header contains current opaque key?\"}\n  transport -->|No| correct[\"Correct secret delivery without logging it\"]\n  transport -->|Yes| lifecycle{\"Key active and unexpired?\"}\n  lifecycle -->|No| replace[\"Use approved rotation or replacement\"]\n  lifecycle -->|Yes| scope{\"Scope and roles match the task?\"}\n  scope -->|No| assignment[\"Correct the narrow assignment\"]\n  scope -->|Yes| contract[\"Check exact operation authentication contract\"]\n  contract --> proof[\"Repeat one safe request and verify result\"]\n~~~\n\nThe non-secret prefix helps identify the credential record; it cannot prove\nthat the workload received the current complete secret.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#usageStatisticsLimitationMarkdown}}\n\nDo not diagnose an apparently unused key from those counters. Correlate the\nworkload's execution logs, secret-access logs, application audit trail and one\ncontrolled request instead.\n\nThe request must carry the complete opaque value in this maintained header\nshape:\n\n~~~text\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#requestHeader}}\n~~~\n\n| Result | Check first | Safe response |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| **401 Unauthorized** | Header spelling, complete secret, absence of `Bearer`, key status, expiry and environment | Correct transport or replace an inactive, expired or revoked key |\n| **403 Forbidden** | Key roles, scope, feature entitlement and whether the operation accepts API keys | Correct the narrow assignment or integration design |\n| **404 Not Found** | Resource identifier and organization visibility | Confirm scope without assuming a hidden resource exists |\n| Requests alternate between success and 401 | Secret version on every workload replica or job runner | Finish deployment of the current secret, then retire the previous one deliberately |\n\n## Isolate the failing decision\n\n1. Confirm the workload targets the expected environment.\n2. Confirm the standard authorization header contains the current complete\n   opaque key and no scheme.\n3. Compare the non-secret prefix with the intended credential record.\n4. Check whether rotation recently created a new secret and whether every\n   workload instance received it.\n5. Check active status and expiry. An expired or inactive key must not\n   authenticate even if its record remains visible.\n6. Check organization or application scope and assigned roles.\n7. Check the exact operation's generated authentication contract. Some\n   operations intentionally refuse API-key access.\n8. Repeat one read-only or otherwise safe request and verify the business result\n   in the intended scope.\n\n## Choose the repair that matches the failure\n\n- **Transport failure:** correct the secrets-manager reference or header\n  construction. Never print the value to compare it.\n- **Old secret after rotation:** deploy the new value everywhere and verify it\n  before the previous value reaches its invalidation time.\n- **Inactive, expired or compromised key:** use the approved lifecycle action;\n  do not reactivate a key whose owner or exposure is uncertain.\n- **Wrong scope or role:** change only the assignment needed by the documented\n  workload. Re-run an expected refusal as well as the success proof.\n- **Operation rejects API keys:** use the supported human or delegated-client\n  journey. A broader API key does not change the operation's authentication\n  policy.\n\nNever replace a narrow key with a broadly privileged key merely to silence an\nauthorization error. That turns a diagnosable assignment problem into a larger\nsecurity exposure.\n\n## Escalate without exposing the credential\n\nProvide the environment, operation, HTTP result, approximate time, correlation\nidentifier, non-secret key prefix, lifecycle state and whether rotation was in\nprogress. Never include the complete key, authorization header, secret-manager\nvalue or a screenshot containing them.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Troubleshoot an API key\n\nDiagnose the failed decision in order: transport, credential lifecycle, scope,\nrole and operation policy. Do not rotate or broaden a credential before you\nknow which decision failed.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| Preserve the environment, operation, approximate time, correlation details and non-secret key prefix | One narrow correction makes a safe request succeed, and the workload still cannot exceed its intended scope |\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Diagnose an API key from transport to operation access\n  accDescr: The integration owner confirms the environment and authorization header, matches the non-secret prefix to an active unexpired key, verifies organization or application scope and assigned roles, and finally checks whether the exact operation accepts API-key authentication.\n  symptom[\"Request is refused or resource is missing\"] --> environment[\"Confirm environment and operation\"]\n  environment --> transport{\"Header contains current opaque key?\"}\n  transport -->|No| correct[\"Correct secret delivery without logging it\"]\n  transport -->|Yes| lifecycle{\"Key active and unexpired?\"}\n  lifecycle -->|No| replace[\"Use approved rotation or replacement\"]\n  lifecycle -->|Yes| scope{\"Scope and roles match the task?\"}\n  scope -->|No| assignment[\"Correct the narrow assignment\"]\n  scope -->|Yes| contract[\"Check exact operation authentication contract\"]\n  contract --> proof[\"Repeat one safe request and verify result\"]\n~~~\n\nThe non-secret prefix helps identify the credential record; it cannot prove\nthat the workload received the current complete secret.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#usageStatisticsMarkdown}}\n\nOnly requests the application ACCEPTED the key for are counted. A key sent with\nthe wrong secret, past its expiry or after deactivation is refused and leaves no\ncount, and neither does a request stopped before it reaches the application. So\na key with no recent use points at the workload not sending it; failures on a\nkey with recent use point at the request itself (its scope, roles or payload).\nConfirm either reading with one controlled request.\n\nThe request must carry the complete opaque value in this maintained header\nshape:\n\n~~~text\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#requestHeader}}\n~~~\n\n| Result | Check first | Safe response |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| **401 Unauthorized** | Header spelling, complete secret, absence of `Bearer`, key status, expiry and environment | Correct transport or replace an inactive, expired or revoked key |\n| **403 Forbidden** | Key roles, scope, feature entitlement and whether the operation accepts API keys | Correct the narrow assignment or integration design |\n| **404 Not Found** | Resource identifier and organization visibility | Confirm scope without assuming a hidden resource exists |\n| Requests alternate between success and 401 | Secret version on every workload replica or job runner | Finish deployment of the current secret, then retire the previous one deliberately |\n\n## Isolate the failing decision\n\n1. Confirm the workload targets the expected environment.\n2. Confirm the standard authorization header contains the current complete\n   opaque key and no scheme.\n3. Compare the non-secret prefix with the intended credential record.\n4. Check whether rotation recently created a new secret and whether every\n   workload instance received it.\n5. Check active status and expiry. An expired or inactive key must not\n   authenticate even if its record remains visible.\n6. Check organization or application scope and assigned roles.\n7. Check the exact operation's generated authentication contract. Some\n   operations intentionally refuse API-key access.\n8. Repeat one read-only or otherwise safe request and verify the business result\n   in the intended scope.\n\n## Choose the repair that matches the failure\n\n- **Transport failure:** correct the secrets-manager reference or header\n  construction. Never print the value to compare it.\n- **Old secret after rotation:** deploy the new value everywhere and verify it\n  before the previous value reaches its invalidation time.\n- **Inactive, expired or compromised key:** use the approved lifecycle action;\n  do not reactivate a key whose owner or exposure is uncertain.\n- **Wrong scope or role:** change only the assignment needed by the documented\n  workload. Re-run an expected refusal as well as the success proof.\n- **Operation rejects API keys:** use the supported human or delegated-client\n  journey. A broader API key does not change the operation's authentication\n  policy.\n\nNever replace a narrow key with a broadly privileged key merely to silence an\nauthorization error. That turns a diagnosable assignment problem into a larger\nsecurity exposure.\n\n## Escalate without exposing the credential\n\nProvide the environment, operation, HTTP result, approximate time, correlation\nidentifier, non-secret key prefix, lifecycle state and whether rotation was in\nprogress. Never include the complete key, authorization header, secret-manager\nvalue or a screenshot containing them.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "access-and-identity/oauth-provider.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/oauth-provider";
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ export declare const APPLICATION_CONSUMER_DOCUMENTATION_AUTHORED_CONTENT_V1: rea
     readonly managedPath: "access-and-identity/oauth-operate-and-revoke.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/oauth-operate-and-revoke";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/oauth-operate-and-revoke", "source:consumer-fact:access-oauth-clients"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Operate and revoke OAuth clients\n\nReview active clients as independent machine identities. Keep each client,\ncredential and delegated token associated with its owner, environment, subject\nand organization.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| Identify the client, owner, environment, grant, deployed workloads, delegated users and non-secret secret prefix; know whether the change concerns client configuration, client credential or issued tokens | The intended client or token access changes, expected operation and refusal are re-proven, and unrelated integrations continue without broader authority |\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-oauth-clients#markdown}}\n\nThe maintained registered-client lifecycle is:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-oauth-clients#statusMarkdown}}\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-oauth-clients#lifecycleMarkdown}}\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-oauth-clients#currentUsageEvidenceMarkdown}}\n\n## Change the correct lifecycle layer\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Choose the OAuth lifecycle layer that needs to change\n  accDescr: The operator distinguishes the registered client contract, its confidential secret, issued delegated tokens and the person's application membership, then changes and verifies only the affected layer.\n  reason{\"What must change?\"}\n  reason -->|\"Grant, roles, scopes, redirects or class\"| registration[\"Review or replace client registration\"]\n  reason -->|\"Confidential secret\"| credential[\"Rotate with bounded invalidation\"]\n  reason -->|\"One delegated authorization\"| token[\"Use published token revocation or reauthorization\"]\n  reason -->|\"Person leaves organization\"| membership[\"Suspend/remove membership or use SCIM\"]\n  registration --> verify[\"Repeat complete flow and authority proof\"]\n  credential --> verify\n  token --> verify\n  membership --> verify\n~~~\n\nThese layers are related but not interchangeable. Rotating a client secret does\nnot by itself prove that an already issued delegated token is revoked. Removing\na person's organization access is a user-administration decision, not a reason\nto silently grant the client a machine role.\n\n## Review and change a client safely\n\nAt every review, answer these questions:\n\n- Is the owner and business purpose still current?\n- Does the grant still match who authorizes the work?\n- Are application roles limited to the exact operations still used?\n- Are identity scopes limited to claims the delegated client still needs?\n- Does every redirect and post-sign-out destination still belong to this client\n  and environment?\n- Does the public/confidential classification match where the client now runs?\n- Is explicit consent still appropriate for the client's trust posture?\n- Do expiry, audit evidence, resource-server activity and active deployments\n  support keeping it?\n\nA changed redirect, role, grant, identity scope, consent posture or token method\nchanges the security contract. Where the management surface does not safely\nsupport that transition in place, register a replacement client and migrate\ndeliberately instead of repurposing an established identity.\n\n## Rotate a confidential client secret\n\nRotate a confidential client secret through the administration operation\nprovided for that client. Deploy and verify the new secret before the previous\none becomes invalid when a handover is intended. For suspected compromise,\ninvalidate the previous secret promptly or remove the client; do not rely on\nan open-ended regenerate operation to contain exposure.\n\nRotation reissues the secret on the same client. A future invalidation time\ncreates a bounded overlap; the default is immediate invalidation. Regeneration\ncreates an open-ended overlap until a later reissue, so it is not incident\ncontainment.\n\n1. Inventory every workload instance using the confidential client.\n2. Choose the shortest practical invalidation time and record the owner.\n3. Store the one-time replacement directly in the approved secrets manager.\n4. Deploy it everywhere and complete a safe token plus operation proof.\n5. After invalidation, confirm the replacement succeeds and the previous secret\n   is refused.\n\nIf disclosure is suspected and ownership is uncertain, remove the compromised\nclient through the supported administration lifecycle and register a protected\nreplacement. Do not leave an open-ended overlap while searching for consumers.\n\n## Revoke delegated access or retire a client\n\nUse the application's published token-revocation behavior when one delegated\nauthorization should end, and require a fresh authorization journey if the\nperson later restores it. Retire an entire integration by removing its client\nregistration and every deployed secret, then confirm new token issuance fails.\nSeparately suspend or remove the person's organization membership when their\napplication access must end; SSO or OAuth revocation alone is not the membership\nlifecycle.\n\nFor a suspected incident, treat client credential exposure and issued-token\nexposure as separate questions. Contain both applicable paths and review\nactivity for the affected client, person, organization and period.\n\nToken revocation follows [RFC 7009](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7009): an\nunknown or already revoked token still receives a successful response so the\nendpoint does not become a token-validity oracle. Therefore **HTTP success is\nnot the final proof**. Retry one safe protected operation with the revoked token\nand verify that it is refused, then confirm a different unaffected client still\nworks. Confidential clients must authenticate to the revocation endpoint using\ntheir registered method; a bad client secret is refused before revocation.\n\n## Diagnose OAuth failures\n\n| Symptom | Check first | Safe response |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Discovery or registration is unavailable | Whether the capability is advertised here | Use an enabled onboarding path; do not probe undocumented endpoints |\n| Authorization request is rejected | Client, allowed grant, exact redirect and required proof | Correct the registered client or request |\n| Consent is denied or required | Client identity, claims and intended roles | Preserve the decision and explain or correct the request |\n| Code exchange fails | Issuer, redirect, proof, client class and token method | Restart the published flow; never reuse a code |\n| Token is valid but an operation is refused | Organization, client roles and person's authority | Diagnose authorization; do not request broader identity scopes |\n| Token is invalid or revoked | Client and token lifecycle | Refresh or reauthorize only through advertised behavior |\n\n## Close the change with non-secret evidence\n\nRetain the client identifier, non-secret secret prefixes, owner, environment,\ngrant, roles, identity scopes, redirect inventory, action and approval, old-\nsecret invalidation time, affected delegated authorization, successful expected\noperation, expected refusal and correlation evidence. Never attach a client\nsecret, authorization code, access/refresh token, Authorization header or\ncomplete authorization response.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Operate and revoke OAuth clients\n\nReview active clients as independent machine identities. Keep each client,\ncredential and delegated token associated with its owner, environment, subject\nand organization.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| Identify the client, owner, environment, grant, deployed workloads, delegated users and non-secret secret prefix; know whether the change concerns client configuration, client credential or issued tokens | The intended client or token access changes, expected operation and refusal are re-proven, and unrelated integrations continue without broader authority |\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-oauth-clients#markdown}}\n\nThe maintained registered-client lifecycle is:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-oauth-clients#statusMarkdown}}\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-oauth-clients#lifecycleMarkdown}}\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-oauth-clients#usageEvidenceMarkdown}}\n\n## Change the correct lifecycle layer\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Choose the OAuth lifecycle layer that needs to change\n  accDescr: The operator distinguishes the registered client contract, its confidential secret, issued delegated tokens and the person's application membership, then changes and verifies only the affected layer.\n  reason{\"What must change?\"}\n  reason -->|\"Grant, roles, scopes, redirects or class\"| registration[\"Review or replace client registration\"]\n  reason -->|\"Confidential secret\"| credential[\"Rotate with bounded invalidation\"]\n  reason -->|\"One delegated authorization\"| token[\"Use published token revocation or reauthorization\"]\n  reason -->|\"Person leaves organization\"| membership[\"Suspend/remove membership or use SCIM\"]\n  registration --> verify[\"Repeat complete flow and authority proof\"]\n  credential --> verify\n  token --> verify\n  membership --> verify\n~~~\n\nThese layers are related but not interchangeable. Rotating a client secret does\nnot by itself prove that an already issued delegated token is revoked. Removing\na person's organization access is a user-administration decision, not a reason\nto silently grant the client a machine role.\n\n## Review and change a client safely\n\nAt every review, answer these questions:\n\n- Is the owner and business purpose still current?\n- Does the grant still match who authorizes the work?\n- Are application roles limited to the exact operations still used?\n- Are identity scopes limited to claims the delegated client still needs?\n- Does every redirect and post-sign-out destination still belong to this client\n  and environment?\n- Does the public/confidential classification match where the client now runs?\n- Is explicit consent still appropriate for the client's trust posture?\n- Do expiry, audit evidence, resource-server activity and active deployments\n  support keeping it?\n\nA changed redirect, role, grant, identity scope, consent posture or token method\nchanges the security contract. Where the management surface does not safely\nsupport that transition in place, register a replacement client and migrate\ndeliberately instead of repurposing an established identity.\n\n## Rotate a confidential client secret\n\nRotate a confidential client secret through the administration operation\nprovided for that client. Deploy and verify the new secret before the previous\none becomes invalid when a handover is intended. For suspected compromise,\ninvalidate the previous secret promptly or remove the client; do not rely on\nan open-ended regenerate operation to contain exposure.\n\nRotation reissues the secret on the same client. A future invalidation time\ncreates a bounded overlap; the default is immediate invalidation. Regeneration\ncreates an open-ended overlap until a later reissue, so it is not incident\ncontainment.\n\n1. Inventory every workload instance using the confidential client.\n2. Choose the shortest practical invalidation time and record the owner.\n3. Store the one-time replacement directly in the approved secrets manager.\n4. Deploy it everywhere and complete a safe token plus operation proof.\n5. After invalidation, confirm the replacement succeeds and the previous secret\n   is refused.\n\nIf disclosure is suspected and ownership is uncertain, remove the compromised\nclient through the supported administration lifecycle and register a protected\nreplacement. Do not leave an open-ended overlap while searching for consumers.\n\n## Revoke delegated access or retire a client\n\nUse the application's published token-revocation behavior when one delegated\nauthorization should end, and require a fresh authorization journey if the\nperson later restores it. Retire an entire integration by removing its client\nregistration and every deployed secret, then confirm new token issuance fails.\nSeparately suspend or remove the person's organization membership when their\napplication access must end; SSO or OAuth revocation alone is not the membership\nlifecycle.\n\nFor a suspected incident, treat client credential exposure and issued-token\nexposure as separate questions. Contain both applicable paths and review\nactivity for the affected client, person, organization and period.\n\nToken revocation follows [RFC 7009](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7009): an\nunknown or already revoked token still receives a successful response so the\nendpoint does not become a token-validity oracle. Therefore **HTTP success is\nnot the final proof**. Retry one safe protected operation with the revoked token\nand verify that it is refused, then confirm a different unaffected client still\nworks. Confidential clients must authenticate to the revocation endpoint using\ntheir registered method; a bad client secret is refused before revocation.\n\n## Diagnose OAuth failures\n\n| Symptom | Check first | Safe response |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Discovery or registration is unavailable | Whether the capability is advertised here | Use an enabled onboarding path; do not probe undocumented endpoints |\n| Authorization request is rejected | Client, allowed grant, exact redirect and required proof | Correct the registered client or request |\n| Consent is denied or required | Client identity, claims and intended roles | Preserve the decision and explain or correct the request |\n| Code exchange fails | Issuer, redirect, proof, client class and token method | Restart the published flow; never reuse a code |\n| Token is valid but an operation is refused | Organization, client roles and person's authority | Diagnose authorization; do not request broader identity scopes |\n| Token is invalid or revoked | Client and token lifecycle | Refresh or reauthorize only through advertised behavior |\n\n## Close the change with non-secret evidence\n\nRetain the client identifier, non-secret secret prefixes, owner, environment,\ngrant, roles, identity scopes, redirect inventory, action and approval, old-\nsecret invalidation time, affected delegated authorization, successful expected\noperation, expected refusal and correlation evidence. Never attach a client\nsecret, authorization code, access/refresh token, Authorization header or\ncomplete authorization response.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "user-administration.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/user-administration";
@@ -251,22 +251,22 @@ export declare const APPLICATION_CONSUMER_DOCUMENTATION_AUTHORED_CONTENT_V1: rea
     readonly managedPath: "security-and-audit/configure-siem.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/configure-siem-export";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/configure-siem-export", "source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Configure organization SIEM export\n\nSIEM export sends selected organization audit events to one webhook destination.\nCreate a destination dedicated to the organization and environment, then choose\nthe authentication, wire format and filters your receiver can actually verify.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| The organization security owner and SIEM owner agree on destination, TLS, authentication, event scope, format, volume, retention and a controlled test event | One organization/environment sends only the approved event set, the receiver validates and correlates it, failures are recoverable, and the destination secret remains protected |\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Configure a bounded organization SIEM export\n  accDescr: The organization and SIEM owners prepare one receiver, choose authentication and a format, select a narrow category and severity filter, keep export disabled while validating configuration, enable it for one controlled event, compare the received copy with the source audit row, then expand deliberately.\n  owners[\"Agree owners, organization and receiver\"] --> receiver[\"Prepare TLS, authentication and acknowledgement\"]\n  receiver --> format[\"Choose one receiver-supported format\"]\n  format --> filter[\"Select minimum event set and severity\"]\n  filter --> disabled[\"Save while export remains disabled\"]\n  disabled --> enable[\"Enable and perform one controlled event\"]\n  enable --> compare[\"Compare event ID, scope, time, actor and outcome\"]\n  compare --> expand[\"Expand only after volume and recovery checks\"]\n~~~\n\nSIEM export is an organization-routed copy of source audit events. Configure one\nreceiver per intended organization/environment boundary; do not use a shared\ndestination when its access and retention rules cannot preserve that separation.\n\n## Follow one event from source record to searchable copy\n\n~~~mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n  accTitle: From application audit record to searchable SIEM copy\n  accDescr: The application records an audit event, applies the organization export filter, formats one outbound event, authenticates an HTTPS request, and sends it to the receiver. A successful HTTP response acknowledges the configured delivery boundary; the SIEM then parses and indexes the copy. Operators prove completion by searching for the source event identifier. Failed delivery follows retry and dead-letter recovery without removing the source audit record.\n  participant Source as Source audit trail\n  participant Export as Organization exporter\n  participant Receiver as Receiver or relay\n  participant SIEM as SIEM index\n  actor Operator as Security operator\n  Source->>Export: Eligible audit event\n  Export->>Export: Apply filter and format one event\n  Export->>Receiver: Authenticated HTTPS request\n  alt Receiver acknowledges configured boundary\n    Receiver-->>Export: Successful HTTP response\n    Receiver->>SIEM: Parse, transform and index\n    Operator->>SIEM: Search exact eventId\n    SIEM-->>Operator: Searchable correlated copy\n  else Receiver refuses or times out\n    Receiver-->>Export: Error or timeout\n    Export->>Export: Retry, then capture recoverable failure\n  end\n~~~\n\nThere are three different facts to verify: **the source event exists**, **the\nreceiver acknowledged the request**, and **the transformed event is searchable\nin the intended index or table**. An HTTP 2xx response proves only the delivery\nboundary implemented by that receiver. It is not automatically proof that a\nparser, transformation, index or detection rule accepted the event.\n\n## Decide whether direct delivery is compatible\n\n| Receiver requirement | Recommended path | Why |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| One HTTPS request containing one JSON object, with a static header or HMAC credential | Test direct delivery | This matches the current structured-JSON worker closely |\n| A provider-specific wrapper around the event | Use a narrow relay unless the exact endpoint accepts the native envelope | The relay owns the wrapper while preserving source identifiers |\n| Short-lived OAuth access tokens or managed identity | Use a provider-side relay | Token acquisition and refresh do not belong in a static credential field |\n| A JSON array or provider batch protocol | Use a relay that batches deliberately | Current delivery is one event per request; configured batch fields are reserved |\n| A syslog, agent, queue or private-network input | Use an adapter or relay inside that boundary | The application sends outbound HTTPS webhooks, not those transports |\n| CEF, LEEF or OCSF ingestion | Test actual emitted samples with the receiver | A format name does not prove field mapping, escaping, severity or class compatibility |\n\nPrefer the smallest component that makes the contracts compatible. A relay is\nnot a generic event platform: it should authenticate before parsing, preserve\nthe source event and correlation identifiers, perform one documented\ntransformation, expose bounded health signals and fail without silently\ndiscarding the event.\n\n## Choose the delivery contract\n\nThe following table is generated from the maintained SIEM configuration schema\nand resource specification. It distinguishes enforced values from reserved\nconfiguration so an accepted field is not mistaken for working delivery\nbehavior.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#configurationMarkdown}}\n\n### Authentication values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#authenticationValuesMarkdown}}\n\n### Wire-format values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#formatValuesMarkdown}}\n\nChoose the simplest format the receiver can validate end to end:\n\n| Format | Use when | Verify before rollout |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Structured JSON | The receiver can preserve named fields and nested event data | Schema/field parsing, timestamps, identifiers and unknown-field handling |\n| CEF | The receiver has a tested CEF ingestion path | Header and extension parsing, escaping and the receiver's event classification |\n| LEEF | The receiver has a tested LEEF/QRadar path | Tab-delimited attributes, escaping and event mapping |\n| OCSF | The receiver consumes the emitted OCSF class documents | Class, activity, required fields and receiver validation for the actual event samples |\n\nDo not choose a format from its name alone. Preserve a receiver-tested sample\nfor each event family that matters to detection; syntactically accepted input\ncan still be mapped to the wrong fields or severity by the downstream product.\n\nAuthentication credentials are write-only secrets. A read returns a masked\nstored-credential marker, not the secret. Leaving that marker unchanged during\nan edit preserves the stored value; entering a new value replaces it. Never\ncopy the secret into a ticket or detection rule.\n\n## Configure filters from their exact values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#filterValuesMarkdown}}\n\nThe optional `specificEventTypes` list is an **exact identifier allowlist**.\nIt is not a substring, prefix, regular expression or wildcard filter. Add an\nidentifier only after confirming that the corresponding event is emitted in the\napplication path you operate.\n\n## Configure delivery behavior\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#deliveryValuesMarkdown}}\n\nThe current worker posts **one event per HTTP request**, and there is no setting\nthat changes that — size a receiver, load balancer or billing estimate on one\nrequest per event.\n\nTwo configuration fields used to sit here promising otherwise — `batchSize` and\n`batchWindowSeconds` — each accepted, stored and read by nothing. They were\nremoved rather than documented as reserved: a stored number that does not change\nbehaviour is worse than its absence, because a receiver sized on it is sized wrong.\n\n## Limit what an exported event carries\n\n`exportProjection` decides what this destination receives. It is the only place\nan export can be narrowed **before** the data leaves; everything else — a filter,\na severity minimum — decides *whether* an event is sent, not *what* it contains.\n\nSet it per destination, not per application: two receivers under two different\nagreements are two different answers.\n\n| Declaration | Admits |\n| --- | --- |\n| `disclosedTiers: [\"attribution\"]` | the user's email address, IP address, user agent, geolocation and client-install identifier |\n| `disclosedTiers: [\"context\"]` | correlation identifier, originating frontend, organization and application names, authentication method and source |\n| `disclosedTiers: [\"detail\"]` | the per-event `eventData` object **and the outcome reason**, subject to the next row |\n| `disclosedEventDataClasses: [\"administrative\"]` | only the `eventData` of events describing configuration or system state |\n| `disclosedEventDataClasses: [\"subject-detail\"]` | also the `eventData` of events describing a person |\n\n**Declaring `detail` while withholding `attribution` is the mistake to avoid.**\nAn authentication event's `eventData` carries the email address and IP address\nthat withholding attribution was meant to keep back, so the narrowing reads as a\ncontrol while changing nothing that matters. Pair it with\n`disclosedEventDataClasses: [\"administrative\"]`.\n\nThe outcome reason sits in `detail` rather than `context` for the same reason,\nand it is worth understanding before you rely on either tier. It is not a field of\nits own: the application lifts it out of the event's own `eventData`. Most of the\ntime it is a short, impersonal failure reason — but **19 event types carry a\nreason somebody typed**, including organization lifecycle changes, emergency\naccess, forced password resets and retained-data access, where it is the\noperator's own words and may name anyone. Withholding an event's detail therefore\nwithholds its reason too.\n\nA **floor always survives** whatever you declare: event identifier, event type,\ncategory, severity, timestamp, organization, the acting user's identifier, source\nservice, source version, source environment, and outcome. Two reasons, and only\nthe first is about privacy. The event identifier is what your receiver\nde-duplicates on, and deliveries are retried — an export minimized past it\nproduces duplicates in your SIEM rather than fewer records. The event type,\nseverity and source version are header fields of the CEF and LEEF grammars, which\nare positional: omitting one does not shorten the record, it corrupts every field\nafter it. The acting user's identifier is an opaque reference, never a name or an\naddress, so it lets you correlate one actor's activity without receiving their\nidentity — which is usually the trade a minimized export exists to make.\n\nOne capability cost to know about, because nothing warns you at the time:\nwithholding `detail` makes OCSF exports coarser. The application refines an\nAPI-activity event's `activity_id` by reading the verb out of `eventData`, so\nwith the object withheld a create and a delete both report the generic\n`Other` activity and share a `type_uid`. The event type is still carried in\n`activity_name` and `metadata.event_code`, so nothing is wrong — but a\ndetection rule or dashboard that groups by `type_uid` will stop separating them.\nCEF, LEEF and structured JSON are unaffected.\n\nWithheld fields are **absent**, not empty. No blank CEF custom-string slot, no\nnull JSON key, no empty OCSF attribute — so a receiver's \"field is present but\nempty\" rule will not fire, and a rule keyed on a withheld field simply never\nmatches. The same projection applies to every wire format, because it is applied\nonce, before the event is signed and queued, rather than per format.\n\nOmit the whole block and the destination receives the full envelope. That is the\nbehaviour of every destination configured before this control existed, so\nintroducing it changes nothing until you declare a narrowing.\n\nVerify a narrowing the way you verify a filter: perform one controlled event,\nread the received copy, and confirm both that the withheld fields are absent and\nthat the event identifier still matches the source audit record. Minimization\ndoes not alter the source audit trail — the full record remains in the\napplication, and a narrowed feed is not evidence that less was recorded.\n\n## Filter for purpose and volume\n\nStart with the categories needed by the monitoring use case and a minimum\nseverity that preserves administrative and security-relevant activity. Add an\nevent-type allowlist only when the receiver intentionally needs that narrower\nset. An allowlist can silently exclude newly introduced event types, so record\nits owner and review it when the application's event catalogue changes.\n\nFilters govern future delivery copies; they do not delete the source audit\ntrail. A narrow SIEM feed is therefore not evidence that no other audit activity\nexists in the application.\n\n## Roll out deliberately\n\n1. Keep export disabled while the receiver, TLS and authentication are prepared.\n2. Start with structured JSON and a narrow event filter that includes one\n   controlled administrative event.\n3. Enable export and perform the controlled action in the intended organization.\n4. Match the received event ID, timestamp, organization, outcome and correlation ID.\n5. Trigger a controlled event outside the filter and confirm it remains in the\n   source trail but is not delivered to this receiver.\n6. Exercise an acknowledged receiver response and one safe temporary failure so\n   ownership of retry/dead-letter recovery is known.\n7. Expand categories and lower the severity threshold only after the receiver\n   handles expected volume and redaction.\n\nConfiguration is cached by the running application for up to five minutes.\nEnabling may therefore miss exports during that interval, and changing a\ndestination may continue sending to the former receiver until the cache expires.\nTreat a destination change as a security operation and verify the old receiver\nhas stopped receiving before closing the change.\n\nFor credential rotation or destination replacement, keep the change window and\nold/new receiver ownership explicit. Verify the current receiver accepts a new\ncontrolled event and the former receiver no longer receives selected traffic\nafter the cache window. Retain configuration approval, non-secret destination\nidentity, format/filter choices, test event and correlation IDs, delivery result\nand recovery owner—never the bearer token, API-key value or HMAC secret.\n\n## Format standards and receiver references\n\n- OpenText’s [Common Event Format implementation standard](https://www.microfocus.com/documentation/arcsight/arcsight-smartconnectors-24.4/cef-implementation-standard/)\n  describes CEF header and extension construction. Validate the application’s\n  actual event samples against the target connector rather than assuming every\n  CEF consumer maps extensions identically.\n- IBM documents [LEEF event components](https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/qradar-on-cloud?topic=overview-leef-event-components)\n  and [predefined LEEF attributes](https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/qradar-on-cloud?topic=overview-predefined-leef-event-attributes)\n  for QRadar ingestion and field mapping.\n- The [OCSF schema browser](https://schema.ocsf.io) and\n  [OCSF schema repository](https://github.com/ocsf/ocsf-schema) define the open\n  event classes and attributes. Confirm the emitted class, activity and\n  required fields for every selected event family.\n\nThese external standards describe receiver-side expectations. The generated\nconfiguration tables above remain the authority for values and behavior this\napplication actually supports.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Configure organization SIEM export\n\nSIEM export sends selected organization audit events to one webhook destination.\nCreate a destination dedicated to the organization and environment, then choose\nthe authentication, wire format and filters your receiver can actually verify.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| The organization security owner and SIEM owner agree on destination, TLS, authentication, event scope, format, volume, retention and a controlled test event | One organization/environment sends only the approved event set, the receiver validates and correlates it, failures are recoverable, and the destination secret remains protected |\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Configure a bounded organization SIEM export\n  accDescr: The organization and SIEM owners prepare one receiver, choose authentication and a format, select a narrow category and severity filter, keep export disabled while validating configuration, enable it for one controlled event, compare the received copy with the source audit row, then expand deliberately.\n  owners[\"Agree owners, organization and receiver\"] --> receiver[\"Prepare TLS, authentication and acknowledgement\"]\n  receiver --> format[\"Choose one receiver-supported format\"]\n  format --> filter[\"Select minimum event set and severity\"]\n  filter --> disabled[\"Save while export remains disabled\"]\n  disabled --> enable[\"Enable and perform one controlled event\"]\n  enable --> compare[\"Compare event ID, scope, time, actor and outcome\"]\n  compare --> expand[\"Expand only after volume and recovery checks\"]\n~~~\n\nSIEM export is an organization-routed copy of source audit events. Configure one\nreceiver per intended organization/environment boundary; do not use a shared\ndestination when its access and retention rules cannot preserve that separation.\n\n## Follow one event from source record to searchable copy\n\n~~~mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n  accTitle: From application audit record to searchable SIEM copy\n  accDescr: The application records an audit event, applies the organization export filter, formats one outbound event, authenticates an HTTPS request, and sends it to the receiver. A successful HTTP response acknowledges the configured delivery boundary; the SIEM then parses and indexes the copy. Operators prove completion by searching for the source event identifier. Failed delivery follows retry and dead-letter recovery without removing the source audit record.\n  participant Source as Source audit trail\n  participant Export as Organization exporter\n  participant Receiver as Receiver or relay\n  participant SIEM as SIEM index\n  actor Operator as Security operator\n  Source->>Export: Eligible audit event\n  Export->>Export: Apply filter and format one event\n  Export->>Receiver: Authenticated HTTPS request\n  alt Receiver acknowledges configured boundary\n    Receiver-->>Export: Successful HTTP response\n    Receiver->>SIEM: Parse, transform and index\n    Operator->>SIEM: Search exact eventId\n    SIEM-->>Operator: Searchable correlated copy\n  else Receiver refuses or times out\n    Receiver-->>Export: Error or timeout\n    Export->>Export: Retry, then capture recoverable failure\n  end\n~~~\n\nThere are three different facts to verify: **the source event exists**, **the\nreceiver acknowledged the request**, and **the transformed event is searchable\nin the intended index or table**. An HTTP 2xx response proves only the delivery\nboundary implemented by that receiver. It is not automatically proof that a\nparser, transformation, index or detection rule accepted the event.\n\n## Decide whether direct delivery is compatible\n\n| Receiver requirement | Recommended path | Why |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| One HTTPS request containing one JSON object, with a static header or HMAC credential | Test direct delivery | This matches the current structured-JSON worker closely |\n| A provider-specific wrapper around the event | Use a narrow relay unless the exact endpoint accepts the native envelope | The relay owns the wrapper while preserving source identifiers |\n| Short-lived OAuth access tokens or managed identity | Use a provider-side relay | Token acquisition and refresh do not belong in a static credential field |\n| A plain JSON array of events | Test direct delivery with `batchSize` above 1 | A batch of `json_structured` or `ocsf` events is sent as one JSON array |\n| A provider-specific batch protocol | Use a relay that batches deliberately | Batching sends a plain array or one line per event, never a provider wrapper |\n| A syslog, agent, queue or private-network input | Use an adapter or relay inside that boundary | The application sends outbound HTTPS webhooks, not those transports |\n| CEF, LEEF or OCSF ingestion | Test actual emitted samples with the receiver | A format name does not prove field mapping, escaping, severity or class compatibility |\n\nPrefer the smallest component that makes the contracts compatible. A relay is\nnot a generic event platform: it should authenticate before parsing, preserve\nthe source event and correlation identifiers, perform one documented\ntransformation, expose bounded health signals and fail without silently\ndiscarding the event.\n\n## Choose the delivery contract\n\nThe following table is generated from the maintained SIEM configuration schema\nand resource specification. It distinguishes enforced values from reserved\nconfiguration so an accepted field is not mistaken for working delivery\nbehavior.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#configurationMarkdown}}\n\n### Authentication values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#authenticationValuesMarkdown}}\n\n### Wire-format values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#formatValuesMarkdown}}\n\nChoose the simplest format the receiver can validate end to end:\n\n| Format | Use when | Verify before rollout |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Structured JSON | The receiver can preserve named fields and nested event data | Schema/field parsing, timestamps, identifiers and unknown-field handling |\n| CEF | The receiver has a tested CEF ingestion path | Header and extension parsing, escaping and the receiver's event classification |\n| LEEF | The receiver has a tested LEEF/QRadar path | Tab-delimited attributes, escaping and event mapping |\n| OCSF | The receiver consumes the emitted OCSF class documents | Class, activity, required fields and receiver validation for the actual event samples |\n\nDo not choose a format from its name alone. Preserve a receiver-tested sample\nfor each event family that matters to detection; syntactically accepted input\ncan still be mapped to the wrong fields or severity by the downstream product.\n\nAuthentication credentials are write-only secrets. A read returns a masked\nstored-credential marker, not the secret. Leaving that marker unchanged during\nan edit preserves the stored value; entering a new value replaces it. Never\ncopy the secret into a ticket or detection rule.\n\n## Configure filters from their exact values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#filterValuesMarkdown}}\n\nThe optional `specificEventTypes` list is an **exact identifier allowlist**.\nIt is not a substring, prefix, regular expression or wildcard filter. Add an\nidentifier only after confirming that the corresponding event is emitted in the\napplication path you operate.\n\n## Configure delivery behavior\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#deliveryValuesMarkdown}}\n\nWith the default `batchSize` of 1, each event is its own HTTP request. Set\n`batchSize` above 1 and this destination's events wait, then travel together:\na batch is sent as soon as `batchSize` events are waiting, or when the oldest has\nwaited `batchWindowSeconds`. A batch is one request body, framed the way its format\nframes several records:\n\n| Format | Body of a batch |\n| --- | --- |\n| `json_structured`, `ocsf` | A JSON array of the events |\n| `cef`, `leef` | One line per event, separated by newlines |\n\nA batch that holds one event is sent exactly like a single event, with no array and\nno trailing newline, so a receiver written for one event per request keeps working\nuntil you raise `batchSize`. If the receiver answers `413 Payload Too Large`, the\nbatch is halved and sent again until the receiver accepts it; the events left out\ngo in the next request. Size a receiver, load balancer or billing estimate on the\nbatch size you choose.\n\n## Limit what an exported event carries\n\n`exportProjection` decides what this destination receives. It is the only place\nan export can be narrowed **before** the data leaves; everything else — a filter,\na severity minimum — decides *whether* an event is sent, not *what* it contains.\n\nSet it per destination, not per application: two receivers under two different\nagreements are two different answers.\n\n| Declaration | Admits |\n| --- | --- |\n| `disclosedTiers: [\"attribution\"]` | the user's email address, IP address, user agent, geolocation and client-install identifier |\n| `disclosedTiers: [\"context\"]` | correlation identifier, originating frontend, organization and application names, authentication method and source |\n| `disclosedTiers: [\"detail\"]` | the per-event `eventData` object **and the outcome reason**, subject to the next row |\n| `disclosedEventDataClasses: [\"administrative\"]` | only the `eventData` of events describing configuration or system state |\n| `disclosedEventDataClasses: [\"subject-detail\"]` | also the `eventData` of events describing a person |\n\n**Declaring `detail` while withholding `attribution` is the mistake to avoid.**\nAn authentication event's `eventData` carries the email address and IP address\nthat withholding attribution was meant to keep back, so the narrowing reads as a\ncontrol while changing nothing that matters. Pair it with\n`disclosedEventDataClasses: [\"administrative\"]`.\n\nThe outcome reason sits in `detail` rather than `context` for the same reason,\nand it is worth understanding before you rely on either tier. It is not a field of\nits own: the application lifts it out of the event's own `eventData`. Most of the\ntime it is a short, impersonal failure reason — but **19 event types carry a\nreason somebody typed**, including organization lifecycle changes, emergency\naccess, forced password resets and retained-data access, where it is the\noperator's own words and may name anyone. Withholding an event's detail therefore\nwithholds its reason too.\n\nA **floor always survives** whatever you declare: event identifier, event type,\ncategory, severity, timestamp, organization, the acting user's identifier, source\nservice, source version, source environment, and outcome. Two reasons, and only\nthe first is about privacy. The event identifier is what your receiver\nde-duplicates on, and deliveries are retried — an export minimized past it\nproduces duplicates in your SIEM rather than fewer records. The event type,\nseverity and source version are header fields of the CEF and LEEF grammars, which\nare positional: omitting one does not shorten the record, it corrupts every field\nafter it. The acting user's identifier is an opaque reference, never a name or an\naddress, so it lets you correlate one actor's activity without receiving their\nidentity — which is usually the trade a minimized export exists to make.\n\nOne capability cost to know about, because nothing warns you at the time:\nwithholding `detail` makes OCSF exports coarser. The application refines an\nAPI-activity event's `activity_id` by reading the verb out of `eventData`, so\nwith the object withheld a create and a delete both report the generic\n`Other` activity and share a `type_uid`. The event type is still carried in\n`activity_name` and `metadata.event_code`, so nothing is wrong — but a\ndetection rule or dashboard that groups by `type_uid` will stop separating them.\nCEF, LEEF and structured JSON are unaffected.\n\nWithheld fields are **absent**, not empty. No blank CEF custom-string slot, no\nnull JSON key, no empty OCSF attribute — so a receiver's \"field is present but\nempty\" rule will not fire, and a rule keyed on a withheld field simply never\nmatches. The same projection applies to every wire format, because it is applied\nonce, before the event is signed and queued, rather than per format.\n\nOmit the whole block and the destination receives the full envelope. That is the\nbehaviour of every destination configured before this control existed, so\nintroducing it changes nothing until you declare a narrowing.\n\nVerify a narrowing the way you verify a filter: perform one controlled event,\nread the received copy, and confirm both that the withheld fields are absent and\nthat the event identifier still matches the source audit record. Minimization\ndoes not alter the source audit trail — the full record remains in the\napplication, and a narrowed feed is not evidence that less was recorded.\n\n## Filter for purpose and volume\n\nStart with the categories needed by the monitoring use case and a minimum\nseverity that preserves administrative and security-relevant activity. Add an\nevent-type allowlist only when the receiver intentionally needs that narrower\nset. An allowlist can silently exclude newly introduced event types, so record\nits owner and review it when the application's event catalogue changes.\n\nFilters govern future delivery copies; they do not delete the source audit\ntrail. A narrow SIEM feed is therefore not evidence that no other audit activity\nexists in the application.\n\n## Roll out deliberately\n\n1. Keep export disabled while the receiver, TLS and authentication are prepared.\n2. Start with structured JSON and a narrow event filter that includes one\n   controlled administrative event.\n3. Enable export and perform the controlled action in the intended organization.\n4. Match the received event ID, timestamp, organization, outcome and correlation ID.\n5. Trigger a controlled event outside the filter and confirm it remains in the\n   source trail but is not delivered to this receiver.\n6. Exercise an acknowledged receiver response and one safe temporary failure so\n   ownership of retry/dead-letter recovery is known.\n7. Expand categories and lower the severity threshold only after the receiver\n   handles expected volume and redaction.\n\nConfiguration is cached by the running application for up to five minutes.\nEnabling may therefore miss exports during that interval, and changing a\ndestination may continue sending to the former receiver until the cache expires.\nTreat a destination change as a security operation and verify the old receiver\nhas stopped receiving before closing the change.\n\nFor credential rotation or destination replacement, keep the change window and\nold/new receiver ownership explicit. Verify the current receiver accepts a new\ncontrolled event and the former receiver no longer receives selected traffic\nafter the cache window. Retain configuration approval, non-secret destination\nidentity, format/filter choices, test event and correlation IDs, delivery result\nand recovery owner—never the bearer token, API-key value or HMAC secret.\n\n## Format standards and receiver references\n\n- OpenText’s [Common Event Format implementation standard](https://www.microfocus.com/documentation/arcsight/arcsight-smartconnectors-24.4/cef-implementation-standard/)\n  describes CEF header and extension construction. Validate the application’s\n  actual event samples against the target connector rather than assuming every\n  CEF consumer maps extensions identically.\n- IBM documents [LEEF event components](https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/qradar-on-cloud?topic=overview-leef-event-components)\n  and [predefined LEEF attributes](https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/qradar-on-cloud?topic=overview-predefined-leef-event-attributes)\n  for QRadar ingestion and field mapping.\n- The [OCSF schema browser](https://schema.ocsf.io) and\n  [OCSF schema repository](https://github.com/ocsf/ocsf-schema) define the open\n  event classes and attributes. Confirm the emitted class, activity and\n  required fields for every selected event family.\n\nThese external standards describe receiver-side expectations. The generated\nconfiguration tables above remain the authority for values and behavior this\napplication actually supports.";
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-    readonly markdown: "# Send audit events to Splunk\n\nSplunk HTTP Event Collector (HEC) accepts events over HTTPS with a token in the\n`Authorization` header. The application can supply that header, but its native\nstructured JSON body is a security-audit envelope—not Splunk’s HEC\n`{\"event\": ...}` wrapper. **Use a small controlled relay unless your chosen HEC\nendpoint and source type have been proven to accept and extract the exact body.**\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#markdown}}\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  audit[\"Organization audit event\"] --> exporter[\"Application SIEM export\"]\n  exporter -->|\"JSON + authenticated HTTPS\"| relay[\"Owned HEC relay\"]\n  relay -->|\"HEC event wrapper\"| hec[\"Splunk HEC\"]\n  hec --> index[\"Dedicated index and source type\"]\n  index --> search[\"Search by eventId and correlationId\"]\n~~~\n\n## Prepare Splunk\n\n1. Create a dedicated Splunk index or confirm the approved existing index.\n2. In Splunk Cloud or Splunk Enterprise, create an HEC token dedicated to this\n   application organization and environment.\n3. Assign the token only to the intended index and choose a JSON-capable source\n   type. Wait until token deployment is complete before testing.\n4. Record the HEC base URL, token owner, index, source type, rotation process and\n   retention policy. Store the token only in approved secret stores.\n\nSplunk’s event endpoint expects a body shaped like:\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"time\": 1776631800,\n  \"host\": \"application-production\",\n  \"source\": \"application-security-audit\",\n  \"sourcetype\": \"_json\",\n  \"index\": \"security\",\n  \"event\": {\n    \"eventId\": \"7b45a61c-9bcc-4bf2-9a29-0f111bff6d07\",\n    \"eventType\": \"user_login_failed\",\n    \"organizationId\": \"org_example\",\n    \"severity\": \"warning\"\n  }\n}\n~~~\n\nThe relay owns this wrapper and any approved metadata; it must preserve the\napplication event object without renaming `eventId`, `correlationId`, actor,\norganization, timestamp, outcome or severity fields.\n\n### Choose the acknowledgement boundary\n\nA normal HEC success response confirms that HEC accepted the request. Splunk\nalso supports **indexer acknowledgement**, where a client submits a channel\nidentifier and later checks whether the event reached the indexing pipeline.\nIf the relay uses that mode, return success to the application only after the\nrelay’s documented durability boundary; do not hold the application request\nopen indefinitely while waiting for a search result.\n\nWhichever mode you choose, the operating proof is still an exact\n`eventId` search in the intended index. Record separately whether a failure\nhappened before HEC acceptance, while awaiting an indexer acknowledgement, or\nafter indexing during parsing and field extraction.\n\n## Configure the application-to-relay request\n\nRecommended application settings:\n\n| Setting | Value |\n| --- | --- |\n| Destination | Relay HTTPS URL dedicated to the organization/environment |\n| Authentication | `hmac_sha256` or a dedicated `api_key_header` |\n| Format | `json_structured` |\n| Delivery | One event per request; choose timeout/retry values below the relay’s bounded acknowledgement time |\n\nIf a controlled test proves direct HEC compatibility, configure:\n\n| Setting | Direct HEC value |\n| --- | --- |\n| `authMethod` | `api_key_header` |\n| `authHeaderName` | `Authorization` |\n| `authCredential` | The complete value `Splunk HEC_TOKEN`, including the `Splunk ` prefix |\n| `webhookUrl` | The exact HEC event or raw endpoint validated by the Splunk owner |\n\nThe API-key-header mode sends the configured credential verbatim. Do not choose\n`bearer_token`: it would send `Authorization: Bearer ...`, which is not\nSplunk HEC token authentication.\n\n## Prove ingestion, not only HTTP acceptance\n\n1. Keep broad export disabled and select one controlled event type.\n2. Trigger the event and find the source audit row.\n3. Confirm relay/HEC HTTP acceptance without logging the token.\n4. Search the intended Splunk index for the exact `eventId`.\n5. Verify organization, timestamp, event type, severity, actor/outcome and\n   correlation identifier.\n6. Trigger an event outside the filter and confirm it remains only in the source\n   audit trail.\n7. Temporarily refuse one request, restore the receiver and prove dead-letter\n   recovery without creating a duplicate indexed event.\n\n## Splunk documentation to keep with the runbook\n\n- Splunk’s [HTTP Event Collector examples](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/get-data-in/collect-http-event-data/http-event-collector-examples)\n  show the HEC authorization header, event wrapper and endpoint shapes used to\n  validate the relay output.\n- Splunk’s [HEC indexer acknowledgement](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/get-started/get-data-in/9.2/get-data-with-http-event-collector/about-http-event-collector-indexer-acknowledgment)\n  documentation explains the optional channel and acknowledgement protocol.\n\nKeep the tested HEC endpoint, source type, acknowledgement mode and sample\nsearch beside these links. Provider documentation defines Splunk’s contract;\nthis guide defines the application envelope that must be conserved.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Send audit events to Splunk\n\nSplunk HTTP Event Collector (HEC) accepts events over HTTPS with a token in the\n`Authorization` header. The application can supply that header, but its native\nstructured JSON body is a security-audit envelope—not Splunk’s HEC\n`{\"event\": ...}` wrapper. **Use a small controlled relay unless your chosen HEC\nendpoint and source type have been proven to accept and extract the exact body.**\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#markdown}}\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  audit[\"Organization audit event\"] --> exporter[\"Application SIEM export\"]\n  exporter -->|\"JSON + authenticated HTTPS\"| relay[\"Owned HEC relay\"]\n  relay -->|\"HEC event wrapper\"| hec[\"Splunk HEC\"]\n  hec --> index[\"Dedicated index and source type\"]\n  index --> search[\"Search by eventId and correlationId\"]\n~~~\n\n## Prepare Splunk\n\n1. Create a dedicated Splunk index or confirm the approved existing index.\n2. In Splunk Cloud or Splunk Enterprise, create an HEC token dedicated to this\n   application organization and environment.\n3. Assign the token only to the intended index and choose a JSON-capable source\n   type. Wait until token deployment is complete before testing.\n4. Record the HEC base URL, token owner, index, source type, rotation process and\n   retention policy. Store the token only in approved secret stores.\n\nSplunk’s event endpoint expects a body shaped like:\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"time\": 1776631800,\n  \"host\": \"application-production\",\n  \"source\": \"application-security-audit\",\n  \"sourcetype\": \"_json\",\n  \"index\": \"security\",\n  \"event\": {\n    \"eventId\": \"7b45a61c-9bcc-4bf2-9a29-0f111bff6d07\",\n    \"eventType\": \"user_login_failed\",\n    \"organizationId\": \"org_example\",\n    \"severity\": \"warning\"\n  }\n}\n~~~\n\nThe relay owns this wrapper and any approved metadata; it must preserve the\napplication event object without renaming `eventId`, `correlationId`, actor,\norganization, timestamp, outcome or severity fields.\n\n### Choose the acknowledgement boundary\n\nA normal HEC success response confirms that HEC accepted the request. Splunk\nalso supports **indexer acknowledgement**, where a client submits a channel\nidentifier and later checks whether the event reached the indexing pipeline.\nIf the relay uses that mode, return success to the application only after the\nrelay’s documented durability boundary; do not hold the application request\nopen indefinitely while waiting for a search result.\n\nWhichever mode you choose, the operating proof is still an exact\n`eventId` search in the intended index. Record separately whether a failure\nhappened before HEC acceptance, while awaiting an indexer acknowledgement, or\nafter indexing during parsing and field extraction.\n\n## Configure the application-to-relay request\n\nRecommended application settings:\n\n| Setting | Value |\n| --- | --- |\n| Destination | Relay HTTPS URL dedicated to the organization/environment |\n| Authentication | `hmac_sha256` or a dedicated `api_key_header` |\n| Format | `json_structured` |\n| Delivery | `batchSize` 1 (one event per request) unless the relay accepts a JSON array; choose timeout/retry values below the relay’s bounded acknowledgement time |\n\nIf a controlled test proves direct HEC compatibility, configure:\n\n| Setting | Direct HEC value |\n| --- | --- |\n| `authMethod` | `api_key_header` |\n| `authHeaderName` | `Authorization` |\n| `authCredential` | The complete value `Splunk HEC_TOKEN`, including the `Splunk ` prefix |\n| `webhookUrl` | The exact HEC event or raw endpoint validated by the Splunk owner |\n\nThe API-key-header mode sends the configured credential verbatim. Do not choose\n`bearer_token`: it would send `Authorization: Bearer ...`, which is not\nSplunk HEC token authentication.\n\n## Prove ingestion, not only HTTP acceptance\n\n1. Keep broad export disabled and select one controlled event type.\n2. Trigger the event and find the source audit row.\n3. Confirm relay/HEC HTTP acceptance without logging the token.\n4. Search the intended Splunk index for the exact `eventId`.\n5. Verify organization, timestamp, event type, severity, actor/outcome and\n   correlation identifier.\n6. Trigger an event outside the filter and confirm it remains only in the source\n   audit trail.\n7. Temporarily refuse one request, restore the receiver and prove dead-letter\n   recovery without creating a duplicate indexed event.\n\n## Splunk documentation to keep with the runbook\n\n- Splunk’s [HTTP Event Collector examples](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/get-data-in/collect-http-event-data/http-event-collector-examples)\n  show the HEC authorization header, event wrapper and endpoint shapes used to\n  validate the relay output.\n- Splunk’s [HEC indexer acknowledgement](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/get-started/get-data-in/9.2/get-data-with-http-event-collector/about-http-event-collector-indexer-acknowledgment)\n  documentation explains the optional channel and acknowledgement protocol.\n\nKeep the tested HEC endpoint, source type, acknowledgement mode and sample\nsearch beside these links. Provider documentation defines Splunk’s contract;\nthis guide defines the application envelope that must be conserved.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "security-and-audit/siem-microsoft-sentinel.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/siem-microsoft-sentinel";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/siem-microsoft-sentinel", "source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Send audit events to Microsoft Sentinel\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel commonly receives custom data through the Azure Monitor Logs\nIngestion API. That API requires a Data Collection Rule (DCR), a matching JSON\nschema and Microsoft Entra OAuth authorization. The application’s SIEM exporter\nuses a static outbound credential and posts one JSON object per event; it does\nnot acquire or refresh Azure OAuth tokens and does not wrap events as the JSON\narray expected by Logs Ingestion. **Use an Azure-hosted relay rather than pointing\nthe application directly at the Logs Ingestion API.**\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#markdown}}\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  app[\"Application SIEM export\"] -->|\"HMAC or API-key authenticated JSON\"| relay[\"Azure Function, Logic App or API Management relay\"]\n  relay --> transform[\"Validate, transform and batch as an array\"]\n  transform -->|\"Entra OAuth token\"| dcr[\"Azure Monitor DCR ingestion endpoint\"]\n  dcr --> table[\"Log Analytics custom table\"]\n  table --> sentinel[\"Microsoft Sentinel analytics\"]\n~~~\n\n## Prepare Azure Monitor and Sentinel\n\n1. Create a custom Log Analytics table whose columns preserve the application\n   event identifiers, timestamp, organization, actor, outcome, severity and\n   event-specific data needed by detections.\n2. Create a DCR with a direct Logs Ingestion endpoint (or a Data Collection\n   Endpoint when private-link architecture requires it), the input stream and a\n   transformation into the table.\n3. Create a relay identity and grant it only the DCR ingestion permission it\n   needs. Keep Azure client credentials or managed identity inside Azure.\n4. Deploy an HTTPS relay that validates the application request **before**\n   parsing, converts the event into the DCR input schema, sends a JSON array to\n   Logs Ingestion and returns success only after the chosen delivery boundary.\n\n### Relay input contract\n\nUse `json_structured` so the relay receives the complete application envelope.\nFor HMAC authentication, validate:\n\n~~~text\nX-Signature-256: sha256=LOWERCASE_HEXADECIMAL_HMAC\n~~~\n\nCompute HMAC-SHA256 over the exact received bytes with the shared secret and use\na constant-time comparison. Do not parse and reserialize before verification.\nAlternatively, configure a dedicated API-key header accepted only by the relay.\n\nThe relay should emit a DCR record similar to:\n\n~~~json\n[\n  {\n    \"TimeGenerated\": \"2026-08-20T19:30:00.000Z\",\n    \"EventId\": \"7b45a61c-9bcc-4bf2-9a29-0f111bff6d07\",\n    \"CorrelationId\": \"req_01HXEXAMPLE\",\n    \"OrganizationId\": \"org_example\",\n    \"EventType\": \"user_login_failed\",\n    \"Severity\": \"warning\",\n    \"Outcome\": \"failure\"\n  }\n]\n~~~\n\n## Configure and prove the path\n\n1. Configure the application destination as the relay URL, authentication as\n   HMAC or API-key header, and format as structured JSON.\n2. Start with one exact event type and leave broad categories disabled.\n3. Trigger the controlled event and record its source `eventId`.\n4. Prove signature/API-key validation at the relay, DCR acceptance, arrival in\n   the custom table and Sentinel queryability by the same `eventId`.\n5. Compare timestamp, organization, actor, outcome and severity with the source\n   row; a transformed row must remain traceable.\n6. Refuse an invalid signature and malformed schema without forwarding either.\n7. Simulate an Azure ingestion failure, restore the path, re-enqueue one\n   dead-letter row and verify the table contains one intended event.\n\nDo not store a short-lived Azure access token as the application’s static bearer\ncredential; token acquisition and renewal belong to the relay identity.\n\n## Microsoft documentation to keep with the runbook\n\n- The [Logs Ingestion API overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/logs-ingestion-api-overview)\n  defines the endpoint, JSON-array and OAuth boundaries the relay must satisfy.\n- The [Data Collection Rule overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/data-collection/data-collection-rule-overview)\n  explains the input stream, destination and transformation relationship.\n- [Data collection transformations](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/data-collection/data-collection-transformations)\n  describes the KQL transformation applied before the target table.\n- Microsoft Sentinel’s [data connector reference](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/connect-data-sources)\n  helps the security owner decide whether the resulting table should feed a\n  custom connector, analytics rule or another supported ingestion route.\n\nPin the DCR immutable identifier, stream name, table, transformation revision\nand relay identity in the runbook. A portal display name alone is not enough to\nreconstruct or audit the delivery path.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Send audit events to Microsoft Sentinel\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel commonly receives custom data through the Azure Monitor Logs\nIngestion API. That API requires a Data Collection Rule (DCR), a matching JSON\nschema and Microsoft Entra OAuth authorization. The application’s SIEM exporter\nuses a static outbound credential and posts one JSON object per event, or a plain\nJSON array when `batchSize` is above 1; it does not acquire or refresh Azure OAuth\ntokens and does not shape events to the Data Collection Rule's schema. **Use an Azure-hosted relay rather than pointing\nthe application directly at the Logs Ingestion API.**\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#markdown}}\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  app[\"Application SIEM export\"] -->|\"HMAC or API-key authenticated JSON\"| relay[\"Azure Function, Logic App or API Management relay\"]\n  relay --> transform[\"Validate, transform and batch as an array\"]\n  transform -->|\"Entra OAuth token\"| dcr[\"Azure Monitor DCR ingestion endpoint\"]\n  dcr --> table[\"Log Analytics custom table\"]\n  table --> sentinel[\"Microsoft Sentinel analytics\"]\n~~~\n\n## Prepare Azure Monitor and Sentinel\n\n1. Create a custom Log Analytics table whose columns preserve the application\n   event identifiers, timestamp, organization, actor, outcome, severity and\n   event-specific data needed by detections.\n2. Create a DCR with a direct Logs Ingestion endpoint (or a Data Collection\n   Endpoint when private-link architecture requires it), the input stream and a\n   transformation into the table.\n3. Create a relay identity and grant it only the DCR ingestion permission it\n   needs. Keep Azure client credentials or managed identity inside Azure.\n4. Deploy an HTTPS relay that validates the application request **before**\n   parsing, converts the event into the DCR input schema, sends a JSON array to\n   Logs Ingestion and returns success only after the chosen delivery boundary.\n\n### Relay input contract\n\nUse `json_structured` so the relay receives the complete application envelope.\nFor HMAC authentication, validate:\n\n~~~text\nX-Signature-256: sha256=LOWERCASE_HEXADECIMAL_HMAC\n~~~\n\nCompute HMAC-SHA256 over the exact received bytes with the shared secret and use\na constant-time comparison. Do not parse and reserialize before verification.\nAlternatively, configure a dedicated API-key header accepted only by the relay.\n\nThe relay should emit a DCR record similar to:\n\n~~~json\n[\n  {\n    \"TimeGenerated\": \"2026-08-20T19:30:00.000Z\",\n    \"EventId\": \"7b45a61c-9bcc-4bf2-9a29-0f111bff6d07\",\n    \"CorrelationId\": \"req_01HXEXAMPLE\",\n    \"OrganizationId\": \"org_example\",\n    \"EventType\": \"user_login_failed\",\n    \"Severity\": \"warning\",\n    \"Outcome\": \"failure\"\n  }\n]\n~~~\n\n## Configure and prove the path\n\n1. Configure the application destination as the relay URL, authentication as\n   HMAC or API-key header, and format as structured JSON.\n2. Start with one exact event type and leave broad categories disabled.\n3. Trigger the controlled event and record its source `eventId`.\n4. Prove signature/API-key validation at the relay, DCR acceptance, arrival in\n   the custom table and Sentinel queryability by the same `eventId`.\n5. Compare timestamp, organization, actor, outcome and severity with the source\n   row; a transformed row must remain traceable.\n6. Refuse an invalid signature and malformed schema without forwarding either.\n7. Simulate an Azure ingestion failure, restore the path, re-enqueue one\n   dead-letter row and verify the table contains one intended event.\n\nDo not store a short-lived Azure access token as the application’s static bearer\ncredential; token acquisition and renewal belong to the relay identity.\n\n## Microsoft documentation to keep with the runbook\n\n- The [Logs Ingestion API overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/logs-ingestion-api-overview)\n  defines the endpoint, JSON-array and OAuth boundaries the relay must satisfy.\n- The [Data Collection Rule overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/data-collection/data-collection-rule-overview)\n  explains the input stream, destination and transformation relationship.\n- [Data collection transformations](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/data-collection/data-collection-transformations)\n  describes the KQL transformation applied before the target table.\n- Microsoft Sentinel’s [data connector reference](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/connect-data-sources)\n  helps the security owner decide whether the resulting table should feed a\n  custom connector, analytics rule or another supported ingestion route.\n\nPin the DCR immutable identifier, stream name, table, transformation revision\nand relay identity in the runbook. A portal display name alone is not enough to\nreconstruct or audit the delivery path.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "security-and-audit/siem-elastic.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/siem-elastic";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/siem-elastic", "source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Send audit events to Elastic\n\nElastic Filebeat’s `http_endpoint` input can receive an HTTPS POST containing a\nJSON object and can validate a fixed secret header or an HMAC signature. This is\na close match for the application’s one-event structured JSON delivery. Run the\nlistener behind a production TLS and network boundary; the example below is a\nstarting contract, not a complete Elastic deployment.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#markdown}}\n\n## Configure the receiver\n\nThe following Filebeat shape places the application envelope at the document\nroot and validates a dedicated header:\n\n~~~yaml\nfilebeat.inputs:\n  - type: http_endpoint\n    enabled: true\n    listen_address: 0.0.0.0\n    listen_port: 8443\n    url: /application-security-audit\n    prefix: \".\"\n    content_type: application/json\n    secret.header: X-Application-SIEM-Token\n    secret.value: ${APPLICATION_SIEM_TOKEN}\n    ssl.enabled: true\n    ssl.certificate: /run/secrets/tls.crt\n    ssl.key: /run/secrets/tls.key\n    tags: [application-security-audit]\n~~~\n\nConfigure the application with:\n\n| Setting | Value |\n| --- | --- |\n| `webhookUrl` | Public/proxied HTTPS endpoint ending in `/application-security-audit` |\n| `authMethod` | `api_key_header` |\n| `authHeaderName` | `X-Application-SIEM-Token` |\n| `authCredential` | The same dedicated secret value, stored once |\n| `eventFormat` | `json_structured` |\n\nFor HMAC instead, configure the Elastic input’s HMAC header as\n`X-Signature-256`, type `sha256`, prefix `sha256=` and the same shared key;\nthen select `hmac_sha256` in the application. Keep either mechanism scoped to\none organization/environment.\n\n## Map and retain the event\n\nKeep the complete application envelope in a controlled namespace, then add\nElastic Common Schema (ECS) fields through an ingest pipeline. Do not destroy\nthe source value merely to make it resemble an ECS value.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Preserve the source event while creating an Elastic search view\n  accDescr: Filebeat receives the application JSON envelope. An ingest pipeline preserves it under an application audit namespace, copies only semantically compatible values into Elastic Common Schema fields, sends the document to a scoped data stream, and makes source and normalized identifiers available to searches and detections.\n  receive[\"Filebeat HTTP endpoint\"] --> pipeline[\"Ingest pipeline\"]\n  pipeline --> original[\"Preserved application.audit fields\"]\n  pipeline --> ecs[\"Explicit ECS mappings\"]\n  original --> stream[\"Scoped data stream\"]\n  ecs --> stream\n  stream --> search[\"Search, dashboards and detections\"]\n~~~\n\n| Application field | Safe Elastic treatment | Important condition |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `timestamp` | Copy to `@timestamp` | Parse as the source-event time; keep receiver ingestion time distinct |\n| `eventId` | Copy to `event.id` | Preserve as an exact keyword for correlation and deduplication |\n| `eventType` | Copy to `event.action` | Keep the original identifier unchanged |\n| `eventCategory` | Preserve under `application.audit.category` | Map to ECS `event.category` only when the value is translated to an allowed ECS category |\n| `severity` | Preserve the source label; optionally derive numeric `event.severity` | ECS severity is numeric, so a text value such as `warning` needs an explicit mapping |\n| `outcome` | Preserve the source value; copy to `event.outcome` only after validation | ECS restricts outcome values; do not copy an incompatible value blindly |\n| `correlationId` | Preserve under `application.audit.correlation_id` | Use `trace.id` only when the identifier truly represents the same distributed trace |\n| `organizationId` and `applicationId` | Preserve as exact scoped keywords | Use them in data-stream access controls and investigation filters |\n\nActor/user identifiers and authentication source remain important for\ninvestigation, but map them only after deciding whether each identifier denotes\nthe acting account, the affected account or another subject. A convenient\n`user.id` mapping that merges those roles makes investigations misleading.\n\nApply an ingest pipeline or index template deliberately. Do not let dynamic\nmapping turn identifiers into analyzed text or allow arbitrary event data to\ncause uncontrolled field growth.\n\n## Prove end-to-end behavior\n\n1. Run the receiver on a controlled endpoint and confirm TLS trust from the\n   application runtime.\n2. Send one selected test event and find it in the source audit trail.\n3. Confirm the Elastic input acknowledges the request, then search by exact\n   `eventId` in the target data stream/index.\n4. Compare organization, time, event type, severity, actor and outcome.\n5. Send a wrong header value or signature and confirm Elastic returns 401 and\n   the document is absent.\n6. Return a temporary 503, restore the endpoint and prove dead-letter recovery\n   without an unintended duplicate detection.\n7. Record receiver capacity for **one request per selected event**; application\n   batching fields are currently reserved and do not reduce that rate.\n\n## Elastic documentation to keep with the runbook\n\n- The [Filebeat HTTP Endpoint input reference](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/beats/filebeat/filebeat-input-http_endpoint)\n  defines JSON-object handling, secret headers, HMAC validation, response codes\n  and acknowledgement options.\n- The [ECS event field reference](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/ecs/ecs-event)\n  defines fields such as `event.id`, `event.action`, `event.category`,\n  `event.outcome` and `event.severity`.\n- Elastic’s [custom fields guidance](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/ecs/ecs-custom-fields-in-ecs)\n  and [ECS mapping guidelines](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/ecs/ecs-guidelines)\n  explain how to preserve application-owned semantics without creating field\n  conflicts.\n- The Elastic Security [SIEM field reference](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/fields-and-object-schemas/siem-field-reference)\n  identifies fields used by detections and investigations; treat it as a\n  consumer requirement, not permission to invent missing source meaning.\n\nVersion the index template and ingest pipeline with the runbook. Re-run the\ncontrolled-event proof after changing either one, because successful HTTP\ndelivery can coexist with a broken mapping or detection.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Send audit events to Elastic\n\nElastic Filebeat’s `http_endpoint` input can receive an HTTPS POST containing a\nJSON object and can validate a fixed secret header or an HMAC signature. This is\na close match for the application’s one-event structured JSON delivery. Run the\nlistener behind a production TLS and network boundary; the example below is a\nstarting contract, not a complete Elastic deployment.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#markdown}}\n\n## Configure the receiver\n\nThe following Filebeat shape places the application envelope at the document\nroot and validates a dedicated header:\n\n~~~yaml\nfilebeat.inputs:\n  - type: http_endpoint\n    enabled: true\n    listen_address: 0.0.0.0\n    listen_port: 8443\n    url: /application-security-audit\n    prefix: \".\"\n    content_type: application/json\n    secret.header: X-Application-SIEM-Token\n    secret.value: ${APPLICATION_SIEM_TOKEN}\n    ssl.enabled: true\n    ssl.certificate: /run/secrets/tls.crt\n    ssl.key: /run/secrets/tls.key\n    tags: [application-security-audit]\n~~~\n\nConfigure the application with:\n\n| Setting | Value |\n| --- | --- |\n| `webhookUrl` | Public/proxied HTTPS endpoint ending in `/application-security-audit` |\n| `authMethod` | `api_key_header` |\n| `authHeaderName` | `X-Application-SIEM-Token` |\n| `authCredential` | The same dedicated secret value, stored once |\n| `eventFormat` | `json_structured` |\n\nFor HMAC instead, configure the Elastic input’s HMAC header as\n`X-Signature-256`, type `sha256`, prefix `sha256=` and the same shared key;\nthen select `hmac_sha256` in the application. Keep either mechanism scoped to\none organization/environment.\n\n## Map and retain the event\n\nKeep the complete application envelope in a controlled namespace, then add\nElastic Common Schema (ECS) fields through an ingest pipeline. Do not destroy\nthe source value merely to make it resemble an ECS value.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Preserve the source event while creating an Elastic search view\n  accDescr: Filebeat receives the application JSON envelope. An ingest pipeline preserves it under an application audit namespace, copies only semantically compatible values into Elastic Common Schema fields, sends the document to a scoped data stream, and makes source and normalized identifiers available to searches and detections.\n  receive[\"Filebeat HTTP endpoint\"] --> pipeline[\"Ingest pipeline\"]\n  pipeline --> original[\"Preserved application.audit fields\"]\n  pipeline --> ecs[\"Explicit ECS mappings\"]\n  original --> stream[\"Scoped data stream\"]\n  ecs --> stream\n  stream --> search[\"Search, dashboards and detections\"]\n~~~\n\n| Application field | Safe Elastic treatment | Important condition |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `timestamp` | Copy to `@timestamp` | Parse as the source-event time; keep receiver ingestion time distinct |\n| `eventId` | Copy to `event.id` | Preserve as an exact keyword for correlation and deduplication |\n| `eventType` | Copy to `event.action` | Keep the original identifier unchanged |\n| `eventCategory` | Preserve under `application.audit.category` | Map to ECS `event.category` only when the value is translated to an allowed ECS category |\n| `severity` | Preserve the source label; optionally derive numeric `event.severity` | ECS severity is numeric, so a text value such as `warning` needs an explicit mapping |\n| `outcome` | Preserve the source value; copy to `event.outcome` only after validation | ECS restricts outcome values; do not copy an incompatible value blindly |\n| `correlationId` | Preserve under `application.audit.correlation_id` | Use `trace.id` only when the identifier truly represents the same distributed trace |\n| `organizationId` and `applicationId` | Preserve as exact scoped keywords | Use them in data-stream access controls and investigation filters |\n\nActor/user identifiers and authentication source remain important for\ninvestigation, but map them only after deciding whether each identifier denotes\nthe acting account, the affected account or another subject. A convenient\n`user.id` mapping that merges those roles makes investigations misleading.\n\nApply an ingest pipeline or index template deliberately. Do not let dynamic\nmapping turn identifiers into analyzed text or allow arbitrary event data to\ncause uncontrolled field growth.\n\n## Prove end-to-end behavior\n\n1. Run the receiver on a controlled endpoint and confirm TLS trust from the\n   application runtime.\n2. Send one selected test event and find it in the source audit trail.\n3. Confirm the Elastic input acknowledges the request, then search by exact\n   `eventId` in the target data stream/index.\n4. Compare organization, time, event type, severity, actor and outcome.\n5. Send a wrong header value or signature and confirm Elastic returns 401 and\n   the document is absent.\n6. Return a temporary 503, restore the endpoint and prove dead-letter recovery\n   without an unintended duplicate detection.\n7. Record receiver capacity for the request rate you configure: **one request per\n   selected event** at the default `batchSize` of 1, or one per batch above it.\n\n## Elastic documentation to keep with the runbook\n\n- The [Filebeat HTTP Endpoint input reference](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/beats/filebeat/filebeat-input-http_endpoint)\n  defines JSON-object handling, secret headers, HMAC validation, response codes\n  and acknowledgement options.\n- The [ECS event field reference](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/ecs/ecs-event)\n  defines fields such as `event.id`, `event.action`, `event.category`,\n  `event.outcome` and `event.severity`.\n- Elastic’s [custom fields guidance](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/ecs/ecs-custom-fields-in-ecs)\n  and [ECS mapping guidelines](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/ecs/ecs-guidelines)\n  explain how to preserve application-owned semantics without creating field\n  conflicts.\n- The Elastic Security [SIEM field reference](https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/fields-and-object-schemas/siem-field-reference)\n  identifies fields used by detections and investigations; treat it as a\n  consumer requirement, not permission to invent missing source meaning.\n\nVersion the index template and ingest pipeline with the runbook. Re-run the\ncontrolled-event proof after changing either one, because successful HTTP\ndelivery can coexist with a broken mapping or detection.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "security-and-audit/operate-siem.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/operate-and-troubleshoot-siem-delivery";
@@ -346,17 +346,17 @@ export declare const APPLICATION_CONSUMER_DOCUMENTATION_AUTHORED_CONTENT_V1: rea
     readonly managedPath: "integrations/rest/conventions.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/rest-api-conventions";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/rest-api-conventions", "source:companion-projection:application-connection", "source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys", "source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions"];
-    readonly markdown: "# REST API conventions\n\nEvery operation in the API reference follows the same rules for addressing, authentication, collections, writes, errors and limits. Read this page once. After that, an operation's entry in the reference only has to tell you what is specific to it: its path, its fields, the roles it accepts and the failures it can return.\n\n## Addressing\n\n- Every path in the API reference already starts with the `/api/v1` mount. Prepend the base URL of the environment you are calling:\n\n{{APPLICATION_CONNECTION:baseUrls}}\n\n- Organization data lives under `/api/v1/organizations/{organizationId}/…`. The organization identifier is the one shown in the application. A collection under an organization your credential is not a member of answers **403**; a single record that belongs to another organization answers **404**, so that the application never confirms what exists outside your scope.\n- The same resource is often reachable through more than one parent path (for example through the organization directly and through a related record). Those paths are aliases of one operation and answer with the same data; use whichever matches the identifiers you already hold.\n- Send and expect `application/json`. Identifiers are opaque strings: store them, compare them, never parse them.\n- Header names are case-insensitive; this documentation writes them the way the application emits them.\n\n## Authentication\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#markdown}}\n\nSigned-in people and OAuth clients use a bearer token instead: `Authorization: Bearer <access token>`. Each operation's **Security** entry in the reference lists which of the two it accepts. Send exactly one credential per request.\n\n## Collections\n\nList and search operations share one query vocabulary:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#collectionQueryMarkdown}}\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#paginationResponseMarkdown}}\n\nA concrete request and its response, using the members of your own organization:\n\n~~~bash\ncurl --fail-with-body \\\n  --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID/organization-members?page=1&limit=20&sort=joinedAt:desc\" \\\n  --header \"Authorization: $ORGANIZATION_API_KEY\" \\\n  --header \"accept: application/json\"\n~~~\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"data\": [\n    {\n      \"_id\": \"0d3f2a9e-6c41-4b7a-8e15-5f9c2b7d4a10\",\n      \"userId\": \"b8e4c2f1-3a57-4d09-9f6e-1c2d3e4f5a6b\",\n      \"userEmail\": \"alex.morgan@example.com\",\n      \"organizationId\": \"7c1f6f0a-4b1e-4d8f-9a0c-2e5b3c9d1f42\",\n      \"roles\": [\"ORG_MEMBER\"],\n      \"status\": \"ACTIVE\",\n      \"createdAt\": \"2026-07-03T09:15:00.000Z\",\n      \"updatedAt\": \"2026-08-18T08:00:00.000Z\",\n      \"_version\": 4\n    }\n  ],\n  \"pagination\": { \"page\": 1, \"limit\": 20, \"total\": 1, \"totalPages\": 1 }\n}\n~~~\n\n## Writes\n\n- The reference states each operation's success status and the fields it accepts. A field you see in a read response is not automatically writable; send only what the request schema lists.\n- Operations marked **idempotent** in the reference can be repeated safely. For any other write, a lost response is an ambiguous outcome: read the record back before sending the write again. [Write and reconcile changes](/integrations/rest/write-and-reconcile) shows the procedure.\n- Bulk variants (`…/bulk` paths) apply one change to several identifiers. Read the operation's response schema before assuming every identifier was applied, and reconcile each one with a read after a failure.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#concurrencyMarkdown}}\n\n## Errors\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#errorEnvelopeMarkdown}}\n\nFor example, removing the last owner of an organization is refused like this:\n\n~~~json\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#errorExampleJson}}\n~~~\n\nBranch on the HTTP status first, then on `error.type`, and on `error.code` only for refusals the operation documents by name:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#errorStatusMarkdown}}\n\n## Rate limits\n\nThe application enforces several windows at once and reports the tightest one:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#rateLimitMarkdown}}\n\nBack off when `x-ratelimit-remaining` reaches zero rather than waiting for the **429**. Parallel workers share the same counters when they share a credential.\n\n## Support evidence\n\nWhen you ask for help, quote the operation path, the HTTP status, `error.type`, `error.code` when present, and `error.correlationId`. That identifier joins your request to the application's logs and audit trail and contains no personal data. Never paste a credential, a bearer token or a full response body into a ticket.";
+    readonly markdown: "# REST API conventions\n\nEvery operation in the API reference follows the same rules for addressing, authentication, collections, writes, errors and limits. Read this page once. After that, an operation's entry in the reference only has to tell you what is specific to it: its path, its fields, the roles it accepts and the failures it can return.\n\n## Addressing\n\n- Every path in the API reference already starts with the `/api/v1` mount. Prepend the base URL of the environment you are calling:\n\n{{APPLICATION_CONNECTION:baseUrls}}\n\n- Organization data lives under `/api/v1/organizations/{organizationId}/…`. The organization identifier is the one shown in the application. A collection under an organization your credential is not a member of answers **403**; a single record that belongs to another organization answers **404**, so that the application never confirms what exists outside your scope.\n- The same resource is often reachable through more than one parent path (for example through the organization directly and through a related record). Those paths are aliases of one operation and answer with the same data; use whichever matches the identifiers you already hold.\n- Send and expect `application/json`. Identifiers are opaque strings: store them, compare them, never parse them.\n- Header names are case-insensitive; this documentation writes them the way the application emits them.\n\n## Authentication\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#markdown}}\n\nSigned-in people and OAuth clients use a bearer token instead: `Authorization: Bearer <access token>`. Each operation's **Security** entry in the reference lists which of the two it accepts. Send exactly one credential per request.\n\n## Collections\n\nList and search operations share one query vocabulary:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#collectionQueryMarkdown}}\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#paginationResponseMarkdown}}\n\nA concrete request and its response, using the members of your own organization:\n\n~~~bash\ncurl --fail-with-body \\\n  --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID/organization-members?page=1&limit=20&sort=createdAt:desc\" \\\n  --header \"Authorization: $ORGANIZATION_API_KEY\" \\\n  --header \"accept: application/json\"\n~~~\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"data\": [\n    {\n      \"_id\": \"0d3f2a9e-6c41-4b7a-8e15-5f9c2b7d4a10\",\n      \"userId\": \"b8e4c2f1-3a57-4d09-9f6e-1c2d3e4f5a6b\",\n      \"userEmail\": \"alex.morgan@example.com\",\n      \"organizationId\": \"7c1f6f0a-4b1e-4d8f-9a0c-2e5b3c9d1f42\",\n      \"roles\": [\"ORG_MEMBER\"],\n      \"status\": \"ACTIVE\",\n      \"createdAt\": \"2026-07-03T09:15:00.000Z\",\n      \"updatedAt\": \"2026-08-18T08:00:00.000Z\",\n      \"_version\": 4\n    }\n  ],\n  \"pagination\": { \"page\": 1, \"limit\": 20, \"total\": 1, \"totalPages\": 1 }\n}\n~~~\n\n## Writes\n\n- The reference states each operation's success status and the fields it accepts. A field you see in a read response is not automatically writable; send only what the request schema lists.\n- Operations marked **idempotent** in the reference can be repeated safely. For any other write, a lost response is an ambiguous outcome: read the record back before sending the write again. [Write and reconcile changes](/integrations/rest/write-and-reconcile) shows the procedure.\n- Bulk variants (`…/bulk` paths) apply one change to several identifiers. Read the operation's response schema before assuming every identifier was applied, and reconcile each one with a read after a failure.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#concurrencyMarkdown}}\n\n## Errors\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#errorEnvelopeMarkdown}}\n\nFor example, removing the last owner of an organization is refused like this:\n\n~~~json\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#errorExampleJson}}\n~~~\n\nBranch on the HTTP status first, then on `error.type`, and on `error.code` only for refusals the operation documents by name:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#errorStatusMarkdown}}\n\n## Rate limits\n\nThe application enforces several windows at once and reports the tightest one:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#rateLimitMarkdown}}\n\nBack off when `x-ratelimit-remaining` reaches zero rather than waiting for the **429**. Parallel workers share the same counters when they share a credential.\n\n## Support evidence\n\nWhen you ask for help, quote the operation path, the HTTP status, `error.type`, `error.code` when present, and `error.correlationId`. That identifier joins your request to the application's logs and audit trail and contains no personal data. Never paste a credential, a bearer token or a full response body into a ticket.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "integrations/rest/send-request.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/send-api-request";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/send-api-request", "source:companion-projection:application-connection", "source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Send your first API request\n\nTen minutes from an API key to a verified connection. The first request proves four things and nothing else: you reached the right environment, the credential is accepted, it sees the organization you expect, and you can read the response. Use a read operation that changes nothing.\n\n## What you need\n\n- The **base URL** of the environment you are calling. {{APPLICATION_NAME}} publishes these:\n\n{{APPLICATION_CONNECTION:baseUrls}}\n\n- Your **organization identifier**, shown in the application's organization settings and present in the URL of most screens.\n- An **organization API key** created for this integration, following [Create and store an API key](/access-and-identity/api-keys-create-and-store). Keep it in a secret store or an environment variable, never in the request URL or a build log.\n\nGive the request a name in your notes before you send it. \"List the members of the Support organization, expect Alex Morgan\" is a result you can check; \"the call returned JSON\" is not.\n\n## Step 1: read your own organization\n\nThe safest first call reads the organization the key belongs to. It needs no other identifier and changes nothing.\n\n~~~bash\nBASE_URL=\"{{APPLICATION_CONNECTION_VALUE:baseUrl}}\"          # this application's own origin\nORGANIZATION_ID=\"7c1f6f0a-4b1e-4d8f-9a0c-2e5b3c9d1f42\"  # from the application's organization settings\nORGANIZATION_API_KEY=\"sk_org_…\"               # the key you created\n\ncurl --fail-with-body \\\n  --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID\" \\\n  {{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#curlRequestHeader}} \\\n  --header \"accept: application/json\"\n~~~\n\nReplace the organization id and the key with yours; the base URL above is already this application's. Leave the header exactly as shown. {{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#markdown}}\n\nA successful answer is **200** with the organization record: its `_id` is the identifier you sent, and `name` is the organization you expected. Anything else, read the [failure table](#if-it-fails) below before changing more than one thing.\n\n## Step 2: read a collection\n\nNow list the organization's members. This exercises the collection envelope you will meet on every list and search operation:\n\n~~~bash\ncurl --fail-with-body \\\n  --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID/organization-members?limit=5&sort=joinedAt:desc\" \\\n  --header \"Authorization: $ORGANIZATION_API_KEY\" \\\n  --header \"accept: application/json\"\n~~~\n\nThe response is `{ \"data\": [ … ], \"pagination\": { \"page\": 1, \"limit\": 5, \"total\": …, \"totalPages\": … } }`. Check that `total` matches the member count you see in the application. [Read collections](/integrations/rest/read-collections) covers paging, sorting and filters in full.\n\n## Step 3: prove the boundary holds\n\nA connection is only safe when a wrong credential is refused. Send the first request again with the key deliberately broken:\n\n~~~bash\ncurl --include \\\n  --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID\" \\\n  --header \"Authorization: sk_org_not_a_real_key\" \\\n  --header \"accept: application/json\"\n~~~\n\nExpect **401** with `\"type\": \"AUTHENTICATION\"` in the error body. Then send the correct key against an organization it does not belong to and expect **404**: the application does not confirm that organizations outside your scope exist. Those two refusals are the negative proof; record them beside the successful read.\n\n## If it fails\n\n| You see | It means | Do this |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| No response, or a TLS or DNS error | The base URL is wrong or unreachable from where you run | Compare the URL with the Servers list; test from the network the integration will run on |\n| **401** `AUTHENTICATION` | The key was not accepted | Check the header carries the full key with no `Bearer` prefix, that the key is `active`, and that it belongs to this environment |\n| **403** `AUTHORIZATION` | The key is valid but its roles do not allow this operation | Compare the roles on the key with the roles the operation lists in the reference |\n| **404** `NOT_FOUND` | The organization identifier is wrong, or this key cannot see it | Copy the identifier from the application again |\n| **429** `RATE_LIMIT` | Too many requests | Wait `Retry-After` seconds |\n\nEvery error an operation produces carries `error.correlationId`. Quote it when you ask for help. [Troubleshoot an API request](/integrations/rest/troubleshoot) goes deeper.\n\n## Before your first write\n\nRepeat Step 1 from the environment where the integration will actually run. Then rotate the key once ([API key lifecycle](/access-and-identity/api-keys-lifecycle)) to prove that the operating procedure works before you depend on it. Only then choose one small write and read [Write and reconcile changes](/integrations/rest/write-and-reconcile).";
+    readonly markdown: "# Send your first API request\n\nTen minutes from an API key to a verified connection. The first request proves four things and nothing else: you reached the right environment, the credential is accepted, it sees the organization you expect, and you can read the response. Use a read operation that changes nothing.\n\n## What you need\n\n- The **base URL** of the environment you are calling. {{APPLICATION_NAME}} publishes these:\n\n{{APPLICATION_CONNECTION:baseUrls}}\n\n- Your **organization identifier**, shown in the application's organization settings and present in the URL of most screens.\n- An **organization API key** created for this integration, following [Create and store an API key](/access-and-identity/api-keys-create-and-store). Keep it in a secret store or an environment variable, never in the request URL or a build log.\n\nGive the request a name in your notes before you send it. \"List the members of the Support organization, expect Alex Morgan\" is a result you can check; \"the call returned JSON\" is not.\n\n## Step 1: read your own organization\n\nThe safest first call reads the organization the key belongs to. It needs no other identifier and changes nothing.\n\n~~~bash\nBASE_URL=\"{{APPLICATION_CONNECTION_VALUE:baseUrl}}\"          # this application's own origin\nORGANIZATION_ID=\"7c1f6f0a-4b1e-4d8f-9a0c-2e5b3c9d1f42\"  # from the application's organization settings\nORGANIZATION_API_KEY=\"sk_org_…\"               # the key you created\n\ncurl --fail-with-body \\\n  --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID\" \\\n  {{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#curlRequestHeader}} \\\n  --header \"accept: application/json\"\n~~~\n\nReplace the organization id and the key with yours; the base URL above is already this application's. Leave the header exactly as shown. {{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-api-keys#markdown}}\n\nA successful answer is **200** with the organization record: its `_id` is the identifier you sent, and `name` is the organization you expected. Anything else, read the [failure table](#if-it-fails) below before changing more than one thing.\n\n## Step 2: read a collection\n\nNow list the organization's members. This exercises the collection envelope you will meet on every list and search operation:\n\n~~~bash\ncurl --fail-with-body \\\n  --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID/organization-members?limit=5&sort=createdAt:desc\" \\\n  --header \"Authorization: $ORGANIZATION_API_KEY\" \\\n  --header \"accept: application/json\"\n~~~\n\nThe response is `{ \"data\": [ … ], \"pagination\": { \"page\": 1, \"limit\": 5, \"total\": …, \"totalPages\": … } }`. Check that `total` matches the member count you see in the application. [Read collections](/integrations/rest/read-collections) covers paging, sorting and filters in full.\n\n## Step 3: prove the boundary holds\n\nA connection is only safe when a wrong credential is refused. Send the first request again with the key deliberately broken:\n\n~~~bash\ncurl --include \\\n  --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID\" \\\n  --header \"Authorization: sk_org_not_a_real_key\" \\\n  --header \"accept: application/json\"\n~~~\n\nExpect **401** with `\"type\": \"AUTHENTICATION\"` in the error body. Then send the correct key against an organization it does not belong to and expect **404**: the application does not confirm that organizations outside your scope exist. Those two refusals are the negative proof; record them beside the successful read.\n\n## If it fails\n\n| You see | It means | Do this |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| No response, or a TLS or DNS error | The base URL is wrong or unreachable from where you run | Compare the URL with the Servers list; test from the network the integration will run on |\n| **401** `AUTHENTICATION` | The key was not accepted | Check the header carries the full key with no `Bearer` prefix, that the key is `active`, and that it belongs to this environment |\n| **403** `AUTHORIZATION` | The key is valid but its roles do not allow this operation | Compare the roles on the key with the roles the operation lists in the reference |\n| **404** `NOT_FOUND` | The organization identifier is wrong, or this key cannot see it | Copy the identifier from the application again |\n| **429** `RATE_LIMIT` | Too many requests | Wait `Retry-After` seconds |\n\nEvery error an operation produces carries `error.correlationId`. Quote it when you ask for help. [Troubleshoot an API request](/integrations/rest/troubleshoot) goes deeper.\n\n## Before your first write\n\nRepeat Step 1 from the environment where the integration will actually run. Then rotate the key once ([API key lifecycle](/access-and-identity/api-keys-lifecycle)) to prove that the operating procedure works before you depend on it. Only then choose one small write and read [Write and reconcile changes](/integrations/rest/write-and-reconcile).";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "integrations/rest/read-collections.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/work-with-api-collections";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/work-with-api-collections", "source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Read collections\n\nA collection is the set of records one list or search operation lets your credential see in one organization. Read it in pages, sort it deliberately, filter it on the fields the operation offers, and stop where the response says to stop. Every list and search operation in the API reference uses the vocabulary below.\n\n## The query vocabulary\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#collectionQueryMarkdown}}\n\nFilter and sort fields are per operation. Each operation's entry in the API reference lists them as query parameters, so open the operation before writing the request; a filter accepted by one resource is not a convention for another.\n\n## The response envelope\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#paginationResponseMarkdown}}\n\nAn empty `data` array on page 1 is a valid answer. Confirm the organization and the filters before treating it as a failure.\n\n## Walk every page\n\n~~~bash\npage=1\nwhile : ; do\n  response=$(curl --fail-with-body --silent \\\n    --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID/organization-members?page=$page&limit=100&sort=joinedAt:asc\" \\\n    --header \"Authorization: $ORGANIZATION_API_KEY\" \\\n    --header \"accept: application/json\")\n  echo \"$response\" | jq -c '.data[]' >> members.ndjson\n  totalPages=$(echo \"$response\" | jq '.pagination.totalPages')\n  [ \"$page\" -ge \"$totalPages\" ] && break\n  page=$((page + 1))\ndone\n~~~\n\nThree rules keep a scan correct:\n\n1. **Sort by a field the reference lists as sortable, or a stable timestamp** such as `joinedAt:asc` for members, when you walk more than one page. A sort field the operation does not accept is ignored, not refused, and the default order applies; sorting by a field that changes during the scan (a status, a name being edited) can move a record between pages and make you skip or repeat it.\n2. **Stop on `totalPages`**, not on a short page. The last page is short by definition; an earlier page is short only when records were deleted while you scanned.\n3. **Process each record idempotently** and key your own records on `_id`. If the scan is interrupted, resume from the last page whose work you completed; repeating a page is safe when processing is idempotent, skipping one never is.\n\n## Search and filter\n\nSearch operations (`…/search`) add `q` for free text. Combine it with filters and sorting:\n\n~~~bash\ncurl --fail-with-body \\\n  --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID/organization-members/search?q=morgan&status=ACTIVE&sort=joinedAt:desc\" \\\n  --header \"Authorization: $ORGANIZATION_API_KEY\" \\\n  --header \"accept: application/json\"\n~~~\n\nDate-range filters are objects and use bracket notation, one key per bound:\n\n~~~text\n?createdAt[startDate]=2026-09-01T00:00:00Z&createdAt[endDate]=2026-09-30T23:59:59Z\n~~~\n\nSend instants in ISO 8601 with a timezone. An unparseable bound answers **400** with the field named in `error.validationErrors`.\n\n## Counts and summaries\n\nBeside the full list, most collections expose `…/summary`, which answers the fields the application uses for pickers and tables and is smaller and faster than the full record. Some also expose `…/count`, which answers only the total without loading records. The API reference shows which variants an operation has. Use them for dashboards and reconciliation counts; use the full list only when you need every field.\n\n## Reconcile a long scan\n\nRecords can change while a scan runs. When the scan feeds a report, a later complete pass corrects it. When it feeds a synchronization, keep the `_id` and `_version` of each record you processed and compare them with a fresh read before you overwrite anything downstream; `_version` increases on every write, so a changed value tells you the record moved.\n\n## When a page fails\n\nA failed page answers with the same error envelope as any request; the status table in [REST API conventions](/integrations/rest/conventions#errors) says what each status means. A **429** carries `Retry-After`; wait that long before resuming from the same page. Do not resume from page 1.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Read collections\n\nA collection is the set of records one list or search operation lets your credential see in one organization. Read it in pages, sort it deliberately, filter it on the fields the operation offers, and stop where the response says to stop. Every list and search operation in the API reference uses the vocabulary below.\n\n## The query vocabulary\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#collectionQueryMarkdown}}\n\nFilter and sort fields are per operation. Each operation's entry in the API reference lists them as query parameters, so open the operation before writing the request; a filter accepted by one resource is not a convention for another.\n\n## The response envelope\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:rest-conventions#paginationResponseMarkdown}}\n\nAn empty `data` array on page 1 is a valid answer. Confirm the organization and the filters before treating it as a failure.\n\n## Walk every page\n\n~~~bash\npage=1\nwhile : ; do\n  response=$(curl --fail-with-body --silent \\\n    --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID/organization-members?page=$page&limit=100&sort=createdAt:asc\" \\\n    --header \"Authorization: $ORGANIZATION_API_KEY\" \\\n    --header \"accept: application/json\")\n  echo \"$response\" | jq -c '.data[]' >> members.ndjson\n  totalPages=$(echo \"$response\" | jq '.pagination.totalPages')\n  [ \"$page\" -ge \"$totalPages\" ] && break\n  page=$((page + 1))\ndone\n~~~\n\nThree rules keep a scan correct:\n\n1. **Sort by a field the reference lists as sortable, or a stable timestamp** such as `createdAt:asc` for members (when the membership was created), when you walk more than one page. A sort field the operation does not accept is ignored, not refused, and the default order applies; sorting by a field that changes during the scan (a status, a name being edited) can move a record between pages and make you skip or repeat it.\n2. **Stop on `totalPages`**, not on a short page. The last page is short by definition; an earlier page is short only when records were deleted while you scanned.\n3. **Process each record idempotently** and key your own records on `_id`. If the scan is interrupted, resume from the last page whose work you completed; repeating a page is safe when processing is idempotent, skipping one never is.\n\n## Search and filter\n\nSearch operations (`…/search`) add `q` for free text. Combine it with filters and sorting:\n\n~~~bash\ncurl --fail-with-body \\\n  --url \"$BASE_URL/api/v1/organizations/$ORGANIZATION_ID/organization-members/search?q=morgan&status=ACTIVE&sort=createdAt:desc\" \\\n  --header \"Authorization: $ORGANIZATION_API_KEY\" \\\n  --header \"accept: application/json\"\n~~~\n\nDate-range filters are objects and use bracket notation, one key per bound:\n\n~~~text\n?createdAt[startDate]=2026-09-01T00:00:00Z&createdAt[endDate]=2026-09-30T23:59:59Z\n~~~\n\nSend instants in ISO 8601 with a timezone. An unparseable bound answers **400** with the field named in `error.validationErrors`.\n\n## Counts and summaries\n\nBeside the full list, most collections expose `…/summary`, which answers the fields the application uses for pickers and tables and is smaller and faster than the full record. Some also expose `…/count`, which answers only the total without loading records. The API reference shows which variants an operation has. Use them for dashboards and reconciliation counts; use the full list only when you need every field.\n\n## Reconcile a long scan\n\nRecords can change while a scan runs. When the scan feeds a report, a later complete pass corrects it. When it feeds a synchronization, keep the `_id` and `_version` of each record you processed and compare them with a fresh read before you overwrite anything downstream; `_version` increases on every write, so a changed value tells you the record moved.\n\n## When a page fails\n\nA failed page answers with the same error envelope as any request; the status table in [REST API conventions](/integrations/rest/conventions#errors) says what each status means. A **429** carries `Retry-After`; wait that long before resuming from the same page. Do not resume from page 1.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "integrations/rest/write-and-reconcile.md";
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