@wildo-ai/saas-technical-doc 1.1.4 → 1.1.5

package/dist/esm/content/application-consumer-documentation-content.techdoc.d.ts

@@ -20,9 +20,12 @@
  * fact in it is projected from sources the application already accepted — its own resource
  * registry, its declared API-reference categories, and each specification's purpose and lifecycle.
  *
- * What remains genuinely deferred is a page PER resource. Those need a variable unit set, and the
- * renderer's route table is deliberately fixed (see `pathForUnit`), so an application-owned unit
- * still fails closed rather than acquiring an implicit route.
+ * A page PER resource followed, as a generated tier with its own reserved namespace (see
+ * `pathForUnit`). And a cross-resource BUSINESS use case — the journey this module can never write,
+ * because it belongs to one application — is authored by that application as a documentation
+ * chapter its plan declares (#874, `application-documentation-chapters.ts`), again in a reserved
+ * namespace. A unit whose ref an application chose freely still fails closed rather than acquiring
+ * an implicit route.
  */
 export declare const APPLICATION_CONSUMER_DOCUMENTATION_AUTHORED_CONTENT_V1: readonly [{
     readonly managedPath: "get-started.md";
@@ -68,12 +71,12 @@ export declare const APPLICATION_CONSUMER_DOCUMENTATION_AUTHORED_CONTENT_V1: rea
     readonly managedPath: "access-and-identity/sso-configure.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/sso-configure";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/sso-configure", "source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Configure a single sign-on connection\n\nCreate one connection for one organization and environment. This task is for an\norganization administrator working with the identity administrator who controls\nthe provider tenant.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| Have an independent administrator recovery method, provider administration access, the current application's connection values and a controlled test identity | The application and provider identify each other correctly and a test response validates for the intended organization |\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Configure one single sign-on trust boundary\n  accDescr: The application and identity-provider owners choose one protocol, exchange environment-specific identities and destinations, configure validation and identity mapping, test while the connection is not default, and enable it only after identity, organization and access checks pass.\n  owners[\"Confirm owners and independent recovery\"] --> protocol[\"Choose OpenID Connect or SAML\"]\n  protocol --> trust[\"Exchange identities, destinations and verification material\"]\n  trust --> mapping[\"Define person, domain and role mapping\"]\n  mapping --> controlled[\"Test one controlled identity\"]\n  controlled --> access[\"Verify identity, organization, allowed action and refusal\"]\n  access --> enable[\"Enable without making default\"]\n~~~\n\nKeep the connection isolated to one organization and environment. Production\nand non-production values may have similar labels but remain different trust\nboundaries.\n\n## Choose the protocol and connection controls\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#markdown}}\n\nGive the connection a display name that identifies the organization and\nenvironment. Keep it disabled while exchanging trust configuration when the\nadministration surface permits that sequence. Do not mark it as default yet.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#connectionConfigurationMarkdown}}\n\n> **Current limitation:** keep `bypassAppMFA` off. The configuration field is\n> present, but the current authentication runtime does not use it to decide\n> whether the application requests another factor. Prove the actual sign-in\n> journey with a controlled account; do not use this field as audit evidence.\n\n> **SSO role mapping is an access grant.** Test every mapped value, keep the\n> fallback role non-administrative, and verify an expected refusal. A provider\n> group name should never become broad application authority merely because it\n> was previously used for a different system.\n\n## Exchange the trust configuration\n\nDepending on the selected protocol, the two administrators exchange the\nnon-secret identifiers and destinations needed to identify the application and\nprovider, plus the protected verification or client material required by that\nprotocol. Use only values displayed for the current environment.\n\nCheck these meanings before saving:\n\n- **Provider identity** names the provider tenant this connection trusts.\n- **Application identity or audience** tells the provider which application the\n  response is intended for.\n- **Sign-in and return destinations** must belong to the matching environments.\n- **Identity mapping** must use a stable identity value rather than a display\n  name that can change or collide.\n- **Verification settings** decide which signed responses the application will\n  trust and how timing is evaluated.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Map provider values to one application connection\n  accDescr: The application publishes its callback or assertion-consumer destination and identity. The provider publishes its issuer or entity identity, endpoints and verification material. Both owners configure stable identity claims, and the application alone maps those claims to membership and least-privilege roles.\n  app[\"Application environment\"] -->|\"Callback or ACS destination; application identity\"| provider[\"Identity provider tenant\"]\n  provider -->|\"Issuer or entity ID; endpoints; signing material\"| app\n  provider --> claims[\"Stable identity and optional role/group claims\"]\n  claims --> mapping[\"Application claim and access mapping\"]\n  mapping --> membership[\"Person + organization membership + roles\"]\n~~~\n\nThe arrows show two separate exchanges. Protocol trust lets the application\naccept a response from the provider. Claim and access mapping decides which\nperson and organization relationship that response may establish. Review both;\na valid signature does not make an unsafe group-to-admin mapping acceptable.\n\n### For an OpenID Connect connection\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#oidcConfigurationMarkdown}}\n\nPrefer the provider's maintained discovery information when the administration\nsurface supports it. Confirm the issuer and discovered authorization, token and\nsigning-key locations all belong to the same provider environment. Register the\nexact application return destination at the provider. Protect the client secret\nas write-only credential material, retain its renewal owner, and keep issuer and\naudience validation enabled. Use the strong proof method offered for the\nauthorization-code journey rather than weakening it to accommodate an old\nclient.\n\nChoose one endpoint mode deliberately:\n\n1. **Discovery** — supply the provider issuer or discovery URL. The sign-in\n   runtime retrieves the current metadata and uses its issuer, authorization,\n   token, user-info, signing-key and logout locations when published.\n2. **Provider template** — choose a maintained provider contract and supply its\n   required tenant substitutions. Verify every resolved URL before enabling.\n3. **Manual** — supply the authorization and token endpoints, plus issuer,\n   user-info and signing-key locations where required. Use this only when the\n   provider cannot publish usable metadata.\n\n> The administrative **Discover endpoints** and **Test connection** operations\n> currently return `supported: false` for OIDC and perform no provider\n> handshake. This does not disable discovery-mode sign-in; it means the admin\n> diagnostic action cannot prove that connection. Use a controlled end-to-end\n> sign-in and provider logs as the positive test.\n\n### For a SAML connection\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#samlConfigurationMarkdown}}\n\nConfirm the provider entity identifier, application audience, sign-in\ndestination and assertion return destination as a single environment-specific\nset. Load the current provider signing certificate through the protected\nadministration surface and plan renewal before it expires. Keep signed-assertion\nvalidation enabled. Choose a stable subject/NameID and explicit attribute\nmapping; do not use a mutable display name as the person's identity.\n\nThe administrative **Discover endpoints** operation can retrieve SAML metadata\nand return the provider entity ID, sign-in/logout URLs, certificates and NameID\nformat for review. It does **not** save those values. After saving the\nconnection, **Test connection** checks the configured entity ID, endpoint\nreachability, certificate validity and generated service-provider metadata. A\npass is useful preflight evidence, but only a real application-started sign-in\nproves the browser, provider policy, response validation and identity mapping.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#diagnosticsMarkdown}}\n\n## Configure a common identity provider\n\nThe provider changes the names and screens, not the application trust model.\nAlways copy the application values from the **same environment** you are\nconfiguring; the examples below deliberately contain no reusable callback URL,\nentity ID, client ID or secret.\n\n| Application meaning | Microsoft Entra ID | Okta | Google Workspace / Cloud Identity |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| OIDC application identity | App registration **Application (client) ID** | OIDC app **Client ID** | OAuth client **Client ID** |\n| OIDC return destination | App registration **Redirect URI** | **Sign-in redirect URI** | OAuth client **Authorized redirect URI** |\n| OIDC provider identity | Tenant-specific issuer/discovery document | Okta authorization-server issuer | Google issuer/discovery document |\n| SAML application identity | **Identifier (Entity ID)** | **Audience URI (SP Entity ID)** | **Entity ID** |\n| SAML return destination | **Reply URL (ACS URL)** | **Single sign-on URL** | **ACS URL** |\n| SAML provider identity | Microsoft Entra Identifier | Identity Provider Issuer | Google Entity ID |\n| SAML verification material | SAML signing certificate / federation metadata | Signing certificate / IdP metadata | Certificate / IdP metadata |\n\n### Microsoft Entra ID\n\nFor OIDC, create or select the application registration, register the exact web\nredirect URI supplied by this application environment, use the tenant-specific\nissuer, and create a client credential with a named owner and expiry. Keep the\nprovider assignment limited to the pilot population. Microsoft distinguishes\nthe app registration (the application definition) from its enterprise\napplication/service-principal instance; record both identities during support.\n\nFor SAML, create or select the enterprise application, configure its Identifier\nand Reply URL from this environment, then load the Microsoft Entra Identifier,\nlogin URL and current signing certificate into the SAML connection. Review the\nprovider's claims before authoring role or group mappings.\n\n- [Microsoft Entra OIDC application setup](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/add-application-portal-setup-oidc-sso)\n- [Microsoft Entra SAML application setup](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/add-application-portal-setup-sso)\n- [Microsoft Entra redirect URI rules](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/how-to-add-redirect-uri)\n\n### Okta\n\nCreate a private OIDC or SAML app integration and initially assign only the\npilot people or groups. For OIDC, choose a **Web Application**, register the\nexact sign-in redirect URI, retain authorization code, and keep PKCE S256. Copy\nthe client ID, client secret and exact issuer used by that authorization server.\nDo not enable a wildcard redirect merely to avoid maintaining environment URLs.\n\nFor SAML, enter this environment's ACS URL and service-provider entity ID, then\nload Okta's Identity Provider issuer, sign-on URL and signing certificate into\nthe application connection. Map claims and groups explicitly; an Okta\nassignment decides who may reach the provider integration, while the\napplication membership and roles still decide application access.\n\n- [Okta OIDC app integration](https://help.okta.com/en-us/content/topics/apps/apps_app_integration_wizard_oidc.htm)\n- [Okta SAML app integration](https://help.okta.com/en-us/content/topics/apps/apps_app_integration_wizard_saml.htm)\n- [Okta SAML field reference](https://help.okta.com/en-us/content/topics/apps/aiw-saml-reference.htm)\n\n### Google Workspace or Cloud Identity\n\nFor OIDC, configure a web OAuth client with the exact authorized redirect URI\nand use Google's published issuer/discovery information. The provider can\nauthenticate Google accounts beyond one Workspace domain, so the application\nconnection's explicit allowed-domain list and the organization's membership\npolicy remain important boundaries.\n\nFor SAML, add a custom SAML app, copy Google's IdP entity ID, SSO URL and\ncertificate into this connection, then enter the application's ACS URL and\nentity ID in Google. Start with the service disabled or assigned to a pilot\norganizational unit/group, depending on the provider controls available to the\norganization.\n\n- [Google OpenID Connect guide](https://developers.google.com/identity/openid-connect/openid-connect)\n- [Google custom SAML application setup](https://support.google.com/a/answer/6087519)\n\n> **Do not paste credentials, private keys or complete certificates into a\n> ticket or screenshot.** Use the protected administration surfaces to exchange\n> sensitive material and share only non-secret identifiers for diagnosis.\n\n## Verify before enabling broadly\n\nEnable the connection for a controlled test, but do not make it default. Start\nfrom the application's sign-in journey and verify:\n\n1. the intended provider and environment receive the request;\n2. the provider accepts the controlled person under its expected policy;\n3. the application accepts the returned issuer/entity, audience, destination,\n   signature and time checks;\n4. the stable subject maps to the intended application person;\n5. the person enters the intended organization with the expected role;\n6. one expected action succeeds and one action outside that authority is\n   refused; and\n7. the independent recovery administrator still signs in.\n\nRecord non-secret identifiers, time, outcome and correlation evidence. Continue with\n[Roll out SSO and keep a recovery path](/access-and-identity/sso-rollout-and-recovery)\nbefore making it the default. Never include a password, client secret, private\nkey, complete assertion, authorization code or session cookie in the evidence.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Configure a single sign-on connection\n\nCreate one connection for one organization and environment. This task is for an\norganization administrator working with the identity administrator who controls\nthe provider tenant.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| Have an independent administrator recovery method, provider administration access, the current application's connection values and a controlled test identity | The application and provider identify each other correctly and a test response validates for the intended organization |\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Configure one single sign-on trust boundary\n  accDescr: The application and identity-provider owners choose one protocol, exchange environment-specific identities and destinations, configure validation and identity mapping, test while the connection is not default, and enable it only after identity, organization and access checks pass.\n  owners[\"Confirm owners and independent recovery\"] --> protocol[\"Choose OpenID Connect or SAML\"]\n  protocol --> trust[\"Exchange identities, destinations and verification material\"]\n  trust --> mapping[\"Define person, domain and role mapping\"]\n  mapping --> controlled[\"Test one controlled identity\"]\n  controlled --> access[\"Verify identity, organization, allowed action and refusal\"]\n  access --> enable[\"Enable without making default\"]\n~~~\n\nKeep the connection isolated to one organization and environment. Production\nand non-production values may have similar labels but remain different trust\nboundaries.\n\n## Choose the protocol and connection controls\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#markdown}}\n\nGive the connection a display name that identifies the organization and\nenvironment. Keep it disabled while exchanging trust configuration when the\nadministration surface permits that sequence. Do not mark it as default yet.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#connectionConfigurationMarkdown}}\n\n> **SSO role mapping is an access grant.** Test every mapped value, keep the\n> fallback role non-administrative, and verify an expected refusal. A provider\n> group name should never become broad application authority merely because it\n> was previously used for a different system.\n\n## Exchange the trust configuration\n\nDepending on the selected protocol, the two administrators exchange the\nnon-secret identifiers and destinations needed to identify the application and\nprovider, plus the protected verification or client material required by that\nprotocol. Use only values displayed for the current environment.\n\nCheck these meanings before saving:\n\n- **Provider identity** names the provider tenant this connection trusts.\n- **Application identity or audience** tells the provider which application the\n  response is intended for.\n- **Sign-in and return destinations** must belong to the matching environments.\n- **Identity mapping** must use a stable identity value rather than a display\n  name that can change or collide.\n- **Verification settings** decide which signed responses the application will\n  trust and how timing is evaluated.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Map provider values to one application connection\n  accDescr: The application publishes its callback or assertion-consumer destination and identity. The provider publishes its issuer or entity identity, endpoints and verification material. Both owners configure stable identity claims, and the application alone maps those claims to membership and least-privilege roles.\n  app[\"Application environment\"] -->|\"Callback or ACS destination; application identity\"| provider[\"Identity provider tenant\"]\n  provider -->|\"Issuer or entity ID; endpoints; signing material\"| app\n  provider --> claims[\"Stable identity and optional role/group claims\"]\n  claims --> mapping[\"Application claim and access mapping\"]\n  mapping --> membership[\"Person + organization membership + roles\"]\n~~~\n\nThe arrows show two separate exchanges. Protocol trust lets the application\naccept a response from the provider. Claim and access mapping decides which\nperson and organization relationship that response may establish. Review both;\na valid signature does not make an unsafe group-to-admin mapping acceptable.\n\n### For an OpenID Connect connection\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#oidcConfigurationMarkdown}}\n\nPrefer the provider's maintained discovery information when the administration\nsurface supports it. Confirm the issuer and discovered authorization, token and\nsigning-key locations all belong to the same provider environment. Register the\nexact application return destination at the provider. Protect the client secret\nas write-only credential material, retain its renewal owner, and keep issuer and\naudience validation enabled. Use the strong proof method offered for the\nauthorization-code journey rather than weakening it to accommodate an old\nclient.\n\nChoose one endpoint mode deliberately:\n\n1. **Discovery** — supply the provider issuer or discovery URL. The sign-in\n   runtime retrieves the current metadata and uses its issuer, authorization,\n   token, user-info, signing-key and logout locations when published.\n2. **Provider template** — choose a maintained provider contract and supply its\n   required tenant substitutions. Verify every resolved URL before enabling.\n3. **Manual** — supply the authorization and token endpoints, plus issuer,\n   user-info and signing-key locations where required. Use this only when the\n   provider cannot publish usable metadata.\n\n> The administrative **Discover endpoints** and **Test connection** operations\n> currently return `supported: false` for OIDC and perform no provider\n> handshake. This does not disable discovery-mode sign-in; it means the admin\n> diagnostic action cannot prove that connection. Use a controlled end-to-end\n> sign-in and provider logs as the positive test.\n\n### For a SAML connection\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#samlConfigurationMarkdown}}\n\nConfirm the provider entity identifier, application audience, sign-in\ndestination and assertion return destination as a single environment-specific\nset. Load the current provider signing certificate through the protected\nadministration surface and plan renewal before it expires. Keep signed-assertion\nvalidation enabled. Choose a stable subject/NameID and explicit attribute\nmapping; do not use a mutable display name as the person's identity.\n\nThe administrative **Discover endpoints** operation can retrieve SAML metadata\nand return the provider entity ID, sign-in/logout URLs, certificates and NameID\nformat for review. It does **not** save those values. After saving the\nconnection, **Test connection** checks the configured entity ID, endpoint\nreachability, certificate validity and generated service-provider metadata. A\npass is useful preflight evidence, but only a real application-started sign-in\nproves the browser, provider policy, response validation and identity mapping.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#diagnosticsMarkdown}}\n\n## Configure a common identity provider\n\nThe provider changes the names and screens, not the application trust model.\nAlways copy the application values from the **same environment** you are\nconfiguring; the examples below deliberately contain no reusable callback URL,\nentity ID, client ID or secret.\n\n| Application meaning | Microsoft Entra ID | Okta | Google Workspace / Cloud Identity |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| OIDC application identity | App registration **Application (client) ID** | OIDC app **Client ID** | OAuth client **Client ID** |\n| OIDC return destination | App registration **Redirect URI** | **Sign-in redirect URI** | OAuth client **Authorized redirect URI** |\n| OIDC provider identity | Tenant-specific issuer/discovery document | Okta authorization-server issuer | Google issuer/discovery document |\n| SAML application identity | **Identifier (Entity ID)** | **Audience URI (SP Entity ID)** | **Entity ID** |\n| SAML return destination | **Reply URL (ACS URL)** | **Single sign-on URL** | **ACS URL** |\n| SAML provider identity | Microsoft Entra Identifier | Identity Provider Issuer | Google Entity ID |\n| SAML verification material | SAML signing certificate / federation metadata | Signing certificate / IdP metadata | Certificate / IdP metadata |\n\n### Microsoft Entra ID\n\nFor OIDC, create or select the application registration, register the exact web\nredirect URI supplied by this application environment, use the tenant-specific\nissuer, and create a client credential with a named owner and expiry. Keep the\nprovider assignment limited to the pilot population. Microsoft distinguishes\nthe app registration (the application definition) from its enterprise\napplication/service-principal instance; record both identities during support.\n\nFor SAML, create or select the enterprise application, configure its Identifier\nand Reply URL from this environment, then load the Microsoft Entra Identifier,\nlogin URL and current signing certificate into the SAML connection. Review the\nprovider's claims before authoring role or group mappings.\n\n- [Microsoft Entra OIDC application setup](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/add-application-portal-setup-oidc-sso)\n- [Microsoft Entra SAML application setup](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/add-application-portal-setup-sso)\n- [Microsoft Entra redirect URI rules](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/how-to-add-redirect-uri)\n\n### Okta\n\nCreate a private OIDC or SAML app integration and initially assign only the\npilot people or groups. For OIDC, choose a **Web Application**, register the\nexact sign-in redirect URI, retain authorization code, and keep PKCE S256. Copy\nthe client ID, client secret and exact issuer used by that authorization server.\nDo not enable a wildcard redirect merely to avoid maintaining environment URLs.\n\nFor SAML, enter this environment's ACS URL and service-provider entity ID, then\nload Okta's Identity Provider issuer, sign-on URL and signing certificate into\nthe application connection. Map claims and groups explicitly; an Okta\nassignment decides who may reach the provider integration, while the\napplication membership and roles still decide application access.\n\n- [Okta OIDC app integration](https://help.okta.com/en-us/content/topics/apps/apps_app_integration_wizard_oidc.htm)\n- [Okta SAML app integration](https://help.okta.com/en-us/content/topics/apps/apps_app_integration_wizard_saml.htm)\n- [Okta SAML field reference](https://help.okta.com/en-us/content/topics/apps/aiw-saml-reference.htm)\n\n### Google Workspace or Cloud Identity\n\nFor OIDC, configure a web OAuth client with the exact authorized redirect URI\nand use Google's published issuer/discovery information. The provider can\nauthenticate Google accounts beyond one Workspace domain, so the application\nconnection's explicit allowed-domain list and the organization's membership\npolicy remain important boundaries.\n\nFor SAML, add a custom SAML app, copy Google's IdP entity ID, SSO URL and\ncertificate into this connection, then enter the application's ACS URL and\nentity ID in Google. Start with the service disabled or assigned to a pilot\norganizational unit/group, depending on the provider controls available to the\norganization.\n\n- [Google OpenID Connect guide](https://developers.google.com/identity/openid-connect/openid-connect)\n- [Google custom SAML application setup](https://support.google.com/a/answer/6087519)\n\n> **Do not paste credentials, private keys or complete certificates into a\n> ticket or screenshot.** Use the protected administration surfaces to exchange\n> sensitive material and share only non-secret identifiers for diagnosis.\n\n## Verify before enabling broadly\n\nEnable the connection for a controlled test, but do not make it default. Start\nfrom the application's sign-in journey and verify:\n\n1. the intended provider and environment receive the request;\n2. the provider accepts the controlled person under its expected policy;\n3. the application accepts the returned issuer/entity, audience, destination,\n   signature and time checks;\n4. the stable subject maps to the intended application person;\n5. the person enters the intended organization with the expected role;\n6. one expected action succeeds and one action outside that authority is\n   refused; and\n7. the independent recovery administrator still signs in.\n\nRecord non-secret identifiers, time, outcome and correlation evidence. Continue with\n[Roll out SSO and keep a recovery path](/access-and-identity/sso-rollout-and-recovery)\nbefore making it the default. Never include a password, client secret, private\nkey, complete assertion, authorization code or session cookie in the evidence.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "access-and-identity/sso-rollout-and-recovery.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/sso-rollout-and-recovery";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/sso-rollout-and-recovery", "source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Roll out SSO and keep a recovery path\n\nIntroduce a configured connection in stages so a mapping mistake or provider\noutage cannot lock every administrator out at once.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| The connection passes a controlled test, the application and identity-provider owners are available, and an independent administrator can enter without this connection | Representative people sign in to the right organization with expected access, the connection becomes default only after proof, and a tested recovery path remains available |\n\nThe application can offer more than one configured connection and distinguish\nenabled from default behavior:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#markdown}}\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Roll out single sign-on in controlled stages\n  accDescr: Keep an independent recovery administrator, test one controlled identity, expand to a representative pilot, make the connection default only after verification, and retain the recovery path.\n  recovery[\"Verify independent administrator recovery\"] --> controlled[\"Test one controlled identity\"]\n  controlled --> pilot[\"Expand to a representative pilot\"]\n  pilot --> default[\"Make default after verification\"]\n  default --> monitor[\"Monitor and retain recovery\"]\n  controlled -.-> stop[\"Stop on unexplained difference\"]\n  pilot -.-> stop\n~~~\n\nThe recovery identity must not depend on the connection being tested. Confirm it\nbefore changing the default connection, and verify it again after a material\nprovider or trust change.\n\n## Build a representative pilot\n\nDo not test only an administrator. Include the identity and access differences\nthat can reveal a mapping defect:\n\n| Pilot case | What it proves |\n| --- | --- |\n| Existing ordinary member | Stable subject mapping does not create a duplicate person |\n| Newly eligible person, when first-sign-in creation is enabled | The intended user and membership lifecycle occurs with the fallback role |\n| Person with a mapped provider role or group | The exact external value maps to the intended application role |\n| Person outside an allowed domain or mapping | The connection refuses the identity without revealing another account |\n| Person with application MFA requirements | The actual post-provider journey is observed; do not infer it from the currently non-operative `bypassAppMFA` field |\n| Independent recovery administrator | Provider outage or mapping failure does not remove all administrative access |\n\nUse controlled test identities and non-sensitive application actions. Do not\nalter a real person's provider attributes merely to make the pilot pass.\n\n## Run the staged rollout\n\n1. Test one controlled identity whose provider attributes and organization\n   membership are already known.\n2. Confirm the person returns to the correct environment and organization.\n3. Verify expected application access and an expected refusal; a successful\n   provider login alone is insufficient.\n4. Expand to a pilot representing the identity patterns and roles used by the\n   organization.\n5. Stop on an unexplained mapping, membership or access difference.\n6. Confirm how leavers and role changes are handled manually or through SCIM;\n   SSO alone does not close the application membership.\n7. Make the connection default only when the pilot and recovery path both pass.\n\n## Make the default change observable\n\nChoose a support window, communicate which people and organization are affected,\nand record the previous default connection. After the change, repeat a normal\napplication-started sign-in rather than reusing a provider URL. Verify the\nresolved person, organization, expected action and expected refusal. Monitor\nauthentication failures separately from membership/role refusals so an access\nproblem is not mistaken for a provider outage.\n\n~~~mermaid\nstateDiagram-v2\n  accTitle: Keep the connection in a known operational state\n  accDescr: A connection begins configured but not default, advances through controlled and representative proof, becomes default only after recovery proof, returns to validation after any trust or mapping change, and is disabled when safe verification cannot be restored.\n  [*] --> ConfiguredNotDefault\n  ConfiguredNotDefault --> ControlledProof: one known identity passes\n  ControlledProof --> Pilot: representative identities pass\n  Pilot --> Default: recovery path also passes\n  Default --> ConfiguredNotDefault: trust, credential, certificate, mapping or provider change\n  ConfiguredNotDefault --> Disabled: validation cannot be completed safely\n  Default --> Disabled: active incident requires containment\n  Disabled --> ConfiguredNotDefault: corrected configuration is ready to retest\n~~~\n\nThe loop back to validation is intentional. A renewed secret, signing\ncertificate, issuer, endpoint, claim mapping or default role changes the trust\nor access proof even when the connection keeps the same display name.\n\n## Renew credentials and signing certificates without an outage\n\n### Rotate an OIDC client secret\n\n1. Confirm whether the provider supports two simultaneously valid secrets.\n2. Create the replacement in the provider and record its owner and expiry.\n3. Update the protected, write-only client-secret field in the matching\n   application environment. Never paste the secret into a change ticket.\n4. Run a fresh controlled sign-in and inspect both provider and application\n   evidence.\n5. Revoke the previous secret only after the replacement succeeds and the\n   rollback window has been approved.\n\nIf the provider permits only one active secret, schedule a support window,\nretain the independent administrator path, update both sides as one controlled\nchange, and test immediately.\n\n### Rotate a SAML signing certificate\n\n1. Obtain the provider's new public signing certificate and verify its\n   fingerprint through an approved independent channel.\n2. When the provider and application support overlapping certificates, load the\n   new certificate before the provider starts signing with it.\n3. Run **Test connection**, then complete a real sign-in.\n4. Switch the provider to the new signing key and repeat the controlled proof.\n5. Remove the old certificate only after all provider nodes use the new key and\n   the overlap window has ended.\n\nThe application schema accepts more than one SAML signing certificate so a\nplanned overlap is possible. Do not replace a certificate merely because a\nticket contains a PEM block; verify the provider source and fingerprint.\n\n## Monitor both sides of the boundary\n\nCorrelate by time, person, application/connection and the provider's request or\ncorrelation identifier where available. Provider success plus application\nfailure points to response validation, mapping or membership. Provider failure\nmeans the application may never receive a response.\n\n- Microsoft Entra: [sign-in logs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-ins)\n  and [sign-in diagnostics](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/howto-use-sign-in-diagnostics).\n- Okta: [System Log](https://help.okta.com/en-us/content/topics/reports/reports_syslog.htm).\n- Google Workspace: use the provider's authentication and SAML application\n  audit/investigation views available for the organization's edition, together\n  with the application audit trail.\n\n## Prepare for provider or configuration failure\n\nRecord who owns the provider and application sides of the connection, how to\nreach the independent recovery method, and which last-known-good values can be\ncompared without exposing secrets. After changing issuer, entity, audience,\nredirect, certificate, client or mapping settings, repeat the controlled test\nbefore expanding again.\n\nIf the provider is unavailable, use the independent recovery method, confirm\nthe scope of the outage and avoid changing trust values speculatively. Restore\nor correct one boundary, retest with a controlled identity, then return the\nconnection to default use. Keep the recovery method narrow and monitored; it is\nnot a shared bypass account.\n\nRetain the connection name, organization, environment, pilot cases, test times,\nnon-secret trust identifiers, mapping decisions, allowed/refused results,\ndefault-change approval and recovery proof. Exclude passwords, one-time codes,\nclient secrets, private keys, complete assertions and session cookies.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Roll out SSO and keep a recovery path\n\nIntroduce a configured connection in stages so a mapping mistake or provider\noutage cannot lock every administrator out at once.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| The connection passes a controlled test, the application and identity-provider owners are available, and an independent administrator can enter without this connection | Representative people sign in to the right organization with expected access, the connection becomes default only after proof, and a tested recovery path remains available |\n\nThe application can offer more than one configured connection and distinguish\nenabled from default behavior:\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:access-single-sign-on#markdown}}\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Roll out single sign-on in controlled stages\n  accDescr: Keep an independent recovery administrator, test one controlled identity, expand to a representative pilot, make the connection default only after verification, and retain the recovery path.\n  recovery[\"Verify independent administrator recovery\"] --> controlled[\"Test one controlled identity\"]\n  controlled --> pilot[\"Expand to a representative pilot\"]\n  pilot --> default[\"Make default after verification\"]\n  default --> monitor[\"Monitor and retain recovery\"]\n  controlled -.-> stop[\"Stop on unexplained difference\"]\n  pilot -.-> stop\n~~~\n\nThe recovery identity must not depend on the connection being tested. Confirm it\nbefore changing the default connection, and verify it again after a material\nprovider or trust change.\n\n## Build a representative pilot\n\nDo not test only an administrator. Include the identity and access differences\nthat can reveal a mapping defect:\n\n| Pilot case | What it proves |\n| --- | --- |\n| Existing ordinary member | Stable subject mapping does not create a duplicate person |\n| Newly eligible person, when first-sign-in creation is enabled | The intended user and membership lifecycle occurs with the fallback role |\n| Person with a mapped provider role or group | The exact external value maps to the intended application role |\n| Person outside an allowed domain or mapping | The connection refuses the identity without revealing another account |\n| Person with application MFA requirements | The actual post-provider journey is observed. A connection cannot exempt anyone from the application's requirement: the declared policy is enforced on the federated lane too, and an organization may only tighten it |\n| Independent recovery administrator | Provider outage or mapping failure does not remove all administrative access |\n\nUse controlled test identities and non-sensitive application actions. Do not\nalter a real person's provider attributes merely to make the pilot pass.\n\n## Run the staged rollout\n\n1. Test one controlled identity whose provider attributes and organization\n   membership are already known.\n2. Confirm the person returns to the correct environment and organization.\n3. Verify expected application access and an expected refusal; a successful\n   provider login alone is insufficient.\n4. Expand to a pilot representing the identity patterns and roles used by the\n   organization.\n5. Stop on an unexplained mapping, membership or access difference.\n6. Confirm how leavers and role changes are handled manually or through SCIM;\n   SSO alone does not close the application membership.\n7. Make the connection default only when the pilot and recovery path both pass.\n\n## Make the default change observable\n\nChoose a support window, communicate which people and organization are affected,\nand record the previous default connection. After the change, repeat a normal\napplication-started sign-in rather than reusing a provider URL. Verify the\nresolved person, organization, expected action and expected refusal. Monitor\nauthentication failures separately from membership/role refusals so an access\nproblem is not mistaken for a provider outage.\n\n~~~mermaid\nstateDiagram-v2\n  accTitle: Keep the connection in a known operational state\n  accDescr: A connection begins configured but not default, advances through controlled and representative proof, becomes default only after recovery proof, returns to validation after any trust or mapping change, and is disabled when safe verification cannot be restored.\n  [*] --> ConfiguredNotDefault\n  ConfiguredNotDefault --> ControlledProof: one known identity passes\n  ControlledProof --> Pilot: representative identities pass\n  Pilot --> Default: recovery path also passes\n  Default --> ConfiguredNotDefault: trust, credential, certificate, mapping or provider change\n  ConfiguredNotDefault --> Disabled: validation cannot be completed safely\n  Default --> Disabled: active incident requires containment\n  Disabled --> ConfiguredNotDefault: corrected configuration is ready to retest\n~~~\n\nThe loop back to validation is intentional. A renewed secret, signing\ncertificate, issuer, endpoint, claim mapping or default role changes the trust\nor access proof even when the connection keeps the same display name.\n\n## Renew credentials and signing certificates without an outage\n\n### Rotate an OIDC client secret\n\n1. Confirm whether the provider supports two simultaneously valid secrets.\n2. Create the replacement in the provider and record its owner and expiry.\n3. Update the protected, write-only client-secret field in the matching\n   application environment. Never paste the secret into a change ticket.\n4. Run a fresh controlled sign-in and inspect both provider and application\n   evidence.\n5. Revoke the previous secret only after the replacement succeeds and the\n   rollback window has been approved.\n\nIf the provider permits only one active secret, schedule a support window,\nretain the independent administrator path, update both sides as one controlled\nchange, and test immediately.\n\n### Rotate a SAML signing certificate\n\n1. Obtain the provider's new public signing certificate and verify its\n   fingerprint through an approved independent channel.\n2. When the provider and application support overlapping certificates, load the\n   new certificate before the provider starts signing with it.\n3. Run **Test connection**, then complete a real sign-in.\n4. Switch the provider to the new signing key and repeat the controlled proof.\n5. Remove the old certificate only after all provider nodes use the new key and\n   the overlap window has ended.\n\nThe application schema accepts more than one SAML signing certificate so a\nplanned overlap is possible. Do not replace a certificate merely because a\nticket contains a PEM block; verify the provider source and fingerprint.\n\n## Monitor both sides of the boundary\n\nCorrelate by time, person, application/connection and the provider's request or\ncorrelation identifier where available. Provider success plus application\nfailure points to response validation, mapping or membership. Provider failure\nmeans the application may never receive a response.\n\n- Microsoft Entra: [sign-in logs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-ins)\n  and [sign-in diagnostics](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/howto-use-sign-in-diagnostics).\n- Okta: [System Log](https://help.okta.com/en-us/content/topics/reports/reports_syslog.htm).\n- Google Workspace: use the provider's authentication and SAML application\n  audit/investigation views available for the organization's edition, together\n  with the application audit trail.\n\n## Prepare for provider or configuration failure\n\nRecord who owns the provider and application sides of the connection, how to\nreach the independent recovery method, and which last-known-good values can be\ncompared without exposing secrets. After changing issuer, entity, audience,\nredirect, certificate, client or mapping settings, repeat the controlled test\nbefore expanding again.\n\nIf the provider is unavailable, use the independent recovery method, confirm\nthe scope of the outage and avoid changing trust values speculatively. Restore\nor correct one boundary, retest with a controlled identity, then return the\nconnection to default use. Keep the recovery method narrow and monitored; it is\nnot a shared bypass account.\n\nRetain the connection name, organization, environment, pilot cases, test times,\nnon-secret trust identifiers, mapping decisions, allowed/refused results,\ndefault-change approval and recovery proof. Exclude passwords, one-time codes,\nclient secrets, private keys, complete assertions and session cookies.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "access-and-identity/sso-troubleshoot.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/sso-troubleshoot";
@@ -183,47 +186,47 @@ export declare const APPLICATION_CONSUMER_DOCUMENTATION_AUTHORED_CONTENT_V1: rea
     readonly managedPath: "user-administration/scim-provisioning.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/scim";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/scim", "source:consumer-fact:organization-scim-provisioning"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Provision users with SCIM\n\nSCIM lets an identity directory maintain a defined population of users and\norganization memberships. Choose it when your directory should own repeatable\njoiner, mover and leaver changes. The application supports **SCIM Users**, not\nSCIM Groups; a directory `department` can be mapped to one existing\norganization unit.\n\n> **SCIM provisions access; it does not sign people in.** Configure and prove\n> single sign-on separately. A directory-managed person needs both a correctly\n> provisioned membership and a working enterprise sign-in path.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Adopt SCIM in four controlled stages\n  accDescr: Configure the connection, map profile and unit data, validate with a small population, then operate and troubleshoot the live integration.\n  configure[\"Configure lifecycle and credential\"] --> map[\"Map profile and unit data\"]\n  map --> validate[\"Validate and roll out\"]\n  validate --> operate[\"Operate and troubleshoot\"]\n~~~\n\n## How a directory change becomes application access\n\nProvisioning is not a single switch. A directory assignment passes through\nseveral independent decisions before a person can use the application:\n\n~~~mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n  accTitle: From directory assignment to usable application access\n  accDescr: A directory administrator assigns a person, the identity provider sends a SCIM User request, the application validates the organization token and profile, maintains the identity and membership, optionally reconciles a mapped organization unit on supported operations, and responds. The person later signs in through a separate authentication journey and current membership and role determine access.\n  actor Admin as Directory administrator\n  participant Directory as Identity directory\n  participant SCIM as Application SCIM service\n  participant Access as Identity and membership\n  participant Units as Organization units\n  actor Person as Person\n  Admin->>Directory: Assign person to the application\n  Directory->>SCIM: Send SCIM User operation\n  SCIM->>SCIM: Authenticate token and validate payload\n  SCIM->>Access: Create or update identity and membership\n  opt Department mapping on a supported operation\n    SCIM->>Units: Reconcile mapped unit assignment\n  end\n  SCIM-->>Directory: Return SCIM result\n  Person->>Access: Sign in through the configured method\n  Access-->>Person: Evaluate current membership and role\n~~~\n\nThis journey separates six decisions that are often confused during a rollout:\n\n| Decision | Question the owners must answer |\n| --- | --- |\n| Provisioned population | Which directory assignment or group decides who is sent to the application? |\n| Identity matching | Which stable directory value identifies the same person after an email or name change? |\n| Initial access | Which non-administrative organization role should a newly provisioned person receive? |\n| Leaver behavior | What should happen to the application user and membership when the directory sends `active:false`? |\n| Unit authority | Should `department` merely describe the person, or authoritatively add and remove organization-unit access? |\n| Authentication | Which sign-in or SSO method will the person use after provisioning succeeds? |\n\n> **A successful SCIM response proves provisioning, not usable access.** Verify\n> the resulting membership, role and unit assignments, then ask the pilot person\n> to complete the separate sign-in journey.\n\n## Choose the stage you are working on\n\n| Your goal | Continue with |\n| --- | --- |\n| Understand the supported SCIM profile, payloads and operation behavior | [SCIM protocol and payload reference](/user-administration/scim-protocol-and-payloads) |\n| Decide lifecycle defaults and connect the directory | [Configure SCIM provisioning](/user-administration/scim-configure) |\n| Connect Microsoft Entra ID or a synchronized Active Directory population | [Connect Microsoft Entra ID](/user-administration/scim-microsoft-entra) |\n| Connect an Okta organization | [Connect Okta](/user-administration/scim-okta) |\n| Start from Active Directory Domain Services or another LDAP directory | [Connect an LDAP or Active Directory source](/user-administration/scim-ldap-and-active-directory) |\n| Map names, email and department-owned unit access | [Map SCIM profiles and organization units](/user-administration/scim-map-profile-and-units) |\n| Prove behavior with controlled users before broad enablement | [Validate and roll out SCIM](/user-administration/scim-validate-and-roll-out) |\n| Rotate credentials, investigate errors or recover a person | [Operate and troubleshoot SCIM](/user-administration/scim-operate-and-troubleshoot) |\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-scim-provisioning#markdown}}\n\n## Decide whether SCIM fits\n\nUse SCIM only when the directory will be the source of truth for the population,\nenterprise sign-in already works, and named owners can respond to provisioning\nfailures and credential changes. Keep people deliberately outside the directory\non the manual path. Do not let SCIM and an administrator compete to manage the\nsame membership or unit assignment.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Provision users with SCIM\n\nSCIM lets an identity directory maintain a defined population of users and\norganization memberships. Choose it when your directory should own repeatable\njoiner, mover and leaver changes. The application supports **SCIM Users** and\n**SCIM Groups**. A directory `department` can be mapped to one existing\norganization unit, and a directory group can become an organization unit of its\nown — see *Provision organization units from your directory*.\n\n> **SCIM provisions access; it does not sign people in.** Configure and prove\n> single sign-on separately. A directory-managed person needs both a correctly\n> provisioned membership and a working enterprise sign-in path.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Adopt SCIM in four controlled stages\n  accDescr: Configure the connection, map profile and unit data, validate with a small population, then operate and troubleshoot the live integration.\n  configure[\"Configure lifecycle and credential\"] --> map[\"Map profile and unit data\"]\n  map --> validate[\"Validate and roll out\"]\n  validate --> operate[\"Operate and troubleshoot\"]\n~~~\n\n## How a directory change becomes application access\n\nProvisioning is not a single switch. A directory assignment passes through\nseveral independent decisions before a person can use the application:\n\n~~~mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n  accTitle: From directory assignment to usable application access\n  accDescr: A directory administrator assigns a person, the identity provider sends a SCIM User request, the application validates the organization token and profile, maintains the identity and membership, optionally reconciles a mapped organization unit on supported operations, and responds. The person later signs in through a separate authentication journey and current membership and role determine access.\n  actor Admin as Directory administrator\n  participant Directory as Identity directory\n  participant SCIM as Application SCIM service\n  participant Access as Identity and membership\n  participant Units as Organization units\n  actor Person as Person\n  Admin->>Directory: Assign person to the application\n  Directory->>SCIM: Send SCIM User operation\n  SCIM->>SCIM: Authenticate token and validate payload\n  SCIM->>Access: Create or update identity and membership\n  opt Department mapping on a supported operation\n    SCIM->>Units: Reconcile mapped unit assignment\n  end\n  SCIM-->>Directory: Return SCIM result\n  Person->>Access: Sign in through the configured method\n  Access-->>Person: Evaluate current membership and role\n~~~\n\nThis journey separates six decisions that are often confused during a rollout:\n\n| Decision | Question the owners must answer |\n| --- | --- |\n| Provisioned population | Which directory assignment or group decides who is sent to the application? |\n| Identity matching | Which stable directory value identifies the same person after an email or name change? |\n| Initial access | Which non-administrative organization role should a newly provisioned person receive? |\n| Leaver behavior | What should happen to the application user and membership when the directory sends `active:false`? |\n| Unit authority | Should `department` merely describe the person, or authoritatively add and remove organization-unit access? |\n| Authentication | Which sign-in or SSO method will the person use after provisioning succeeds? |\n\n> **A successful SCIM response proves provisioning, not usable access.** Verify\n> the resulting membership, role and unit assignments, then ask the pilot person\n> to complete the separate sign-in journey.\n\n## Choose the stage you are working on\n\n| Your goal | Continue with |\n| --- | --- |\n| Understand the supported SCIM profile, payloads and operation behavior | [SCIM protocol and payload reference](/user-administration/scim-protocol-and-payloads) |\n| Decide lifecycle defaults and connect the directory | [Configure SCIM provisioning](/user-administration/scim-configure) |\n| Connect Microsoft Entra ID or a synchronized Active Directory population | [Connect Microsoft Entra ID](/user-administration/scim-microsoft-entra) |\n| Connect an Okta organization | [Connect Okta](/user-administration/scim-okta) |\n| Start from Active Directory Domain Services or another LDAP directory | [Connect an LDAP or Active Directory source](/user-administration/scim-ldap-and-active-directory) |\n| Map names, email and department-owned unit access | [Map SCIM profiles and organization units](/user-administration/scim-map-profile-and-units) |\n| Prove behavior with controlled users before broad enablement | [Validate and roll out SCIM](/user-administration/scim-validate-and-roll-out) |\n| Rotate credentials, investigate errors or recover a person | [Operate and troubleshoot SCIM](/user-administration/scim-operate-and-troubleshoot) |\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-scim-provisioning#markdown}}\n\n## Decide whether SCIM fits\n\nUse SCIM only when the directory will be the source of truth for the population,\nenterprise sign-in already works, and named owners can respond to provisioning\nfailures and credential changes. Keep people deliberately outside the directory\non the manual path. Do not let SCIM and an administrator compete to manage the\nsame membership or unit assignment.";
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     readonly managedPath: "user-administration/scim-protocol-and-payloads.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/scim-protocol-and-payloads";
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-    readonly markdown: "# SCIM protocol and payload reference\n\nUse this page to decide whether a directory or provisioning bridge is compatible\nwith this application **before** configuring production users. The application\nimplements a focused SCIM 2.0 User service. It is not a generic LDAP endpoint and\nit does not implement SCIM Groups.\n\n## Supported profile at a glance\n\n| Contract | This application supports | Important boundary |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Protocol | SCIM 2.0 over HTTPS with `application/scim+json` | SCIM 1.1 and direct LDAP binds are not accepted |\n| Authentication | A dedicated organization SCIM bearer token | The token selects one organization; it is not a user session or ordinary API key |\n| Resources | `Users` plus SCIM discovery documents | `Groups` is not implemented; group assignment can scope which users the provider sends but must not call `/Groups` |\n| User operations | Create, list, read, full replace, partial update and deactivate; Bulk accepts up to 100 operations | Organization-unit reconciliation differs by operation, as shown below |\n| Filtering | User lookup filters with a published maximum result size of 200 | Test the provider’s exact matching query before broad rollout |\n| Password changes | Not supported | Use the configured human sign-in or SSO journey; do not synchronize directory passwords |\n| Sorting and ETags | Not supported | A provider must not require sorting or conditional ETag writes |\n| Request budget | 300 requests per minute for each SCIM token | A 429 response includes retry information; reduce concurrency rather than rotating addresses |\n\nThe public discovery documents are available beneath the SCIM base URL:\n\n~~~text\nGET /ServiceProviderConfig\nGET /Schemas\nGET /ResourceTypes\n~~~\n\nRead `ServiceProviderConfig` during compatibility testing instead of assuming\nthat every feature mentioned by the SCIM standards is implemented.\n\n## Follow one SCIM request through the application\n\n~~~mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n  accTitle: How the application processes one SCIM User request\n  accDescr: The provider sends an authenticated User operation. The SCIM service uses the bearer token to select an organization, validates the operation and profile, matches or creates the identity, maintains the organization membership, performs organization-unit reconciliation only when configured and supported for that operation, and returns a SCIM response.\n  participant Provider as Provisioning provider\n  participant Endpoint as SCIM endpoint\n  participant Scope as Organization boundary\n  participant Identity as User and membership\n  participant Unit as Organization-unit mapping\n  Provider->>Endpoint: User request plus bearer token\n  Endpoint->>Scope: Resolve token to one organization\n  Scope-->>Endpoint: Authorized organization context\n  Endpoint->>Endpoint: Validate operation and SCIM profile\n  Endpoint->>Identity: Match, create or update\n  opt Mapping enabled and operation supported\n    Endpoint->>Unit: Reconcile exact department mapping\n  end\n  Endpoint-->>Provider: SCIM resource, list or error response\n~~~\n\nThe token establishes the organization boundary **before** the profile is\napplied. The service then validates the request, resolves the person, maintains\nthe organization membership and, for the operations shown below, may reconcile\norganization-unit assignments. The response does not create a browser session\nand does not prove that the person can complete SSO.\n\n### Compatibility questions to answer before configuration\n\n| Provider requirement | Compatible expectation |\n| --- | --- |\n| Discovery | The provider can read `ServiceProviderConfig`, `Schemas` and `ResourceTypes` and respect the advertised feature set |\n| Resource types | User provisioning works without calling `/Groups` |\n| Update behavior | The provider can operate with the documented PUT/PATCH consequences, especially when department controls unit access |\n| Authentication | The provider can send the dedicated bearer token in the HTTPS `Authorization` header |\n| Matching and pagination | Its exact user filter and result-window behavior work within the published limit |\n| Unsupported features | It does not require password synchronization, sorting or conditional ETag writes |\n| Request volume | It respects rate-limit responses and does not depend on Bulk for organization-unit reconciliation |\n\n## Understand the base URL\n\nThis is the complete base URL a provider needs. Everything below hangs off it:\n\n~~~text\n{{APPLICATION_CONNECTION_VALUE:scimBaseUrl}}\n~~~\n\nThe organization is not encoded in that URL. The bearer token identifies the\norganization and must therefore be unique to one provider connection and one\nenvironment.\n\n## Example User document\n\nThe following payload shows the fields used by the maintained profile mapping\nand optional organization-unit mapping. Replace every value with a controlled\ntest identity; never copy a real person into documentation or a support ticket.\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"schemas\": [\n    \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User\",\n    \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:extension:enterprise:2.0:User\"\n  ],\n  \"externalId\": \"directory-user-001\",\n  \"userName\": \"alex.morgan@example.com\",\n  \"active\": true,\n  \"name\": {\n    \"givenName\": \"Alex\",\n    \"familyName\": \"Morgan\"\n  },\n  \"displayName\": \"Alex Morgan\",\n  \"emails\": [{\n    \"value\": \"alex.morgan@example.com\",\n    \"type\": \"work\",\n    \"primary\": true\n  }],\n  \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:extension:enterprise:2.0:User\": {\n    \"department\": \"Engineering\"\n  }\n}\n~~~\n\nThe email mapping may use `userName`, the primary email or another configured\nemail path. Department is read from the standard Enterprise User extension; a\ntop-level `department` is accepted as a compatibility fallback. Its value is\nmatched exactly, after trimming, against the organization-unit mapping.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-scim-provisioning#attributeMappingMarkdown}}\n\n## Choose operations with their consequences visible\n\n| Provider operation | User/profile effect | Organization-unit effect |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `POST /Users` | Creates or links the person according to the lifecycle configuration | Reconciles an exact mapped department when unit mapping and a default unit role are configured |\n| `PUT /Users/{id}` | Replaces the maintained profile and active state | Performs authoritative unit reconciliation from the full department value |\n| `PATCH /Users/{id}` | Applies supported partial profile or active-state changes | **Does not currently reconcile organization units** |\n| `DELETE /Users/{id}` | Runs the configured deactivation behavior; it does not physically erase the person | Does not perform a department-to-unit reconciliation |\n| `POST /Bulk` | Executes supported user operations individually | **Does not currently reconcile organization units**, including Bulk PUT operations |\n\nThis difference matters with providers that normally send PATCH. Do not enable\nauthoritative department-to-unit mapping merely because user creation worked.\nCapture the operation used for a department move and confirm that the former\nunit assignment is actually removed.\n\n## Recognize a valid list and error response\n\nA successful lookup with no match is a 200 response containing an empty SCIM\nlist—not a 404:\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"schemas\": [\"urn:ietf:params:scim:api:messages:2.0:ListResponse\"],\n  \"totalResults\": 0,\n  \"startIndex\": 1,\n  \"itemsPerPage\": 0,\n  \"Resources\": []\n}\n~~~\n\nErrors use the SCIM error media type and may include a `scimType` of\n`invalidSyntax`, `invalidValue`, `uniqueness` or `tooMany`. Preserve the HTTP status, SCIM type, redacted detail, operation,\nprovider job identifier and time. Never preserve the bearer token.\n\n## Standards used by this profile\n\n- [RFC 7643 §4.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7643.html#section-4.1)\n  defines the SCIM User resource; [§4.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7643.html#section-4.3)\n  defines the Enterprise User extension used for `department`.\n- [RFC 7644 §3.4.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html#section-3.4.2)\n  defines filtering; [§3.5.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html#section-3.5.1)\n  and [§3.5.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html#section-3.5.2)\n  distinguish full replacement from PATCH; [§3.7](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html#section-3.7)\n  defines Bulk; and [§3.12](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html#section-3.12)\n  defines SCIM error responses.\n- [RFC 6750 §2.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6750.html#section-2.1)\n  defines bearer-token transport in the `Authorization` header. The\n  application’s SCIM token lifecycle and authorization policy remain\n  application behavior, not a promise made by that RFC.\n\nUse these standards to understand the wire contract. Use this page and the\napplication’s discovery response to understand the implemented profile.";
+    readonly markdown: "# SCIM protocol and payload reference\n\nUse this page to decide whether a directory or provisioning bridge is compatible\nwith this application **before** configuring production users. The application\nimplements a focused SCIM 2.0 User and Group service. It is not a generic LDAP\nendpoint, and its Group resource maps to organization units rather than to roles.\n\n## Supported profile at a glance\n\n| Contract | This application supports | Important boundary |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Protocol | SCIM 2.0 over HTTPS with `application/scim+json` | SCIM 1.1 and direct LDAP binds are not accepted |\n| Authentication | A dedicated organization SCIM bearer token | The token selects one organization; it is not a user session or ordinary API key |\n| Resources | `Users`, `Groups` and SCIM discovery documents | A `Group` is an organization unit, not a role. It is available only once an administrator sets the unit role on the SCIM provisioning configuration; until then every `/Groups` request answers 403 |\n| User operations | Create, list, read, full replace, partial update and deactivate; Bulk accepts up to 100 User or Group operations | Organization-unit reconciliation differs by operation, as shown below |\n| Filtering | User lookup filters with a published maximum result size of 200 | Test the provider’s exact matching query before broad rollout |\n| Password changes | Not supported | Use the configured human sign-in or SSO journey; do not synchronize directory passwords |\n| Sorting and ETags | Not supported | A provider must not require sorting or conditional ETag writes |\n| Request budget | 6,000 requests per minute for each SCIM token, sized for the request bursts Microsoft Entra ID and Okta send (neither uses Bulk) | A 429 response carries an integer `Retry-After`; follow it rather than rotating addresses |\n\nThe public discovery documents are available beneath the SCIM base URL:\n\n~~~text\nGET /ServiceProviderConfig\nGET /Schemas\nGET /ResourceTypes\n~~~\n\nRead `ServiceProviderConfig` during compatibility testing instead of assuming\nthat every feature mentioned by the SCIM standards is implemented.\n\n## Follow one SCIM request through the application\n\n~~~mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n  accTitle: How the application processes one SCIM User request\n  accDescr: The provider sends an authenticated User operation. The SCIM service uses the bearer token to select an organization, validates the operation and profile, matches or creates the identity, maintains the organization membership, performs organization-unit reconciliation only when configured and supported for that operation, and returns a SCIM response.\n  participant Provider as Provisioning provider\n  participant Endpoint as SCIM endpoint\n  participant Scope as Organization boundary\n  participant Identity as User and membership\n  participant Unit as Organization-unit mapping\n  Provider->>Endpoint: User request plus bearer token\n  Endpoint->>Scope: Resolve token to one organization\n  Scope-->>Endpoint: Authorized organization context\n  Endpoint->>Endpoint: Validate operation and SCIM profile\n  Endpoint->>Identity: Match, create or update\n  opt Mapping enabled and operation supported\n    Endpoint->>Unit: Reconcile exact department mapping\n  end\n  Endpoint-->>Provider: SCIM resource, list or error response\n~~~\n\nThe token establishes the organization boundary **before** the profile is\napplied. The service then validates the request, resolves the person, maintains\nthe organization membership and, for the operations shown below, may reconcile\norganization-unit assignments. The response does not create a browser session\nand does not prove that the person can complete SSO.\n\n### Compatibility questions to answer before configuration\n\n| Provider requirement | Compatible expectation |\n| --- | --- |\n| Discovery | The provider can read `ServiceProviderConfig`, `Schemas` and `ResourceTypes` and respect the advertised feature set |\n| Resource types | `/ResourceTypes` lists both `User` and `Group`. User provisioning works whether or not the provider calls `/Groups` |\n| Update behavior | The provider can operate with the documented PUT/PATCH consequences, especially when department controls unit access |\n| Authentication | The provider can send the dedicated bearer token in the HTTPS `Authorization` header |\n| Matching and pagination | Its exact user filter and result-window behavior work within the published limit |\n| Unsupported features | It does not require password synchronization, sorting or conditional ETag writes |\n| Request volume | It respects rate-limit responses and does not depend on Bulk for organization-unit reconciliation |\n\n## Understand the base URL\n\nThis is the complete base URL a provider needs. Everything below hangs off it:\n\n~~~text\n{{APPLICATION_CONNECTION_VALUE:scimBaseUrl}}\n~~~\n\nThe organization is not encoded in that URL. The bearer token identifies the\norganization and must therefore be unique to one provider connection and one\nenvironment.\n\n## Example User document\n\nThe following payload shows the fields used by the maintained profile mapping\nand optional organization-unit mapping. Replace every value with a controlled\ntest identity; never copy a real person into documentation or a support ticket.\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"schemas\": [\n    \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User\",\n    \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:extension:enterprise:2.0:User\"\n  ],\n  \"externalId\": \"directory-user-001\",\n  \"userName\": \"alex.morgan@example.com\",\n  \"active\": true,\n  \"name\": {\n    \"givenName\": \"Alex\",\n    \"familyName\": \"Morgan\"\n  },\n  \"displayName\": \"Alex Morgan\",\n  \"emails\": [{\n    \"value\": \"alex.morgan@example.com\",\n    \"type\": \"work\",\n    \"primary\": true\n  }],\n  \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:extension:enterprise:2.0:User\": {\n    \"department\": \"Engineering\"\n  }\n}\n~~~\n\nThe email mapping may use `userName`, the primary email or another configured\nemail path. Department is read from the standard Enterprise User extension; a\ntop-level `department` is accepted as a compatibility fallback. Its value is\nmatched exactly, after trimming, against the organization-unit mapping.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-scim-provisioning#attributeMappingMarkdown}}\n\n## Choose operations with their consequences visible\n\n| Provider operation | User/profile effect | Organization-unit effect |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `POST /Users` | Creates or links the person according to the lifecycle configuration | Reconciles an exact mapped department when unit mapping and a default unit role are configured |\n| `PUT /Users/{id}` | Replaces the maintained profile and active state | Performs authoritative unit reconciliation from the full department value |\n| `PATCH /Users/{id}` | Applies supported partial profile or active-state changes | Reconciles units only when the PATCH sets or removes the department; a PATCH that does not touch the department leaves unit assignments unchanged |\n| `DELETE /Users/{id}` | Runs the configured deactivation behavior; it does not physically erase the person | Does not perform a department-to-unit reconciliation |\n| `POST /Bulk` | Executes each User or Group operation individually, exactly as the same request would on its own | The same effect as the individual operation: a Bulk PUT reconciles like `PUT`, a Bulk PATCH like `PATCH`. A `bulkId:` reference to a resource created earlier in the same request is replaced by its id, so one request can create a user and add them to a new group |\n\nThis difference matters with providers that normally send PATCH. Do not enable\nauthoritative department-to-unit mapping merely because user creation worked.\nCapture the operation used for a department move and confirm that the former\nunit assignment is actually removed.\n\n## Recognize a valid list and error response\n\nA successful lookup with no match is a 200 response containing an empty SCIM\nlist—not a 404:\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"schemas\": [\"urn:ietf:params:scim:api:messages:2.0:ListResponse\"],\n  \"totalResults\": 0,\n  \"startIndex\": 1,\n  \"itemsPerPage\": 0,\n  \"Resources\": []\n}\n~~~\n\nErrors use the SCIM error media type and may include a `scimType` of\n`invalidSyntax`, `invalidValue`, `uniqueness` or `tooMany`. Preserve the HTTP status, SCIM type, redacted detail, operation,\nprovider job identifier and time. Never preserve the bearer token.\n\n## Standards used by this profile\n\n- [RFC 7643 §4.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7643.html#section-4.1)\n  defines the SCIM User resource; [§4.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7643.html#section-4.3)\n  defines the Enterprise User extension used for `department`.\n- [RFC 7644 §3.4.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html#section-3.4.2)\n  defines filtering; [§3.5.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html#section-3.5.1)\n  and [§3.5.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html#section-3.5.2)\n  distinguish full replacement from PATCH; [§3.7](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html#section-3.7)\n  defines Bulk; and [§3.12](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html#section-3.12)\n  defines SCIM error responses.\n- [RFC 6750 §2.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6750.html#section-2.1)\n  defines bearer-token transport in the `Authorization` header. The\n  application’s SCIM token lifecycle and authorization policy remain\n  application behavior, not a promise made by that RFC.\n\nUse these standards to understand the wire contract. Use this page and the\napplication’s discovery response to understand the implemented profile.";
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-    readonly markdown: "# Configure SCIM provisioning\n\nConfigure the lifecycle rules and a dedicated credential before you send any\nproduction user. This page is for an organization administrator working with\nthe identity team that owns the directory connection.\n\n## What you need and what success looks like\n\n| | |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Who performs this task** | An organization owner or administrator together with the identity-directory owner |\n| **Where the configuration applies** | One selected organization and one directory environment |\n| **Before you begin** | Prove enterprise sign-in, choose lifecycle defaults, create any mapped units and prepare a protected secret store |\n| **Successful result** | The provisioning configuration and a dedicated active token exist, and a controlled SCIM user operation produces the expected application state |\n\n## Open SCIM administration\n\n1. Select the organization the directory will manage.\n2. Open **Settings**, then the organization’s **User provisioning** area.\n3. Use **Provisioning** for lifecycle defaults, attribute mappings and unit\n   mappings.\n4. Use **Tokens** to create and manage the directory credential.\n\nIf **User provisioning** is absent, do not infer that SCIM is enabled. Confirm\nthe organization entitlement and application capability with the application\nowner. For automation, use the SCIM configuration and token API references\nlinked from this section.\n\n## Confirm the prerequisites\n\n- The organization type allows SCIM. The provisioning record has no separate\n  `scimEnabled` switch.\n- Enterprise sign-in works for a representative directory-managed person.\n- You have selected a least-privileged default organization role.\n- Any organization units referenced by the directory already exist.\n- You know whether trusted directory assertions verify email and whether\n  directory deactivation should change application access.\n\n## Configure the lifecycle decisions\n\nThe configuration below is projected from the maintained SCIM resource\nspecification and schema. The API reference remains authoritative for its exact\nrequest shape; this table explains what each value changes operationally.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-scim-provisioning#configurationMarkdown}}\n\nThe standard **Organization owner** and **Organization administrator** roles\ncannot be SCIM defaults. Review every custom role’s effective inheritance before\nusing it for automatic provisioning.\n\n### Example: cautious first configuration\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"autoCreateUsers\": true,\n  \"autoVerifyEmail\": true,\n  \"autoDeactivateUsers\": false,\n  \"defaultRole\": \"ORG_MEMBER\",\n  \"attributeMapping\": {\n    \"email\": \"emails[primary eq true].value\",\n    \"firstName\": \"name.givenName\",\n    \"lastName\": \"name.familyName\",\n    \"displayName\": \"displayName\"\n  }\n}\n~~~\n\nThis example deliberately leaves automatic deactivation off for the first\ncontrolled tests. It is not a recommended permanent policy: before production,\ndecide who owns leaver access and prove the multi-organization consequence\ndescribed below. Replace the example role with one from this application’s\n[Roles and permissions](/user-administration/roles-and-permissions) page.\n\n## Create the directory credential\n\nUse the application’s public API origin with the SCIM base path:\n\n~~~text\n/api/v1/scim/v2\n~~~\n\nSend a dedicated bearer token:\n\n~~~http\nAuthorization: Bearer SCIM_TOKEN\n~~~\n\nCreate a separate token for each directory connection and environment. The\nplaintext secret is returned once; store it immediately in the identity\nprovider’s secret store. Keep it out of source control, screenshots, logs,\ntickets and reusable examples.\n\nThe current request budget is **300 requests per minute per token**. When the\nservice returns a rate limit, follow its retry information and reduce\nconcurrency instead of starting parallel retries.\n\n## Treat deactivation as a high-impact choice\n\nThe current deactivation path marks both the global user and the addressed\norganization membership inactive. For a person who belongs to several\norganizations, this can affect more than the directory-owned membership. Test\nthat case before production rollout. A later `active:true` does not prove that\nthe organization membership was restored; verify both layers before announcing\nrecovery.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Configure SCIM provisioning\n\nConfigure the lifecycle rules and a dedicated credential before you send any\nproduction user. This page is for an organization administrator working with\nthe identity team that owns the directory connection.\n\n## What you need and what success looks like\n\n| | |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Who performs this task** | An organization owner or administrator together with the identity-directory owner |\n| **Where the configuration applies** | One selected organization and one directory environment |\n| **Before you begin** | Prove enterprise sign-in, choose lifecycle defaults, create any mapped units and prepare a protected secret store |\n| **Successful result** | The provisioning configuration and a dedicated active token exist, and a controlled SCIM user operation produces the expected application state |\n\n## Open SCIM administration\n\n1. Select the organization the directory will manage.\n2. Open **Settings**, then the organization’s **User provisioning** area.\n3. Use **Provisioning** for lifecycle defaults, attribute mappings and unit\n   mappings.\n4. Use **Tokens** to create and manage the directory credential.\n\nIf **User provisioning** is absent, do not infer that SCIM is enabled. Confirm\nthe organization entitlement and application capability with the application\nowner. For automation, use the SCIM configuration and token API references\nlinked from this section.\n\n## Confirm the prerequisites\n\n- The organization type allows SCIM. The provisioning record has no separate\n  `scimEnabled` switch.\n- Enterprise sign-in works for a representative directory-managed person.\n- You have selected a least-privileged default organization role.\n- Any organization units referenced by the directory already exist.\n- You know whether trusted directory assertions verify email and whether\n  directory deactivation should change application access.\n\n## Configure the lifecycle decisions\n\nThe configuration below is projected from the maintained SCIM resource\nspecification and schema. The API reference remains authoritative for its exact\nrequest shape; this table explains what each value changes operationally.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-scim-provisioning#configurationMarkdown}}\n\nThe standard **Organization owner** and **Organization administrator** roles\ncannot be SCIM defaults. Review every custom role’s effective inheritance before\nusing it for automatic provisioning.\n\n### Example: cautious first configuration\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"autoCreateUsers\": true,\n  \"autoVerifyEmail\": true,\n  \"autoDeactivateUsers\": false,\n  \"defaultRole\": \"ORG_MEMBER\",\n  \"attributeMapping\": {\n    \"email\": \"emails[primary eq true].value\",\n    \"firstName\": \"name.givenName\",\n    \"lastName\": \"name.familyName\",\n    \"displayName\": \"displayName\"\n  }\n}\n~~~\n\nThis example deliberately leaves automatic deactivation off for the first\ncontrolled tests. It is not a recommended permanent policy: before production,\ndecide who owns leaver access and prove the multi-organization consequence\ndescribed below. Replace the example role with one from this application’s\n[Roles and permissions](/user-administration/roles-and-permissions) page.\n\n## Create the directory credential\n\nUse the application’s public API origin with the SCIM base path:\n\n~~~text\n/api/v1/scim/v2\n~~~\n\nSend a dedicated bearer token:\n\n~~~http\nAuthorization: Bearer SCIM_TOKEN\n~~~\n\nCreate a separate token for each directory connection and environment. The\nplaintext secret is returned once; store it immediately in the identity\nprovider’s secret store. Keep it out of source control, screenshots, logs,\ntickets and reusable examples.\n\nThe current request budget is **6,000 requests per minute per token**. It is\nsized for how identity providers really push: neither Microsoft Entra ID nor\nOkta uses SCIM Bulk, so a first sync arrives as a burst of individual requests.\nWhen the service returns a rate limit, it states an integer `Retry-After` in\nseconds; follow it instead of starting parallel retries.\n\n## Treat deactivation as a high-impact choice\n\nDeactivation withdraws the person's membership in **this organization only**,\ntogether with the access that membership conferred. Their account and their\nmemberships in other organizations are not touched: one organization's\ndirectory cannot lock a person out of another.\n\nA later `active:true` restores the membership with the organization's\n**current default role**, not the roles the person held before. Re-grant any\nadditional role deliberately. A person whose account was disabled by the\napplication operator is not re-enabled by the directory; restoring them is the\noperator's decision.";
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-    readonly markdown: "# Provision users from Microsoft Entra ID\n\nConnect one Microsoft Entra enterprise application to one application\norganization. Entra decides which assigned people should exist; SCIM creates or\nupdates their application identities and organization memberships. **This\nconnection provisions access—it does not configure how those people sign in.**\nConfigure and test single sign-on separately.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  directory[\"Active Directory or another HR source\"] --> entra[\"Microsoft Entra ID\"]\n  entra -->|\"SCIM 2.0 over HTTPS\"| endpoint[\"Application SCIM endpoint\"]\n  endpoint --> identity[\"User profile\"]\n  endpoint --> membership[\"Organization membership and role\"]\n  endpoint -. \"department on supported operations\" .-> unit[\"Organization-unit assignments\"]\n~~~\n\nIf your source is on-premises Active Directory Domain Services, synchronize it\nto Entra first. The application does not accept LDAP traffic at its SCIM\nendpoint.\n\n## Before you configure Entra\n\n- Create a non-production organization or select a small pilot organization.\n- Verify that the pilot person can sign in by the organization’s intended\n  authentication method.\n- Create the application’s SCIM provisioning configuration and a **dedicated\n  token for this Entra connection**.\n- Choose a non-administrative default role. Do not provision broad access merely\n  to make the first test pass.\n- Decide whether Entra’s `department` value should control organization-unit\n  access. Leave unit mapping off until the operation behavior below is proven.\n\n## Create the enterprise application\n\n1. In the Microsoft Entra admin center, open **Enterprise applications** and\n   create or select the application used for provisioning.\n2. Open **Provisioning**, choose an automatic provisioning mode, and start a new\n   configuration.\n3. Set **Tenant URL** to the application’s public API origin followed by:\n\n   ~~~text\n   /api/v1/scim/v2\n   ~~~\n\n4. Set **Secret Token** to the plaintext SCIM token returned by the application.\n   It is a bearer credential; store it in Entra and your approved secret-recovery\n   process, not in a ticket or documentation screenshot.\n5. Run **Test Connection**.\n\nEntra’s connection test queries a randomly generated, non-existent user. A\ncorrect empty result is HTTP 200 with a SCIM `ListResponse` and zero resources.\nThat proves URL, TLS, token and basic query compatibility. **It does not prove\nrole assignment, deactivation, department changes or sign-in.**\n\n## Configure the user mappings\n\nKeep the first mapping small and observable:\n\n| Entra source | SCIM target | Decision to verify |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `userPrincipalName` or a verified mail attribute | `userName` | Must be stable and unique for the person |\n| `mail` | `emails[type eq \"work\"].value` | Must resolve to an admitted organization domain when domain restrictions exist |\n| `givenName` | `name.givenName` | Check accents and empty values |\n| `surname` | `name.familyName` | Check the real payload, not the portal preview alone |\n| `displayName` | `displayName` | Decide which system owns later changes |\n| Account-enabled expression | `active` | Test disable and re-enable as separate access events |\n| `department` | Enterprise User `department` | Enable only if department is an access-control authority |\n\nThis application currently exposes **Users**, not SCIM **Groups**. Disable group\nobject provisioning and Push Groups-style expectations. Entra groups may still\nbe useful on the Entra side to decide who is assigned to the enterprise\napplication, but they are not imported as application groups.\n\n## Treat department-to-unit mapping as a controlled rollout\n\nThe application reconciles organization units on direct `POST /Users` and full\n`PUT /Users/{id}` operations. It does **not** currently reconcile units on\n`PATCH` or `Bulk`. Entra can use PATCH for attribute changes, so a successful\nprofile update does not prove that moving a person between departments removed\ntheir former unit access.\n\nBefore making department authoritative:\n\n1. Map one test department to one existing organization unit.\n2. Use **Provision on demand** for a pilot person and record the SCIM operation\n   visible in the application/provider evidence.\n3. Change the person’s department.\n4. Confirm both the new assignment and removal of the old assignment in the\n   application—not only a successful Entra job.\n5. If Entra sends PATCH, leave automatic unit reconciliation disabled until the\n   application supports that operation or your integration deliberately sends a\n   tested full replacement.\n\n## Roll out and operate\n\n- Start with **Sync only assigned users and groups** and assign a small pilot\n  population. This scopes Entra’s source population; it does not add SCIM Group\n  support to the application.\n- Verify in the application: user profile, membership status, organization role,\n  unit assignments and sign-in.\n- Review Entra provisioning logs for the request and response associated with\n  each pilot person. Preserve provider job identifiers, not bearer tokens.\n- Configure provisioning-failure notifications and review Microsoft’s\n  accidental-deletion prevention before broad assignment.\n- Rotate a token as an immediate credential cutover: update Entra promptly and\n  run the connection test again.\n\n## Microsoft documentation to keep with the runbook\n\n- Use Microsoft’s [provision users and groups with SCIM](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/app-provisioning/use-scim-to-provision-users-and-groups)\n  guide for current Entra portal controls, attribute mappings, test connection\n  and provisioning behavior. The application-specific limits on this page\n  still take precedence over generic provider capabilities.\n- Use [how Microsoft Entra provisioning works](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/app-provisioning/how-provisioning-works)\n  to understand the provider’s synchronization cycle and the path from a\n  connected source such as Active Directory to an enterprise application.\n\nRecord the reviewed provider-documentation date in the production runbook;\nportal labels and provider behavior can change independently of the application.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Provision users from Microsoft Entra ID\n\nConnect one Microsoft Entra enterprise application to one application\norganization. Entra decides which assigned people should exist; SCIM creates or\nupdates their application identities and organization memberships. **This\nconnection provisions access—it does not configure how those people sign in.**\nConfigure and test single sign-on separately.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  directory[\"Active Directory or another HR source\"] --> entra[\"Microsoft Entra ID\"]\n  entra -->|\"SCIM 2.0 over HTTPS\"| endpoint[\"Application SCIM endpoint\"]\n  endpoint --> identity[\"User profile\"]\n  endpoint --> membership[\"Organization membership and role\"]\n  endpoint -. \"department on supported operations\" .-> unit[\"Organization-unit assignments\"]\n~~~\n\nIf your source is on-premises Active Directory Domain Services, synchronize it\nto Entra first. The application does not accept LDAP traffic at its SCIM\nendpoint.\n\n## Before you configure Entra\n\n- Create a non-production organization or select a small pilot organization.\n- Verify that the pilot person can sign in by the organization’s intended\n  authentication method.\n- Create the application’s SCIM provisioning configuration and a **dedicated\n  token for this Entra connection**.\n- Choose a non-administrative default role. Do not provision broad access merely\n  to make the first test pass.\n- Decide whether Entra’s `department` value should control organization-unit\n  access. Leave unit mapping off until the operation behavior below is proven.\n\n## Create the enterprise application\n\n1. In the Microsoft Entra admin center, open **Enterprise applications** and\n   create or select the application used for provisioning.\n2. Open **Provisioning**, choose an automatic provisioning mode, and start a new\n   configuration.\n3. Set **Tenant URL** to the application’s public API origin followed by:\n\n   ~~~text\n   /api/v1/scim/v2\n   ~~~\n\n4. Set **Secret Token** to the plaintext SCIM token returned by the application.\n   It is a bearer credential; store it in Entra and your approved secret-recovery\n   process, not in a ticket or documentation screenshot.\n5. Run **Test Connection**.\n\nEntra’s connection test queries a randomly generated, non-existent user. A\ncorrect empty result is HTTP 200 with a SCIM `ListResponse` and zero resources.\nThat proves URL, TLS, token and basic query compatibility. **It does not prove\nrole assignment, deactivation, department changes or sign-in.**\n\n## Configure the user mappings\n\nKeep the first mapping small and observable:\n\n| Entra source | SCIM target | Decision to verify |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `userPrincipalName` or a verified mail attribute | `userName` | Must be stable and unique for the person |\n| `mail` | `emails[type eq \"work\"].value` | Must resolve to an admitted organization domain when domain restrictions exist |\n| `givenName` | `name.givenName` | Check accents and empty values |\n| `surname` | `name.familyName` | Check the real payload, not the portal preview alone |\n| `displayName` | `displayName` | Decide which system owns later changes |\n| Account-enabled expression | `active` | Test disable and re-enable as separate access events |\n| `department` | Enterprise User `department` | Enable only if department is an access-control authority |\n\nThis application exposes **Users** and **Groups**. A pushed Entra group becomes\nan organization UNIT, and its members become assignments in that unit carrying\nthe unit role configured on the SCIM provisioning configuration — it does not\nbecome a role or a permission set. Enable group provisioning only if you intend\nyour directory's groups to define unit access; leave it off and Entra groups\nremain purely an Entra-side way to decide who is assigned to the enterprise\napplication.\n\nTwo consequences to plan for. A group this application did not create is never\nadopted, so an Entra group whose name matches a unit an administrator authored\ncreates a second unit rather than taking over the first. And a group Entra\ndeletes takes its unit, and every assignment in it, with it.\n\nWhile the directory is connected, a unit it created is **managed by the\ndirectory**: its name and its members are refused if changed in this\napplication, because the next push would put them back. The organization-units\nscreen marks such a unit with its source (SCIM) and the directory's own group\nidentifier. Rename the group, or change who is in it, in Entra. An assignment's\nunit role, and the unit's code, type, status and position, are not\ndirectory-managed and stay editable here. If the directory is disconnected —\nevery SCIM token revoked — the unit becomes editable like any other.\n\n## Treat department-to-unit mapping as a controlled rollout\n\nThe application reconciles organization units on `POST /Users`, on full\n`PUT /Users/{id}`, and on a `PATCH` that sets or removes the department — and\non the same operations inside `Bulk`. A PATCH that does not touch the department\nleaves unit assignments unchanged. Entra sends PATCH for attribute changes, so\nconfirm that a department move actually reaches the application as a department\nchange before relying on it to remove former unit access.\n\nBefore making department authoritative:\n\n1. Map one test department to one existing organization unit.\n2. Use **Provision on demand** for a pilot person and record the SCIM operation\n   visible in the application/provider evidence.\n3. Change the person’s department.\n4. Confirm both the new assignment and removal of the old assignment in the\n   application—not only a successful Entra job.\n5. If Entra sends PATCH, leave automatic unit reconciliation disabled until the\n   application supports that operation or your integration deliberately sends a\n   tested full replacement.\n\n## Roll out and operate\n\n- Start with **Sync only assigned users and groups** and assign a small pilot\n  population. This scopes Entra’s source population; it does not add SCIM Group\n  support to the application.\n- Verify in the application: user profile, membership status, organization role,\n  unit assignments and sign-in.\n- Review Entra provisioning logs for the request and response associated with\n  each pilot person. Preserve provider job identifiers, not bearer tokens.\n- Configure provisioning-failure notifications and review Microsoft’s\n  accidental-deletion prevention before broad assignment.\n- Rotate a token as an immediate credential cutover: update Entra promptly and\n  run the connection test again.\n\n## Microsoft documentation to keep with the runbook\n\n- Use Microsoft’s [provision users and groups with SCIM](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/app-provisioning/use-scim-to-provision-users-and-groups)\n  guide for current Entra portal controls, attribute mappings, test connection\n  and provisioning behavior. The application-specific limits on this page\n  still take precedence over generic provider capabilities.\n- Use [how Microsoft Entra provisioning works](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/app-provisioning/how-provisioning-works)\n  to understand the provider’s synchronization cycle and the path from a\n  connected source such as Active Directory to an enterprise application.\n\nRecord the reviewed provider-documentation date in the production runbook;\nportal labels and provider behavior can change independently of the application.";
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-    readonly markdown: "# Provision users from Okta\n\nUse an Okta SCIM 2.0 application to create, update and deactivate people in one\napplication organization. The Okta assignment determines who is provisioned;\nthe application’s SCIM configuration determines the role and lifecycle effects.\nSign-on configuration remains a separate SSO decision.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Keep Okta assignment, provisioning and application access distinct\n  accDescr: An Okta administrator assigns a person or population to the Okta application. Okta sends SCIM User operations to the application. The application maintains the user profile and organization membership, applies the configured default role, and optionally reconciles a mapped department on supported operations. The person signs in through a separately configured method.\n  source[\"Okta user and assignment\"] --> provision[\"Okta provisioning connector\"]\n  provision -->|\"SCIM User operations\"| endpoint[\"Application SCIM endpoint\"]\n  endpoint --> profile[\"User profile\"]\n  endpoint --> membership[\"Organization membership and default role\"]\n  endpoint -. \"mapped department on supported operations\" .-> units[\"Organization-unit access\"]\n  signin[\"Separate sign-in or SSO journey\"] --> membership\n~~~\n\nThe Okta assignment defines the population. It does not choose the\napplication role, import an Okta group as an application group, or prove that\nthe person can sign in. Verify those outcomes separately during the pilot.\n\n## Choose the correct Okta integration shape\n\nFor a private connection, create or use a **SCIM 2.0 Test App (Header Auth)** or\nanother Okta application whose provisioning connector lets you supply a SCIM\nbase URL and bearer token. If the application later has a reviewed Okta\nIntegration Network entry, follow that entry instead of duplicating it.\n\nThe application accepts SCIM **User** resources. It does not currently expose a\nSCIM Group resource, so do not enable Push Groups or depend on group-object\nimports. An Okta group can still control which users are assigned to the Okta\napplication.\n\n## Connect Okta\n\n1. In the Okta Admin Console, open the application’s **Provisioning** settings.\n2. Enable API integration and choose bearer/header authentication.\n3. Set the SCIM connector base URL to the application’s public API origin plus\n   `/api/v1/scim/v2`.\n4. Paste a dedicated application-issued SCIM token into the API token field.\n5. Run **Test API Credentials**.\n\nThe credential test is a transport and authorization test. Complete a pilot\ncreate, update and deactivate before treating the connection as ready.\n\n## Configure provisioning actions\n\nEnable only the actions you are prepared to verify:\n\n| Okta **To App** action | Application effect to test |\n| --- | --- |\n| Create Users | Creates or links the user, then creates the organization membership with the configured default role |\n| Update User Attributes | Updates maintained profile values; inspect whether Okta used PUT or PATCH |\n| Deactivate Users | Normally sends `active:false`; verify the application user and organization membership consequences |\n| Sync Password | **Keep disabled.** The SCIM service does not accept password changes |\n\nUse a stable, unique Okta attribute for `userName`. Map the work email, given\nname, family name and display name explicitly. When verified-domain restrictions\nexist, ensure the resolved work email is admitted before the pilot.\n\n### Department and organization units\n\nMap Okta’s department to the SCIM Enterprise User extension only when it is\nauthoritative enough to change access. Then map exact department values to\nexisting application organization units.\n\n> **Operation limitation:** organization-unit reconciliation currently runs for\n> direct user creation and full replacement. It does not run for PATCH or Bulk.\n> Capture the operation Okta sends for a department change and prove that the\n> old unit assignment is removed before production rollout.\n\n## Prove one complete lifecycle\n\n1. Assign one pilot user to the Okta application.\n2. Confirm the person appears in the intended application organization with the\n   approved role—not an administrator role.\n3. Change one mapped profile value and confirm it in the application.\n4. If unit mapping is enabled, move the pilot between two mapped departments and\n   confirm both addition and removal.\n5. Unassign or deactivate the pilot. Confirm the user and membership state in\n   the application and verify the effect on any other organization membership.\n6. Reassign the pilot. Confirm that the organization membership is usable again;\n   a globally active user alone is not sufficient proof.\n\nUse Okta’s **System Log** and provisioning task details to correlate failures.\nRecord time, Okta user/application identifiers, SCIM operation, HTTP status,\nredacted SCIM error and resulting application state. Never record the API token.\n\n## Okta documentation to keep with the runbook\n\n- Use Okta’s [connect a private SCIM integration](https://developer.okta.com/docs/guides/scim-provisioning-integration-connect/main/)\n  guide for current Admin Console fields and connector setup.\n- Use the [Okta SCIM protocol reference](https://developer.okta.com/docs/api/openapi/okta-scim/guides)\n  when diagnosing the operation, filter, payload or response Okta expects.\n- Use [Understanding SCIM](https://developer.okta.com/docs/concepts/scim/)\n  to align directory and application owners on assignment, provisioning and\n  deprovisioning responsibilities.\n\nKeep the application profile on this page beside those provider references:\nOkta’s support for a feature does not mean this application exposes it.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Provision users from Okta\n\nUse an Okta SCIM 2.0 application to create, update and deactivate people in one\napplication organization. The Okta assignment determines who is provisioned;\nthe application’s SCIM configuration determines the role and lifecycle effects.\nSign-on configuration remains a separate SSO decision.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Keep Okta assignment, provisioning and application access distinct\n  accDescr: An Okta administrator assigns a person or population to the Okta application. Okta sends SCIM User operations to the application. The application maintains the user profile and organization membership, applies the configured default role, and optionally reconciles a mapped department on supported operations. The person signs in through a separately configured method.\n  source[\"Okta user and assignment\"] --> provision[\"Okta provisioning connector\"]\n  provision -->|\"SCIM User operations\"| endpoint[\"Application SCIM endpoint\"]\n  endpoint --> profile[\"User profile\"]\n  endpoint --> membership[\"Organization membership and default role\"]\n  endpoint -. \"mapped department on supported operations\" .-> units[\"Organization-unit access\"]\n  signin[\"Separate sign-in or SSO journey\"] --> membership\n~~~\n\nThe Okta assignment defines the population. It does not choose the\napplication role, import an Okta group as an application group, or prove that\nthe person can sign in. Verify those outcomes separately during the pilot.\n\n## Choose the correct Okta integration shape\n\nFor a private connection, create or use a **SCIM 2.0 Test App (Header Auth)** or\nanother Okta application whose provisioning connector lets you supply a SCIM\nbase URL and bearer token. If the application later has a reviewed Okta\nIntegration Network entry, follow that entry instead of duplicating it.\n\nThe application accepts SCIM **User** and **Group** resources. A pushed group\nbecomes an organization UNIT rather than a role: its members receive the unit\nrole configured on the SCIM provisioning configuration, which confines which\nrecords they reach and never widens their permissions. Enable Push Groups only\nif that is what you intend; otherwise an Okta group can still control which users\nare assigned to the Okta application without being pushed.\n\nNote that Okta creates a group without an `externalId`, which this application\nhandles: the group is identified by the id returned when it was created.\n\nA pushed group's name and members are managed by Okta while it stays connected:\nchanging either in this application is refused, because the next push would\nrestore it. Make those changes in Okta; unit roles and the unit's other settings\nstay editable here.\n\n## Connect Okta\n\n1. In the Okta Admin Console, open the application’s **Provisioning** settings.\n2. Enable API integration and choose bearer/header authentication.\n3. Set the SCIM connector base URL to the application’s public API origin plus\n   `/api/v1/scim/v2`.\n4. Paste a dedicated application-issued SCIM token into the API token field.\n5. Run **Test API Credentials**.\n\nThe credential test is a transport and authorization test. Complete a pilot\ncreate, update and deactivate before treating the connection as ready.\n\n## Configure provisioning actions\n\nEnable only the actions you are prepared to verify:\n\n| Okta **To App** action | Application effect to test |\n| --- | --- |\n| Create Users | Creates or links the user, then creates the organization membership with the configured default role |\n| Update User Attributes | Updates maintained profile values; inspect whether Okta used PUT or PATCH |\n| Deactivate Users | Normally sends `active:false`; verify the application user and organization membership consequences |\n| Sync Password | **Keep disabled.** The SCIM service does not accept password changes |\n\nUse a stable, unique Okta attribute for `userName`. Map the work email, given\nname, family name and display name explicitly. When verified-domain restrictions\nexist, ensure the resolved work email is admitted before the pilot.\n\n### Department and organization units\n\nMap Okta’s department to the SCIM Enterprise User extension only when it is\nauthoritative enough to change access. Then map exact department values to\nexisting application organization units.\n\n> **Operation boundary:** organization-unit reconciliation runs on user creation,\n> full replacement, and a PATCH that sets or removes the department, including the\n> same operations inside Bulk. A PATCH that does not touch the department leaves\n> unit assignments unchanged. Capture the operation Okta sends for a department\n> change and prove that the old unit assignment is removed before production rollout.\n\n## Prove one complete lifecycle\n\n1. Assign one pilot user to the Okta application.\n2. Confirm the person appears in the intended application organization with the\n   approved role—not an administrator role.\n3. Change one mapped profile value and confirm it in the application.\n4. If unit mapping is enabled, move the pilot between two mapped departments and\n   confirm both addition and removal.\n5. Unassign or deactivate the pilot. Confirm the user and membership state in\n   the application and verify the effect on any other organization membership.\n6. Reassign the pilot. Confirm that the organization membership is usable again;\n   a globally active user alone is not sufficient proof.\n\nUse Okta’s **System Log** and provisioning task details to correlate failures.\nRecord time, Okta user/application identifiers, SCIM operation, HTTP status,\nredacted SCIM error and resulting application state. Never record the API token.\n\n## Okta documentation to keep with the runbook\n\n- Use Okta’s [connect a private SCIM integration](https://developer.okta.com/docs/guides/scim-provisioning-integration-connect/main/)\n  guide for current Admin Console fields and connector setup.\n- Use the [Okta SCIM protocol reference](https://developer.okta.com/docs/api/openapi/okta-scim/guides)\n  when diagnosing the operation, filter, payload or response Okta expects.\n- Use [Understanding SCIM](https://developer.okta.com/docs/concepts/scim/)\n  to align directory and application owners on assignment, provisioning and\n  deprovisioning responsibilities.\n\nKeep the application profile on this page beside those provider references:\nOkta’s support for a feature does not mean this application exposes it.";
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-    readonly markdown: "# Provision from LDAP or Active Directory\n\nLDAP and SCIM solve different parts of directory integration. LDAP is a\ndirectory access protocol; this application exposes an HTTPS SCIM 2.0 service.\n**Do not send LDAP requests to the SCIM URL and do not expose an internal LDAP\nserver to the application.** Place a provisioning service or controlled bridge\nbetween the source directory and SCIM.\n\n## Choose an architecture\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  subgraph source[\"Directory source\"]\n    ad[\"Active Directory Domain Services\"]\n    ldap[\"LDAP directory\"]\n  end\n  ad --> entra[\"Microsoft Entra synchronization and provisioning\"]\n  ldap --> bridge[\"Managed provisioning agent or owned bridge\"]\n  entra -->|\"HTTPS + SCIM 2.0\"| app[\"Application SCIM Users service\"]\n  bridge -->|\"HTTPS + SCIM 2.0\"| app\n~~~\n\n| Source situation | Practical route |\n| --- | --- |\n| Active Directory identities already synchronized to Microsoft Entra ID | Configure Entra enterprise-application provisioning and let Entra emit SCIM |\n| LDAP identities governed through Okta | Use the supported Okta directory/agent path, then configure Okta’s application provisioning connector |\n| Another LDAP directory with a supported identity-governance product | Use that product’s SCIM connector after validating this application’s implemented profile |\n| No provider can emit the required SCIM profile | Build and operate a narrow LDAP-to-SCIM bridge with explicit ownership, tests and monitoring |\n\nThe last option is software you own. It should not be treated as a configuration\nscript: it becomes an identity lifecycle and access-control component.\n\n## Define the attribute transformation\n\nRead the source directory using its documented schema, then emit a standards-\ncompliant SCIM User. A common starting point is:\n\n| LDAP / Active Directory value | SCIM value | Required decision |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `userPrincipalName` or approved login attribute | `userName` | Stable uniqueness and rename policy |\n| `mail` | `emails[type eq \"work\"].value` | Missing email and verified-domain policy |\n| `givenName` | `name.givenName` | Empty and internationalized values |\n| `sn` | `name.familyName` | Empty-value behavior |\n| `displayName` | `displayName` | Which system owns later edits |\n| `department` | Enterprise User `department` | Whether it is authoritative for unit access |\n| Disabled-account state | `active:false` | Global user and membership deactivation consequence |\n\nThese are mapping decisions, not guaranteed attributes in every LDAP schema.\nInspect representative entries and document the source object classes,\nattribute ownership and null behavior.\n\n### Example SCIM document emitted by a bridge\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"schemas\": [\n    \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User\",\n    \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:extension:enterprise:2.0:User\"\n  ],\n  \"externalId\": \"4fd9cc8d-7f42-4ab4-9036-07c94b2ac663\",\n  \"userName\": \"alex.morgan@example.com\",\n  \"active\": true,\n  \"name\": {\n    \"givenName\": \"Alex\",\n    \"familyName\": \"Morgan\"\n  },\n  \"emails\": [\n    { \"type\": \"work\", \"primary\": true, \"value\": \"alex.morgan@example.com\" }\n  ],\n  \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:extension:enterprise:2.0:User\": {\n    \"department\": \"Engineering\"\n  }\n}\n~~~\n\n## Requirements for an owned bridge\n\nA production bridge needs all of the following:\n\n- TLS validation for LDAP and HTTPS, and secrets held in an approved vault;\n- a durable relationship between source identifiers, SCIM `externalId` and the\n  application’s returned SCIM resource identifier;\n- deterministic create-versus-update matching and a documented rename policy;\n- bounded pagination, checkpoints, retry with backoff and idempotent replay;\n- explicit handling for disable, delete, restore and a person missing from a\n  source query;\n- redacted operational evidence linking one source change to one SCIM response;\n- reconciliation that detects drift rather than repeatedly overwriting it;\n- a tested response to rate limiting, token rotation and partial batch failure.\n\nDo not use Bulk for a first implementation merely for speed. The application\nsupports a bounded Bulk request, but Bulk currently does not perform\norganization-unit reconciliation. Start with observable individual operations.\n\n## Validate before production\n\nRun a positive and negative lifecycle: create an admitted user, reject a user\nfrom a disallowed domain when restrictions exist, update the profile, change a\ndepartment, disable the source account and restore it. At every step compare\nthe directory state, emitted SCIM document, HTTP result, application user,\nmembership, role and unit assignments.\n\n## Standards and provider documentation\n\n- [RFC 4511](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4511.html) defines LDAP’s\n  protocol. It explains the source-side boundary; it does not make an LDAP\n  directory a SCIM provider.\n- [RFC 7643](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7643.html) and\n  [RFC 7644](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html) define the SCIM\n  resource and protocol boundaries the bridge must emit.\n- Microsoft documents the path from connected systems to SCIM in\n  [How application provisioning works](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/app-provisioning/how-provisioning-works).\n- For an Okta-governed directory, compare the bridge design with Okta’s\n  [private SCIM integration guide](https://developer.okta.com/docs/guides/scim-provisioning-integration-connect/main/)\n  and [SCIM protocol reference](https://developer.okta.com/docs/api/openapi/okta-scim/guides).\n\nThese references define the systems on either side of the bridge. The bridge’s\nmatching, checkpoint, retry and reconciliation behavior remains an operated\ncomponent your organization must specify and test.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Provision from LDAP or Active Directory\n\nLDAP and SCIM solve different parts of directory integration. LDAP is a\ndirectory access protocol; this application exposes an HTTPS SCIM 2.0 service.\n**Do not send LDAP requests to the SCIM URL and do not expose an internal LDAP\nserver to the application.** Place a provisioning service or controlled bridge\nbetween the source directory and SCIM.\n\n## Choose an architecture\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  subgraph source[\"Directory source\"]\n    ad[\"Active Directory Domain Services\"]\n    ldap[\"LDAP directory\"]\n  end\n  ad --> entra[\"Microsoft Entra synchronization and provisioning\"]\n  ldap --> bridge[\"Managed provisioning agent or owned bridge\"]\n  entra -->|\"HTTPS + SCIM 2.0\"| app[\"Application SCIM Users service\"]\n  bridge -->|\"HTTPS + SCIM 2.0\"| app\n~~~\n\n| Source situation | Practical route |\n| --- | --- |\n| Active Directory identities already synchronized to Microsoft Entra ID | Configure Entra enterprise-application provisioning and let Entra emit SCIM |\n| LDAP identities governed through Okta | Use the supported Okta directory/agent path, then configure Okta’s application provisioning connector |\n| Another LDAP directory with a supported identity-governance product | Use that product’s SCIM connector after validating this application’s implemented profile |\n| No provider can emit the required SCIM profile | Build and operate a narrow LDAP-to-SCIM bridge with explicit ownership, tests and monitoring |\n\nThe last option is software you own. It should not be treated as a configuration\nscript: it becomes an identity lifecycle and access-control component.\n\n## Define the attribute transformation\n\nRead the source directory using its documented schema, then emit a standards-\ncompliant SCIM User. A common starting point is:\n\n| LDAP / Active Directory value | SCIM value | Required decision |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `userPrincipalName` or approved login attribute | `userName` | Stable uniqueness and rename policy |\n| `mail` | `emails[type eq \"work\"].value` | Missing email and verified-domain policy |\n| `givenName` | `name.givenName` | Empty and internationalized values |\n| `sn` | `name.familyName` | Empty-value behavior |\n| `displayName` | `displayName` | Which system owns later edits |\n| `department` | Enterprise User `department` | Whether it is authoritative for unit access |\n| Disabled-account state | `active:false` | Withdraws the membership in this organization only; the account and other memberships stay |\n\nThese are mapping decisions, not guaranteed attributes in every LDAP schema.\nInspect representative entries and document the source object classes,\nattribute ownership and null behavior.\n\n### Example SCIM document emitted by a bridge\n\n~~~json\n{\n  \"schemas\": [\n    \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User\",\n    \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:extension:enterprise:2.0:User\"\n  ],\n  \"externalId\": \"4fd9cc8d-7f42-4ab4-9036-07c94b2ac663\",\n  \"userName\": \"alex.morgan@example.com\",\n  \"active\": true,\n  \"name\": {\n    \"givenName\": \"Alex\",\n    \"familyName\": \"Morgan\"\n  },\n  \"emails\": [\n    { \"type\": \"work\", \"primary\": true, \"value\": \"alex.morgan@example.com\" }\n  ],\n  \"urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:extension:enterprise:2.0:User\": {\n    \"department\": \"Engineering\"\n  }\n}\n~~~\n\n## Requirements for an owned bridge\n\nA production bridge needs all of the following:\n\n- TLS validation for LDAP and HTTPS, and secrets held in an approved vault;\n- a durable relationship between source identifiers, SCIM `externalId` and the\n  application’s returned SCIM resource identifier;\n- deterministic create-versus-update matching and a documented rename policy;\n- bounded pagination, checkpoints, retry with backoff and idempotent replay;\n- explicit handling for disable, delete, restore and a person missing from a\n  source query;\n- redacted operational evidence linking one source change to one SCIM response;\n- reconciliation that detects drift rather than repeatedly overwriting it;\n- a tested response to rate limiting, token rotation and partial batch failure.\n\nDo not use Bulk for a first implementation merely for speed. The application\nsupports a bounded Bulk request whose operations behave exactly as the same\nindividual requests, but a Bulk response reports each operation's status\nseparately, which makes failures harder to observe. Start with observable\nindividual operations.\n\n## Validate before production\n\nRun a positive and negative lifecycle: create an admitted user, reject a user\nfrom a disallowed domain when restrictions exist, update the profile, change a\ndepartment, disable the source account and restore it. At every step compare\nthe directory state, emitted SCIM document, HTTP result, application user,\nmembership, role and unit assignments.\n\n## Standards and provider documentation\n\n- [RFC 4511](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4511.html) defines LDAP’s\n  protocol. It explains the source-side boundary; it does not make an LDAP\n  directory a SCIM provider.\n- [RFC 7643](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7643.html) and\n  [RFC 7644](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7644.html) define the SCIM\n  resource and protocol boundaries the bridge must emit.\n- Microsoft documents the path from connected systems to SCIM in\n  [How application provisioning works](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/app-provisioning/how-provisioning-works).\n- For an Okta-governed directory, compare the bridge design with Okta’s\n  [private SCIM integration guide](https://developer.okta.com/docs/guides/scim-provisioning-integration-connect/main/)\n  and [SCIM protocol reference](https://developer.okta.com/docs/api/openapi/okta-scim/guides).\n\nThese references define the systems on either side of the bridge. The bridge’s\nmatching, checkpoint, retry and reconciliation behavior remains an operated\ncomponent your organization must specify and test.";
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-    readonly markdown: "# Map SCIM profiles and organization units\n\nMap the directory’s actual payload to the profile values the application needs.\nThen, only when department data should control access, map exact department\nvalues to existing organization units.\n\n## What you need and what success looks like\n\n| | |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Who performs this task** | The organization administrator and directory engineer who know the real SCIM payload |\n| **Where the mapping applies** | One organization’s SCIM provisioning configuration |\n| **Before you begin** | Capture representative non-production payloads, create every target unit and decide whether department data should be authoritative for unit assignments |\n| **Successful result** | Each required profile field resolves predictably, each approved department maps exactly once, and unmapped or malformed values have a tested outcome |\n\nOpen **Settings → User provisioning → Provisioning** for the organization, then\nedit the attribute and organization-unit mappings. Use the linked SCIM\nconfiguration API reference when the mapping is maintained by automation.\n\n## Map profile values\n\n| Application value | Built-in SCIM path |\n| --- | --- |\n| Email | `emails[0].value` |\n| Given name | `name.givenName` |\n| Family name | `name.familyName` |\n| Display name | `displayName` |\n\nCustom expressions may use dotted fields, an array index or an `eq` filter:\n\n- `name.givenName`\n- `emails[primary eq true].value`\n- `emails[type eq \"work\"].value`\n\n> **Test paths against a real directory payload.** A malformed or unmatched\n> expression does not necessarily reject the request. It can produce no value;\n> email may fall back to `userName`, the primary email or the first email,\n> while another profile field remains empty.\n\n## Understand verified email domains\n\nSCIM mirrors verified domains from the organization’s SSO configuration; it\ndoes not keep another list. A non-empty list restricts admitted email domains.\nAn empty or unavailable list leaves provisioning unrestricted by email domain.\nIf your policy requires a restriction, stop until at least one verified domain\nis visible and a deliberately invalid domain is refused.\n\n## Map a department to a unit\n\nEach mapping binds one exact directory value to one existing unit:\n\n~~~text\n\"Sales\" -> existing Sales organization unit\n~~~\n\nMatching trims surrounding whitespace but is case-sensitive. `Sales` and\n`sales` are different. The application does not search by unit name or code,\ndoes not use fuzzy matching and never creates the missing unit.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Reconcile a directory department to unit access\n  accDescr: An exact department value selects one configured unit. With a default unit role, a supported full reconciliation replaces the person's directory-managed unit assignments.\n  payload[\"SCIM User department\"] --> exact{\"Exact configured value?\"}\n  exact -->|\"Yes\"| unit[\"Existing organization unit\"]\n  unit --> role[\"Configured default unit role\"]\n  role --> replace[\"Replace desired unit assignments\"]\n  exact -->|\"No or blank\"| remove[\"No mapped desired assignment\"]\n~~~\n\nReconciliation becomes active only with at least one explicit mapping and a\ndefault unit role. On supported direct user creation and full replacement, the\ndirectory becomes authoritative: a changed, blank or unmapped department can\nremove former assignments, including manual ones. **PATCH and Bulk do not\ncurrently perform this reconciliation.** Prove the exact operation used by\nyour identity provider.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Map SCIM profiles and organization units\n\nMap the directory’s actual payload to the profile values the application needs.\nThen, only when department data should control access, map exact department\nvalues to existing organization units.\n\n## What you need and what success looks like\n\n| | |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Who performs this task** | The organization administrator and directory engineer who know the real SCIM payload |\n| **Where the mapping applies** | One organization’s SCIM provisioning configuration |\n| **Before you begin** | Capture representative non-production payloads, create every target unit and decide whether department data should be authoritative for unit assignments |\n| **Successful result** | Each required profile field resolves predictably, each approved department maps exactly once, and unmapped or malformed values have a tested outcome |\n\nOpen **Settings → User provisioning → Provisioning** for the organization, then\nedit the attribute and organization-unit mappings. Use the linked SCIM\nconfiguration API reference when the mapping is maintained by automation.\n\n## Map profile values\n\n| Application value | Built-in SCIM path |\n| --- | --- |\n| Email | `emails[0].value` |\n| Given name | `name.givenName` |\n| Family name | `name.familyName` |\n| Display name | `displayName` |\n\nCustom expressions may use dotted fields, an array index or an `eq` filter:\n\n- `name.givenName`\n- `emails[primary eq true].value`\n- `emails[type eq \"work\"].value`\n\n> **Test paths against a real directory payload.** A malformed or unmatched\n> expression does not necessarily reject the request. It can produce no value;\n> email may fall back to `userName`, the primary email or the first email,\n> while another profile field remains empty.\n\n## Understand verified email domains\n\nSCIM mirrors verified domains from the organization’s SSO configuration; it\ndoes not keep another list. A non-empty list restricts admitted email domains.\nAn empty or unavailable list leaves provisioning unrestricted by email domain.\nIf your policy requires a restriction, stop until at least one verified domain\nis visible and a deliberately invalid domain is refused.\n\n## Map a department to a unit\n\nEach mapping binds one exact directory value to one existing unit:\n\n~~~text\n\"Sales\" -> existing Sales organization unit\n~~~\n\nMatching trims surrounding whitespace but is case-sensitive. `Sales` and\n`sales` are different. The application does not search by unit name or code,\ndoes not use fuzzy matching and never creates the missing unit.\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Reconcile a directory department to unit access\n  accDescr: An exact department value selects one configured unit. With a default unit role, a supported full reconciliation replaces the person's directory-managed unit assignments.\n  payload[\"SCIM User department\"] --> exact{\"Exact configured value?\"}\n  exact -->|\"Yes\"| unit[\"Existing organization unit\"]\n  unit --> role[\"Configured default unit role\"]\n  role --> replace[\"Replace desired unit assignments\"]\n  exact -->|\"No or blank\"| remove[\"No mapped desired assignment\"]\n~~~\n\nReconciliation becomes active only with at least one explicit mapping and a\ndefault unit role. On supported direct user creation and full replacement, the\ndirectory becomes authoritative: a changed, blank or unmapped department can\nremove former assignments, including manual ones. A PATCH performs this\nreconciliation only when it sets or removes the department; Bulk operations\nbehave as the same individual requests. Prove the exact operation used by\nyour identity provider.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "user-administration/scim-validate-and-roll-out.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/scim-validate-and-roll-out";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/scim-validate-and-roll-out"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Validate and roll out SCIM\n\nDo not enable a full directory population after a successful connection check.\nUse a small controlled group and inspect the resulting user, membership, role,\nunit assignment and sign-in behavior after every change.\n\n## What you need and what success looks like\n\n| | |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Who performs this task** | The identity-directory owner, an organization administrator and the owner of the pilot population |\n| **Where validation applies** | One non-production or tightly controlled organization cohort |\n| **Before you begin** | Define expected identities, roles, units and states for every test case, plus the stop and rollback decision |\n| **Successful result** | Real SCIM operations match the expected application state for creation, update, movement, deactivation and recovery before the next cohort is enabled |\n\n> **The current connection-test and provisioning-statistics actions are not\n> readiness evidence.** Prove the integration with real controlled SCIM\n> operations and authoritative application state.\n\n## Run the validation matrix\n\n1. **Create a new person.** Verify the user state, organization membership,\n   organization role and enterprise sign-in path.\n2. **Send an existing email.** Confirm that it links to the intended identity\n   and does not create a duplicate.\n3. **Change each mapped profile value.** Inspect the destination after the\n   directory operation.\n4. **Exercise email verification.** When automatic verification is off, prove\n   the pending-verification and resend journey.\n5. **Move a department.** Use a direct full replacement, then confirm the former\n   unit assignment was removed.\n6. **Send blank, unmapped and wrong-case departments.** Verify the exact result\n   before making mapping authoritative.\n7. **Deactivate a multi-organization person.** Inspect both the global user and\n   every affected membership.\n8. **Recover the person.** Confirm that the user and intended membership are\n   both **Active** and that enterprise sign-in succeeds.\n\n## Roll out in stages\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Expand SCIM only after each cohort is verified\n  accDescr: Begin with controlled identities, then a representative pilot, then broader cohorts. Stop and reconcile differences before proceeding.\n  controlled[\"Controlled identities\"] --> pilot[\"Representative pilot\"]\n  pilot --> cohort[\"First production cohort\"]\n  cohort --> broad[\"Broader population\"]\n  controlled -.-> stop[\"Stop on unexplained difference\"]\n  pilot -.-> stop\n  cohort -.-> stop\n~~~\n\nFor each stage, name the expected count and membership states, reconcile the\nresult, document exceptions and retain a rollback decision. Do not silently\nrepair directory-owned people in the application; fix the authoritative input\nor explicitly move the person to manual ownership.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Validate and roll out SCIM\n\nDo not enable a full directory population after a successful connection check.\nUse a small controlled group and inspect the resulting user, membership, role,\nunit assignment and sign-in behavior after every change.\n\n## What you need and what success looks like\n\n| | |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Who performs this task** | The identity-directory owner, an organization administrator and the owner of the pilot population |\n| **Where validation applies** | One non-production or tightly controlled organization cohort |\n| **Before you begin** | Define expected identities, roles, units and states for every test case, plus the stop and rollback decision |\n| **Successful result** | Real SCIM operations match the expected application state for creation, update, movement, deactivation and recovery before the next cohort is enabled |\n\n> **The current connection-test and provisioning-statistics actions are not\n> readiness evidence.** Prove the integration with real controlled SCIM\n> operations and authoritative application state.\n\n## Run the validation matrix\n\n1. **Create a new person.** Verify the user state, organization membership,\n   organization role and enterprise sign-in path.\n2. **Send an existing email.** Confirm that it links to the intended identity\n   and does not create a duplicate.\n3. **Change each mapped profile value.** Inspect the destination after the\n   directory operation.\n4. **Exercise email verification.** When automatic verification is off, prove\n   the pending-verification and resend journey.\n5. **Move a department.** Use a direct full replacement, then confirm the former\n   unit assignment was removed.\n6. **Send blank, unmapped and wrong-case departments.** Verify the exact result\n   before making mapping authoritative.\n7. **Deactivate a multi-organization person.** Confirm that only this\n   organization's membership became inactive and their other memberships\n   are unchanged.\n8. **Recover the person.** Confirm that the user and intended membership are\n   both **Active** and that enterprise sign-in succeeds.\n\n## Roll out in stages\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  accTitle: Expand SCIM only after each cohort is verified\n  accDescr: Begin with controlled identities, then a representative pilot, then broader cohorts. Stop and reconcile differences before proceeding.\n  controlled[\"Controlled identities\"] --> pilot[\"Representative pilot\"]\n  pilot --> cohort[\"First production cohort\"]\n  cohort --> broad[\"Broader population\"]\n  controlled -.-> stop[\"Stop on unexplained difference\"]\n  pilot -.-> stop\n  cohort -.-> stop\n~~~\n\nFor each stage, name the expected count and membership states, reconcile the\nresult, document exceptions and retain a rollback decision. Do not silently\nrepair directory-owned people in the application; fix the authoritative input\nor explicitly move the person to manual ownership.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "user-administration/scim-operate-and-troubleshoot.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/scim-operate-and-troubleshoot";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/scim-operate-and-troubleshoot"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Operate and troubleshoot SCIM\n\nOperate SCIM as a security-sensitive directory connection: protect its token,\nreconcile outcomes from authoritative state and investigate errors before\nretrying. A request reaching the service is not proof that provisioning\nsucceeded.\n\n## What you need and what success looks like\n\n| | |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Who performs this task** | The directory operator and an organization administrator able to inspect provisioning state |\n| **Where the operation applies** | One organization, directory environment and dedicated SCIM credential |\n| **Before you begin** | Record the affected user, operation, time and redacted response; identify the authoritative owner before making a correction |\n| **Successful result** | The credential or provisioning failure is corrected, one controlled operation succeeds, and the final user, membership, role and unit state is verified |\n\nUse **Settings → User provisioning → Tokens** for token lifecycle work and\n**Provisioning** for configuration and mapping checks. The linked API references\nremain authoritative for exact automation operations and responses.\n\n## Replace or revoke a token\n\nAn in-place rotation is an **immediate cutover**. The previous secret stops\nworking with no overlap. For a planned replacement without interruption:\n\n1. create a second dedicated token;\n2. install it in the identity provider;\n3. prove it with a controlled user operation;\n4. revoke the former token; and\n5. retain only the non-secret metadata needed for review.\n\nRevocation keeps the token record and marks it inactive. A last-used time proves\nthat authenticated traffic reached the service; it does not prove that the user\nchange completed successfully.\n\n## Start from the symptom\n\n| Symptom | First checks |\n| --- | --- |\n| **401** | Token is exact, active, unexpired and sent as a bearer credential |\n| **403** | The organization type permits SCIM and the request belongs to the intended organization |\n| **409** | An existing identity or membership conflicts; inspect it instead of creating a duplicate |\n| **429** | Follow retry information and reduce concurrency |\n| Profile value is missing | Test the exact mapping expression against the real directory payload |\n| Unit did not change | Confirm exact department value and case, explicit mapping, existing unit, default role and a supported direct create/full replacement operation |\n| Person remains unable to sign in | Check enterprise sign-in, global user state and organization membership state separately |\n\n## Recover safely\n\n- Read the SCIM error returned to the identity provider before retrying.\n- Inspect the user, membership, role and unit assignments in the application.\n- Correct the directory or mapping when it owns the person; do not create a\n  manual competing state.\n- For deactivation recovery, confirm both the global user and intended\n  membership are **Active**.\n- Re-run one controlled operation and inspect its final resource state.\n\nRedact bearer tokens and unnecessary personal data before sharing payloads or\nerrors with support.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Operate and troubleshoot SCIM\n\nOperate SCIM as a security-sensitive directory connection: protect its token,\nreconcile outcomes from authoritative state and investigate errors before\nretrying. A request reaching the service is not proof that provisioning\nsucceeded.\n\n## What you need and what success looks like\n\n| | |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Who performs this task** | The directory operator and an organization administrator able to inspect provisioning state |\n| **Where the operation applies** | One organization, directory environment and dedicated SCIM credential |\n| **Before you begin** | Record the affected user, operation, time and redacted response; identify the authoritative owner before making a correction |\n| **Successful result** | The credential or provisioning failure is corrected, one controlled operation succeeds, and the final user, membership, role and unit state is verified |\n\nUse **Settings → User provisioning → Tokens** for token lifecycle work and\n**Provisioning** for configuration and mapping checks. The linked API references\nremain authoritative for exact automation operations and responses.\n\n## Replace or revoke a token\n\nAn in-place rotation is an **immediate cutover**. The previous secret stops\nworking with no overlap. For a planned replacement without interruption:\n\n1. create a second dedicated token;\n2. install it in the identity provider;\n3. prove it with a controlled user operation;\n4. revoke the former token; and\n5. retain only the non-secret metadata needed for review.\n\nRevocation keeps the token record and marks it inactive. A last-used time proves\nthat authenticated traffic reached the service; it does not prove that the user\nchange completed successfully.\n\n## Start from the symptom\n\n| Symptom | First checks |\n| --- | --- |\n| **401** | Token is exact, active, unexpired and sent as a bearer credential |\n| **403** | The organization type permits SCIM and the request belongs to the intended organization |\n| **409** | An existing identity or membership conflicts; inspect it instead of creating a duplicate |\n| **429** | Follow retry information and reduce concurrency |\n| Profile value is missing | Test the exact mapping expression against the real directory payload |\n| Unit did not change | Confirm exact department value and case, explicit mapping, existing unit, default role, and that the operation carried the department (create, full replacement, or a PATCH that sets it) |\n| Person remains unable to sign in | Check enterprise sign-in, global user state and organization membership state separately |\n\n## Recover safely\n\n- Read the SCIM error returned to the identity provider before retrying.\n- Inspect the user, membership, role and unit assignments in the application.\n- Correct the directory or mapping when it owns the person; do not create a\n  manual competing state.\n- For deactivation recovery, confirm both the global user and intended\n  membership are **Active**.\n- Re-run one controlled operation and inspect its final resource state.\n\nRedact bearer tokens and unnecessary personal data before sharing payloads or\nerrors with support.";
 }, {
     readonly managedPath: "security-and-audit/audit-trail-and-siem.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/audit-and-siem";
@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ export declare const APPLICATION_CONSUMER_DOCUMENTATION_AUTHORED_CONTENT_V1: rea
     readonly managedPath: "security-and-audit/configure-siem.md";
     readonly unitRef: "technical-documentation:unit/configure-siem-export";
     readonly sourceRefs: readonly ["saas-technical-doc:engine-content/configure-siem-export", "source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export"];
-    readonly markdown: "# Configure organization SIEM export\n\nSIEM export sends selected organization audit events to one webhook destination.\nCreate a destination dedicated to the organization and environment, then choose\nthe authentication, wire format and filters your receiver can actually verify.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| The organization security owner and SIEM owner agree on destination, TLS, authentication, event scope, format, volume, retention and a controlled test event | One organization/environment sends only the approved event set, the receiver validates and correlates it, failures are recoverable, and the destination secret remains protected |\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Configure a bounded organization SIEM export\n  accDescr: The organization and SIEM owners prepare one receiver, choose authentication and a format, select a narrow category and severity filter, keep export disabled while validating configuration, enable it for one controlled event, compare the received copy with the source audit row, then expand deliberately.\n  owners[\"Agree owners, organization and receiver\"] --> receiver[\"Prepare TLS, authentication and acknowledgement\"]\n  receiver --> format[\"Choose one receiver-supported format\"]\n  format --> filter[\"Select minimum event set and severity\"]\n  filter --> disabled[\"Save while export remains disabled\"]\n  disabled --> enable[\"Enable and perform one controlled event\"]\n  enable --> compare[\"Compare event ID, scope, time, actor and outcome\"]\n  compare --> expand[\"Expand only after volume and recovery checks\"]\n~~~\n\nSIEM export is an organization-routed copy of source audit events. Configure one\nreceiver per intended organization/environment boundary; do not use a shared\ndestination when its access and retention rules cannot preserve that separation.\n\n## Follow one event from source record to searchable copy\n\n~~~mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n  accTitle: From application audit record to searchable SIEM copy\n  accDescr: The application records an audit event, applies the organization export filter, formats one outbound event, authenticates an HTTPS request, and sends it to the receiver. A successful HTTP response acknowledges the configured delivery boundary; the SIEM then parses and indexes the copy. Operators prove completion by searching for the source event identifier. Failed delivery follows retry and dead-letter recovery without removing the source audit record.\n  participant Source as Source audit trail\n  participant Export as Organization exporter\n  participant Receiver as Receiver or relay\n  participant SIEM as SIEM index\n  actor Operator as Security operator\n  Source->>Export: Eligible audit event\n  Export->>Export: Apply filter and format one event\n  Export->>Receiver: Authenticated HTTPS request\n  alt Receiver acknowledges configured boundary\n    Receiver-->>Export: Successful HTTP response\n    Receiver->>SIEM: Parse, transform and index\n    Operator->>SIEM: Search exact eventId\n    SIEM-->>Operator: Searchable correlated copy\n  else Receiver refuses or times out\n    Receiver-->>Export: Error or timeout\n    Export->>Export: Retry, then capture recoverable failure\n  end\n~~~\n\nThere are three different facts to verify: **the source event exists**, **the\nreceiver acknowledged the request**, and **the transformed event is searchable\nin the intended index or table**. An HTTP 2xx response proves only the delivery\nboundary implemented by that receiver. It is not automatically proof that a\nparser, transformation, index or detection rule accepted the event.\n\n## Decide whether direct delivery is compatible\n\n| Receiver requirement | Recommended path | Why |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| One HTTPS request containing one JSON object, with a static header or HMAC credential | Test direct delivery | This matches the current structured-JSON worker closely |\n| A provider-specific wrapper around the event | Use a narrow relay unless the exact endpoint accepts the native envelope | The relay owns the wrapper while preserving source identifiers |\n| Short-lived OAuth access tokens or managed identity | Use a provider-side relay | Token acquisition and refresh do not belong in a static credential field |\n| A JSON array or provider batch protocol | Use a relay that batches deliberately | Current delivery is one event per request; configured batch fields are reserved |\n| A syslog, agent, queue or private-network input | Use an adapter or relay inside that boundary | The application sends outbound HTTPS webhooks, not those transports |\n| CEF, LEEF or OCSF ingestion | Test actual emitted samples with the receiver | A format name does not prove field mapping, escaping, severity or class compatibility |\n\nPrefer the smallest component that makes the contracts compatible. A relay is\nnot a generic event platform: it should authenticate before parsing, preserve\nthe source event and correlation identifiers, perform one documented\ntransformation, expose bounded health signals and fail without silently\ndiscarding the event.\n\n## Choose the delivery contract\n\nThe following table is generated from the maintained SIEM configuration schema\nand resource specification. It distinguishes enforced values from reserved\nconfiguration so an accepted field is not mistaken for working delivery\nbehavior.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#configurationMarkdown}}\n\n### Authentication values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#authenticationValuesMarkdown}}\n\n### Wire-format values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#formatValuesMarkdown}}\n\nChoose the simplest format the receiver can validate end to end:\n\n| Format | Use when | Verify before rollout |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Structured JSON | The receiver can preserve named fields and nested event data | Schema/field parsing, timestamps, identifiers and unknown-field handling |\n| CEF | The receiver has a tested CEF ingestion path | Header and extension parsing, escaping and the receiver's event classification |\n| LEEF | The receiver has a tested LEEF/QRadar path | Tab-delimited attributes, escaping and event mapping |\n| OCSF | The receiver consumes the emitted OCSF class documents | Class, activity, required fields and receiver validation for the actual event samples |\n\nDo not choose a format from its name alone. Preserve a receiver-tested sample\nfor each event family that matters to detection; syntactically accepted input\ncan still be mapped to the wrong fields or severity by the downstream product.\n\nAuthentication credentials are write-only secrets. A read returns a masked\nstored-credential marker, not the secret. Leaving that marker unchanged during\nan edit preserves the stored value; entering a new value replaces it. Never\ncopy the secret into a ticket or detection rule.\n\n## Configure filters from their exact values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#filterValuesMarkdown}}\n\nThe optional `specificEventTypes` list is an **exact identifier allowlist**.\nIt is not a substring, prefix, regular expression or wildcard filter. Add an\nidentifier only after confirming that the corresponding event is emitted in the\napplication path you operate.\n\n## Configure delivery behavior\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#deliveryValuesMarkdown}}\n\nThe current worker posts **one event per HTTP request**. Do not configure a\nreceiver, load balancer or billing estimate on the assumption that `batchSize`\nor `batchWindowSeconds` reduces request volume. The\n`includeRawEventData` and `includeDeviceContext` flags are also reserved in\nthe current runtime: changing them does not remove those fields from the emitted\nenvelope. Treat data minimization at the receiver as necessary until those\nconfiguration controls are implemented end to end.\n\n## Filter for purpose and volume\n\nStart with the categories needed by the monitoring use case and a minimum\nseverity that preserves administrative and security-relevant activity. Add an\nevent-type allowlist only when the receiver intentionally needs that narrower\nset. An allowlist can silently exclude newly introduced event types, so record\nits owner and review it when the application's event catalogue changes.\n\nFilters govern future delivery copies; they do not delete the source audit\ntrail. A narrow SIEM feed is therefore not evidence that no other audit activity\nexists in the application.\n\n## Roll out deliberately\n\n1. Keep export disabled while the receiver, TLS and authentication are prepared.\n2. Start with structured JSON and a narrow event filter that includes one\n   controlled administrative event.\n3. Enable export and perform the controlled action in the intended organization.\n4. Match the received event ID, timestamp, organization, outcome and correlation ID.\n5. Trigger a controlled event outside the filter and confirm it remains in the\n   source trail but is not delivered to this receiver.\n6. Exercise an acknowledged receiver response and one safe temporary failure so\n   ownership of retry/dead-letter recovery is known.\n7. Expand categories and lower the severity threshold only after the receiver\n   handles expected volume and redaction.\n\nConfiguration is cached by the running application for up to five minutes.\nEnabling may therefore miss exports during that interval, and changing a\ndestination may continue sending to the former receiver until the cache expires.\nTreat a destination change as a security operation and verify the old receiver\nhas stopped receiving before closing the change.\n\nFor credential rotation or destination replacement, keep the change window and\nold/new receiver ownership explicit. Verify the current receiver accepts a new\ncontrolled event and the former receiver no longer receives selected traffic\nafter the cache window. Retain configuration approval, non-secret destination\nidentity, format/filter choices, test event and correlation IDs, delivery result\nand recovery owner—never the bearer token, API-key value or HMAC secret.\n\n## Format standards and receiver references\n\n- OpenText’s [Common Event Format implementation standard](https://www.microfocus.com/documentation/arcsight/arcsight-smartconnectors-24.4/cef-implementation-standard/)\n  describes CEF header and extension construction. Validate the application’s\n  actual event samples against the target connector rather than assuming every\n  CEF consumer maps extensions identically.\n- IBM documents [LEEF event components](https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/qradar-on-cloud?topic=overview-leef-event-components)\n  and [predefined LEEF attributes](https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/qradar-on-cloud?topic=overview-predefined-leef-event-attributes)\n  for QRadar ingestion and field mapping.\n- The [OCSF schema browser](https://schema.ocsf.io) and\n  [OCSF schema repository](https://github.com/ocsf/ocsf-schema) define the open\n  event classes and attributes. Confirm the emitted class, activity and\n  required fields for every selected event family.\n\nThese external standards describe receiver-side expectations. The generated\nconfiguration tables above remain the authority for values and behavior this\napplication actually supports.";
+    readonly markdown: "# Configure organization SIEM export\n\nSIEM export sends selected organization audit events to one webhook destination.\nCreate a destination dedicated to the organization and environment, then choose\nthe authentication, wire format and filters your receiver can actually verify.\n\n| Before you begin | Successful result |\n| --- | --- |\n| The organization security owner and SIEM owner agree on destination, TLS, authentication, event scope, format, volume, retention and a controlled test event | One organization/environment sends only the approved event set, the receiver validates and correlates it, failures are recoverable, and the destination secret remains protected |\n\n~~~mermaid\nflowchart TD\n  accTitle: Configure a bounded organization SIEM export\n  accDescr: The organization and SIEM owners prepare one receiver, choose authentication and a format, select a narrow category and severity filter, keep export disabled while validating configuration, enable it for one controlled event, compare the received copy with the source audit row, then expand deliberately.\n  owners[\"Agree owners, organization and receiver\"] --> receiver[\"Prepare TLS, authentication and acknowledgement\"]\n  receiver --> format[\"Choose one receiver-supported format\"]\n  format --> filter[\"Select minimum event set and severity\"]\n  filter --> disabled[\"Save while export remains disabled\"]\n  disabled --> enable[\"Enable and perform one controlled event\"]\n  enable --> compare[\"Compare event ID, scope, time, actor and outcome\"]\n  compare --> expand[\"Expand only after volume and recovery checks\"]\n~~~\n\nSIEM export is an organization-routed copy of source audit events. Configure one\nreceiver per intended organization/environment boundary; do not use a shared\ndestination when its access and retention rules cannot preserve that separation.\n\n## Follow one event from source record to searchable copy\n\n~~~mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n  accTitle: From application audit record to searchable SIEM copy\n  accDescr: The application records an audit event, applies the organization export filter, formats one outbound event, authenticates an HTTPS request, and sends it to the receiver. A successful HTTP response acknowledges the configured delivery boundary; the SIEM then parses and indexes the copy. Operators prove completion by searching for the source event identifier. Failed delivery follows retry and dead-letter recovery without removing the source audit record.\n  participant Source as Source audit trail\n  participant Export as Organization exporter\n  participant Receiver as Receiver or relay\n  participant SIEM as SIEM index\n  actor Operator as Security operator\n  Source->>Export: Eligible audit event\n  Export->>Export: Apply filter and format one event\n  Export->>Receiver: Authenticated HTTPS request\n  alt Receiver acknowledges configured boundary\n    Receiver-->>Export: Successful HTTP response\n    Receiver->>SIEM: Parse, transform and index\n    Operator->>SIEM: Search exact eventId\n    SIEM-->>Operator: Searchable correlated copy\n  else Receiver refuses or times out\n    Receiver-->>Export: Error or timeout\n    Export->>Export: Retry, then capture recoverable failure\n  end\n~~~\n\nThere are three different facts to verify: **the source event exists**, **the\nreceiver acknowledged the request**, and **the transformed event is searchable\nin the intended index or table**. An HTTP 2xx response proves only the delivery\nboundary implemented by that receiver. It is not automatically proof that a\nparser, transformation, index or detection rule accepted the event.\n\n## Decide whether direct delivery is compatible\n\n| Receiver requirement | Recommended path | Why |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| One HTTPS request containing one JSON object, with a static header or HMAC credential | Test direct delivery | This matches the current structured-JSON worker closely |\n| A provider-specific wrapper around the event | Use a narrow relay unless the exact endpoint accepts the native envelope | The relay owns the wrapper while preserving source identifiers |\n| Short-lived OAuth access tokens or managed identity | Use a provider-side relay | Token acquisition and refresh do not belong in a static credential field |\n| A JSON array or provider batch protocol | Use a relay that batches deliberately | Current delivery is one event per request; configured batch fields are reserved |\n| A syslog, agent, queue or private-network input | Use an adapter or relay inside that boundary | The application sends outbound HTTPS webhooks, not those transports |\n| CEF, LEEF or OCSF ingestion | Test actual emitted samples with the receiver | A format name does not prove field mapping, escaping, severity or class compatibility |\n\nPrefer the smallest component that makes the contracts compatible. A relay is\nnot a generic event platform: it should authenticate before parsing, preserve\nthe source event and correlation identifiers, perform one documented\ntransformation, expose bounded health signals and fail without silently\ndiscarding the event.\n\n## Choose the delivery contract\n\nThe following table is generated from the maintained SIEM configuration schema\nand resource specification. It distinguishes enforced values from reserved\nconfiguration so an accepted field is not mistaken for working delivery\nbehavior.\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#configurationMarkdown}}\n\n### Authentication values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#authenticationValuesMarkdown}}\n\n### Wire-format values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#formatValuesMarkdown}}\n\nChoose the simplest format the receiver can validate end to end:\n\n| Format | Use when | Verify before rollout |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Structured JSON | The receiver can preserve named fields and nested event data | Schema/field parsing, timestamps, identifiers and unknown-field handling |\n| CEF | The receiver has a tested CEF ingestion path | Header and extension parsing, escaping and the receiver's event classification |\n| LEEF | The receiver has a tested LEEF/QRadar path | Tab-delimited attributes, escaping and event mapping |\n| OCSF | The receiver consumes the emitted OCSF class documents | Class, activity, required fields and receiver validation for the actual event samples |\n\nDo not choose a format from its name alone. Preserve a receiver-tested sample\nfor each event family that matters to detection; syntactically accepted input\ncan still be mapped to the wrong fields or severity by the downstream product.\n\nAuthentication credentials are write-only secrets. A read returns a masked\nstored-credential marker, not the secret. Leaving that marker unchanged during\nan edit preserves the stored value; entering a new value replaces it. Never\ncopy the secret into a ticket or detection rule.\n\n## Configure filters from their exact values\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#filterValuesMarkdown}}\n\nThe optional `specificEventTypes` list is an **exact identifier allowlist**.\nIt is not a substring, prefix, regular expression or wildcard filter. Add an\nidentifier only after confirming that the corresponding event is emitted in the\napplication path you operate.\n\n## Configure delivery behavior\n\n{{CONSUMER_FACT:source:consumer-fact:organization-siem-export#deliveryValuesMarkdown}}\n\nThe current worker posts **one event per HTTP request**, and there is no setting\nthat changes that — size a receiver, load balancer or billing estimate on one\nrequest per event.\n\nTwo configuration fields used to sit here promising otherwise — `batchSize` and\n`batchWindowSeconds` — each accepted, stored and read by nothing. They were\nremoved rather than documented as reserved: a stored number that does not change\nbehaviour is worse than its absence, because a receiver sized on it is sized wrong.\n\n## Limit what an exported event carries\n\n`exportProjection` decides what this destination receives. It is the only place\nan export can be narrowed **before** the data leaves; everything else — a filter,\na severity minimum — decides *whether* an event is sent, not *what* it contains.\n\nSet it per destination, not per application: two receivers under two different\nagreements are two different answers.\n\n| Declaration | Admits |\n| --- | --- |\n| `disclosedTiers: [\"attribution\"]` | the user's email address, IP address, user agent, geolocation and client-install identifier |\n| `disclosedTiers: [\"context\"]` | correlation identifier, originating frontend, organization and application names, authentication method and source |\n| `disclosedTiers: [\"detail\"]` | the per-event `eventData` object **and the outcome reason**, subject to the next row |\n| `disclosedEventDataClasses: [\"administrative\"]` | only the `eventData` of events describing configuration or system state |\n| `disclosedEventDataClasses: [\"subject-detail\"]` | also the `eventData` of events describing a person |\n\n**Declaring `detail` while withholding `attribution` is the mistake to avoid.**\nAn authentication event's `eventData` carries the email address and IP address\nthat withholding attribution was meant to keep back, so the narrowing reads as a\ncontrol while changing nothing that matters. Pair it with\n`disclosedEventDataClasses: [\"administrative\"]`.\n\nThe outcome reason sits in `detail` rather than `context` for the same reason,\nand it is worth understanding before you rely on either tier. It is not a field of\nits own: the application lifts it out of the event's own `eventData`. Most of the\ntime it is a short, impersonal failure reason — but **19 event types carry a\nreason somebody typed**, including organization lifecycle changes, emergency\naccess, forced password resets and retained-data access, where it is the\noperator's own words and may name anyone. Withholding an event's detail therefore\nwithholds its reason too.\n\nA **floor always survives** whatever you declare: event identifier, event type,\ncategory, severity, timestamp, organization, the acting user's identifier, source\nservice, source version, source environment, and outcome. Two reasons, and only\nthe first is about privacy. The event identifier is what your receiver\nde-duplicates on, and deliveries are retried — an export minimized past it\nproduces duplicates in your SIEM rather than fewer records. The event type,\nseverity and source version are header fields of the CEF and LEEF grammars, which\nare positional: omitting one does not shorten the record, it corrupts every field\nafter it. The acting user's identifier is an opaque reference, never a name or an\naddress, so it lets you correlate one actor's activity without receiving their\nidentity — which is usually the trade a minimized export exists to make.\n\nOne capability cost to know about, because nothing warns you at the time:\nwithholding `detail` makes OCSF exports coarser. The application refines an\nAPI-activity event's `activity_id` by reading the verb out of `eventData`, so\nwith the object withheld a create and a delete both report the generic\n`Other` activity and share a `type_uid`. The event type is still carried in\n`activity_name` and `metadata.event_code`, so nothing is wrong — but a\ndetection rule or dashboard that groups by `type_uid` will stop separating them.\nCEF, LEEF and structured JSON are unaffected.\n\nWithheld fields are **absent**, not empty. No blank CEF custom-string slot, no\nnull JSON key, no empty OCSF attribute — so a receiver's \"field is present but\nempty\" rule will not fire, and a rule keyed on a withheld field simply never\nmatches. The same projection applies to every wire format, because it is applied\nonce, before the event is signed and queued, rather than per format.\n\nOmit the whole block and the destination receives the full envelope. That is the\nbehaviour of every destination configured before this control existed, so\nintroducing it changes nothing until you declare a narrowing.\n\nVerify a narrowing the way you verify a filter: perform one controlled event,\nread the received copy, and confirm both that the withheld fields are absent and\nthat the event identifier still matches the source audit record. Minimization\ndoes not alter the source audit trail — the full record remains in the\napplication, and a narrowed feed is not evidence that less was recorded.\n\n## Filter for purpose and volume\n\nStart with the categories needed by the monitoring use case and a minimum\nseverity that preserves administrative and security-relevant activity. Add an\nevent-type allowlist only when the receiver intentionally needs that narrower\nset. An allowlist can silently exclude newly introduced event types, so record\nits owner and review it when the application's event catalogue changes.\n\nFilters govern future delivery copies; they do not delete the source audit\ntrail. A narrow SIEM feed is therefore not evidence that no other audit activity\nexists in the application.\n\n## Roll out deliberately\n\n1. Keep export disabled while the receiver, TLS and authentication are prepared.\n2. Start with structured JSON and a narrow event filter that includes one\n   controlled administrative event.\n3. Enable export and perform the controlled action in the intended organization.\n4. Match the received event ID, timestamp, organization, outcome and correlation ID.\n5. Trigger a controlled event outside the filter and confirm it remains in the\n   source trail but is not delivered to this receiver.\n6. Exercise an acknowledged receiver response and one safe temporary failure so\n   ownership of retry/dead-letter recovery is known.\n7. Expand categories and lower the severity threshold only after the receiver\n   handles expected volume and redaction.\n\nConfiguration is cached by the running application for up to five minutes.\nEnabling may therefore miss exports during that interval, and changing a\ndestination may continue sending to the former receiver until the cache expires.\nTreat a destination change as a security operation and verify the old receiver\nhas stopped receiving before closing the change.\n\nFor credential rotation or destination replacement, keep the change window and\nold/new receiver ownership explicit. Verify the current receiver accepts a new\ncontrolled event and the former receiver no longer receives selected traffic\nafter the cache window. Retain configuration approval, non-secret destination\nidentity, format/filter choices, test event and correlation IDs, delivery result\nand recovery owner—never the bearer token, API-key value or HMAC secret.\n\n## Format standards and receiver references\n\n- OpenText’s [Common Event Format implementation standard](https://www.microfocus.com/documentation/arcsight/arcsight-smartconnectors-24.4/cef-implementation-standard/)\n  describes CEF header and extension construction. Validate the application’s\n  actual event samples against the target connector rather than assuming every\n  CEF consumer maps extensions identically.\n- IBM documents [LEEF event components](https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/qradar-on-cloud?topic=overview-leef-event-components)\n  and [predefined LEEF attributes](https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/qradar-on-cloud?topic=overview-predefined-leef-event-attributes)\n  for QRadar ingestion and field mapping.\n- The [OCSF schema browser](https://schema.ocsf.io) and\n  [OCSF schema repository](https://github.com/ocsf/ocsf-schema) define the open\n  event classes and attributes. Confirm the emitted class, activity and\n  required fields for every selected event family.\n\nThese external standards describe receiver-side expectations. The generated\nconfiguration tables above remain the authority for values and behavior this\napplication actually supports.";
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