@wildo-ai/saas-specifications 1.1.3 → 1.1.4

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (857) hide show
  1. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  2. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/_catalog-spec.shared.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  3. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/aggregate-offer.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  4. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/aggregate-rating.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  5. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/article.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  6. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/blog-posting.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  7. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/breadcrumb-list.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  8. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/faq-page.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  9. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  10. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/offer.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  11. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/organization.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  12. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/product.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/review.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  14. package/dist/esm/_catalogs/schema-org/website.catalog-spec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  15. package/dist/esm/_core/assertions/assertion-authored-metadata.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  16. package/dist/esm/_core/assertions/assertion-behaviors.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  17. package/dist/esm/_core/assertions/assertion-references.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  18. package/dist/esm/_core/assertions/assertion-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  19. package/dist/esm/_core/assertions/assertion-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  20. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-asset.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  21. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-asset.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  22. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-authored-metadata.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  23. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  24. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  25. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-logo-direction.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  26. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-name.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  27. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  28. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-snapshot.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  29. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-snapshot.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  30. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-visual-tone.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  31. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  32. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  33. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  34. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  35. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-validation.js.map +1 -1
  36. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  37. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  38. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-authored-metadata.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  39. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  40. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  41. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  42. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot-validation.js.map +1 -1
  43. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  44. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-references.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  45. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  46. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/pricing-plan.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  47. package/dist/esm/_core/business-semantics.specifications.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  48. package/dist/esm/_core/chart-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  49. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-completeness-statement.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  50. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.d.ts +118 -0
  51. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  52. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.js +65 -3
  53. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  54. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.d.ts +498 -7
  55. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  56. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.js +472 -19
  57. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  58. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-documents.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  59. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/document-fact-specification-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  60. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  61. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.schemas.d.ts +2 -0
  62. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  63. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.schemas.js +2 -0
  64. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  65. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/required-document-set.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  66. package/dist/esm/_core/composite-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  67. package/dist/esm/_core/cross-registry-assertions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  68. package/dist/esm/_core/data-seed-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  69. package/dist/esm/_core/definition-specification-validators.d.ts.map +1 -1
  70. package/dist/esm/_core/definition-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  71. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  72. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  73. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  74. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  75. package/dist/esm/_core/error-message-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  76. package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  77. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-authored-metadata.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  78. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-charter.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  79. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-charter.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  80. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  81. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-validation.js.map +1 -1
  82. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-role-template.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  83. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-role-template.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  84. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.registry.d.ts.map +1 -1
  85. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  86. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  87. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/capability-map-output-set-generation.schemas.d.ts +9 -9
  88. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/capability-map-output-set-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  89. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/capability-map-output-set-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  90. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/capability-map-output-set.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  91. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-drafts.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  92. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-drafts.family-aspects.js.map +1 -1
  93. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-specification-drafts-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  94. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-specification-drafts-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  95. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-specification-drafts-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  96. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-specification-drafts.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  97. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  98. package/dist/esm/_core/flows-actors-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  99. package/dist/esm/_core/frontend-component-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  100. package/dist/esm/_core/full-custom-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  101. package/dist/esm/_core/guidance-flow-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  102. package/dist/esm/_core/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  103. package/dist/esm/_core/index.js.map +1 -1
  104. package/dist/esm/_core/market/feature-benefit.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  105. package/dist/esm/_core/market/inherit-from.d.ts.map +1 -1
  106. package/dist/esm/_core/market/is-benefit-available.d.ts.map +1 -1
  107. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-alternative.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  108. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-authored-metadata.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  109. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-buying-journey.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  110. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-category.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  111. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-channel.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  112. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-context-block.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  113. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-gain.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  114. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  115. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-icp.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  116. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-job.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  117. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-message-template.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  118. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-objection.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  119. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-pain.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  120. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-persona.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  121. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-positioning.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  122. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-proof.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  123. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-references.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  124. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-scoring.d.ts.map +1 -1
  125. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts +18 -18
  126. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  127. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  128. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  129. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-validation.js.map +1 -1
  130. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  131. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-tone-of-voice.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  132. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-trigger.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  133. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  134. package/dist/esm/_core/milestone-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  135. package/dist/esm/_core/onboarding-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  136. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  137. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  138. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-validation.d.ts +22 -16
  139. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  140. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-validation.js +17 -11
  141. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-validation.js.map +1 -1
  142. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  143. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.schemas.d.ts +12 -8
  144. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  145. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.schemas.js +12 -8
  146. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  147. package/dist/esm/_core/product-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  148. package/dist/esm/_core/provider-specification.schemas.d.ts +16 -0
  149. package/dist/esm/_core/provider-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  150. package/dist/esm/_core/provider-specification.schemas.js +0 -20
  151. package/dist/esm/_core/provider-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  152. package/dist/esm/_core/required-features-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  153. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/functional-requirement.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  154. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/non-functional-requirement.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  155. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-authored-metadata.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  156. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-references.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  157. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  158. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  159. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  160. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-validation.js.map +1 -1
  161. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  162. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  163. package/dist/esm/_core/resource-specification-registry-alignment.d.ts.map +1 -1
  164. package/dist/esm/_core/resource-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  165. package/dist/esm/_core/resource-type-member-name.types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  166. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-authored-metadata.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  167. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-phase.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  168. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-references.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  169. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  170. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  171. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  172. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot-validation.js.map +1 -1
  173. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  174. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  175. package/dist/esm/_core/role-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  176. package/dist/esm/_core/sidebar-section-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  177. package/dist/esm/_core/system-email-template-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  178. package/dist/esm/_core/translation-slot-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  179. package/dist/esm/_core/utils/extract-field-specs.d.ts.map +1 -1
  180. package/dist/esm/_core/utils/family-ref-stamping.d.ts.map +1 -1
  181. package/dist/esm/_core/utils/family-ref-stamping.js.map +1 -1
  182. package/dist/esm/_core/utils/retention-marker-field-specs.d.ts.map +1 -1
  183. package/dist/esm/_core/utils/validate-field-shapes.d.ts.map +1 -1
  184. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-authored-metadata.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  185. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-constraint.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  186. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-idea.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  187. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-mission.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  188. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-problem.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  189. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-references.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  190. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  191. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  192. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  193. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-snapshot.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  194. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-success-criterion.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  195. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  196. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-coding-tasks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  197. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-fact-specification.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  198. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-fact-specification.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  199. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-release-policy-specification.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  200. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-release-policy-specification.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  201. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-specification-family-identity.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  202. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-specification-family-identity.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  203. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-facts.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  204. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-release-policy.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
  205. package/dist/esm/application-creation/domain-plan-evaluation-identities.application-creation.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  206. package/dist/esm/application-creation/journey.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  207. package/dist/esm/application-creation/journey.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  208. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +8 -0
  209. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  210. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.js +8 -0
  211. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  212. package/dist/esm/application-creation/specification-content-validation-state.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  213. package/dist/esm/application-creation/structured-artifact-landing.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  214. package/dist/esm/application-creation-playbook-runtime.exports.d.ts.map +1 -1
  215. package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.d.ts.map +1 -1
  216. package/dist/esm/assurance/application-document-publication.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  217. package/dist/esm/assurance/application-document-publication.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  218. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.d.ts +11 -0
  219. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  220. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js +37 -4
  221. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  222. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.schemas.d.ts +2 -2
  223. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  224. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-blueprint-selection.d.ts +30 -0
  225. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-blueprint-selection.d.ts.map +1 -1
  226. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-blueprint-selection.js +40 -0
  227. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-blueprint-selection.js.map +1 -1
  228. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  229. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  230. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.d.ts +22 -9
  231. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  232. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.js +2002 -29
  233. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  234. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-external-framework-mapping.d.ts.map +1 -1
  235. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-foundation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  236. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-foundation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  237. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-objective-catalog.definitions.d.ts +30 -0
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{ CoreAuditableEventType } from \"@wildo-ai/saas-models\";\n\nimport {\n AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane,\n AssuranceEvidenceHome,\n type AssuranceEvidenceRequirementBody,\n} from \"./assurance-program.schemas\";\n\n/**\n * What each `evidence-requirement:*` slug actually ASKS FOR.\n *\n * ## Why bodies live here rather than beside the bindings\n *\n * `assurance-authority-basis.definitions.ts` is 2151 lines of ref-shaped bindings that a reader scans\n * to answer \"what does this objective demand?\". A body is prose — minimum evidence, verification\n * steps, severity, limits — and forty-nine of them inline would make the binding table unreadable\n * for the one question it exists to answer. Keyed by requirement ref and composed in, the two stay\n * separately legible and the composer joins them.\n *\n * ## Authored from a PAPER body, and the paper body is not superseded\n *\n * Each entry is distilled from a working artifact in `__evidence-plane-slice__/`. That directory's\n * README said the paper bodies would be \"superseded when the body schema lands\" — they are NOT, and\n * saying so matters. What ships here is what a COLLECTOR and a JUDGE need. The paper body also\n * carries the reasoning that produced it: which proxy was wrong and why, what the marker comments\n * said, what the author checked and found absent. That is authoring context, it is what makes the\n * next body cheaper, and it has no runtime consumer — so it stays where it is rather than being\n * flattened into a string field nobody reads.\n *\n * ## Coverage\n *\n * NINETEEN of 49 today — every body #302's paper run produced, and between them they exercise EVERY\n * member of both vocabularies: DECLARED, EMITTED, APPLICATION_RECORDED, PERFORMED and UNPRODUCED, at\n * META_APPLICATION, VERIFICATION and PRODUCTION. That was the point of composing all five rather than\n * the first: an enum member with no instance is the same declared-and-read-by-nothing defect one\n * level down, and four of the five members had none.\n *\n * The remaining 30 are #296's tranche, which now has a schema to author against and nineteen validated\n * instances to author FROM. The field is optional on the authority for exactly this window; it\n * becomes required when the catalog is complete.\n */\nexport const ASSURANCE_EVIDENCE_REQUIREMENT_BODIES: Readonly<Record<string, AssuranceEvidenceRequirementBody>> = {\n \"evidence-requirement:security-event-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application unconditionally. The audit trail is engine-owned, so no application opts out of the \"\n + \"obligation and none has to build the lane first — unlike a demand whose evidence is an application-authored record.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation:\n \"Authentication, authorization, privilege, credential and security-configuration changes each emit a typed auditable event.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The demanded artifact is a per-occurrence row in the engine's own durable event store, so one collector query \"\n + \"serves every application. Not read off the attesting capability: it is read off the artifact the clause names.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n // authentication\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGIN,\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGIN_FAILED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGOUT,\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SESSION_EVICTED,\n // authorization and privilege\n CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_DENIED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_APP_ROLES_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS,\n // credential\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_TOKEN_REVOKED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ONE_OFF_TOKEN_REVOKED,\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Non-human privileged access is audited OR refused.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Same store as C1, but the evidence is a DISJUNCTION and must not be flattened: an absent row is the CORRECT \"\n + \"outcome when access was refused, so a judge reading 'no rows' as failure is wrong.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"The absence of the audit delivery path is surfaced at boot rather than tolerated silently.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The subtle one. It is ABOUT boot, but what evidences it is a runtime-emitted diagnostic rather than a \"\n + \"configuration file — so it does not fall to META_APPLICATION even though its subject is startup.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a non-empty, queryable class of rows for each member named in the clause's requiredAuditEventMembers — the \"\n + \"members are DERIVED from the enum there rather than restated here, so a collector reads the query off the demand \"\n + \"and this prose cannot drift from it. \"\n + \"C2: for each non-human privileged access in the window, either an audit row or evidence of refusal. \"\n + \"C3: the boot-time diagnostic emitted when no audit delivery path is configured.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Establish the reporting window and the application's audit store, and record which store answered.\",\n \"For C1, query each change family and assert a non-empty typed class per represented family; report families with no activity as observations rather than gaps.\",\n \"For C2, enumerate non-human privileged accesses in the window and resolve each to an audit row OR a refusal; a window with neither is the only failing shape.\",\n \"For C3, assert the boot diagnostic exists for a deployment with no delivery path configured, driving it rather than reading configuration.\",\n \"Record any clause not run as insufficient_evidence for that clause; never let a NOT RUN clause pass on its siblings' evidence.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A represented change family with no typed class is a MAJOR: the control did not operate. A family with no activity \"\n + \"in the window is an OBSERVATION, not a gap — absence of activity and absence of a control read identically in a \"\n + \"row store, and only the emitter check separates them. C2 read as failure on an absent row is a judge defect, not a \"\n + \"finding. A control that operated with a missing evidence export is an OBSERVATION, never a nonconformity.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences that events were EMITTED, never that the trail is complete: an event class nobody wired emits nothing \"\n + \"and looks identical to a quiet period. It attests the window queried and says nothing about periods outside it. \"\n + \"And it is production evidence for the deployment that produced it — a different deployment of the same build has \"\n + \"its own window and its own answer.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:retention-window-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"APPLICABLE to every application: capability:declared-retention-window is ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, so it survives the \"\n + \"composer's capability filter unconditionally.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C0\",\n obligation: \"The row-retention windows themselves are declared.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The premise the objective operates on rather than what it demands evidence of — needed as the BASELINE C1 is \"\n + \"judged against, since enforcement cannot be assessed without knowing what was declared.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Declared row-retention windows are ENFORCED.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The sweep emits NO auditable event by design — a database TTL deletes silently, so 'did retention run?' is \"\n + \"answerable only from the sweep's own execution record. Engine-owned and uniform across applications, which is \"\n + \"why EMITTED covers it and why EMITTED cannot mean 'an audit row'.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A configuration whose derived copies could outlive the row they came from is REFUSED at startup.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The startup validator's outcome, read from the accountable runtime's boot log. PRODUCTION despite being about \"\n + \"boot: what evidences it is a runtime-emitted outcome, not a configuration file.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C0: the declared retention configuration, named by data-retention-class members derived from the capability's \"\n + \"implementationRefs. C1: execution records for the retention sweep over the claimed period — that it ran, \"\n + \"per-resource removal counts, and whether it stopped early. C2: the startup validator's outcome from the boot log, \"\n + \"NOT from an API: probing HTTP for a boot-time fact is a category error whose silence establishes nothing.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Record the window, the application revision and the runtime profile.\",\n \"Read the declared windows (C0) as the baseline; without them C1 cannot be judged.\",\n \"Gather sweep execution records across the period and reconcile them against the declared classes.\",\n \"Read the boot log for the validator outcome; a clean boot means no unsafe derived-copy configuration was present.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"'Stopped early' is NORMAL operation — the sweep defers the remainder rather than taking a table-wide lock — and \"\n + \"must never read as failure. The nonconformity is the ABSENCE of a run in a period where retention was due. A \"\n + \"startup refusal is the control working, not a finding.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences that the sweep RAN and what it removed, never that every row past its window is gone. And the boot \"\n + \"outcome attests the configuration that booted, so it goes stale the moment configuration changes.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"UNDETERMINED when the two required capabilities resolve differently — capability:audit-events is gated on an \"\n + \"engine capability an application may not enable, while capability:privileged-access-review is ALWAYS_AVAILABLE. \"\n + \"That status is DERIVED, not judged: deriveExpectationCapabilityApplicability returns APPLICABLE when every \"\n + \"required capability is available, NOT_APPLICABLE when all are unavailable, and UNDETERMINED when only some \"\n + \"are — this shape. A collector reads the status and stops rather than deciding.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"The enumeration a review reads — who currently holds privileged access, and the access events behind it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"Engine-produced, in the engine's own store. This is the half the attesting capability correctly describes.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The review OCCURRENCE — that authorized people examined that enumeration and decided.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.PERFORMED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"No engine mechanism produces it, none can, and none should: a review is a human act, and a framework that \"\n + \"synthesised one would manufacture the evidence it is meant to collect. The framework's obligation is to make \"\n + \"C1 available and to accept and retain C2. PRODUCTION because the review is performed against the live \"\n + \"deployment — that the engine cannot OBSERVE it is carried by the home, not by the plane.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the current privileged-access enumeration and the access events behind it, over the review period. C2: the \"\n + \"operator-supplied review record, as a host artifact — who reviewed, what enumeration they read, what they decided.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Resolve applicability first; if the two capabilities resolve differently, record UNDETERMINED and stop.\",\n \"Gather the enumeration and its backing events for the period (C1).\",\n \"Accept the host-supplied review record and check it cites the enumeration it read, not a re-derived one (C2).\",\n \"Never synthesise C2 from C1: an enumeration is what a review READS, never evidence that a review happened.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A missing C2 with a healthy C1 is a MAJOR against the OPERATOR, not the framework — the record was never supplied. \"\n + \"A missing C1 is a MAJOR against the framework: the review had nothing to read. A capability-keyed classifier that \"\n + \"reports this demand satisfied on C1 alone has silently dropped the half the objective is named for.\",\n limits:\n \"C2 is self-attested by construction. The framework can retain it and check that it cites the enumeration; it cannot \"\n + \"evidence that the examination was competent or independent.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies only where the APPLICATION owns an erasure-request resource. Four of the five marked sites are in an \"\n + \"application, not the engine. An application that never built an erasure lane has not failed a control — it \"\n + \"declared none — and a judge records not_applicable_as_configured rather than a nonconformity.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"The request is recorded on intake, whether the subject or the controller raised it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.APPLICATION_RECORDED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The application's own resource row is the durable record, and no CoreAuditableEventType member covers the \"\n + \"erasure lifecycle at all — verified, including the unemitted-marker check on the two erasure-shaped members, \"\n + \"which are about propagating erasure to EXTERNAL systems. The row's schema and status vocabulary are the \"\n + \"application's, so a collector queries it against that application's specification.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"It may be withdrawn by the subject while it is pending.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.APPLICATION_RECORDED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"Same store; the withdrawal is a state transition on the same application-authored row.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"It is executed on the declared schedule.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.APPLICATION_RECORDED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"Same store, plus the schedule that drove the sweep — execution cannot be judged against outcome alone.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"It terminates the erased person's sessions.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The session-revocation service emits no event and writes no durable record — its own marker calls it a write to \"\n + \"our own Redis. That is the right design for the CONTROL and leaves the DEMAND unevidenced. UNPRODUCED is the \"\n + \"honest value, not an absence.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: rows created in the window, each carrying a channel member and, where controller-raised, the requesting user and \"\n + \"justification. C2: the withdrawal operation reachable to the subject, plus any cancelled rows — an EMPTY \"\n + \"withdrawal set is not a deficiency. C3: completed or failed rows with a completion timestamp and outcome, plus the \"\n + \"declared schedule. C4: nothing produces it; what can be gathered is that the revoker is installed, which evidences \"\n + \"the control's PRESENCE and not its OPERATION.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Resolve applicability: does the application own an erasure-request resource? If not, record not_applicable_as_configured and stop.\",\n \"Assert every row in the window carries a channel, and that controller-raised rows carry the requester.\",\n \"Confirm the withdrawal operation is reachable to a subject-scoped principal, and that no row left the pending state by an unaccounted route.\",\n \"Gather failed rows and report them; a suppressed failure is the defect this clause exists to catch.\",\n \"Record C4 as UNPRODUCED and state that the binding evidence attests presence, not operation.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A row with no channel, or a completed row with no outcome, is an OBSERVATION: the control operated and its evidence \"\n + \"is incomplete. A row that left the pending state by an unaccounted route is a MAJOR — the state machine IS the \"\n + \"control. Failed rows with no follow-up are a MAJOR: an unmet obligation to a real person. C4 carries NO severity \"\n + \"against the application; it is a framework gap and belongs in the finding as such, so it is fixed once rather than \"\n + \"raised against every application forever.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the erasure LANE — intake, state, schedule, outcome — and never that the data is gone; whether \"\n + \"impersonalization removed what it claims is a different demand. It does not prove sessions ended, and nothing \"\n + \"available does. A window with no erasures evidences nothing about the lane: absence of activity and absence of a \"\n + \"control read identically in a row store.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:selected-processor-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application unconditionally. The control is the ABSENCE of egress by default, so an application \"\n + \"that selected no provider is not un-evidenced — it is the strongest possible evidence for this demand.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Nothing leaves unless the application selects a provider for that capability.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The committed configuration IS the evidence: what a reviewer must establish is which capabilities have a \"\n + \"provider selected, which is a property of the commit rather than of any runtime event. There is no audit \"\n + \"member for 'a provider was selected', and there should not be — a selection is not an occurrence.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"With no selection, the work is served locally with no egress at all.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A committed configuration can prove no provider is SELECTED. It cannot prove no bytes LEFT — that is a claim \"\n + \"about behaviour under no selection, evidenced by driving the seam. Flattening C2 into C1's plane would let a \"\n + \"reviewer accept a declaration as proof of a runtime property.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the committed provider selection per capability, and for each selected provider its compliance choice — the \"\n + \"deployment model and the region. The deployment model is required even for a single-model provider, because \"\n + \"reading it from a framework default rather than an operator's declaration is how a wrong one goes unnoticed. \"\n + \"C2: that the extraction seam REFUSES when no provider is resolved rather than degrading, and that its one \"\n + \"functional caller serves the local library when the field did not opt in.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate the capabilities with a provider selected, from committed configuration.\",\n \"Assert each selected provider carries a compliance choice with a deployment model and a region.\",\n \"Cross-check each chosen region against the provider's declared processing regions; a region outside the list is APP-ASSERTED — report it, never fail it.\",\n \"Drive the seam with no provider configured and assert the refusal, then assert the local path serves.\",\n \"Cross-check the selected set against the application's processor register, in BOTH directions.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A selected provider with no compliance choice is a MAJOR: the processor exists and the deployment model is \"\n + \"unstated, so no transfer statement about it can be derived. A selected provider absent from the processor \"\n + \"register is a MAJOR — the routing happened and the notice does not name the recipient. A region outside the \"\n + \"declared list is an OBSERVATION, app-asserted by design. A register entry with no selection is an OBSERVATION \"\n + \"worth reading twice: a stale entry, or a processor reached by a path this demand does not see.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the PROVIDER seam. Any other outbound path — a webhook, an integration, an application's own fetch — \"\n + \"is outside this demand and is not made safe by it. C2's evidence attests the BUILD it was driven against, and \"\n + \"nothing currently detects a change to the selection ladder. And the register cross-check compares two HUMAN \"\n + \"statements: nothing derives a register entry from a provider's declared profile.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:multi-factor-enrolment-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application: the verification authority is engine-owned and unconditional. Note the demand is \"\n + \"about the AUTHORITY, not about enrolment coverage — an application whose users enrolled no second factor still \"\n + \"has the control, and still has to satisfy it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Verification of an enrolled second factor goes through ONE authority — no caller builds a second door.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second verifier, which no committed specification can attest — a spec can say \"\n + \"none was declared, never that none was built. A driven enumeration is engine-owned and uniform, so one query \"\n + \"serves every application.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"That authority is replay-resistant: a code or backup code used once cannot be used again.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"A driven scenario result. Production evidence would need a per-occurrence record this control deliberately does not produce.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And timing-safe, so a match position cannot leak through timing.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Timing-safety is a property of an execution that leaves no trace of having held. A scenario can assert the \"\n + \"authority CALLS a constant-time primitive — which is C1's structural question wearing C3's clothes — and no \"\n + \"artifact evidences that a particular verification was timing-safe.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: an enumeration of every path verifying an enrolled second factor, each resolving to the single authority, plus \"\n + \"the assertion that no other code compares a TOTP secret or consumes a backup code. C2: a driven scenario replaying \"\n + \"a successful code and a consumed backup code, both refused. C3: nothing produces it; the constant-time primitive is \"\n + \"confirmed by inspection, which evidences the CODE and not an execution. \"\n + \"Deliberately NO audit members: the authority emits nothing by design and the MFA event members belong to the \"\n + \"CALLERS — demanding them here would attribute a caller's evidence to a control that produces none.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate every verification path and resolve each to the single authority; a path that compares a secret itself is the finding, not a variant.\",\n \"Drive a successful verification, replay the same code, and assert refusal.\",\n \"Consume a backup code, replay it, and assert refusal.\",\n \"Confirm the comparison primitive is constant-time by inspection and record C3 as UNPRODUCED with that as its only support.\",\n \"Do NOT gather MFA audit rows as evidence: they evidence the callers' flows and would read here as coverage the authority does not provide.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A second verification path is a MAJOR — the intent names that failure mode explicitly, a second and weaker door onto \"\n + \"the same credential. A replayable code or backup code is a MAJOR. C3 carries no severity: it is a framework-side \"\n + \"absence, not an application's failure. MFA audit rows presented as evidence are a JUDGE defect rather than a \"\n + \"finding, and they will look like thorough evidence.\",\n limits:\n \"It does not prove any user enrolled a second factor, and despite the slug it is not asked to. C1's enumeration \"\n + \"attests the BUILD it was taken against — a door added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated, and nothing \"\n + \"detects that. C2 proves the authority refuses a replay when DRIVEN, never that every production verification was \"\n + \"replay-resistant.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. The gate is engine-owned and the objective is about REACHABILITY, so an application \"\n + \"that has granted no entitlement still has the control and still has to satisfy it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Feature and entitlement writes declare an operator-gated door.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The role gate IS a committed declaration — ScopeFeatures writes are APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN-only, and the marker \"\n + \"notes the fields cannot be field-protected because the super-admin path must write them. So the gate is the \"\n + \"whole boundary, and it is readable from the resource configuration.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"No other door reaches those writes — a principal cannot widen what it is entitled to.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second reachable path, which produces no rows and no occurrence: an entitlement \"\n + \"nobody widened emits nothing. A driven reachability enumeration is the only artifact, and it is engine-owned \"\n + \"and uniform. THIS IS WHY THE OBJECTIVE IS MARKED IN A TEST — for a reachability invariant the test IS the \"\n + \"control's evidence, not a stand-in for it.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the declared role gate on every feature and entitlement write, from committed configuration. C2: a driven \"\n + \"enumeration over the operation variants asserting each stays non-client-reachable — progression and lifecycle \"\n + \"state writes in particular, whose state fields carry no field-level exclusion, so a variant flip would let a \"\n + \"client self-forge currentStage, milestonesAchieved or totalPoints.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the declared gate for every feature and entitlement write (C1).\",\n \"Drive the reachability enumeration over every operation variant and assert none is client-reachable (C2).\",\n \"Check the progression and lifecycle writes specifically: their fields have no field-level exclusion, so the variant gate is the only guard.\",\n \"Do NOT look for occurrence rows. An entitlement nobody widened produces none, and their absence evidences nothing either way.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A client-reachable entitlement write is a MAJOR and the objective's whole subject. A gate weakened from \"\n + \"APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN is a MAJOR: the marker records that this one role gate is the ENTIRE self-grant boundary \"\n + \"for paid entitlements. An empty occurrence set is NOT a finding in either direction.\",\n limits:\n \"The enumeration attests the BUILD it ran against; a variant added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated. It \"\n + \"evidences that no door is REACHABLE, never that no entitlement was wrongly granted through the legitimate door — \"\n + \"that is the credit-grant demand's question, not this one.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:lifecycle-stage-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. The control is that a self-reported stage confers nothing, so an application whose \"\n + \"users report stages freely is exactly the case it exists for.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A self-reported lifecycle stage confers no capability.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Evidence of a NON-grant. Nothing is emitted when a capability is not conferred, so there is no occurrence to \"\n + \"collect — the artifact is a driven scenario in which activation succeeds with no feature repository present \"\n + \"at all, so a grant would have to reach a repository that is not there.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"And it cannot cross a scope boundary — authority comes only from a decision an authorized party made.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Scoping of the evaluator, driven with an explicit principal. The HTTP-tier half — that one user cannot make a \"\n + \"request the backend attributes to another — is a different mechanism proven at the e2e tier, and this clause \"\n + \"must not claim it.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven activation with no feature repository bound, succeeding — the absence of the repository is what makes \"\n + \"the non-grant provable rather than merely unobserved. C2: the evaluator driven with an explicit principal, \"\n + \"asserting the guidance write is scoped to it.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Drive activation with no feature repository bound and assert it succeeds (C1).\",\n \"Drive the evaluator with an explicit principal and assert the write is scoped to it (C2).\",\n \"Record explicitly that the transport tier is out of scope here: this evidences the evaluator's scoping, not the request attribution.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A capability conferred from a self-reported stage is a MAJOR — it is the objective's entire subject. A scope \"\n + \"crossing is a MAJOR. Absence of activity evidences nothing: a stage nobody reported produces no signal either way.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the EVALUATOR, never the transport. That user A cannot make a request attributed to user B is the \"\n + \"context-addressed-singleton mechanism, proven elsewhere, and reading this evidence as covering it would claim a \"\n + \"tier this demand never touched.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:first-exposure-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application: the disclosure boundary is engine-owned and every resource schema passes through it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Material a schema declares backend-only does not cross the client boundary.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A non-disclosure produces no record: a field that never crossed emits nothing. The artifact is a driven \"\n + \"assertion over the disclosure predicate, which now covers BOTH decorators — isBackendOnly and its sibling \"\n + \"isWriteOnlySecret, held to the same boundary.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Except at a single first exposure, which is itself audited.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The one clause with a real occurrence: a first exposure is a per-occurrence row in the engine's audit trail. \"\n + \"The intent's word 'single' is the control — an exposure that happens twice is the defect the audit row makes \"\n + \"visible.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.FIELD_ACCESS],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven assertion that the response DTO refuses to emit any field the disclosure predicate marks \"\n + \"non-disclosable, across both decorators. C2: FIELD_ACCESS rows for each first exposure in the window, and the \"\n + \"assertion that no field appears twice.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Drive the disclosure predicate across both decorators and assert the response DTO masks every non-disclosable field (C1).\",\n \"Gather FIELD_ACCESS rows for the window and resolve each to a first exposure (C2).\",\n \"Assert no field has more than one first exposure; a repeat is the defect, not a duplicate row.\",\n \"Check any surface that renders a field OUTSIDE the response DTO — a retrieval header assembled from application declarations reaches values the DTO exists to mask, and that path is latent rather than absent.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A non-disclosable field crossing the boundary is a MAJOR. A second exposure of the same field is a MAJOR: 'single' \"\n + \"is the control. A first exposure with no FIELD_ACCESS row is an OBSERVATION where the exposure was legitimate and \"\n + \"only its evidence is missing — effectiveness and evidence-availability stay apart.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 attests the predicate and the DTO, not every surface that can render a value: a header assembled from an \"\n + \"application's own declarations is outside the DTO and reaches the same material. C2 evidences exposures that were \"\n + \"AUDITED, so it cannot see one that crossed by a path emitting nothing — which is what C1 exists to close.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: the authorization funnel is engine-owned and every operation passes through it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Access-control decisions, refusals included, are attributable and reviewable.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"A per-occurrence row in the engine's audit trail. REFUSALS are the half that matters — a demand satisfied only by grants would evidence the opposite of the control.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_DENIED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Repeated refusals stay detectable without the record itself becoming an availability risk.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"Same rows, read as a RATE rather than as instances. The clause carries its own tension — a control that records every refusal can be driven to exhaust storage — so evidence must show both that repetition is visible and that recording is bounded.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A failure of the recording pipeline is detectable and attributable to the specific action it lost.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"NO audit member exists for a pipeline failure — verified against the enum, which carries none matching AUDIT, PIPELINE, DELIVERY or SINK. The delivery path surfaces its absence at boot and drains a dead-letter queue, but nothing attributes a LOST record to the action that produced it, which is what this clause asks for.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: denial rows for the window, each attributable to a principal and an operation. C2: the same rows aggregated by \"\n + \"principal and by operation, plus evidence that recording is bounded rather than unbounded. C3: nothing produces it \"\n + \"— what can be gathered is the boot diagnostic for an absent delivery path and the dead-letter drain, both of which \"\n + \"evidence the PIPELINE's health and not the attribution this clause demands.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Gather denial rows for the window and assert each carries a principal and an operation.\",\n \"Aggregate by principal and by operation so repetition is visible; a single-row view cannot satisfy C2.\",\n \"Confirm recording is bounded — the clause names availability as a risk of the control itself.\",\n \"Record C3 as UNPRODUCED, citing the absence of any pipeline-failure member rather than substituting pipeline-health evidence for attribution.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"Denials absent while grants are present is a MAJOR — it is the exact shape of a funnel recording only successes. \"\n + \"Unbounded recording is a MAJOR against availability, which the intent names explicitly. C3 carries no severity: it \"\n + \"is a framework gap, and a demand nothing can answer must not become a finding against an application.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences DECISIONS, never their correctness — a wrongly granted access is recorded exactly like a right one. \"\n + \"And C1's rows come from the funnel: an authorization decision taken outside it is invisible here, which is why the \"\n + \"funnel being the sole denial chokepoint is a separate and load-bearing property.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:credential-state-transition-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application. Credentials are engine-owned across every authentication method an application enables.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Issuance, refresh, rotation, revocation and expiry of a credential are explicit attributable transitions.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"Per-occurrence rows in the audit trail, one class per transition kind. EXPIRY is the one to watch: it is a transition nothing actively performs, so a demand assuming an actor for every member would fail on it.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ONE_OFF_TOKEN_REVOKED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_TOKEN_ROTATED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_TOKEN_REVOKED,\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Credential theft is detected and answered by invalidation.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"A detection followed by a revocation is TWO rows that must be correlatable, not one. Evidence that cannot link them evidences a revocation nobody can attribute to a detection.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A revocation actually terminates the sessions and tokens it names, rather than merely marking them.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"'Actually terminates' is a claim about EFFECT, and a revocation row evidences the intent rather than the outcome. Only a driven scenario — revoke, then present the credential and be refused — separates a real termination from a mark.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: transition rows across the window covering each kind an application's enabled methods can produce. C2: paired \"\n + \"detection and invalidation rows, correlatable. C3: a driven scenario in which a revoked credential is presented \"\n + \"and refused, for sessions and for tokens separately.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Gather transition rows and group by kind; report kinds with no activity as observations, not gaps.\",\n \"For each invalidation, resolve the detection that preceded it; an unpaired invalidation is reported, not assumed benign.\",\n \"Drive a revocation and then present the credential, asserting refusal for a session and for a token.\",\n \"Treat expiry separately: it has no actor, so an attribution check that demands one will misreport it.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A revocation that leaves a credential usable is a MAJOR — it is C3's whole subject and the difference between \"\n + \"marking and terminating. An uncorrelatable detection/invalidation pair is an OBSERVATION unless the invalidation \"\n + \"is missing entirely, which is a MAJOR.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 and C2 attest the window; C3 attests the BUILD it was driven against, not that every production revocation took \"\n + \"effect. Nothing here evidences that a credential was not ALSO copied before revocation.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: roles and memberships are engine-owned, and the demand covers whichever privilege kinds an application uses.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Every grant, widening, narrowing and revocation of privilege leaves durable evidence of the assignment's FULL LIFE, not merely its current state.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"The intent's contrast is the control: a current-state read (who holds what NOW) satisfies nothing here. Only an append-only per-occurrence class evidences a life, which is why the audit trail rather than the role table is the store.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_APP_ROLES_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE,\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Across all four privilege kinds — a role, a unit-scoped membership, a discretionary entitlement, a subscription-derived one.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"The intent ENUMERATES four kinds, so coverage is per-kind and a body naming only role changes would report a satisfied demand while two kinds go unevidenced. A subscription-derived privilege is the easiest to miss: nobody grants it, a billing state change does.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: lifecycle rows for the window, each naming the assignment, the direction of change and the actor. C2: coverage \"\n + \"per privilege kind, including the subscription-derived kind whose transitions originate in billing rather than in \"\n + \"an administrative act.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Gather lifecycle rows and assert each names the assignment, the change direction and an actor.\",\n \"Partition by privilege kind and report per-kind coverage; a kind with no rows in a window that had activity is the finding.\",\n \"Reconstruct one assignment's full life from the rows alone, without reading current state — that reconstruction IS the demand.\",\n \"Check the subscription-derived kind specifically: its transitions are not administrative acts and a role-shaped query misses them.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"Evidence that only reports current state is a MAJOR — it is precisely what the intent excludes. A missing privilege \"\n + \"kind is a MAJOR for that kind, not for the demand as a whole. A row without an actor is an OBSERVATION where the \"\n + \"transition was legitimate and only its attribution is thin.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences that a privilege CHANGED, never that the change was authorized — a grant made by someone entitled to \"\n + \"make it and one made wrongly are recorded identically. Authorization is the decision demand's question.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application, and most sharply to those with no platform-tier administration: the demand's strongest evidence is an empty crossing set beside a live enforcement path.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A crossing is admitted only by an explicitly enumerated operation variant — never ambient.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The enumeration is a committed declaration: a variant either declares cross-tenant admission or it does not. Reach acquired by position in the request path is exactly what the intent forbids, and a declaration is what makes admission auditable rather than emergent.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"It requires an elevation that was REQUESTED rather than assumed, and where the tenant demands it, approved by that tenant.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"The grant's life is a per-occurrence class. 'Requested rather than assumed' is a property of the record's existence: an elevation with no request row is the ambient standing privilege the objective exists to remove.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And the crossing itself is recorded.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"A separate row from the grant, and it must be: a grant evidences permission to cross, never that a crossing occurred. The record distinguishes a sanctioned crossing from an attempted undeclared one.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the set of operation variants declaring cross-tenant admission, from committed configuration. C2: grant \"\n + \"lifecycle rows showing request, and where required approval, before use. C3: crossing rows for the window, each \"\n + \"distinguishing a declared admission from an attempted undeclared one.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the declared cross-tenant variants and assert the set is explicit rather than derived from a role alone.\",\n \"For each crossing in the window, resolve the grant that permitted it and assert the grant was requested before use.\",\n \"Assert every crossing produced a record, including attempted undeclared ones — those are the rows a reviewer most needs.\",\n \"An empty crossing set with a live enforcement path is a PASS, not insufficient evidence: no platform administration occurred.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A crossing with no grant is a MAJOR — it is the ambient reach the objective removes. An undeclared crossing that \"\n + \"succeeded is a MAJOR; one that was refused and recorded is the control WORKING. A grant used before approval, \"\n + \"where the tenant demands approval, is a MAJOR.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences crossings the engine mediates. A platform operator reaching a tenant's data outside the application — \"\n + \"a database console — is invisible here and is not made safe by it.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:session-eviction-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies wherever a concurrency bound is configured; an application with no bound has no eviction to evidence and the demand is not applicable as configured.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A principal holds a bounded number of concurrent sessions.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The bound holding is a non-event — a principal who never exceeded it emits nothing. Only a driven scenario that exceeds the bound and observes the refusal-or-eviction evidences that it is enforced.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The eviction retires the OLDEST refresh chain — the property that pushes a stolen chain out instead of a legitimate one.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"The ORDERING is the control, not the eviction. The record must name which chain was retired and when it was issued, because a record naming only the victim would prove a session ended without proving the RIGHT one did.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SESSION_EVICTED],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven scenario exceeding the configured bound. C2: eviction rows carrying the evicted chain's issue time, so \"\n + \"the ordering claim is checkable from the row rather than inferred.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Confirm a concurrency bound is configured; if none is, record not_applicable_as_configured and stop.\",\n \"Drive the bound past its limit and observe the eviction.\",\n \"For each eviction row, assert the retired chain was the OLDEST — an eviction that retired a newer chain is the defect, and a row without an issue time cannot show either way.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"An eviction retiring a chain that was not the oldest is a MAJOR: it is the property the objective is named for, and \"\n + \"it inverts the control by pushing out the legitimate session. A row with no issue time is an OBSERVATION — the \"\n + \"eviction may have been correct and its evidence is insufficient to say.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the eviction's ORDERING, never that the evicted chain was stolen. And an unreadable issue time yields \"\n + \"ABSENCE, never a synthesised instant — a reconstructed ordering would be evidence of the reconstruction.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:outbound-call-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application that enables any provider-backed capability; an application with none makes no provider calls and the egress half is not applicable as configured.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Outbound traffic leaves through a single named egress per capability.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"'A single named egress' is a structural property of the configuration, and a committed declaration is what a reviewer enumerates. That no SECOND egress exists is C1's harder half and is evidenced by the same enumeration, not by rows.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Every physical provider call is recorded — provider, model, usage and outcome.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"This record is NOT an audit event. It is the agent-call trace, emitted through the standard sink chain and carrying provider, model, usage and outcome — a third engine-owned durable store beside the audit trail and the batch execution record. Naming an audit member here would demand a row nothing writes.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And an administrative probe records its initiating actor.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"A different call kind with a different question: a probe has no provider or model, and what a reviewer needs is WHO initiated it. Separate store, separate member, and a body merging C2 and C3 would demand provider fields of a call that has none.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_DIRECTORY_ACCESS],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the declared egress per capability, and the enumeration showing no second path. C2: agent-call traces for the \"\n + \"window carrying provider, model, usage and outcome — from the trace sink, NOT the audit trail. C3: probe rows \"\n + \"naming the initiating actor.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate the declared egress per enabled capability and assert exactly one per capability.\",\n \"Gather agent-call traces from the trace sink for the window; do NOT look for them in the audit trail, where they do not exist.\",\n \"Assert each trace carries provider, model, usage and outcome — a trace missing usage cannot support a cost or volume statement.\",\n \"Gather administrative probe rows separately and assert each names its initiating actor.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A second egress path for one capability is a MAJOR — it defeats the enumeration the whole demand rests on. A \"\n + \"provider call with no trace is a MAJOR. A trace missing usage is an OBSERVATION: the call was recorded and one \"\n + \"field of its record is thin. A probe with no actor is a MAJOR — attribution is the entire point of C3.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences calls that went through the named egress. A call made outside it is precisely what C1 exists to \"\n + \"exclude and precisely what C2 cannot see, so the two clauses must both hold or neither means much.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:credit-grant-reachability-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies wherever a credit balance exists; an application with no credit model has no door to gate and the demand is not applicable as configured.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"An increase in a credit balance is reachable only through a system or payment-gated door.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"REACHABILITY is a property of the declared operation surface: which variants can increase a balance, and what gates each. The committed configuration answers it, and a runtime row could not — a balance nobody increased emits nothing.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"So no ordinary principal can grant itself economic value.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The self-grant is the failure mode, and its absence is a non-event. Only a driven attempt — an ordinary principal trying to increase its own balance and being refused — separates a closed door from an untested one.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: every operation variant that can increase a credit balance, with its gate, from committed configuration — the \"\n + \"enumeration must be exhaustive, because one ungated variant defeats the rest. C2: a driven attempt by an ordinary \"\n + \"principal, refused.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate every variant that writes an increase and assert each is system- or payment-gated.\",\n \"Drive an increase as an ordinary principal and assert refusal.\",\n \"Do NOT read balance rows as evidence: a balance nobody wrongly increased looks exactly like a control that never ran.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"An ungated increase variant is a MAJOR and the objective's entire subject — economic value granted to self. A \"\n + \"successful driven self-grant is a MAJOR. An empty set of illegitimate increases evidences nothing either way.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the DOOR, never the amounts: a payment-gated increase for the wrong quantity is correct here and wrong \"\n + \"elsewhere. And the enumeration attests the build — a variant added later is invisible until re-enumerated.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:field-authority-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: server-owned fields are engine-declared and the boot proof runs unconditionally.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A server-owned field has exactly one named authority that writes it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The authority is NAMED in the declaration, and 'exactly one' is a property of that declaration rather than of any write. A second writer is a declaration defect, visible without running anything.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"And that authority is PROVEN at boot rather than assumed.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"The intent's own contrast — proven, not assumed — makes the boot outcome the evidence rather than the declaration. It is a runtime-emitted diagnostic, so it is PRODUCTION despite being about startup, the same reading retention-window-declaration's C2 required.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: every server-owned field with its single named authority, from committed configuration. C2: the boot validation \"\n + \"outcome from the accountable runtime's log — not from an API, since probing HTTP for a boot-time fact is a \"\n + \"category error whose silence establishes nothing.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate server-owned fields and assert each names exactly one authority.\",\n \"Read the boot outcome for the running revision; a clean boot is the proof C2 asks for.\",\n \"Assert no reader has to disambiguate: two authorities for one field is the defect even if only one ever writes.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"Two named authorities for one field is a MAJOR — the intent's stated harm is that a reader must work out which \"\n + \"value is current. A boot that did not run the proof is insufficient_evidence for C2, not a pass.\",\n limits:\n \"C2 attests the CONFIGURATION that booted and goes stale the moment it changes. Neither clause evidences that the \"\n + \"authority wrote correct values — only that exactly one of them can.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:key-retirement-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies wherever token signing keys rotate; an application that has never rotated has no retirement to evidence, which is not_applicable_as_configured rather than a gap.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A rotated signing key can be given an explicit retirement instant.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The retirement instant is authored, and the intent's contrast is with a key that stays trusted 'until someone edits configuration' — so the declared instant IS the control, and its presence is readable without running anything.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"After which it stops being advertised and stops verifying tokens.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"TWO effects, and a body must name both: advertisement is what a client discovers, verification is what a token relies on. A key removed from the advertised set while still verifying is the failure the clause exists to catch, and only driving both separates them.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the retirement instant on each rotated key, from committed configuration. C2: a driven check past that instant \"\n + \"asserting the key is absent from the advertised set AND that a token signed by it is refused.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the retirement instant for each rotated key; a key with none is C1's finding.\",\n \"Past the instant, assert the key is not advertised.\",\n \"Past the instant, present a token signed by it and assert refusal — separately from the advertisement check, because a key can pass one and fail the other.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A retired key that still verifies is a MAJOR: an aged or compromised key staying trusted is the harm the objective \"\n + \"names. A retired key still advertised is a MAJOR of a different kind — clients will keep selecting it. A rotated \"\n + \"key with no retirement instant is an OBSERVATION unless the application's policy requires one.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the retirement MECHANISM at the instant driven, never that no token signed by a retired key was \"\n + \"accepted earlier in the window. Retroactive assurance would need a per-verification record this control does not \"\n + \"produce.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:operation-serviceability-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: the declared operation surface is engine-mediated for every resource.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A declared, API-reachable operation stays reachable and is actually implemented.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"Declaration cannot evidence it — that a verb is declared is precisely what is not in question. Only driving the declared surface distinguishes reachable-and-implemented from declared-and-absent.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"An interface must not report success for an action it did not perform.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"A false success emits a SUCCESS, so no row distinguishes it — the record of a lie looks exactly like the record of a truth. Only driving the action and observing its effect separates them, which is why this cannot be a PRODUCTION clause.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A named verb must not silently widen into an unconstrained write over fields its resource never exposed for update.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The writable field set is declared, so the widening is visible as a mismatch between what a verb writes and what the resource exposes — readable from configuration without driving anything.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven call per declared API-reachable operation, reaching an implementation. C2: for each action with an \"\n + \"observable effect, the effect confirmed after a reported success. C3: each named verb's written field set, \"\n + \"compared against the fields its resource exposes for update.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Drive each declared operation and assert it reaches an implementation rather than an acknowledgement.\",\n \"For each success, confirm the effect independently — the report is the thing under test and cannot be its own evidence.\",\n \"Compare each verb's written fields against the resource's updatable set and assert no widening.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A success reported for an action not performed is a MAJOR and the intent's central harm. A declared operation with \"\n + \"no implementation is a MAJOR. A verb writing outside its resource's updatable set is a MAJOR — it is mass \"\n + \"assignment wearing a named verb.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 and C2 attest the BUILD they were driven against. An operation that regresses after the run is invisible until \"\n + \"re-driven, and nothing currently detects that.\",\n },\n};\n"]}
1
+ 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{ CoreAuditableEventType } from \"@wildo-ai/saas-models\";\n\nimport {\n AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane,\n AssuranceEvidenceHome,\n type AssuranceEvidenceRequirementBody,\n} from \"./assurance-program.schemas\";\n\n/**\n * What each `evidence-requirement:*` slug actually ASKS FOR.\n *\n * ## Why bodies live here rather than beside the bindings\n *\n * `assurance-authority-basis.definitions.ts` is 2151 lines of ref-shaped bindings that a reader scans\n * to answer \"what does this objective demand?\". A body is prose — minimum evidence, verification\n * steps, severity, limits — and forty-nine of them inline would make the binding table unreadable\n * for the one question it exists to answer. Keyed by requirement ref and composed in, the two stay\n * separately legible and the composer joins them.\n *\n * ## Authored from a PAPER body, and the paper body is not superseded\n *\n * Each entry is distilled from a working artifact in `__evidence-plane-slice__/`. That directory's\n * README said the paper bodies would be \"superseded when the body schema lands\" — they are NOT, and\n * saying so matters. What ships here is what a COLLECTOR and a JUDGE need. The paper body also\n * carries the reasoning that produced it: which proxy was wrong and why, what the marker comments\n * said, what the author checked and found absent. That is authoring context, it is what makes the\n * next body cheaper, and it has no runtime consumer — so it stays where it is rather than being\n * flattened into a string field nobody reads.\n *\n * ## Coverage\n *\n * FIFTY-ONE of 51 — COMPLETE, and the completion is what makes the field REQUIRED on the authority\n * (see `AssuranceProgramEvidenceExpectationAuthoritySchema.body`). Re-count rather than trusting this\n * line; an earlier revision said 5 while the file held 20. The first twenty-four are every body #302's paper run produced, and between\n * them they exercise EVERY member of both vocabularies: DECLARED, EMITTED, APPLICATION_RECORDED,\n * PERFORMED and UNPRODUCED, at META_APPLICATION, VERIFICATION and PRODUCTION. That was the point of\n * composing all five rather than the first: an enum member with no instance is the same\n * declared-and-read-by-nothing defect one level down, and four of the five members had none.\n *\n * The eleven that follow are the first #296 tranche, chosen as the objectives with the FEWEST marked\n * sites — a body over one or two markers is where the marker comment carries the whole argument, so\n * the reasoning is densest and the drafting cheapest. The seven after them are the second tranche and\n * the first drafted against VERIFIED emitters rather than a grep: every audit member named below was\n * traced to a production CALLER, not merely to a file that mentions it.\n *\n * The last nine closed the tranche. They are the objectives with the MOST marked sites — delegated\n * authorization alone has 45 — and taking them last was deliberate: a body over forty markers is an\n * argument about which clauses the intent decomposes into, and that argument is much cheaper once\n * forty-two bodies have already established what a clause looks like.\n *\n * **Adding a fifty-second binding now requires authoring its body in the same change.** That is the\n * point of closing the optional: an absent body is a slug a collector cannot act on, and the\n * composer refuses it by NAME rather than letting a Zod path report a missing object.\n */\nexport const ASSURANCE_EVIDENCE_REQUIREMENT_BODIES: Readonly<Record<string, AssuranceEvidenceRequirementBody>> = {\n \"evidence-requirement:security-event-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application unconditionally. The audit trail is engine-owned, so no application opts out of the \"\n + \"obligation and none has to build the lane first — unlike a demand whose evidence is an application-authored record.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation:\n \"Authentication, authorization, privilege, credential and security-configuration changes each emit a typed auditable event.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The demanded artifact is a per-occurrence row in the engine's own durable event store, so one collector query \"\n + \"serves every application. Not read off the attesting capability: it is read off the artifact the clause names.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n // authentication\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGIN,\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGIN_FAILED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGOUT,\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SESSION_EVICTED,\n // authorization and privilege\n CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_DENIED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_APP_ROLES_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS,\n // credential\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ONE_OFF_TOKEN_REVOKED,\n // `SCIM_TOKEN_REVOKED` was demanded here and REMOVED 2026-09-10: its emit method has no\n // caller, so the demand would have raised a MAJOR the first time a directory token was\n // revoked — a working control, failed for its evidence. `check:audit-event-coverage` cannot\n // see that shape (the emitter's own file counts as a reference), which is why the\n // reachability axis now lives in `check-assurance-body-audit-members` (#591).\n //\n // Nothing replaces it, and nothing needs to: the directory-token verbs are declared HIGH\n // risk, so each already lands as a generic `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` row above the\n // audit floor. That row is demanded by this clause's siblings.\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Non-human privileged access is audited OR refused.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Same store as C1, but the evidence is a DISJUNCTION and must not be flattened: an absent row is the CORRECT \"\n + \"outcome when access was refused, so a judge reading 'no rows' as failure is wrong.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"The absence of the audit delivery path is surfaced at boot rather than tolerated silently.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The subtle one. It is ABOUT boot, but what evidences it is a runtime-emitted diagnostic rather than a \"\n + \"configuration file — so it does not fall to META_APPLICATION even though its subject is startup.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a non-empty, queryable class of rows for each member named in the clause's requiredAuditEventMembers — the \"\n + \"members are DERIVED from the enum there rather than restated here, so a collector reads the query off the demand \"\n + \"and this prose cannot drift from it. \"\n + \"C2: for each non-human privileged access in the window, either an audit row or evidence of refusal. \"\n + \"C3: the boot-time diagnostic emitted when no audit delivery path is configured.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Establish the reporting window and the application's audit store, and record which store answered.\",\n \"For C1, query each change family and assert a non-empty typed class per represented family; report families with no activity as observations rather than gaps.\",\n \"For C2, enumerate non-human privileged accesses in the window and resolve each to an audit row OR a refusal; a window with neither is the only failing shape.\",\n \"For C3, assert the boot diagnostic exists for a deployment with no delivery path configured, driving it rather than reading configuration.\",\n \"Record any clause not run as insufficient_evidence for that clause; never let a NOT RUN clause pass on its siblings' evidence.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A represented change family with no typed class is a MAJOR: the control did not operate. A family with no activity \"\n + \"in the window is an OBSERVATION, not a gap — absence of activity and absence of a control read identically in a \"\n + \"row store, and only the emitter check separates them. C2 read as failure on an absent row is a judge defect, not a \"\n + \"finding. A control that operated with a missing evidence export is an OBSERVATION, never a nonconformity.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences that events were EMITTED, never that the trail is complete: an event class nobody wired emits nothing \"\n + \"and looks identical to a quiet period. It attests the window queried and says nothing about periods outside it. \"\n + \"And it is production evidence for the deployment that produced it — a different deployment of the same build has \"\n + \"its own window and its own answer.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:retention-window-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"APPLICABLE to every application: capability:declared-retention-window is ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, so it survives the \"\n + \"composer's capability filter unconditionally.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C0\",\n obligation: \"The row-retention windows themselves are declared.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The premise the objective operates on rather than what it demands evidence of — needed as the BASELINE C1 is \"\n + \"judged against, since enforcement cannot be assessed without knowing what was declared.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Declared row-retention windows are ENFORCED.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The sweep emits NO auditable event by design — a database TTL deletes silently, so 'did retention run?' is \"\n + \"answerable only from the sweep's own execution record. Engine-owned and uniform across applications, which is \"\n + \"why EMITTED covers it and why EMITTED cannot mean 'an audit row'.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A configuration whose derived copies could outlive the row they came from is REFUSED at startup.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The startup validator's outcome, read from the accountable runtime's boot log. PRODUCTION despite being about \"\n + \"boot: what evidences it is a runtime-emitted outcome, not a configuration file.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C0: the declared retention configuration, named by data-retention-class members derived from the capability's \"\n + \"implementationRefs. C1: execution records for the retention sweep over the claimed period — that it ran, \"\n + \"per-resource removal counts, and whether it stopped early. C2: the startup validator's outcome from the boot log, \"\n + \"NOT from an API: probing HTTP for a boot-time fact is a category error whose silence establishes nothing.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Record the window, the application revision and the runtime profile.\",\n \"Read the declared windows (C0) as the baseline; without them C1 cannot be judged.\",\n \"Gather sweep execution records across the period and reconcile them against the declared classes.\",\n \"Read the boot log for the validator outcome; a clean boot means no unsafe derived-copy configuration was present.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"'Stopped early' is NORMAL operation — the sweep defers the remainder rather than taking a table-wide lock — and \"\n + \"must never read as failure. The nonconformity is the ABSENCE of a run in a period where retention was due. A \"\n + \"startup refusal is the control working, not a finding.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences that the sweep RAN and what it removed, never that every row past its window is gone. And the boot \"\n + \"outcome attests the configuration that booted, so it goes stale the moment configuration changes.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"UNDETERMINED when the two required capabilities resolve differently — capability:audit-events is gated on an \"\n + \"engine capability an application may not enable, while capability:privileged-access-review is ALWAYS_AVAILABLE. \"\n + \"That status is DERIVED, not judged: deriveExpectationCapabilityApplicability returns APPLICABLE when every \"\n + \"required capability is available, NOT_APPLICABLE when all are unavailable, and UNDETERMINED when only some \"\n + \"are — this shape. A collector reads the status and stops rather than deciding.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"The enumeration a review reads — who currently holds privileged access, and the access events behind it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"Engine-produced, in the engine's own store. This is the half the attesting capability correctly describes.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The review OCCURRENCE — that authorized people examined that enumeration and decided.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.PERFORMED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"No engine mechanism produces it, none can, and none should: a review is a human act, and a framework that \"\n + \"synthesised one would manufacture the evidence it is meant to collect. The framework's obligation is to make \"\n + \"C1 available and to accept and retain C2. PRODUCTION because the review is performed against the live \"\n + \"deployment — that the engine cannot OBSERVE it is carried by the home, not by the plane.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the current privileged-access enumeration and the access events behind it, over the review period. C2: the \"\n + \"operator-supplied review record, as a host artifact — who reviewed, what enumeration they read, what they decided.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Resolve applicability first; if the two capabilities resolve differently, record UNDETERMINED and stop.\",\n \"Gather the enumeration and its backing events for the period (C1).\",\n \"Accept the host-supplied review record and check it cites the enumeration it read, not a re-derived one (C2).\",\n \"Never synthesise C2 from C1: an enumeration is what a review READS, never evidence that a review happened.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A missing C2 with a healthy C1 is a MAJOR against the OPERATOR, not the framework — the record was never supplied. \"\n + \"A missing C1 is a MAJOR against the framework: the review had nothing to read. A capability-keyed classifier that \"\n + \"reports this demand satisfied on C1 alone has silently dropped the half the objective is named for.\",\n limits:\n \"C2 is self-attested by construction. The framework can retain it and check that it cites the enumeration; it cannot \"\n + \"evidence that the examination was competent or independent.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies only where the APPLICATION owns an erasure-request resource. Four of the five marked sites are in an \"\n + \"application, not the engine. An application that never built an erasure lane has not failed a control — it \"\n + \"declared none — and a judge records not_applicable_as_configured rather than a nonconformity.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"The request is recorded on intake, whether the subject or the controller raised it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.APPLICATION_RECORDED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The application's own resource row is the durable record, and no CoreAuditableEventType member covers the \"\n + \"erasure lifecycle at all — verified, including the unemitted-marker check on the two erasure-shaped members, \"\n + \"which are about propagating erasure to EXTERNAL systems. The row's schema and status vocabulary are the \"\n + \"application's, so a collector queries it against that application's specification.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"It may be withdrawn by the subject while it is pending.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.APPLICATION_RECORDED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"Same store; the withdrawal is a state transition on the same application-authored row.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"It is executed on the declared schedule.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.APPLICATION_RECORDED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"Same store, plus the schedule that drove the sweep — execution cannot be judged against outcome alone.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"It terminates the erased person's sessions.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The session-revocation service emits no event and writes no durable record — its own marker calls it a write to \"\n + \"our own Redis. That is the right design for the CONTROL and leaves the DEMAND unevidenced. UNPRODUCED is the \"\n + \"honest value, not an absence.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: rows created in the window, each carrying a channel member and, where controller-raised, the requesting user and \"\n + \"justification. C2: the withdrawal operation reachable to the subject, plus any cancelled rows — an EMPTY \"\n + \"withdrawal set is not a deficiency. C3: completed or failed rows with a completion timestamp and outcome, plus the \"\n + \"declared schedule. C4: nothing produces it; what can be gathered is that the revoker is installed, which evidences \"\n + \"the control's PRESENCE and not its OPERATION.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Resolve applicability: does the application own an erasure-request resource? If not, record not_applicable_as_configured and stop.\",\n \"Assert every row in the window carries a channel, and that controller-raised rows carry the requester.\",\n \"Confirm the withdrawal operation is reachable to a subject-scoped principal, and that no row left the pending state by an unaccounted route.\",\n \"Gather failed rows and report them; a suppressed failure is the defect this clause exists to catch.\",\n \"Record C4 as UNPRODUCED and state that the binding evidence attests presence, not operation.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A row with no channel, or a completed row with no outcome, is an OBSERVATION: the control operated and its evidence \"\n + \"is incomplete. A row that left the pending state by an unaccounted route is a MAJOR — the state machine IS the \"\n + \"control. Failed rows with no follow-up are a MAJOR: an unmet obligation to a real person. C4 carries NO severity \"\n + \"against the application; it is a framework gap and belongs in the finding as such, so it is fixed once rather than \"\n + \"raised against every application forever.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the erasure LANE — intake, state, schedule, outcome — and never that the data is gone; whether \"\n + \"impersonalization removed what it claims is a different demand. It does not prove sessions ended, and nothing \"\n + \"available does. A window with no erasures evidences nothing about the lane: absence of activity and absence of a \"\n + \"control read identically in a row store.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:selected-processor-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application unconditionally. The control is the ABSENCE of egress by default, so an application \"\n + \"that selected no provider is not un-evidenced — it is the strongest possible evidence for this demand.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Nothing leaves unless the application selects a provider for that capability.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The committed configuration IS the evidence: what a reviewer must establish is which capabilities have a \"\n + \"provider selected, which is a property of the commit rather than of any runtime event. There is no audit \"\n + \"member for 'a provider was selected', and there should not be — a selection is not an occurrence.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"With no selection, the work is served locally with no egress at all.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A committed configuration can prove no provider is SELECTED. It cannot prove no bytes LEFT — that is a claim \"\n + \"about behaviour under no selection, evidenced by driving the seam. Flattening C2 into C1's plane would let a \"\n + \"reviewer accept a declaration as proof of a runtime property.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the committed provider selection per capability, and for each selected provider its compliance choice — the \"\n + \"deployment model and the region. The deployment model is required even for a single-model provider, because \"\n + \"reading it from a framework default rather than an operator's declaration is how a wrong one goes unnoticed. \"\n + \"C2: that the extraction seam REFUSES when no provider is resolved rather than degrading, and that its one \"\n + \"functional caller serves the local library when the field did not opt in.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate the capabilities with a provider selected, from committed configuration.\",\n \"Assert each selected provider carries a compliance choice with a deployment model and a region.\",\n \"Cross-check each chosen region against the provider's declared processing regions; a region outside the list is APP-ASSERTED — report it, never fail it.\",\n \"Drive the seam with no provider configured and assert the refusal, then assert the local path serves.\",\n \"Cross-check the selected set against the application's processor register, in BOTH directions.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A selected provider with no compliance choice is a MAJOR: the processor exists and the deployment model is \"\n + \"unstated, so no transfer statement about it can be derived. A selected provider absent from the processor \"\n + \"register is a MAJOR — the routing happened and the notice does not name the recipient. A region outside the \"\n + \"declared list is an OBSERVATION, app-asserted by design. A register entry with no selection is an OBSERVATION \"\n + \"worth reading twice: a stale entry, or a processor reached by a path this demand does not see.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the PROVIDER seam. Any other outbound path — a webhook, an integration, an application's own fetch — \"\n + \"is outside this demand and is not made safe by it. C2's evidence attests the BUILD it was driven against, and \"\n + \"nothing currently detects a change to the selection ladder. And the register cross-check compares two HUMAN \"\n + \"statements: nothing derives a register entry from a provider's declared profile.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:multi-factor-enrolment-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application: the verification authority is engine-owned and unconditional. Note the demand is \"\n + \"about the AUTHORITY, not about enrolment coverage — an application whose users enrolled no second factor still \"\n + \"has the control, and still has to satisfy it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Verification of an enrolled second factor goes through ONE authority — no caller builds a second door.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second verifier, which no committed specification can attest — a spec can say \"\n + \"none was declared, never that none was built. A driven enumeration is engine-owned and uniform, so one query \"\n + \"serves every application.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"That authority is replay-resistant: a code or backup code used once cannot be used again.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"A driven scenario result. Production evidence would need a per-occurrence record this control deliberately does not produce.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And timing-safe, so a match position cannot leak through timing.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Timing-safety is a property of an execution that leaves no trace of having held. A scenario can assert the \"\n + \"authority CALLS a constant-time primitive — which is C1's structural question wearing C3's clothes — and no \"\n + \"artifact evidences that a particular verification was timing-safe.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: an enumeration of every path verifying an enrolled second factor, each resolving to the single authority, plus \"\n + \"the assertion that no other code compares a TOTP secret or consumes a backup code. C2: a driven scenario replaying \"\n + \"a successful code and a consumed backup code, both refused. C3: nothing produces it; the constant-time primitive is \"\n + \"confirmed by inspection, which evidences the CODE and not an execution. \"\n + \"Deliberately NO audit members: the authority emits nothing by design and the MFA event members belong to the \"\n + \"CALLERS — demanding them here would attribute a caller's evidence to a control that produces none.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate every verification path and resolve each to the single authority; a path that compares a secret itself is the finding, not a variant.\",\n \"Drive a successful verification, replay the same code, and assert refusal.\",\n \"Consume a backup code, replay it, and assert refusal.\",\n \"Confirm the comparison primitive is constant-time by inspection and record C3 as UNPRODUCED with that as its only support.\",\n \"Do NOT gather MFA audit rows as evidence: they evidence the callers' flows and would read here as coverage the authority does not provide.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A second verification path is a MAJOR — the intent names that failure mode explicitly, a second and weaker door onto \"\n + \"the same credential. A replayable code or backup code is a MAJOR. C3 carries no severity: it is a framework-side \"\n + \"absence, not an application's failure. MFA audit rows presented as evidence are a JUDGE defect rather than a \"\n + \"finding, and they will look like thorough evidence.\",\n limits:\n \"It does not prove any user enrolled a second factor, and despite the slug it is not asked to. C1's enumeration \"\n + \"attests the BUILD it was taken against — a door added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated, and nothing \"\n + \"detects that. C2 proves the authority refuses a replay when DRIVEN, never that every production verification was \"\n + \"replay-resistant.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. The gate is engine-owned and the objective is about REACHABILITY, so an application \"\n + \"that has granted no entitlement still has the control and still has to satisfy it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Feature and entitlement writes declare an operator-gated door.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The role gate IS a committed declaration — ScopeFeatures writes are APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN-only, and the marker \"\n + \"notes the fields cannot be field-protected because the super-admin path must write them. So the gate is the \"\n + \"whole boundary, and it is readable from the resource configuration.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"No other door reaches those writes — a principal cannot widen what it is entitled to.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second reachable path, which produces no rows and no occurrence: an entitlement \"\n + \"nobody widened emits nothing. A driven reachability enumeration is the only artifact, and it is engine-owned \"\n + \"and uniform. THIS IS WHY THE OBJECTIVE IS MARKED IN A TEST — for a reachability invariant the test IS the \"\n + \"control's evidence, not a stand-in for it.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the declared role gate on every feature and entitlement write, from committed configuration. C2: a driven \"\n + \"enumeration over the operation variants asserting each stays non-client-reachable — progression and lifecycle \"\n + \"state writes in particular, whose state fields carry no field-level exclusion, so a variant flip would let a \"\n + \"client self-forge currentStage, milestonesAchieved or totalPoints.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the declared gate for every feature and entitlement write (C1).\",\n \"Drive the reachability enumeration over every operation variant and assert none is client-reachable (C2).\",\n \"Check the progression and lifecycle writes specifically: their fields have no field-level exclusion, so the variant gate is the only guard.\",\n \"Do NOT look for occurrence rows. An entitlement nobody widened produces none, and their absence evidences nothing either way.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A client-reachable entitlement write is a MAJOR and the objective's whole subject. A gate weakened from \"\n + \"APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN is a MAJOR: the marker records that this one role gate is the ENTIRE self-grant boundary \"\n + \"for paid entitlements. An empty occurrence set is NOT a finding in either direction.\",\n limits:\n \"The enumeration attests the BUILD it ran against; a variant added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated. It \"\n + \"evidences that no door is REACHABLE, never that no entitlement was wrongly granted through the legitimate door — \"\n + \"that is the credit-grant demand's question, not this one.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:lifecycle-stage-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. The control is that a self-reported stage confers nothing, so an application whose \"\n + \"users report stages freely is exactly the case it exists for.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A self-reported lifecycle stage confers no capability.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Evidence of a NON-grant. Nothing is emitted when a capability is not conferred, so there is no occurrence to \"\n + \"collect — the artifact is a driven scenario in which activation succeeds with no feature repository present \"\n + \"at all, so a grant would have to reach a repository that is not there.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"And it cannot cross a scope boundary — authority comes only from a decision an authorized party made.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Scoping of the evaluator, driven with an explicit principal. The HTTP-tier half — that one user cannot make a \"\n + \"request the backend attributes to another — is a different mechanism proven at the e2e tier, and this clause \"\n + \"must not claim it.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven activation with no feature repository bound, succeeding — the absence of the repository is what makes \"\n + \"the non-grant provable rather than merely unobserved. C2: the evaluator driven with an explicit principal, \"\n + \"asserting the guidance write is scoped to it.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Drive activation with no feature repository bound and assert it succeeds (C1).\",\n \"Drive the evaluator with an explicit principal and assert the write is scoped to it (C2).\",\n \"Record explicitly that the transport tier is out of scope here: this evidences the evaluator's scoping, not the request attribution.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A capability conferred from a self-reported stage is a MAJOR — it is the objective's entire subject. A scope \"\n + \"crossing is a MAJOR. Absence of activity evidences nothing: a stage nobody reported produces no signal either way.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the EVALUATOR, never the transport. That user A cannot make a request attributed to user B is the \"\n + \"context-addressed-singleton mechanism, proven elsewhere, and reading this evidence as covering it would claim a \"\n + \"tier this demand never touched.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:first-exposure-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application: the disclosure boundary is engine-owned and every resource schema passes through it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Material a schema declares backend-only does not cross the client boundary.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A non-disclosure produces no record: a field that never crossed emits nothing. The artifact is a driven \"\n + \"assertion over the disclosure predicate, which now covers BOTH decorators — isBackendOnly and its sibling \"\n + \"isWriteOnlySecret, held to the same boundary.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Except at a single first exposure, which is itself audited.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The one clause with a real occurrence: a first exposure is a per-occurrence row in the engine's audit trail. \"\n + \"The intent's word 'single' is the control — an exposure that happens twice is the defect the audit row makes \"\n + \"visible.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.FIELD_ACCESS],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven assertion that the response DTO refuses to emit any field the disclosure predicate marks \"\n + \"non-disclosable, across both decorators. C2: FIELD_ACCESS rows for each first exposure in the window, and the \"\n + \"assertion that no field appears twice.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Drive the disclosure predicate across both decorators and assert the response DTO masks every non-disclosable field (C1).\",\n \"Gather FIELD_ACCESS rows for the window and resolve each to a first exposure (C2).\",\n \"Assert no field has more than one first exposure; a repeat is the defect, not a duplicate row.\",\n \"Check any surface that renders a field OUTSIDE the response DTO — a retrieval header assembled from application declarations reaches values the DTO exists to mask, and that path is latent rather than absent.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A non-disclosable field crossing the boundary is a MAJOR. A second exposure of the same field is a MAJOR: 'single' \"\n + \"is the control. A first exposure with no FIELD_ACCESS row is an OBSERVATION where the exposure was legitimate and \"\n + \"only its evidence is missing — effectiveness and evidence-availability stay apart.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 attests the predicate and the DTO, not every surface that can render a value: a header assembled from an \"\n + \"application's own declarations is outside the DTO and reaches the same material. C2 evidences exposures that were \"\n + \"AUDITED, so it cannot see one that crossed by a path emitting nothing — which is what C1 exists to close.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: the authorization funnel is engine-owned and every operation passes through it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Access-control decisions, refusals included, are attributable and reviewable.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"A per-occurrence row in the engine's audit trail. REFUSALS are the half that matters — a demand satisfied only by grants would evidence the opposite of the control.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_DENIED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Repeated refusals stay detectable without the record itself becoming an availability risk.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"Same rows, read as a RATE rather than as instances. The clause carries its own tension — a control that records every refusal can be driven to exhaust storage — so evidence must show both that repetition is visible and that recording is bounded.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A failure of the recording pipeline is detectable and attributable to the specific action it lost.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"NO audit member exists for a pipeline failure — verified against the enum, which carries none matching AUDIT, PIPELINE, DELIVERY or SINK. The delivery path surfaces its absence at boot and drains a dead-letter queue, but nothing attributes a LOST record to the action that produced it, which is what this clause asks for.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: denial rows for the window, each attributable to a principal and an operation. C2: the same rows aggregated by \"\n + \"principal and by operation, plus evidence that recording is bounded rather than unbounded. C3: nothing produces it \"\n + \"— what can be gathered is the boot diagnostic for an absent delivery path and the dead-letter drain, both of which \"\n + \"evidence the PIPELINE's health and not the attribution this clause demands.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Gather denial rows for the window and assert each carries a principal and an operation.\",\n \"Aggregate by principal and by operation so repetition is visible; a single-row view cannot satisfy C2.\",\n \"Confirm recording is bounded — the clause names availability as a risk of the control itself.\",\n \"Record C3 as UNPRODUCED, citing the absence of any pipeline-failure member rather than substituting pipeline-health evidence for attribution.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"Denials absent while grants are present is a MAJOR — it is the exact shape of a funnel recording only successes. \"\n + \"Unbounded recording is a MAJOR against availability, which the intent names explicitly. C3 carries no severity: it \"\n + \"is a framework gap, and a demand nothing can answer must not become a finding against an application.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences DECISIONS, never their correctness — a wrongly granted access is recorded exactly like a right one. \"\n + \"And C1's rows come from the funnel: an authorization decision taken outside it is invisible here, which is why the \"\n + \"funnel being the sole denial chokepoint is a separate and load-bearing property.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:credential-state-transition-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application. Credentials are engine-owned across every authentication method an application enables.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Issuance, refresh, rotation, revocation and expiry of a credential are explicit attributable transitions.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"Per-occurrence rows in the audit trail, one class per transition kind. EXPIRY is the one to watch: it is a transition nothing actively performs, so a demand assuming an actor for every member would fail on it.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ONE_OFF_TOKEN_REVOKED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_TOKEN_REVOKED,\n // `SCIM_TOKEN_ROTATED` was demanded here and REMOVED 2026-09-10, for the same reason as\n // `SCIM_TOKEN_REVOKED` in `security-event-record` — no caller, so no rotation of a\n // directory token can ever produce it. Its ROTATION transition is still evidenced, by the\n // generic resource-operation row the HIGH-risk verb produces; what is lost is only the\n // purpose-built member, and losing it silently is what this removal prevents.\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Credential theft is detected and answered by invalidation.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"A detection followed by a revocation is TWO rows that must be correlatable, not one. Evidence that cannot link them evidences a revocation nobody can attribute to a detection.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A revocation actually terminates the sessions and tokens it names, rather than merely marking them.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"'Actually terminates' is a claim about EFFECT, and a revocation row evidences the intent rather than the outcome. Only a driven scenario — revoke, then present the credential and be refused — separates a real termination from a mark.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: transition rows across the window covering each kind an application's enabled methods can produce. C2: paired \"\n + \"detection and invalidation rows, correlatable. C3: a driven scenario in which a revoked credential is presented \"\n + \"and refused, for sessions and for tokens separately.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Gather transition rows and group by kind; report kinds with no activity as observations, not gaps.\",\n \"For each invalidation, resolve the detection that preceded it; an unpaired invalidation is reported, not assumed benign.\",\n \"Drive a revocation and then present the credential, asserting refusal for a session and for a token.\",\n \"Treat expiry separately: it has no actor, so an attribution check that demands one will misreport it.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A revocation that leaves a credential usable is a MAJOR — it is C3's whole subject and the difference between \"\n + \"marking and terminating. An uncorrelatable detection/invalidation pair is an OBSERVATION unless the invalidation \"\n + \"is missing entirely, which is a MAJOR.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 and C2 attest the window; C3 attests the BUILD it was driven against, not that every production revocation took \"\n + \"effect. Nothing here evidences that a credential was not ALSO copied before revocation.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: roles and memberships are engine-owned, and the demand covers whichever privilege kinds an application uses.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Every grant, widening, narrowing and revocation of privilege leaves durable evidence of the assignment's FULL LIFE, not merely its current state.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"The intent's contrast is the control: a current-state read (who holds what NOW) satisfies nothing here. Only an append-only per-occurrence class evidences a life, which is why the audit trail rather than the role table is the store.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_APP_ROLES_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE,\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Across all four privilege kinds — a role, a unit-scoped membership, a discretionary entitlement, a subscription-derived one.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"The intent ENUMERATES four kinds, so coverage is per-kind and a body naming only role changes would report a satisfied demand while two kinds go unevidenced. A subscription-derived privilege is the easiest to miss: nobody grants it, a billing state change does.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: lifecycle rows for the window, each naming the assignment, the direction of change and the actor. C2: coverage \"\n + \"per privilege kind, including the subscription-derived kind whose transitions originate in billing rather than in \"\n + \"an administrative act.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Gather lifecycle rows and assert each names the assignment, the change direction and an actor.\",\n \"Partition by privilege kind and report per-kind coverage; a kind with no rows in a window that had activity is the finding.\",\n \"Reconstruct one assignment's full life from the rows alone, without reading current state — that reconstruction IS the demand.\",\n \"Check the subscription-derived kind specifically: its transitions are not administrative acts and a role-shaped query misses them.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"Evidence that only reports current state is a MAJOR — it is precisely what the intent excludes. A missing privilege \"\n + \"kind is a MAJOR for that kind, not for the demand as a whole. A row without an actor is an OBSERVATION where the \"\n + \"transition was legitimate and only its attribution is thin.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences that a privilege CHANGED, never that the change was authorized — a grant made by someone entitled to \"\n + \"make it and one made wrongly are recorded identically. Authorization is the decision demand's question.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:second-signature-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application that has a platform tier at all. The strongest evidence here is an EMPTY set of \"\n + \"application-wide elevations beside a live refusal path — an application whose operators never needed one is \"\n + \"in scope and passes on that basis, not by exemption.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation:\n \"An operator act that names no single customer is granted only after a SECOND, distinct administrator signs, \"\n + \"and the requester is refused as their own approver.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Two identities have to be COMPARED, and a comparison leaves nothing behind unless it is recorded per occurrence. \"\n + \"A declaration could say the rule exists; only an emitted pair of rows — one naming the requester, one naming the \"\n + \"signer — shows that two different people were actually involved in a given elevation.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The requester's stated justification is recorded, and it is what the second administrator decided on.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A second signature with no stated reason is a countersignature on nothing. The signer of an application-wide \"\n + \"elevation has no tenant and no support case in front of them — the justification IS the whole of what they weigh, \"\n + \"so evidence that omits it cannot show the decision was a decision.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation:\n \"The resulting authority is TIME-BOUND, and its end leaves a record — whether it was revoked or simply elapsed.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A second signature that grants standing authority has moved the problem rather than solved it. The end of the \"\n + \"window is the half a reader most needs and the half most likely to be missing, because nothing happens at that \"\n + \"moment unless something writes it down.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: for each application-wide elevation in the window, the request row and the approval row, naming two DIFFERENT \"\n + \"principals. C2: the justification carried on those rows. C3: for each elevation, a terminal row — revoked or \"\n + \"expired — or a window that has not yet closed.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Gather the elevation lifecycle rows for the window and partition them by grant.\",\n \"For each grant that became usable, assert the requester and the approver are different principals; a grant reaching \"\n + \"the usable state with one principal on both rows is the finding this demand exists for.\",\n \"Assert every request carries a justification, and that the approval refers to the same grant.\",\n \"Assert every closed grant has a terminal row, and that no grant is still usable past its stated window.\",\n \"Attempt a self-approval against the running system and confirm it is REFUSED — an empty set of self-approvals proves \"\n + \"nothing on its own, because it is also what a broken refusal path produces when nobody happened to try.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A usable elevation whose request and approval name the SAME principal is a MAJOR, and is the only finding here that \"\n + \"invalidates the control rather than the evidence. A missing justification is a MAJOR for that grant: it makes the \"\n + \"signature unauditable. A missing terminal row where the window has demonstrably closed is an OBSERVATION when the \"\n + \"elevation itself is unusable — the authority ended, the bookkeeping lagged.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences that TWO PEOPLE acted, never that either was entitled to, and never that the second one read what they \"\n + \"signed. Collusion is outside its reach by construction: two administrators who agree in advance produce evidence \"\n + \"indistinguishable from a well-run approval. What it does buy is that a single compromised or mistaken operator \"\n + \"cannot reach application-wide data alone.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application, and most sharply to those with no platform-tier administration: the demand's strongest evidence is an empty crossing set beside a live enforcement path.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A crossing is admitted only by an explicitly enumerated operation variant — never ambient.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The enumeration is a committed declaration: a variant either declares cross-tenant admission or it does not. Reach acquired by position in the request path is exactly what the intent forbids, and a declaration is what makes admission auditable rather than emergent.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"It requires an elevation that was REQUESTED rather than assumed, and where the tenant demands it, approved by that tenant.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"The grant's life is a per-occurrence class. 'Requested rather than assumed' is a property of the record's existence: an elevation with no request row is the ambient standing privilege the objective exists to remove.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And the crossing itself is recorded.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"A separate row from the grant, and it must be: a grant evidences permission to cross, never that a crossing occurred. The record distinguishes a sanctioned crossing from an attempted undeclared one.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the set of operation variants declaring cross-tenant admission, from committed configuration. C2: grant \"\n + \"lifecycle rows showing request, and where required approval, before use. C3: crossing rows for the window, each \"\n + \"distinguishing a declared admission from an attempted undeclared one.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the declared cross-tenant variants and assert the set is explicit rather than derived from a role alone.\",\n \"For each crossing in the window, resolve the grant that permitted it and assert the grant was requested before use.\",\n \"Assert every crossing produced a record, including attempted undeclared ones — those are the rows a reviewer most needs.\",\n \"An empty crossing set with a live enforcement path is a PASS, not insufficient evidence: no platform administration occurred.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A crossing with no grant is a MAJOR — it is the ambient reach the objective removes. An undeclared crossing that \"\n + \"succeeded is a MAJOR; one that was refused and recorded is the control WORKING. A grant used before approval, \"\n + \"where the tenant demands approval, is a MAJOR.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences crossings the engine mediates. A platform operator reaching a tenant's data outside the application — \"\n + \"a database console — is invisible here and is not made safe by it.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:session-eviction-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to EVERY application, unconditionally, and this said the opposite until 2026-09-10 — that it applied \"\n + \"\\\"wherever a concurrency bound is configured\\\" and was otherwise not applicable as configured. There is no such \"\n + \"configuration. An application that declares nothing is capped at the framework default, and the vocabulary says so \"\n + \"in its own words: there is no value that disables the cap. So the escape let an application decline evidence for a \"\n + \"control that was running the whole time, which is the most expensive shape an applicability clause can take — it \"\n + \"reads as diligence and removes the demand.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A principal holds a bounded number of concurrent sessions.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The bound holding is a non-event — a principal who never exceeded it emits nothing. Only a driven scenario that exceeds the bound and observes the refusal-or-eviction evidences that it is enforced.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The eviction retires the OLDEST refresh chain — the property that pushes a stolen chain out instead of a legitimate one.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"The ORDERING is the control, not the eviction. The record must name which chain was retired and when it was issued, because a record naming only the victim would prove a session ended without proving the RIGHT one did.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SESSION_EVICTED],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the effective bound, declared or defaulted, and a driven scenario exceeding it. C2: eviction rows carrying the \"\n + \"evicted chain's issue time, so the ordering claim is checkable from the row rather than inferred.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the effective bound — the declared value, or the framework default where nothing is declared. There is no configuration under which this step yields \\\"no bound\\\", so an answer of none means the resolution is wrong, not that the demand is inapplicable.\",\n \"Drive the bound past its limit and observe the eviction.\",\n \"For each eviction row, assert the retired chain was the OLDEST — an eviction that retired a newer chain is the defect, and a row without an issue time cannot show either way.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"An eviction retiring a chain that was not the oldest is a MAJOR: it is the property the objective is named for, and \"\n + \"it inverts the control by pushing out the legitimate session. A row with no issue time is an OBSERVATION — the \"\n + \"eviction may have been correct and its evidence is insufficient to say.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the eviction's ORDERING, never that the evicted chain was stolen. And an unreadable issue time yields \"\n + \"ABSENCE, never a synthesised instant — a reconstructed ordering would be evidence of the reconstruction.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:outbound-call-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application that enables any provider-backed capability; an application with none makes no provider calls and the egress half is not applicable as configured.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Outbound traffic leaves through a single named egress per capability.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"'A single named egress' is a structural property of the configuration, and a committed declaration is what a reviewer enumerates. That no SECOND egress exists is C1's harder half and is evidenced by the same enumeration, not by rows.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Every physical provider call is recorded — provider, model, usage and outcome.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"This record is NOT an audit event — that much was always right, and naming an audit member here would demand a \"\n + \"row nothing writes. What was wrong, until 2026-09-10, was calling the agent-call trace \\\"a third engine-owned \"\n + \"durable STORE beside the audit trail and the batch execution record\\\", which made the home read EMITTED. It is \"\n + \"not a store: every sink is a logger, a composite, an analytics forwarder, an LLM-observability forwarder or a \"\n + \"companion filesystem writer. None is a repository, and a collector has nothing to query. So the honest home is \"\n + \"UNPRODUCED — the framework demands a per-call record and produces telemetry instead, which is a framework gap \"\n + \"named once rather than a nonconformity raised against every application. Wiring a queryable sink would move \"\n + \"this to EMITTED and is the fix; a judge must not accept a log search as its substitute, because a retention \"\n + \"window on a log is not an evidence retention decision.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And an administrative probe records its initiating actor.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A different call kind with a different question: a probe has no provider or model, and what a reviewer needs is \"\n + \"WHO initiated it. Separate store, separate member, and a body merging C2 and C3 would demand provider fields of \"\n + \"a call that has none. Unlike C2 this half IS an audit row, which is why the two cannot share a home.\\n\\n\"\n + \"The member was `PLATFORM_DIRECTORY_ACCESS` until 2026-09-10, and that was a demand borrowed from another \"\n + \"objective: its own declaration is marked `WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT` and it records an \"\n + \"unconfined administrative READ of application-wide data — not an outbound call at all. The member marked for \"\n + \"THIS objective is the outbound administrative probe, which is emitted directly rather than through the audit \"\n + \"service. Read the member's own marker before demanding it; the enum says which objective each member answers.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT_TEST_DISPATCHED],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the declared egress per capability, and the enumeration showing no second path. C2: nothing a collector can \"\n + \"query — see the home. What CAN be gathered is the sink configuration, which evidences where the telemetry goes and \"\n + \"not what it contains. C3: outbound-probe rows naming the initiating actor.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate the declared egress per enabled capability and assert exactly one per capability.\",\n \"Record C2 as UNPRODUCED. Do NOT substitute a log search: a log is not an evidence store, its retention is an operational setting rather than a retention decision, and treating it as one is how an unqueryable control comes to read as evidenced.\",\n \"Read the configured trace sinks and record where the telemetry goes — that is what the current mechanism supports, and stating it is more useful than an empty result.\",\n \"Gather administrative outbound-probe rows separately and assert each names its initiating actor, its scope and its destination HOST — never the full URL, since customer endpoint paths routinely embed per-tenant tokens and these rows replicate to the tenant SIEM and the immutable store.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A second egress path for one capability is a MAJOR — it defeats the enumeration the whole demand rests on. A probe \"\n + \"with no actor is a MAJOR: attribution is the entire point of C3. C2 carries NO severity against an application: \"\n + \"the per-call record it asks for is not produced by anything the framework ships, and raising that against every \"\n + \"application forever is noise rather than a finding.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 evidences the declared egress and nothing about traffic. A call made outside it is precisely what C1 exists to \"\n + \"exclude — and C2, which would have caught it, produces nothing today, so the enumeration is currently the ONLY \"\n + \"thing standing between this demand and an unobserved second path. That is the weakest position in this body and it \"\n + \"should be read as such rather than as two clauses reinforcing each other.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:credit-grant-reachability-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies wherever a credit balance exists; an application with no credit model has no door to gate and the demand is not applicable as configured.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"An increase in a credit balance is reachable only through a system or payment-gated door.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"REACHABILITY is a property of the declared operation surface: which variants can increase a balance, and what gates each. The committed configuration answers it, and a runtime row could not — a balance nobody increased emits nothing.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"So no ordinary principal can grant itself economic value.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The self-grant is the failure mode, and its absence is a non-event. Only a driven attempt — an ordinary principal trying to increase its own balance and being refused — separates a closed door from an untested one.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: every operation variant that can increase a credit balance, with its gate, from committed configuration — the \"\n + \"enumeration must be exhaustive, because one ungated variant defeats the rest. C2: a driven attempt by an ordinary \"\n + \"principal, refused.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate every variant that writes an increase and assert each is system- or payment-gated.\",\n \"Drive an increase as an ordinary principal and assert refusal.\",\n \"Do NOT read balance rows as evidence: a balance nobody wrongly increased looks exactly like a control that never ran.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"An ungated increase variant is a MAJOR and the objective's entire subject — economic value granted to self. A \"\n + \"successful driven self-grant is a MAJOR. An empty set of illegitimate increases evidences nothing either way.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the DOOR, never the amounts: a payment-gated increase for the wrong quantity is correct here and wrong \"\n + \"elsewhere. And the enumeration attests the build — a variant added later is invisible until re-enumerated.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:field-authority-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: server-owned fields are engine-declared and the boot proof runs unconditionally.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A server-owned field has exactly one named authority that writes it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The authority is NAMED in the declaration, and 'exactly one' is a property of that declaration rather than of any write. A second writer is a declaration defect, visible without running anything.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"And that authority is PROVEN at boot rather than assumed.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale: \"The intent's own contrast — proven, not assumed — makes the boot outcome the evidence rather than the declaration. It is a runtime-emitted diagnostic, so it is PRODUCTION despite being about startup, the same reading retention-window-declaration's C2 required.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: every server-owned field with its single named authority, from committed configuration. C2: the boot validation \"\n + \"outcome from the accountable runtime's log — not from an API, since probing HTTP for a boot-time fact is a \"\n + \"category error whose silence establishes nothing.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate server-owned fields and assert each names exactly one authority.\",\n \"Read the boot outcome for the running revision; a clean boot is the proof C2 asks for.\",\n \"Assert no reader has to disambiguate: two authorities for one field is the defect even if only one ever writes.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"Two named authorities for one field is a MAJOR — the intent's stated harm is that a reader must work out which \"\n + \"value is current. A boot that did not run the proof is insufficient_evidence for C2, not a pass.\",\n limits:\n \"C2 attests the CONFIGURATION that booted and goes stale the moment it changes. Neither clause evidences that the \"\n + \"authority wrote correct values — only that exactly one of them can.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:key-retirement-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies wherever token signing keys rotate; an application that has never rotated has no retirement to evidence, which is not_applicable_as_configured rather than a gap.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A rotated signing key can be given an explicit retirement instant.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The retirement instant is authored, and the intent's contrast is with a key that stays trusted 'until someone edits configuration' — so the declared instant IS the control, and its presence is readable without running anything.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"After which it stops being advertised and stops verifying tokens.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"TWO effects, and a body must name both: advertisement is what a client discovers, verification is what a token relies on. A key removed from the advertised set while still verifying is the failure the clause exists to catch, and only driving both separates them.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the retirement instant on each rotated key, from committed configuration. C2: a driven check past that instant \"\n + \"asserting the key is absent from the advertised set AND that a token signed by it is refused.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the retirement instant for each rotated key; a key with none is C1's finding.\",\n \"Past the instant, assert the key is not advertised.\",\n \"Past the instant, present a token signed by it and assert refusal — separately from the advertisement check, because a key can pass one and fail the other.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A retired key that still verifies is a MAJOR: an aged or compromised key staying trusted is the harm the objective \"\n + \"names. A retired key still advertised is a MAJOR of a different kind — clients will keep selecting it. A rotated \"\n + \"key with no retirement instant is an OBSERVATION unless the application's policy requires one.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the retirement MECHANISM at the instant driven, never that no token signed by a retired key was \"\n + \"accepted earlier in the window. Retroactive assurance would need a per-verification record this control does not \"\n + \"produce.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:operation-serviceability-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: the declared operation surface is engine-mediated for every resource.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A declared, API-reachable operation stays reachable and is actually implemented.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"Declaration cannot evidence it — that a verb is declared is precisely what is not in question. Only driving the declared surface distinguishes reachable-and-implemented from declared-and-absent.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"An interface must not report success for an action it did not perform.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale: \"A false success emits a SUCCESS, so no row distinguishes it — the record of a lie looks exactly like the record of a truth. Only driving the action and observing its effect separates them, which is why this cannot be a PRODUCTION clause.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A named verb must not silently widen into an unconstrained write over fields its resource never exposed for update.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale: \"The writable field set is declared, so the widening is visible as a mismatch between what a verb writes and what the resource exposes — readable from configuration without driving anything.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven call per declared API-reachable operation, reaching an implementation. C2: for each action with an \"\n + \"observable effect, the effect confirmed after a reported success. C3: each named verb's written field set, \"\n + \"compared against the fields its resource exposes for update.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Drive each declared operation and assert it reaches an implementation rather than an acknowledgement.\",\n \"For each success, confirm the effect independently — the report is the thing under test and cannot be its own evidence.\",\n \"Compare each verb's written fields against the resource's updatable set and assert no widening.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A success reported for an action not performed is a MAJOR and the intent's central harm. A declared operation with \"\n + \"no implementation is a MAJOR. A verb writing outside its resource's updatable set is a MAJOR — it is mass \"\n + \"assignment wearing a named verb.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 and C2 attest the BUILD they were driven against. An operation that regresses after the run is invisible until \"\n + \"re-driven, and nothing currently detects that.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:consent-decision-transition-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: privacy preferences are engine-owned and every application's subjects have them.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A consent decision — given, changed or withdrawn — is recorded exactly once and never lost to a race, naming the previous and the resulting value.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The record is the framework's AUTOMATIC AUDIT FLOOR, not a dedicated consent member — the operation is CRITICAL, \"\n + \"so it emits resource_operation_performed. Naming a consent-specific member would demand a row nothing writes: \"\n + \"the enum's only CONSENT members are OAUTH_CONSENT_*, which are OAuth authorization consent and a different \"\n + \"thing entirely from a data subject's processing consent.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Every verb able to change consent routes through ONE emission point.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A structural property of the operation surface: preferences RESET, the generic UPDATE and update_privacy all \"\n + \"reach the same point, so no verb can change consent without a record. Rows cannot evidence it — a verb that \"\n + \"bypassed the point would emit nothing, and its silence is indistinguishable from no consent change at all.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And resetting a subject's privacy preferences is itself such a decision.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Called out because it is the one an implementer drops: a reset returns dataProcessingConsent to its DEFAULT, \"\n + \"which is a consent decision with a previous and a resulting value even though nobody chose the new one.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: audit-floor rows for consent-changing operations in the window, each naming the previous and the resulting \"\n + \"value — a row naming only the new value does not satisfy the clause. C2: the enumeration of every verb that can \"\n + \"write consent, all resolving to the single emission point. C3: reset operations present in the same row class as \"\n + \"explicit changes.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate every verb able to write a consent field and assert each reaches the one emission point (C2).\",\n \"Gather audit-floor rows for those operations and assert each carries previous AND resulting values.\",\n \"Assert exactly-once: a consent change that produced two rows is a race the clause names explicitly, not a duplicate to deduplicate.\",\n \"Check resets appear in the same class as explicit changes; a body that queries only explicit verbs will miss them.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A consent change with no record is a MAJOR — a subject's decision unevidenced. A row naming only the resulting \"\n + \"value is a MAJOR: the intent demands both, because 'changed' is unprovable without the prior. Two rows for one \"\n + \"decision is a MAJOR, since 'never lost to a race' cuts both ways. A verb that bypasses the emission point is a \"\n + \"MAJOR even with no consent change observed through it.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences that a decision was RECORDED, never that it was honoured — whether processing actually stopped is the \"\n + \"third-party-processing and minimisation demands' question. And it evidences decisions made through the \"\n + \"application: consent captured out of band and imported is invisible here.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: subject access and portability are engine-owned obligations, and a resource opts in rather than an application opting out.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Authorized subject access and portability exports are purpose-specific, resource-opted-in and subject-isolated.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Three properties of the declared export surface: which purposes exist, which resources opted in, and that the \"\n + \"scope is the subject. All readable from committed configuration, and none evidenced by a row — an export that \"\n + \"leaked another subject's data emits the same event shape as one that did not.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"And auditable: the export event names the purpose, the subject, the resource types included, the record count and the fields withheld as derived.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The intent ENUMERATES five fields, which makes this a completeness clause rather than an existence one: a row \"\n + \"that exists but omits the withheld-fields list fails it. 'Withheld as derived' is the subtle one — a subject \"\n + \"must be able to tell what was excluded and why.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the declared purposes, the resources that opted in, and the subject-isolation mechanism, from committed \"\n + \"configuration. C2: export rows for the window, each carrying all five enumerated fields.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the declared purposes and the opted-in resource set; a resource carrying subject data and not opted in is C1's finding.\",\n \"For each export row assert all five fields are present — purpose, subject, resource types, record count, withheld fields.\",\n \"Assert the withheld list is DERIVED rather than authored, or it will drift from what the export actually omitted.\",\n \"Do not treat a window with no exports as a gap: no subject exercised the right, and C1 stands on its own.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"An export row missing any of the five fields is a MAJOR — the intent enumerates them and a partial receipt cannot \"\n + \"answer a subject. A resource carrying subject data that never opted in is a MAJOR: the export is silently \"\n + \"incomplete, which is worse than refused. An export not isolated to its subject is a MAJOR and a disclosure.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences the RECEIPT, never the payload: that the row says five resource types were included does not prove \"\n + \"those were the right five. And it cannot see data the resource never declared as the subject's.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:collection-export-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application with an exportable collection; one with none has no bulk export to record.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A bulk export of a resource collection is a recorded event naming the resource exported, the operation it was taken from, and the format it was rendered in.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A per-occurrence row, and the three named fields are the clause: a bulk export is the largest disclosure an \"\n + \"application performs routinely, and 'which resource, from which operation, in which format' is what makes it \"\n + \"reviewable rather than merely counted. The FORMAT matters because a rendering can carry more than the \"\n + \"operation's own projection.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: export rows for the window, each naming the resource, the source operation and the render format.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Gather collection-export rows and assert each carries resource, operation and format.\",\n \"Reconcile against the operations that can produce a bulk export: an export path with no rows is the finding, not an empty window.\",\n \"Note the row records the EVENT, not the extent — a row does not say how many records left.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A bulk export with no record is a MAJOR: the single largest routine disclosure, unevidenced. A row missing the \"\n + \"format is an OBSERVATION unless the operation supports more than one, in which case it is a MAJOR — the record \"\n + \"cannot then say what was actually rendered.\",\n limits:\n \"Unlike the subject export, this row names no record count, so it evidences THAT a collection left and not how much \"\n + \"of it. Reading it as a volume control would overstate what it holds.\",\n },\n\n \"evidence-requirement:record-context-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability: \"Applies to every application: the trusted-system write path is engine-owned and every audit row passes through it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"The actor and tenant an audit row names survive the trusted-system write that persists it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"SURVIVAL is a property of a transformation, and no row evidences it: a record whose actor was replaced looks \"\n + \"exactly like one that always named that actor. Only driving a write with a known actor and tenant and reading \"\n + \"the persisted row back separates them.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"And a log record names which application and which environment produced it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A field-presence property of live records, checkable in the window. It is the clause that makes a record \"\n + \"attributable across deployments — without it two environments' rows are indistinguishable once pooled.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven trusted-system write with a known actor and tenant, and the persisted row read back carrying both \"\n + \"unchanged. C2: log records from the window carrying application and environment identifiers.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Drive a write as a trusted system on behalf of a known principal in a known tenant.\",\n \"Read the persisted row and assert the actor and tenant are the ones supplied, not the trusted system's own.\",\n \"Sample log records from the window and assert application and environment are present.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A row naming the trusted system instead of the principal is a MAJOR — it is the intent's stated harm, a record \"\n + \"silently losing the principal it belongs to. A tenant replaced is a MAJOR and also a tenancy defect. A log record \"\n + \"without application or environment is an OBSERVATION alone and a MAJOR once records from two deployments are \"\n + \"pooled, which is the case the clause exists for.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 attests the write path DRIVEN, not every production write; a second path that persists rows without passing \"\n + \"through it is invisible here. C2 evidences presence of the identifiers, never that they are correct.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:constraint-conflict-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application that declares a uniqueness constraint, which is every application with a business key. \"\n + \"The head noun is misleading and the mismatch matters: nothing is RECORDED. What the intent demands is the SHAPE of a \"\n + \"refusal handed back to a caller, so a judge looking for rows will find none and must not read that as an absence.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A resource names the conflict identity beside the constraint that produces it, rather than leaving every duplicate to collapse into one generic code.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The identity a conflict is reported BY does not exist unless the committed schema names it — isUnique with a \"\n + \"conflictMessageReference for a single-field key, businessKeySet for a compound one. Nothing at runtime can invent \"\n + \"one, and resolveDeclaredUniqueConflictReference returns undefined by design when nothing was declared, so the \"\n + \"declaration is the whole of this half.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A driven duplicate is answered with that declared identity rather than as an opaque datastore failure — at BOTH persistence adapters.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The report is a response shape, not a stored artifact, and the vocabulary has no member for one — EMITTED is the \"\n + \"member widened to cover an engine-owned artifact class that is a driven result, as multi-factor-enrolment-record \"\n + \"C1 and C2 already use it. The adapter split is the load-bearing part: the Mongo and PostgreSQL resource \"\n + \"repositories are separate classes and each translates its own driver error, so evidence at one says nothing \"\n + \"about the other.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the committed declarations, read off the schema rather than transcribed. C2: a driven duplicate insert per adapter \"\n + \"in use, and the refusal it produced carrying the declared ErrorCustomMessageReference.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate every declared uniqueness constraint that carries a conflict message reference.\",\n \"Drive a duplicate against one such constraint on the Mongo adapter and assert the declared reference is returned.\",\n \"Drive the same against the PostgreSQL adapter — a translation present in one repository class is absent in the other until shown.\",\n \"Assert an UNDECLARED constraint still yields the generic conflict code rather than a guessed one.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A declared reference not returned on a driven conflict is a MAJOR at that adapter — the declaration is then a promise \"\n + \"nothing keeps. A WRONG-but-specific reference is also MAJOR and is worse than a generic one, in the resolver's own \"\n + \"words: an integrator branching on it takes the wrong recovery path. A constraint that declared no identity is an \"\n + \"OBSERVATION and not a nonconformity; the fail-safe path is honouring a choice the resource made.\",\n limits:\n \"It attests the adapters DRIVEN, never every conflict in production. Resolution is by the FIELD-NAME SET the datastore \"\n + \"reports, deliberately rather than by reconstructing index shapes — so a driver that reports a violated index without \"\n + \"its covered fields resolves to nothing and is indistinguishable here from a resource that declared no identity.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:over-limit-refusal-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application, unconditionally: the bound is engine-mounted and no application opts out. Note the \"\n + \"asymmetry a judge must carry — the intent speaks of an unauthenticated request generally, and the single marked site \"\n + \"bounds ONE unauthenticated surface.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"An unauthenticated request consumes a bounded amount of resource.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The bound is a committed constant applied at a named mount, so reading the mount answers the clause. No occurrence \"\n + \"evidences a bound — a window with no oversize request looks identical whether the cap exists or not.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"An over-limit request is answered as a CLIENT error rather than surfacing as a server failure.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A status code is a driven result. It is also the half that silently regresses: a body-parser rejection that reaches \"\n + \"no translator surfaces as a 500, and a 500 on an unauthenticated surface is an availability signal an attacker \"\n + \"reads rather than a refusal.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the mounted limit and the routes it covers. C2: a driven oversize POST answered 413 with the status preserved, and \"\n + \"an unacceptable content type answered 415 — the two the mount is registered to translate.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the committed body limit and the mount path it is applied at.\",\n \"POST a body exceeding it to an unauthenticated token route and assert 413, not 500.\",\n \"POST an unacceptable content type and assert 415.\",\n \"Assert the same routes under GET are unaffected — they carry no body and the translator is a no-op for them.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"An over-limit request answered 500 is a MAJOR: the intent names exactly that outcome. An absent bound on an \"\n + \"unauthenticated surface is a MAJOR. Evidence gathered at only the marked mount is an OBSERVATION about COVERAGE, \"\n + \"never a nonconformity — see the limits, where the under-report runs in the safe direction.\",\n limits:\n \"The marked mount is one unauthenticated surface. Every OTHER route is covered by a framework-wide net that classifies \"\n + \"any body-parser rejection as a validation error, and by the perimeter rate limiter — neither of which is marked, so a \"\n + \"collector following markers UNDER-reports coverage rather than over-reporting it. That is the safe direction, and it \"\n + \"is still a reason not to read this evidence as the application's whole answer on resource limits.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:redirect-target-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to any application that registers OAuth clients. An application registering none has nothing to evidence and \"\n + \"has not failed the control.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Every registered redirect target is a safe absolute URL whose scheme is a member of the named permitted set.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The registered target set is committed configuration and the permitted schemes are a closed vocabulary with one \"\n + \"named runtime source — exported for exactly this reason, so this demand reads the set the guard branches on \"\n + \"instead of transcribing it into a second list free to drift.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A target outside that set is REFUSED at registration.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A clean registered set proves nothing on its own — it is equally consistent with a guard that refuses and with an \"\n + \"application nobody has yet attacked. Only a driven refusal separates them.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the registered clients and their targets, checked against the exported scheme vocabulary by reference. C2: driven \"\n + \"registration attempts carrying a script-executing scheme, an inline-data scheme and a relative target, each refused.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate registered OAuth clients and their redirect targets.\",\n \"Assert each target parses as an absolute URL and its scheme is a member of the exported permitted set.\",\n \"Attempt to register a script-executing scheme and assert refusal.\",\n \"Attempt to register a relative target and assert refusal.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A stored script-executing or inline-data target is a MAJOR and is the delegation primitive the intent names by \"\n + \"consequence, not by category. A registration accepted for a scheme outside the set is a MAJOR whatever the target \"\n + \"turned out to be. A loopback http target is NOT a finding: the rule is deliberately not https-only, because that \"\n + \"would refuse the conformant native and CLI flow.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences REGISTRATION. It says nothing about whether the authorization endpoint matches a presented redirect \"\n + \"target against the registered set — a distinct control, and the one an open-redirect actually travels through. A \"\n + \"custom scheme registered by a legitimate native client is admissible here and is not thereby proven to be controlled \"\n + \"by that client.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:reserved-claim-set-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to any application issuing ID tokens. The set and the strip are engine-owned, so no application authors either \"\n + \"and none can opt out.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"The protocol and security claim names the ID-token builder owns are one named set, not a list restated where it is used.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A closed vocabulary with one named runtime source. The clause is satisfied or broken by the source tree alone, and \"\n + \"the failure it guards against is a second copy drifting from the builder's own claim set — invisible to any \"\n + \"runtime observation, because both copies produce well-formed tokens.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A member of that set supplied through extra claims is stripped BEFORE the extras are spread, so it can never ride into an issued token.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Ordering is the whole control and no artifact records it: a token carrying a correct issuer looks identical whether \"\n + \"the server authored it or the caller happened to supply the right value. Only issuing a token from extras that \"\n + \"deliberately carry reserved names separates the two.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the named reserved-claim set, referenced not retyped. C2: an issued ID token whose resolver supplied a \"\n + \"not-before, a nonce, an authentication-context reference and an issuer among its extras, with every one of those \"\n + \"claims in the result server-authored.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the named reserved-claim set and assert the builder strips from that source rather than from a local list.\",\n \"Drive an issuance whose extra claims carry a not-before and assert the issued token does not carry the supplied value.\",\n \"Repeat with a nonce and an authentication-context reference — the claims a relying party reads to decide HOW the user authenticated.\",\n \"Repeat with issuer, audience and subject, which the server re-sets anyway, and assert the strip is what refuses them rather than the ordering.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A smuggled not-before is a MAJOR and the intent names its consequence: a token that later fails verification, which \"\n + \"presents as an outage rather than as an attack. A forged nonce, authentication-context or access-token hash is a \"\n + \"MAJOR — those are the claims a relying party trusts about the ceremony it did not witness. A strip that happens \"\n + \"AFTER the spread and is rescued only by a later re-set is still a MAJOR: the defence then rests on statement order.\",\n limits:\n \"It attests the ID-token builder and nothing else. Access tokens, the userinfo response and any second token minter \"\n + \"have their own claim rules and are invisible here. It evidences that reserved names cannot be supplied, never that \"\n + \"the server-authored values are correct.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:secret-contract-shape-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application that selects a provider, which is every application with an external capability. The \"\n + \"artifact is platform-owned and committed, so no application authors it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A provider's secret contract is recorded as a SHAPE, with no secret value persisted anywhere in the artifact.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The artifact is a committed lock entry, so the committed specification IS the evidence and the values-free property \"\n + \"is settled by reading it rather than by driving anything. Note this digest NAMES content and is carried in git, \"\n + \"which is the use one-source-of-truth permits — it is not a second ledger recording agreement between two parts of \"\n + \"the repository.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Drift in that shape is DETECTABLE.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Detection is a property of the digest under change, and a digest that never moves is indistinguishable from one that \"\n + \"moves correctly until something changes. The evidence is a driven shape change and the resulting difference.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the per-provider secret-contract digest and the shape it was computed over, plus the assertion that no secret VALUE \"\n + \"appears in the artifact. C2: a driven change to a provider's secret contract shape and the digest before and after.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the committed lock entry for each selected provider and locate its secret-contract digest.\",\n \"Assert the digested input is a shape — key names and structure — and carries no value.\",\n \"Scan the whole artifact for material matching the provider's declared secret keys and assert absence.\",\n \"Add, rename or remove one key in a provider's secret contract, recompute, and assert the digest moved.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A secret VALUE present in the artifact is a MAJOR and an incident rather than a documentation defect — the artifact is \"\n + \"committed, so disclosure is permanent in history. A digest that does not move when the shape changes is a MAJOR: \"\n + \"detection is the control's only function, and a digest that cannot detect is worse than none because it reads as \"\n + \"coverage. A provider with no entry is an OBSERVATION unless it declares secrets.\",\n limits:\n \"It detects a change in SHAPE, never in VALUES — a rotated or a leaked credential moves nothing, by design and correctly. \"\n + \"It attests the lock as committed; a runtime that resolves a secret contract from somewhere other than the lock is \"\n + \"outside this evidence entirely.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:personal-data-field-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application that stores personal data. The DECLARATION mechanism is engine-owned; what is declared is \"\n + \"the application's own, which is what makes C3 below unevidenceable rather than merely unevidenced.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Categories of personal data are declared ON THE FIELD, in the committed schema.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The decorator on the field IS the inventory. There is no second store to query and no occurrence to observe: a field \"\n + \"holding personal data emits nothing by holding it.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"No category is INFERRED from a field's identifier.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a name-reading producer, so the ENUMERATION is the artifact — the same shape as the \"\n + \"one-authority clause of multi-factor-enrolment-record. A declared inventory looks identical whether it was authored \"\n + \"or pattern-matched, so nothing but enumerating the producers separates them. Exactly ONE derivation is expected and \"\n + \"must be found: the credentials category, derived from the password, one-time-code and write-only-secret MARKERS — \"\n + \"which the author wrote, rather than from names the producer read.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And the inventory is COMPLETE — every field holding personal data is declared.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Nothing produces it, and the objective's own reasoning is why: an inventory assembled by pattern-matching identifiers \"\n + \"is a guess whose misses are silently undisclosed. That argument disqualifies a completeness CHECKER as thoroughly \"\n + \"as it disqualifies a name-inferring producer — a field called notes holding a case history is invisible to both. \"\n + \"Recording it UNPRODUCED once is what stops a gap the framework owns being raised against every application forever.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the declared category set per field, read off the committed schema. C2: an enumeration of every producer of a \"\n + \"field's category set, with the single marker-derived category identified and its inputs shown to be markers. C3: \"\n + \"nothing.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate fields carrying a declared data-category set and the categories each names.\",\n \"Enumerate every producer that writes into that set and assert none reads the field identifier.\",\n \"Assert the one derived category derives from authored markers, and that its inputs are those markers and not names.\",\n \"Record C3 as UNPRODUCED. Do NOT approximate it with a name-based sweep — that reproduces the exact defect the objective refuses.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A producer that derives a category from an identifier is a MAJOR and is the objective's stated failure, whatever its \"\n + \"hit rate. A field whose declared categories are wrong is a MAJOR. A field with no declaration is NOT a finding on this \"\n + \"evidence — that is C3, which carries no severity: reporting it would mean asserting a population nobody can enumerate, \"\n + \"which is a count about the search rather than about the world.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences what was DECLARED and how the declarations were produced. It cannot evidence what was not declared, which \"\n + \"is the half a data-protection reviewer most wants — say so rather than letting a clean C1 read as a complete inventory. \"\n + \"C2 attests the producer set as enumerated; one added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:restriction-release-schedule\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application: the suspension verbs, the scheduled instant and the sweep are all engine-owned. An \"\n + \"application that has suspended nobody has an empty population, not a failed control.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A restriction imposed as time-boxed records the instant at which it ends.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The scheduled instant lives on the engine-owned membership and user rows, so a query over the window answers the \"\n + \"clause for every application through one schema. It is not DECLARED: the window is chosen per act by an \"\n + \"administrator, not configured once.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The release runs through the SAME guarded authority that imposed the restriction, not through a direct status write.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A released row looks identical whichever path released it, so no record evidences this. The sweep dispatches the \"\n + \"lifecycle verbs precisely so the state-machine check, the authoritative-field declaration that lets the patch \"\n + \"survive the strict re-parse, and the administrative-continuity floors all run — a sweep wired around them would be \"\n + \"a latent bypass nobody adding the next floor would think to check.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And the sweep ran over the period, on schedule.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The batch execution record is the artifact — the same widening retention-window-declaration made, and for the same \"\n + \"reason: a sweep that silently stopped running leaves rows that look exactly like rows whose window has not elapsed.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"A reactivation date accepted on a VOLUNTARY self-deactivation is honoured on the same terms.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Nothing keeps it, and the sweep says so in its own words. The inactive population is not swept because no door \"\n + \"exists: the only reactivation verb for that state is self-scoped and the self resource grants no system update, so \"\n + \"the date is a declared contract nothing honours. The two workarounds were considered and refused as worse than the \"\n + \"gap — widening the suspension verb merges an imposed restriction with a chosen one, and minting a per-user context \"\n + \"would hand a batch the ability to impersonate. Recording it here is what keeps a KNOWN framework gap from being \"\n + \"raised as an application nonconformity.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: rows in the window carrying a scheduled release instant. C2: an enumeration of every writer of the restricted \"\n + \"status, plus a driven elapsed window showing the verb path ran. C3: the sweep's execution records over the period. \"\n + \"C4: nothing.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Query suspended memberships and users in the window and assert a scheduled release instant is present where the imposing act declared one.\",\n \"Advance a row past its window, run the sweep, and assert the status changed AND the schedule was cleared — a stale deadline on a released row means the verb did not run.\",\n \"Enumerate writers of the restricted status and assert the sweep is not among the direct writers.\",\n \"Read the sweep execution records for the period and assert continuity of runs.\",\n \"Do NOT raise the un-swept voluntary-deactivation population. It is C4 and carries no severity.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A row whose window elapsed and whose restriction persists is a MAJOR — the intent names it exactly: a measure taken as \"\n + \"temporary that silently became permanent. A release performed by a direct status write is a MAJOR even where the \"\n + \"outcome was correct, because the floors and the state machine did not run. A gap in the sweep's execution record is a \"\n + \"MAJOR for the period it covers, since nothing else lifts a window. C4 carries no severity at all.\",\n limits:\n \"C2 attests the path DRIVEN, on the build it was driven against. C1 and C3 attest a period and say nothing about the next \"\n + \"one. And none of it evidences that the window an administrator CHOSE was appropriate — only that the system honoured \"\n + \"the one it was given.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:uniqueness-verification-outcome\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application that declares a uniqueness or integrity control, which is every application with a business \"\n + \"key. The gates are engine-owned and run before traffic, so no application opts out.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Every declared uniqueness control is PROVEN to exist in the datastore before the application serves traffic.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The artifact is the boot gate's own outcome. It is not DECLARED — the declaration is the premise, and the whole point \"\n + \"of the objective is that a declared constraint must not be ASSUMED to have been created. There are TWO gates, one \"\n + \"per adapter, and they are separate code: a proof at one is silence about the other.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A PASS carries the number of controls checked, rather than being reported as silence.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The gate says this in its own words: a fail-closed gate that passes proves nothing on its own, because one that \"\n + \"iterated an EMPTY set — an unpopulated registry, a generator that yielded nothing — exits exactly as one that \"\n + \"checked every index. A count is what makes a green boot evidence rather than an absence of noise.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A probe that could not learn anything is treated as INDETERMINATE and skipped, never reported as a missing control.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The distinction is only visible in the gate's behaviour under an interrupted probe, and it is the clause with a \"\n + \"recorded cost: a connection lifecycle interrupted mid-boot once produced a report of dozens of declared indexes \"\n + \"that did not exist, against two entirely healthy databases. A false nonconformity is not a lesser outcome than a \"\n + \"missed one — it sends an operator to repair data that is correct.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1 and C2: the boot verification outcome from EACH adapter in use, carrying the count checked and the declared set it \"\n + \"was checked against. C3: a driven interrupted probe showing the gate skips rather than reports.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate the declared uniqueness and integrity controls from the committed schema.\",\n \"Read the Mongo boot verification outcome and assert its checked count matches that declared set.\",\n \"Read the PostgreSQL boot verification outcome separately — a guard present in one repository class is absent in the other until shown.\",\n \"Drop one declared index, boot, and assert the gate REFUSES rather than serving.\",\n \"Interrupt a probe mid-verification and assert the outcome is indeterminate rather than a missing-control report.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"An application serving traffic with a declared unique control absent is a MAJOR: the constraint is what a business key \"\n + \"MEANS, and without it duplicate rows are already possible. A gate reporting a pass with a count of zero against a \"\n + \"non-empty declared set is a MAJOR against the GATE rather than the datastore — that is the shape the count exists to \"\n + \"expose. An indeterminate probe reported as a missing control is a MAJOR for the same reason and in the same direction.\",\n limits:\n \"It attests BOOT. An index dropped afterwards is invisible until the next boot, and nothing continuously re-checks. It \"\n + \"evidences PRESENCE, never enforcement: an index that exists with a partial filter can fail to cover the rows a \"\n + \"business key means, and the gate reports it present.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:refusal-classification-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. Both marked controls are engine-owned; the second is reachable only where enterprise \"\n + \"single sign-on is configured, which narrows its POPULATION and not its obligation.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Untrusted input is rejected WHOLE rather than partly sanitized.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A sanitized value produces a successful response, so there is no record of the refusal that did not happen. Only \"\n + \"driving a filter that carries an operator and asserting the WHOLE value was refused separates rejection from \"\n + \"stripping — and the site names why the distinction matters: a partially-stripped operator object is a filter the \"\n + \"caller did not ask for, which is its own kind of wrong answer.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A validator whose dependency is unavailable fails CLOSED on what it guards.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The condition has to be created to be observed. A production window in which the dependency was present evidences \"\n + \"nothing about the window in which it is not.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And that degradation is CLASSIFIED distinctly from a rejected signature.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"This is the clause the requirement is really named after, and it is a property of the ERROR the refusal carries: a \"\n + \"configuration problem with an actionable remedy, never an assertion-invalid verdict. Both outcomes refuse; only \"\n + \"the classification tells an operator whether to look at the identity provider or at their own toolchain.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven query filter carrying an operator object, and the whole-value refusal it produced. C2 and C3: the validator \"\n + \"driven with its dependency removed, and the error TYPE and code it produced.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Send a filter value carrying a structured operator and assert the request is refused rather than answered on a stripped filter.\",\n \"Assert the permitted scalar set is a named predicate and that a new structured shape would require a deliberate edit to it.\",\n \"Remove the validator dependency, drive an assertion, and assert the refusal is a configuration error carrying a remedy.\",\n \"Assert that refusal is NOT reported as an invalid signature — the two must be separable by an operator reading only the error.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A partially sanitized filter is a MAJOR. A validator that degrades OPEN is a MAJOR and is the objective's whole subject. \"\n + \"A degraded validator reporting an invalid signature is also a MAJOR, and the reason is diagnostic rather than \"\n + \"cryptographic: it sends the operator at the identity provider while the fault is in the local toolchain, so the outage \"\n + \"outlives the diagnosis.\",\n limits:\n \"Two marked sites for a principle the intent states generally — every other control that must refuse when it cannot \"\n + \"evaluate is outside this evidence, and a clean result here is not an application-wide fail-closed claim. C2 and C3 \"\n + \"attest the BUILD driven; note in particular that the validator dependency is a COMPILED artifact whose absence is \"\n + \"per-workspace, so a probe in one workspace says nothing about another.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:persistence-isolation-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application whose resources do not all sit on the default adapter. An application on one adapter has \"\n + \"an empty population; the refusal below still runs and still protects it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A resource declares its persistence isolation before it may sit on a non-default adapter.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The declaration is a committed member of a named vocabulary on the resource config. Nothing observable at runtime \"\n + \"distinguishes a resource that declared from one that was never asked, because the refusal happens at registry \"\n + \"build and a booted application has already passed it.\\n\\n\"\n + \"\\\"Non-default\\\" is narrower than it sounds and a judge must resolve it before counting: the obligation reaches \"\n + \"only adapters that OWN a transaction. A resource on a read-through or introspection adapter is skipped before \"\n + \"the door — it takes part in no atomic boundary, so it owes no declaration — and treating those as an undeclared \"\n + \"population is the derive-before-you-ask defect exactly: a ratio whose denominator the reviewer chose.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A configuration whose cross-resource writes could not be atomic is REFUSED when the registry is built, rather than discovered under load.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The evidence is the refusal, which only exists when the bad configuration is presented. A booting application \"\n + \"evidences that ITS configuration passed, never that a failing one would be refused.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And the declaration buys the right to BOOT, never a silent degradation: a declared resource actually reached by a cross-adapter atomic boundary still fails there.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Without this clause a judge reading C1 alone would take the declaration for a waiver, which is the one reading that \"\n + \"makes the control dangerous. The compatibility assessment still classifies such a boundary as mixed and the unit \"\n + \"of work still throws — evidenced by driving that boundary, not by reading the declaration.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the declared isolation member per resource on a non-default adapter, and the resource-to-adapter map. C2: a driven \"\n + \"registry build over an undeclared mixed set, refused. C3: a driven cross-adapter atomic boundary over a DECLARED \"\n + \"resource, throwing.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Map each resource to its adapter, then scope the population to TRANSACTION-OWNING adapters before asserting anything. The registry skips a resource on a read-through or introspection adapter BEFORE the isolation door, deliberately — such a resource owns no transaction, so it cannot break atomicity and is never asked to declare. Asserting over every non-default adapter raises a MAJOR on correct configuration; real resources rely on that skip.\",\n \"Within that population, assert every resource carries an isolation declaration.\",\n \"Build a registry over a mixed set with no declaration and no platform tolerance option, and assert refusal.\",\n \"Drive a cross-adapter atomic write over a resource that DID declare, and assert it throws at the boundary rather than committing partially.\",\n \"Where the platform dual-store tolerance option is set, record it and the reason it was set — it is a sanctioned transition, not a defect.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A mixed set that booted with neither a declaration nor the sanctioned platform option is a MAJOR — the guarantee was \"\n + \"lost silently, which is exactly what building the check at registry time exists to prevent. A resource on a \"\n + \"non-transactional adapter with no declaration is NOT a finding in any degree: it was never in the population. A \"\n + \"declared resource that \"\n + \"then throws at a boundary is the control WORKING: an OBSERVATION about that configuration, never a nonconformity. The \"\n + \"tolerance option set with no recorded reason is an OBSERVATION.\",\n limits:\n \"It attests the registry BUILD. An adapter assignment made outside the registry, or changed after it, is invisible here. \"\n + \"And it evidences that atomicity cannot be silently LOST — never that any particular write was atomic, which is a \"\n + \"different question with a different answer per boundary.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:ingested-content-inspection\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application that accepts uploads. An application with no file field has nothing to inspect; note that \"\n + \"is a genuinely empty population and not a declined control.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Whether ingested content is inspected is a DECLARED decision — per field, and then per application.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Both halves are committed: the per-field scan policy on the file field, and the application-wide answer, which is \"\n + \"DERIVED from the scanner topology an operator provisions and is refused a default. Neither is implicit in either \"\n + \"direction, which is the property the clause asks for.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The inspection reaches a member of the file's own status vocabulary rather than an opaque success, and that same vocabulary decides servability.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The clause is about the JOIN — the downloadable set reads the same status the verdict writes, so inspected and \"\n + \"servable are one decision rather than two that could disagree. A row carrying a clean status looks identical \"\n + \"whether the join holds or not, so only driving an infected upload and asserting it is unservable evidences it.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A concluded infection and a scan that could not run are each attributable in the audit trail.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A durable row class in the engine's own event store, so one collector query serves every application. The two are \"\n + \"separate members deliberately: an infection is a conclusion about a real threat, an unrunnable scan is an \"\n + \"operational fault, and merging them would make the alert that matters unreadable.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.FILE_MALWARE_DETECTED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.FILE_MALWARE_SCAN_FAILED,\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"A requested scan with no scanner available REFUSES rather than passing.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The fail-closed half, and the one that cannot be read off a healthy deployment: with a scanner present, a refusing \"\n + \"and a degrading implementation behave identically. The condition has to be created.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the per-field scan policies and the provisioned scanner topology the application-wide answer derives from. C2: a \"\n + \"driven infected upload, its terminal status, and a download attempt refused on that status. C3: the two audit members \"\n + \"over the window. C4: a driven upload requesting a scan with no scanner reachable.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate file fields and read each per-field scan policy, then the application-wide answer and the topology it derives from.\",\n \"Upload a benign test pattern that a scanner concludes infected, and assert the terminal status is a member of the file status vocabulary.\",\n \"Attempt to download that file and assert refusal — asserting the status alone leaves the join unproven.\",\n \"Query the two audit members over the window and assert each row follows its terminal transition rather than preceding it.\",\n \"Remove the scanner, upload a file whose field requests a scan, and assert refusal rather than a pass.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A servable file that was never inspected is a MAJOR and is the objective's stated harm — the intent asks precisely that \"\n + \"never-inspected and passed be distinguishable. A scan that could not run and passed anyway is a MAJOR. An infection \"\n + \"concluded with no audit row is an OBSERVATION where the file was correctly quarantined and a MAJOR where it was not: \"\n + \"the control operated in the first case and only the evidence export is missing.\",\n limits:\n \"The application-wide half of C1 was NOT true before 2026-09-09 — the resolution step read a configuration path no schema \"\n + \"declared and answered negative in every application ever built, leaving the per-field policy the only reachable \"\n + \"declaration. Evidence gathered against an earlier build is not evidence about this clause. C2 and C4 attest the build \"\n + \"driven. And none of it evidences detection QUALITY: that a scanner concluded clean is not evidence that the content \"\n + \"was.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:authentication-eligibility-change-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. The status field, its exclusion from ordinary updates and the system door are all \"\n + \"engine-owned, so no application authors the mechanism and none can opt out of it.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A change to whether a principal may authenticate runs through ONE guarded authority.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second writer, so the enumeration is the artifact. A changed status looks \"\n + \"identical whichever path changed it, and — this is the sharp part — a status write from the WRONG path does not \"\n + \"fail either: the field is excluded from ordinary updates, so a handler writing it directly is stripped by the \"\n + \"repository's strict re-parse and the operation reports success having persisted nothing. That failure mode has \"\n + \"already cost this repository four sibling activations.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The field carrying it is excluded from ordinary updates, so the change cannot arrive as a side effect of an unrelated write.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A decorator on the committed schema, and the whole of the clause. Nothing observable distinguishes a system in \"\n + \"which the exclusion holds from one in which no unrelated write has yet been attempted.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And each such change is evidenced, with the state it moved from and to.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The status field is marked as audit evidence, so the generic resource-operation row carries its before and after \"\n + \"values. This is why the purpose-built per-status members are acknowledged unemitted rather than wired: emitting \"\n + \"both would write two rows for one action. Demand the generic row, not the purpose-built members.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"Consolidating two identities is authorized, attributable, and non-destructive to the audit trail.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Carried in the tree as an explicit unimplemented-control marker rather than as an omission: the merge verb is \"\n + \"routed and unimplemented, and seven conditions are enumerated at the declaration — among them an event naming the \"\n + \"TWO identities being consolidated, which no generic before-and-after row can express, and the erasure \"\n + \"interaction, where a merged-away identity subject to retention must not resurrect scrubbed personal data through \"\n + \"the surviving row. Recording it UNPRODUCED keeps a known framework gap from being raised as an application \"\n + \"nonconformity.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: an enumeration of every writer of the authentication-eligibility status, each resolving to the guarded system \"\n + \"door. C2: the committed field declaration. C3: generic resource-operation rows over the window carrying that \"\n + \"field's before and after values. C4: nothing.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate every writer of the status field and assert each reaches the system door rather than an ordinary update.\",\n \"Assert the field is excluded from ordinary updates in the committed schema, and marked as audit evidence.\",\n \"Drive an eligibility change through the guarded verb and assert the row changed AND a resource-operation row carries the before and after values.\",\n \"Drive one through an ordinary update and assert nothing changed — a success response with an unchanged row is the signature this clause exists to make visible.\",\n \"Query the window for resource-operation rows on that field and assert every eligibility change in the window has one.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A second writer that reaches the field through the system door without the guard is a MAJOR. A writer that reaches it \"\n + \"through an ordinary update is a MAJOR of a different kind and the more dangerous one: the account never changes \"\n + \"state, with no error and no signal, so the symptom surfaces hops away as something else entirely. An eligibility \"\n + \"change with no corresponding row is a MAJOR. C4 carries no severity.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 attests the writer set as ENUMERATED; one added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated, and the added writer \"\n + \"will not fail loudly. C3 evidences the window it covers. And none of it evidences that a given change was \"\n + \"APPROPRIATE — only that it was made through the one authority and left a record.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:directory-authority-switch-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies ONLY where an application opts in — the intent says so in its first clause. An application with no directory \"\n + \"connection has an empty population and has declined nothing; an application WITH a connection and no declared \"\n + \"switches is the case this demand is actually about.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"The switches conferring directory authority are DECLARED explicitly, rather than implied by the presence of a connection.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The provisioning configuration IS the evidence, and the clause is precisely that a connection alone must not be \"\n + \"read as consent to it. Unit reconciliation is the sharpest case: it runs only when the organization declared \"\n + \"BOTH a unit mapping and a default unit role, and that gate is load-bearing because reconciliation REPLACES a \"\n + \"member's assignments with what the directory pushed.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Unit membership is treated as an authorization grant, not a label — so the binding is unit-id-addressed and never guessed.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The bindings are committed values. The reason they must be explicit is structural: a directory pushes a flat \"\n + \"string, units live in a TREE where a code is unique only among siblings and a name is freeform, so a \"\n + \"search-based match is genuinely ambiguous and resolving to the wrong node grants the wrong DATA. Nothing \"\n + \"guesses — an unbound value is ignored and no unit is ever created — which is a property of the declaration set, \"\n + \"readable without driving anything.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"Accounts created, updated and deprovisioned by the directory are each attributable.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A durable row class in the engine's own event store. These three members were verified to have a production \"\n + \"caller, one each, in the directory controller.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_USER_PROVISIONED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_USER_UPDATED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_USER_DEACTIVATED,\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"A directory-managed member cannot authenticate around deprovisioning at the credential layer.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A driven result and NOT a declaration: what stops such a member today is the effective-policy block, not the \"\n + \"absence of a local first factor. The sweep that destroys local credentials can leave some standing and says so \"\n + \"at error level — so the clause is evidenced by driving a deprovisioned member against the login path, never by \"\n + \"reading that the sweep ran.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1 and C2: the committed provisioning configuration — the create, verify and deprovision switches, the unit mapping \"\n + \"and the default unit role — read as declarations rather than inferred from the connection. C3: the three directory \"\n + \"audit members over the window. C4: a driven authentication attempt by a deprovisioned directory-managed member, \"\n + \"refused, plus the sweep's error-level report of members still carrying local credentials.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the provisioning configuration and assert each authority-conferring switch is explicitly declared.\",\n \"Assert unit reconciliation is enabled only where BOTH a unit mapping and a default unit role are declared.\",\n \"Assert every declared binding addresses a unit by id, and that a directory value with no binding is ignored rather than matched by name.\",\n \"Query the three directory audit members over the window against the provisioning activity they should account for.\",\n \"Deprovision a directory-managed member and assert authentication is refused, then read the sweep report for members still carrying local credentials.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A directory treated as authoritative for unit membership with no declared mapping is a MAJOR — the assignments are an \"\n + \"authorization axis and would be replaced by whatever the directory pushed. A member still authenticating after \"\n + \"deprovisioning is a MAJOR. Members named in the sweep's still-carrying report are an OBSERVATION where the \"\n + \"effective-policy block holds and a MAJOR where it does not: the physical destruction is OWED, and the report line \"\n + \"exists to say so rather than to assert a breach.\",\n limits:\n \"The two provisioning-CONFIGURATION events are deliberately NOT demanded here. Both have a typed emit method with ZERO \"\n + \"production callers, so demanding either would raise a MAJOR against a working control the first time its activity \"\n + \"occurs — and neither carries an unemitted acknowledgement, so no gate refuses the demand either. Recorded as issue \"\n + \"#591. The practical consequence for C1: a CHANGE to a declared switch is evidenced today only by the generic \"\n + \"resource-operation row over the fields marked as audit evidence, which covers the create, deprovision and \"\n + \"default-role switches and not the unit mapping.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:reconstructable-authorization-effect\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. The generic resource-operation row is engine-owned and emitted for every privileged \"\n + \"action, so no application builds the lane and none opts out.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A privileged action on a resource is attributable.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"One durable row class in the engine's own store, carrying the operation identity triple, the actor, and the \"\n + \"correlation id that groups a cascade. One collector query serves every application.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The authorization EFFECT the action had is reconstructable from the record itself, rather than re-derived from role tables afterwards.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The clause is about what the row CARRIES: the actor's roles as they stood, and before-and-after values for every \"\n + \"field marked as audit evidence. Re-deriving from today's role tables answers a different question — what the \"\n + \"actor could do NOW — and a role change that does not record its old and new values proves nothing at all.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"The configuration deciding what the trail captures is itself governed as part of the trail.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The audit-configuration block is committed, and the reason it is in scope is the pre-incident tampering move: \"\n + \"disabling event logging or shortening the retention window must not be the one change the trail cannot evidence. \"\n + \"A row cannot evidence its own absence, so the declaration is the only artifact that can.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"And the field set the row carries is bounded by the erasure obligation: authority-bearing values are recorded, personal data is not.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Which fields are marked as audit evidence is a committed decision per field, and it is a two-sided one. Marking a \"\n + \"personal-data field would manufacture an unerasable duplicate in a ledger that cannot be scrubbed — in direct \"\n + \"conflict with the erasure obligation and with the impersonalization capability built to satisfy it. Not marking \"\n + \"an authority-bearing one empties C2.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1 and C2: resource-operation rows over the window carrying the operation triple, the actor and its roles as they \"\n + \"stood, the correlation id, and before-and-after values for the audit-evidence fields. C3: the committed audit \"\n + \"configuration and its own change history. C4: the audit-evidence field set, cross-read against the declared \"\n + \"personal-data categories.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Sample privileged actions from the window and assert each has a row naming actor, operation triple and correlation id.\",\n \"For a role-bearing change, assert the row carries the OLD and NEW values rather than only the new one.\",\n \"Assert the reconstruction uses the roles the row recorded, not the role table as it stands today — those answer different questions.\",\n \"Read the audit configuration and assert a change to it is itself evidenced.\",\n \"Cross-read the audit-evidence field set against the declared personal-data categories and assert no field appears in both.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A privileged action with no row is a MAJOR. A row from which the authorization effect cannot be reconstructed — a \"\n + \"role change with no prior value — is a MAJOR, and it is the clause the objective is named for. A personal-data field \"\n + \"marked as audit evidence is a MAJOR in the OTHER direction: the trail is working and the erasure obligation is \"\n + \"broken, permanently, because the ledger cannot be scrubbed. An audit configuration change with no record is a MAJOR.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences that the effect is RECONSTRUCTABLE from what the row carries, never that any reconstruction performed was \"\n + \"correct. It attests the window. And it says nothing about actions taken outside the resource-operation path — a \"\n + \"direct datastore write leaves no row and is invisible here, which is the one gap no row class can close.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"The identifier half applies to every application and the answer for most is that it is OFF, which is a full answer \"\n + \"rather than an empty one — the control is opt-in with no default. The egress and observability halves apply \"\n + \"wherever an external processor or a trace sink is reached.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A device-stored pseudonymous identifier is collected only under an explicit application opt-in — absent that policy, not at all.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The scope is a committed application decision and the default is off. The framework WARNS rather than refuses when \"\n + \"it is on, deliberately: opting in is a legitimate choice, and refusing to boot over an application-authored \"\n + \"privacy posture would be the framework overriding the controller's own decision.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Absent policy means the identifier is refused at ingestion, for every transport at once.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The refusal happens in ONE place — frame construction, before the value can reach a log line or the audit store — \"\n + \"and the evidence is that a supplied identifier does not appear anywhere downstream. An absent identifier in a \"\n + \"clean deployment is not evidence: nobody sent one. The value has to be sent.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"Withdrawing or NARROWING the policy erases the identifier from the device, rather than merely ceasing to send it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A property of the client under a policy CHANGE, which no server-side artifact can observe. It is the practical \"\n + \"form of the erasure obligation on this one field: a persistent identifier that outlives the decision that \"\n + \"created it is exactly what withdrawal is supposed to end. Narrowing counts as withdrawal for the scope being \"\n + \"left behind.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"Only what the declared purpose requires leaves the boundary: an external processor receives the payload and nothing identifying the requester or its row, and observability surfaces receive summaries rather than raw content.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"STRUCTURAL since 2026-09-09 rather than a property of a body some service composes: the provider request input \"\n + \"carries the bytes, the media type and the resolved model and nothing else, so no provider can include an \"\n + \"identifier it was never given. That is a shape a reader settles from the type, which is what makes it DECLARED \"\n + \"rather than a driven observation — and it is a stronger guarantee than a driven one, because it holds for \"\n + \"providers not yet written.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the committed identifier scope, and the startup warning where it is on. C2: a driven request supplying an \"\n + \"identifier under no policy, with the logs, traces and audit rows it produced. C3: a driven policy withdrawal and a \"\n + \"narrowing, each followed by an inspection of device storage. C4: the provider request input type, and trace and log \"\n + \"records from the egress paths.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the committed identifier scope and record it — a declared DISABLED is a complete answer to C1.\",\n \"Send a request carrying an identifier with no policy declared, then search logs, traces and audit rows for it at every verbosity.\",\n \"Turn the policy off after it was on, and assert the stored identifier is gone from the device rather than merely unsent.\",\n \"Narrow the policy from persistent to session and assert the persistent value is erased, not left behind.\",\n \"Read the provider request input type and assert it cannot carry a filename, a row identifier, an organization or a user.\",\n \"Sample egress traces and assert they carry summaries — token counts, page counts, outcomes — and never raw text or raw vectors.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"An identifier persisted with no declared policy is a MAJOR. An identifier surviving on the device after withdrawal is \"\n + \"a MAJOR and is the erasure-shaped half of this objective. An identifier or row context reaching an external \"\n + \"processor is a MAJOR. Raw content in a trace is a MAJOR — a summary surface holding raw text is a disclosure with a \"\n + \"different retention regime and a different audience. A declared opt-in with the startup warning present is NOT a \"\n + \"finding: it is the control working and the decision being surfaced.\",\n limits:\n \"C2 and C3 attest the build driven and, for C3, the client build driven — a different client version may store \"\n + \"differently. C4's structural guarantee covers the provider seam only: any other outbound path, an application's own \"\n + \"call among them, is outside this demand and is not made minimal by it. And none of it evidences that the declared \"\n + \"PURPOSE was itself proportionate, which is a judgement no artifact carries.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:client-registration-provenance-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies wherever the application exposes an authorization server. Both halves are engine-owned; an application with \"\n + \"no registered clients has an empty population.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A client identity is bound to a domain the client demonstrably controls.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Demonstrable control is a property of a resolution that happened, not of a stored row: a bound identity looks the \"\n + \"same whether the binding was demonstrated or asserted. The resolver deliberately decides IDENTITY only — a client \"\n + \"that resolves is one whose NAME the consent screen may show, and consent, scope and audience remain separate \"\n + \"gates — so evidence gathered here must not be read as an authorization outcome.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A client identity created by a party that authenticated to NOTHING is recorded.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A durable row class, and the reason it exists is not that one such registration is dangerous — the client is \"\n + \"confined to identity scopes, holds no roles, and always faces consent. It is that this is the only \"\n + \"unauthenticated WRITE in the application, so an operator must be able to see the population it produces. The \"\n + \"same member also covers a self-registered client CHANGING its own registration, which is the one way its \"\n + \"redirect set moves after creation.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTERED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And EVERY refused client assertion is recorded, with the reason that distinguishes a misconfiguration from an attack.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The row is the artifact and the REASON is why it is high risk: the vocabulary spans a misconfiguration and an \"\n + \"active outbound-request attack, both arriving at the same endpoint from the same kind of unauthenticated caller. \"\n + \"Only the reason tells them apart, and an operator watching this event is watching for the second — so it must be \"\n + \"queryable rather than buried in a log line.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CIMD_CLIENT_REFUSED],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven client-identity resolution against a domain under test control, and a driven resolution against one that \"\n + \"is not, refused. C2 and C3: the two audit members over the window, with C3 grouped BY REASON rather than counted.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Drive a client-identity resolution for a domain the test controls and assert the identity binds.\",\n \"Drive one for a host outside the allowed set and assert refusal.\",\n \"Query the registration member over the window and reconcile it against the client rows created in that window.\",\n \"Query the refusal member over the window and GROUP BY reason — an undifferentiated count answers neither of the two questions the event exists for.\",\n \"Assert both emissions are fire-and-forget: auditing must never change or fail the request it observes.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A registration with no row is a MAJOR: the unauthenticated write population becomes unobservable, which is the whole \"\n + \"reason the event exists. A refusal with no row is a MAJOR. A refusal row with no reason is also a MAJOR rather than \"\n + \"an observation — a refusal you cannot classify is operationally the same as one you did not record. An audit failure \"\n + \"that CHANGED the outcome of the request it observed is a MAJOR against the emission design, not against the control.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 attests the build driven. C2 and C3 evidence that registrations and refusals were RECORDED, never that the \"\n + \"registered population is legitimate — the control is observability of an unauthenticated write, not prevention of \"\n + \"it. And an update to a self-registered client shares the registration member, so the two cannot be separated by \"\n + \"event type alone; separate them by the row payload or not at all.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. All five acts are engine-owned tenant-lifecycle verbs; an application with one \"\n + \"organization still has the population, because the acts are about the scope rather than about its size.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Access rights are withdrawn when the relationship conferring them ends.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A durable row class naming from whom access was withdrawn, by whom, and what authority it carried. Note the \"\n + \"cascade shape a collector must not assume: there is deliberately NO relationship from users to memberships, so \"\n + \"deleting a user does not cascade to a membership removal and produces no such row.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_REMOVED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A scope that stops being operational stops conferring authority, without waiting for its data to be destroyed.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A named, closed set of statuses that confer no authority. It is DECLARED because the guarantee is a property of \"\n + \"that set and of its fail-CLOSED consumer reading — an unresolvable scope is treated as non-conferring, so a \"\n + \"missing row can never widen authority. No occurrence evidences a set.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"The credentials asserting those rights are revoked at the moment the granting scope is torn down, not merely marked.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The reconciliation runs INLINE rather than after commit, deliberately, because the only outcome that leaves live \"\n + \"credentials against a torn-down tenant is the deferred one. That ordering is invisible in any record — a \"\n + \"reconciled row and a row awaiting reconciliation look identical — so it is evidenced by tearing a tenant down \"\n + \"and attempting to use a credential it granted.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"And RESTORING access is as attributable as removing it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The clause the objective's title is built on, and the one an implementer drops: the destructive direction gets an \"\n + \"event and the recuperative one does not. Then a tenant marked and restored a year ago still reads as pending \"\n + \"destruction, and an access review asking why it has live members again has no answer on record. Four members, \"\n + \"two pairs, deliberately not merged — a teardown request and a suspension have the same blast radius and entirely \"\n + \"different remedies.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_DELETION_REQUESTED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_RESTORED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_SUSPENDED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_ACTIVATED,\n ],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1 and C4: the five tenant-lifecycle members over the window, PAIRED — each withdrawal read beside its restoration. \"\n + \"C2: the committed non-conferring status set and the consumer that reads it. C3: a driven teardown followed by an \"\n + \"attempted use of a credential the torn-down scope granted.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Query the withdrawal and restoration members over the window and pair them by scope — an unpaired restoration is the finding this demand exists for.\",\n \"Assert the non-conferring status set is a named closed vocabulary, and that its consumer treats an unresolvable scope as non-conferring.\",\n \"Suspend a scope and assert its members lose authority immediately, before any data is destroyed.\",\n \"Tear a tenant down and attempt to use a credential it granted; assert refusal rather than a marked-but-live credential.\",\n \"Do NOT expect a membership-removal row from a user deletion — no relationship exists, so its absence is correct rather than a gap.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A withdrawal with no row is a MAJOR. A RESTORATION with no row is equally a MAJOR and is the one most likely to be \"\n + \"argued down as harmless: it destroys nothing, and that is exactly why the record is the only trace it leaves. A live \"\n + \"credential against a torn-down scope is a MAJOR. A scope in a non-conferring status still granting authority is a \"\n + \"MAJOR and is a tenancy defect as well.\",\n limits:\n \"C1, C2 and C4 attest the window; C3 attests the build driven. None of it evidences that a withdrawal was \"\n + \"APPROPRIATE — only that it happened, was attributed, and took effect. And the credential reconciliation covers \"\n + \"credentials the ENGINE knows it granted; anything an application minted outside that path is outside this evidence.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:tenancy-derivation-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. Every clause is engine-owned; the retrieval clauses have an empty population where no \"\n + \"resource declares a retrieval source, which is an absence of subject matter rather than a declined control.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Tenancy narrowing is DERIVED from the resolved execution context and never offered as a parameter.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The evidence is that a caller-supplied scope has no effect, which no stored row shows: a correctly narrowed result \"\n + \"looks the same whether the narrowing came from the context or from a parameter that happened to match. It has to \"\n + \"be driven, with a scope the caller does not hold.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The derivation is ONE authority, applied at every call site rather than re-derived per site.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"An enumeration, and the site says why it must be one: a predicate added to one filter builder is a bypass on the \"\n + \"other, and this repository has been bitten by exactly that shape. Two persistence adapters mean two \"\n + \"implementations unless a single authority is what both call, so the enumeration must name the call sites and \"\n + \"resolve each to the same one.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"The scope is not offered as a knob to an agent or to any other non-client caller either.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The tool schema an agent reads is generated, so the clause is about what the GENERATOR strips — at both nesting \"\n + \"positions, top level and inside the filter object, because the builder places the scope in either depending on \"\n + \"the operation. Evidence is the generated schema for a scoped operation, which is a driven artifact rather than \"\n + \"an authored one.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"Where the read is a similarity search, the predicate is evaluated INSIDE the traversal rather than over its results, then re-checked by an authorized read of the owning row.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The distinction is invisible in the result set: filtering after the traversal returns the same rows, minus the \"\n + \"ones it drops, and differs only in what the traversal SAW. It is evidenced by the query the store issues and by \"\n + \"the second, authorized read of the owning row — which is the half that turns a store-level predicate into an \"\n + \"authorization decision.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: a driven read supplying a scope the caller does not hold, returning nothing from it. C2: an enumeration of the \"\n + \"filter call sites, each resolving to the single authority. C3: the generated agent tool schema for a scoped \"\n + \"operation, with the scope absent at both nesting positions. C4: the issued similarity query showing the predicate \"\n + \"inside the traversal, plus evidence of the re-read.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Call a scoped read supplying another tenant's scope as a parameter and assert nothing from it is returned.\",\n \"Enumerate the filter call sites and assert each reaches the one authoritative context-filter method — count them, and record the count.\",\n \"Generate the agent tool schema for a scoped operation and assert the scope field is absent at top level AND inside the filter object.\",\n \"Issue a similarity search and assert the tenancy predicate is part of the traversal, not applied to its output.\",\n \"Assert each admitted chunk is re-checked by an authorized read of its owning row before its text is used.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A caller-supplied scope that widens a result is a MAJOR and is a disclosure, not a defect in degree. A second filter \"\n + \"implementation not reaching the single authority is a MAJOR even where it currently agrees — agreement today is not \"\n + \"the guarantee, and the two adapters drift independently. A scope offered as an agent parameter is a MAJOR. A \"\n + \"similarity predicate applied over results rather than inside the traversal is a MAJOR: it caps how much a caller \"\n + \"sees rather than what it may see, so the failure is silent and proportional to corpus size.\",\n limits:\n \"Every clause attests the build driven, on the adapters driven. C2's enumeration goes stale the moment a call site is \"\n + \"added, and an added one will not fail — it will simply be wrong for one adapter. And none of it evidences that the \"\n + \"resolved execution context was itself correct: this demand is about a caller not WIDENING its scope, never about \"\n + \"the scope it legitimately holds.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application that mints a credential — an API key or a client secret — which is every application \"\n + \"with a machine caller. The mechanism is engine-owned and the marked declarations are on engine resources, so an \"\n + \"application declines nothing by not participating.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"The FIRST disclosure of server-minted secret material is an attributable, audited event.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"One durable row class naming a principal and a FIELD. It fires on two disjoint markers, and a judge must read the \"\n + \"row to tell them apart: the stored artifact at first exposure, and the secret actually handed to the caller — \"\n + \"the same operation can produce one, the other, or both.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.FIELD_ACCESS],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The row names the FIELD and never carries its contents.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A property of the emitter's payload contract, settled by reading it. The reason it is load-bearing rather than \"\n + \"hygienic: rows replicate to the per-tenant export and to the immutable ledger, neither of which can be \"\n + \"scrubbed — so recording the secret would turn the record OF a disclosure into a second, permanent copy of it. \"\n + \"The row and the secret must never be the same artifact.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"Every operation that discloses minted material is reachable by that audit, on both the operation and the field axis.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Coverage is a property of the committed declarations — which operations carry the below-risk-floor audit opt-in, \"\n + \"and which fields carry the two disclosure markers. Note WHY the opt-in exists rather than a raised risk level: \"\n + \"buying the row by mis-declaring a verb's danger would corrupt the risk vocabulary every other control reads.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: field-access rows over the window, each naming a principal, a field and whether it was the create-time exposure. \"\n + \"C2: the emitter's payload contract, plus a scan of sampled rows for material matching a live credential. C3: the \"\n + \"committed disclosure declarations across the minting resources, at both application and tenant scope.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate the operations that mint or reissue credential material at both scopes, and assert each carries the audit opt-in.\",\n \"Enumerate the fields carrying the two disclosure markers and assert each is one of those operations' outputs.\",\n \"Drive a mint and a reissue, and assert a field-access row exists for each, attributable to the calling principal.\",\n \"Assert the rows name the field and carry no value — scan the sampled rows for the minted material itself.\",\n \"Distinguish the two markers on a row rather than counting rows: the stored artifact and the handed-out secret are different disclosures of different things.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A minting operation with no field-access row is a MAJOR: the credential exists and nothing says who received it. A row \"\n + \"carrying the secret VALUE is a MAJOR and an incident — the ledger cannot be scrubbed, so the disclosure is \"\n + \"permanent and the erasure obligation is broken with it. A verb whose risk level was RAISED to buy the row is an \"\n + \"OBSERVATION about the declaration and a real one: it makes that verb read as more dangerous than it is to every \"\n + \"other consumer of the risk vocabulary.\",\n limits:\n \"It evidences FIRST disclosure. A later re-read of stored material, or a copy made outside the operation path, is a \"\n + \"different question this row class does not answer — which is why the marker is on first exposure rather than on the \"\n + \"field generally. And a row proves a disclosure was RECORDED, never that the recipient was entitled to it.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:auditable-event-actor-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. The sentinel vocabulary and every marked emitter are engine-owned; the read-through and \"\n + \"agent clauses have an empty population where no external binding or agent exists.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A security-relevant action records who performed it, and never disguises an UNATTRIBUTABLE action as an ordinary automated one.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The clause is about a VOCABULARY, and that is what makes it declarative. Three sentinels are semantically \"\n + \"distinct: the system acting with no human principal by design, a machine principal acting legitimately, and a \"\n + \"principal that was EXPECTED and could not be resolved. Only the third is an anomaly. Collapsing them onto one \"\n + \"value is what hid a batch-purged tenant recorded as deleted by an unknown actor — the one case worth \"\n + \"investigating, buried inside the two that are not.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The sentinel a row carries is RESOLVED from the execution context, not chosen by hand at each emitter.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"An enumeration: the mapping from execution type to sentinel belongs in one place, so the evidence is that every \"\n + \"emitter reaches the shared resolver. A hand-chosen sentinel that happens to be right today is indistinguishable \"\n + \"in the row from a resolved one, and drifts silently.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"Read-through access to an external system carries the REAL initiating user through the shared service principal.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A durable row class, and the clause exists because a service-principal binding authenticates every remote call as \"\n + \"one account — so without this field attribution dies at the boundary. Note the unit: one row per read-family \"\n + \"OPERATION execution, so a paginated list and the count totalling its envelope are ONE access. Counting \"\n + \"transport calls instead inflates the trail and answers a question no reviewer asked.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.HTTP_API_READ_THROUGH_ACCESS,\n CoreAuditableEventType.PROVIDER_OPERATION_CALL,\n CoreAuditableEventType.MCP_TOOL_CALL,\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"An outbound DELETION on that plane names the subject it served and the system it reached, and an acknowledged non-erasure is recorded per resource per request rather than as a standing posture.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Two members, and the second is the one that would be dropped. A hole in erasure that is acknowledged ONCE as a \"\n + \"configuration becomes invisible; recorded per resource per request, it stays countable, and a reviewer can see \"\n + \"how often the application chose to accept it.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.HTTP_API_EXTERNAL_ERASURE,\n CoreAuditableEventType.HTTP_API_NON_ERASURE_ACKNOWLEDGED,\n ],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the sentinel vocabulary as a named closed set. C2: an enumeration of the emitters, each resolving the sentinel \"\n + \"through the shared resolver. C3 and C4: the five outbound members over the window, with the initiating-user field \"\n + \"present wherever the execution had a human principal. Absence of that field means a runtime acted, which is a \"\n + \"value rather than a gap.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Assert the sentinel set is a named closed vocabulary and that the anomaly value is distinct from the two ordinary ones.\",\n \"Query the window for rows carrying the anomaly sentinel — this is the alerting query, and a nonzero count is the finding.\",\n \"Enumerate audit emitters and assert each resolves its actor through the shared resolver rather than choosing a literal.\",\n \"Sample read-through rows and assert the real initiating user is present for executions that had one, and absent for machine and internal ones.\",\n \"Assert one row per read-family operation execution, not per transport call — a list and its count are one access.\",\n \"Query the acknowledged-non-erasure member GROUPED BY resource, and read the count as the size of the accepted hole.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A row carrying the anomaly sentinel is a MAJOR and is exactly what the vocabulary exists to surface: a privileged \"\n + \"action happened and the trail cannot say who. A read-through row missing the real initiating user where the \"\n + \"execution had one is a MAJOR — attribution died at the service principal, which is the failure the field exists \"\n + \"for. An outbound deletion with no row is a MAJOR. An acknowledged non-erasure recorded as a standing posture \"\n + \"rather than per request is a MAJOR: it is the same fact made uncountable.\",\n limits:\n \"C2's enumeration attests the emitter set as enumerated. C3 and C4 attest the window, and they evidence attribution \"\n + \"of the calls that were MADE — a call made outside the read-through plane leaves no row here. And a resolved actor \"\n + \"is not a verified one: the row records who the execution context said was acting, which is a different claim from \"\n + \"who was at the keyboard.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:administrative-continuity-breach-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application, at BOTH scopes — the application itself and each tenant. The two are separate floors \"\n + \"with separate acknowledgements on purpose: an erasure that may lawfully strand one tenant is not thereby licensed \"\n + \"to leave the whole application unadministrable.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A removal, demotion or deactivation that would strand a scope is REFUSED, at every door onto the status that decides administrative usability.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The refusal is the artifact and it only exists when the last administrator is the subject. A healthy application \"\n + \"evidences nothing: every scope having an administrator is equally consistent with a floor that holds and with \"\n + \"one nobody has tested. The enumeration matters as much as the drive — EVERY door onto that status must enforce \"\n + \"the same floor, and a door added later will not announce itself.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Concurrent reductions are SERIALIZED, so two of them cannot pass each other.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Textbook write skew: each transaction measures a count, then writes, and under snapshot isolation each sees the \"\n + \"other still present. No amount of re-checking closes it and no row shows it — the outcome is a scope with zero \"\n + \"administrators and two perfectly ordinary success responses. The evidence is that the two transactions COLLIDE, \"\n + \"which requires giving them something to collide on and then driving them concurrently.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A data-protection erasure proceeds only on an explicit per-request acknowledgement, and the breach it causes is recorded.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Here the record IS the control, not decoration: the acknowledgement's entire justification is that the \"\n + \"consequence becomes VISIBLE rather than prevented. Two members, one per scope, deliberately not merged. And the \"\n + \"acknowledgement must not silence the evaluation — an acknowledged erasure that strands nobody must stay quiet, \"\n + \"or the alert stops meaning anything.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.APPLICATION_SUPER_ADMIN_FLOOR_BREACHED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_OWNER_FLOOR_BREACHED,\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"Any scope that has ALREADY been stranded is reported at startup.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The boot report observes states no write guard ever saw — a direct datastore edit, a restore from a mid-erasure \"\n + \"backup, a seed that authored no administrator, a role-table reconfiguration. It is non-fatal always, and that is \"\n + \"deliberate: a fresh deployment legitimately has none of the population, and a diagnostic must never be why \"\n + \"startup fails.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C5\",\n obligation: \"And a stranded TENANT has a higher-tier repair door, additive and audited.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The industry pattern has two halves and shipping only the refusal turns every mistake into a permanent lockout. \"\n + \"The tenant half exists — an operator-tier grant that PROMOTES an existing member, writes one field additively, \"\n + \"and requires a justification — which is declared, validated, and then DISCARDED: the implementation never reads it, it has no column, and the generic row has no request-payload field to carry it (issue #593). So the compensating control that makes this crossing accountable does not exist today, and this clause must not be evidenced against it. The application half does NOT and cannot: there is no scope \"\n + \"above the application, which is why its acknowledgement names an out-of-band restore as the only remedy.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: an enumeration of every door onto the deciding status, plus a driven last-administrator removal at each scope, \"\n + \"refused with a conflict rather than a forbidden. C2: two concurrent reductions driven against one scope, one \"\n + \"aborting. C3: the two breach members over the window, each carrying the scope stranded and the action that caused \"\n + \"it. C4: the startup report, including its count of scopes at exactly ONE administrator. C5: repair-door rows. \"\n + \"Do NOT require a justification on them: the field is mandatory at the API and reaches no store (#593), so \"\n + \"demanding it raises a MAJOR against every row of a control working exactly as it was built.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate every door that writes the status deciding administrative usability, and assert each consults the floor.\",\n \"Remove the last administrator at tenant scope and assert refusal with a CONFLICT — the caller IS authorized and the payload IS valid; it is the STATE that forbids the write.\",\n \"Repeat at application scope and assert the distinct, scope-specific code.\",\n \"Drive two concurrent reductions and assert one aborts rather than both succeeding.\",\n \"Drive an acknowledged erasure that strands a scope and assert the breach row exists; drive one that strands nobody and assert SILENCE.\",\n \"Read the startup report and record both counts: scopes at zero administrators, and scopes at exactly one.\",\n \"Assert the repair door promotes an EXISTING member, writes only the role, and refuses a member the floor would not count.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A door onto the deciding status that does not consult the floor is a MAJOR whether or not it has been used. A scope \"\n + \"at zero administrators is a MAJOR and is simultaneously an access-control failure and an availability failure for \"\n + \"that scope. A refusal answered as FORBIDDEN rather than CONFLICT is an OBSERVATION with real cost: the caller was \"\n + \"authorized, and a wrong code sends an integrator to fix permissions. Scopes at exactly ONE administrator are an \"\n + \"OBSERVATION, never a nonconformity — nothing is broken yet, and they are precisely the population the floor will \"\n + \"REFUSE to help. A repair-door row with no justification is NOT a finding today — the field reaches no store (#593). That absence is itself worth reporting as an OBSERVATION against the FRAMEWORK, because the justification is the whole control on an \"\n + \"action no downstream check can second-guess, and the door was opened on the argument that it is recorded.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 and C2 attest the build driven; C2 in particular needs a datastore that really serializes, and an environment that \"\n + \"mocks transactions can evidence the collision POINT but not the abort. C4's report is a snapshot at boot and says \"\n + \"nothing about the interval since. And none of it evidences that a remaining administrator is REACHABLE — an \"\n + \"account that exists, is active, and belongs to someone who has left satisfies every clause here.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:authentication-posture-change-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application for the application-wide posture, and to every tenant that configures single sign-on \"\n + \"for the per-tenant half. A tenant with no single-sign-on configuration has an empty population there.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"How principals may authenticate is EXPLICITLY configured — the multi-factor, password, lockout, methods, step-up and session posture.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The authored per-user-type configuration IS the posture. Nothing observed at runtime distinguishes a deliberate \"\n + \"permissive posture from an unconsidered default, which is why the clause asks for the declaration rather than \"\n + \"for behaviour.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Which identity provider is trusted, whether single sign-on is ENFORCED, and whether that provider's assertions are actually VERIFIED are declared per tenant.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Four separate declarations that a reader is tempted to treat as one: the live switch, the default provider, the \"\n + \"endpoints, and the signature and replay validation posture. The last is the one that matters most and is \"\n + \"easiest to leave permissive — a trusted provider whose assertions are not verified is not an identity \"\n + \"provider, it is an open door with a name on it. A verified DOMAIN is upstream of all four: it decides which \"\n + \"provider authenticates every principal at that domain.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"Every GENUINE change to that posture is detected at startup and evidenced once, from the runtime that puts it into effect.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A durable row class, and the detector's shape is the clause: the trail is its OWN change-detection state, so a \"\n + \"first boot emits a baseline row, a moved digest emits a before-and-after naming the changed user types, and an \"\n + \"identical digest emits NOTHING. One row per genuine change rather than one per boot is what keeps the trail \"\n + \"readable — and it is why an empty result in a window means the posture did not move, rather than that nothing \"\n + \"watched it.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"An authenticated BYPASS of a tenant's own authentication requirement is itself evidenced.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The clause an implementer drops, because a bypass is granted to keep an administrator from locking themselves \"\n + \"out — a helpful act, and therefore one nobody thinks to record. Its whole point is that it defeats the \"\n + \"enforcement the tenant declared, so a posture reviewed without it is a posture read as stricter than it is.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C5\",\n obligation: \"And privileged access under ANOTHER identity is authorized, time-boxed, and attributable to the human actor.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Carried in the tree as an explicit unimplemented-control marker rather than as an omission: the verb is routed \"\n + \"and unimplemented. It is named here so a judge does not go looking for impersonation evidence and read its \"\n + \"absence as an application that never impersonates.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the authored per-user-type authentication configuration. C2: per tenant, the enforcement switch, the trusted \"\n + \"provider, the endpoints, the signature and replay validation posture, and the domain verification behind them. C3: \"\n + \"the policy-change rows over the window, read as one per change. C4: rows evidencing each granted bypass. C5: \"\n + \"nothing.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Read the authored authentication configuration per user type and record the posture rather than judging it — a permissive declared posture is a decision, and severity follows what it exposes.\",\n \"Per tenant, assert the four single-sign-on declarations, and specifically that assertion verification is ON where a provider is trusted.\",\n \"Assert each configured domain was VERIFIED, since the domain is what routes principals to that provider.\",\n \"Query the policy-change member over the window and reconcile the number of rows against the number of genuine changes — one per change, and none for an unchanged boot.\",\n \"Assert the first-ever row is a baseline with no prior value, rather than treating its absence as a gap.\",\n \"Enumerate granted bypasses of tenant enforcement and assert each is evidenced.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A trusted identity provider whose assertion verification is off is a MAJOR and the most consequential finding this \"\n + \"demand can produce. A posture change with no row is a MAJOR — the pre-incident weakening of an authentication \"\n + \"requirement is precisely what the detector exists to catch. An unverified domain routing principals to a provider \"\n + \"is a MAJOR. Several rows for one change is an OBSERVATION about noise, not a control failure. C5 carries no \"\n + \"severity.\",\n limits:\n \"C3 detects change in the AUTHORED snapshot. A posture altered by a mechanism outside that snapshot moves no digest \"\n + \"and emits nothing. The detector is fire-and-forget by design — a backend must boot whether or not it could record \"\n + \"this — so a boot whose emission failed leaves a gap that looks exactly like an unchanged posture, and only the \"\n + \"backend's own error log distinguishes them. And C1 and C2 evidence what was declared, never that the declared \"\n + \"posture is adequate for the risk.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:conferring-grant-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. Narrowing is engine-owned and runs on every scoped read and write; the unit-subtree \"\n + \"clause has an empty population where no organization unit exists.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Reads and writes are narrowed to the tenant, unit subtree or parent row the caller's own grant reaches.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Narrowing is only visible against data the caller should NOT see, so it has to be driven with rows outside the \"\n + \"grant present. The write side needs its own drive and is the half that is missed: a row filter cannot \"\n + \"constrain a CREATE — there is no row yet — and does not constrain the VALUES an update writes, so read-side \"\n + \"evidence says nothing about it.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The conferring GRANT is recorded alongside the decision.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The stamp is the artifact, and it exists to answer a specific question an access review asks — why does this \"\n + \"principal reach this record — without reconstructing it from role tables afterwards. Reconstruction answers a \"\n + \"different question: what the principal could reach NOW.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A unit grant expands to exactly its declared subtree and no further.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Exactness is two-sided and a single drive only ever shows one side. The expansion follows the unit's declared \"\n + \"inheritance, so the evidence must show a sibling excluded AND a declared descendant included — an \"\n + \"over-narrow grant is a defect too, and it presents as a support ticket rather than as a breach, so it survives \"\n + \"longer.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"And a tenant cannot LIFT a narrowing the platform imposed on it.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The direction that matters: every other clause makes a result smaller, and this one refuses an attempt to make \"\n + \"it larger. Evidenced by driving a tenant-authored write against a platform-imposed restriction and asserting \"\n + \"refusal — no artifact records a restriction that was NOT lifted.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: driven reads and WRITES per scope kind — tenant, unit, parent row — each with out-of-scope rows present. C2: the \"\n + \"conferring-grant stamp on decisions over the window. C3: a driven read from a unit grant showing an included \"\n + \"declared descendant and an excluded sibling. C4: a driven tenant attempt to relax a platform restriction, refused.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Drive a scoped read with out-of-scope rows present and assert none is returned.\",\n \"Drive a CREATE and an UPDATE under the same grant and assert the values are constrained — a read-side filter does not constrain either.\",\n \"Sample access decisions and assert each carries the grant that conferred it, not merely the role name.\",\n \"From a unit grant, assert a declared descendant IS reached and a sibling is NOT — both directions, in one drive.\",\n \"Attempt, as the tenant, to widen a platform-imposed restriction on itself, and assert refusal.\",\n \"Assert the audit trail's own tenant segregation holds on the AUTHENTICATED scope while a subject tenant still sees events concerning it.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A read returning an out-of-scope row is a MAJOR and a disclosure. An unconstrained CREATE or UPDATE is a MAJOR of \"\n + \"the same order and is more likely to be missed, because nothing looks wrong in a response. A unit grant reaching \"\n + \"beyond its declared subtree is a MAJOR; one falling short is an OBSERVATION with a real cost, since it is reported \"\n + \"as a product fault and worked around. A decision with no conferring-grant stamp is an OBSERVATION unless the \"\n + \"review cannot proceed without it, at which point it is the demand's whole subject.\",\n limits:\n \"Every clause attests the build driven, on the scope kinds driven. C2 evidences that the stamp is PRESENT; whether it \"\n + \"names the grant that truly conferred access is a question about the resolver, not about the row. And none of it \"\n + \"evidences that the grant itself was appropriate — this demand is about confinement to a grant, never about whether \"\n + \"the grant should exist.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:delegated-authorization-decision-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application exposing an authorization server or connecting to a third party. The largest marked \"\n + \"surface in the catalog, and the demand covers BOTH directions: a third party acting for a user of this \"\n + \"application, and this application acting toward a third party for one of its own principals.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A third party acts for a user only on that user's recorded authorization, and approval, refusal, persistence and failure of the exchange are each audited.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Four members, and they are four because the four facts are not recoverable from each other. A REFUSAL leaves no \"\n + \"token and no grant, so nothing but its own row records that the user was asked and said no. A PERSISTED grant \"\n + \"is a standing authorization that outlives the ceremony that created it, and it is separately audited even when \"\n + \"it is created in the same request. A FAILED exchange is the monitoring surface — the code never decoded — and \"\n + \"is the only one of the four that an attacker produces on purpose.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_DENIED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANT_PERSISTED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CODE_EXCHANGE_FAILED,\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"Issuing a delegated token — the ability to act AS the user — is recorded with its subject, its client, its audience, its granted scopes and its lifetime.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Its own clause rather than part of C1, because consent and issuance are separable in both directions: a \"\n + \"persisted grant issues tokens later with no new ceremony, and a client declaring itself consent-free inside its \"\n + \"own trust boundary may skip the prompt entirely. The token row is then the only per-occurrence record that the \"\n + \"delegation was exercised.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_DELEGATED_TOKEN_ISSUED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"Proof of possession is enforced on the exchange.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A property of what the endpoint REFUSES, which no successful exchange records. It has to be driven: present a \"\n + \"code without its proof, and with a weakened proof, and assert both are refused. A row saying a token was \"\n + \"issued cannot say whether the challenge would have been skippable.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"The issued token carries no more than the grant declared.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Confinement is evidenced by asking for MORE than was granted and being refused, not by reading a correct token. \"\n + \"The same holds for renewal, which happens with no new act of consent and is therefore bounded only by what the \"\n + \"original grant carried — the point at which scope creep would be invisible.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C5\",\n obligation: \"In the outbound direction, a principal's authorization for this application to act toward a named third party is recorded, is spent only for that principal, and its withdrawal is recorded too.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The mirrored direction, with its own member set at both user and organization scope. FOUR facts per credential \"\n + \"and each is separately load-bearing: the authorization, every USE of it — delegated authority exercised is what \"\n + \"an access review counts — the ROTATION, and the withdrawal, without which a revoked credential is \"\n + \"indistinguishable in the trail from one that was never granted. Read each member's own marker before demanding \"\n + \"it: the enum assigns members to this objective and states which question each answers.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n // The AUTHORIZATION, at both scopes. `*_CONNECTION_GRANTED` rather than `*_CREDENTIAL_SET`,\n // which this clause demanded until 2026-09-10 — the enum draws the distinction itself and\n // says it is the one an auditor asks for first: \"which of our people granted a third party\n // access, to what, and when\" is a different question from \"which credentials were\n // configured\", and a trail answering both with one event answers neither well. `_SET` is\n // emitted by the resource write hook AFTER the value is sealed, so it cannot carry the\n // scopes — which are exactly what \"to what\" means.\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PROVIDER_CONNECTION_GRANTED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CONNECTION_GRANTED,\n // The USE, which is what an access review counts.\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_USED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_USED,\n // The RENEWAL, which C4 reasons about and which this clause omitted: a rotation replaces the\n // secret under the SAME grant, so without it a credential's authority outlives every\n // artifact describing how it was authorized.\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_ROTATED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_ROTATED,\n // The WITHDRAWAL, without which a revoked credential is indistinguishable from one never granted.\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_DELETED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_DELETED,\n ],\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1, C2 and C5: the eleven members over the window, with the refusal and failure members read as first-class results \"\n + \"rather than as the absence of success. C3: driven exchanges without the possession proof and with a weakened one, \"\n + \"both refused. C4: a driven exchange requesting more scope than the grant declared, and a driven renewal, both \"\n + \"confined to the original grant.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Query the consent members over the window and read GRANTED, DENIED and PERSISTED as three separate populations — a persisted grant created inside a granting request produces two rows, and that is correct rather than duplication.\",\n \"Reconcile issued delegated tokens against grants: a token with no consent ceremony behind it must resolve to a persisted grant or to a client declaring itself consent-free inside its own trust boundary.\",\n \"Present an authorization code with no possession proof and assert refusal; repeat with a weakened proof.\",\n \"Request a scope beyond the grant and assert the issued token does not carry it.\",\n \"Renew a token and assert the renewal is bounded by the ORIGINAL grant, since no new consent occurred.\",\n \"For the outbound direction, assert each credential USE names the principal whose authority it spent, and that a withdrawal leaves its own row.\",\n \"Assert every emission on this path is fire-and-forget — auditing must never change the authorization outcome it observes.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A delegated token issued with no recorded authorization behind it is a MAJOR and is the most severe finding this \"\n + \"demand produces: a third party holds the ability to act as a user who never agreed. A missing refusal row is a \"\n + \"MAJOR — the trail then records only the outcomes the user accepted, which reads as unanimous consent. A skippable \"\n + \"possession proof is a MAJOR. A token carrying more than the grant declared is a MAJOR. A credential USE with no \"\n + \"row is a MAJOR, since delegated authority exercised is the only thing an access review can count. A failed-exchange \"\n + \"row is not itself a finding — it is the monitoring surface, and a spike in it is.\",\n limits:\n \"C3 and C4 attest the build driven. The audited-emission design means an emission failure is swallowed rather than \"\n + \"failing the request, so a gap in the trail and a period of no delegation look the same. Consent is evidenced as \"\n + \"RECORDED, never as informed — what the user was shown is outside every artifact named here. And a consent-free \"\n + \"client inside its own trust boundary legitimately produces no ceremony, so its absence must be resolved against \"\n + \"the client declaration rather than reported.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:destruction-decision-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. The identity and tenant destruction verbs are engine-owned; the retained-record \"\n + \"clauses have an empty population where no resource declares a retention treatment, which is an absence of subject \"\n + \"matter rather than a declined control.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Destruction of an identity, a tenant or its data is a deliberate, attributable, evidenced DECISION.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Durable rows, and the unit is the DECISION rather than the destruction. The moment worth catching is when the \"\n + \"tenant loses its access, which is also the moment a mistaken or malicious teardown can still be reversed; the \"\n + \"purge that follows is the mechanical consequence. So the scheduling row must exist even where the decision was \"\n + \"later reversed — an evidence trail that only records completed destructions cannot show an attempt.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_DELETION_REQUESTED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_DELETED,\n CoreAuditableEventType.USER_DELETED,\n ],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"It is REVERSIBLE until its declared window elapses, and the reversal is itself audited and performed by a separately-privileged party.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The restoration row is the artifact, and the separately-privileged half is what makes the window a control \"\n + \"rather than a delay: a party that can both schedule and reverse has a window with itself. Reversal destroys \"\n + \"nothing, which is exactly why the record is the only trace it leaves.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_RESTORED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"Then it is carried out ON SCHEDULE, with evidence per scope destroyed.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The scheduled sweep's evidence, per scope rather than per run. A sweep that silently stopped leaves rows that \"\n + \"look exactly like rows whose window has not yet elapsed, so continuity of the sweep is itself part of the \"\n + \"evidence rather than an operational aside.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"An erased-but-RETAINED record is hidden from, and immutable to, every ORDINARY access path — the only door is an audited see-through read.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A negative property of every ordinary path, which no row can show: a retained row absent from a result is \"\n + \"indistinguishable from a row that never existed. It has to be driven from both sides — ordinary reads and \"\n + \"writes refused, and the one declared door succeeding and leaving its own audited trace. Both halves matter: a \"\n + \"door that is not audited is not a door, it is a bypass.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C5\",\n obligation: \"And its DERIVED copies are excluded by a live check against the parent row, rather than by waiting for a sweep.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The clause an implementer most reliably drops, because the primary row is correct and the derived copy is \"\n + \"somewhere else — a retrieval chunk, an index entry. Sweep-based exclusion has a window during which erased \"\n + \"content is still served, and the length of that window is an operational accident rather than a declared \"\n + \"property. Evidenced by erasing a parent and immediately querying the derived surface.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1, C2 and C3: the destruction and restoration members over the window, plus the scheduled sweep's per-scope \"\n + \"evidence and the continuity of its runs. C4: driven ordinary reads and writes against a retained record, refused, \"\n + \"and a driven see-through read that succeeds and is itself recorded. C5: a parent erased and its derived copies \"\n + \"queried immediately.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Query the destruction members over the window and PAIR each decision with either a completed destruction or a restoration — a decision with neither is a window still open, and its deadline is the finding.\",\n \"Assert a reversal was performed by a party distinct from the one that scheduled it.\",\n \"Read the sweep's per-scope evidence and assert continuity of runs across the period.\",\n \"Attempt an ordinary read of a retained record and assert it is not returned; attempt an ordinary write and assert refusal.\",\n \"Perform the declared see-through read and assert BOTH that it succeeds and that it left its own audited row.\",\n \"Erase a parent row and query its derived copies IMMEDIATELY — not after a sweep interval, which is the assumption this clause exists to refuse.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A destruction with no decision row is a MAJOR. A retained record reachable on an ordinary path is a MAJOR and a \"\n + \"disclosure of data the subject asked to have erased. A see-through read that leaves no row is a MAJOR: the \"\n + \"carve-out's justification is that the access is accountable. A derived copy still served after its parent was \"\n + \"erased is a MAJOR, and its severity does not fall because a sweep would eventually remove it — the window is the \"\n + \"defect. A scheduled destruction past its window is a MAJOR against the sweep, not against the decision.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 to C3 attest the window; C4 and C5 attest the build driven, on the derived surfaces driven — a derived copy in a \"\n + \"surface nobody queried is invisible here. It evidences that destruction was DECIDED and CARRIED OUT, never that \"\n + \"every copy in every backup and export is gone, which no runtime artifact can show. And a reversal by a \"\n + \"separately-privileged party evidences separation of the two roles, not that either was exercised well.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:operation-role-declaration\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. Every clause is engine-owned; the non-controller-surface clause has an empty \"\n + \"population where the application exposes no agent, retrieval or self-service surface, which is an absence of \"\n + \"subject matter rather than a declined control.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"Every operation declares the authority it requires.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The declaration IS the control's subject and the input every other clause reads. An operation that declares \"\n + \"nothing does not fail visibly — it is simply gated on nothing, and no runtime observation distinguishes that \"\n + \"from an operation legitimately open.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"A principal can never grant authority it does not itself hold — role assignment and machine-credential minting are bounded by the caller's own ceiling.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Evidenced by an attempted upward grant being refused, which no successful grant records. The population is \"\n + \"larger than role assignment alone and each site is separate code: membership roles, unit assignments, and the \"\n + \"roles requested when minting an API key or an OAuth client. Two of those are credential MINTS, where a \"\n + \"successful escalation hands out a durable credential rather than merely changing a row.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"A non-controller surface facing an external caller applies the SAME declared operation-role gate, through the SAME predicate, before a self-service verb, a retrieval corpus or an agent-facing tool is reached.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"This is the clause the objective was widened for, and it is an enumeration plus a drive. Through the SAME \"\n + \"predicate is the operative phrase: a second gate that agrees today is a bypass tomorrow, and the retrieval \"\n + \"case shows why the ordering matters — the gate runs per resource type BEFORE anything is searched, so a caller \"\n + \"whose roles would be refused a read never reaches the corpus at all.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"And a refusal is RECORDED, by the same funnel that records a controller-tier refusal.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A durable row class. Sharing the funnel is what makes the refusals comparable: a denial from an agent surface and \"\n + \"one from the HTTP tier are the same fact about the same declared authority, and splitting them by surface would \"\n + \"make a repeated-refusal pattern invisible in exactly the case where it matters most.\",\n requiredAuditEventMembers: [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_DENIED],\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C5\",\n obligation: \"An administrative action on another principal is authorized by the caller's ROLE, never by caller and subject being the same person.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A property of the operation vocabulary rather than of a runtime check: a self-service verb must not be a \"\n + \"privilege-assignment or lifecycle-override surface, which is enforced by what its request contract can even \"\n + \"EXPRESS. Least privilege applies to a request contract as much as to a role — a contract that cannot carry a \"\n + \"role cannot be used to grant one, whatever the caller holds.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the declared authority per operation, from the committed configuration. C2: driven upward-grant attempts at each \"\n + \"site — membership roles, unit assignment, and both credential mints — each refused. C3: an enumeration of the \"\n + \"non-controller surfaces with each resolving to the shared predicate, plus a driven refusal at each. C4: refusal \"\n + \"rows over the window carrying the surface they came from. C5: the request contracts of the self-service verbs.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate operations and assert each declares its required authority; list any that declare none and treat that list as the finding rather than as the baseline.\",\n \"Attempt, as a caller holding a bounded role, to grant a higher one — on a membership, on a unit assignment, and on each credential mint. Assert refusal at all four.\",\n \"Enumerate the non-controller surfaces and assert each reaches the SAME authorizer predicate, not an equivalent one.\",\n \"Drive a refusal at an agent surface and at the retrieval surface, and assert the retrieval gate ran BEFORE the search rather than filtering its results.\",\n \"Query refusal rows over the window and assert refusals from every surface land in one funnel.\",\n \"Read the self-service request contracts and assert none can express a role or a lifecycle status.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A successful upward grant is a MAJOR and, on a credential mint, an incident: the escalated authority left the system \"\n + \"as a durable credential. A non-controller surface with no gate is a MAJOR — the controller tier's coverage is \"\n + \"irrelevant to a caller that does not go through it. A second gate that duplicates the predicate rather than sharing \"\n + \"it is a MAJOR even while it agrees, because agreement is not the guarantee. A refusal that leaves no row is an \"\n + \"OBSERVATION alone and a MAJOR where a repeated-refusal pattern is part of the application's detection story. An \"\n + \"operation declaring no authority is an OBSERVATION until its exposure is assessed, then whatever that assessment \"\n + \"warrants.\",\n limits:\n \"C1 and C5 attest declarations. C2 and C3 attest the build driven, at the sites driven — and C3's enumeration is the \"\n + \"part that goes stale, since a surface added later will simply not be in it and will not fail. None of it evidences \"\n + \"that the DECLARED authority is the right authority for the operation, which is a judgement no artifact carries.\",\n },\n \"evidence-requirement:step-up-challenge-record\": {\n schemaVersion: 1,\n applicability:\n \"Applies to every application. The flag, the challenge and the consumable proof are engine-owned, and the operations \"\n + \"carrying the flag are engine resources — so no application builds the lane and none opts out.\",\n clauses: [\n {\n clauseRef: \"C1\",\n obligation: \"A high-impact action requires a FRESH re-proof of identity.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.DECLARED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.META_APPLICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"Which actions are high-impact is a committed per-operation declaration, and the SET is the evidence a reviewer \"\n + \"needs — the question is not whether the mechanism works but which verbs were judged to need it. Note one \"\n + \"declaration that reads as coverage and is not: the flag is INERT on read-shaped operations, which are skipped, \"\n + \"so a read carrying it is a declaration nothing enforces.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C2\",\n obligation: \"The re-proof is accepted over ANY factor the principal actually holds.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"A driven property, and the clause that keeps the control from becoming an availability failure: a ceremony that \"\n + \"accepts only one factor locks out every principal who holds a different one, and the response to a lockout is \"\n + \"to relax the control. Evidenced by re-proving with each factor kind a test principal holds.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C3\",\n obligation: \"And that ceremony CANNOT be satisfied by a credential presented for a different purpose.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.EMITTED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.VERIFICATION,\n homeRationale:\n \"The clause the requirement is really named after, and the one no successful ceremony evidences: a valid proof \"\n + \"and a repurposed one both authenticate the same person. The proof is consumable and bound to its purpose \"\n + \"precisely so the two are separable, and the only evidence of that is presenting a credential minted for \"\n + \"something else and being refused — plus replaying a spent one and being refused again.\",\n },\n {\n clauseRef: \"C4\",\n obligation: \"A refused high-impact action is recorded.\",\n home: AssuranceEvidenceHome.UNPRODUCED,\n plane: AssuranceEvidenceExecutionPlane.PRODUCTION,\n homeRationale:\n \"There is no step-up-specific audit member, and inventing a demand for one would raise a MAJOR against a control \"\n + \"that works. This clause concluded that correctly and then demanded the generic access-control denial instead, \"\n + \"which is the same mistake wearing a live member's name: that member has ONE production emitter, in the \"\n + \"authorizer funnel, and the step-up gate is a private check at the services-registry tier that throws without \"\n + \"passing through it. So the demand named a real, emitted, frequently-written row that no step-up refusal can \"\n + \"ever produce, and its verification step returned nothing by construction. A live member is not evidence that \"\n + \"YOUR control emits it. Corrected 2026-09-10.\\n\\n\"\n + \"UNPRODUCED is the honest answer: refusals of high-impact actions are countable today only from the \"\n + \"application's own error responses, which are not an evidence store. Routing the gate's refusal through the \"\n + \"denial funnel would make this EMITTED, and is the fix.\",\n },\n ],\n minimumEvidence:\n \"C1: the set of operations declaring the re-proof requirement, with read-shaped ones identified as inert. C2: driven \"\n + \"re-proofs over each factor kind the principal holds. C3: a driven attempt using a credential minted for another \"\n + \"purpose, refused, and a driven replay of a spent proof, refused. C4: nothing.\",\n verificationSteps: [\n \"Enumerate operations declaring the re-proof requirement and separate the read-shaped ones — the flag does not run there, so listing them as covered overstates the control.\",\n \"Drive a declared action with no proof and assert refusal.\",\n \"Drive it with a fresh proof over each factor the principal holds, and assert each is accepted.\",\n \"Present a credential minted for a different purpose and assert refusal — this is the clause, not a variant of the previous step.\",\n \"Replay a proof already spent and assert refusal.\",\n \"Record C4 as UNPRODUCED. Do NOT query access-control denial rows for these refusals: the gate does not route through the funnel that writes them, so an empty result reads as no refusals rather than as no recording.\",\n ],\n severityGuidance:\n \"A high-impact action reachable with no fresh proof is a MAJOR. A ceremony satisfiable by a credential minted for \"\n + \"another purpose is a MAJOR and is the objective's stated failure — it makes the re-proof a formality that any \"\n + \"live session already satisfies. A replayable proof is a MAJOR. A ceremony that accepts only ONE factor is a MAJOR \"\n + \"as an availability failure, and it is the one most likely to be argued down: the pressure it creates is to weaken \"\n + \"the control, not to fix the ceremony. A read-shaped operation carrying the inert flag is an OBSERVATION, and it is \"\n + \"worth reporting because it reads as coverage. C4 carries no severity — a framework gap, not an application's.\",\n limits:\n \"C2 and C3 attest the build driven, over the factors the test principal held — a factor kind nobody drove is \"\n + \"unevidenced in both directions. C1 evidences which actions were JUDGED high-impact, never that the judgement was \"\n + \"complete: an action that should carry the requirement and does not is invisible to every step here, because there \"\n + \"is no independent source that says which actions are high-impact.\",\n },\n};\n"]}