@wildo-ai/saas-specifications 1.1.15 → 1.1.17
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-open-items.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-open-items.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-open-items.js +2 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-open-items.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-validation.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-validation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-relationship-grouping.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-relationship-grouping.js +5 -2
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-relationship-grouping.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-generation.schemas.d.ts +251 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-generation.schemas.js +43 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph.schemas.d.ts +43 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph.schemas.js +58 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set-generation.schemas.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set-generation.schemas.js +5 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set-validation.js +2 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set-validation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set.schemas.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set.schemas.js +12 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan-output-set.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +19 -3
- package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.js +11 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.js +43 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method-derivation.d.ts +17 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method-derivation.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method-derivation.js +46 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method-derivation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method-generation.schemas.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method.family-aspects.js +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method.family-aspects.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method.schemas.d.ts +36 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method.schemas.js +49 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/service-method/service-method.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/utils/extract-field-specs.d.ts +4 -3
- package/dist/esm/_core/utils/extract-field-specs.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/utils/extract-field-specs.js +4 -3
- package/dist/esm/_core/utils/extract-field-specs.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +5 -4
- package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.js +5 -4
- package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.js +13 -5
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-objective-catalog.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-objective-catalog.definitions.js +9 -2
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-objective-catalog.definitions.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-verification-requirement-bodies.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-verification-requirement-bodies.definitions.js +8 -4
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-verification-requirement-bodies.definitions.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/signature-requests.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/signature-requests.resource.specification.js +8 -5
- package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/signature-requests.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-specifications.registry.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-specifications.registry.js +4 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-specifications.registry.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/actor-system-executions.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/actor-system-executions.resource.specification.js +4 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/actor-system-executions.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/actor-tasks.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/actor-tasks.resource.specification.js +3 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/actor-tasks.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/remote-agent-task-updates.resource.specification.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/remote-agent-task-updates.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/remote-agent-task-updates.resource.specification.js +98 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/remote-agent-task-updates.resource.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/remote-agent-tasks.resource.specification.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/remote-agent-tasks.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/remote-agent-tasks.resource.specification.js +132 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/remote-agent-tasks.resource.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/ai-elements/chat/ai-conversation-thread.frontend-component.specification.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/ai-elements/chat/ai-conversation-thread.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/app/app-layout-agent-activity-settings.frontend-component.specification.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/app/app-layout-agent-activity-settings.frontend-component.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/app/app-layout-agent-activity-settings.frontend-component.specification.js +79 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/app/app-layout-agent-activity-settings.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/app/app-layout-connected-accounts-settings.frontend-component.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/app/app-layout-connected-accounts-settings.frontend-component.specification.js +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/app/app-layout-connected-accounts-settings.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/approval-seal.frontend-component.specification.js +3 -3
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/approval-seal.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/signature-requests.frontend-component.specification.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/signature-requests.frontend-component.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/signature-requests.frontend-component.specification.js +29 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/signature-requests.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/flows-actors/low-level-ai-approval.frontend-component.specification.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/flows-actors/low-level-ai-approval.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/index.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/index.js +6 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/system-emails/delegated-work.system-emails.specification.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/system-emails/delegated-work.system-emails.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/system-emails/delegated-work.system-emails.specification.js +65 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/system-emails/delegated-work.system-emails.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/system-emails/index.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/system-emails/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/system-emails/index.js +3 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/system-emails/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.js +50 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-relationships.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-relationships.resource.specification.js +25 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-relationships.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/antigravity.provider.specification.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/antigravity.provider.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/antigravity.provider.specification.js +54 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/antigravity.provider.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/google-drive.provider.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/google-drive.provider.specification.js +8 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/google-drive.provider.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/index.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/index.js +5 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/microsoft-onedrive.provider.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/microsoft-onedrive.provider.specification.js +17 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/microsoft-onedrive.provider.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/outbound-bearer-token.provider.specification.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/outbound-bearer-token.provider.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/outbound-bearer-token.provider.specification.js +41 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/outbound-bearer-token.provider.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/twilio.provider.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/twilio.provider.specification.js +3 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/providers/twilio.provider.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +1 -1
- package/package.json +8 -8
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EACL,sBAAsB,EACtB,sBAAsB,EACtB,WAAW,EACX,aAAa,EACb,iCAAiC,EACjC,cAAc,EACd,UAAU,EACV,SAAS,EACT,uBAAuB,EACvB,mCAAmC,EACnC,yCAAyC,EACzC,qBAAqB,EACrB,6BAA6B,EAC7B,8BAA8B,EAC9B,kBAAkB,EAClB,cAAc,EACd,kBAAkB,EAClB,sBAAsB,EACtB,gBAAgB,EAChB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,uBAAuB,EACvB,iCAAiC,EACjC,oBAAoB,EACpB,wBAAwB,EACxB,SAAS,EACT,oCAAoC,EACpC,mCAAmC,EACnC,mCAAmC,EACnC,qBAAqB,EACrB,UAAU,EACV,4BAA4B,EAC5B,oCAAoC,EACpC,2BAA2B,EAC3B,uBAAuB,EACvB,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,qBAAqB,EACrB,yBAAyB,EACzB,2CAA2C,EAC3C,8BAA8B,EAC9B,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,8BAA8B,EAC9B,cAAc,EACd,6BAA6B,EAC7B,cAAc,EACd,kCAAkC,EAClC,+BAA+B,EAC/B,mBAAmB,EACnB,uCAAuC,EACvC,wBAAwB,EACxB,sCAAsC,EACtC,oBAAoB,EACpB,sCAAsC,EACtC,qCAAqC,EACrC,kBAAkB,EAClB,uCAAuC,EACvC,uCAAuC,EACvC,4BAA4B,EAC5B,yCAAyC,EACzC,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,iCAAiC,EACjC,yBAAyB,EACzB,kCAAkC,EAClC,gCAAgC,EAChC,oBAAoB,EACpB,qBAAqB,EACrB,UAAU,EACV,wBAAwB,EACxB,WAAW,EACX,oBAAoB,EACpB,+BAA+B,EAC/B,yCAAyC,EACzC,iCAAiC,EACjC,+BAA+B,EAC/B,mCAAmC,EACnC,2BAA2B,EAC3B,0BAA0B,EAC1B,iBAAiB,EACjB,cAAc,EACd,cAAc,EACd,4BAA4B,EAC5B,iCAAiC,EACjC,kCAAkC,EAClC,gCAAgC,EAChC,oBAAoB,EACpB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,iBAAiB,EACjB,yBAAyB,EACzB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,0BAA0B,EAC1B,6BAA6B,EAC7B,2BAA2B,EAC3B,yBAAyB,EACzB,+BAA+B,EAC/B,kBAAkB,EAClB,+BAA+B,EAC/B,eAAe,EACf,sBAAsB,EACtB,kBAAkB,EAClB,eAAe,EACf,qBAAqB,EACrB,6BAA6B,EAC7B,4BAA4B,EAC5B,sBAAsB,EACtB,oBAAoB,EACpB,4BAA4B,GAC7B,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,MAAM,sCAAsC,CAAC;AACrK,OAAO,EACL,qCAAqC,EACrC,iDAAiD,EACjD,uBAAuB,EACvB,0BAA0B,EAC1B,0BAA0B,EAC1B,8BAA8B,EAC9B,6BAA6B,EAC7B,4CAA4C,EAC5C,oCAAoC,GACrC,MAAM,sCAAsC,CAAC;AAE9C,OAAO,EACL,oCAAoC,EACpC,0CAA0C,GAE3C,MAAM,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAC7C,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,kFAAkF,CAAC;AAChH,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,8DAA8D,CAAC;AACtG,OAAO,EACL,8BAA8B,EAC9B,qCAAqC,EACrC,sCAAsC,GAGvC,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AACrC,OAAO,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,MAAM,qDAAqD,CAAC;AAC5G,OAAO,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,MAAM,yDAAyD,CAAC;AACpH,OAAO,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,MAAM,2CAA2C,CAAC;AAChG,OAAO,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,MAAM,yCAAyC,CAAC;AACzG,OAAO,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,MAAM,yCAAyC,CAAC;AAC5F,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AACjE,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAC3E,OAAO,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAEzE;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wDAAwD,GAAG,4EAA4E,CAAC;AACrJ;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sDAAsD,GAAG,0EAA0E,CAAC;AACjJ,8GAA8G;AAC9G,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uCAAuC,GAAG,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAE7F;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAU,CAAC;AACxH,mGAAmG;AACnG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAG,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAEnF,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,qCAAqC,GAAG,kDAAkD,CAAC;AACxG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgEG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,yCAAyC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAC3D;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAyBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,8DAA8D,GAAG;IAC5E,yDAAyD;IACzD,mEAAmE;IACnE,oDAAoD;IACpD,iDAAiD;IACjD,0DAA0D;IAC1D,uDAAuD;IACvD,2DAA2D;IAC3D,4DAA4D;CACpD,CAAC;AACX,kHAAkH;AAClH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,qDAAqD,GAAG,4DAA4D,CAAC;AAClI,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACzD,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,oCAAoC,CAAC;AACpE,MAAM,iDAAiD,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACrF,MAAM,kDAAkD,GAAG,qCAAqC,CAAC;AACjG;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,2BAA2B,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC/D,gMAAgM;AAChM,MAAM,yBAAyB,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC7D,oIAAoI;AACpI,MAAM,wCAAwC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC5E,yJAAyJ;AACzJ,MAAM,6CAA6C,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACjF;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,0CAA0C,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC9E,uIAAuI;AACvI,MAAM,oCAAoC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACxE,0HAA0H;AAC1H,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACtE,yIAAyI;AACzI,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACnE,2JAA2J;AAC3J,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACnE,wHAAwH;AACxH,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACpE,0IAA0I;AAC1I,MAAM,qCAAqC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACzE,6HAA6H;AAC7H,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC1E,yIAAyI;AACzI,MAAM,uCAAuC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAE3E;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAuBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wCAAwC,GAAG;IACtD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,uCAAuC,CAAC;QAC5F,sBAAsB,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACnF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,0DAA0D,CAAC;QAC3F,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,4BAA4B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACrF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACjE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACjF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;KAC3F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,4BAA4B,EAAE,gDAAgD;QAC9E,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,CAAC;QAC5D,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,8CAA8C;QAC1E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;KACpF;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,4BAA4B,EAAE,4CAA4C;QAC1E,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC;QACtD,sBAAsB,EAAE,gDAAgD;QACxE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;QACxF,0BAA0B,EAAE,0CAA0C;QACtE,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAAC;KAChF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAqBG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,4BAA4B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,uCAAuC,CAAC;QAC5F,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACrF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;KAC/F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAClF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,4CAA4C;QACpE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;QAC7E,0BAA0B,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC9E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;KACxF;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,4BAA4B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAC5E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;QACrF,0BAA0B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACnF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;KAC7F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,CAAC;QAClE,sBAAsB,EAAE,6CAA6C;QACrE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;QACrF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD,8GAA8G;IAC9G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3E,4BAA4B,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC5F,oHAAoH;QACpH,iHAAiH;QACjH,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC3E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;QACpF,0BAA0B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACxF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;KAClG;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,4BAA4B,EAAE,2EAA2E;QACzG,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,gEAAgE;QACxF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,gEAAgE,CAAC;QACjG,0BAA0B,EAAE,yEAAyE;QACrG,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,yEAAyE,CAAC;KAC/G;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,4BAA4B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAC9E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;QACvF,0BAA0B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACrF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;KAC/F;IACD,8GAA8G;IAC9G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,gEAAgE;QAC9F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD;QAChF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACzF,0BAA0B,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC1F,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,8DAA8D,CAAC;KACpG;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,sEAAsE;QACpG,gHAAgH;QAChH,iHAAiH;QACjH,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACxF,sBAAsB,EAAE,8CAA8C;QACtE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;QAC/E,0BAA0B,EAAE,oEAAoE;QAChG,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oEAAoE,CAAC;KAC1G;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,4BAA4B,EAAE,0DAA0D;QACxF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,2CAA2C,CAAC;QAChG,sBAAsB,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAC9E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;QACvF,0BAA0B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACpF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;KAC9F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,4BAA4B,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACjF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;QAC1F,0BAA0B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QACzF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,6DAA6D,CAAC;KACnG;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,4BAA4B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QAC1F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACjG,sBAAsB,EAAE,8DAA8D;QACtF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,8DAA8D,CAAC;QAC/F,0BAA0B,EAAE,0DAA0D;QACtF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,0DAA0D,CAAC;KAChG;IACD,mHAAmH;IACnH;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAiBG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,yCAAyC,CAAC;QAC9F,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE;YAC7B,oDAAoD;YACpD,iDAAiD;SAClD;QACD,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,4BAA4B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC/E,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,gDAAgD,CAAC;QAC1E,sBAAsB,EAAE,8CAA8C;QACtE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;QAC/E,0BAA0B,EAAE,+CAA+C;QAC3E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC;KACrF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,4BAA4B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC3F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,oCAAoC,CAAC;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,8DAA8D;QACtF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,8DAA8D,CAAC;QAC/F,0BAA0B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACvF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;KACjG;IACD,0GAA0G;IAC1G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,4BAA4B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACrF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC7D,sBAAsB,EAAE,+CAA+C;QACvE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC;QAChF,0BAA0B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACjF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;KAC3F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,4BAA4B,EAAE,oEAAoE;QAClG,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACnF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;QAC5F,0BAA0B,EAAE,kEAAkE;QAC9F,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,kEAAkE,CAAC;KACxG;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1E,4BAA4B,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACxG,sBAAsB,EAAE,+DAA+D;QACvF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+DAA+D,CAAC;QAChG,0BAA0B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QACzF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,6DAA6D,CAAC;KACnG;IACD,wGAAwG;IACxG;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,4BAA4B,EAAE,kEAAkE;QAChG,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,wCAAwC,CAAC;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,gEAAgE;QAC5F,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,gEAAgE,CAAC;KACtG;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF;;;;WAIG;QACH,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,gDAAgD,EAAE,6CAA6C,CAAC;QACzH,sBAAsB,EAAE,mEAAmE;QAC3F,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,EAAE,mEAAmE,CAAC;QAC/J,0BAA0B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC7E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;KACvF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,uBAAuB,CAAC;QACpH,sBAAsB,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC3E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,mDAAmD,CAAC;QAC9H,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChF,4BAA4B,EAAE,0DAA0D;QACxF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,oCAAoC,CAAC;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACjF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;QAC1F,0BAA0B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACpF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;KAC9F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC;QAC1F,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,wCAAwC,CAAC;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACjF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;QAC1F,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC;QAC/D,sBAAsB,EAAE,+CAA+C;QACvE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC;QAChF,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD,qGAAqG;IACrG;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC7D,sBAAsB,EAAE,qDAAqD;QAC7E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;QACtF,0BAA0B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC7E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;KACvF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,4BAA4B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACnF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;QAC5F,0BAA0B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACnF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;KAC7F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,4BAA4B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAClF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,2CAA2C;QACnE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,2CAA2C,CAAC;QAC5E,0BAA0B,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC9E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;KACxF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,4BAA4B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD;QAChF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACzF,0BAA0B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACnF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;KAC7F;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,4BAA4B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACrF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,2CAA2C,CAAC;QAChG,sBAAsB,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACpF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;QAC7F,0BAA0B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACjF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;KAC3F;IACD,qGAAqG;IACrG;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;QACxE,sBAAsB,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACnF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;QAC5F,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAkBG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,wCAAwC,CAAC;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,4BAA4B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACrF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACjE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACjF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;KAC3F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,4CAA4C,CAAC;QACjG,sBAAsB,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACpF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;QAC7F,0BAA0B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACnF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;KAC7F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,4BAA4B,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC5F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAAC;QACpE,sBAAsB,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAC9E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;QACvF,0BAA0B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACxF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;KAClG;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC;QAChE,sBAAsB,EAAE,qDAAqD;QAC7E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;QACtF,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACjE,sBAAsB,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACnF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;QAC5F,0BAA0B,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC3F,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,+DAA+D,CAAC;KACrG;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC5F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnG,sBAAsB,EAAE,+DAA+D;QACvF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+DAA+D,CAAC;QAChG,0BAA0B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACxF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;KAClG;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAClF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,qDAAqD;QAC7E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;QACtF,0BAA0B,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC9E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;KACxF;IACD;QACE;;;WAGG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yCAAyC,CAAC;QACnE,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD;QAChF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACzF,0BAA0B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACxF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;KAClG;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC3F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QACvE,sBAAsB,EAAE,uDAAuD;QAC/E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;QACxF,0BAA0B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACvF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;KACjG;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,4BAA4B,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAChF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC3E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;QACpF,0BAA0B,EAAE,gDAAgD;QAC5E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,gDAAgD,CAAC;KACtF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,8CAA8C;QAC5E,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,+CAA+C;QACvE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC;QAChF,0BAA0B,EAAE,4CAA4C;QACxE,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;KAClF;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7E,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC7D,sBAAsB,EAAE,6CAA6C;QACrE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QAC9E,0BAA0B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC7E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;KACvF;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACxF,sBAAsB,EAAE,6CAA6C;QACrE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QAC9E,0BAA0B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC7E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;KACvF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,4BAA4B,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,8CAA8C,CAAC;QACnG,sBAAsB,EAAE,+DAA+D;QACvF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+DAA+D,CAAC;QAChG,0BAA0B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QACzF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,6DAA6D,CAAC;KACnG;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,+CAA+C;QACvE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC;QAChF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,4CAA4C;QACpE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;QAC7E,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,4CAA4C;QACpE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;QAC7E,0BAA0B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC7E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;KACvF;IACD,sGAAsG;IACtG;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,yCAAyC,CAAC;QAC7G,sBAAsB,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACpF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;QAC7F,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC3F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,yCAAyC,CAAC;QAC7G,sBAAsB,EAAE,iEAAiE;QACzF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iEAAiE,CAAC;QAClG,0BAA0B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACvF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;KACjG;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,4BAA4B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC;QACpH,sBAAsB,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC3E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;QACpF,0BAA0B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACrF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;KAC/F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACjE,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD,2GAA2G;IAC3G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,4BAA4B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;QACtE,sBAAsB,EAAE,qDAAqD;QAC7E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;QACtF,0BAA0B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACnF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;KAC7F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QACvE,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,4BAA4B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACrF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACxM,sBAAsB,EAAE,qDAAqD;QAC7E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;QACtF,0BAA0B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACjF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;KAC3F;IACD,4GAA4G;IAC5G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QACvE,sBAAsB,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAC9E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;QACvF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAAC;QACpE,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD,6GAA6G;IAC7G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,gDAAgD;QAC9E,gHAAgH;QAChH,8GAA8G;QAC9G,8GAA8G;QAC9G,sCAAsC;QACtC,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,EAAE,mCAAmC,CAAC;QACnH,sBAAsB,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAC5E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;QACrF,0BAA0B,EAAE,8CAA8C;QAC1E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;KACpF;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QAC1F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC7D,sBAAsB,EAAE,gDAAgD;QACxE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,gDAAgD,CAAC;QACjF,0BAA0B,EAAE,0DAA0D;QACtF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,0DAA0D,CAAC;KAChG;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,sCAAsC,CAAC;QAC3F,sBAAsB,EAAE,uDAAuD;QAC/E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;QACxF,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC7D,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC;QAChE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,CAAC;QAClE,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD;QAChF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACzF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAgBG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,8CAA8C;QACtE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;QAC/E,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAiBG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,sEAAsE;QACpG,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yCAAyC,CAAC;QACnE,sBAAsB,EAAE,gEAAgE;QACxF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,gEAAgE,EAAE,yDAAyD,CAAC;QAC5J,0BAA0B,EAAE,oEAAoE;QAChG,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oEAAoE,CAAC;KAC1G;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QAC1F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD;QAChF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACzF,0BAA0B,EAAE,0DAA0D;QACtF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,0DAA0D,CAAC;KAChG;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAClF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC;QAChE,sBAAsB,EAAE,6CAA6C;QACrE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QAC9E,0BAA0B,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC9E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;KACxF;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC;QAChE,sBAAsB,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACpF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;QAC7F,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC3F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QACvE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACvF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;KACjG;CACO,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAAgD;IACjG,+FAA+F;IAC/F,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IAC3B,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IACvB,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IAC1B,2FAA2F;IAC3F,+FAA+F;IAC/F,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IAClC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IAC3B,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IACrC,2EAA2E;IAC3E,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAG;IAC1C,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,mBAAmB;IAC5D,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,mBAAmB;CAC9D,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAuBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,4BAA4B,GAAG,CAAC,UAAmC,EAAY,EAAE,CAC5F,SAAS,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE;KAC/B,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC;KACjF,IAAI,EAAE;KACN,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAE9C,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG;IAC9C;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAyBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7F,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAwBG;QACH,kHAAkH;QAClH,4FAA4F;QAC5F,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACpH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAClG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;WAUG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAC7I,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,2BAA2B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iCAAiC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAChI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAChH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oCAAoC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;SAC3H,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACzH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oCAAoC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC5H,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;SAC1H,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAClH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;QACtF,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACpH,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR;gBACE,UAAU,EAAE,yDAAyD;gBACrE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;aAC/G;SACF;QACD,4BAA4B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACxF,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,8BAA8B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;SAC1G;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WA0BG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,+BAA+B,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kCAAkC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACxH,uCAAuC,gCAAgC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE;SACtF,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3F,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACzD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;KACtI;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3D,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,mBAAmB,EAAE;KACtJ;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;QAC9H,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;WAUG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,oBAAoB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,4BAA4B,oBAAoB,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QACtJ,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAcG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACzF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SAC7F,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,gDAAgD,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,+BAA+B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;QACpI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,cAAc,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,EAAE,oBAAoB,cAAc,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QACjI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAuBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD;;;;WAIG;QACH,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;YAC3G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SACjG;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mDAAmD,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,uCAAuC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yCAAyC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1I,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,+FAA+F;QAC/F,iGAAiG;QACjG,gGAAgG;QAChG,4FAA4F;QAC5F,iGAAiG;QACjG,mEAAmE;QACnE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACvG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACnH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;QAC9H,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAqBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1E,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qBAAqB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAChF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qBAAqB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAChF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACnF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SAC1G,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAyBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mBAAmB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACvG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAcG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,gBAAgB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7F,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,kBAAkB,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QAClI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACrI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YACnI,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SACnI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;aACzD,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,OAAO,IAAI,yCAAyC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACjI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QACtH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAClH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACzG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SAC5G;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qBAAqB,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7G,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACtG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/E,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SACjF;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,2GAA2G;QAC3G,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACrG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SACpG;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,0HAA0H;QAC1H,oHAAoH;QACpH,kFAAkF;QAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,qFAAqF;YACrF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7G,wBAAwB,mBAAmB,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE;YAC1D,wBAAwB,mBAAmB,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE;YAC5D,wBAAwB,mBAAmB,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAChE,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;SACjG;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;WAUG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,6BAA6B,mCAAmC,EAAE;YAClE,6BAA6B,2BAA2B,EAAE;YAC1D,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,4BAA4B,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACjH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAChF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1H,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kCAAkC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3I,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACpI,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,8BAA8B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3G,kHAAkH;YAClH,qGAAqG;YACrG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,8BAA8B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;SAC1G,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAgBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACxG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;SAC7F,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,2BAA2B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,2BAA2B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,gCAAgC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACrG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iCAAiC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACzG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;SACrH,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,uBAAuB,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9E,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YACtG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YAChH,GAAG,8BAA8B,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,gCAAgC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SACxF,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,gDAAgD,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,2CAA2C,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QAClJ,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACpH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACvI,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;SAChH;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3J,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3H,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YACxG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,+BAA+B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SACrH;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAChF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SAChG;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yCAAyC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YACvH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACxG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SAChH,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAChG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SAClH,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7F,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;QACpI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,8BAA8B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1H,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD;;;;;WAKG;QACH,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACtI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,kCAAkC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACrH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACpI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/G,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mBAAmB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACnG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAmBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACjG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,oDAAoD,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACvI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACtG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAcG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,gCAAgC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YACtE,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;SACxE,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAcG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACrI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yCAAyC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAC1I,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yDAAyD,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5G,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACrH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yCAAyC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,gDAAgD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;SAC9I,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;KAC1I;IACD;QACE;;;WAGG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACnH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;KAC1I;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;YAClG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;SACxH,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YACpH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oCAAoC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;SAC1G,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;CACO,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,CAAI,MAAoB,EAAE,QAA8B,EAAO,EAAE,CAC3F,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAExH;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAM,mCAAmC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACvE,+FAA+F;AAC/F,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACrE,2GAA2G;AAC3G,MAAM,qCAAqC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACzE,iDAAiD;AACjD,MAAM,yCAAyC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC7E,+DAA+D;AAC/D,MAAM,iDAAiD,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACrF,gHAAgH;AAChH,MAAM,mCAAmC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAevE,kEAAkE;AAClE,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAqC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,sCAAsC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AAEnH;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,CAAC,SAAiB,EAAoC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,sCAAsC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAExJ;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAAiC;IAC3E,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,gFAAgF,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAChL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,6EAA6E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAC/K,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,sEAAsE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACzL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,gFAAgF,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACxL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,yEAAyE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAClL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,6EAA6E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACvL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,yEAAyE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACxL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACzL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,+EAA+E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAC3L,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,2FAA2F,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACzM,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,8EAA8E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACvL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACtL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,yEAAyE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACjL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,+EAA+E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACzL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,4EAA4E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAClL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,sEAAsE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAC1L,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,4EAA4E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACjL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,mFAAmF,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAClM,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,sEAAsE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAC3K,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAChL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,iFAAiF,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAC/L,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,2EAA2E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;CACxL,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,MAAM,uCAAuC,GAAiC;IAC5E;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC/E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,mIAAmI;cAC/H,6IAA6I;cAC7I,kIAAkI,CACvI;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACxE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,2IAA2I;cAC3I,mHAAmH,CACxH;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACtE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,6IAA6I;cAC7I,WAAW,CAChB;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;QAChF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,6FAA6F,CAClG;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACzE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;cACrI,sIAAsI;cACtI,gGAAgG,CACrG;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC7E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;cACjI,kIAAkI;cAClI,aAAa,CAClB;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC7E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;cACpI,uIAAuI;cACvI,aAAa,CAClB;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8BG;AACH,MAAM,2BAA2B,GAAiC;IAChE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;QAC1E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;KACzB;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,yEAAyE;QACzF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,6HAA6H;cAC7H,0CAA0C,CAC/C;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACxE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,0IAA0I;cAC1I,SAAS,CACd;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,wEAAwE;QACxF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,6IAA6I;cAC7I,qBAAqB,CAC1B;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;QACjF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,wIAAwI;cACxI,yBAAyB,CAC9B;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,oDAAoD;QACpE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;cACpI,wIAAwI;cACxI,qCAAqC,CAC1C;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,sEAAsE;QACtF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,mIAAmI,CACxI;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;QACrF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;cACpI,0IAA0I;cAC1I,sCAAsC,CAC3C;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,4DAA4D;QAC5E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,oIAAoI;cACpI,oCAAoC,CACzC;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAiC;IACrD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;QACrF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,oHAAoH,CACzH;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,mCAAmC,GAAiC;IACxE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,8EAA8E;QAC9F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,2IAA2I;cAC3I,wCAAwC,CAC7C;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAiC;IACrE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;QACrF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;cAChI,6IAA6I;cAC7I,6BAA6B,CAClC;KACF;IACD,yHAAyH;IACzH;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACtE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,uDAAuD,CAC5D;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAiC;IACrE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,2EAA2E;QAC3F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,uFAAuF,CAC5F;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAiC;IACtE,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,uFAAuF,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;CACtM,CAAC;AAEF,8CAA8C;AAC9C,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAE1E,kDAAkD;AAClD,MAAM,uCAAuC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAE3E,kDAAkD;AAClD,MAAM,wCAAwC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAE5E,4CAA4C;AAC5C,MAAM,oCAAoC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAExE;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAiC;IACtE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;QACjF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,6HAA6H;cAC7H,gIAAgI;cAChI,uCAAuC,CAC5C;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF,qDAAqD;AACrD,MAAM,6CAA6C,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAEjF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiBG;AACH,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAiC;IACvE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,yEAAyE;QACzF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,mIAAmI;cAC/H,+HAA+H;cAC/H,oHAAoH;cACpH,4IAA4I;cAC5I,0FAA0F,CAC/F;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAoBG;AACH,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAiC;IACvE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE;QACvF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,yCAAyC,CAC9C;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;QACnF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,kCAAkC,CACvC;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qFAAqF;QACrG,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,0FAA0F,CAC/F;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAiC;IACtE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC/E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,0HAA0H,CAC/H;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE;QACvF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,0IAA0I;cAC1I,kBAAkB,CACvB;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AACH,MAAM,oCAAoC,GAAiC;IACzE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC7E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,2IAA2I;cAC3I,2IAA2I;cAC3I,KAAK,CACV;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;QACnF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,qFAAqF,CAC1F;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;QACjF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,kHAAkH,CACvH;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAiC;IACvD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC9E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;cACpI,oGAAoG,CACzG;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAiC;IAC3D,oHAAoH;IACpH,8DAA8D;IAC9D;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,iFAAiF;QACjG,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,2HAA2H,CAChI;KACF;IACD,2FAA2F;IAC3F;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;QAClF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;cACjI,yHAAyH,CAC9H;KACF;IACD,oFAAoF;IACpF;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;QACpF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,kDAAkD,CACvD;KACF;IACD,wGAAwG;IACxG;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,2EAA2E;QAC3F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,oFAAoF,CACzF;KACF;IACD,kHAAkH;IAClH,6CAA6C;IAC7C;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,sFAAsF;QACtG,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,sJAAsJ;cACtJ,kIAAkI;cAClI,mFAAmF,CACxF;KACF;IACD,mHAAmH;IACnH,wHAAwH;IACxH,uCAAuC;IACvC;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,0EAA0E;QAC1F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;cAChI,2IAA2I;cAC3I,yBAAyB,CAC9B;KACF;IACD,qHAAqH;IACrH,uHAAuH;IACvH,sHAAsH;IACtH,uHAAuH;IACvH,mHAAmH;IACnH,uEAAuE;IACvE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,uFAAuF;QACvG,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;cACrI,0OAA0O;cAC1O,6FAA6F,CAClG;KACF;IACD,sHAAsH;IACtH,uFAAuF;IACvF;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;QAC1E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;cACrI,sIAAsI;cACtI,wHAAwH;cACxH,+HAA+H;cAC/H,mMAAmM;cACnM,qIAAqI;cACrI,8CAA8C,CACnD;KACF;IACD,qHAAqH;IACrH,mGAAmG;IACnG;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;QAC1E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;cACrI,mGAAmG,CACxG;KACF;IACD,2HAA2H;IAC3H,wHAAwH;IACxH,mEAAmE;IACnE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,4EAA4E;QAC5F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,kHAAkH,CACvH;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAM,eAAe,GAAiC;IACpD,wEAAwE;IACxE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAClE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;cACpI,8CAA8C,CACnD;KACF;IACD,2EAA2E;IAC3E;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACrE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,mFAAmF,CACxF;KACF;IACD,0HAA0H;IAC1H,iCAAiC;IACjC;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,0EAA0E;QAC1F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,kIAAkI;cAC9H,4CAA4C,CACjD;KACF;IACD,oEAAoE;IACpE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC/E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;cACjI,8FAA8F,CACnG;KACF;IACD,8GAA8G;IAC9G;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,sEAAsE;QACtF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;KACzB;IACD,yHAAyH;IACzH,6BAA6B;IAC7B;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC9E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,4CAA4C,CACjD;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAiC;IACvD,2FAA2F;IAC3F;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,6EAA6E;QAC7F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,uFAAuF,CAC5F;KACF;IACD,yHAAyH;IACzH,kGAAkG;IAClG;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;QAClF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;cACjI,6IAA6I;cAC7I,oCAAoC,CACzC;KACF;IACD,2FAA2F;IAC3F;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;QACpF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;KACzB;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,MAAM,cAAc,GAAiC;IACnD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;QACjF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;cAChI,4IAA4I;cAC5I,oFAAoF,CACzF;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC7E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,wGAAwG,CAC7G;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAM,YAAY,GAAiC;IACjD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC9E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,uHAAuH,CAC5H;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,MAAM,gDAAgD,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAEpF,MAAM,cAAc,GAAiC;IACnD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACvE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,4IAA4I;cAC5I,wHAAwH,CAC7H;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACnE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,qHAAqH,CAC1H;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAiC;IACrE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;QAC3E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,0IAA0I;cAC1I,wBAAwB,CAC7B;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;QAClF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,6HAA6H,CAClI;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAiC;IAC1D;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACrE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,2IAA2I;cAC3I,QAAQ,CACb;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAiC;IAC3D,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;CACtL,CAAC;AAEF,iHAAiH;AACjH,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,CAAC,SAAiB,EAAE,gBAAwB,EAAE,IAAkC,EAAE,aAAqB,mCAAmC,EAAE,EAAE,CACvK,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACjB,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;IACvC,cAAc,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,cAAc;IAClC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;IACrB,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS;IACxB,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM;IAClB,gBAAgB;IAChB,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;IACrC,UAAU;CACX,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAcN;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,kDAAkD;IAChE,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAoD;QAC9D;YACE;;;;eAIG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;YAC1E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,+GAA+G,CACpH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAoBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;YACpF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACjF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;kBACjI,iIAAiI;kBACjI,oFAAoF,CACzF;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;YAC7E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACjF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,qIAAqI;kBACrI,wBAAwB,CAC7B;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,0EAA0E;YAC1F,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACjF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,kIAAkI;kBAClI,sHAAsH,CAC3H;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACpE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,mIAAmI;kBACnI,qIAAqI,CAC1I;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,qDAAqD;YACrE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;kBACjI,kIAAkI;kBAClI,0BAA0B,CAC/B;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,iDAAiD;SAC9D;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,kDAAkD;YAClE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,qIAAqI;kBACrI,uIAAuI;kBACvI,aAAa,CAClB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,iDAAiD;YACjE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACjF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,sGAAsG,CAC3G;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,2BAA2B;SACxC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;YAC3E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,mIAAmI,CACxI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,sCAAsC;YACxD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,2BAA2B;SACxC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;YAC1E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,gIAAgI;kBAChI,qCAAqC,CAC1C;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,2BAA2B;SACxC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;YAC3E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;kBACjI,qIAAqI;kBACrI,wEAAwE,CAC7E;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACnF,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,2BAA2B;SACxC;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAmBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;YAC9E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC3E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,0HAA0H,CAC/H;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,yBAAyB;SACtC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,sDAAsD;YACtE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC3E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,sIAAsI;kBACtI,kIAAkI,CACvI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,yBAAyB;SACtC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;YAChF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,mIAAmI;kBACnI,gCAAgC,CACrC;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,yBAAyB;SACtC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;YACrF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,mIAAmI;kBAC/H,mHAAmH,CACxH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,yBAAyB;SACtC;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAoBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;YAC/E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,mDAAmD,CACxD;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,wCAAwC;SACrD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;YAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACvF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,kIAAkI;kBAClI,cAAc,CACnB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,wCAAwC;SACrD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,uDAAuD;YACvE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACvF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,mEAAmE,CACxE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,wCAAwC;SACrD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;YAC/E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC1F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,kIAAkI;kBAClI,2FAA2F,CAChG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,wCAAwC;SACrD;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAkBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;YAChF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAChF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,oIAAoI;kBACpI,gBAAgB,CACrB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,6CAA6C;SAC1D;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACjF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAChF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,gIAAgI;kBAC5H,mIAAmI;kBACnI,6DAA6D,CAClE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,6CAA6C;SAC1D;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;YAC7E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,qEAAqE,CAC1E;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,6CAA6C;SAC1D;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACpE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,8HAA8H;kBAC1H,sIAAsI;kBACtI,2HAA2H,CAChI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,6CAA6C;SAC1D;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;YACpF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC1F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,sIAAsI;kBACtI,0FAA0F,CAC/F;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,6CAA6C;SAC1D;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAmBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACjF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,oHAAoH,CACzH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,oCAAoC;SACjD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE;YACvF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACxB,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,oCAAoC;SACjD;QACD;YACE;;;;eAIG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACjF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,+HAA+H;kBAC/H,iHAAiH,CACtH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;YAChF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,oIAAoI;kBACpI,qGAAqG,CAC1G;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;YACnF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,iIAAiI;kBACjI,uFAAuF,CAC5F;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;eAkBG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;YACrF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,kIAAkI;kBAClI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,kDAAkD,CACvD;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;YACnF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,qIAAqI;kBACrI,2FAA2F,CAChG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE;;;;eAIG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;YACrF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,iIAAiI;kBACjI,uIAAuI;kBACvI,MAAM,CACX;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;YAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,mIAAmI,CACxI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,oCAAoC;SACjD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;YACpF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC1E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,gGAAgG,CACrG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,oCAAoC;SACjD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;YAC9E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC1E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,uFAAuF,CAC5F;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,oCAAoC;SACjD;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAmBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;YAC1E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,yHAAyH,CAC9H;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,kCAAkC;SAC/C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;YAChF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,sCAAsC,CAC3C;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,kCAAkC;SAC/C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,2CAA2C;YAC3D,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,wDAAwD,CAC7D;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,kCAAkC;SAC/C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,4CAA4C;YAC5D,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,iIAAiI,CACtI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,kCAAkC;SAC/C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,iDAAiD;YACjE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAChF,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACxB,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,kCAAkC;SAC/C;QACD;;;;;WAKG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,kDAAkD;YAClE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,sIAAsI;kBACtI,8DAA8D,CACnE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAcG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;YAC1E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,kIAAkI;kBAC9H,uHAAuH,CAC5H;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;YACpF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,mIAAmI;kBACnI,uCAAuC,CAC5C;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;YACnF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;kBACjI,uIAAuI;kBACvI,+DAA+D,CACpE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;YAC7E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACxB,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;YACpF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,oEAAoE,CACzE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAiCG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;YAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,sIAAsI;kBACtI,8EAA8E,CACnF;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;YAC/E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACtF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,wGAAwG,CAC7G;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;YAC1E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,sIAAsI;kBACtI,cAAc,CACnB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,8CAA8C;YAC9D,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,mIAAmI;kBACnI,2HAA2H,CAChI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACjF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,iGAAiG,CACtG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAChE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,kGAAkG,CACvG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;YAC7E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,mGAAmG,CACxG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;YAC9E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,oIAAoI;kBACpI,gHAAgH,CACrH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAqBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;YACrF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,mIAAmI,CACxI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;SAC7C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;YAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,wCAAwC,CAC7C;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;SAC7C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,yDAAyD;YACzE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,kIAAkI;kBAC9H,kIAAkI,CACvI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;SAC7C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;YAChF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,uIAAuI;kBACvI,aAAa,CAClB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;SAC7C;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,yDAAyD;YACzE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,gBAAgB,CACrB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qCAAqC;SAClD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;YACnF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACtF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,kIAAkI;kBAC9H,qIAAqI;kBACrI,iCAAiC,CACtC;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qCAAqC;SAClD;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;YACnF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,wHAAwH,CAC7H;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,sCAAsC;SACnD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE;YACvF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC1F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,qIAAqI;kBACrI,gEAAgE,CACrE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,sCAAsC;SACnD;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAsBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;YAC3E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,iHAAiH,CACtH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;YAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,6DAA6D,CAClE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;YAC3E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,6EAA6E,CAClF;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD;YACE;;;;;;eAMG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,+EAA+E;YAC/F,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,gGAAgG,CACrG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD;YACE;;;;;eAKG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACjF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,8EAA8E,CACnF;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD;YACE;;;;;eAKG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;YAC3E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5F,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACxB,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,6BAA6B,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACzI,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC;QACrI,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,+CAA+C,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,gDAAgD,CAAC;QACnK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gDAAgD,CAAC;QAC5L,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,2CAA2C,EAAE,oDAAoD,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,gDAAgD,CAAC;QACjM,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,iCAAiC,CAAC;QAC7I,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,yCAAyC,CAAC;QACxK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAC7K,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,oCAAoC,CAAC;QACjK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACpK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,wCAAwC,CAAC;QACtK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,2CAA2C,EAAE,oDAAoD,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAC7M,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,sCAAsC,CAAC;QACxK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC;QACjJ,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,CAAC;QACxJ,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,mCAAmC,CAAC;QACtI,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,6CAA6C,CAAC;QAC5J,GAAG,kBAAkB,CACnB,8CAA8C,EAC9C,6HAA6H,EAC7H,eAAe,EACf,mCAAmC,CACpC;QACD,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,4BAA4B,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC1J,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,4BAA4B,EAAE,gDAAgD,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,mCAAmC,CAAC;KAC7J,CAAC;IACF,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;QACZ,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC,sCAAsC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,mCAAmC,CAAC;QACnH,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,gDAAgD,CAAC;QAChH,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC,iCAAiC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,iDAAiD,CAAC;KAC7H,CAAC;IACF,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5J,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,SAAS,yBAAyB,CAChC,KAAmC,EACnC,QAAkE,EAClE,UAAkB;IAElB,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QACxB,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc;QACnC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;QACrB,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS;QACzB,MAAM,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;QACnD,gBAAgB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACnE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;QACrC,UAAU;KACb,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACN,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,gCAAgC,CAAC,SAGhD;IACC,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,wCAAwC,CAAC,IAAI,CAC3D,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAClJ,CAAC;IACF,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO;QAAE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,2CAA2C,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9J,OAAO,aAAa,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,KAAK,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QAC7G,CAAC,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACtD,CAAC,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC;AACzE,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,+DAA+D,CAC7E,OAAiE,kDAAkD,EAAE;IAErH,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5H,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,wCAAwC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE;QAC5E,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;QACtF,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,gCAAgC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;QAClI,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI,qBAAqB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;YAAE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,4EAA4E,CAAC,CAAC;QAChJ,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;YAClD,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,yIAAyI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3J,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACZ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACH,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC;QAAE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,yFAAyF,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5J,CAAC;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,2CAA2C,CAAC,KAE3D;IACC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,8CAA8C,EAAE,CAAC;IAClF,MAAM,4BAA4B,GAAG,kDAAkD,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1F,+DAA+D,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9F,MAAM,8BAA8B,GAAG;QACrC,iBAAiB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,iBAAiB;KAClE,CAAC;IACF,OAAO,oCAAoC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;QAChD,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QAChB,QAAQ,EAAE,qCAAqC;QAC/C,YAAY,EAAE,yCAAyC;QACvD,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;QACxD,cAAc,EAAE,iCAAiC;QACjD,wBAAwB;QACxB,gBAAgB,EAAE,mCAAmC;QACrD,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,sBAAsB;QACpD,8BAA8B,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,gCAAgC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACnM,SAAS,EAAE;gBACT,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;gBAC5B,cAAc,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,cAAc;gBACxC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC;gBACrD,sBAAsB,EAAE,8BAA8B;gBACtD,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;gBAC3L,4BAA4B,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC;aAC1E;YACD,YAAY;SACb,CAAC,CAAC;QACH,4BAA4B;QAC5B,oCAAoC,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,4BAA4B,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YAClK,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,4BAA4B,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS;YAC5B,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC;SAC5D,CAAC,CAAC;QACH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAkBG;QACH,8BAA8B,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,sBAAsB,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACtJ,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS;YAC5B,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC;YACzE,iBAAiB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE;gBAC9E,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;gBACnE,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;oBACV,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,gDAAgD,cAAc,iBAAiB,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;gBACrI,CAAC;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAClC,CAAC,CAAC;SACH,CAAC,CAAC;QACH;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,kCAAkC,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,0BAA0B,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YAC9J,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACvF,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS;YAC5B,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC;YACjF,iBAAiB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE;gBACtF,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,yCAAyC,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;gBACvE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAChD,CAAC,CAAC;SACH,CAAC,CAAC;KACJ,CAAC,CAAC;AACL,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import {\n AI_ENGINE_CAPABILITIES,\n AiUseDeclarationSource,\n AiUseDomain,\n AiUseRiskTier,\n AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode,\n AuditActorKind,\n AuthMethod,\n AuthUtils,\n DecisionStepUpProofKind,\n BillingReconciliationDivergenceKind,\n BillingReconciliationUncomparedPopulation,\n ClientInstanceIdScope,\n ConfigurationValidationDomain,\n DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES,\n ConsentGateRefusal,\n ConsentPurpose,\n DataRetentionClass,\n CoreAuditableEventType,\n EngineCapability,\n EngineCapabilityResolutionMode,\n ProcessingRegionHolding,\n ProviderProcessingRegionReachKind,\n ErasureRetentionMode,\n StatutoryRetentionGround,\n ErrorType,\n EvaluationDatasetExportRefusalReason,\n EvaluationDatasetInvalidationReason,\n EvaluationExportAuthorizationStatus,\n EvaluationExportBasis,\n FileStatus,\n GovernedDocumentApprovalGate,\n GovernedDocumentReleaseApprovalState,\n HumanDecision_RefusalReason,\n HumanDecision_RouteKind,\n HumanDecision_Plane,\n AiDecisionConsequence,\n AutonomousTurnTrigger,\n FunctionToolAuthorityKind,\n FLOWS_ACTORS_PERSONAL_DATA_MODEL_TREATMENTS,\n InboundDeliveryRejectionReason,\n CryptoKey_Purpose,\n JwtPublicKeys,\n ExecutionContext_ExecutionType,\n LifecycleStage,\n OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin,\n OAuthGrantType,\n OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES,\n OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission,\n OutboundTargetClass,\n ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY,\n OrganizationMemberStatus,\n PlatformAccessGrantLifecycleTransition,\n PersonalDataCategory,\n ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema,\n OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind,\n PersistenceAdapter,\n ResourceOperationImplementationCoverage,\n ResourceOperationRequestContractBreadth,\n ResourceOperationVariantType,\n PERSISTENCE_ADAPTER_TRANSACTION_OWNERSHIP,\n ResourcePrimaryScope,\n RetentionStatus,\n RuntimePrincipalDatabaseGrantAxis,\n SubjectErasureDisposition,\n SubjectErasureExternalEffectStatus,\n ProviderCredentialDeletionReason,\n SubjectExportPurpose,\n UsageRecordFlushState,\n UserStatus,\n ApplicationRiskSignalRef,\n LawfulBasis,\n RiskTreatmentPosture,\n FlowsActors_ModeratedOutputKind,\n FlowsActors_PromptInjectionScreeningScope,\n FlowsActors_ScreenedContentSource,\n ProviderComplianceDetermination,\n A2A_PERSON_TOKEN_CEILING_FEATURE_ID,\n A2A_TOKEN_BUDGET_FEATURE_ID,\n A2ATokenBudgetDenialReason,\n TokenSpendCeiling,\n ModelSpendDoor,\n ModelUsageUnit,\n modelUsageCeilingFeatureIdOf,\n modelSpendDoorAdmitsEachModelCall,\n modelSpendDoorChargesPersonCeiling,\n modelSpendDoorChargesTokenBudget,\n FeatureLimitSemantic,\n AGENT_INVOCATION_FAILURE_CODES,\n AgentOperationEnd,\n FlowsActors_ToolCallPhase,\n AgentBehaviorReportCategory,\n AgentBehaviorReportOutcome,\n AgentBehaviorReportRemedyKind,\n AgentBehaviorReportSeverity,\n AgentBehaviorReportStatus,\n AgentBehaviorReports_Operations,\n LegalHoldErrorCode,\n LegalHoldSubjectAttributionKind,\n LegalHoldGround,\n LegalHoldPlacementTier,\n LegalHoldScopeKind,\n LegalHoldStatus,\n LegalHolds_Operations,\n ExternalTurnRatePrincipalKind,\n DeclaredRateLimitSubjectKind,\n OperationDispatchPlane,\n AgentSuspensionScope,\n AgentSuspensionRefusalReason,\n} from \"@wildo-ai/saas-models\";\nimport { MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceScreeningOutcome, MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceTrust, ResearchProvenanceCatalogReading } from \"@wildo-ai/saas-models/meta-workflows\";\nimport {\n AgentClientProtocol_PermissionCeiling,\n AgentClientProtocol_PermissionEscalationBehaviour,\n APPLICATION_ENVIRONMENT,\n ContentSafety_HarmCategory,\n ContentSafety_HarmSeverity,\n ContentSafetyModerationOutcome,\n ContentSafetyScreeningOutcome,\n ExternalProvider_ModuleOwnedConfigurationKey,\n ProviderConfigurationCredentialField,\n} from \"@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models\";\n\nimport {\n AssuranceProgramAuthorityBasisSchema,\n AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind,\n type AssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis,\n} from \"./assurance-authority-basis.schemas\";\nimport { AcceptOrigin } from \"../application-creation/accepted-change-attribution.application-creation.schemas\";\nimport { Journey_AutonomyPreset } from \"../application-creation/journey.application-creation.schemas\";\nimport {\n AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind,\n AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis,\n AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswerExtent,\n type AssuranceProgramSourceRevision,\n type AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswer,\n} from \"./assurance-program.schemas\";\nimport { ASSURANCE_EVIDENCE_REQUIREMENT_BODIES } from \"./assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions\";\nimport { ASSURANCE_VERIFICATION_REQUIREMENT_BODIES } from \"./assurance-verification-requirement-bodies.definitions\";\nimport { INITIAL_ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_CATALOG } from \"./assurance-objective-catalog.definitions\";\nimport { createInitialAssuranceDocumentAuthorityCatalog } from \"./assurance-document-system.definitions\";\nimport { INITIAL_ASSURANCE_SOURCE_REGISTRY } from \"./assurance-source-registry.definitions\";\nimport { AssuranceSourceUse } from \"./assurance-sources.schemas\";\nimport { resolveAssessmentTwinAnswer } from \"./assurance-assessment-twins\";\nimport { APPLICATION_SIGNING_KEY_PURPOSES } from '@wildo-ai/saas-models';\n\n/**\n * The application's subject-data-export configuration, supplied by the host when authorities are composed, which\n * `capability:subject-data-export` requires. DERIVED, never authored: `deriveSubjectDataExportConfigurationArtifact`\n * (`assurance-host-implementation-artifacts.ts`, #2993) reads it off the resource configurations the application registers.\n */\nexport const SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_HOST_CONFIGURATION_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF = \"implementation-artifact-kind:application.subject-data-export-configuration\";\n/**\n * The review OCCURRENCE record — who reviewed the privileged-access population, when, and what they\n * concluded — supplied by the application as a host artifact (#202).\n *\n * A host artifact rather than something the engine records, because Wildo cannot witness a human\n * review. It can enumerate WHO holds privileged access\n * (`privileged-access-review.backend.utils.ts`); it cannot know that a person looked at that list,\n * nor what they decided. A framework that wrote a review record would be asserting a decision nobody\n * made — the same line the governed-document fact families draw between a derivation and a decision.\n *\n * Note the objective's own caveat, which this ref must not be read as escaping: the record is\n * retained as traceable evidence WITHOUT implying remediation completion. It proves a review\n * happened, never that what it found was fixed.\n */\nexport const PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_HOST_RECORD_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF = \"implementation-artifact-kind:application.privileged-access-review-record\";\n/** Stable semantic capability identity for the review the engine ENUMERATES for and the operator PERFORMS. */\nexport const PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF = \"capability:privileged-access-review\";\n\n/*\n * The scopes at which the engine can enumerate privileged access, DERIVED from the runtime vocabulary\n * it actually branches on rather than transcribed.\n *\n * A deliberate SUBSET of `ResourcePrimaryScope`, and the subset is the honest part: `USER_SELF` and\n * `ANONYMOUS` confer no privileged access, so claiming them would widen the capability to two scopes\n * the enumeration does not — and could not — cover. Written as enum MEMBERS so a rename moves it,\n * which is what the anchoring rule asks for; what it does not ask for is claiming every member of an\n * enum merely because it is closed.\n */\nconst PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_SCOPES = [ResourcePrimaryScope.APPLICATION, ResourcePrimaryScope.ORGANIZATIONS] as const;\n/** Stable semantic capability identity used by host composition to derive only selected proofs. */\nexport const SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF = \"capability:subject-data-export\";\n\nexport const INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_REF = \"assurance-authority-basis:wildo-safe-baseline-v1\";\n/**\n * The COMPATIBILITY GENERATION of this basis: two equal generations promise the same interpretation contract, so a\n * change that alters what a control MEANS advances it and every application re-accepts its programme deliberately\n * (`CLAUDE.md`, the assurance paragraph). An application pins it as `basisRef` + `basisVersion`.\n *\n * - 1: the generation every binding up to #1845 was accepted against.\n * - 2 (#1845): `WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION` also requires `capability:legal-hold` and `capability:audit-events`\n * and demands `evidence-requirement:legal-hold-record`. A programme accepted against 1 bound that objective to the\n * declared retention windows alone; under 2 the objective also claims that a legal hold suspends every deletion path\n * for its scope and that placing, releasing and honouring a hold is recorded.\n * - 2 kept (#2935): `WILDO.AI.MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT` moved to `objectiveVersion` 2 (every model call counted, a declared flow\n * a door) without advancing the generation. The objective version already refuses a programme accepted against\n * version 1: validated against the catalog, its binding is `UNKNOWN_OBJECTIVE` (\"absent from the supplied Wildo\n * objective catalog\"). And no committed programme binds the objective.\n * - 2 kept (#2846): `WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL` moved to `objectiveVersion` 2 (what a coding agent's brief\n * carries from outside the repository is screened or marked) and gained `capability:coding-brief-content-trust`, for\n * the same two reasons: a programme bound to version 1 is `UNKNOWN_OBJECTIVE` against the catalog, and no committed\n * programme binds the objective.\n * - 2 kept (#2990): an obligation may declare `sourceBasis: NONE_BY_DESIGN` for an objective the basis reviews under no\n * source requirement, and the six such bindings now say so. No control's meaning moved: every binding demands what it\n * demanded and every reviewed source requirement is the same row. A v3 programme needs one MECHANICAL addition,\n * `sourceBasis: REVIEWED_SOURCE_REQUIREMENTS` on each existing obligation (the field is required, so the absence of a\n * source can never be read as a default), which restates what the obligation already cited and changes no reading.\n * The change makes REPRESENTABLE an obligation the programme family refused, for objectives the basis already bound\n * under no source, so there is no control decision for an application to re-accept.\n * - 2 kept (#2994, #3008): `WILDO.OPERATIONS.AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT` moved to `objectiveVersion` 2 (an operation's\n * own declared limit records the first refusal of each declared window on MCP tool calls, agent function tools and chat\n * commands, where version 1 said an MCP refusal of it left no row) and gained the declared-policy subject and plane\n * vocabularies and evidence clause C5, for #2935's two reasons: a programme bound to version 1\n * is `UNKNOWN_OBJECTIVE` against the catalog, and no committed programme binds the objective. Measured 2026-10-20:\n * `git grep AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT HEAD -- examples` finds nothing, while the applications' assurance state\n * (`examples/<app>/.wildo-saas/state/assurance`) does name `MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT`, so the search reaches where a binding\n * would be recorded.\n * - 2 kept (#3030): `WILDO.AI.MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT` was AMENDED IN PLACE at `objectiveVersion` 2: its intent, evidence and\n * verification now name the three per-organization unit ceilings (embedding tokens, extraction pages, screening text\n * records) where they said those units were bounded by no limit, and the capability gained the unit vocabulary and the\n * three limit features. In place rather than a version, because no committed programme binds the objective: measured\n * 2026-10-21, a recursive grep for `MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT` under every `examples/<app>/specifications` finds nothing, and the only hits under\n * `examples/<app>/.wildo-saas/state/assurance` are coverage packs, committed in each application's own assurance\n * repository: a coverage pack is a derived report of what the basis maps, not a programme binding the objective.\n * - 2 kept (#2843): `WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT` moved to `objectiveVersion` 2 (an administrator can suspend an agent, and\n * every call to it is refused before its model runs) and gained the suspension vocabularies and evidence clauses C4 and\n * C5, for the same two reasons.\n * - 2 kept (#2949): `WILDO.OPERATIONS.AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT` moved to `objectiveVersion` 3 (the operation's own HTTP\n * route counts the declared policy per signed-in person or machine once authorized and records its refusals, naming\n * `http_route`, and counts anyone else per address, recording nothing) and\n * `WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING` to `objectiveVersion` 2 (a person's reports are bounded per window, and a repeat of an\n * open report answers with it, evidenced by the new clause C8), for #2935's two reasons. Measured 2026-10-20:\n * `git grep 'INCIDENT_HANDLING\\|AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT' HEAD -- examples` finds neither in a committed programme. The\n * capability gained the new plane by derivation from `OperationDispatchPlane`, not by a new vocabulary.\n * - 2 kept (#3328): `WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` moved to `objectiveVersion` 2 (one transactional store per\n * application, the isolation declaration that admitted a second removed), and its expectation, capability, evidence\n * and verification refs were renamed `single-transactional-store`, the capability now derived from\n * `PERSISTENCE_ADAPTER_TRANSACTION_OWNERSHIP`. For #2935's two reasons: a programme bound to version 1 is\n * `UNKNOWN_OBJECTIVE` against the catalog, and no committed programme binds the objective. Measured 2026-11-06:\n * `git grep TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY HEAD -- examples` finds nothing; the only hits under\n * `examples/<app>/.wildo-saas/state/assurance` are measurements, judged runs and snapshots in each application's own\n * assurance repository, which record what was measured then and bind nothing.\n * - 2 kept (#2296): `evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record` now applies to every application, where it\n * applied only to one that had built its own erasure lane. The engine changed, not the demand: since #2296 every\n * application has the core `dataSubjectRequests` resource, which declares the lane, so the text was corrected to what\n * is true. The clauses, their homes and what each measures are unchanged, and the one committed programme binding\n * `WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE` (Wonder Todos', measured 2026-11-09 with `git grep SUBJECT_ERASURE HEAD -- examples`)\n * had a lane before and has the engine's now, so its reading of the demand does not move.\n */\nexport const INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_VERSION = 2;\n/**\n * The implementation artifacts this basis is composed around, by ref: what a programme derived against it ATTESTS\n * (`authorityBases[].attestedArtifactRefs`), and what the published basis's `implementationRevision.artifacts`\n * inventory carries.\n *\n * ## Why the basis inventory is the source of truth, and the programme copies it (#2984)\n *\n * The one consumer of `attestedArtifactRefs` is `validateAssuranceProgramSpecification`, which refuses any attested ref\n * the host's basis inventory does not carry (`UNKNOWN_IMPLEMENTATION_ARTIFACT`). So the inventory is the reference and a\n * programme's attestation is a subset of it, never the other way round. The inventory is also the side that names\n * something real: Framework Knowledge generation composes the shipped basis from the authored\n * `assurance-authority-bases/<basis>/authority-basis.json`, which maps each of these refs to a repository file and fails\n * when one does not resolve. The programme generator used to stamp a stand-in, `source-artifact:wildo-assurance-authority-basis`,\n * that named no file and no inventory carried, so every generated programme was refused on it.\n *\n * Rejected: adding the stand-in to the inventory. It resolves to no file, so the generation path check would have to\n * exempt it, and an attestation that any programme satisfies by quoting one name checks nothing.\n * Rejected: having the host read the shipped basis and pass its inventory to the normalizer. The normalizer already\n * stamps the basis IDENTITY from the constants above rather than from a loaded file, so the artifact refs follow the\n * identity they belong to; a host fact would add a fourth hop through the companion and leave no honest value when\n * the host could not load the file.\n *\n * Only the REFS live here. Where each artifact sits in the repository stays in the authored Framework Knowledge file,\n * because repository locations never enter this contract. Framework Knowledge generation refuses an authored inventory\n * whose refs differ from this list, so the two cannot drift; the committed-programme gate checks the same.\n */\nexport const INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_IMPLEMENTATION_ARTIFACT_REFS = [\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.application-role-contract\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.audit-event-classification-contract\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.audit-event-contract\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.audit-log-service\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.engine-capability-contract\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.subject-export-contract\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.subject-export-orchestrator\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.subject-export-system-access\",\n] as const;\n/** Owner-approved bounded HHS requirement identity; this does not establish HIPAA applicability or conformity. */\nexport const HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REQUIREMENT_REF = \"source-requirement:hipaa-security-privileged-access-review\";\nconst AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-08-03T00:00:00.000Z\";\nconst AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF = \"reviewer:wildo-assurance-authority\";\nconst HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-08-13T08:57:58.000Z\";\nconst HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF = \"reviewer:paul-cayon-assurance-owner\";\n/*\n * The 2026-09-01 mapping tranche — NIST, GDPR and HIPAA, decided by the owner.\n *\n * Stamped with the FRAMEWORK's own authority identity rather than a person's. `reviewer:paul-cayon-assurance-owner` is reserved for entries the owner personally\n * approved (today: the HIPAA privileged-access-review requirement above), and putting a person's ref on a mapping they have not read would be the fabricated review\n * this layer exists to refuse. The review record for these is the COMMIT — `one-source-of-truth.md` Rule 7: the author is the commit author, the instant is the commit\n * time, and independence is enforced by the forge rather than by bespoke code.\n */\nconst MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-01T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche — three objectives the audit trail already attests (attributed then to COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL; since 2026-09-14 to the application's own audit store). */\nconst AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche — objectives selected by CODE-MARKER coverage rather than by reading the catalog. */\nconst PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche — the three most heavily marked objectives that answer \"how much authority, and over which rows\". */\nconst AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/**\n * The 2026-09-17 authenticator-strength tranche (#1247) — what a FACTOR must prove, which no\n * registered source previously governed.\n *\n * The identity objectives were answered by general access-control requirements: whether\n * authentication happens, how authenticators are stored, whether a privileged action re-proves\n * identity. None of them governs the STRENGTH of a factor or the independence of two — the subject of\n * SP 800-63B — so the objectives read as though they covered authentication while the basis made no\n * claim about it.\n */\nconst AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-17T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche — how identity is re-proved, how its policy changes are evidenced, and when access ends. */\nconst IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche — the four privacy objectives a governed privacy notice quotes most directly. */\nconst DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 attribution tranche — what the trail must be able to say about isolation, egress, provisioning and client identity. */\nconst ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 declaration tranche — objectives satisfied by what a schema or config DECLARES, plus the trail that records the declaration changing. */\nconst DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 reachability tranche — objectives whose control is WHICH DOOR exists, and which values it refuses. */\nconst REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche — two objectives whose vocabulary existed and was only in the wrong package or unexported. */\nconst SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche — two objectives whose vocabulary is the SUBSTRATE the control runs against. */\nconst DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche — three objectives whose control is a DISTINCTION INSIDE one classification vocabulary. */\nconst DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/**\n * Which objectives the basis can carry an obligation for, and the expectation refs each one binds.\n *\n * ONE source for a fact two very different callers need. The basis composer below builds its three expectation-authority arrays from this; the compliance-programme\n * generation normalizer (`assurance-program-generation.schemas.ts`) reads it to STAMP an obligation's `implementationExpectationRefs`, `evidenceExpectationRefs` and\n * `verificationExpectationRefs` — all three `.min(1)` on every entry — and to REFUSE an objective that is not here.\n *\n * That refusal is the point. The objective catalog defines 49 objectives and this binds a SUBSET of them; the gap is tracked as #207. Do not quote a count from here\n * or from any prose — count the entries below, because every tranche that lands makes a written number wrong and a written number is what stops the next reader\n * measuring. Without the lookup a producer would be free to invent an expectation ref for any unbound objective, and the\n * result would validate: a programme claiming coverage the framework has never stated a demand for. Deriving the refs instead makes the\n * coverage ceiling mechanical rather than a sentence in an issue (#207).\n *\n * Growing this is FRAMEWORK authoring, not generation — see #207. Each entry says what an objective demands of an application, which is Wildo's decision to make.\n *\n * ## `sourceBasis` — an objective no registered source states (#2990)\n *\n * A binding whose objective the basis reviews under NO source requirement declares\n * `sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN`, and every other binding declares nothing. The\n * declaration is what makes the absence of source rows a DECISION: {@link createInitialAssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis}\n * refuses a binding with no reviewed row that does not declare it (a source mapping someone forgot), and one that\n * declares it while rows exist. A programme obligation for such an objective then declares the same basis and cites no\n * source; the validator accepts that only when the basis it reads reviews the objective under no source.\n */\nexport const ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS = [\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:privileged-access-review\",\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, and the second is what makes the binding honest (#202).\n *\n * `capability:audit-events` was the only one for as long as this objective had no implementation,\n * and on its own it says the wrong thing: audit events are bound to many objectives and record\n * that access CHANGED, never that anyone reviewed who holds it. The review capability is what\n * carries the part Wildo actually supplies — the enumeration — and the host-artifact requirement\n * that names the part it cannot: the occurrence record.\n */\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:privileged-access-review-occurrences\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:privileged-access-review\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:privileged-access-review\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * RISK TREATMENT — the one binding whose evidence is entirely DECLARED, and deliberately so.\n *\n * Nothing here rests on a runtime row. The signals are derived from committed configuration and\n * committed code, the posture is committed configuration, and the register is a committed file\n * whose acceptance IS the commit. So the whole obligation is readable from the repository at any\n * instant, which is what lets an application answer it on the day it is asked rather than after a\n * collection window.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:risk-treatment-declaration\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:risk-treatment-declaration\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:risk-treatment-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:risk-treatment-declaration\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:subject-data-export\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:subject-data-export-receipt\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:subject-data-export\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:subject-data-export\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:subject-erasure\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:subject-erasure\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:subject-erasure-execution\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:subject-erasure\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:subject-erasure\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * ERASURE PROPAGATION — what the erasure REACHED, accounted per store, as distinct from whether the\n * erasure LANE ran. \"Per store\" is bounded: the subject's dependent edges — direct, and every edge\n * below a dependent the erasure deletes, at any depth (#976) — and its registered external effects.\n * Below a dependent whose rows are retained the erasure walks nothing, so nothing there is claimed.\n * `WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE` above evidences intake, withdrawal, schedule and outcome\n * of a request, and its body says outright that it \"never\" evidences that the data is gone; this\n * objective is the per-store reading it deliberately leaves out (#602).\n *\n * TWO capabilities, and either alone is a false claim. `capability:erasure-propagation-report`\n * attests the per-edge and per-external-system accounting, which the engine returns on every erasure\n * whether or not an audit trail exists. `capability:audit-events` attests the durable per-store rows\n * — an erasure forwarded to a system of record, a recipient's erasure outcome — which only exist where the trail does.\n * Without the trail the accounting still operates and the external records cannot be attested, which\n * is exactly what UNDETERMINED means.\n *\n * The per-credential destruction record for a person's own third-party credentials is claimed too\n * (#975): the USERS erasure cascade removes those rows through the raw repository, and the credential\n * resource's cascade removal observer emits one deletion row per credential with the erasure reason —\n * only when the cascade declares itself an erasure, never for an administrator's hard delete of the\n * user. It is an audit row, so it rides `capability:audit-events` like the forwarded-erasure and recipient-outcome rows.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.ERASURE_PROPAGATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:erasure-propagation-accounting\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:erasure-propagation-report\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:erasure-propagation-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:erasure-propagation-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:erasure-propagation-accounting\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:erasure-propagation-accounting\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:security-event-emission\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:security-event-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:security-event-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:security-event-emission\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:security-event-emission\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:authorization-decision-audit\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:authorization-decision-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:authorization-decision-audit\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:authorization-decision-audit\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:multi-factor-authentication\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:multi-factor-authentication\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:multi-factor-enrolment\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:multi-factor-enrolment-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:multi-factor-authentication\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:multi-factor-authentication\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche — see the source-requirement block for the verified implementations ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution\",\n // Two capabilities: the actor VOCABULARY is what C1 declares (a named closed set whose anomaly member is distinct),\n // and the trail is where C3 and C4 count rows. The audit-events capability names event types, never actor kinds.\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-actor-attribution\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:auditable-event-actor-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:auditable-event-actor-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:auditable-event-actor-attribution\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-audit\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * SEGREGATION OF DUTIES — the rung above \"requested and time-bound\" for an act NO CUSTOMER CAN\n * APPROVE.\n *\n * Bound to the audit-events capability alone, deliberately. The refusal itself is a code path with\n * no capability behind it: an application does not switch it on, and there is nothing to declare.\n * What an application must be able to SHOW is the pair of signatures, and that is the trail — read through the\n * grant lifecycle vocabulary (2026-10-05, #2488), whose terminal members C3 counts.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation\",\n // The trail, plus the lifecycle vocabulary C3 discriminates on: the end of an authority is a REVOKED or EXPIRED\n // transition, so the basis names the transition set whole and a member added to it is a basis change, not drift.\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:access-grant-lifecycle\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:second-signature-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:second-signature-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * MAKER-CHECKER on a decision the product holds for review (#2488) — the separation SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES does not\n * state, since that one is an operator act signed by a second administrator.\n *\n * TWO capabilities. `HumanDecision_RefusalReason` is why a human-decision act was refused. Most members are the\n * decision space of the ONE predicate every door asks (`authorizeHumanDecisionActor`): `REQUESTER_MAY_NOT_ACT` is the\n * separation itself, `ELIGIBLE_ROLE_NOT_HELD` the role re-checked at the moment of acting. A few are decided by the\n * door before the predicate is asked: a decision outside the delivery's organization, a granting organization's\n * authentication policy (#2797), an actor whose authority lapsed (#2811). The audit trail is the record: each refusal\n * is a `HUMAN_DECISION_ANSWER_REFUSED` row carrying its `reason`.\n *\n * Bound to what the predicate covers, and the site says so: the decisions the human-decision planes raise, which since\n * #2288 include a person's operation its application declares `requiresApproval` on (the OPERATION_APPROVAL plane: the\n * same predicate, the same refusal row). An operation declared without it is applied at once, and nothing here claims\n * a review of one.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:requester-reviewer-separation\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:pending-decision-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:pending-decision-refusal-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:pending-decision-refusal-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:requester-reviewer-separation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:requester-reviewer-separation\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:credential-state-transition-record\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:credential-state-transition-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:credential-state-transition-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:credential-state-transition-record\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:credential-state-transition-record\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, and that is the point of this entry. The floor is what RETAINS the\n * administrator — a refusal — and the audit trail is what makes a breach visible when an erasure\n * acknowledgement is allowed to strand a scope anyway. Naming only the floor would claim\n * prevention the design deliberately does not always offer; naming only the audit would claim a\n * record of something nothing prevents.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:administrative-continuity-floor\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:administrative-continuity-breach-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:administrative-continuity-breach-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:administrative-continuity-floor\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities since 2026-09-12, and the history is worth keeping because the previous entry\n * was deliberately SHORT.\n *\n * It required `capability:operation-role-authorization` alone and said so explicitly: the half of\n * this control that most deserves an audit row did not produce one. Every\n * `assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling` call site is a custom-impl service, so a\n * `role_ceiling_exceeded` refusal never passed through `runAuthorizationPhase` and the denial\n * funnel never saw it (measured 2026-09-02, filed as #263). Requiring the audit capability then\n * would have made the programme claim a record that was not written.\n *\n * #263 closed: the gate now records through `AuthorizationsBackendService.recordRoleCeilingDenial`\n * — the same chokepoint, with the dedup ladder, the escalation rungs and the loss counters — under\n * `ResourceOperationDenialReason.ROLE_CEILING_EXCEEDED`, carrying the refused roles. So the record\n * exists and the claim is now true. The evidence requirement is added as a SECOND statement ref\n * rather than replacing the declaration one: the control has two halves, a declared ceiling and a\n * recorded refusal, and an application must evidence both.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:operation-role-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:operation-role-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\n \"evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record\",\n \"evidence-requirement:operation-role-declaration\",\n ],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:granted-authority-ceiling\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:scope-confined-query\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:organization-unit-scope-confinement\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:conferring-grant-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:conferring-grant-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:scope-confined-query\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:scope-confined-query\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, for the reason `ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY` has two: the grant machinery is\n * what CONFINES the delegation (PKCE proof-of-possession, exact redirect, a token carrying no\n * more than the grant declared) and the audit trail is what makes each decision READABLE — five\n * distinct events covering approval, refusal, persistence, issuance and a failed exchange.\n * Naming only the exchange would claim a deliberate authorization nobody can review afterwards.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:delegated-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:delegated-authorization-decision-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:delegated-authorization-decision-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:delegated-authorization-exchange\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:step-up-authentication\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:step-up-challenge-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:step-up-challenge-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:high-impact-action-reproof\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * NO new capability, deliberately. This objective's control is not a mechanism an application\n * selects — it is that a change to the authored authentication posture is DETECTED at startup and\n * evidenced once, which the audit trail already does through\n * `APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED`. Minting a second capability identity for the configuration\n * itself would ask an application to select something it cannot decline.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:authentication-posture-change-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:authentication-posture-change-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:authentication-posture-change-detection\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, and the objective's own wording is why: access is \"withdrawn when the\n * relationship conferring them ends, and restoring access is as attributable as removing it.\"\n * The status vocabulary is what WITHDRAWS; the audit trail is what makes the restoration\n * attributable. A withdrawal nobody can see reversed is half the control.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:access-withdrawal-on-conferring-status\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:conferring-relationship-withdrawal\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities. Concealment is what makes a retained row behave as deleted; the audit trail is\n * what makes the destruction DECISION deliberate, attributable and evidenced — and it is also the\n * only door onto a retained row, since the see-through read is audited. Either alone describes\n * half of an objective whose whole subject is destroying data on purpose and on a schedule.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:retained-record-concealment\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:destruction-decision-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:destruction-decision-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:purpose-limited-egress\",\n /*\n * The model boundary joined in #2839: what an agent's model is sent of a personal field is the same question as what\n * leaves for any other recipient, answered by the agent's declared treatment (`PersonalDataGuard` applies it in the\n * tool result path) rather than by the client install policy.\n */\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-personal-data-model-treatment\", \"capability:client-install-identifier-policy\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-model-boundary-personal-data\", \"evidence-requirement:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:purpose-limited-egress\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:purpose-limited-egress\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * THREE capabilities since #1845 (basis generation 2), and each names a different half.\n * `capability:declared-retention-window` is the PERIOD a class declares. `capability:legal-hold` is the EXCEPTION to\n * a period: a hold suspends every deletion path for its scope, and it is not a window, so naming the hold vocabulary\n * under the window capability would have claimed it as one. `capability:audit-events` attests the record a hold\n * leaves: `LEGAL_HOLD_PLACED` / `LEGAL_HOLD_RELEASED` are audit rows, and `legal-hold-record` C1 counts them.\n *\n * Two demands, one per half: `retention-window-declaration` (the windows are declared and enforced) and\n * `legal-hold-record` (placing and releasing a hold is recorded, and every deletion path reports what a hold kept).\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:declared-retention-window\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:declared-retention-window\", \"capability:legal-hold\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:retention-window-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:legal-hold-record\", \"evidence-requirement:retention-window-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:declared-retention-window\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:declared-retention-window\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, and here the audit trail is not merely corroborating — it IS the record. The\n * objective demands a decision recorded \"exactly once and never lost to a race, naming the\n * previous and the resulting value\", which is precisely what `.isAuditEvidence()` on the two\n * consent leaves produces through the single emission point every consent-changing verb routes\n * through. The vocabulary capability says WHAT may be decided; the audit says it was.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:single-consent-emission-point\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:consent-decision-record\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:consent-decision-transition-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:consent-decision-transition-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:single-consent-emission-point\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:single-consent-emission-point\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * CONSENT ENFORCEMENT (#2488) — the half CONSENT_RECORD's body disclaims (\"never that it was honoured\").\n *\n * TWO capabilities. `ConsentGateRefusal` is what a missing consent-gated purpose COSTS — nothing withheld, one\n * operation withheld, or the whole service withheld — and is the vocabulary `assertServiceConsentRequirementMet`\n * branches on through `consentGateCapabilityOwed`. INFORM is named beside the two refusals because the control is\n * that contrast: a declaration that only informs must withhold nothing. The audit trail is the record of a refusal:\n * `RESOURCE_OPERATION_DENIED` with the two consent denial reasons.\n *\n * The browser-provider half has no vocabulary the basis can reach: its decision is made by\n * `consentBasedProviderStopRefusal` in `@wildo-ai/external-connectors-public` and reported only as a diagnostic.\n * Its evidence is therefore the provider modules' own declarations, which the companion projection refuses, and the\n * body states that limit rather than this binding naming a console vocabulary.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_ENFORCEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:consent-gated-processing\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:consent-gate-enforcement\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:consent-gate-refusal-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:consent-gate-refusal-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:consent-gated-processing\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:consent-gated-processing\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * PURPOSE LIMITATION for a secondary use (#2488): exporting a tenant's agent-work decisions as evaluation data.\n *\n * TWO capabilities. `capability:secondary-use-authorization` names the four vocabularies the gate runs against,\n * each WHOLE: the authorization's status (only ACTIVE admits), the basis it names, why an export was refused, and\n * why an exported dataset may no longer be used. The audit trail records every change to the authorization and\n * every refused export; the export ledger, an engine store, carries the marking.\n *\n * Not bound: `EvaluationExportAuthorizationWriteRefusal` (the write rules) and the client-answer helper's private\n * vocabulary live in `saas-backend-lib`, which this package cannot name. Both are invariants over the status\n * transitions named here, and the verification body drives them.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SECONDARY_USE_AUTHORIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:authorized-secondary-use\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:secondary-use-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:secondary-use-authorization-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:secondary-use-authorization-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:authorized-secondary-use\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:authorized-secondary-use\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * LAWFUL BASIS — entirely DECLARED, like risk treatment. The evidence is the operator's committed\n * `operatorComplianceIdentity.lawfulBases`, so the demand is answerable from the repository at any\n * instant. One capability, because nothing at runtime records WHY a purpose is lawful: the\n * declaration is the record.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:lawful-basis-declaration\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:lawful-basis-declaration\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:lawful-basis-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:lawful-basis-declaration\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 attribution tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:caller-derived-tenancy\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:tenancy-derivation-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:tenancy-derivation-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:caller-derived-tenancy\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * NO new capability. This objective is ABOUT the audit trail rather than served by it: a\n * privileged action must be attributable and the authorization effect it had reconstructable\n * from the record itself, and the configuration deciding what the trail captures is governed as\n * part of the trail. There is nothing else for an application to select.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:self-describing-audit-record\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:reconstructable-authorization-effect\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:reconstructable-authorization-effect\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:self-describing-audit-record\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:self-describing-audit-record\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:outbound-call-recording\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:outbound-call-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:outbound-call-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:outbound-call-recording\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:outbound-call-recording\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The audit trail alone, and the reason is the same shape as `SESSION_ASSURANCE`: the control is\n * that the switches conferring directory authority are DECLARED rather than implied, and what\n * makes a declaration attestable is that its before/after values are audit evidence. Configuring\n * `defaultUnitRole` IS granting a role, and flipping `autoDeactivateUsers` off silently strands\n * access — both are reconstructable from the trail and from nowhere else.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:declared-directory-authority\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:directory-authority-switch-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:directory-authority-switch-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:declared-directory-authority\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:declared-directory-authority\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities: the provenance vocabulary says WHAT a client's identity rests on, and the\n * audit trail carries the objective's second half — that a client created by a party which\n * authenticated to nothing, and every refused assertion, are both recorded.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:verifiable-client-identity\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:client-registration-provenance\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:client-registration-provenance-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:client-registration-provenance-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:verifiable-client-identity\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:verifiable-client-identity\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 declaration tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:operation-serviceability\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:operation-implementation-coverage\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:operation-serviceability-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:operation-serviceability-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:operation-serviceability\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:operation-serviceability\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities — the mechanism AND its record. The second half arrived with #506.\n *\n * The mechanism is real and fail-closed: the upload handler awaits `initiateScan`, which awaits the\n * UPLOADED -> SCANNING transition before the pipeline fires, so a file on a `scanPolicy: 'required'`\n * field is already non-downloadable when the caller is told the upload succeeded (#433).\n *\n * The RECORD is now real too. `FileScanningBackendService` emits `FILE_MALWARE_DETECTED` when a\n * scanner concludes an infection and `FILE_MALWARE_SCAN_FAILED` when the scan could not run — two\n * events rather than one severity, because an infection means the control WORKED and a failure\n * means it did not RUN, and from outside they are indistinguishable (the file is non-downloadable\n * either way). Both are emitted after the terminal transition and carry the status the RECORD\n * holds, so the trail cannot describe a state the row does not.\n *\n * This binding previously named ONE capability with the absence stated at the site, because\n * binding `capability:audit-events` over an unwritten record would have made every programme\n * assert a record that is not written — the same reason `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE` binds\n * narrower. That reason is now discharged rather than waived.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:ingested-content-inspection\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:ingested-content-inspection\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:ingested-content-inspection\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:ingested-content-inspection\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:ingested-content-inspection\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:ingested-content-inspection\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * v2 (#3328): one transactional store per application, with no isolation declaration admitting a second. Every ref\n * was renamed with the mechanism (`declared-persistence-isolation` → `single-transactional-store`), because the old\n * names described a declaration that no longer exists.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:single-transactional-store\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:single-transactional-store\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:single-transactional-store\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:single-transactional-store\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:single-transactional-store\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:single-transactional-store\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * APPROVAL BEFORE PRESENTATION (#2538) — the governed-document approval gate, armed at Gate 3.\n *\n * TWO capabilities. `capability:governed-document-approval-gate` names the switch and the approval state it reads,\n * each WHOLE: UNARMED beside ARMED and UNAPPROVED beside APPROVED, because the control is those contrasts. The audit\n * trail is the record of what a person met: every GOVERNED_DOCUMENT_INTERACTION_RECORDED row names the approval state\n * of the release, so with the gate armed an UNAPPROVED row is a person who met a document nobody approved.\n *\n * No source requirement. None of the registered sources states that a legally binding document is approved before a\n * person is shown it or asked to accept it, and a mapping to the nearest text would assert a correspondence nobody\n * reviewed — the reason `BILLING.USAGE_REPORTING` and `NETWORK.OUTBOUND_TARGET_CONTROL` carry none either.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DOCUMENTS.APPROVAL_BEFORE_PRESENTATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:approval-before-presentation\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:governed-document-approval-gate\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:governed-document-presentation-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:governed-document-presentation-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:approval-before-presentation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:approval-before-presentation\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:personal-data-field-inventory\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:personal-data-field-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:personal-data-field-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:declared-personal-data-categories\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:provider-selection-opt-in\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:selected-processor-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:selected-processor-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:provider-selection-opt-in\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The AI half of third-party processing (#1564). `WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING` makes every\n * processor opt-in and names it; this objective asks what each AI component is FOR, which only the\n * declared use posture says. One capability: the declared posture over the AI capability vocabulary.\n * The processor register it also reads is an application specification, not an engine capability.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:declared-ai-component-use\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:ai-use-posture-declaration\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:third-party-ai-component-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:third-party-ai-component-declaration\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, the shape of `INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION`, which this is the AI-input twin of (#2292). The\n * screening vocabulary is what decides whether third-party content reaches the model; the audit trail is what makes a\n * withholding EVIDENCED, and the objective names the record. Either alone is a false claim: a screening nobody can\n * show happened, or a record of a decision no vocabulary bounds.\n *\n * Application governance scope (the catalog says why). Applicable to EVERY application, classifier selected or not:\n * the refusal of a turn that would bring a screening agent third-party content where nothing can screen is the\n * control operating, and it operates exactly when no classifier is selected.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_SCREENING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-untrusted-content-screening\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-untrusted-content-screening\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-untrusted-content-screening-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-untrusted-content-screening-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-untrusted-content-screening\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-untrusted-content-screening\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The output twin (#2292 Phase 3), on the same two halves for the same reason: the moderation vocabulary bounds WHAT\n * is judged (the four kinds of output, the harm categories and their ordered severities) and what the judgement can\n * conclude; the audit trail records each withholding. Applicable to every application, like the screening.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OUTPUT_MODERATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-output-moderation\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-output-moderation\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-output-moderation-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-output-moderation-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-output-moderation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-output-moderation\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The use DOMAIN of each AI use (#2838). One capability, the closed domain vocabulary the regulatory class is derived\n * from. No audit capability: the evidence is the committed declaration and the agents that run, not an audit row.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:declared-ai-use-domain\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:ai-use-domain-classification\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:ai-use-classification-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:ai-use-classification-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:ai-use-classification-declaration\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:ai-use-classification-declaration\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * What an agent's tools may do (#2839). One capability: the authority vocabulary every tool declares, which is what the\n * DECLARED evidence reads. No audit capability: a refused tool dispatch is recorded by the authorizer's own denial\n * funnel, which `WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT` already claims.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-tool-authority-confinement\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-tool-authority-declaration\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-tool-authority-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-tool-authority-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-tool-authority-confinement\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-tool-authority-confinement\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * People in front of what an agent does (#2839, version 2 #2843). TWO capabilities, the `INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION`\n * shape: the oversight vocabulary that decides WHO decides and which record suspends an agent, and the audit trail that\n * makes each decision, each suspension and each refused call EVIDENCED.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-human-oversight\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-human-oversight\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-human-oversight-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-human-oversight-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-human-oversight\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-human-oversight\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * What an organization's agents may spend (#2844, widened by #2935 and #3030). TWO capabilities: the spend-limit\n * vocabulary (the limits a plan grants: the generation allowance, the person ceiling and the three unit ceilings; the\n * doors that pay, the doors a person's ceiling counts and the door asked before each call, the units, the limit that\n * refused and why), and the audit trail that records refusals (`MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT_REFUSED`, written by the budget gate\n * itself: one row per refusal at every door and at a flow's step, and, for a unit-ceiling refusal of a call made in no\n * door, one row per organization, unit, reason and period in each process).\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:model-spend-limit\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:model-spend-limit\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:model-spend-limit-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:model-spend-limit-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:model-spend-limit\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:model-spend-limit\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * What an agent call did (#2841). ONE capability, the record's own vocabularies. No `capability:audit-events`: the\n * evidence is the engine's own store, read for a window through its door; the guardrails' audit rows are the\n * screening and moderation objectives' evidence, and claiming them here would count one row twice.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-operation-record\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-operation-record\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-operation-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-operation-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-operation-record\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-operation-record\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a person reported about an agent's reply, and how it was handled (#2842). TWO capabilities: the report's own\n * vocabularies (what a report says, how it moves and how it ends), and the audit trail, which records each step of\n * every report (received, triaged, closed) and is how the operator reads reports across organizations.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-behavior-reports\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-behavior-reports\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-behavior-reports\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-behavior-reports\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-behavior-reports\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-behavior-reports\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities. `UserStatus` is the vocabulary that decides whether a principal may\n * authenticate at all; the audit trail is what makes the change EVIDENCED, which the objective\n * demands by name. The status also carries `.excludeFromUpdate()`, so the change cannot arrive\n * as a side effect of an unrelated write — a guard the vocabulary alone does not express.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:authentication-eligibility-status\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:authentication-eligibility-change-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:authentication-eligibility-change-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:guarded-authentication-eligibility\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:collection-export-recording\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:collection-export-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:collection-export-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:collection-export-recording\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:collection-export-recording\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:record-context-preservation\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:record-context-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:record-context-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:record-context-preservation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:record-context-preservation\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The audit trail alone, because the objective's exception is where its content lives: backend-only\n * material does not cross the client boundary EXCEPT at a single first exposure that is itself\n * audited. For SCHEMA-declared material the non-crossing half is a DTO-selection property with no vocabulary to\n * attest; the audited exception is the part a programme can carry.\n *\n * One neighbouring door DOES have a vocabulary, and it is deliberately not bound here (#2488):\n * `FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal` names why a provider's public configuration was refused before it reached\n * a browser (`SECRET_KEY`, a served value matching a secret, …). That material is declared backend-only by a\n * provider's SECRET CONTRACT, not by a schema, so it sits outside this objective's intent; binding it would widen\n * what the objective means rather than evidence it.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:audited-first-exposure\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:first-exposure-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:first-exposure-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:audited-first-exposure\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:audited-first-exposure\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 reachability tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, and together they are the whole control. The VARIANT decides whether a door\n * faces a client at all; the ROLE GATE decides who may open the ones that do. `credit-pool TOP_UP`\n * was once an API_CALL gated on ORG_OWNER — a tenant owner could self-grant unlimited credits —\n * and the fix was to move it to INTERNAL_CALL, which is a reachability decision the role gate\n * alone cannot express.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:operation-reachability-gate\", \"capability:operation-role-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:credit-grant-reachability-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:credit-grant-reachability-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:system-gated-credit-grant\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The same pair, for the same reason: `ScopeFeatures` writes cannot be field-protected, because\n * the super-admin path must write them — so the ENTIRE self-grant boundary for paid entitlements\n * is one role gate on operations that stay non-client-reachable.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:operation-reachability-gate\", \"capability:operation-role-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:operator-gated-entitlement-write\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The sweep that LIFTS a time-boxed restriction, bound to the two status vocabularies it moves\n * between — a suspended user and a suspended membership. It reuses\n * `capability:authentication-eligibility-status` rather than minting a third: the statuses being\n * released are the same ones `IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE` attests being set, and two capability identities\n * for one vocabulary is what an application would have to select twice.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:authentication-eligibility-status\", \"capability:membership-eligibility-status\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:restriction-release-schedule\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:restriction-release-schedule\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:time-boxed-restriction-release\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:constrained-redirect-target\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:redirect-target-constraint\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:redirect-target-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:redirect-target-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:constrained-redirect-target\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:constrained-redirect-target\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:server-authored-token-claims\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:reserved-token-claim-authorship\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:reserved-claim-set-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:reserved-claim-set-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:server-authored-token-claims\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:server-authored-token-claims\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:startup-configuration-validation\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:field-authority-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:field-authority-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:boot-proven-field-authority\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * How the application's code was produced (#2845, widened by #2846). FOUR capabilities, because the claim has four\n * halves and any one alone is false: the session confinement (ceiling, the agent's measured escalation, the admitted\n * environments) says what an agent may do; the vendor declaration says who receives the source; the brief's content\n * trust says what the agent was shown and whether third-party text in it was screened; the accepted-change\n * attribution says who accepted the result. No audit capability: no coding run writes an audit row, and the record of\n * who accepted a change is the application's own git history, read by the DECLARED collector (C3).\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:ai-produced-change-control\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:accepted-change-attribution\", \"capability:coding-agent-session-confinement\", \"capability:coding-agent-vendor-declaration\", \"capability:coding-brief-content-trust\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:ai-produced-change-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:ai-produced-change-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:ai-produced-change-control\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:ai-produced-change-control\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:declared-uniqueness-verification\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:uniqueness-verification-outcome\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:uniqueness-verification-outcome\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:datastore-proven-uniqueness\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:self-reported-lifecycle-stage\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:lifecycle-stage-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:lifecycle-stage-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:stage-confers-no-capability\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:diagnosable-refusal\",\n // Two vocabularies, one per refusal surface. A thrown refusal carries an `ErrorType`; the inbound delivery door\n // ANSWERS rather than throws, and records which refusal it was in `InboundDeliveryRejectionReason` — the only\n // place a missing verification secret (a degradation) is told apart from a bad signature (a rejection), since\n // both answer the sender identically.\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:inbound-delivery-refusal-classification\", \"capability:refusal-classification\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:refusal-classification-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:refusal-classification-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:diagnosable-refusal\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:diagnosable-refusal\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:refusal-classification\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:over-limit-refusal-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:over-limit-refusal-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:bounded-unauthenticated-request\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * How fast an authenticated caller from outside the application may drive work (#2936, version 2 #2994). TWO\n * capabilities: the two limiters' own vocabularies (whom each counts), and the audit trail, which holds the\n * `EXTERNAL_TURN_RATE_LIMITED` row the throttle writes for the first refusal of each window and the\n * `OPERATION_RATE_LIMIT_REFUSED` row an operation's declared limit writes for each of its declared windows.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 3 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:authenticated-burst-limit\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:authenticated-burst-limit\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:authenticated-burst-limit-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:authenticated-burst-limit-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:authenticated-burst-limit\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:authenticated-burst-limit\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:named-constraint-conflict\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:refusal-classification\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:constraint-conflict-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:constraint-conflict-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:named-constraint-conflict\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:named-constraint-conflict\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:verifiable-key-retirement\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:key-retirement-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:key-retirement-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:bounded-retired-signing-key\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:values-free-secret-contract\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:values-free-secret-contract\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:secret-contract-shape-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:secret-contract-shape-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:values-free-secret-contract\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:values-free-secret-contract\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The FORTY-NINTH, and the only one that needed the engine to grow a control rather than the\n * basis to find a vocabulary.\n *\n * Five candidate vocabularies were checked and eliminated by measurement: `SessionType` (the\n * eviction does not consult it), a revocation-reason enum (none existed in `saas-models`), the\n * configured axis (user type — an application-defined open string), and the ordering itself (an\n * ordering is not a set). What was actually missing was EVIDENCE: the eviction enforcing the cap\n * left only a debug line, so a security-relevant token-lifecycle act had no durable record at\n * all — which `CLAUDE.md`'s assurance-by-construction rule asks for by name.\n *\n * `CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SESSION_EVICTED` closes it, and the binding is honest because the\n * record carries `evictedIssuedAt`. The objective calls the FIFO ordering \"the property that\n * pushes a stolen chain out instead of a legitimate one\"; a record naming only the victim would\n * prove a session ended without proving the right one did. Naming when the retired chain was\n * issued is what makes the ordering reviewable from the trail rather than merely implemented.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:session-eviction-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:session-eviction-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:bounded-concurrent-sessions\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The grant AXIS is the claim, not the table name. `RuntimePrincipalDatabaseGrantAxis` is the privilege\n * vocabulary both self-managed adapters translate, and the audit trail's place on the APPEND axis — with\n * a declaration that would put it on WRITE refused at parse and again at derivation — is what makes a\n * named principal unable to alter what it recorded.\n *\n * NO audit capability: a refused declaration is a configuration error at startup, not an audited act.\n * And the scope is stated in the intent rather than implied by the binding: the application backend owns\n * its database on every adapter, so its immutability is application-layer only.\n *\n * Second demand `tamper-evident-audit-store-account` (#298): the account the application writes its\n * TAMPER-EVIDENT store (immudb) with. The intent's exclusion is the backend's OWN database; immudb is a store the\n * platform provisions and the backend does not own, where the platform issues each application a confined\n * credential (#1696) — the per-principal credential the intent is about, on the one append-only store the backend\n * writes. Its evidence is the provider's own report through the compliance-state door, so the binding gains no\n * capability: the door answers in every application, and one declaring no such provider has an empty population.\n * No dogfood programme states this objective, so the authority basis generation does not advance.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.TAMPER_RESISTANCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:runtime-principal-grant-axes\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:runtime-principal-audit-grant-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:runtime-principal-audit-grant-declaration\", \"evidence-requirement:tamper-evident-audit-store-account\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The durable record is the RUN OUTPUT, not an audit row: a repair is a subscription or invoice UPDATE\n * below the automatic audit floor. So the binding names the divergence vocabularies the recorded output\n * is total over, and no audit capability.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.BILLING.PROVIDER_RECONCILIATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:provider-billing-reconciliation\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:billing-reconciliation-divergence-accounting\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:billing-reconciliation-run-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:billing-reconciliation-run-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:provider-billing-reconciliation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:provider-billing-reconciliation\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * `UsageRecordFlushState` is the vocabulary the flush branches on, and all three members carry the\n * claim: PENDING is retried, REPORTED means the provider accepted it, UNREPORTABLE means no money moved.\n * No audit event exists for a flush — the recorded run output is the evidence.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.BILLING.USAGE_REPORTING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:metered-usage-reporting\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:metered-usage-flush-state\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:usage-flush-run-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:usage-flush-run-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:metered-usage-reporting\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:metered-usage-reporting\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * NARROW, deliberately: no audit capability. Only two classes record a refusal (the MCP client and CIMD);\n * a refused webhook, SIEM, federated-IdP or push request is reported to its caller and logged, not written\n * as an audit row. Binding the trail would assert a record most classes do not write.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.NETWORK.OUTBOUND_TARGET_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:admitted-outbound-target\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:outbound-target-admission\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:outbound-target-admission-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:outbound-target-admission-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:admitted-outbound-target\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:admitted-outbound-target\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * #3022. No audit capability, deliberately: every refusal is a startup, load or CLI refusal, and a misconfigured\n * application does not start, so there is no row to count. The committed configuration is the evidence (C1, derived\n * by the doors' own reader), and the refusals are driven (C2). NONE_BY_DESIGN: no reviewed source requirement is\n * mapped to it yet.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.CREDENTIAL_SCOPING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:module-scoped-credential-release\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:module-scoped-credential-release\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:credential-scoping-refusal\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:credential-scoping-refusal\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:module-scoped-credential-release\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:module-scoped-credential-release\"],\n },\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * Every capability the basis can attest, minus the implementation revision the composer supplies.\n *\n * ONE source, for the same reason as {@link ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS}. The composer below turns these into `capabilityAuthorityDescriptors`; the\n * compliance-programme normalizer reads them to emit the `capabilityAuthorities` a programme must carry for every capability its implementation decisions select —\n * the family refuses a selection with no declared authority (`UNKNOWN_CAPABILITY`).\n *\n * `implementationRevision` is deliberately absent: it identifies the engine build being attested and is only known to the composer's caller.\n */\n/**\n * Which ENGINE CAPABILITY an authentication method's delivery channel depends on, or `null` when the\n * engine verifies it unaided.\n *\n * This exists so the three multi-factor capability entries below can be DERIVED from the factor\n * vocabulary rather than transcribing its members (#1247) — the rule the audit-event capability\n * adopted on 2026-09-14, and the reason `pnpm assurance:uncovered-surface` reports TRANSCRIPTION_DRIFT.\n * It is `Record<AuthMethod, …>` and therefore TOTAL: a method added to the vocabulary tomorrow is a\n * compile error here, where the procurement question has to be answered, instead of being silently\n * omitted from a hand-kept list.\n *\n * It answers ONE question — what must an application have BOUGHT for this method to work at all — and\n * deliberately not the two it is easy to conflate with:\n * - WHERE a method may sit (first factor, second, either) is `AUTH_METHOD_FACTOR_MAP`;\n * - HOW STRONG it is as a second factor is `isStrongSecondFactor`, which reads the proof CHANNEL.\n * `SMS_OTP` is procurement-dependent AND restricted; `EMAIL_OTP` is procurement-dependent AND weak;\n * `MAGIC_LINK` is procurement-dependent and is not a second factor at all. Three independent facts,\n * and the defect #1247 fixed was one field being read as though it carried all of them.\n */\nexport const AUTH_METHOD_DELIVERY_ENGINE_CAPABILITY: Record<AuthMethod, EngineCapability | null> = {\n // Engine-native: verified from material the engine itself holds, with no provider in the path.\n [AuthMethod.PASSWORD]: null,\n [AuthMethod.TOTP]: null,\n [AuthMethod.PASSKEY]: null,\n // Federated: the IDENTITY PROVIDER is the application's own configuration, never an engine\n // capability it buys — so there is nothing to procure and these are `null` rather than absent.\n [AuthMethod.EXTERNAL_OAUTH2]: null,\n [AuthMethod.ORG_SAML]: null,\n [AuthMethod.ORG_OPENID_CONNECT]: null,\n // Delivered to the person over a channel the application must have bought.\n [AuthMethod.SMS_OTP]: EngineCapability.SMS,\n [AuthMethod.EMAIL_OTP]: EngineCapability.EMAIL_TRANSACTIONAL,\n [AuthMethod.MAGIC_LINK]: EngineCapability.EMAIL_TRANSACTIONAL,\n};\n\n/**\n * The second factors the engine can verify, partitioned by what an application must have procured.\n *\n * Derived from `AuthUtils.getSecondFactorMethods()`, which is itself total over\n * `AUTH_METHOD_FACTOR_MAP` — so a second factor added to the engine belongs to exactly one of the\n * three multi-factor capability entries below, computably.\n *\n * ## Why the entries still WRITE their members out, when this function could have produced them\n *\n * `pnpm assurance:uncovered-surface` reads this file as TEXT. Its parser understands exactly two\n * shapes — a literal `` `prefix:${Enum.MEMBER}` ``, and `Object.values(Enum)…` meaning every member —\n * and a call to this function is neither. Measured: replacing the three literal arrays with calls took\n * the `auth-method` surface from 5 of 9 covered to 3, not because the basis said less but because the\n * one instrument that measures it went blind. A derivation nothing can read is less verifiable than a\n * transcription, not more.\n *\n * `Object.values(AuthMethod)` is not the escape either: the parser reads it as EVERY member, and these\n * capabilities cover a subset, so it would report 9 of 9 falsely — a green worse than the gap.\n *\n * So the refs are literal and the drift risk is closed by a PIN instead: the `partitions the engine's\n * second-factor vocabulary…` test in `assurance-authority-basis.schemas.test.ts` asserts the three\n * arrays are exactly this partition. Add a second factor to `AUTH_METHOD_FACTOR_MAP` and that test\n * fails naming it, which is where the procurement question belongs.\n */\nexport const secondFactorMethodsRequiring = (capability: EngineCapability | null): string[] =>\n AuthUtils.getSecondFactorMethods()\n .filter((method) => AUTH_METHOD_DELIVERY_ENGINE_CAPABILITY[method] === capability)\n .sort()\n .map((method) => `auth-method:${method}`);\n\nexport const ASSURANCE_CAPABILITY_AUTHORITIES = [\n {\n /*\n * Ingested-content inspection, anchored on the vocabulary the engine BRANCHES on.\n *\n * `FileStatus` is derived whole, deliberately: the members that are not the good outcome —\n * `INFECTED`, `QUARANTINED`, `FAILED` — are the substance of the claim, not its exceptions. Naming\n * only `CLEAN` would describe a system in which inspection never concludes anything else.\n *\n * It is the right vocabulary because the engine reads it for BOTH halves of the control: the scan\n * outcome (`FILE_STATUS_TRANSITIONS` maps SCANNING -> CLEAN | INFECTED | FAILED, and INFECTED ->\n * QUARANTINED) and servability (`FILE_DOWNLOADABLE_STATUSES`). A scan that concluded and a file that\n * may be served are the same decision expressed once.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the status vocabulary and the transition guard exist in every application. What\n * is operator-configured is whether a scanner is reachable (`InfraCapability.ANTIVIRUS_SCANNING`,\n * fulfilled by ClamAV, with YARA optional beside it) and whether a field declares `scanPolicy:\n * 'required'`. Exactly two axes, and that stayed accurate through the 2026-09-09 repair of the\n * application-wide switch: reachability IS the application-wide opt-in — `shouldScan` falls back to\n * `clamavScanner.isConfigured() || yaraScanner.isEnabled()` for a field that declares no policy — so\n * the first axis now carries a second consequence rather than a third axis being added. Before that\n * repair the fallback read a configuration path no schema declares and answered `false` in every\n * application, which is why this prose has never named a global flag. Deriving keeps the count at two;\n * a separately-declared boolean would have made it three, one of them able to disagree with the other.\n * NOT `REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY`: the engine slot that once spelled this was removed\n * in #292 because no provider token could fill it, so requiring it would make the objective\n * uncomposable for every application.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:ingested-content-inspection\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(FileStatus).sort().map((status) => `file-status:${status}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The application's OWN audit store (Layer 1), which every application has.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, and until 2026-09-14 it was not: this capability required\n * `EngineCapability.COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL`, a gate that arrived in `fc9dd93b` with no stated reason. That engine\n * capability is the Layer-2 provider FAN-OUT (`EngineCapabilityResolutionMode.FAN_OUT`) — its own documentation\n * says security events \"are recorded in the application's own database regardless\", and\n * `CompositeAuditLogSink` calls itself \"NOT the authoritative store\". No evidence or verification body demands\n * Layer-2 delivery; the security-event body says outright that it \"does not prove delivery to a Layer-2 sink\".\n *\n * The gate made the derivation contradict the evidence. On Wonder CRM, which does not enable the fan-out, it\n * derived 16 objectives NOT_APPLICABLE and 11 UNDETERMINED, while the application audit door returned 1,096\n * rows and the emitted-evidence collector recorded 48 measurements from them (#302, #297). #302's own\n * recollection read the control as operating at Layer 1 and still had to record `not_applicable_as_configured`.\n * A verdict that says \"there is nothing here to claim\" beside rows that exist is the over-claim's mirror image,\n * and it let an application escape every audit-attested objective by leaving an optional provider unconfigured.\n *\n * So an absent fan-out removes nothing an objective demands. Should a demand ever require EXTERNAL delivery or a\n * provider-backed tamper-evident destination, that is a separate capability requiring the engine capability,\n * bound only where it is demanded — never a condition on reading the store every application writes.\n *\n * The implementation refs are the engine's core event vocabulary derived WHOLE, because each member is a\n * literal-typed event class the store records. A member being listed does not claim it is EMITTED: an\n * `audit-event-unemitted` marker and each body's emitter check decide that, per member.\n */\n // Version 2 (2026-09-14): availability and implementation refs changed, so a programme accepted against version 1\n // is refused as a version mismatch rather than as an unexplained implementation difference.\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:audit-events\", capabilityVersion: 2 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(CoreAuditableEventType).sort().map((eventType) => `audit-event-type:${eventType}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * WHO an audited action is attributed to, as a closed vocabulary (#2488).\n *\n * `WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION`'s C1 is a DECLARED clause — \"the sentinel vocabulary as a named closed set\" — and a\n * declared clause is answered by what the basis names. Until 2026-10-05 the objective bound only\n * `capability:audit-events`, whose refs are event TYPES, so the set C1 asks about was named nowhere: a member added\n * to it, or the anomaly member merged into an ordinary one, changed no basis and was seen by nothing.\n *\n * Every member is named, the routine ones beside the anomaly, because the control is the CONTRAST: `UNATTRIBUTED`\n * (a principal was expected and could not be resolved) means something only against `SYSTEM` and\n * `UNAUTHENTICATED`, which are ordinary.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:audit-actor-attribution\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(AuditActorKind).map((kind) => `audit-actor-kind:${kind}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The steps of an access grant's life, as the trail records them (#2488).\n *\n * One vocabulary for both grant kinds: the per-tenant crossing grant and the application-wide two-person grant\n * write the same `PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE` event with a `transition` from this enum.\n * `WILDO.ACCESS.SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES`'s C3 counts the TERMINAL members (`REVOKED`, `EXPIRED`), so the set it\n * discriminates on is now named whole by the basis rather than only inside one clause's match.\n *\n * Naming the set claims nothing about any grant: that a transition EXISTS is not that it was recorded. The\n * clause's count decides the latter.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:access-grant-lifecycle\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(PlatformAccessGrantLifecycleTransition).map((transition) => `access-grant-transition:${transition}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Why a pending-decision act was refused (#2488), named WHOLE.\n *\n * `REQUESTER_MAY_NOT_ACT` is the separation `WILDO.ACCESS.REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION` states and the member its\n * C1 counts. The other members are the rest of the predicate's decision space, plus the refusals the door decides\n * before asking it (the delivery's organization, a granting organization's policy, an actor whose authority lapsed),\n * named so that a member added to either is a basis change. Always available: the predicate is engine code every\n * human-decision plane asks, with nothing to enable. Naming the set claims no refusal happened.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:pending-decision-authorization\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(HumanDecision_RefusalReason).map((reason) => `human-decision-refusal-reason:${reason}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a missing consent-gated purpose costs a person (#2488): nothing withheld (INFORM), the declaring operation\n * withheld, or the whole service withheld. Named WHOLE, INFORM included, because the enforcement is the contrast\n * between the members. Always available: an application that declares no requirement simply withholds nothing.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:consent-gate-enforcement\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ConsentGateRefusal).map((refusal) => `consent-gate-refusal:${refusal}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The governed-document approval gate (#2538) and the approval state it reads, each named WHOLE: the switch's two\n * positions, and the two states a release can be in. Always available: the gate is engine code every serving and\n * asking surface reads, and whether an application ARMED it is a declaration its evidence reads, not a capability\n * it enables. Naming the set claims nothing was withheld.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:governed-document-approval-gate\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(GovernedDocumentApprovalGate).map((position) => `governed-document-approval-gate:${position}`),\n ...Object.values(GovernedDocumentReleaseApprovalState).map((state) => `governed-document-release-approval-state:${state}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The gate on a secondary use of a tenant's agent-work decisions (#2488), as four vocabularies named WHOLE: the\n * authorization's status (only ACTIVE admits an export; NOT_GRANTED and REVOKED are the two ways of not holding\n * one), the basis it names, why an export was refused, and why an exported dataset may no longer be used. Always\n * available: an application that never exports simply holds no authorization.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:secondary-use-authorization\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(EvaluationExportAuthorizationStatus).map((status) => `evaluation-export-authorization-status:${status}`),\n ...Object.values(EvaluationExportBasis).map((basis) => `evaluation-export-basis:${basis}`),\n ...Object.values(EvaluationDatasetExportRefusalReason).map((reason) => `evaluation-dataset-export-refusal-reason:${reason}`),\n ...Object.values(EvaluationDatasetInvalidationReason).map((reason) => `evaluation-dataset-invalidation-reason:${reason}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Privileged-access review: the engine ENUMERATES, the operator DECIDES and RECORDS (#202).\n *\n * `ALWAYS_AVAILABLE` because the enumeration needs no engine capability to be switched on — roles\n * and memberships exist in every application, and `enumeratePrivilegedAccessPopulation` reads\n * them through the ordinary repositories.\n *\n * The host-artifact requirement is the whole point of the split: without it this capability would\n * read as \"Wildo reviews privileged access\", which is false and is the claim the objective's four\n * demands would then be quoted against. With it, an application that binds this objective must\n * declare where its review occurrences live, and one that cannot produce them fails to satisfy the\n * capability rather than silently claiming it.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF, capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_SCOPES].map((scope) => `privileged-access-scope:${scope}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_HOST_RECORD_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n identity: { capabilityRef: SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF, capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(SubjectExportPurpose).sort().map((purpose) => `subject-export-purpose:${purpose}`),\n profiles: [\n {\n profileRef: \"capability-profile:subject-data-export-safe-baseline-v1\",\n parameters: [{ parameterRef: \"parameter:export-format\", allowedOptionRefs: [\"option:json-machine-readable\"] }],\n },\n ],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_HOST_CONFIGURATION_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Erasure that RETAINS where the law requires it. `implementationRefs` name the two modes a resource may declare, so the capability is anchored to vocabulary the\n * engine actually branches on rather than to prose — the same discipline as `subject-export-purpose:` above. Since #1635 they also name the statutory\n * GROUND a resource may declare (`retentionPolicy.statutoryRetention`), on which an erasure keeps a business record restricted until its period ends,\n * or leaves it in use where the resource declares why (`staysInUseBecause`).\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:subject-erasure\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(ErasureRetentionMode).sort().map((mode) => `erasure-retention-mode:${mode}`),\n ...Object.values(StatutoryRetentionGround).sort().map((ground) => `statutory-retention-ground:${ground}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The per-store ACCOUNTING a subject erasure returns, named by the two vocabularies its receipt is\n * written in. `SubjectErasureDisposition` is what each dependent edge the erasure walks — direct, or below a\n * dependent it deletes (#976) — was classified as before anything ran; `SubjectErasureExternalEffectStatus` is what each registered\n * external effect answered. They are separate enums on purpose — a local edge commits with the\n * transaction and an external effect cannot — so they are named side by side rather than folded into one prefix.\n *\n * Both derived WHOLE, including the members that are not the good outcome: `UNCLASSIFIED` and\n * `UNSUPPORTED_DEFERRED` (an edge at any walked depth nobody classified, or one that would defer its teardown\n * to a queue, on which the orchestrator REFUSES before any write rather than guessing), and every status\n * that `isIncompleteSubjectErasureExternalEffect` reads as data still live at a third party.\n * `RESTRICTED_BY_DECLARATION` (#1123) is a leave-alone edge whose parent may not be deleted while its\n * rows exist; below a dependent the erasure deletes, such an edge with rows REFUSES the erasure. The claim\n * is that those outcomes surface as themselves at every depth the erasure walks — refused before any\n * write, or reported — and naming only the complete ones would describe an erasure that never meets a\n * store it cannot finish. Since #976 a descendant edge below a deleted dependent is classified by the\n * same classifier and reported in `descendantEdges`, so the dispositions are those of every walked edge.\n *\n * `ProviderCredentialDeletionReason.USER_ERASED` is anchored MEMBER-level, deliberately: it is the\n * reason the credential destruction record carries when an ERASURE destroyed the credential (#975).\n * The vocabulary's other members are revocations and a tenant purge — other controls' reasons — so\n * deriving the enum whole here would claim them for erasure propagation.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the report is the return value of every erasure. What an application decides is\n * whether it RETAINS that receipt — the engine persists none of it — which is why the evidence body\n * homes it on the application's own record.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:erasure-propagation-report\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(SubjectErasureDisposition).map((disposition) => `subject-erasure-disposition:${disposition}`),\n ...Object.values(SubjectErasureExternalEffectStatus).map((status) => `subject-erasure-external-effect-status:${status}`),\n `provider-credential-deletion-reason:${ProviderCredentialDeletionReason.USER_ERASED}`,\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The second factors that need NO procurement — today `TOTP` and `PASSKEY` — so ALWAYS_AVAILABLE is\n * a true statement about every application. They are written out rather than computed for the\n * reason recorded on `secondFactorMethodsRequiring`, which pins them.\n *\n * Until #1247 this entry named two methods by hand and the other two were simply ABSENT, with a\n * comment as the only record of why — that they depend on engine capabilities an application may\n * not have bought. That reasoning is about PROCUREMENT, and absence was doing double duty as though\n * it were a statement about STRENGTH: an application that HAS bought the email capability gets\n * `EMAIL_OTP` as a second factor, and the basis made no claim about it either way. The two now have\n * capability entries of their own, below, where `availability` STATES the procurement fact instead\n * of omission implying it — and because all three partition one derived set, a second factor added\n * to the engine lands in exactly one of them rather than quietly in none.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:multi-factor-authentication\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [`auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSKEY}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.TOTP}`],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The SMS second factor, whose availability is a PROCUREMENT fact and is stated as one (#1247).\n *\n * Deliberately NOT added to `WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR`'s `requiredCapabilityRefs`: that would\n * make the objective unclaimable by an application that never bought SMS, which is the opposite of\n * the truth — such an application has a perfectly good second factor in TOTP or a passkey. What\n * this entry does is let the basis SAY something about `SMS_OTP` where it previously said nothing.\n *\n * Its own strength is a separate question from its availability, and 800-63B-4 §3.2.9 answers it:\n * PSTN is the one RESTRICTED authenticator. The basis records availability here; the engine records\n * the strength judgement at `isStrongSecondFactor`, which excludes email rather than SMS.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:multi-factor-authentication-sms\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [`auth-method:${AuthMethod.SMS_OTP}`],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY, engineCapability: EngineCapability.SMS },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The email second factor. Same shape as the SMS entry, and the same non-membership in\n * `requiredCapabilityRefs` for the same reason.\n *\n * Strength, again separately: an email OTP shares its channel with a magic link and with password\n * recovery, so `isStrongSecondFactor` excludes it and `sharesProofChannel` stops it completing a\n * second factor beside another email-channel method. Availability and strength are two facts and\n * this field carries only the first.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:multi-factor-authentication-email\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [`auth-method:${AuthMethod.EMAIL_OTP}`],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY, engineCapability: EngineCapability.EMAIL_TRANSACTIONAL },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The administrative-continuity FLOORS, named by the two refusals that ARE the control.\n *\n * `AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode` is the closed vocabulary those refusals answer with, so the\n * implementation refs are the mechanism itself rather than a description of it — the same shape as\n * the erasure modes and auth methods above. A floor is engine-native and unconditional: an\n * application cannot decline to retain an administrator, which is why availability is\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE and no host artifact is required.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:administrative-continuity-floor\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode).sort().map((code) => `administrative-continuity:${code}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * \"How much authority\" — the ceiling on what a principal may grant, and the same declared\n * operation-role gate applied at a surface that is not a controller.\n *\n * `implementationRefs` name the two ROLE-TABLE SCOPES the ceiling resolves against, because that\n * split IS the mechanism: a held role is expanded through the hierarchy of the scope that granted\n * it, so an organization-scoped grant can never confer application-scoped authority. Naming the\n * individual roles instead would enumerate an application's own table, which is not the\n * framework's to attest. `USER_SELF` and `ANONYMOUS` are absent because neither carries a role\n * table for a ceiling to resolve against.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:operation-role-authorization\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [`authorization-role-scope:${ResourcePrimaryScope.APPLICATION}`, `authorization-role-scope:${ResourcePrimaryScope.ORGANIZATIONS}`],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What the operator DECIDED about each derived exposure — #300's Layer 2, named by both closed\n * vocabularies it runs on.\n *\n * TWO refs sets rather than one, because the capability is a PAIR and either alone describes\n * something else. The signal vocabulary says which exposures an application can take a position\n * on; the posture vocabulary says which positions exist. Naming only the signals would attest that\n * exposures are enumerated and say nothing about a decision having been made; naming only the\n * postures would attest a vocabulary of choices with nothing to choose about.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: both derivation and declaration are engine-native and need no provider. An\n * application that has declared nothing is COVERED by this capability and REPORTED as undeclared\n * by it — which is the distinction the whole layer turns on, and the reason absence is a finding\n * rather than a gap in the capability.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:risk-treatment-declaration\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(ApplicationRiskSignalRef).map((signalRef) => `risk-signal:${signalRef}`),\n ...Object.values(RiskTreatmentPosture).map((posture) => `risk-treatment-posture:${posture}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * \"Over which rows\" — the narrowing decision, named by the closed vocabulary it answers with.\n *\n * All four kinds are listed, including the two that do NOT narrow. The stamp records the decision\n * whatever it was, and an access review asking \"why does this person see this row\" needs\n * `ORGANIZATION_WIDE` and `NOT_NARROWED` as much as `UNIT_NARROWED` — an answer that only ever\n * recorded the confining cases could not distinguish a grant that reached everything from a\n * resource that never participated.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:organization-unit-scope-confinement\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind).sort().map((kind) => `organization-unit-narrowing:${kind}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The delegated exchange, named by the two grant types that carry a USER's authorization.\n *\n * `CLIENT_CREDENTIALS` is deliberately absent and its absence is the whole distinction: that grant\n * authenticates a machine acting as itself, so there is no user to authorize anything and nothing\n * for this objective to attest. Including it would make a delegated-authorization claim out of an\n * exchange no data subject ever saw.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:delegated-authorization\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [`oauth-grant-type:${OAuthGrantType.AUTHORIZATION_CODE}`, `oauth-grant-type:${OAuthGrantType.REFRESH_TOKEN}`],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The re-proof ceremony, named by the three factors `reAuthenticate` actually accepts.\n *\n * All three are engine-native, which is what makes this ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: `PASSWORD`, `TOTP` (a\n * code or a backup code, through the same anti-replay authority login uses) and `PASSKEY` (an\n * assertion produced under a STEP_UP ceremony whose challenge key a login assertion cannot\n * redeem).\n *\n * `SMS_OTP` and `EMAIL_OTP` are absent for a reason of their OWN, and this comment used to borrow\n * the multi-factor entry's — that they need a provider an application may not have bought. That is\n * true of them generally and is NOT why they are missing here: `reAuthenticate` refuses them\n * outright. Its trailing `else` accepts no method beyond the three above, so an application that\n * has bought both channels still cannot re-prove with either. Procurement is an availability fact\n * and belongs to `availability`; this is an absence of IMPLEMENTATION, which is what an\n * implementation ref is for. Corrected under #1247, where the same conflation was the defect.\n *\n * The SSO methods are absent because an IdP assertion is a first factor, not a re-proof that the\n * human is still present.\n *\n * This capability is DISTINCT from `capability:multi-factor-authentication` even though the two\n * overlap on `TOTP` and `PASSKEY`, and merging them would lose the distinction the objectives\n * draw: MFA asks whether a second factor was ever required, step-up asks whether identity was\n * re-proved for THIS action.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:step-up-authentication\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n /*\n * #2923: and the verdict every decision plane reaches on the proof an answer carries, when the decision requires a\n * step-up (`DecisionStepUpProofKind`, read by `checkDecisionStepUp` on the operation-approval, conversational,\n * actor/flow and representative-admission planes). Derived, so a verdict added to the vocabulary is anchored here.\n */\n implementationRefs: [\n `auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSKEY}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSWORD}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.TOTP}`,\n ...Object.values(DecisionStepUpProofKind).sort().map((kind) => `decision-step-up-proof:${kind}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Withdrawal when the conferring relationship ends, named by the closed status set the engine\n * branches on: `ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY`, read through\n * `isAuthorityConferringOrganizationStatus`.\n *\n * `TRIAL_EXPIRED` is deliberately NOT in that set and so is absent here — an expired trial stops\n * a tenant BUYING, not its members from administering what they already have, and listing it\n * would claim a withdrawal the engine does not perform. The refs are kept in step with the set\n * by construction rather than by memory: they are the enum members, not a transcription.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:access-withdrawal-on-conferring-status\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY].sort().map((status) => `organization-status-without-authority:${status}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * An erased-but-retained row behaving as deleted, named by the per-record marker that decides it.\n *\n * BOTH members are listed, and `ACTIVE` is not filler: the control is a two-valued rule, and the\n * predicate's hardest recovered defect was about which rows a marker's ABSENCE selects — Mongo's\n * `$ne` matches a null field while Postgres `<>` excludes it under three-valued logic, so the two\n * adapters disagreed about every pre-opt-in row until the SQL compilers were taught\n * `IS DISTINCT FROM`. Naming only `RETAINED` would describe the hidden half of a rule whose\n * difficulty is entirely in the visible half.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:retained-record-concealment\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n // retention-authority: N/A — these are CAPABILITY REFERENCES, not a re-expression of the rule.\n // DERIVED from `RetentionStatus`, not listed from it. Interpolating each member's symbol — which\n // is what stood here — keeps the string-literal checker quiet and leaves the LIST hand-written,\n // so a third status would be silently unclaimed: the drift `assurance-objective-binding.md`\n // calls invisible, since a basis is read by people who cannot check it. Nothing here branches on\n // a status or rebuilds the hide predicate; the total is the point.\n implementationRefs: Object.values(RetentionStatus).sort().map((status) => `retention-status:${status}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The device-stored pseudonymous identifier, named by the policy vocabulary that governs it.\n *\n * `DISABLED` is the DEFAULT and is the reason this capability is worth attesting at all: absent an\n * explicit application policy nothing is minted, sent, stored or recorded, and the backend\n * additionally REFUSES an inbound header — so a misconfigured client cannot start populating a\n * pseudonymous identifier in an application's retained audit trail without anyone opting in.\n * A capability listing only the collecting scopes would invert that reading.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:client-install-identifier-policy\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ClientInstanceIdScope).sort().map((scope) => `client-instance-id-scope:${scope}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Declared retention windows, named by the classes a window is declared PER.\n *\n * The classes are separate because their lawful windows differ, and the audit-trail class most of\n * all: it is the record an operator needs to DEFEND itself, which is the Art. 17(3) ground on\n * which erasure may lawfully be refused. Collapsing the classes here would let a shorter\n * customer-data window be read as governing the evidence that justifies keeping it.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:declared-retention-window\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(DataRetentionClass).sort().map((retentionClass) => `data-retention-class:${retentionClass}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Legal holds (#1634, bound by #1845): the EXCEPTION to a retention period. A hold suspends every deletion path for\n * its scope (the interactive deletes and scrubs refuse, the retention-class sweep skips, the subject erasure leaves the\n * rows as they are, the tenant purge and the file cleanup pass over them). Every path reads the same active holds,\n * fail-closed (`readActiveLegalHolds`): the row paths decide through `resolveLegalHeldRows`, and the tenant purge,\n * which asks which TENANTS a hold covers rather than which rows, through `resolveLegalHeldOrganizations`.\n *\n * Named by the seven closed vocabularies the mechanism branches on, each derived WHOLE:\n *\n * - `LegalHoldScopeKind`: what a hold covers (a tenant, rows of one resource, one data subject);\n * - `LegalHoldGround`: why (the Art. 17(3)(b) / (e) grounds), the ground the audit rows and an erasure report carry;\n * - `LegalHoldStatus`: ACTIVE and RELEASED, with no expiry state — a hold ends by decision, never by clock;\n * - `LegalHoldPlacementTier`: who placed it, and therefore the only tier that may release it;\n * - `LegalHolds_Operations`: the two verbs, the only writes a client reaches;\n * - `LegalHoldErrorCode`: the two refusals, including `legal_hold_state_unverifiable`, the fail-closed answer when\n * the holds cannot be read. Naming only the held refusal would describe a predicate that can always read;\n * - `LegalHoldSubjectAttributionKind`: which rows a data-subject hold covers, derived from the subject-export graph.\n * Its UNRESOLVABLE member HOLDS a row it cannot attribute, which is the over-preserving side of the guarantee.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the mechanism ships in every application and needs no engine capability or provider. Whether an\n * application ever PLACES a hold is a fact about its operation, which `legal-hold-record` reads.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:legal-hold\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldScopeKind).map((scopeKind) => `legal-hold-scope-kind:${scopeKind}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldGround).map((ground) => `legal-hold-ground:${ground}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldStatus).map((status) => `legal-hold-status:${status}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldPlacementTier).map((tier) => `legal-hold-placement-tier:${tier}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHolds_Operations).map((operation) => `legal-hold-operation:${operation}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldErrorCode).map((code) => `legal-hold-error-code:${code}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldSubjectAttributionKind).map((kind) => `legal-hold-subject-attribution:${kind}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a subject may decide, named by the closed consent vocabulary the decision is held in.\n *\n * `ConsentPurpose` only (#534 — a SET of purposes, replacing the ordered `DataProcessingConsent`).\n * It is now the ONLY subject decision in the user privacy block, so this capability's\n * implementation set is total over what a subject can decide rather than a selection from it.\n *\n * ## History, kept because the exclusion it argued has dissolved rather than been overturned\n *\n * A `privacyLevel` field (MINIMAL / STANDARD / ENHANCED) sat beside the purposes under the same\n * audit decorator, and this note excluded it — first for a WRONG reason (\"a visibility\n * preference\"; the visibility enums are `UserProfileVisibility` and\n * `OrganizationProfileVisibility`, and that adjacency was the likely source of the mix-up), then\n * for a sound one: it had no production reader, and a field nothing reads cannot be evidence of\n * any control.\n *\n * #1280 removed the field outright. Researched against B2B practice: an end user of a B2B product\n * has no individual dial over product-usage collection — their employer is the controller and the\n * DPA governs — and on the website side the settled pattern is granular per-category consent,\n * which `ConsentPurpose` already is. A three-step ladder would have bundled those categories,\n * which is the shape the specificity requirement of consent exists to refuse.\n *\n * The lesson worth keeping for the next candidate: a decision leaf earns a place in this\n * capability's implementation set only if a lawful basis rests on it. Marking two fields with the\n * same audit decorator is not evidence that both are consent.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:consent-decision-record\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ConsentPurpose).sort().map((purpose) => `consent-purpose:${purpose}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The ground each processing purpose stands on, named by the closed Art. 6(1) vocabulary it is\n * declared in (#1288).\n *\n * Every member is listed because each carries a DIFFERENT obligation, which is what makes naming\n * them substantive rather than cosmetic: consent must be withdrawable, a legal obligation must be\n * nameable, and legitimate interests is lawful only where a balancing test was done — the one\n * member-level distinction the declaring schema already enforces, by refusing that basis without\n * an assessment. Found by #301's contract anchoring; its file carried no marker, so the\n * vocabulary window had never reached it.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the declaration is engine-native configuration and needs no provider. An\n * application that has declared nothing is COVERED by this capability and REPORTED as unanswered\n * by it, exactly as with risk treatment.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:lawful-basis-declaration\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(LawfulBasis).sort().map((basis) => `lawful-basis:${basis}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Tenancy derived from the caller, named by the execution types it is derived FROM.\n *\n * Every member is listed because each resolves tenancy differently and the differences are the\n * control: an `ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` is bound to one tenant, `PUBLIC_EXECUTION` has none,\n * `INTERNALLY_INITIATED_REQUEST` is the framework acting as itself. The objective's demand is\n * that this resolution is never OFFERED as a parameter — to a client, to an agent, or to a\n * retrieval surface — so the vocabulary being attested is precisely the set of answers the\n * runtime may reach without asking the request.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:caller-derived-tenancy\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ExecutionContext_ExecutionType).sort().map((executionType) => `execution-type:${executionType}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a client identity rests on, named by the two provenances a registration can have.\n *\n * `DYNAMIC` is the one the objective is about — a client that \"asserted its own name and redirect\n * URIs and proved nothing\", granted no roles, capped at identity scopes and always facing the\n * user's consent prompt. `OPERATOR` is listed with it because the control is the DISTINCTION:\n * a capability naming only the self-registered case could not attest that the other kind exists\n * and is treated differently, which is the whole posture.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:client-registration-provenance\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin).sort().map((origin) => `oauth-client-registration-origin:${origin}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Whether a declared operation is actually SERVICED, and whether a custom verb authored the\n * contract it exposes — the two verdicts the shared boot/request predicate answers with.\n *\n * BOTH vocabularies, because the objective has two halves and each is a different failure: an\n * operation that reports success having performed nothing, and a named verb that silently widens\n * into an unconstrained write. A capability naming only the first would leave the second\n * unattested while looking complete.\n *\n * `NOT_APPLICABLE` is listed with the coverage verdicts because the gate's REMIT is part of its\n * claim: naming only SERVICEABLE and UNSERVICEABLE would read as covering every operation, when\n * core operations and variants the service tier never enters are deliberately outside it.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:operation-implementation-coverage\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(ResourceOperationImplementationCoverage).sort().map((coverage) => `operation-implementation-coverage:${coverage}`),\n ...Object.values(ResourceOperationRequestContractBreadth).sort().map((breadth) => `operation-request-contract-breadth:${breadth}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * One transactional store per application (#3328), named by the classification the registry build refuses on: an\n * adapter that OWNS a transaction may only be the application's store, and one that owns none (read-through,\n * introspection) may sit beside it. Derived whole from `PERSISTENCE_ADAPTER_TRANSACTION_OWNERSHIP`, the map the\n * registry reads, so an adapter added to the enum is attested with its classification or fails to compile there.\n *\n * Replaced `capability:declared-persistence-isolation`, whose vocabulary was the removed isolation declaration.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:single-transactional-store\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(PersistenceAdapter).sort()\n .map((adapter) => `persistence-adapter-transaction-ownership:${adapter}:${PERSISTENCE_ADAPTER_TRANSACTION_OWNERSHIP[adapter]}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The categories a field may be DECLARED to hold, which is the whole objective: an inventory is\n * authored on the field itself and never inferred from its name, because pattern-matching\n * identifiers is a guess whose misses go silently undisclosed. The vocabulary is what an\n * application chooses from, so it is exactly what the capability attests.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:personal-data-field-inventory\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(PersonalDataCategory).sort().map((category) => `personal-data-category:${category}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Provider selection as the egress gate, named by the resolution modes a capability may be\n * satisfied through.\n *\n * The control is what happens with NO selection: nothing leaves, and the work is served locally.\n * So the attested mechanism is the resolution itself rather than any particular provider — and\n * deliberately not the `EngineCapability` list, which would be a hand-drawn subset of \"the ones\n * that cause egress\" and would drift the first time a capability changed shape.\n *\n * Selecting a processor includes selecting WHERE it processes (#3513), so the capability also names how a chosen\n * processing region is reached (`ProviderProcessingRegionReachKind`: the region selects the endpoint or the request\n * parameter the product uses, or it is the account's) and how it therefore holds (`ProcessingRegionHolding`: enforced,\n * attested or neither). Both are READ by a clause: the computed `recipients-and-processors` document fact states each\n * chosen region with its reach and holding (`chosenProcessingRegions`), so a published notice says which regions the\n * product enforces and which the operator only attests.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:provider-selection-opt-in\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(EngineCapabilityResolutionMode).sort().map((mode) => `engine-capability-resolution-mode:${mode}`),\n ...Object.values(ProcessingRegionHolding).sort().map((holding) => `processing-region-holding:${holding}`),\n ...Object.values(ProviderProcessingRegionReachKind).sort().map((kind) => `processing-region-reach:${kind}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Whether an AI use DECIDES something about a person, declared per AI capability (`aiUsePosture`) or, since #2838, on\n * every agent running on it (`FlowsActors_Agent.aiUse`).\n *\n * The refs are DERIVED from `AI_ENGINE_CAPABILITIES`, the vocabulary a document asks about, so a new AI\n * capability joins this capability by being named there rather than by anyone remembering it here.\n * Always available: the declaration surface is configuration, and an application enabling no AI\n * capability is simply asked nothing.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:ai-use-posture-declaration\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...AI_ENGINE_CAPABILITIES].sort().map((capability) => `engine-capability:${capability}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The use domain an AI use declares (`AiUseDomain`, #2838), the closed vocabulary its regulatory class is derived from\n * (`deriveAiUseRiskTier`), with the two vocabularies the evidence reads beside it: where each use is declared\n * (`AiUseDeclarationSource`) and the tier the derivation answers (`AiUseRiskTier`). The refs are DERIVED from the\n * enums, so a member added tomorrow joins the capability by being declared. Always available: the declaration is configuration and agent definitions, and an application\n * running no AI use is asked nothing.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:ai-use-domain-classification\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AiUseDeclarationSource).sort().map((source) => `ai-use-declaration-source:${source}`),\n ...Object.values(AiUseDomain).sort().map((domain) => `ai-use-domain:${domain}`),\n ...Object.values(AiUseRiskTier).sort().map((tier) => `ai-use-risk-tier:${tier}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * How a tool reaches the application's data (`FunctionToolAuthorityKind`, #2839), the vocabulary every tool declares\n * on `FunctionTool.authority`. Derived from the enum, so a kind added tomorrow joins the capability by being declared.\n * Always available: an application with no agents is an empty population, not an inapplicable objective (#2292's\n * precedent); a gate on an AI engine capability would also read a build-time-only capability as applicable.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-tool-authority-declaration\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n // With the turn triggers, because the claim covers what a turn started by content from outside is offered.\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AutonomousTurnTrigger).sort().map((trigger) => `autonomous-turn-trigger:${trigger}`),\n ...Object.values(FunctionToolAuthorityKind).sort().map((kind) => `function-tool-authority:${kind}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Who decides an agent's held action (`HumanDecision_RouteKind`, #2839): the person whose turn raised it, a role, or an\n * assignee. A ROLE or ASSIGNEE route refuses an answer from the requester, so a reviewer other than them decides.\n * Beside it (#2843), which record suspended an agent (one organization's, or the application's) and why a call was\n * refused for it (suspended, or a suspension that could not be read, which refuses rather than runs), each derived\n * whole from its enum.\n * Always available, for the same reason as the tool authority above.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-human-oversight\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n // With the consequence the join reads (a use that affects a person must reach a gate) and the planes it covers: the three\n // where an agent's or a held operation's action waits. NOT the representative-admission plane, which records a firm\n // admitting a representative, no AI action; naming the whole enum would claim it.\n implementationRefs: [\n // In the array's lexical order: the two `agent-suspension-` sets sort first (#2843).\n ...Object.values(AgentSuspensionRefusalReason).sort().map((reason) => `agent-suspension-refusal:${reason}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentSuspensionScope).sort().map((scope) => `agent-suspension-scope:${scope}`),\n ...Object.values(AiDecisionConsequence).sort().map((consequence) => `ai-decision-consequence:${consequence}`),\n `human-decision-plane:${HumanDecision_Plane.ACTOR_SYSTEM}`,\n `human-decision-plane:${HumanDecision_Plane.CONVERSATIONAL}`,\n `human-decision-plane:${HumanDecision_Plane.OPERATION_APPROVAL}`,\n ...Object.values(HumanDecision_RouteKind).sort().map((route) => `human-decision-route:${route}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The model-spend limits (#2844, #2935, #3030), derived whole from the engine's own vocabulary: the LIMIT features a plan\n * grants (the generation allowance, the person ceiling, and one ceiling per `ModelUsageUnit`, each derived through\n * `modelUsageCeilingFeatureIdOf` so a unit added tomorrow is claimed with its limit), the units themselves, the doors\n * that pay the organization allowance, the doors a person's ceiling counts and the doors asked before\n * EACH model call (each a `ModelSpendDoor` set filtered through the engine's own predicate, so a door that stops paying\n * or stops being asked leaves the ref set instead of being over-claimed), the limit that refused and why, and the limit\n * semantic that makes a grant engage. A call outside any door, and the estimate an unreported call is charged, are no\n * vocabulary and are stated in the intent and the evidence's limits instead. Always available: an application that grants neither limit has an uncapped population, which is\n * what the DECLARED evidence reports, not an inapplicable objective (#2292's precedent).\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:model-spend-limit\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n `model-spend-limit-feature:${A2A_PERSON_TOKEN_CEILING_FEATURE_ID}`,\n `model-spend-limit-feature:${A2A_TOKEN_BUDGET_FEATURE_ID}`,\n ...Object.values(ModelUsageUnit).map((unit) => `model-spend-limit-feature:${modelUsageCeilingFeatureIdOf(unit)}`),\n ...Object.values(ModelUsageUnit).map((unit) => `model-spend-usage-unit:${unit}`),\n ...Object.values(ModelSpendDoor).filter(modelSpendDoorChargesTokenBudget).sort().map((door) => `model-spend-door:${door}`),\n ...Object.values(ModelSpendDoor).filter(modelSpendDoorChargesPersonCeiling).sort().map((door) => `model-spend-person-ceiling-door:${door}`),\n ...Object.values(ModelSpendDoor).filter(modelSpendDoorAdmitsEachModelCall).sort().map((door) => `model-spend-per-call-door:${door}`),\n ...Object.values(TokenSpendCeiling).sort().map((ceiling) => `model-spend-ceiling:${ceiling}`),\n ...Object.values(A2ATokenBudgetDenialReason).sort().map((reason) => `model-spend-refusal-reason:${reason}`),\n // How a plan's grant composes with the definition default: CEILING is what makes a finite grant engage on a limit\n // whose default is unlimited, FLOOR the contrast. Named whole, because the semantic IS the decision.\n ...Object.values(FeatureLimitSemantic).sort().map((semantic) => `model-spend-limit-semantic:${semantic}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The burst throttle on the external agent transports (#2936), named by the one vocabulary it decides with: WHOM it\n * counts a caller against, derived whole. Every member is an owner (a person, an organization, the application),\n * and the machine credential is deliberately not one, which is the claim that a tenant cannot buy headroom by issuing\n * credentials. Beside it (#2994), whom an operation's own declared limit counts, also derived whole: the machine\n * credential first, else the person (through a client they delegated to, in the application, or as a linked chat\n * member; the organization and the application are defensive fallbacks the key keeps), the vocabulary its refusal row\n * names as `subjectKind`, and the planes it is enforced and recorded on (#3008: an MCP tool call, an agent's function\n * tool, a chat command), the row's `plane`. Two limiters with their own vocabularies, because the second counts\n * exactly what the first refuses to. The caps and windows of the two transports and the three chat doors are\n * engine-authored constants, not a vocabulary: C4 of the evidence reads them, and the rule that relaxes them in development and test only, from the\n * engine contract the application resolves (`@wildo-ai/saas-backend-lib/assurance-derivations`). The chat doors'\n * member buckets are keyed on the member and have no vocabulary of their own.\n *\n * Always available: the engine mounts the throttle on both transports in every application. An application that\n * exposes neither has no caller to bound, an empty population rather than an inapplicable objective.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:authenticated-burst-limit\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(ExternalTurnRatePrincipalKind).map((kind) => `external-turn-rate-principal-kind:${kind}`),\n ...Object.values(DeclaredRateLimitSubjectKind).map((kind) => `declared-rate-limit-subject-kind:${kind}`),\n ...Object.values(OperationDispatchPlane).map((plane) => `operation-dispatch-plane:${plane}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * A person's report of an agent's reply (#2842), named by its own vocabularies, each derived whole: what the reporter\n * says was wrong (the category), how serious it is (the severity, derived from the category), where it stands and how\n * it ended (the status and the outcome, including the dismissals, so the claim is not only of the \"good\" ending), what\n * a remedy link points at, and the verbs that move it. No `resource:` ref, for #2841's reason.\n *\n * Always available: the record exists in every application, and an application whose agents answer nobody has an\n * empty population, which the evidence reports as evidencing nothing either way (the AI objectives' precedent).\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-behavior-reports\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReportCategory).map((category) => `agent-behavior-report-category:${category}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReportSeverity).map((severity) => `agent-behavior-report-severity:${severity}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReportStatus).map((status) => `agent-behavior-report-status:${status}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReportOutcome).map((outcome) => `agent-behavior-report-outcome:${outcome}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReportRemedyKind).map((kind) => `agent-behavior-report-remedy-kind:${kind}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReports_Operations).map((operation) => `agent-behavior-report-operation:${operation}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The agent operation record (#2841), named by the vocabularies the record states and its evidence door counts: how a\n * call ended, the phase each tool call ended at, what screening concluded about a tool result, and the failure codes\n * an invocation can end with. Each derived whole: the end and the phase from their enums, the screening outcome from\n * the content-safety vocabulary (the screening capability names it too, as the DECISION; here it is what the record\n * states), the failure codes from `AGENT_INVOCATION_FAILURE_CODES`, the codomain of the runtime's own rule\n * (`agentInvocationFailureCodeOf` is typed by it), never a hand-picked subset of the conversation's whole vocabulary,\n * most of whose codes only a turn's door answers with.\n *\n * No `resource:` ref for the store: no capability names a resource type, and one member of that vocabulary would make\n * every other resource type uncovered surface of this objective.\n *\n * Always available: the engine writes the record for every agent call, whatever the agent declares. An application\n * with no agent is an empty population, which the evidence reports as evidencing nothing, not an inapplicable\n * objective.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-operation-record\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AgentOperationEnd).map((end) => `agent-operation-end:${end}`),\n ...Object.values(FlowsActors_ToolCallPhase).map((phase) => `agent-operation-tool-call-phase:${phase}`),\n ...Object.values(ContentSafetyScreeningOutcome).map((outcome) => `agent-operation-screening-outcome:${outcome}`),\n ...AGENT_INVOCATION_FAILURE_CODES.map((code) => `agent-operation-failure-code:${code}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What an agent's model is sent in place of a personal field's value (#2839): the treatments a model call can apply,\n * derived from the engine's own list, so a treatment admitted tomorrow joins by being admitted. Always available: an\n * agent declaring no treatment is the decision the evidence names, not an inapplicable capability.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-personal-data-model-treatment\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...FLOWS_ACTORS_PERSONAL_DATA_MODEL_TREATMENTS].sort().map((treatment) => `agent-personal-data-model-treatment:${treatment}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a coding agent's session may do (#2845), named by the three vocabularies the dispatch and the runner branch on:\n * the declared ceiling (`permissionAllowedByCeiling`, the runner), the agent's MEASURED escalation behaviour (the\n * dispatch refuses a narrower ceiling for an agent whose guards cannot fire, `agentClientProtocolInFlightGuardsCanFire`),\n * and the application environments a profile may admit (the environment gate). All three derived whole: the\n * non-escalating and the unrestricted members are named too, because the claim is a CONTRAST — a ceiling holds for an\n * agent that asks and is declared unrestricted for one that does not.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, not gated on `EngineCapability.AI_CODING_AGENT`: measured, no dispatch path reads that capability's\n * `enabled` flag, so a gate would read an application as out of scope while its coding agents still run. An\n * application whose code no agent writes is an empty population, the #2292 precedent.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:coding-agent-session-confinement\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AgentClientProtocol_PermissionCeiling).sort().map((ceiling) => `acp-permission-ceiling:${ceiling}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentClientProtocol_PermissionEscalationBehaviour).sort().map((behaviour) => `acp-permission-escalation:${behaviour}`),\n ...Object.values(APPLICATION_ENVIRONMENT).sort().map((environment) => `application-environment:${environment}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Who receives the application's source (#2845): a provider that runs a coding agent is refused at composition unless\n * its compliance profile is ESTABLISHED (`assertCodingAgentProvidersDeclareComplianceProfile`, which branches on\n * `ProviderComplianceDetermination` through `establishedProviderComplianceProfile`). The engine capability those\n * providers serve and the deployment model the evidence also reads stay unnamed: no guard branches on either (no\n * dispatch reads `AI_CODING_AGENT`'s enabled flag), so naming them would claim a decision nothing makes, and naming\n * one `EngineCapability` member would report its seventeen siblings as uncovered surface. Always available, for the\n * reason above.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:coding-agent-vendor-declaration\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...Object.values(ProviderComplianceDetermination).sort().map((determination) => `provider-compliance-determination:${determination}`)],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a coding agent's brief carries from outside the repository (#2846): every section declares who wrote it\n * (`MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceTrust`), and a THIRD_PARTY one says what screening concluded\n * (`MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceScreeningOutcome`), which the coding contract refuses to omit; and whether the catalog\n * could say which elements came from the web (`ResearchProvenanceCatalogReading`, #2846 review B2), since a reading\n * other than READ routes every served and website-plan element third-party. All derived whole, so a member added to\n * any of them joins the capability by being declared.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, deliberately not gated on `EngineCapability.AI_CONTENT_SAFETY`: the marking (the trust class, the\n * unscreened notice, the contract's refusal) runs in every application, and with no classifier bound the outcome is\n * UNSCREENED_NO_CLASSIFIER, which is the control operating. The runtime screening objective fails closed on a missing\n * classifier; the creation lane marks instead, because it never stops on a missing guard.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:coding-brief-content-trust\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceScreeningOutcome).sort().map((outcome) => `context-source-screening:${outcome}`),\n ...Object.values(MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceTrust).sort().map((trust) => `context-source-trust:${trust}`),\n ...Object.values(ResearchProvenanceCatalogReading).sort().map((reading) => `research-provenance-reading:${reading}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Who accepted a change (#2845): the accept origins and the autonomy postures that decide them. An automatic origin\n * is committed under the companion's identity and a person's under theirs (`accepted-change-commit`), and since M2\n * every commit names its origin, and an automatic one the posture it ran under, in trailers the collector reads from\n * the application's history. Both derived whole: the OPERATOR origin and the GUIDED posture are the contrast.\n * Always available: an application whose history holds no lane acceptance is an empty population.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:accepted-change-attribution\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AcceptOrigin).sort().map((origin) => `accept-origin:${origin}`),\n ...Object.values(Journey_AutonomyPreset).sort().map((posture) => `autonomy-posture:${posture}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Screening what an agent's model reads from third parties (#2292), named by the three vocabularies that decide it:\n * WHAT is screened (the scope an agent declares), WHERE a screened piece came from (the source the audit row\n * records), and what a screening CONCLUDED — only `clean` releases content, so the decision itself is in the set and\n * not only its inputs. Each derived whole, so a new source or outcome joins the capability by being declared.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, deliberately not REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY `AI_CONTENT_SAFETY`. Screening runs only through a\n * selected classifier, but the vocabulary and the fail-closed refusal exist in every application: with no classifier\n * selected, a turn that would bring a screening agent third-party content (offering it tools, or started by an\n * inbound delivery) is refused, and that refusal IS the control. Gating on the classifier would call an application NOT_APPLICABLE exactly where the refusal is what\n * protects it (and, beside the always-available audit trail, would make the demand UNDETERMINED rather than\n * either). An application where no agent declares screening is a genuinely empty population, answered as such.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-untrusted-content-screening\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(FlowsActors_PromptInjectionScreeningScope).map((scope) => `prompt-injection-screening-scope:${scope}`),\n ...Object.values(FlowsActors_ScreenedContentSource).map((source) => `screened-content-source:${source}`),\n ...Object.values(ContentSafetyScreeningOutcome).map((outcome) => `content-safety-screening-outcome:${outcome}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Moderating what an agent's model writes (#2292 Phase 3), named by WHAT is judged (the four output kinds, total\n * over what leaves a model), the harm categories and the ORDERED severity scale a policy withholds at, and what a\n * moderation CONCLUDED. ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, for the screening's reason: an agent whose policy no classifier can serve is\n * refused, and that refusal operates when none is selected.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-output-moderation\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(FlowsActors_ModeratedOutputKind).map((kind) => `moderated-output-kind:${kind}`),\n ...Object.values(ContentSafety_HarmCategory).map((category) => `harm-category:${category}`),\n ...Object.values(ContentSafety_HarmSeverity).map((severity) => `harm-severity:${severity}`),\n ...Object.values(ContentSafetyModerationOutcome).map((outcome) => `content-safety-moderation-outcome:${outcome}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Whether a principal may authenticate at all, named by the status vocabulary that decides it.\n *\n * Every member is listed because the control is the TRANSITION between them, and a reviewer\n * reconstructing \"when did this account stop being able to log in\" needs the whole set — the\n * pending states as much as the terminal ones, since an invitation that never completes is\n * indistinguishable from a deactivation if only the active/deleted ends are attested.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:authentication-eligibility-status\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(UserStatus).sort().map((status) => `user-status:${status}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * WHICH DOOR EXISTS — the variant vocabulary that decides whether an operation faces a client at\n * all, before any question of who may open it.\n *\n * Every member is named because the control is the CHOICE among them. `INTERNAL_CALL` and\n * `REPOSITORY_ONLY` are the two that answer no HTTP request, and moving an operation onto one of\n * them is a different act from tightening its roles: `credit-pool TOP_UP` was an `API_CALL` gated\n * on ORG_OWNER, which let a tenant owner self-grant unlimited credits, and no role gate could have\n * fixed it — the legitimate caller is a billing webhook coming through the service tier.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:operation-reachability-gate\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ResourceOperationVariantType).sort().map((variantType) => `operation-variant-type:${variantType}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Whether a MEMBERSHIP confers what it names, distinct from whether its user may authenticate.\n *\n * Kept apart from `capability:authentication-eligibility-status` because the two answer different\n * questions about different rows: a fully ACTIVE user can hold a SUSPENDED membership in one\n * tenant, and merging the vocabularies would make a programme unable to say which of the two a\n * time-boxed restriction was placed on.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:membership-eligibility-status\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(OrganizationMemberStatus).sort().map((status) => `organization-member-status:${status}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The redirect-scheme denial list, READ from the guard's own set rather than transcribed.\n *\n * This is why `DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES` was exported: it is a closed vocabulary with one\n * named runtime source, and it was reachable by nothing outside its own module — so attesting the\n * control meant restating eleven schemes in a second list free to drift from the one the\n * validator actually branches on. Deriving it means the basis cannot describe a denial the guard\n * does not make, in either direction.\n *\n * The refused set is the honest thing to name. An allow-list would be the wrong shape: the guard\n * accepts any absolute URL that is not one of these, deliberately, because a strict https-only\n * rule breaks the native/CLI loopback flow and a reverse-DNS requirement would refuse conformant\n * clients like `cursor:`.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:redirect-target-constraint\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n /*\n * Sorted AFTER the prefix is applied, not before, and that is a real trap rather than style:\n * stripping the trailing colon REORDERS the set. Raw, `chrome-extension:` sorts before `chrome:`\n * (\"-\" < \":\"); stripped, `chrome` sorts before `chrome-extension`. Sorting the schemes first\n * produced a list the basis schema rejected as unsorted.\n */\n implementationRefs: [...DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES].map((scheme) => `refused-redirect-scheme:${scheme.replace(/:$/u, \"\")}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The claim names the ID-token builder OWNS, READ from the builder's own strip set.\n *\n * Naming the RESERVED set is the control: these are stripped from caller-supplied `extraClaims`\n * BEFORE they are spread, so a smuggled `nbf` cannot later make the token fail verification and a\n * forged `nonce` / `acr` / `amr` / `at_hash` cannot ride in. An allow-list of identity claims would\n * describe a different mechanism — one the scope-gated resolver performs elsewhere.\n *\n * Derived rather than transcribed, which is why the set had to leave `saas-backend-lib`. A second\n * list of fifteen claim names would be free to drift from the one the builder strips, and the\n * drift would be invisible: the basis would attest a claim as server-authored while the builder\n * let it through.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:reserved-token-claim-authorship\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES].map((claim) => `reserved-id-token-claim:${claim}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The startup validator that REFUSES a configuration before it can serve traffic, named by the\n * domains it validates.\n *\n * This is the shape `DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` already showed: a boot gate IS bindable when\n * the thing it checks has a vocabulary. Here the vocabulary is the domain set, and the severity\n * split (`ERROR` refuses, `WARNING` reports) is what makes \"refused before serving traffic\" a\n * claim rather than a hope.\n *\n * NOT every boot gate in the engine routes through this validator — the declared-unique-index\n * verification lives in the repositories registry and produces no `ConfigurationValidationIssue`,\n * which is why `DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS` is NOT bound to this capability. Binding it here would\n * claim a validation path it does not take.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:startup-configuration-validation\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ConfigurationValidationDomain).sort().map((domain) => `configuration-validation-domain:${domain}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * A declared uniqueness control PROVEN to exist in the datastore before traffic, named by the\n * adapters the proof runs against.\n *\n * The adapter set is the vocabulary because the verification is genuinely per-adapter and the two\n * halves are separate code — `verifyDeclaredMongoUniqueIndexes` and its PostgreSQL counterpart —\n * so \"which datastores has this been proven against\" is exactly the question a reader has. It is\n * also the axis on which the guarantee could silently become partial: an adapter added without a\n * verifier would make the objective true for some resources and not others.\n *\n * Distinct from `capability:startup-configuration-validation`, and deliberately not folded into\n * it: this gate emits no `ConfigurationValidationIssue`. It lives in the repositories registry,\n * and claiming the config validator's path for it would describe a route the check does not take.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:declared-uniqueness-verification\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(PersistenceAdapter).sort().map((adapter) => `persistence-adapter:${adapter}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The self-reported lifecycle stages, named so a programme can state what they do NOT confer.\n *\n * This capability is unusual and the wording matters: it attests a NEGATIVE. Every member is a\n * stage a user's own activity can move them into, and the control is that reaching one grants no\n * capability and cannot cross a scope boundary — authority comes only from a decision an\n * authorized party made. Naming the stages is how a reader learns which self-reported values\n * exist to be wrongly trusted; a capability naming a mechanism would imply the stages DO something.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:self-reported-lifecycle-stage\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(LifecycleStage).sort().map((stage) => `lifecycle-stage:${stage}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * How a refusal is CLASSIFIED — the one vocabulary three separate objectives are each a\n * distinction inside.\n *\n * | objective | the distinction it demands |\n * |---|---|\n * | `SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED` | a refusal carries a named type — `CONFIGURATION` for a validator whose dependency is unavailable, `VALIDATION` for rejected untrusted input — rather than surfacing as `UNCAUGHT_EXCEPTION`, which is how a degradation gets mistaken for a rejection |\n * | `OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT` | an over-limit request is `PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE` or `RATE_LIMIT`, NOT `INTERNAL` — a client error rather than a server failure |\n * | `OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS` | a constraint violation is `CONFLICT` carrying the identity that was violated, NOT the opaque `DATABASE` the driver would otherwise produce |\n *\n * Every member is named because the control in all three cases is a CONTRAST between members: the\n * good outcome only means something against the bad one it is not. A capability listing only the\n * client-error types would describe a system that never returns `INTERNAL`, which is a different\n * and false claim.\n *\n * This does NOT attest that any particular refusal is classified correctly — a mapping is not a\n * proof, and `UNKNOWN` is in the set precisely because the engine admits it cannot always tell.\n * What it attests is that the framework HAS one closed vocabulary for the answer, so a\n * misclassification is a wrong member rather than an unclassified crash.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:refusal-classification\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ErrorType).sort().map((errorType) => `error-type:${errorType}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Why the inbound delivery door refused a request, before it became a delivery (#2488).\n *\n * The door ANSWERS rather than throws, so `capability:refusal-classification` never sees these refusals. It\n * deliberately answers `SECRET_NOT_CONFIGURED` and `SIGNATURE_INVALID` identically to the sender (a caller learns\n * nothing about the configuration), so the record is the ONLY place the two are told apart — which is exactly\n * `WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED`'s \"degradation not mistaken for a rejection\". Every member is named because that\n * contrast is the control.\n *\n * `ALWAYS_AVAILABLE`: the door exists in every application. One with no endpoint declared has an empty population,\n * which is a value and not an exemption.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:inbound-delivery-refusal-classification\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(InboundDeliveryRejectionReason).map((reason) => `inbound-delivery-rejection-reason:${reason}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Key management (#2891): every key the platform uses is named by a purpose, held by a custodian, and moved through\n * one audited lifecycle (created, published ahead, promoted, retired, destroyed, compromised), with the application\n * keeping the public half of every version it is signed with.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, the counterpart of `EngineCapability.KEY_MANAGEMENT` being always enabled: an application cannot\n * turn key management off, so no objective that requires this capability can be derived inapplicable by a\n * configuration choice. Named by the purposes, because the purpose is what a guarantee is about: a purpose added to\n * the vocabulary joins the capability with no edit here.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:purpose-bound-key-management\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(CryptoKey_Purpose).sort().map((purpose) => `key-purpose:${purpose}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * A rotated key that STOPS verifying at a declared instant, named by the keys the guarantee\n * applies to.\n *\n * The key set is the vocabulary because the retirement is PER KEY — `notAfter` is optional on\n * each — so \"which keys can be given a bounded life\" is the reader's question, and a key type\n * added without retirement support is exactly how the guarantee would become partial without\n * anything failing. Before this, a rotated key was time-unbounded in code and fenced only by the\n * token's own `exp`.\n *\n * BOTH directions are named. The private keys are what this application SIGNS with and the\n * public ones are the platform services it VERIFIES; retiring one of each is a different act with\n * a different blast radius, and a capability naming only the signing half would leave the\n * verification half unattested while looking complete.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:verifiable-key-retirement\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...APPLICATION_SIGNING_KEY_PURPOSES.map((key) => `signing-key:${key}`),\n ...Object.values(JwtPublicKeys).map((key) => `verification-key:${key}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * A provider's secret contract described WITHOUT its values, named by the fields an entry may\n * carry — and the control is what is NOT among them.\n *\n * `ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema` is a `z.strictObject`, so a `value` field is not\n * merely absent by convention: it is REFUSED at parse. That is what makes drift detectable\n * without persisting a secret — the shape can be compared because it never held one. Deriving\n * the refs from the schema's own shape means the capability cannot describe a field the contract\n * does not have, in either direction, and a field added there appears here automatically.\n *\n * The control lives in `platform-config-lib`, which this package must not depend on. It is\n * attestable anyway because the VOCABULARY is in `saas-models` — the shape that crosses the\n * companion-safe boundary — while only the digesting stayed on the platform side. That split is\n * why this objective needed no move at all, unlike the three that did.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:values-free-secret-contract\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.keys(ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema.shape).sort().map((field) => `secret-contract-field:${field}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The privilege axes a named runtime principal's database credential is built from. Derived whole: READ,\n * WRITE, APPEND and MAINTAIN are distinct verb sets, and APPEND is the one that makes evidence unalterable.\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE — the derivation and its refusal exist in every application; whether a principal is\n * issued an axis-scoped credential at all depends on the adapter, which the evidence body states.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:runtime-principal-grant-axes\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(RuntimePrincipalDatabaseGrantAxis).map((axis) => `runtime-principal-database-grant-axis:${axis}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Both reconciliation vocabularies, derived whole: what KIND of divergence was detected, and which\n * populations were met and not compared. The recorded run output is total over both.\n *\n * REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY BILLING: the sweep is registered only for an application with billing. The\n * runtime gate is the backend's `billing.enabled`, not this engine capability, and nothing forces the two\n * to agree — an application declaring BILLING without enabling it runs no sweep.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:billing-reconciliation-divergence-accounting\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(BillingReconciliationDivergenceKind).map((kind) => `billing-reconciliation-divergence-kind:${kind}`),\n ...Object.values(BillingReconciliationUncomparedPopulation).map((population) => `billing-reconciliation-uncompared-population:${population}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY, engineCapability: EngineCapability.BILLING },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Where each metered usage row stands with respect to the provider flush. REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY\n * BILLING, with the same caveat as reconciliation: the flush runs where the backend's `billing.enabled`.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:metered-usage-flush-state\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(UsageRecordFlushState).map((state) => `usage-record-flush-state:${state}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY, engineCapability: EngineCapability.BILLING },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The target classes (who chose the destination) and the admissions they resolve to. Both derived whole —\n * NONE and PRIVATE_NETWORK are as much the claim as LOOPBACK_ONLY. ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the resolver and the\n * pinned client exist in every application.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:outbound-target-admission\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(OutboundTargetClass).map((targetClass) => `outbound-target-class:${targetClass}`),\n ...Object.values(OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission).map((admission) => `outbound-private-address-admission:${admission}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * #3022: the keys a configuration may not author (the module owns where its credential goes) and the fields that name\n * a credential, each held to a rule the doors branch on. Both derived whole from the enums the doors read, so a field\n * added to the vocabulary joins the claim. The forbidden set the inherited environment is compared against\n * (`RUNTIME_SECRET_ENV_KEYS` and every provider's `secretsContract`) is deliberately NOT bound: it is a derived set in a\n * platform package this one does not depend on, and its completeness is the verification's\n * (`runtime-secret-env-keys.material-coverage.test.ts`). ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the refusals run at every startup and in the\n * CLI door, with nothing to enable.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:module-scoped-credential-release\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(ExternalProvider_ModuleOwnedConfigurationKey).map((key) => `module-owned-configuration-key:${key}`),\n ...Object.values(ProviderConfigurationCredentialField).map((field) => `credential-naming-field:${field}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * Canonical order, applied at composition rather than demanded of the authored constants above.\n *\n * The basis schema requires four of its arrays lexically sorted by semantic identity. Requiring the AUTHORED lists to be hand-sorted makes every added mapping a\n * chance to fail on form rather than on substance — and the failure surfaces as four opaque \"must be unique and lexically sorted\" issues rather than as anything about\n * the entry. Sorting here means an author appends where it reads best and the composer canonicalizes, which is the same split the compliance-programme normalizer makes.\n */\nconst byCanonicalIdentity = <T>(values: readonly T[], identity: (value: T) => string): T[] =>\n [...values].sort((left, right) => (identity(left) < identity(right) ? -1 : identity(left) > identity(right) ? 1 : 0));\n\n/*\n * ── 2026-09-24 source-coverage tranche (#452) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Three registered NIST sources were cited by no requirement authority, so their rights review bought\n * nothing and a US-only application had no US privacy authority behind the privacy objectives. Each\n * table below is authored rather than derived, and the authority-basis tests hold the twin tables\n * EXHAUSTIVE against the rows they twin — so a new SP 800-53 or HIPAA Security Rule row without its\n * twin reddens a test instead of going quietly uncited.\n *\n * Slugs stay DESCRIPTIVE, per every tranche above: no identifier from the source's own numbering, so\n * an edition that renumbers leaves them true. Section and subcategory numbers appear only in these\n * comments, as the trail a reviewer follows to check the mapping.\n */\nconst SOURCE_COVERAGE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-24T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The #1564 tranche: third-party AI components, and the PCI DSS service-provider list row. */\nconst AI_COMPONENTS_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-25T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The #2292 tranche: what an AI model reads from third parties screened, and what it writes moderated. */\nconst AI_CONTENT_SAFETY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-18T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The AI use classification tranche (#2838). */\nconst AI_USE_CLASSIFICATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-18T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The agent authority and human oversight tranche (#2839). */\nconst AGENT_AUTHORITY_AND_OVERSIGHT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-19T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The open AI sources tranche (#2837): the OWASP AI Exchange, the UK AI code, NIST AI 100-2 and the AI Act. */\nconst OPEN_AI_SOURCES_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-19T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\ninterface SourceCoverageRow {\n readonly requirementRef: string;\n readonly objective: { readonly objectiveRef: string; readonly objectiveVersion: number };\n /** How much of the requirement the objective answers, as reviewed (#2956). */\n readonly answer: AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswer;\n}\n\n/**\n * An SP 800-53A assessment-procedure row: it carries no grade of its own, because it assesses exactly the control its\n * SP 800-53 twin maps, so it answers exactly as much (#2956). {@link withAssessmentTwinAnswers} derives it.\n */\ntype AssessmentTwinRow = Omit<SourceCoverageRow, \"answer\">;\n\n/** A reviewed requirement the objective answers whole (#2956). */\nconst ANSWERED_IN_FULL: AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswer = { extent: AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswerExtent.FULL };\n\n/**\n * A reviewed requirement that asks for more than the objective delivers (#2956). `remainder` is what it asks that the\n * objective does not deliver, in Wildo's words: the reviewer's grade, read against the source's own text, kept as a field\n * a coverage pack can read rather than as prose beside the row.\n */\nconst answeredInPart = (remainder: string): AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswer => ({ extent: AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswerExtent.PARTIAL, remainder });\n\n/**\n * SP 800-53A twins — one assessment procedure per SP 800-53 row, SAME control, SAME objective.\n *\n * SP 800-53A provides an assessment procedure for each SP 800-53 control, and for each control in the\n * plan assessors \"select the corresponding assessment procedure\". So a mapping to a control\n * implies its procedure without any further judgement, which is why the twin is mechanical and why a\n * missing one is a defect rather than a choice. The slug is the control row's own descriptive suffix\n * with `-assessment` appended.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-53A Rev. 5, §3.2.2 \"Select Procedures to Assess the Security and Privacy Controls\"\n */\nconst NIST_800_53A_ASSESSMENT_PROCEDURE_ROWS: readonly AssessmentTwinRow[] = [\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-account-disable-on-relationship-end-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-account-enable-disable-authority-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-audit-of-access-decisions-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-audit-record-content-and-protection-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-audit-record-context-binding-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-authenticator-storage-protection-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-automated-account-management-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-concurrent-session-control-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-configuration-settings-enforcement-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-cryptographic-key-establishment-and-management-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-denial-of-service-resource-bounds-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-error-handling-diagnostics-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-information-flow-confinement-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-information-integrity-verification-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-least-privilege-authority-limit-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-malicious-code-protection-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-media-sanitization-and-disposal-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-reauthentication-for-privileged-action-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-shared-resource-isolation-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-temporary-account-expiry-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-transaction-authorization-separation-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-transaction-recovery-integrity-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 2 } },\n];\n\n/**\n * SP 800-66 twins — the implementation guidance for the SAME HIPAA Security Rule standard, one per\n * Security Rule row, same objective.\n *\n * SP 800-66 Rev. 2 §5 walks the Security Rule standard by standard, giving key activities for each, so\n * a Security Rule row has exactly one section of guidance behind it. The slug keeps the Security Rule\n * row's descriptive suffix. Which section each twins, so a reviewer can check it:\n *\n * | twin suffix | SP 800-66 Rev. 2 section |\n * |---|---|\n * | `privileged-access-review` | §5.1.4 Information Access Management — access establishment and modification |\n * | `access-authorization-recording` | §5.1.4 Information Access Management — access authorization |\n * | `workforce-access-termination` | §5.1.3 Workforce Security — termination procedures |\n * | `credential-management` | §5.1.5 Security Awareness and Training — password management |\n * | `authentication-controls` | §5.3.4 Person or Entity Authentication |\n * | `person-or-entity-reverification` | §5.3.4 Person or Entity Authentication |\n * | `transmission-confidentiality` | §5.3.5 Transmission Security |\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-66 Rev. 2, §5.1.3, §5.1.4, §5.1.5, §5.3.4, §5.3.5 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-66r2)\n *\n * Citing implementation guidance does not make the Security Rule applicable; applicability stays the\n * application's decision per source, exactly as for the Security Rule rows themselves.\n */\nconst NIST_800_66_SECURITY_RULE_GUIDANCE_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-access-authorization-recording\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective governs one kind of privileged access: platform administration that crosses into a tenant, which must be declared, \"\n + \"requested, approved and recorded. It does not cover the documented policy and procedures for granting workforce access, choosing the basis \"\n + \"and method of access control, keeping a list of the people who may approve access requests, or identifying all authorized users.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-authentication-controls\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective ensures enrolled second factors are verified through one replay-resistant authority and counted only when independent. It \"\n + \"does not cover identifying the access points that need authentication, weighing the authentication options, or choosing and implementing \"\n + \"methods (including when to require multi-factor) from the risk assessment; those are the organisation's own acts.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-credential-management\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The key activity is workforce training on creating, changing and safeguarding passwords, and on monitoring login attempts, with each \"\n + \"member's role built into awareness efforts. The objective makes credential transitions explicit and attributable but delivers none of that \"\n + \"training.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-person-or-entity-reverification\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective requires a fresh re-proof of identity before high-impact actions only. It does not cover verifying identity at every access \"\n + \"point that needs it, or selecting authentication methods from the entity's risk assessment.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-privileged-access-review\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective scopes and periodically reviews privileged access and keeps evidence, but explicitly does not claim that review findings \"\n + \"were fixed. It does not cover modifying access based on the review, standards and formal authorization before access is granted, or \"\n + \"reviewing ordinary (non-privileged) users' access; the review itself remains a human practice.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-transmission-confidentiality\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective keeps backend-only fields from crossing the client boundary. It does not cover encrypting protected data in transit, \"\n + \"integrity controls on transmitted data, identifying every transmission pathway, or the written transmission-security policy and \"\n + \"procedures.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-workforce-access-termination\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective withdraws access rights and credentials when the relationship ends, and restores access attributably. It does not cover \"\n + \"recovering physical access devices (badges, keys, cards), changing facility access codes, or the organisation's standard termination \"\n + \"procedures.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * Privacy Framework rows — one per privacy objective the Core can honestly speak to.\n *\n * Before this tranche every privacy objective was backed by GDPR alone, so an application operating\n * only in the United States had no US privacy authority behind any of them. Each row names the ONE\n * Core subcategory whose outcome the objective delivers; where the fit covers only part of the\n * objective, the row says which part rather than widening the claim.\n *\n * | objective | Core subcategory (Appendix A) | fit |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | `SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT` | CT.DM-P1 / CT.DM-P2 — data elements can be accessed for review, and for transmission or disclosure | the two halves of access and portability, one category |\n * | `SUBJECT_ERASURE` | CT.DM-P4 — data elements can be accessed for deletion | the deletion capability; intake and withdrawal of the request sit under CT.PO-P3, which this row does not claim |\n * | `ERASURE_PROPAGATION` | CM.AW-P5 — data corrections or deletions can be communicated to individuals or organizations in the data processing ecosystem | the external-store half; the per-relationship internal accounting has no Core counterpart |\n * | `STORAGE_LIMITATION` | CT.DM-P5 — data are destroyed according to policy | enforced retention windows are the policy |\n * | `DATA_MINIMIZATION` | CT.DP-P4 — configurations permit selective collection or disclosure of data elements | the Disassociated Processing category names data minimization among the principles it enables |\n * | `CONSENT_RECORD` | CT.PO-P1 — policies, processes and procedures for authorizing data processing (e.g., individual consent), revoking and maintaining authorizations | the runtime record the subcategory's policy and process maintain |\n * | `PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY` | ID.IM-P6 — data elements within the data actions are inventoried | declared on the field |\n * | `THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING` | ID.IM-P2 — owners or operators, including service providers, and their roles are inventoried | a processor is a role, and routing is opt-in by declaration |\n * | `COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT` | CM.AW-P4 — records of data disclosures and sharing are maintained | the bulk-export event IS the disclosure record |\n *\n * The fit column records why each row was mapped. How much of the requirement a row answers is its `answer` (#2956), graded\n * against the source's text, which this column predates.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST Privacy Framework Version 1.0 (NIST CSWP 01162020), Appendix A \"Privacy Framework Core\" — subcategories as tabulated above\n *\n * SKIPPED, deliberately: `WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS`. The Core has no notion of a legal ground for\n * processing. Its nearest outcome, ID.IM-P5 (purposes for the data actions are inventoried), is what\n * that objective PRESUPPOSES rather than what it demands — the basis per purpose and the balancing\n * assessment behind it — so citing it would claim coverage of the one part the framework does not\n * address. GDPR stays that objective's only authority.\n */\nconst NIST_PRIVACY_FRAMEWORK_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-data-access-for-deletion\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-data-access-for-review-and-transmission\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"CT.DM-P2 is not limited to the person the data describe: data elements are also to be reachable for transmission or disclosure to other \"\n + \"parties, such as a recipient organisation or an authority. The objective's export reaches the subject alone, so access for \"\n + \"disclosure to anyone else is not stated.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-data-element-inventory\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective records, on each stored field, which category of personal data it holds. It does not tie each data element to the data \"\n + \"actions (collection, transmission, disclosure, logging) that process it, and the subcategory asks for the inventory to be kept per data \"\n + \"action.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-deletion-communicated-across-ecosystem\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.ERASURE_PROPAGATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective covers deletions only. It does not communicate data corrections, and it does not tell individuals in the ecosystem (such as \"\n + \"data sources) that a deletion happened; its reporting is aimed at registered external erasure effects and stores, and it explicitly leaves \"\n + \"out derived copies.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-destruction-according-to-policy\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective enforces declared retention windows on resource rows. It does not state that data held outside rows (stored files, backups, \"\n + \"logs, third-party copies) is destroyed under the policy, and it does not cover writing the organisation's retention policy, which the \"\n + \"windows only formalise.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-disclosure-records\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Only bulk exports of a resource collection are recorded. Other disclosures and sharing (to processors, through subject exports or API \"\n + \"access) are not covered, the record does not name who received the data, and the objective does not say the records can themselves be \"\n + \"accessed for review or transmitted.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-processing-authorization-maintenance\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective records each consent decision exactly once. It does not establish the policies, processes and procedures for authorizing and \"\n + \"revoking processing, and it does not cover authorizations that come from organisational decisions rather than individual consent.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-selective-collection-and-disclosure\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Disclosure is limited for external processors and observability, and collection is selectable only for the device-stored pseudonymous \"\n + \"identifier. The objective does not state that configurations let the application or the individual choose, in general, which other data \"\n + \"elements are collected or disclosed.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-third-party-role-inventory\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective makes each external processor an explicit, opt-in provider selection per capability. It does not inventory the other owners \"\n + \"and operators the subcategory names (the organisation itself, partners, customers, developers), their roles toward each system or \"\n + \"component, or internal components.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI RMF 1.0 (NIST AI 100-1), added with `WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS` (#1564).\n *\n * One row, for the subcategory that asks internal risk controls \"for components of the AI system, including\n * third-party AI technologies\" to be \"identified and documented\" (MAP 4.2) — which is what the objective's\n * declarations discharge. The GOVERN 6 subcategories (policies for third-party AI risk, contingency for\n * high-risk third-party AI) ask for an organisation's policies and procedures, which no declaration of the\n * product can stand for, so they are deliberately not mapped.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MAP 4.2 and GOVERN 6.1–6.2 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-third-party-ai-components-identified\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"MAP 4.2 asks for the internal risk controls applied to each component, third-party AI included, to be identified and documented. The \"\n + \"objective lists the AI capabilities and the providers serving them but does not record which controls govern each.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI RMF 1.0, added with `WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION` (#2838).\n *\n * One row, for the subcategory asking that the intended purposes, the \"context-specific laws, norms and expectations\"\n * and the settings an AI system is deployed in be \"understood and documented\" (MAP 1.1). A declared use domain, with\n * its regulatory reading derived over the declared jurisdictions, is that documentation in a form a function can read.\n * The AI Act rows are in `EU_AI_ACT_ROWS` (#2837).\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MAP 1.1 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_USE_CLASSIFICATION_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-intended-purpose-and-legal-context-documented\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"MAP 1.1 also asks for these to be understood and documented: beneficial uses, deployment settings, the users and their expectations, \"\n + \"positive and negative impacts, assumptions and limitations, and test and evaluation metrics. The objective records only a use domain and \"\n + \"the EU AI Act reading derived from it.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The agent authority and human oversight tranche (#2839).\n *\n * - Human oversight: NIST AI RMF MAP 3.5, \"Processes for human oversight are defined, assessed, and documented\". The\n * approval gates, holds, deadlines and stop are those processes, in a form the evidence can read. MANAGE 2.4 (mechanisms\n * to \"supersede, disengage, or deactivate\" an AI system) waited for the administrator stop it asks for, and is mapped\n * with it below (`NIST_AI_RMF_AGENT_SUSPENSION_ROWS`, #2843).\n * - Authority confinement: SP 800-53 AC-6, least privilege \"for users (or processes acting on behalf of users)\", with its\n * 800-53A assessment twin. An agent's tool is exactly such a process, and AC-6's other row\n * (`nist-800-53-least-privilege-authority-limit`) stays with `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE`.\n *\n * - Data minimization at the model boundary: MEASURE 2.10, \"Privacy risk of the AI system ... is examined and documented\".\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MAP 3.5, MANAGE 2.4 and MEASURE 2.10 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1)\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.2.0, AC-6 \"Least Privilege\", read from the OSCAL catalog (usnistgov/oscal-content, NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.json)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_HUMAN_OVERSIGHT_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-human-oversight-processes-documented\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The subcategory asks for oversight processes that are defined, assessed and documented under the organisation's own policies. The \"\n + \"objective supplies the gates, holds, deadlines and stop those processes run on, but not the assessment of the processes or their alignment \"\n + \"with organisational policy.\",\n ),\n },\n // MEASURE 2.10, \"Privacy risk of the AI system ... is examined and documented\": the model boundary of data minimization.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-privacy-risk-examined\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The subcategory asks for the AI system's privacy risk to be examined and documented. The objective minimises what leaves each boundary but \"\n + \"does not examine or document the privacy risk itself.\",\n ),\n },\n];\nconst NIST_800_53_AGENT_AUTHORITY_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-least-privilege-processes-acting-for-users\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"An agent's tools are confined to the authority of the principal they act for. The control also asks that the agent's access be cut down to \"\n + \"what its assigned task needs, rather than inheriting everything that principal holds.\",\n ),\n },\n];\nconst NIST_800_53A_AGENT_AUTHORITY_ROWS: readonly AssessmentTwinRow[] = [\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-least-privilege-processes-acting-for-users-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n];\n\n/** The AI-produced change tranche (#2845). */\nconst AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-19T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/** The agent operation record tranche (#2841). */\nconst AI_OPERATION_RECORD_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-19T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/** The agent behaviour report tranche (#2842). */\nconst AI_INCIDENT_HANDLING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-19T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/** The agent suspension tranche (#2843). */\nconst AGENT_SUSPENSION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-20T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/**\n * NIST AI RMF 1.0, added with the administrator's suspension of an agent (#2843). One row, what it leaves out its `answer`:\n *\n * - MANAGE 2.4: mechanisms are in place and applied, and responsibilities are assigned and understood, to supersede,\n * disengage, or deactivate AI systems whose performance or outcomes are inconsistent with intended use. The suspension is\n * such a mechanism, for one organization or for the whole application, refused before the model runs.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MANAGE 2.4 (Table 4) (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1, read 2026-10-20)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_AGENT_SUSPENSION_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-ai-system-deactivation-mechanism\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The subcategory also asks that the responsibility for superseding, disengaging or deactivating a system be assigned and understood, and \"\n + \"that the mechanism be used when outcomes stray from the intended use. The objective supplies the suspension itself, for an \"\n + \"organization or the whole application; who holds that responsibility and when it is used are the operator's, and a suspension \"\n + \"does not stop a call already running.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/** The authenticated burst-limit tranche (#2936). */\nconst AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-20T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/**\n * The OWASP AI Exchange, added with `WILDO.OPERATIONS.AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT` (#2936). One row; what it leaves out is its `answer` (#2956):\n *\n * - 2.0 #RATE LIMIT: limit the rate of access to the model, preferably per actor (user, API key or session), and\n * \"Breaching a rate limit must trigger event logging and potential incident workflows.\" The throttle limits an A2A\n * agent's turns, which reach a model, and an MCP client's tool calls per minute, and logs the first breach of each\n * window as an audit row.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped: NIST SP 800-53 SC-5. Its statement protects against or limits the effects of\n * organization-defined denial-of-service events with organization-defined controls, and draws no line between an\n * authenticated and an unauthenticated request, so a second row beside `nist-800-53-denial-of-service-resource-bounds`\n * (which `WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT` holds) would split one control between two objectives on a reading the text\n * does not draw: the #2842 MANAGE 4.1 reasoning.\n *\n * spec-cite: OWASP AI Exchange, read 2026-10-20 — 2.0 #RATE LIMIT (https://owaspai.org/docs/2_threats_through_use/);\n * NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 SC-5 control statement, read 2026-10-20 from the publication linked at\n * https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5)\n */\nconst OWASP_AI_EXCHANGE_BURST_LIMIT_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-external-agent-access-rate-limited\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 3 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The transport throttle counts per owner, so an organization's keys share one window rather than one per actor; a per-actor count \"\n + \"exists only where an application declares an operation's own limit and the operation is called as an MCP tool, an agent tool \"\n + \"or a chat command (over REST the declared limit counts a source IP), and there is no total-use cap across actors. \"\n + \"A breach is logged but never routed to an incident workflow or alert, and no per-agent or per-session cap on tool calls and orchestration \"\n + \"steps ends a running turn or holds agents handling untrusted content to a tighter limit.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI RMF 1.0, added with `WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING` (#2842). Each row is the mechanism a practice runs on, and each row's `answer`\n * names what the subcategory asks beyond it (#2956):\n *\n * - MEASURE 3.3 (Table 3, p. 31): feedback processes for end users and impacted communities to report problems and\n * appeal system outcomes, established and integrated into evaluation metrics. The report is the reporting half, for the\n * people who use the application.\n * - MANAGE 4.3 (Table 4, p. 33): incidents and errors communicated to relevant actors, including affected communities,\n * and processes for tracking, responding to and recovering from them followed and documented. The record and its\n * lifecycle are the tracking and the documented response.\n *\n * - MANAGE 4.1 (Table 4, p. 33): post-deployment monitoring plans implemented, including mechanisms for\n * capturing and evaluating input from users and other relevant AI actors, appeal and override, decommissioning, incident\n * response, recovery and change management. The subcategory names two mechanisms this objective is: the capture and\n * evaluation of users' input (a report and its triage) and incident response (its outcome). `WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD` (#2841) maps\n * the same subcategory for the system's behaviour, under a row of its own: one requirement row names one objective, and\n * the text describes both.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MEASURE 3.3, MANAGE 4.3, MANAGE 4.1 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1, read from\n * the PDF 2026-10-19)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_INCIDENT_HANDLING_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-end-user-problem-reporting-established\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Impacted communities who are not users of the application have no reporting channel, there is no appeal of a system outcome, and reports \"\n + \"are not fed into any evaluation metric.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-incidents-tracked-and-responded-to\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Incidents are not communicated to relevant actors or affected communities beyond the audit rows, nobody is notified or paged, and recovery \"\n + \"from an incident is not covered.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-user-input-capture-and-incident-response-implemented\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Input from AI actors other than users is not captured, and the monitoring plans, appeal and override, decommissioning, recovery and change \"\n + \"management are not delivered. A report past its target is only counted, never escalated.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI RMF 1.0, added with `WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD` (#2841). Both rows are the per-call SUBSTRATE of a practice the\n * operator runs, never the practice:\n *\n * - MEASURE 2.4 (Table 3, p. 29): the functionality and behaviour of the system and its components are monitored in\n * production. The record states, for every agent call, the model that answered, the tools and how each ended, the\n * guardrails' verdicts and the end; the monitoring itself (who reads it, against what expectation) is the operator's.\n * - MANAGE 4.1 (Table 4, p. 33): post-deployment monitoring plans are implemented. Only the capture of what the\n * system did (the operation record) is answered; each row's `answer` names the rest (#2956).\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped: MEASURE 3.1 (identifying and tracking emergent risks over time is an organisational tracking\n * practice, and mapping it would claim the practice from the record) and MANAGE 2.4 (supersede, disengage or deactivate,\n * #2843's door, as the oversight tranche left it).\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MEASURE 2.4, MANAGE 4.1, MEASURE 3.1, MANAGE 2.4 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1,\n * read from the PDF 2026-10-19)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_OPERATION_RECORD_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-production-behaviour-monitored\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The record is the data a monitoring practice reads; the monitoring itself (who reviews it, against what expectation of behaviour) is the \"\n + \"operator's. The system's non-agent components are not covered, and calls made outside the agent runtime leave no record.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-post-deployment-monitoring-implemented\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Only the capture of what the agent runtime did is delivered. The monitoring plans themselves are not, nor are capture of users' and other \"\n + \"actors' input, appeal and override, decommissioning, incident response, recovery and change management; calls outside the agent runtime \"\n + \"leave no record.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST SP 800-218 (SSDF 1.1), activated by the first objective about how an application's code is PRODUCED (#2845). Three\n * tasks, each answered by the creation lane's coding-agent controls and read from the application's own declarations and\n * history:\n *\n * - PO.3.1 (specify the tools a toolchain must include and how they integrate; its Example 2: identify security tools to\n * integrate into the developer toolchain): the application declares which coding-agent providers and execution\n * profiles may write its code, and composition refuses one without an established compliance profile; since #2846 it\n * also declares the content-safety classifier its build-time toolchain screens third-party text through, integrated\n * where a coding brief is assembled. PO.3.2 (operating and hardening the tools) is the operator's installation\n * practice and is not mapped.\n * - PO.5.1 (separate and protect each environment involved in software development): a coding agent runs only in an\n * application environment its profile admits, and never in production on a guessed one.\n * - PS.1.1 (store all forms of code based on least privilege, so that only authorized personnel, tools and services have\n * access; its Example 2: track all changes with accountability to the individual account): the declared edits of an\n * agent that asks are confined by the ceiling and the task's write scope, and every change accepted through the lane's\n * accept door is committed under the identity of whoever accepted it.\n *\n * What each task asks beyond the lane's controls is that row's `answer` (#2956).\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped: PW.7 (code review). Under the decided YOLO posture the system commits and a person is notified,\n * so mapping review would claim one that did not happen; the attribution is what lets a reviewer see which changes no\n * person accepted. Nor PO.3.3 (configure tools to generate artefacts of their support of secure practices): a run's\n * screening outcomes are such artefacts, but they are per-run state nothing retains (C7), so mapping it would claim a\n * trail nothing keeps. Nor PW.4 (acquire, create and verify well-secured software components): it governs components\n * reused in the product, not third-party TEXT reaching an agent's input.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-218, SSDF Version 1.1, February 2022, Table 1 — PO.3.1 and its Example 2, PO.3.2, PO.3.3,\n * PO.5.1, PS.1.1 and its Example 2, PW.4, PW.7 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218, fetched 2026-10-19)\n */\nconst NIST_800_218_AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-218-code-access-least-privilege\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The task asks that all forms of code be stored so that only authorised personnel, tools and services can access them; repository access \"\n + \"control is not part of the objective, which confines a coding agent's declared edits and attributes accepted changes. Shell commands and \"\n + \"agents that never ask are only recorded afterwards, file reads are not confined, and a commit an agent makes itself is not attributed to \"\n + \"it.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-218-development-environment-separated\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective keeps coding agents out of production. Protecting each development environment (multi-factor access, network segmentation, \"\n + \"restricting connections, monitoring access) is the host's job and is not delivered.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-218-development-toolchain-specified\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Only the coding-agent providers, execution profiles and the build-time classifier are specified. The other tools each toolchain must \"\n + \"include to mitigate identified risks are not, and neither is how all its components integrate and exchange data.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI 600-1, the Generative AI profile, added with the content-safety objectives (#2292).\n *\n * ONE row: the content filters of MG-3.2-005, which \"flag problematic inputs and outputs\", are what the moderation does to\n * what the agent writes, the action's own subject (harmful generated content). The action is tagged with the information\n * integrity, harmful bias, dangerous content and obscene content risks, and not with Information Security, so its input\n * half was not read as the screening of injected instructions. A row doing that, with a join to §2.9, was retired in the\n * #2956 review (M4): the profile describes indirect prompt injection in §2.9 and names no runtime filter for it, and its\n * only action naming prompt injection is red-teaming (MS-2.7-007), an organisation's practice. AI 100-2 §3.4.4 carries\n * the screening instead.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped: MG-2.2-005, due diligence analysing GAI output \"for harmful content, potential\n * misinformation, and CBRN-related or NCII content\". Moderation discharges the harmful-content part only, and an\n * organisation's due-diligence act is not a runtime filter. Red-teaming, incident response and human moderation in the\n * same MANAGE subcategories are an organisation's practices.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 600-1, July 2024, §2.9 Information Security; MANAGE 3.2 MG-3.2-005 and its risk tags; MANAGE 2.2\n * MG-2.2-005; MEASURE 2.7 MS-2.7-007 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.600-1, fetched 2026-10-18, the tags re-read 2026-10-20)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_600_1_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-600-1-problematic-output-filtered\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OUTPUT_MODERATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The action names false and illegal content alongside harmful and violent content. The objective withholds only what the policy's harm \"\n + \"categories judge, so misinformation and illegal content outside those categories are not filtered.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The open AI sources tranche (#2837): rows from four sources the epic registered, for the six `WILDO.AI.*` objectives\n * bound before them. Each source was read on 2026-10-19 and each row was graded against the objective's intent: only\n * rows where the source asks for what the intent states, or for a larger thing of which the intent is a stated part,\n * are filed. Where the intent is narrower, the row's `answer` names what it leaves out (#2956).\n *\n * Three objectives are conditional on a declaration (screening, moderation, and the approval gates), while every\n * source asks unconditionally. The row says the objective answers the requirement where the application declares the\n * control; the evidence bodies report an agent that does not.\n *\n * The OWASP AI Exchange (community guidance, CC0). Each locator below is a section of https://owaspai.org/docs/.\n * spec-cite: OWASP AI Exchange, read 2026-10-19 — 1.1 #AI PROGRAM; 1.3 #LEAST MODEL PRIVILEGE and #OVERSIGHT;\n * 2.0 #MONITOR USE (and its agentic incident lifecycle); 2.2 #PROMPT INJECTION I/O HANDLING (2.2.2 indirect prompt injection); 2.5 AI resource exhaustion,\n * #LIMIT RESOURCES; 3.0 #SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGE (https://owaspai.org/)\n */\nconst OWASP_AI_EXCHANGE_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n // 1.3 #LEAST MODEL PRIVILEGE: act with the rights of whoever is served, enforced in the backend and re-bound to the\n // initiating principal per call, never in model instructions.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-agent-acts-with-served-principal-authority\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The control also says that when the person served asks the AI system to provide information to others, those others' authorisation must be \"\n + \"taken into account. The objective bounds the tool by the caller's authority only and states nothing about the recipients.\",\n ),\n },\n // 1.1 #AI PROGRAM, its impact analysis: whether the law prohibits the type of application.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-ai-use-legal-class-assessed\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Only the EU AI Act reading is derived, and only as a candidate for a person to confirm. Other laws are not assessed, and the other \"\n + \"impact-analysis questions (transparency, privacy rights, bias, need for AI, data use for the purpose) are not answered.\",\n ),\n },\n // 3.0 #SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGE: a record of the external models and AI services in use.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-external-ai-services-recorded\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Model versions and lineage are not recorded, nor which external model served which system version. Integrity verification, vulnerability \"\n + \"monitoring and supplier evaluation are not done.\",\n ),\n },\n // 1.3 #OVERSIGHT, automated oversight: unwanted output detected and withheld before anyone receives it.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-harmful-output-detected-and-withheld\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OUTPUT_MODERATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Detection covers only the harm categories the policy names. Misinformation, dangerous information, sensitive data and suspicious actions, \"\n + \"which the automated-oversight list also names, are not detected by this objective.\",\n ),\n },\n // 1.3 #OVERSIGHT, human-in-the-loop: high-impact agent actions wait for a verified human approval enforced by the\n // infrastructure, not by model instructions.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-human-approval-before-high-impact-agent-actions\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The control also asks that every agent action be sorted into a risk tier before deployment, with the oversight each tier needs; that \"\n + \"a high-risk approval carry a unique token per request, tied to the exact action parameters, the approver and an expiry, refused when the parameters \"\n + \"change or the token has lapsed; and that the person approving be qualified and instructed for the decision. The objective holds \"\n + \"high-impact actions for a verified human decision and does not state those three.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.2 #PROMPT INJECTION I/O HANDLING, for indirect injection: third-party content (tool output, retrieved data) is\n // inspected for injected instructions before it reaches the model, and stopped on detection. Its direct-input, encoding\n // and escaping halves are not claimed.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-indirect-prompt-injection-screening\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_SCREENING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective detects and withholds injected instructions in tool results and inbound deliveries. It does not normalise or escape \"\n + \"untrusted text, label or delineate it by trust level, validate tool output against a schema, or inspect earlier turns and stored content \"\n + \"already in the context.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.2 #PROMPT INJECTION I/O HANDLING, for the creation lane (#2846): text a research step brought in from the web is\n // labelled by its source (THIRD_PARTY), delineated in its own brief sections that the host, above the data block, says\n // are never to be followed, inspected where the brief is assembled, and withheld from the brief on detection. Its own\n // requirement row, because one requirement binds one objective and the runtime row above is the application's agents'.\n // spec-cite: OWASP AI Exchange, read 2026-10-19 — 2.2.2 Indirect prompt injection; #PROMPT INJECTION I/O HANDLING;\n // #INPUT SEGREGATION (https://owaspai.org/docs/2_threats_through_use/)\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-coding-brief-indirect-prompt-injection-screening\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"A research step's evidence is inspected where it is produced, before a generation step reads it, and the elements a step wrote from it \"\n + \"when the brief is assembled and when the `wildo context elements` door answers (#2938); when no classifier answers, the text is passed marked rather than stopped, and text written after reading research-informed input is treated as \"\n + \"trusted, its input having been screened or marked before the writing model read it (#2937).\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.5 AI resource exhaustion, #LIMIT RESOURCES (#2844): limit the resources a single model input, and for agents each\n // agent or session, may use, and on a breach terminate cleanly and log an audit event.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-model-spend-bounded\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The bound is a per-period token allowance per organization and, in in-app chat, per person, with no cap per input, agent or session on \"\n + \"compute, tool calls or execution time. A spent allowance refuses the next turn or call rather than ending the running one; a call a \"\n + \"resource operation makes pays as the operation's principal, else from the organization its work is for, else from its \"\n + \"application, and is refused when none of them can pay; a call outside any turn, flow or operation is refused only when it is \"\n + \"attributed to an organization, and one attributed to none (the host's own tooling) is neither counted nor refused (#2957). Embeddings, document extraction and content screening are bounded per \"\n + \"organization by a ceiling of their own each, asked before every such call, and the ceilings are granted by plan, so an application \"\n + \"granting none leaves them unbounded (#3030).\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.0 #MONITOR USE (#2841): log model usage and system behaviour so an incident can be reconstructed; its processing\n // context (model version, errors) and its filtering or blocking actions are what the record holds.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-model-use-monitored\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The control also logs the user, the input and the output, which the record deliberately omits, and it asks for detection, correlation, \"\n + \"alerting and response, which are the operator's. Calls outside the agent runtime leave no record.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.0 #MONITOR USE, agentic incident lifecycle, its Detection and triage bullet (#2842): signals correlated from automated\n // monitoring, user reports and operator observation, classified by severity, scope and urgency, routed by severity, and\n // triage decisions logged with timestamps, rationale and assignee.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-agentic-incident-detection-and-triage\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Only user reports are a signal, and nothing correlates them with automated monitoring or operator observation. Incidents are classified by \"\n + \"severity but not by scope or urgency, and no critical report is routed to containment or immediate human review.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The UK Code of Practice for the Cyber Security of AI (OGL v3.0). Its provisions say \"shall\" for a requirement and\n * \"should\" for a recommendation; every row below cites a \"shall\". No provision names prompt injection or output\n * filtering (the introduction names indirect prompt injection only as a risk), so it has no row for the moderation\n * objective, and the screening row cites the general resilience provision.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped for `WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING` (#2842): 10.3 (supporting end-users during and after an incident)\n * and 12.2 (analysing the logs for undesired output) are \"should\" provisions; 6.5 is a \"shall\", and asks for an AI system\n * incident management plan and recovery plan, an organisational artefact no product mechanism stands for.\n * spec-cite: UK Code of Practice for the Cyber Security of AI, DSIT, 31 January 2025 — provisions 2.1, 2.2, 2.6, 4.3, 5.1 and 12.1\n * (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-cyber-security-code-of-practice/code-of-practice-for-the-cyber-security-of-ai);\n * provisions 6.5, 10.3 and 12.2 read the same day for the note above\n */\nconst UK_AI_CODE_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n // 5.1: a comprehensive inventory of assets and their interdependencies.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-ai-asset-inventory\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The inventory covers the AI capabilities and the providers serving them. The other assets (data, models, prompts, infrastructure) and \"\n + \"their interdependencies are not inventoried.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.1: the business purpose of an AI system documented before it is built.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-ai-purpose-documented\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The provision asks for a thorough assessment before building, documenting the AI security risks and mitigation strategies alongside the \"\n + \"business requirement. The objective records the declared use and its domain only.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.6: an AI system that interacts with other systems or data is given only the permissions its function needs, and those\n // permissions are risk-assessed.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-ai-system-permissions-limited-and-assessed\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"A tool is bounded by its caller's authority, which is a ceiling rather than only the permissions its function requires, and the \"\n + \"permissions granted are not risk-assessed.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.2: the system resists adversarial attacks and unexpected input.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-resilience-to-adversarial-input\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_SCREENING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Screening third-party content for injected instructions is one defence against one class of adversarial input. Resistance to other \"\n + \"adversarial attacks, to unexpected input in general and to AI system failure is not covered.\",\n ),\n },\n // 4.3: where human oversight reduces a risk, technical measures for it are designed, verified and maintained.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-technical-measures-for-human-oversight\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n },\n // 12.1 (#2841): system operators log system and user actions to support security compliance, incident investigations and\n // vulnerability remediation.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-system-and-user-actions-logged\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The record logs what each agent invocation did; a person's actions and the system's other activity are not part of this objective. Calls \"\n + \"outside the agent runtime leave no record.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI 100-2 E2025 is a taxonomy: its mitigation sections DESCRIBE what has been proposed and recommend nothing as\n * sufficient. Each row therefore reads \"the source describes this mitigation, and the objective is it\". Its GenAI part\n * says nothing of human-in-the-loop, so it has no oversight row.\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-2 E2025, March 2025 — §3.3.3 Mitigations, §3.4 Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks and its §3.4.4\n * Mitigations (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-2e2025)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_100_2_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n // §3.3.3, detecting harmful generations with a classifier and terminating the interaction.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-100-2-harmful-generation-detected-and-terminated\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OUTPUT_MODERATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The mitigation describes classifying generations as harmful or undesirable in general. The objective judges only the harm categories the \"\n + \"agent's policy names, so undesirable output outside those categories is not detected.\",\n ),\n },\n // §3.4.4, closing paragraph: design on the assumption that prompt injection is possible, for example with several models\n // holding different permissions, or reaching untrusted data only through well-defined interfaces.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-100-2-injection-assumed-system-design\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Bounding a tool by its caller's authority still lets a model that read injected content act with that caller's full authority. The \"\n + \"objective does not split work across models holding different permissions, and it does not confine untrusted data to narrow interfaces, as \"\n + \"the paragraph's examples describe.\",\n ),\n },\n // §3.4.4: filtering instructions out of third-party data and detecting indirect injection.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-100-2-third-party-instruction-filtering\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_SCREENING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The AI Act. Two rows, both for the use classification, and both say KNOWING rather than complying: the objective\n * reports a use as a prohibited-practice or high-risk candidate for a person to confirm, never refuses it, and produces\n * neither the documented assessment of Art. 6(4) nor the registration of Art. 49(2). Art. 5 applies to every AI system;\n * the high-risk classification rule of Art. 6(2) is cited only as what identifies a candidate.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped:\n * - Arts. 14 (human oversight) and 26 (deployer obligations): they bind high-risk systems, which Wildo does not support\n * yet (#2851), and a row would claim coverage of a high-risk obligation.\n * - Art. 50 (transparency, applying since 2 August 2026): no objective answers it yet (#2840).\n * - Art. 4 (AI literacy): an organisation's act.\n * spec-cite: Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 — Art. 5(1), Art. 6(2) and Annex III,\n * Art. 6(4), Arts. 14, 26, 50 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj; article text read 2026-10-19 from the\n * consolidated reading at https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/ and checked against the OJ text of 2026/1744)\n */\nconst EU_AI_ACT_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:eu-ai-act-high-risk-candidate-use-identified\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective only flags a use as a high-risk candidate from its declared domain, for a person to confirm. It does not settle the \"\n + \"classification, it does not make the Art. 6(3) significant-risk assessment that can take an Annex III use out of the high-risk class, and \"\n + \"it does not cover the Art. 6(1) route for safety components of regulated products.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:eu-ai-act-prohibited-practice-identified\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Art. 5(1) prohibits the practices, while the objective reports a use in one of them as a candidate for a person to confirm and never stops \"\n + \"it. Its reading also rests on the declared domain rather than on the conditions each prohibition sets.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * PCI DSS v4.0.1, cited by reference only (#1564 part 3).\n *\n * One row: the requirement to maintain a list of the third-party service providers account data is shared\n * with (§12.8.1). `WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING` already discharges it — its evidence demand refuses a\n * runtime-selected provider missing from the processor register, the billing provider included — so a second\n * objective would state the same obligation twice. Written agreements, due diligence and monitoring (§12.8.2\n * to §12.8.4) are the operator's own acts and are not mapped. The responsibility split (§12.8.5) has a\n * framework half — the engine collects payment only through the provider's hosted checkout and billing\n * portal, so the application never receives card data — but it is a split between two contracting parties,\n * which no product declaration records, so it is not mapped either.\n *\n * spec-cite: N/A — requirement identifiers only, per the reference-only rights record; no PCI DSS text is quoted.\n */\nconst PCI_DSS_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:pci-dss-third-party-service-provider-list\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The intent makes each external provider an explicit opt-in selection. The requirement asks for more: the entity's own up-to-date record \"\n + \"of every outside service provider it shares account data with, whether or not the application selected that provider.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The #2488 tranche: three objectives for markers that claimed an objective whose intent excluded what they guard.\n * Every source below was already registered and ACTIVE; nothing is added to the registry.\n *\n * | objective | source | what it maps to | fit |\n * |---|---|---|---|\n * | `SECONDARY_USE_AUTHORIZATION` | GDPR | Art. 5(1)(b) purpose limitation, Art. 6(4) compatibility of further processing, Art. 28(3)(a) a processor acts only on documented instructions | the two members of `EvaluationExportBasis` are the two conditions under which the further use is admissible; an export is refused without one |\n * | `SECONDARY_USE_AUTHORIZATION` | Privacy Framework | CT.PO-P1 — authorizing data processing (e.g., organizational decisions), revoking authorizations, and maintaining authorizations | as for `CONSENT_RECORD`: the runtime gate and record the subcategory's process maintains |\n * | `CONSENT_ENFORCEMENT` | GDPR | Art. 7(3) — consent can be withdrawn at any time, and withdrawing must be as easy as giving | the processing stops when the purpose is not granted; a browser provider that a withdrawal could not stop is never started |\n * | `CONSENT_ENFORCEMENT` | Privacy Framework | CT.PO-P3 — enabling individuals' data processing preferences | the enforcement the subcategory's procedures put in place |\n * | `REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION` | SP 800-53 | AC-5 Separation of Duties — define system access authorizations to support separation of duties | the predicate is the access authorization; separation is the requester never being among those it admits |\n * | `REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION` | SP 800-53A | the AC-5 assessment procedure | the mechanical twin the source-coverage guard requires |\n *\n * The fit column records why each row was mapped. How much of the requirement a row answers is its `answer` (#2956), graded\n * against the source's text, which this column predates.\n *\n * spec-cite: GDPR (EU) 2016/679, Art. 5(1)(b), Art. 6(4), Art. 7(3), Art. 28(3)(a) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj)\n * spec-cite: NIST Privacy Framework Version 1.0 (NIST CSWP 01162020), Appendix A — CT.PO-P1, CT.PO-P3\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, AC-5 Separation of Duties; SP 800-53A Rev. 5, AC-05\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped: GDPR Art. 6(1) for the secondary use. Neither basis member is a lawful ground; each is a\n * condition on FURTHER processing, which is why `WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS` was rejected as the home.\n */\nconst SEPARATION_AND_SECONDARY_USE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-05T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\nconst GDPR_2488_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-compatible-further-processing\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SECONDARY_USE_AUTHORIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The controller has to carry out the compatibility assessment itself, weighing the link between the purposes, the context of collection, \"\n + \"the nature of the data, the consequences for the people concerned and the safeguards. The objective only requires that such an assessment \"\n + \"or instruction is recorded as the basis, and it covers one further use, exporting decision records as evaluation data.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-consent-withdrawal-effect\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_ENFORCEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Art. 7(3) also requires that the person is told about the right to withdraw before consenting, and that withdrawing is as easy as giving \"\n + \"consent. The objective stops the processing once consent is gone, but it does not state either of those two things.\",\n ),\n },\n];\nconst NIST_PRIVACY_FRAMEWORK_2488_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-further-use-authorization\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SECONDARY_USE_AUTHORIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective is a runtime gate and record for one further use, exporting decision records as evaluation data. It does not establish the \"\n + \"organisation's policies, processes and procedures for authorizing, revoking and maintaining authorizations, and it does not govern data \"\n + \"processing in general.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-individual-preference-enablement\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_ENFORCEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective enforces consent-based processing at runtime. It does not establish the organisation's policies and procedures, it does not \"\n + \"cover processing preferences other than consent, and it does not cover individuals' requests (access, correction, erasure).\",\n ),\n },\n];\nconst NIST_800_53_2488_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-separation-of-duties\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective keeps a requester from acting on decisions their own work raised. Identifying and documenting which duties must be separated \"\n + \"is the organisation's job, and so is defining access authorizations that support that separation beyond the review decisions the product \"\n + \"holds.\",\n ),\n },\n];\nconst NIST_800_53A_2488_ROWS: readonly AssessmentTwinRow[] = [\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-separation-of-duties-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n];\n\n/** The registry locator for each tranche source — every tranche above cites the locator the registry records. */\nconst sourceCoverageRows = (sourceRef: string, canonicalLocator: string, rows: readonly SourceCoverageRow[], reviewedAt: string = SOURCE_COVERAGE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT) =>\n rows.map((row) => ({\n source: { sourceRef, sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: row.requirementRef,\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: row.objective,\n answer: row.answer,\n canonicalLocator,\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt,\n }));\n\nexport interface InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow {\n readonly source: { readonly sourceRef: string; readonly sourceVersion: number };\n readonly requirementRef: string;\n readonly requirementVersion: number;\n readonly objective: { readonly objectiveRef: string; readonly objectiveVersion: number };\n /** How much of the requirement the objective answers, as reviewed (#2956). */\n readonly answer: AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswer;\n readonly canonicalLocator: string;\n readonly reviewedByRef: string;\n readonly reviewedAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Every reviewed source-requirement row of the initial basis: which source a requirement comes from and which\n * objective it was reviewed against.\n *\n * A function of its own (not inline in the composer) because the rows are needed WITHOUT composing a basis: the\n * jurisdiction gate (`deriveObjectiveJurisdictionApplicability`, #2852) reads them in programme generation and\n * in the creation brief, neither of which holds an implementation revision. The rows depend on no composer\n * input, so moving them changed nothing they say.\n */\nexport function createInitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorities(): InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow[] {\n const reviewed: InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow[] = [\n {\n /*\n * Malicious-code protection. The slug is DESCRIPTIVE and carries no control identifier from the\n * source's own numbering — `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses those outside an authorized\n * mapping boundary, and a descriptive slug survives an edition that renumbers them.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-malicious-code-protection\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective inspects uploaded content before it can be served. It does not cover exit points, automatic updates to the protection \"\n + \"mechanism, periodic whole-system scans, alerting designated people on detection, or handling false positives.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * The RISK-TREATMENT rows (#269 proportionality check, 2026-09-17).\n *\n * Added after checking this lane against what the field expects rather than against its own\n * reasoning, and the correlation turned out to be closer than the design was: the CSF's GOVERN\n * function names, as three separate outcomes, the three things #300's layers produce.\n *\n * Every slug here is DESCRIPTIVE and carries no identifier from the source's own numbering, per\n * the rule stated on the malicious-code row above — a descriptive slug survives an edition that\n * renumbers, and `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses the other kind outside a mapping\n * boundary.\n *\n * ONE DIVERGENCE, RECORDED RATHER THAN SMOOTHED OVER. The third outcome asks for a standardized\n * method for \"calculating, documenting, categorizing and prioritizing\" risks. This framework\n * documents, categorizes and prioritizes — and deliberately does NOT calculate: the register\n * carries two qualitative bands and multiplies nothing, because Layer 1 asserts structurally\n * that it emits no score and a number derived from two judgements is the thing a reader trusts\n * without checking. The citation is made for the three it answers, and the fourth is a stated\n * difference rather than a silent one. A mapping that hid it would be the \"conformity assertion\"\n * this boundary's own caveat refuses to make.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-risk-appetite-and-tolerance-statements\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks for statements of how much risk the organisation is willing to accept and tolerate, established, communicated and \"\n + \"maintained over time. The objective derives the exposures and records the treatment chosen for each with its reasoning, but it \"\n + \"produces no appetite or tolerance statement, nor its communication or maintenance.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-risk-response-options-direction\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks for strategic direction, established and communicated, describing which risk response options are appropriate. The \"\n + \"objective records the response the operator chose for each exposure and why, but it does not set or communicate the direction that \"\n + \"governs those choices.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-risk-documentation-and-prioritization-method\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks for a standardized method for calculating, documenting, categorizing and prioritizing risks that is established and \"\n + \"communicated. The objective documents derived exposures and their treatments, but states neither a calculation (which the basis \"\n + \"records as deliberately absent) nor prioritization, and establishing and communicating the method is organisational.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-subject-access-portability\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Access also means telling the person the purposes, recipients, retention period, their other rights, the data's source, any automated \"\n + \"decision-making and any transfer safeguards; portability needs a structured, machine-readable format and, where feasible, direct \"\n + \"transfer to another controller. The objective states an audited, subject-isolated export, not this information, format or transfer.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REQUIREMENT_REF,\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The rule asks for policies and procedures, based on the entity's access authorization policies, to establish, document, review and \"\n + \"modify every user's right of access. The objective covers periodic review of privileged access only, and it is not the entity's \"\n + \"policies and procedures.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-govern-access-review\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome covers all access permissions, entitlements and authorizations, asks that they be defined in a policy and managed and \"\n + \"enforced as well as reviewed, and that they incorporate least privilege and separation of duties. The objective delivers periodic, \"\n + \"evidenced review of privileged access only; the policy, the non-privileged population and the review's practice by people remain the \"\n + \"operator's.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-01 mapping tranche: NIST, GDPR and HIPAA ──────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * A requirement is named by a DESCRIPTIVE slug, never by the source's own control identifier, and the locator is the one the registry already records for that\n * source. That is not decoration: `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses restricted external identifiers outside an authorized boundary, the rights records\n * govern what may be reproduced, and a slug that says what the requirement IS survives an edition change that renumbers it.\n *\n * Each entry binds ONE objective to ONE requirement of one source. Where two sources reach the same objective they are separate entries, because applicability\n * is decided per source by the application and collapsing them would decide it here.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-erasure-and-restriction\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not cover restriction of processing: holding contested or objected-to data in storage only, using it only on the \"\n + \"narrow Art. 18(2) grounds, and telling the person before a restriction is lifted. Nor does it cover deciding whether an erasure ground \"\n + \"applies, erasing without undue delay, or informing other controllers when the data were made public.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-security-event-logging\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that log records be generated across the organisation's platforms (hardware, operating systems, services) and made \"\n + \"available to a continuous monitoring capability. The objective covers typed events for the application's own security-relevant changes \"\n + \"and checks at boot that the delivery path exists, not logging across the rest of the platform or the monitoring that consumes it.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-of-access-decisions\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective records access decisions only. The control also asks for record generation across every auditable event type on defined \"\n + \"components, a way for designated people to choose which events each component logs, and records carrying the full content the \"\n + \"audit-record content control lists.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hipaa-security-authentication-controls\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The standard asks for procedures that verify every person or entity seeking access to ePHI. The objective only makes second-factor \"\n + \"verification sound (one replay-resistant, timing-safe authority, counting only independent proofs); it does not cover first-factor \"\n + \"authentication, authenticating entities, or the procedures themselves.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Three objectives whose control is ALREADY IMPLEMENTED by the audit trail, verified in source\n * before binding rather than inferred from the objective's wording:\n *\n * | objective | the implementation that attests it |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION` | every auditable-event payload carries an actor field, and `audit-actor.shared.schemas.ts` closes the no-user case with a SENTINEL vocabulary instead of a bare `'unknown'` |\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION` | `CoreAuditableEventType.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS`, emitted on every crossing with `admissionDeclared` separating a sanctioned one from an attempted one |\n * | `WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT` | `CoreAuditableEventType.FIELD_ACCESS`, which `audit-access-fields.backend.utils.ts` fires on CREATE for `isBackendOnly({ isReturnedAtCreation: true })` — a minted secret returned exactly once |\n *\n * All three bind `capability:audit-events`, so this tranche adds no capability authority: the\n * engine capability that attests them was already declared, and inventing a second identity for\n * the same mechanism would split what an application must select.\n *\n * The requirement slugs describe what the requirement IS and never carry a source's own control\n * identifier — `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses those outside an authorized boundary,\n * and a descriptive slug survives an edition that renumbers them.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-attributable-event-record\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that personnel activity and technology usage actually be monitored to find potentially adverse events. The objective \"\n + \"makes each security-relevant action attributable in the record, but performs no monitoring or analysis of that activity.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-accountability-demonstration\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The controller has to be able to show that every Art. 5(1) principle is respected, using technical and organisational measures it \"\n + \"reviews and updates. Recording who performed a security-relevant action is one piece of that evidence; it does not show lawfulness, \"\n + \"minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation or security, and it does not provide the data protection policies Art. 24(2) expects.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hhs-security-access-authorization-recording\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The rule asks for policies and procedures for granting any workforce member access to ePHI through a workstation, transaction, program \"\n + \"or process. The objective covers only platform-tier administrators crossing into a tenant, and it is a mechanism rather than the \"\n + \"entity's authorization policy.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-authenticator-disclosure-record\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that identities and credentials for users, services and hardware be managed by the organisation throughout. The \"\n + \"objective covers a single moment in a minted secret's life, its first disclosure, as an attributable audit event.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Selected by CODE-MARKER COVERAGE rather than by reading the catalog, which is a better\n * criterion than the previous tranche's: an objective carrying `assurance-control:` markers is\n * one the codebase itself claims to implement, and `check:assurance-control-boundary` already\n * validates every marker against the catalog. All 40 unbound objectives carry at least one; these\n * three are among the four most heavily marked (25, 20 and 19 sites).\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE` | the API-key and OAuth-client schemas plus the audit trail — the privileged grant's whole life is the record, which is why the evidence IS the audit event |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE` | the API-key custom implementation, the password-reset service and the audit trail |\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY` | its own `administrative-continuity.shared.schemas.ts`, the organization-owner and super-admin floors, and the CRITICAL breach record |\n *\n * `LEAST_PRIVILEGE` was deliberately NOT bound in THIS tranche: the generation contract's refusal\n * pin used it as its canonical UNBOUND objective, so binding it in the same change would have\n * silently turned that pin into a test of nothing. The authorization-confinement tranche below\n * binds it, and fixes the pin properly — it now DERIVES an unbound objective from the catalog\n * minus these bindings, so no future tranche can hollow it out by accident.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-privileged-grant-evidence\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that permissions be defined in a policy, enforced and reviewed, with least privilege and separation of duties. The \"\n + \"objective keeps durable evidence of every grant, widening, narrowing and revocation, which supports management and review but does not \"\n + \"itself define, enforce or review the permissions.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-credential-state-transitions\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome covers managing identities as well as credentials, for users, services and hardware. The objective covers the credential's \"\n + \"lifecycle transitions, theft response and effective revocation, but not the management of the identities themselves or hardware \"\n + \"credentials.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hhs-security-credential-management\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The rule asks for procedures, delivered through the workforce training program, for creating, changing and safeguarding passwords. The \"\n + \"objective makes credential issuance, rotation and revocation explicit and attributable, but it does not provide the procedures or the \"\n + \"training, or state rules for creating and safeguarding passwords.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-govern-accountable-role-retention\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that cybersecurity risk-management roles, responsibilities and authorities be established, communicated, understood \"\n + \"and enforced across the organisation. The objective only guarantees that every scope keeps a usable administrator; defining and \"\n + \"communicating who is responsible for what is organisational practice it does not deliver.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche ──────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * The three most heavily marked remaining objectives (21, 15 and 14 sites), and together they\n * answer the two halves of an access question that the already-bound audit objectives only\n * RECORD: how much authority a principal may hold, and which rows that authority reaches.\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE` | `role-ceiling.backend.utils.ts` (a caller cannot grant what it does not hold, resolved per role-table scope) and `authorizeInProgrammaticSurface` (a non-controller surface applies the operation's declared role gate through the SAME predicate) |\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT` | seven confinement modules under `security/authorizations/` plus the WRITE-side narrowing in BOTH resource repositories, and the `OrganizationUnitNarrowingStamp` that records why access was reached |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION` | the OIDC authorization-code service, `pkce.backend.utils.ts`, and five distinct OAuth consent/exchange audit events |\n *\n * NOT claimed, and this is why the LEAST_PRIVILEGE binding above requires no audit capability:\n * the role-ceiling refusal is raised from custom-impl services, outside `runAuthorizationPhase`,\n * so it produces no authorization-denial audit row. That is a gap in the engine rather than in\n * this mapping, and it is filed as one — binding around it here keeps the programme's claim\n * true, which is the only thing this layer can do about it.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-least-privilege-authority-limit\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective stops a principal from granting authority it does not hold, and applies the same role gate on every surface. It does not \"\n + \"ensure that each principal's access is limited to what its assigned tasks need, which depends on how the organisation designs and \"\n + \"assigns roles.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-least-privilege-enforcement\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that permissions be defined in a policy, managed and reviewed, and that separation of duties be incorporated \"\n + \"alongside least privilege. The objective enforces a grant ceiling and one shared operation-role gate across surfaces, but policy \"\n + \"definition, review and separation of duties are not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-information-flow-confinement\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective confines reads and writes inside the application to the scope the caller's grant reaches. It does not enforce approved \"\n + \"flow policies for information moving to and from connected systems.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-processing-confidentiality\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Art. 32 asks for security measures matched to the risk: encryption or pseudonymisation; ongoing integrity, availability and \"\n + \"resilience; restoring access after an incident; regular testing of the measures; and making sure people with access act only on the \"\n + \"controller's instructions. Narrowing queries to the scope the caller's grant reaches covers only part of confidentiality.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-delegated-access-authorization\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that access permissions be defined in a policy and reviewed, and that they incorporate separation of duties. The \"\n + \"objective enforces and audits delegated access on the user's recorded authorization and bounds the token to the declared grant, but \"\n + \"defining the policy, reviewing delegated grants and separation of duties are not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Three objectives about identity over TIME, where the tranches above covered identity at a\n * single decision: how it is re-proved for a high-impact act, how a change to the authored\n * policy is evidenced, and when the access it confers ends.\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION` | the per-operation `requiresStepUpAuthentication` flag on eight resource configs, `reAuthenticate` (PASSWORD / TOTP / PASSKEY), and the separate `PasskeyAuthenticationCeremony.STEP_UP` challenge key that makes a login assertion structurally unredeemable at the step-up door |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE` | the SSO connection and config schemas, and `APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED` — emitted at boot, by the system, when the resolved policy snapshot differs from the last one recorded |\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE` | `ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY` read through `isAuthorityConferringOrganizationStatus`, the organization custom implementation that withdraws credentials, and four audit events covering withdrawal and restoration |\n *\n * A correction landed with this tranche rather than beside it: the `requiresStepUpAuthentication`\n * docstring still said re-authentication was PASSWORD-only and warned authors away from\n * declaring the flag on operations SSO-only, passkey-only or directory-managed users perform.\n * TOTP and passkey re-auth have both shipped, so that advice had inverted — and it was the\n * advice a framework author would have read while deciding whether this objective was\n * satisfiable at all.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hhs-security-person-or-entity-reverification\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The standard asks the entity to verify that any person or entity seeking access to ePHI is who it claims to be, every time access is \"\n + \"sought, and to have procedures for doing so. A fresh re-proof before high-impact actions covers only part of that.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-reauthentication-for-privileged-action\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * Named by Wildo's own DESCRIPTIVE SLUG, never by the standard's section number — the mapping\n * module is explicit that this is not a control-identifier crosswalk. The slug says what the\n * requirement is about; the canonical locator says where to read it.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63b-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63b-distinct-authentication-factors\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not enforce the permitted composition: either a multi-factor authenticator, or one physical something-you-have \"\n + \"authenticator combined with a password or a biometric comparison. Nor does it state the other AAL2 obligations: at least one \"\n + \"replay-resistant authenticator, approved cryptography, and communication over authenticated protected channels.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63b-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63b-out-of-band-channel-separation\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not state the out-of-band mechanics: a separate, encrypted secondary channel on which the device authenticates \"\n + \"itself, never email; the secret transferred between the two channels rather than a bare approval; a random secret of at least six \"\n + \"digits, valid for 10 minutes and accepted once; and rate limiting that a new secret does not reset.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63b-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63b-authenticator-activation-verified\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not state that an authenticator whose activation flag shows no activation factor was used is counted as a single \"\n + \"factor, or that every authentication event requires the local activation factor to be presented and verified. Nor does it deliver the \"\n + \"activation-secret obligations: a minimum length, disabling the authenticator after no more than 10 failed activation attempts, \"\n + \"hardware-protected verification at AAL3, and erasing the activation secret after use.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * What step-up IS, in the source's own vocabulary: reauthentication.\n *\n * This binding first carried `…authenticator-activation-verified`, the same requirement the\n * multi-factor objective above cites — on the reasoning that a step-up also re-proves a factor\n * the person still holds AND still unlocks. True, and not expressible: a source requirement's\n * identity is `source@version:requirement@version` with the OBJECTIVE excluded, so the basis\n * binds each requirement to exactly ONE objective and refused the pair as a duplicate. That\n * refusal is right — two objectives citing one requirement would make \"which control does this\n * requirement land on\" unanswerable — and the fix is to cite the requirement that is actually\n * step-up's, not to borrow the neighbour's.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-63B-4 (https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html) carries a\n * `Reauthentication` subsection under EACH assurance level, stating what a session may be\n * extended with at that level. The slug is descriptive and names no section number, like every\n * requirement ref here — deliberately, since two fetches of that document disagreed about the\n * numbering and a section number nobody can confirm is exactly the fabricated-citation defect\n * `external-specification-citations.md` exists for. The per-AAL structure is what was verified.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63b-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63b-reauthentication-at-assurance-level\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective requires a fresh re-proof before a high-impact action. It does not deliver the periodic reauthentication the provision \"\n + \"mandates: an overall session timeout per assurance level and an inactivity timeout, the session ending when either expires, the \"\n + \"timeouts resetting on activity and on reauthentication, reauthentication at AAL3 meeting the initial-authentication requirements, and \"\n + \"the limits documented in a system security plan.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63b-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63b-phishing-resistant-authentication\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective makes the authentication posture explicit and evidences its changes; it does not deliver phishing resistance itself: an \"\n + \"authentication protocol with channel binding or verifier name binding under approved cryptography, at least one phishing-resistant \"\n + \"option offered at AAL2, and never treating a manually entered code as phishing-resistant.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * The FEDERATION volume, for the half of session assurance that is about what an assertion\n * carries between parties — which is the authority for the `amr` an application now publishes\n * and for the `acr` it deliberately does not.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63c-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63c-assertion-states-its-authentication\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not state what an assertion carries: the authentication time, the assurance level used at the identity provider or \"\n + \"an explicit statement that none is asserted, the intended federation assurance level, and the issuer, audience, issuance time, \"\n + \"validity window, assertion identifier and signature; nor that the provider reports the resulting level even when the request was not \"\n + \"met.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/c/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-govern-authentication-posture-change\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that the policy be reviewed and updated to reflect changes in requirements, threats, technology and mission, and \"\n + \"communicated, as well as enforced. The objective makes the authentication posture explicit and evidences each change from the runtime \"\n + \"that enforces it, but the review cadence, the decision to update and the communication of the policy are the operator's practice.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-account-disable-on-relationship-end\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective covers taking access away when the relationship behind it ends. The control also asks that accounts be disabled within a \"\n + \"defined time when they have expired, break policy, or have been inactive for a defined period.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hhs-security-workforce-access-termination\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The rule asks for procedures for ending access when a workforce member's employment or other arrangement ends, or when the workforce \"\n + \"clearance determination requires it. The objective withdraws access once the conferring relationship has ended in the system; it does \"\n + \"not provide the procedure that notices the departure, or the clearance determination.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * The four privacy objectives a governed privacy notice quotes most directly, which is why\n * they are worth binding even though three of them carry fewer markers than some alternatives:\n * an application's privacy notice has retention, minimisation and consent paragraphs whether or\n * not the programme can support them.\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE` | the single retention-hide authority consumed by both persistence adapters, the aggregation/charts surface and RAG retrieval; the organization-purge batch; and four destruction audit events |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION` | the embeddings and document-extraction services (the processor receives the payload and nothing identifying the requester), and the client-install identifier policy chokepoint that fails closed absent an application opt-in |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION` | three startup refusals in the config validator plus the resource-retention sweep |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD` | `.isAuditEvidence()` on the two consent leaves, the preferences RESET, and the single emission point every consent-changing verb routes through |\n *\n * A correction landed with this tranche for the same reason the last one's did:\n * `RetentionStatus.RETAINED` still described its own concealment as \"enforcement wired in a\n * later phase\" long after that phase shipped, and a reader deciding whether SECURE_LIFECYCLE\n * was satisfiable would have concluded the row was still visible.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-erasure-with-retention-carve-out\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The controller has to decide that one of the listed grounds applies (a legal obligation, public health, archiving or research, or \"\n + \"legal claims) and keep the data only to the extent that ground requires. The objective hides and freezes retained records and destroys \"\n + \"data on schedule, but it does not tie a retained record to a valid ground or limit retention to what that ground needs.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-media-sanitization-and-disposal\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective makes the destruction of records deliberate, attributable and scheduled, and hides erased-but-retained records. It does \"\n + \"not sanitise the underlying system media before disposal, release or reuse with defined techniques, or match sanitisation strength to \"\n + \"the information's security category.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-data-minimisation\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The principle covers all personal data the application collects and stores, which must be adequate, relevant and limited to what each \"\n + \"purpose needs. The objective only limits what leaves to processors, to observability surfaces and as a device identifier; it does not \"\n + \"decide which fields the application collects or keeps.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-storage-limitation\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The controller has to set each window to no longer than its purpose needs, and longer storage for archiving or research needs the Art. \"\n + \"89(1) safeguards. The objective enforces the windows that were declared, but it does not show that those windows are necessary.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-consent-demonstrability\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * The lawful-basis row (#1288). Art. 6(1) closes the set of grounds and conditions the sixth on a\n * balancing of interests; the transparency articles then require a notice to state the basis per\n * purpose. The objective answers the declaration half — it evidences what the operator DECLARED,\n * never that the declared ground is legally sound, which stays a qualified reviewer's judgement.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-lawful-basis-per-purpose\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Art. 6(1) makes processing lawful only where a ground actually applies: the necessity tests are met and, for legitimate interests, the \"\n + \"person's rights do not override those interests. The objective records the declared basis and its balancing assessment, but whether \"\n + \"the basis is sound remains a qualified reviewer's judgement.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 attribution tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Five objectives about what the trail must be able to SAY. Four of them bind only\n * `capability:audit-events`, which is not thin coverage — it is the honest shape when the\n * control IS the record rather than a mechanism the record corroborates.\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION` | the resource-operations helper (a caller cannot widen its own scope), the MCP tool adapter (an agent is never offered its tenancy as a parameter), and both RAG chunk stores, where the predicate is evaluated INSIDE the traversal |\n * | `WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY` | the SSO config block that governs what the trail captures, and the services-registry handler that reconstructs a privileged action's authorization effect from the record rather than from role tables |\n * | `WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT` | the embeddings and document-extraction services (provider, model, usage and outcome per physical call) and the webhook test-endpoint probe (the initiating actor) |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING` | the SCIM provisioning switches carrying `.isAuditEvidence()`, and the declared department-to-unit bindings that make the directory authoritative over an authorization axis |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION` | the CIMD client-metadata service, the dynamic-registration path, and two audit events covering a client created by an unauthenticated party and every refused assertion |\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-shared-resource-isolation\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective derives tenant narrowing from the caller and applies it inside similarity search. It does not state that leftover \"\n + \"information in reused shared resources such as memory, storage or caches is prevented from passing to another tenant.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-record-content-and-protection\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not say that every record carries what happened, when, where, from what source, with what outcome, and every party \"\n + \"involved. Nor does it say the trail and its tools are protected from unauthorised access, change or deletion, or that designated \"\n + \"people are alerted when that happens.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-outbound-connection-monitoring\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that networks and network services be monitored to find potentially adverse events. The objective routes outbound \"\n + \"calls through named egresses and records each one so a reviewer can enumerate them, but it does not watch that traffic for anomalies \"\n + \"or cover network services beyond the application's own calls.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-automated-account-management\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-identify-service-identity-verification\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that identities of users, services and hardware be proofed and bound to credentials according to the context of the \"\n + \"interaction. The objective proofs only client identities, by demonstrated control of a domain, and records refusals; user and hardware \"\n + \"identities and context-dependent proofing strength are outside it.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 declaration tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Eight objectives satisfied by what a schema or configuration DECLARES, plus the trail that\n * records the declaration changing. This is where the marker-count method stops choosing for\n * you: every objective here carries one or two markers, so the ranking no longer discriminates\n * and each was decided by whether a real vocabulary exists to attest.\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY` | the coverage predicate that startup validation and request-time refusal SHARE, so an operation blessed at boot cannot answer 2xx having performed nothing |\n * | `WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` | the registry build that refuses a non-atomic configuration (the isolation declaration it then admitted was removed by #3328) |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY` | the `PersonalDataCategory` decorator on the field itself |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING` | the document-extraction service, where no bytes leave unless a provider is selected and the local library otherwise serves every extraction |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE` | `UserStatus` carrying `.isAuditEvidence().excludeFromUpdate()`, so the change cannot arrive as a side effect of an unrelated write |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT` | `CoreAuditableEventType.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT`, one event with `riskLevel` separating a page from a full result set |\n * | `WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION` | the audit service preserving actor and tenant across the trusted-system write, and the logger stamping `appSlug:env` |\n * | `WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY` | the backend-only exposure guard and the audited first exposure |\n *\n * `WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY` was blocked by a LAYERING problem rather than a\n * mapping one, and the fix was to move the boundary. Its vocabularies lived in\n * `saas-backend-lib`, which this package must not depend on — so a control that is real,\n * well-marked and enforced was unnameable from the layer obliged to describe it. They are\n * closed vocabularies rather than backend behaviour, so they now live in `saas-models` beside\n * the acknowledgement type that shares their marker; the resolvers that compute them did not\n * move. When an objective cannot be bound, check whether the obstacle is the EVIDENCE or the\n * package graph before recording it as uncovered.\n *\n * WHAT THIS TRANCHE LEAVES: fourteen objectives whose control is real but has no vocabulary a\n * capability could name from here — boot gates, a body-size cap, a conflict reference, an\n * open-redirect constraint. Binding them would mean inventing a capability identity per gate,\n * which is the plausible-coverage failure #207 exists to prevent. They need a decision about\n * whether the capability model should carry named GATES at all, not another tranche.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-declared-interface-integrity\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data at rest be protected. The objective protects one aspect \"\n + \"of integrity, that an operation never reports success it did not perform nor widens into writes over fields not exposed for update; \"\n + \"confidentiality, availability and other integrity threats are not addressed.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-transaction-recovery-integrity\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective refuses configurations whose cross-resource writes could not be atomic, which makes rollback possible. It does not state \"\n + \"any recovery mechanism that restores transactions after a failure, such as journaling or roll-forward.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-records-of-processing-categories\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The record must also describe the categories of data subjects, and it has to be kept as a written record of processing activities that \"\n + \"can be shown to the supervisory authority. Declaring personal-data categories on each field supplies only the data-category half of \"\n + \"that record.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-processor-engagement\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The controller may use only processors that give sufficient guarantees, each bound by a written contract stating the subject-matter, \"\n + \"duration and instructions, plus the Art. 28(3) duties: confidentiality, security, assistance, deletion or return at the end, and \"\n + \"audit; sub-processors need authorisation and the same obligations. Making routing opt-in does not establish any of these.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-account-enable-disable-authority\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective guards only the change to whether a principal may authenticate, which is enabling and disabling. Creating, modifying and \"\n + \"removing accounts, and the organisation's own policy and criteria for doing so, are not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-bulk-disclosure-record\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The record of processing has to name the categories of recipients the data have been or will be disclosed to, including recipients in \"\n + \"third countries, kept in writing and shown to the supervisory authority on request. The export event names the resource, operation and \"\n + \"format, but not who received the data, and it does not keep the record of processing activities.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-record-context-binding\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective keeps the actor, tenant, application and environment on a record. It does not state a defined strength for that binding, \"\n + \"such as cryptographic, or give authorised people a way to establish who produced the information.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hhs-security-transmission-confidentiality\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The standard asks for technical measures that protect ePHI against unauthorised access while it travels over an electronic network, \"\n + \"including encryption where appropriate and integrity controls that detect changes in transit. Keeping backend-only fields off the \"\n + \"client boundary does not protect the data that is transmitted, and it does not encrypt or check transmissions.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 reachability tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Four objectives whose control is WHICH DOOR EXISTS, and which values it refuses. They were\n * classified as unbindable in the tranche above and that was WRONG — the mistake is worth\n * recording because it is the one this lane keeps making.\n *\n * The question asked was \"does this guard have its own vocabulary\", and the answer was no for\n * all four. The right question is \"which vocabulary names this mechanism\", and for three of them\n * it already existed and was already exported:\n *\n * | objective | the vocabulary that names it |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY` | `ResourceOperationVariantType` — `credit-pool TOP_UP` was an API_CALL gated on ORG_OWNER, letting a tenant owner self-grant credits; the fix was the VARIANT, which no role gate could express |\n * | `WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT` | the same pair — `ScopeFeatures` writes cannot be field-protected, so the whole self-grant boundary is one role gate on operations that stay non-client-reachable |\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND` | `UserStatus` + `OrganizationMemberStatus`, the two the reactivation sweep moves between |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION` | `DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES`, which had to be EXPORTED — a closed vocabulary with one named source that nothing outside its module could reach |\n *\n * So of the fourteen the previous tranche left, four were a discovery failure rather than a\n * modelling limit. Before recording an objective as uncoverable, ask which existing vocabulary\n * describes the mechanism — the answer is often a capability that is already declared.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-transaction-authorization-separation\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective keeps credit increases behind system or payment authority, so no ordinary principal can grant itself value. Identifying \"\n + \"and documenting the duties that need separating, and defining access authorizations for them beyond credit grants, is not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-entitlement-change-authority\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that entitlements be defined in a policy, managed and reviewed, with least privilege and separation of duties. The \"\n + \"objective ensures entitlement writes pass only through an operator-gated door so no principal widens its own; defining, reviewing and \"\n + \"minimizing entitlements is not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-temporary-account-expiry\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The control asks that temporary and emergency accounts be removed or disabled automatically when their defined period ends. The \"\n + \"objective does the reverse: it automatically lifts a time-boxed restriction, and says nothing about temporary accounts expiring.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-redirect-target-constraint\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that identity assertions be protected, conveyed and verified. The objective constrains only where an OAuth flow may \"\n + \"deliver its result, a registered redirect target restricted to a safe absolute URL; protecting and verifying the assertion itself is \"\n + \"outside it.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Two objectives whose vocabulary EXISTED and was only in the wrong place — the third and\n * fourth time in four tranches, which is why the pattern is written down rather than fixed\n * quietly each time.\n *\n * | objective | where its vocabulary was | what moved |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY` | `OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES`, module-private in `saas-backend-lib` | moved to `saas-models` beside `OAuthGrantType`, which is the same kind of thing — an OIDC/OAuth protocol vocabulary. Having one consumer is a fact about usage, not about where a protocol constant belongs |\n * | `WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY` | `ConfigurationValidationDomain`, already exported | nothing — the boot validator's own domain vocabulary names the mechanism, exactly as `PersistenceAdapterTransactionOwnership` does for `DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` |\n *\n * The second one settles a question the previous tranche got wrong in prose: a BOOT GATE is not\n * inherently unbindable. It is bindable when the thing it checks has a vocabulary. What is not\n * bindable is a gate whose only description is its own name.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-assertion-integrity\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that identity assertions be protected, conveyed and verified as a whole. The objective only ensures the server alone \"\n + \"authors an ID token's protocol and security claims; how the assertion is protected in transit, conveyed and verified by its recipient \"\n + \"is not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-configuration-settings-enforcement\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective gives each server-owned field a single writer that is proven at boot. It does not establish and document the most \"\n + \"restrictive secure settings for system components, approve and record deviations from them, or monitor and control changes to them \"\n + \"under organisational procedure.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Two objectives whose vocabulary is the SUBSTRATE the control runs against rather than the\n * control's own machinery — the fifth and sixth time asking \"which vocabulary names this\"\n * rather than \"does this guard have one\" changed the answer.\n *\n * | objective | vocabulary | why the substrate is the right axis |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | `WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS` | `PersistenceAdapter` | the verification is genuinely per-adapter (two separate verifiers), so \"which datastores has this been proven against\" is the reader's question — and an adapter added without a verifier is exactly how the guarantee would become silently partial |\n * | `WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY` | `LifecycleStage` | the capability attests a NEGATIVE: naming the stages is how a reader learns which self-reported values exist to be wrongly trusted |\n *\n * The second is the only capability in the basis that attests something a vocabulary does NOT\n * do. That is deliberate — a capability naming a mechanism would imply the stages confer\n * something, which is the precise claim this objective exists to deny.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-information-integrity-verification\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective proves at boot that declared uniqueness and integrity constraints exist. It does not use integrity verification tools to \"\n + \"detect unauthorised changes to software, firmware or information, or take defined actions when such a change is found.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-authority-not-inferred-from-state\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that access permissions be defined in a policy, managed, enforced and reviewed with least privilege and separation of \"\n + \"duties. The objective ensures a self-reported lifecycle stage never confers authority or crosses a scope, which is one enforcement \"\n + \"property, not the policy, management or review of permissions.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Three objectives that looked like three unrelated guards — a SAML availability check, a 32kb\n * body cap, a unique-constraint resolver — and are each a DISTINCTION INSIDE ONE VOCABULARY.\n * All three bind `capability:refusal-classification`, and re-reading their intents is what\n * showed it: every one of them is phrased as a contrast.\n *\n * | objective | its own words |\n * |---|---|\n * | `SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED` | \"stays diagnosable … without its degradation being mistaken for a rejection\" |\n * | `OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT` | \"answered as a client error rather than surfacing as a server failure\" |\n * | `OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS` | \"reported with the identity that was violated rather than as an opaque datastore failure\" |\n *\n * Each contrast is between two `ErrorType` members. That is why one capability serves all\n * three and why naming the whole enum is right: the good outcome only means something against\n * the bad one it is not.\n *\n * What this does NOT claim, stated at the capability: that any particular refusal is classified\n * CORRECTLY. `UNKNOWN` is in the set because the engine admits it cannot always tell. The claim\n * is that one closed vocabulary owns the answer, so a misclassification is a wrong member rather\n * than an unclassified crash.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-fail-secure-behaviour\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that mechanisms meet the organisation's resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations, which includes \"\n + \"keeping services available. The objective makes a control that cannot run refuse and stay diagnosable, which protects confidentiality \"\n + \"and integrity under degradation, but it neither establishes resilience requirements nor preserves availability.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-denial-of-service-resource-bounds\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective bounds what unauthenticated requests consume. Denial-of-service events from authenticated traffic, and the other event \"\n + \"types and controls an organisation defines, are not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-error-handling-diagnostics\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective makes one error class, constraint conflicts, actionable. It does not state that error messages withhold information an \"\n + \"attacker could use, or that they are shown only to defined people or roles.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * The third package-placement unblock, and the weakest-argued of them — recorded as such. The\n * OIDC claim set was plainly a protocol vocabulary; these are Wildo's own key-purpose names.\n * What justifies the move independently of assurance is that they name identities crossing a\n * PROCESS boundary: the platform issues a token this application verifies, and this\n * application signs a webhook an integrator verifies. Both sides need the same names.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-cryptographic-key-establishment-and-management\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective bounds how long a retired signing key is trusted. It does not cover key generation, distribution, storage or access \"\n + \"against the organisation's key-management requirements, or keys other than token-signing keys.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * Attested from the engine even though the CONTROL lives in `platform-config-lib`, which this\n * package must not depend on. The vocabulary crosses the companion-safe boundary into\n * `saas-models` while only the digesting stayed on the platform side — so the objective that\n * looked structurally unreachable needed no move at all.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-authenticator-storage-protection\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective tracks the shape of a provider's secret contract without persisting the values. It does not ensure that no unencrypted \"\n + \"static secret is embedded in the application or in any other static storage.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * The forty-ninth binding, and the only one that required the ENGINE to change. The other\n * forty-eight were mapping work — finding the vocabulary that already named a control. This\n * one was a genuine coverage hole: the concurrent-session cap was enforced and untested-for\n * in the trail, so there was nothing to bind to until the eviction started emitting.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-concurrent-session-control\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-sp-800-66-rev-2\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-66r2\", NIST_800_66_SECURITY_RULE_GUIDANCE_ROWS),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-privacy-framework-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.01162020\", NIST_PRIVACY_FRAMEWORK_ROWS),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\", GDPR_2488_ROWS, SEPARATION_AND_SECONDARY_USE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-privacy-framework-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.01162020\", NIST_PRIVACY_FRAMEWORK_2488_ROWS, SEPARATION_AND_SECONDARY_USE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\", NIST_800_53_2488_ROWS, SEPARATION_AND_SECONDARY_USE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_ROWS, AI_COMPONENTS_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_USE_CLASSIFICATION_ROWS, AI_USE_CLASSIFICATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_HUMAN_OVERSIGHT_ROWS, AGENT_AUTHORITY_AND_OVERSIGHT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_AGENT_SUSPENSION_ROWS, AGENT_SUSPENSION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_OPERATION_RECORD_ROWS, AI_OPERATION_RECORD_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_INCIDENT_HANDLING_ROWS, AI_INCIDENT_HANDLING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\", NIST_800_53_AGENT_AUTHORITY_ROWS, AGENT_AUTHORITY_AND_OVERSIGHT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-sp-800-218\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218\", NIST_800_218_AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_ROWS, AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-600-1\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.600-1\", NIST_AI_600_1_ROWS, AI_CONTENT_SAFETY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:pci-dss-4.0.1\", \"https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/document_library/\", PCI_DSS_ROWS, AI_COMPONENTS_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:owasp-ai-exchange\", \"https://owaspai.org/\", OWASP_AI_EXCHANGE_ROWS, OPEN_AI_SOURCES_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:owasp-ai-exchange\", \"https://owaspai.org/\", OWASP_AI_EXCHANGE_BURST_LIMIT_ROWS, AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\n \"source:uk-ai-cyber-security-code-of-practice\",\n \"https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-cyber-security-code-of-practice/code-of-practice-for-the-cyber-security-of-ai\",\n UK_AI_CODE_ROWS,\n OPEN_AI_SOURCES_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n ),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-100-2-e2025\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-2e2025\", NIST_AI_100_2_ROWS, OPEN_AI_SOURCES_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:eu-ai-act-2024-1689\", \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj\", EU_AI_ACT_ROWS, OPEN_AI_SOURCES_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ];\n const twins = [\n ...withAssessmentTwinAnswers(NIST_800_53A_ASSESSMENT_PROCEDURE_ROWS, reviewed, SOURCE_COVERAGE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...withAssessmentTwinAnswers(NIST_800_53A_2488_ROWS, reviewed, SEPARATION_AND_SECONDARY_USE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...withAssessmentTwinAnswers(NIST_800_53A_AGENT_AUTHORITY_ROWS, reviewed, AGENT_AUTHORITY_AND_OVERSIGHT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ];\n return byCanonicalIdentity([...reviewed, ...twins], (a) => `${a.source.sourceRef}@${a.source.sourceVersion}:${a.requirementRef}@${a.requirementVersion}`);\n}\n\n/**\n * The SP 800-53A twins of the reviewed SP 800-53 rows, each answering exactly as much as the control it assesses (#2956).\n *\n * SP 800-53A's procedure for a control assesses that control and nothing else, so a twin carries its control row's\n * grade by construction rather than a second grade a reviewer could let drift. The control row is found by the twin's\n * own slug (`nist-800-53a-<x>-assessment` twins `nist-800-53-<x>`), and a twin whose control is missing, or answers\n * another objective or objective version, refuses the basis: that is a twin of nothing. The resolution is\n * `resolveAssessmentTwinAnswer` (`assurance-assessment-twins.ts`, a module no entrypoint re-exports), tested on planted\n * twins.\n */\nfunction withAssessmentTwinAnswers(\n twins: readonly AssessmentTwinRow[],\n reviewed: readonly InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow[],\n reviewedAt: string,\n): InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow[] {\n return twins.map((twin) => ({\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53a-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: twin.requirementRef,\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: twin.objective,\n answer: resolveAssessmentTwinAnswer(twin, reviewed),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/a/r5/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt,\n }));\n}\n\n/**\n * The source basis an obligation for this objective declares, as the authority basis decides it (#2990): `NONE_BY_DESIGN`\n * when its binding declares that no registered source states it, `REVIEWED_SOURCE_REQUIREMENTS` otherwise.\n *\n * One reader for the programme normalizer and the creation brief, so neither re-derives it from the rows. Throws for an\n * objective the basis does not bind: no obligation can exist for it, and answering a basis for it would hide that.\n */\nexport function assuranceObjectiveSourceBasisFor(objective: {\n readonly objectiveRef: string;\n readonly objectiveVersion: number;\n}): AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis {\n const binding = ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS.find(\n (candidate) => candidate.objective.objectiveRef === objective.objectiveRef && candidate.objective.objectiveVersion === objective.objectiveVersion,\n );\n if (!binding) throw new Error(`The assurance authority basis binds no \"${objective.objectiveRef}@${objective.objectiveVersion}\", so it has no source basis.`);\n return \"sourceBasis\" in binding && binding.sourceBasis === AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN\n ? AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN\n : AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.REVIEWED_SOURCE_REQUIREMENTS;\n}\n\n/**\n * Every binding's declared source basis agrees with the reviewed source-requirement rows (#2990): `NONE_BY_DESIGN` exactly\n * when no row reviews the objective.\n *\n * Total over the bindings and refused by name, both ways. A binding with no row and no declaration is a source mapping\n * somebody forgot, which would otherwise let a programme bind the objective as answering no source; a declaration\n * beside rows denies a review the basis holds. Called by the composer, so no basis carrying either can be composed.\n */\nexport function assertDeclaredObjectiveSourceBasesAgreeWithReviewedRequirements(\n rows: readonly InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow[] = createInitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorities(),\n): void {\n const reviewedObjectiveKeys = new Set(rows.map((row) => `${row.objective.objectiveRef}@${row.objective.objectiveVersion}`));\n const problems = ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS.flatMap((binding) => {\n const key = `${binding.objective.objectiveRef}@${binding.objective.objectiveVersion}`;\n const declaredNone = assuranceObjectiveSourceBasisFor(binding.objective) === AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN;\n if (declaredNone && reviewedObjectiveKeys.has(key)) return [`${key} declares no source by design, but source requirements are reviewed for it`];\n if (!declaredNone && !reviewedObjectiveKeys.has(key))\n return [`${key} is reviewed under no source requirement; declare sourceBasis NONE_BY_DESIGN on its binding if that is deliberate, or review its source`];\n return [];\n });\n if (problems.length > 0) throw new Error(`The assurance authority basis's source bases disagree with its reviewed requirements: ${problems.join(\"; \")}.`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Compose the source-neutral safe baseline around one Framework Knowledge-generated implementation revision.\n * Repository source locations never enter this contract; the generator resolves them before calling this function.\n */\nexport function createInitialAssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis(input: {\n readonly implementationRevision: AssuranceProgramSourceRevision;\n}): AssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis {\n const documentAuthorityCatalog = createInitialAssuranceDocumentAuthorityCatalog();\n const sourceRequirementAuthorities = createInitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorities();\n assertDeclaredObjectiveSourceBasesAgreeWithReviewedRequirements(sourceRequirementAuthorities);\n const implementationRevisionIdentity = {\n sourceRevisionRef: input.implementationRevision.sourceRevisionRef,\n };\n return AssuranceProgramAuthorityBasisSchema.parse({\n schemaVersion: 1,\n basisRef: INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_REF,\n basisVersion: INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_VERSION,\n requestedSourceUses: [AssuranceSourceUse.STORE_METADATA],\n sourceRegistry: INITIAL_ASSURANCE_SOURCE_REGISTRY,\n documentAuthorityCatalog,\n objectiveCatalog: INITIAL_ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_CATALOG,\n implementationRevision: input.implementationRevision,\n capabilityAuthorityDescriptors: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_CAPABILITY_AUTHORITIES, (a) => `${a.identity.capabilityRef}@${a.identity.capabilityVersion}`).map(({ availability, ...authority }) => ({\n authority: {\n identity: authority.identity,\n capabilityKind: authority.capabilityKind,\n implementationRefs: [...authority.implementationRefs],\n implementationRevision: implementationRevisionIdentity,\n profiles: authority.profiles.map((profile) => ({ ...profile, parameters: profile.parameters.map((parameter) => ({ ...parameter, allowedOptionRefs: [...parameter.allowedOptionRefs] })) })),\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [...authority.requiredHostArtifactKindRefs],\n },\n availability,\n })),\n sourceRequirementAuthorities,\n implementationExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.implementationExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => ({\n identity: { expectationRef: binding.implementationExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },\n objective: binding.objective,\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [...binding.requiredCapabilityRefs],\n })),\n /*\n * Bodies are joined in by REQUIREMENT ref rather than authored here — ONE PER STATED DEMAND.\n *\n * This joined `requiredStatementEvidenceRefs[0]` until 2026-09-12, beside a comment claiming every\n * binding was \"1:1:1\". Neither survived `4ac83c1f`, which gave `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE` a second\n * demand that sorts first: the authority named `operation-role-declaration` composed with the body of\n * `authorization-decision-record`, and its own body reached no consumer. Measured rather than inferred —\n * compared through the body schema on both sides, 50 of 50 single-demand authorities carried their own\n * body and the one multi-demand authority did not — and reproduced on `pnpm assurance:collection-plan`,\n * which planned the wrong demand's clauses under the right demand's name.\n *\n * A requirement demanded by two objectives (`authorization-decision-record`, by\n * `AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT` and by `LEAST_PRIVILEGE`) correctly composes the same body twice: the\n * body belongs to the requirement, and applicability — which differs between those two objectives on\n * an application without the audit trail — belongs to the run.\n *\n * The join throws BY NAME on an unauthored demand, for every demand rather than the first: the schema\n * would refuse the authority anyway, and failing here names the requirement, which a Zod path cannot.\n */\n evidenceExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.evidenceExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => ({\n identity: { expectationRef: binding.evidenceExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },\n objective: binding.objective,\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [...binding.requiredStatementEvidenceRefs],\n requirementBodies: binding.requiredStatementEvidenceRefs.map((requirementRef) => {\n const body = ASSURANCE_EVIDENCE_REQUIREMENT_BODIES[requirementRef];\n if (!body) {\n throw new Error(`No evidence requirement body is authored for ${requirementRef} (demanded by ${binding.evidenceExpectationRef}).`);\n }\n return { requirementRef, body };\n }),\n })),\n /*\n * Bodies are joined in by REQUIREMENT ref, ONE PER STATED DEMAND THAT HAS ONE — since 2026-09-12.\n *\n * This joined `requiredStatementVerificationRefs[0]`, the same join that silently gave the evidence\n * tier's multi-demand authority another demand's body. Unlike the evidence tier, a demand here may\n * still compose with no body rather than refusing: the verification authority keeps bodies optional\n * per demand so an application's own basis can be partly authored. The framework's completeness is\n * held by a test beside this basis, not by a throw here.\n *\n * Until 2026-09-08 these refs were the expectation's OWN ref in 50 of 50 bindings — the demand\n * said \"to verify X, see X\" (#452). They now name `verification-requirement:*`, which is a\n * namespace a body can be written against.\n */\n verificationExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.verificationExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => ({\n identity: { expectationRef: binding.verificationExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },\n objective: binding.objective,\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [...binding.requiredStatementVerificationRefs],\n requirementBodies: binding.requiredStatementVerificationRefs.flatMap((requirementRef) => {\n const body = ASSURANCE_VERIFICATION_REQUIREMENT_BODIES[requirementRef];\n return body ? [{ requirementRef, body }] : [];\n }),\n })),\n });\n}\n"]}
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EACL,sBAAsB,EACtB,sBAAsB,EACtB,WAAW,EACX,aAAa,EACb,iCAAiC,EACjC,cAAc,EACd,UAAU,EACV,SAAS,EACT,uBAAuB,EACvB,mCAAmC,EACnC,yCAAyC,EACzC,qBAAqB,EACrB,6BAA6B,EAC7B,8BAA8B,EAC9B,kBAAkB,EAClB,cAAc,EACd,kBAAkB,EAClB,sBAAsB,EACtB,gBAAgB,EAChB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,uBAAuB,EACvB,iCAAiC,EACjC,oBAAoB,EACpB,wBAAwB,EACxB,SAAS,EACT,oCAAoC,EACpC,mCAAmC,EACnC,mCAAmC,EACnC,qBAAqB,EACrB,UAAU,EACV,4BAA4B,EAC5B,oCAAoC,EACpC,2BAA2B,EAC3B,uBAAuB,EACvB,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,qBAAqB,EACrB,yBAAyB,EACzB,2CAA2C,EAC3C,8BAA8B,EAC9B,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,8BAA8B,EAC9B,cAAc,EACd,6BAA6B,EAC7B,cAAc,EACd,kCAAkC,EAClC,+BAA+B,EAC/B,mBAAmB,EACnB,uCAAuC,EACvC,wBAAwB,EACxB,sCAAsC,EACtC,oBAAoB,EACpB,sCAAsC,EACtC,qCAAqC,EACrC,kBAAkB,EAClB,uCAAuC,EACvC,uCAAuC,EACvC,4BAA4B,EAC5B,yCAAyC,EACzC,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,iCAAiC,EACjC,yBAAyB,EACzB,kCAAkC,EAClC,gCAAgC,EAChC,oBAAoB,EACpB,qBAAqB,EACrB,UAAU,EACV,wBAAwB,EACxB,WAAW,EACX,oBAAoB,EACpB,+BAA+B,EAC/B,yCAAyC,EACzC,iCAAiC,EACjC,+BAA+B,EAC/B,mCAAmC,EACnC,2BAA2B,EAC3B,0BAA0B,EAC1B,iBAAiB,EACjB,cAAc,EACd,cAAc,EACd,4BAA4B,EAC5B,iCAAiC,EACjC,kCAAkC,EAClC,gCAAgC,EAChC,oBAAoB,EACpB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,iBAAiB,EACjB,yBAAyB,EACzB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,0BAA0B,EAC1B,6BAA6B,EAC7B,2BAA2B,EAC3B,yBAAyB,EACzB,+BAA+B,EAC/B,kBAAkB,EAClB,+BAA+B,EAC/B,eAAe,EACf,sBAAsB,EACtB,kBAAkB,EAClB,eAAe,EACf,qBAAqB,EACrB,6BAA6B,EAC7B,4BAA4B,EAC5B,sBAAsB,EACtB,oBAAoB,EACpB,4BAA4B,GAC7B,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,MAAM,sCAAsC,CAAC;AACrK,OAAO,EACL,qCAAqC,EACrC,iDAAiD,EACjD,uBAAuB,EACvB,0BAA0B,EAC1B,0BAA0B,EAC1B,8BAA8B,EAC9B,6BAA6B,EAC7B,4CAA4C,EAC5C,oCAAoC,GACrC,MAAM,sCAAsC,CAAC;AAE9C,OAAO,EACL,oCAAoC,EACpC,0CAA0C,GAE3C,MAAM,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAC7C,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,kFAAkF,CAAC;AAChH,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,8DAA8D,CAAC;AACtG,OAAO,EACL,8BAA8B,EAC9B,qCAAqC,EACrC,sCAAsC,GAGvC,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AACrC,OAAO,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,MAAM,qDAAqD,CAAC;AAC5G,OAAO,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,MAAM,yDAAyD,CAAC;AACpH,OAAO,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,MAAM,2CAA2C,CAAC;AAChG,OAAO,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,MAAM,yCAAyC,CAAC;AACzG,OAAO,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,MAAM,yCAAyC,CAAC;AAC5F,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AACjE,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAC3E,OAAO,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAEzE;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wDAAwD,GAAG,4EAA4E,CAAC;AACrJ;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sDAAsD,GAAG,0EAA0E,CAAC;AACjJ,8GAA8G;AAC9G,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uCAAuC,GAAG,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAE7F;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAU,CAAC;AACxH,mGAAmG;AACnG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAG,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAEnF,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,qCAAqC,GAAG,kDAAkD,CAAC;AACxG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgEG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,yCAAyC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAC3D;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAyBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,8DAA8D,GAAG;IAC5E,yDAAyD;IACzD,mEAAmE;IACnE,oDAAoD;IACpD,iDAAiD;IACjD,0DAA0D;IAC1D,uDAAuD;IACvD,2DAA2D;IAC3D,4DAA4D;CACpD,CAAC;AACX,kHAAkH;AAClH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,qDAAqD,GAAG,4DAA4D,CAAC;AAClI,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACzD,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,oCAAoC,CAAC;AACpE,MAAM,iDAAiD,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACrF,MAAM,kDAAkD,GAAG,qCAAqC,CAAC;AACjG;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,2BAA2B,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC/D,gMAAgM;AAChM,MAAM,yBAAyB,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC7D,oIAAoI;AACpI,MAAM,wCAAwC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC5E,yJAAyJ;AACzJ,MAAM,6CAA6C,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACjF;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,0CAA0C,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC9E,uIAAuI;AACvI,MAAM,oCAAoC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACxE,0HAA0H;AAC1H,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACtE,yIAAyI;AACzI,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACnE,2JAA2J;AAC3J,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACnE,wHAAwH;AACxH,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACpE,0IAA0I;AAC1I,MAAM,qCAAqC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACzE,6HAA6H;AAC7H,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC1E,yIAAyI;AACzI,MAAM,uCAAuC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAE3E;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAuBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wCAAwC,GAAG;IACtD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,uCAAuC,CAAC;QAC5F,sBAAsB,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACnF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,0DAA0D,CAAC;QAC3F,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,4BAA4B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACrF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACjE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACjF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;KAC3F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,4BAA4B,EAAE,gDAAgD;QAC9E,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,CAAC;QAC5D,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,8CAA8C;QAC1E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;KACpF;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,4BAA4B,EAAE,4CAA4C;QAC1E,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC;QACtD,sBAAsB,EAAE,gDAAgD;QACxE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;QACxF,0BAA0B,EAAE,0CAA0C;QACtE,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAAC;KAChF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAqBG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,4BAA4B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,uCAAuC,CAAC;QAC5F,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACrF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;KAC/F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAClF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,4CAA4C;QACpE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;QAC7E,0BAA0B,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC9E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;KACxF;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,4BAA4B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAC5E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;QACrF,0BAA0B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACnF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;KAC7F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,CAAC;QAClE,sBAAsB,EAAE,6CAA6C;QACrE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;QACrF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD,8GAA8G;IAC9G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3E,4BAA4B,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC5F,oHAAoH;QACpH,iHAAiH;QACjH,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC3E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;QACpF,0BAA0B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACxF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;KAClG;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,4BAA4B,EAAE,2EAA2E;QACzG,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,gEAAgE;QACxF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,gEAAgE,CAAC;QACjG,0BAA0B,EAAE,yEAAyE;QACrG,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,yEAAyE,CAAC;KAC/G;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,4BAA4B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAC9E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;QACvF,0BAA0B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACrF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;KAC/F;IACD,8GAA8G;IAC9G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,gEAAgE;QAC9F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD;QAChF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACzF,0BAA0B,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC1F,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,8DAA8D,CAAC;KACpG;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,sEAAsE;QACpG,gHAAgH;QAChH,iHAAiH;QACjH,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACxF,sBAAsB,EAAE,8CAA8C;QACtE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;QAC/E,0BAA0B,EAAE,oEAAoE;QAChG,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oEAAoE,CAAC;KAC1G;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,4BAA4B,EAAE,0DAA0D;QACxF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,2CAA2C,CAAC;QAChG,sBAAsB,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAC9E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;QACvF,0BAA0B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACpF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;KAC9F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,4BAA4B,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACjF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;QAC1F,0BAA0B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QACzF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,6DAA6D,CAAC;KACnG;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,4BAA4B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QAC1F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACjG,sBAAsB,EAAE,8DAA8D;QACtF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,8DAA8D,CAAC;QAC/F,0BAA0B,EAAE,0DAA0D;QACtF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,0DAA0D,CAAC;KAChG;IACD,mHAAmH;IACnH;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAiBG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,yCAAyC,CAAC;QAC9F,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE;YAC7B,oDAAoD;YACpD,iDAAiD;SAClD;QACD,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,4BAA4B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC/E,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,gDAAgD,CAAC;QAC1E,sBAAsB,EAAE,8CAA8C;QACtE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;QAC/E,0BAA0B,EAAE,+CAA+C;QAC3E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC;KACrF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,4BAA4B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC3F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,oCAAoC,CAAC;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,8DAA8D;QACtF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,8DAA8D,CAAC;QAC/F,0BAA0B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACvF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;KACjG;IACD,0GAA0G;IAC1G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,4BAA4B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACrF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC7D,sBAAsB,EAAE,+CAA+C;QACvE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC;QAChF,0BAA0B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACjF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;KAC3F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,4BAA4B,EAAE,oEAAoE;QAClG,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACnF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;QAC5F,0BAA0B,EAAE,kEAAkE;QAC9F,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,kEAAkE,CAAC;KACxG;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1E,4BAA4B,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACxG,sBAAsB,EAAE,+DAA+D;QACvF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+DAA+D,CAAC;QAChG,0BAA0B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QACzF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,6DAA6D,CAAC;KACnG;IACD,wGAAwG;IACxG;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,4BAA4B,EAAE,kEAAkE;QAChG,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,wCAAwC,CAAC;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,gEAAgE;QAC5F,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,gEAAgE,CAAC;KACtG;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF;;;;WAIG;QACH,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,gDAAgD,EAAE,6CAA6C,CAAC;QACzH,sBAAsB,EAAE,mEAAmE;QAC3F,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,EAAE,mEAAmE,CAAC;QAC/J,0BAA0B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC7E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;KACvF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,uBAAuB,CAAC;QACpH,sBAAsB,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC3E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,mDAAmD,CAAC;QAC9H,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChF,4BAA4B,EAAE,0DAA0D;QACxF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,oCAAoC,CAAC;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACjF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;QAC1F,0BAA0B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACpF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;KAC9F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC;QAC1F,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,wCAAwC,CAAC;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACjF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;QAC1F,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC;QAC/D,sBAAsB,EAAE,+CAA+C;QACvE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC;QAChF,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD,qGAAqG;IACrG;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC7D,sBAAsB,EAAE,qDAAqD;QAC7E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;QACtF,0BAA0B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC7E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;KACvF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,4BAA4B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACnF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;QAC5F,0BAA0B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACnF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;KAC7F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,4BAA4B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAClF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,2CAA2C;QACnE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,2CAA2C,CAAC;QAC5E,0BAA0B,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC9E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;KACxF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,4BAA4B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD;QAChF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACzF,0BAA0B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACnF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;KAC7F;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,4BAA4B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACrF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,2CAA2C,CAAC;QAChG,sBAAsB,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACpF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;QAC7F,0BAA0B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACjF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;KAC3F;IACD,qGAAqG;IACrG;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;QACxE,sBAAsB,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACnF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;QAC5F,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAkBG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,wCAAwC,CAAC;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,4BAA4B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACrF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACjE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACjF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;KAC3F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,4CAA4C,CAAC;QACjG,sBAAsB,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACpF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;QAC7F,0BAA0B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACnF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;KAC7F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,4BAA4B,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC5F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAAC;QACpE,sBAAsB,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAC9E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;QACvF,0BAA0B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACxF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;KAClG;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC;QAChE,sBAAsB,EAAE,qDAAqD;QAC7E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;QACtF,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACjE,sBAAsB,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACnF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;QAC5F,0BAA0B,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC3F,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,+DAA+D,CAAC;KACrG;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC5F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnG,sBAAsB,EAAE,+DAA+D;QACvF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+DAA+D,CAAC;QAChG,0BAA0B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACxF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;KAClG;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAClF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,qDAAqD;QAC7E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;QACtF,0BAA0B,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC9E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;KACxF;IACD;QACE;;;WAGG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yCAAyC,CAAC;QACnE,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD;QAChF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACzF,0BAA0B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACxF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;KAClG;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC3F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QACvE,sBAAsB,EAAE,uDAAuD;QAC/E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;QACxF,0BAA0B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACvF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;KACjG;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,4BAA4B,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAChF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC3E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;QACpF,0BAA0B,EAAE,gDAAgD;QAC5E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,gDAAgD,CAAC;KACtF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,8CAA8C;QAC5E,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,+CAA+C;QACvE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC;QAChF,0BAA0B,EAAE,4CAA4C;QACxE,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;KAClF;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7E,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC7D,sBAAsB,EAAE,6CAA6C;QACrE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QAC9E,0BAA0B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC7E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;KACvF;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACxF,sBAAsB,EAAE,6CAA6C;QACrE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QAC9E,0BAA0B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC7E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;KACvF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,4BAA4B,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC7F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,8CAA8C,CAAC;QACnG,sBAAsB,EAAE,+DAA+D;QACvF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+DAA+D,CAAC;QAChG,0BAA0B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QACzF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,6DAA6D,CAAC;KACnG;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,+CAA+C;QACvE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC;QAChF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,4CAA4C;QACpE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;QAC7E,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACjF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,4CAA4C;QACpE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;QAC7E,0BAA0B,EAAE,iDAAiD;QAC7E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;KACvF;IACD,sGAAsG;IACtG;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,yCAAyC,CAAC;QAC7G,sBAAsB,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACpF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;QAC7F,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC3F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,yCAAyC,CAAC;QAC7G,sBAAsB,EAAE,iEAAiE;QACzF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iEAAiE,CAAC;QAClG,0BAA0B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACvF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;KACjG;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,4BAA4B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACzF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC;QACpH,sBAAsB,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC3E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;QACpF,0BAA0B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACrF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;KAC/F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACjE,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD,2GAA2G;IAC3G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,4BAA4B,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACvF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;QACtE,sBAAsB,EAAE,qDAAqD;QAC7E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;QACtF,0BAA0B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACnF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;KAC7F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QACvE,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,4BAA4B,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACrF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACxM,sBAAsB,EAAE,qDAAqD;QAC7E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;QACtF,0BAA0B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACjF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,CAAC;KAC3F;IACD,4GAA4G;IAC5G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QACvE,sBAAsB,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAC9E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;QACvF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAAC;QACpE,sBAAsB,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC1E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;QACnF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD,6GAA6G;IAC7G;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,4BAA4B,EAAE,gDAAgD;QAC9E,gHAAgH;QAChH,8GAA8G;QAC9G,8GAA8G;QAC9G,sCAAsC;QACtC,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,EAAE,mCAAmC,CAAC;QACnH,sBAAsB,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAC5E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;QACrF,0BAA0B,EAAE,8CAA8C;QAC1E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;KACpF;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,4BAA4B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QAC1F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC7D,sBAAsB,EAAE,gDAAgD;QACxE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,gDAAgD,CAAC;QACjF,0BAA0B,EAAE,0DAA0D;QACtF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,0DAA0D,CAAC;KAChG;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,sCAAsC,CAAC;QAC3F,sBAAsB,EAAE,uDAAuD;QAC/E,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,uDAAuD,CAAC;QACxF,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,4BAA4B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACpF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC7D,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAChF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC;KAC1F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC;QAChE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,wCAAwC,CAAC;QAClE,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD;QAChF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACzF,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAgBG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,4BAA4B,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACtF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QACnD,sBAAsB,EAAE,8CAA8C;QACtE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC;QAC/E,0BAA0B,EAAE,sDAAsD;QAClF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;KAC5F;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAiBG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,sEAAsE;QACpG,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yCAAyC,CAAC;QACnE,sBAAsB,EAAE,gEAAgE;QACxF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,gEAAgE,EAAE,yDAAyD,CAAC;QAC5J,0BAA0B,EAAE,oEAAoE;QAChG,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,oEAAoE,CAAC;KAC1G;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,4DAA4D;QAC1F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD;QAChF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACzF,0BAA0B,EAAE,0DAA0D;QACtF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,0DAA0D,CAAC;KAChG;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,oDAAoD;QAClF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC;QAChE,sBAAsB,EAAE,6CAA6C;QACrE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QAC9E,0BAA0B,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAC9E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC;KACxF;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACnF,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC;QAChE,sBAAsB,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACpF,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,4DAA4D,CAAC;QAC7F,0BAA0B,EAAE,mDAAmD;QAC/E,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;KACzF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,WAAW,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACjE,4BAA4B,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC3F,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC;QACvE,sBAAsB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACzE,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAClF,0BAA0B,EAAE,2DAA2D;QACvF,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,2DAA2D,CAAC;KACjG;CACO,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAAgD;IACjG,+FAA+F;IAC/F,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IAC3B,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IACvB,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IAC1B,2FAA2F;IAC3F,+FAA+F;IAC/F,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IAClC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IAC3B,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI;IACrC,2EAA2E;IAC3E,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAG;IAC1C,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,mBAAmB;IAC5D,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,mBAAmB;CAC9D,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAuBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,4BAA4B,GAAG,CAAC,UAAmC,EAAY,EAAE,CAC5F,SAAS,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE;KAC/B,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC;KACjF,IAAI,EAAE;KACN,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAE9C,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG;IAC9C;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAyBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7F,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAwBG;QACH,kHAAkH;QAClH,4FAA4F;QAC5F,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACpH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAClG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;WAUG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAC7I,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,2BAA2B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iCAAiC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAChI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAChH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oCAAoC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;SAC3H,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACzH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oCAAoC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4CAA4C,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC5H,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;SAC1H,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAClH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;QACtF,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACpH,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR;gBACE,UAAU,EAAE,yDAAyD;gBACrE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;aAC/G;SACF;QACD,4BAA4B,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC;QACxF,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,8BAA8B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;SAC1G;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WA0BG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,+BAA+B,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kCAAkC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACxH,uCAAuC,gCAAgC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE;SACtF,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3F,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACzD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;KACtI;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3D,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,mBAAmB,EAAE;KACtJ;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;QAC9H,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;WAUG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,oBAAoB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,4BAA4B,oBAAoB,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QACtJ,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAcG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACzF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SAC7F,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,gDAAgD,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,+BAA+B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;QACpI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,cAAc,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,EAAE,oBAAoB,cAAc,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QACjI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAuBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD;;;;WAIG;QACH,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;YAC3G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SACjG;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mDAAmD,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,uCAAuC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yCAAyC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1I,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,+FAA+F;QAC/F,iGAAiG;QACjG,gGAAgG;QAChG,4FAA4F;QAC5F,iGAAiG;QACjG,mEAAmE;QACnE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACvG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACnH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;QAC9H,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAqBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1E,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qBAAqB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAChF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qBAAqB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAChF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACnF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SAC1G,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAyBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mBAAmB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACvG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAcG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,gBAAgB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7F,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,kBAAkB,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QAClI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACrI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YACnI,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SACnI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;aACzD,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6CAA6C,OAAO,IAAI,yCAAyC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACjI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QACtH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAClH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACzG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SAC5G;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qBAAqB,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7G,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACtG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/E,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SACjF;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,2GAA2G;QAC3G,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACrG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SACpG;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,0HAA0H;QAC1H,oHAAoH;QACpH,kFAAkF;QAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,qFAAqF;YACrF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7G,wBAAwB,mBAAmB,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE;YAC1D,wBAAwB,mBAAmB,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE;YAC5D,wBAAwB,mBAAmB,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAChE,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;SACjG;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;WAUG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,6BAA6B,mCAAmC,EAAE;YAClE,6BAA6B,2BAA2B,EAAE;YAC1D,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,4BAA4B,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACjH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAChF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1H,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kCAAkC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3I,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACpI,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,8BAA8B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3G,kHAAkH;YAClH,qGAAqG;YACrG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,8BAA8B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;SAC1G,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAgBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACxG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;SAC7F,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,2BAA2B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,2BAA2B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,gCAAgC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACrG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iCAAiC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACzG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1G,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;SACrH,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,uBAAuB,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9E,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YACtG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YAChH,GAAG,8BAA8B,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,gCAAgC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SACxF,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,gDAAgD,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,2CAA2C,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QAClJ,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACpH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,6BAA6B,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACvI,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;SAChH;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3J,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3H,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YACxG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,+BAA+B,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SACrH;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;WAMG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAChF,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SAChG;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yCAAyC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YACvH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACxG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oCAAoC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SAChH,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAChG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3F,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;SAClH,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7F,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;QACpI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,8BAA8B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1H,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD;;;;;WAKG;QACH,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACtI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,kCAAkC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACrH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mCAAmC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACpI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/G,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,mBAAmB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACnG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAmBG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACtF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACjG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;WAWG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,oDAAoD,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACvI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACtG,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAcG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,gCAAgC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YACtE,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;SACxE,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAcG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACrI,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;WAKG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yCAAyC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QAC1I,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,yDAAyD,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5G,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACrH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,yCAAyC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,gDAAgD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;SAC9I,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;KAC1I;IACD;QACE;;;WAGG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,4BAA4B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACnH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;KAC1I;IACD;QACE;;;;WAIG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,yBAAyB,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;YAClG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,sCAAsC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;SACxH,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;IACD;QACE;;;;;;;;WAQG;QACH,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,6CAA6C,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChG,cAAc,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM;QACrD,kBAAkB,EAAE;YAClB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,kCAAkC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YACpH,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oCAAoC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,2BAA2B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;SAC1G,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACR,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;QACZ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE;KACpF;CACO,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,CAAI,MAAoB,EAAE,QAA8B,EAAO,EAAE,CAC3F,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAExH;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAM,mCAAmC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACvE,+FAA+F;AAC/F,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACrE,2GAA2G;AAC3G,MAAM,qCAAqC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACzE,iDAAiD;AACjD,MAAM,yCAAyC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC7E,+DAA+D;AAC/D,MAAM,iDAAiD,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACrF,gHAAgH;AAChH,MAAM,mCAAmC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAevE,kEAAkE;AAClE,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAqC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,sCAAsC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AAEnH;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,CAAC,SAAiB,EAAoC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,sCAAsC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAExJ;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAAiC;IAC3E,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,gFAAgF,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAChL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,6EAA6E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAC/K,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,sEAAsE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACzL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,gFAAgF,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACxL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,yEAAyE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAClL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,6EAA6E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACvL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,yEAAyE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACxL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACzL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,+EAA+E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAC3L,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,2FAA2F,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACzM,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,8EAA8E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACvL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACtL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,yEAAyE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACjL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,+EAA+E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACzL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,4EAA4E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAClL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,sEAAsE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAC1L,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,4EAA4E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IACjL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,mFAAmF,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAClM,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,sEAAsE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAC3K,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAChL,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,iFAAiF,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;IAC/L,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,2EAA2E,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;CACxL,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,MAAM,uCAAuC,GAAiC;IAC5E;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC/E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,mIAAmI;cAC/H,6IAA6I;cAC7I,kIAAkI,CACvI;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACxE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,2IAA2I;cAC3I,mHAAmH,CACxH;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACtE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACvF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,6IAA6I;cAC7I,WAAW,CAChB;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;QAChF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,6FAA6F,CAClG;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,yDAAyD;QACzE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;cACrI,sIAAsI;cACtI,gGAAgG,CACrG;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC7E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;cACjI,kIAAkI;cAClI,aAAa,CAClB;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC7E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC1E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;cACpI,uIAAuI;cACvI,aAAa,CAClB;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8BG;AACH,MAAM,2BAA2B,GAAiC;IAChE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;QAC1E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACjF,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;KACzB;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,yEAAyE;QACzF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,6HAA6H;cAC7H,0CAA0C,CAC/C;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,wDAAwD;QACxE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,0IAA0I;cAC1I,SAAS,CACd;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,wEAAwE;QACxF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,6IAA6I;cAC7I,qBAAqB,CAC1B;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;QACjF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,wIAAwI;cACxI,yBAAyB,CAC9B;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,oDAAoD;QACpE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;cACpI,wIAAwI;cACxI,qCAAqC,CAC1C;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,sEAAsE;QACtF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAChF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,mIAAmI,CACxI;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;QACrF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;cACpI,0IAA0I;cAC1I,sCAAsC,CAC3C;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,4DAA4D;QAC5E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,oIAAoI;cACpI,oCAAoC,CACzC;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAiC;IACrD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;QACrF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,oHAAoH,CACzH;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,mCAAmC,GAAiC;IACxE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,8EAA8E;QAC9F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,2IAA2I;cAC3I,wCAAwC,CAC7C;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAiC;IACrE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;QACrF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;cAChI,6IAA6I;cAC7I,6BAA6B,CAClC;KACF;IACD,yHAAyH;IACzH;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,sDAAsD;QACtE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,uDAAuD,CAC5D;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAiC;IACrE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,2EAA2E;QAC3F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,uFAAuF,CAC5F;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAiC;IACtE,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,uFAAuF,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;CACtM,CAAC;AAEF,8CAA8C;AAC9C,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAE1E,kDAAkD;AAClD,MAAM,uCAAuC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAE3E,kDAAkD;AAClD,MAAM,wCAAwC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAE5E,4CAA4C;AAC5C,MAAM,oCAAoC,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAExE;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAiC;IACtE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;QACjF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,6HAA6H;cAC7H,gIAAgI;cAChI,uCAAuC,CAC5C;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF,qDAAqD;AACrD,MAAM,6CAA6C,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAEjF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiBG;AACH,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAiC;IACvE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,yEAAyE;QACzF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,mIAAmI;cAC/H,+HAA+H;cAC/H,oHAAoH;cACpH,4IAA4I;cAC5I,0FAA0F,CAC/F;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAoBG;AACH,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAiC;IACvE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE;QACvF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,yCAAyC,CAC9C;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;QACnF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,kCAAkC,CACvC;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qFAAqF;QACrG,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,0FAA0F,CAC/F;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAiC;IACtE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC/E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,0HAA0H,CAC/H;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE;QACvF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,0IAA0I;cAC1I,kBAAkB,CACvB;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AACH,MAAM,oCAAoC,GAAiC;IACzE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC7E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,2IAA2I;cAC3I,2IAA2I;cAC3I,KAAK,CACV;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;QACnF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,qFAAqF,CAC1F;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;QACjF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,kHAAkH,CACvH;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAiC;IACvD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC9E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;cACpI,oGAAoG,CACzG;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAiC;IAC3D,oHAAoH;IACpH,8DAA8D;IAC9D;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,iFAAiF;QACjG,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,2HAA2H,CAChI;KACF;IACD,2FAA2F;IAC3F;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;QAClF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;cACjI,yHAAyH,CAC9H;KACF;IACD,oFAAoF;IACpF;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;QACpF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,kDAAkD,CACvD;KACF;IACD,wGAAwG;IACxG;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,2EAA2E;QAC3F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,oFAAoF,CACzF;KACF;IACD,kHAAkH;IAClH,6CAA6C;IAC7C;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,sFAAsF;QACtG,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;cACnI,sJAAsJ;cACtJ,kIAAkI;cAClI,mFAAmF,CACxF;KACF;IACD,mHAAmH;IACnH,wHAAwH;IACxH,uCAAuC;IACvC;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,0EAA0E;QAC1F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;cAChI,2IAA2I;cAC3I,yBAAyB,CAC9B;KACF;IACD,qHAAqH;IACrH,uHAAuH;IACvH,sHAAsH;IACtH,uHAAuH;IACvH,mHAAmH;IACnH,uEAAuE;IACvE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,uFAAuF;QACvG,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;cACrI,0OAA0O;cAC1O,6FAA6F,CAClG;KACF;IACD,sHAAsH;IACtH,uFAAuF;IACvF;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;QAC1E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;cACrI,sIAAsI;cACtI,wHAAwH;cACxH,+HAA+H;cAC/H,mMAAmM;cACnM,qIAAqI;cACrI,8CAA8C,CACnD;KACF;IACD,qHAAqH;IACrH,mGAAmG;IACnG;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;QAC1E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;cACrI,mGAAmG,CACxG;KACF;IACD,2HAA2H;IAC3H,wHAAwH;IACxH,mEAAmE;IACnE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,4EAA4E;QAC5F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,kHAAkH,CACvH;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAM,eAAe,GAAiC;IACpD,wEAAwE;IACxE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,kDAAkD;QAClE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;cACpI,8CAA8C,CACnD;KACF;IACD,2EAA2E;IAC3E;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACrE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,mFAAmF,CACxF;KACF;IACD,0HAA0H;IAC1H,iCAAiC;IACjC;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,0EAA0E;QAC1F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,kIAAkI;cAC9H,4CAA4C,CACjD;KACF;IACD,oEAAoE;IACpE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;QAC/E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;cACjI,8FAA8F,CACnG;KACF;IACD,8GAA8G;IAC9G;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,sEAAsE;QACtF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC5E,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;KACzB;IACD,yHAAyH;IACzH,6BAA6B;IAC7B;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC9E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,4CAA4C,CACjD;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAiC;IACvD,2FAA2F;IAC3F;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,6EAA6E;QAC7F,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,uFAAuF,CAC5F;KACF;IACD,yHAAyH;IACzH,kGAAkG;IAClG;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;QAClF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;cACjI,6IAA6I;cAC7I,oCAAoC,CACzC;KACF;IACD,2FAA2F;IAC3F;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;QACpF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;KACzB;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,MAAM,cAAc,GAAiC;IACnD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;QACjF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;cAChI,4IAA4I;cAC5I,oFAAoF,CACzF;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;QAC7E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,wGAAwG,CAC7G;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAM,YAAY,GAAiC;IACjD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;QAC9E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,uHAAuH,CAC5H;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,MAAM,gDAAgD,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAEpF,MAAM,cAAc,GAAiC;IACnD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,uDAAuD;QACvE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,0IAA0I;cACtI,4IAA4I;cAC5I,wHAAwH,CAC7H;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,mDAAmD;QACnE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,qHAAqH,CAC1H;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAiC;IACrE;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;QAC3E,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,2IAA2I;cACvI,0IAA0I;cAC1I,wBAAwB,CAC7B;KACF;IACD;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;QAClF,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,4IAA4I;cACxI,6HAA6H,CAClI;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAiC;IAC1D;QACE,cAAc,EAAE,qDAAqD;QACrE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QAC9F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,6IAA6I;cACzI,2IAA2I;cAC3I,QAAQ,CACb;KACF;CACF,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAiC;IAC3D,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE;CACtL,CAAC;AAEF,iHAAiH;AACjH,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,CAAC,SAAiB,EAAE,gBAAwB,EAAE,IAAkC,EAAE,aAAqB,mCAAmC,EAAE,EAAE,CACvK,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACjB,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;IACvC,cAAc,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,cAAc;IAClC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;IACrB,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS;IACxB,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM;IAClB,gBAAgB;IAChB,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;IACrC,UAAU;CACX,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAcN;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,kDAAkD;IAChE,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAoD;QAC9D;YACE;;;;eAIG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;YAC1E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,+GAA+G,CACpH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAoBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;YACpF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACjF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;kBACjI,iIAAiI;kBACjI,oFAAoF,CACzF;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;YAC7E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACjF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,qIAAqI;kBACrI,wBAAwB,CAC7B;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,0EAA0E;YAC1F,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACjF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,kIAAkI;kBAClI,sHAAsH,CAC3H;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACpE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,mIAAmI;kBACnI,qIAAqI,CAC1I;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,qDAAqD;YACrE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;kBACjI,kIAAkI;kBAClI,0BAA0B,CAC/B;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,iDAAiD;SAC9D;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,kDAAkD;YAClE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,qIAAqI;kBACrI,uIAAuI;kBACvI,aAAa,CAClB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;;;;;;;;;WASG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,iDAAiD;YACjE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACjF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,sGAAsG,CAC3G;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,2BAA2B;SACxC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;YAC3E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,mIAAmI,CACxI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,sCAAsC;YACxD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,2BAA2B;SACxC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;YAC1E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,gIAAgI;kBAChI,qCAAqC,CAC1C;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,2BAA2B;SACxC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;YAC3E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;kBACjI,qIAAqI;kBACrI,wEAAwE,CAC7E;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACnF,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,2BAA2B;SACxC;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAmBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;YAC9E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC3E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,0HAA0H,CAC/H;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,yBAAyB;SACtC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,sDAAsD;YACtE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC3E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,sIAAsI;kBACtI,kIAAkI,CACvI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,yBAAyB;SACtC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;YAChF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,mIAAmI;kBACnI,gCAAgC,CACrC;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,yBAAyB;SACtC;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;YACrF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,mIAAmI;kBAC/H,mHAAmH,CACxH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,yBAAyB;SACtC;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAoBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;YAC/E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,mDAAmD,CACxD;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,wCAAwC;SACrD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;YAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACvF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,kIAAkI;kBAClI,cAAc,CACnB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,wCAAwC;SACrD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,uDAAuD;YACvE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,qCAAqC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACvF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,mEAAmE,CACxE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,wCAAwC;SACrD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;YAC/E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC1F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,kIAAkI;kBAClI,2FAA2F,CAChG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,wCAAwC;SACrD;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAkBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;YAChF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAChF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,oIAAoI;kBACpI,gBAAgB,CACrB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,6CAA6C;SAC1D;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACjF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAChF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,gIAAgI;kBAC5H,mIAAmI;kBACnI,6DAA6D,CAClE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,6CAA6C;SAC1D;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;YAC7E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,qEAAqE,CAC1E;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,6CAA6C;SAC1D;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACpE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,8HAA8H;kBAC1H,sIAAsI;kBACtI,2HAA2H,CAChI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,6CAA6C;SAC1D;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;YACpF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC1F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,sIAAsI;kBACtI,0FAA0F,CAC/F;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,6CAA6C;SAC1D;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAmBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACjF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,oHAAoH,CACzH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,oCAAoC;SACjD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE;YACvF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACxB,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,oCAAoC;SACjD;QACD;YACE;;;;eAIG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACjF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,+HAA+H;kBAC/H,iHAAiH,CACtH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;YAChF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,oIAAoI;kBACpI,qGAAqG,CAC1G;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;YACnF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,iIAAiI;kBACjI,uFAAuF,CAC5F;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;eAkBG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;YACrF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,kIAAkI;kBAClI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,kDAAkD,CACvD;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;YACnF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,qIAAqI;kBACrI,2FAA2F,CAChG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE;;;;eAIG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnE,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;YACrF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,iIAAiI;kBACjI,uIAAuI;kBACvI,MAAM,CACX;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAClE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,0CAA0C;SACvD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;YAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,mIAAmI,CACxI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,oCAAoC;SACjD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;YACpF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC1E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,gGAAgG,CACrG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,oCAAoC;SACjD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;YAC9E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC1E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,uFAAuF,CAC5F;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,oCAAoC;SACjD;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAmBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;YAC1E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,yHAAyH,CAC9H;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,kCAAkC;SAC/C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;YAChF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,sCAAsC,CAC3C;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,kCAAkC;SAC/C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,2CAA2C;YAC3D,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,wDAAwD,CAC7D;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,kCAAkC;SAC/C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,4CAA4C;YAC5D,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,iIAAiI,CACtI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,kCAAkC;SAC/C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,iDAAiD;YACjE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAChF,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACxB,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,kCAAkC;SAC/C;QACD;;;;;WAKG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,kDAAkD;YAClE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,sIAAsI;kBACtI,8DAA8D,CACnE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qBAAqB;SAClC;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAcG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;YAC1E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC/E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,kIAAkI;kBAC9H,uHAAuH,CAC5H;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;YACpF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,mIAAmI;kBACnI,uCAAuC,CAC5C;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;YACnF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,qIAAqI;kBACjI,uIAAuI;kBACvI,+DAA+D,CACpE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;YAC7E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACxB,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,oEAAoE;YACpF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,oEAAoE,CACzE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAiCG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;YAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,sIAAsI;kBACtI,8EAA8E,CACnF;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,+DAA+D;YAC/E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACtF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,wGAAwG,CAC7G;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,0DAA0D;YAC1E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,sIAAsI;kBACtI,cAAc,CACnB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,8CAA8C;YAC9D,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,mIAAmI;kBACnI,2HAA2H,CAChI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACjF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,iGAAiG,CACtG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClE,cAAc,EAAE,gDAAgD;YAChE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,yIAAyI;kBACzI,kGAAkG,CACvG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,+CAA+C;YACjE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,6DAA6D;YAC7E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,mGAAmG,CACxG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzE,cAAc,EAAE,8DAA8D;YAC9E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,oIAAoI;kBACpI,gHAAgH,CACrH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,kFAAkF;YACpG,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;YACjE,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;SAC5C;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAqBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,qEAAqE;YACrF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,mIAAmI,CACxI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;SAC7C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;YAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,sIAAsI;kBAClI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,wCAAwC,CAC7C;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;SAC7C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,yDAAyD;YACzE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACrF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,kIAAkI;kBAC9H,kIAAkI,CACvI;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;SAC7C;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,gEAAgE;YAChF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,uIAAuI;kBACvI,aAAa,CAClB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;SAC7C;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,yDAAyD;YACzE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAClF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,wIAAwI;kBACpI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,gBAAgB,CACrB;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qCAAqC;SAClD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;YACnF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACtF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,kIAAkI;kBAC9H,qIAAqI;kBACrI,iCAAiC,CACtC;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,qCAAqC;SAClD;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,mEAAmE;YACnF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,wHAAwH,CAC7H;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,sCAAsC;SACnD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,uEAAuE;YACvF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC1F,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,yIAAyI;kBACrI,qIAAqI;kBACrI,gEAAgE,CACrE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,sCAAsC;SACnD;QACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAsBG;QACH;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9D,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;YAC3E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9E,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,wIAAwI;kBACxI,iHAAiH,CACtH;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,qCAAqC;YACvD,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,kEAAkE;YAClF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,6DAA6D,CAClE;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD;YACE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;YAC3E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,6EAA6E,CAClF;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD;YACE;;;;;;eAMG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,+EAA+E;YAC/F,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACxF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,oIAAoI;kBAChI,gGAAgG,CACrG;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD;YACE;;;;;eAKG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,iEAAiE;YACjF,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CACpB,uIAAuI;kBACnI,8EAA8E,CACnF;YACD,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD;YACE;;;;;eAKG;YACH,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACpF,cAAc,EAAE,2DAA2D;YAC3E,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5F,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACxB,gBAAgB,EAAE,oDAAoD;YACtE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;YACrC,UAAU,EAAE,uCAAuC;SACpD;QACD,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,6BAA6B,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACzI,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC;QACrI,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,+CAA+C,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,gDAAgD,CAAC;QACnK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,gDAAgD,CAAC;QAC5L,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,2CAA2C,EAAE,oDAAoD,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,gDAAgD,CAAC;QACjM,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,iCAAiC,CAAC;QAC7I,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,yCAAyC,CAAC;QACxK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAC7K,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,oCAAoC,CAAC;QACjK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,uCAAuC,CAAC;QACpK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,wCAAwC,CAAC;QACtK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,2CAA2C,EAAE,oDAAoD,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,iDAAiD,CAAC;QAC7M,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,sCAAsC,CAAC;QACxK,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,qCAAqC,CAAC;QACjJ,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,wDAAwD,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iCAAiC,CAAC;QACxJ,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,mCAAmC,CAAC;QACtI,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,6CAA6C,CAAC;QAC5J,GAAG,kBAAkB,CACnB,8CAA8C,EAC9C,6HAA6H,EAC7H,eAAe,EACf,mCAAmC,CACpC;QACD,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,4BAA4B,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,mCAAmC,CAAC;QAC1J,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,4BAA4B,EAAE,gDAAgD,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,mCAAmC,CAAC;KAC7J,CAAC;IACF,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;QACZ,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC,sCAAsC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,mCAAmC,CAAC;QACnH,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,gDAAgD,CAAC;QAChH,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC,iCAAiC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,iDAAiD,CAAC;KAC7H,CAAC;IACF,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5J,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,SAAS,yBAAyB,CAChC,KAAmC,EACnC,QAAkE,EAClE,UAAkB;IAElB,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QACxB,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACrF,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc;QACnC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;QACrB,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS;QACzB,MAAM,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;QACnD,gBAAgB,EAAE,iDAAiD;QACnE,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;QACrC,UAAU;KACb,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACN,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,gCAAgC,CAAC,SAGhD;IACC,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,wCAAwC,CAAC,IAAI,CAC3D,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAClJ,CAAC;IACF,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO;QAAE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,2CAA2C,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,+BAA+B,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9J,OAAO,aAAa,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,KAAK,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QAC7G,CAAC,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc;QACtD,CAAC,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC;AACzE,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,+DAA+D,CAC7E,OAAiE,kDAAkD,EAAE;IAErH,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5H,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,wCAAwC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE;QAC5E,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;QACtF,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,gCAAgC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;QAClI,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI,qBAAqB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;YAAE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,4EAA4E,CAAC,CAAC;QAChJ,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;YAClD,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,yIAAyI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3J,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACZ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACH,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC;QAAE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,yFAAyF,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5J,CAAC;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,2CAA2C,CAAC,KAE3D;IACC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,8CAA8C,EAAE,CAAC;IAClF,MAAM,4BAA4B,GAAG,kDAAkD,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1F,+DAA+D,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9F,MAAM,8BAA8B,GAAG;QACrC,iBAAiB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,iBAAiB;KAClE,CAAC;IACF,OAAO,oCAAoC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;QAChD,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QAChB,QAAQ,EAAE,qCAAqC;QAC/C,YAAY,EAAE,yCAAyC;QACvD,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;QACxD,cAAc,EAAE,iCAAiC;QACjD,wBAAwB;QACxB,gBAAgB,EAAE,mCAAmC;QACrD,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,sBAAsB;QACpD,8BAA8B,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,gCAAgC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACnM,SAAS,EAAE;gBACT,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;gBAC5B,cAAc,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,cAAc;gBACxC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC;gBACrD,sBAAsB,EAAE,8BAA8B;gBACtD,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;gBAC3L,4BAA4B,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC;aAC1E;YACD,YAAY;SACb,CAAC,CAAC;QACH,4BAA4B;QAC5B,oCAAoC,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,4BAA4B,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YAClK,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,4BAA4B,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACzF,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS;YAC5B,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC;SAC5D,CAAC,CAAC;QACH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAkBG;QACH,8BAA8B,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,sBAAsB,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACtJ,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACnF,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS;YAC5B,6BAA6B,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC;YACzE,iBAAiB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE;gBAC9E,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,qCAAqC,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;gBACnE,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;oBACV,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,gDAAgD,cAAc,iBAAiB,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;gBACrI,CAAC;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAClC,CAAC,CAAC;SACH,CAAC,CAAC;QACH;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,kCAAkC,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,0BAA0B,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YAC9J,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;YACvF,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS;YAC5B,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC;YACjF,iBAAiB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE;gBACtF,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,yCAAyC,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;gBACvE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAChD,CAAC,CAAC;SACH,CAAC,CAAC;KACJ,CAAC,CAAC;AACL,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import {\n AI_ENGINE_CAPABILITIES,\n AiUseDeclarationSource,\n AiUseDomain,\n AiUseRiskTier,\n AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode,\n AuditActorKind,\n AuthMethod,\n AuthUtils,\n DecisionStepUpProofKind,\n BillingReconciliationDivergenceKind,\n BillingReconciliationUncomparedPopulation,\n ClientInstanceIdScope,\n ConfigurationValidationDomain,\n DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES,\n ConsentGateRefusal,\n ConsentPurpose,\n DataRetentionClass,\n CoreAuditableEventType,\n EngineCapability,\n EngineCapabilityResolutionMode,\n ProcessingRegionHolding,\n ProviderProcessingRegionReachKind,\n ErasureRetentionMode,\n StatutoryRetentionGround,\n ErrorType,\n EvaluationDatasetExportRefusalReason,\n EvaluationDatasetInvalidationReason,\n EvaluationExportAuthorizationStatus,\n EvaluationExportBasis,\n FileStatus,\n GovernedDocumentApprovalGate,\n GovernedDocumentReleaseApprovalState,\n HumanDecision_RefusalReason,\n HumanDecision_RouteKind,\n HumanDecision_Plane,\n AiDecisionConsequence,\n AutonomousTurnTrigger,\n FunctionToolAuthorityKind,\n FLOWS_ACTORS_PERSONAL_DATA_MODEL_TREATMENTS,\n InboundDeliveryRejectionReason,\n CryptoKey_Purpose,\n JwtPublicKeys,\n ExecutionContext_ExecutionType,\n LifecycleStage,\n OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin,\n OAuthGrantType,\n OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES,\n OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission,\n OutboundTargetClass,\n ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY,\n OrganizationMemberStatus,\n PlatformAccessGrantLifecycleTransition,\n PersonalDataCategory,\n ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema,\n OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind,\n PersistenceAdapter,\n ResourceOperationImplementationCoverage,\n ResourceOperationRequestContractBreadth,\n ResourceOperationVariantType,\n PERSISTENCE_ADAPTER_TRANSACTION_OWNERSHIP,\n ResourcePrimaryScope,\n RetentionStatus,\n RuntimePrincipalDatabaseGrantAxis,\n SubjectErasureDisposition,\n SubjectErasureExternalEffectStatus,\n ProviderCredentialDeletionReason,\n SubjectExportPurpose,\n UsageRecordFlushState,\n UserStatus,\n ApplicationRiskSignalRef,\n LawfulBasis,\n RiskTreatmentPosture,\n FlowsActors_ModeratedOutputKind,\n FlowsActors_PromptInjectionScreeningScope,\n FlowsActors_ScreenedContentSource,\n ProviderComplianceDetermination,\n A2A_PERSON_TOKEN_CEILING_FEATURE_ID,\n A2A_TOKEN_BUDGET_FEATURE_ID,\n A2ATokenBudgetDenialReason,\n TokenSpendCeiling,\n ModelSpendDoor,\n ModelUsageUnit,\n modelUsageCeilingFeatureIdOf,\n modelSpendDoorAdmitsEachModelCall,\n modelSpendDoorChargesPersonCeiling,\n modelSpendDoorChargesTokenBudget,\n FeatureLimitSemantic,\n AGENT_INVOCATION_FAILURE_CODES,\n AgentOperationEnd,\n FlowsActors_ToolCallPhase,\n AgentBehaviorReportCategory,\n AgentBehaviorReportOutcome,\n AgentBehaviorReportRemedyKind,\n AgentBehaviorReportSeverity,\n AgentBehaviorReportStatus,\n AgentBehaviorReports_Operations,\n LegalHoldErrorCode,\n LegalHoldSubjectAttributionKind,\n LegalHoldGround,\n LegalHoldPlacementTier,\n LegalHoldScopeKind,\n LegalHoldStatus,\n LegalHolds_Operations,\n ExternalTurnRatePrincipalKind,\n DeclaredRateLimitSubjectKind,\n OperationDispatchPlane,\n AgentSuspensionScope,\n AgentSuspensionRefusalReason,\n} from \"@wildo-ai/saas-models\";\nimport { MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceScreeningOutcome, MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceTrust, ResearchProvenanceCatalogReading } from \"@wildo-ai/saas-models/meta-workflows\";\nimport {\n AgentClientProtocol_PermissionCeiling,\n AgentClientProtocol_PermissionEscalationBehaviour,\n APPLICATION_ENVIRONMENT,\n ContentSafety_HarmCategory,\n ContentSafety_HarmSeverity,\n ContentSafetyModerationOutcome,\n ContentSafetyScreeningOutcome,\n ExternalProvider_ModuleOwnedConfigurationKey,\n ProviderConfigurationCredentialField,\n} from \"@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models\";\n\nimport {\n AssuranceProgramAuthorityBasisSchema,\n AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind,\n type AssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis,\n} from \"./assurance-authority-basis.schemas\";\nimport { AcceptOrigin } from \"../application-creation/accepted-change-attribution.application-creation.schemas\";\nimport { Journey_AutonomyPreset } from \"../application-creation/journey.application-creation.schemas\";\nimport {\n AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind,\n AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis,\n AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswerExtent,\n type AssuranceProgramSourceRevision,\n type AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswer,\n} from \"./assurance-program.schemas\";\nimport { ASSURANCE_EVIDENCE_REQUIREMENT_BODIES } from \"./assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions\";\nimport { ASSURANCE_VERIFICATION_REQUIREMENT_BODIES } from \"./assurance-verification-requirement-bodies.definitions\";\nimport { INITIAL_ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_CATALOG } from \"./assurance-objective-catalog.definitions\";\nimport { createInitialAssuranceDocumentAuthorityCatalog } from \"./assurance-document-system.definitions\";\nimport { INITIAL_ASSURANCE_SOURCE_REGISTRY } from \"./assurance-source-registry.definitions\";\nimport { AssuranceSourceUse } from \"./assurance-sources.schemas\";\nimport { resolveAssessmentTwinAnswer } from \"./assurance-assessment-twins\";\nimport { APPLICATION_SIGNING_KEY_PURPOSES } from '@wildo-ai/saas-models';\n\n/**\n * The application's subject-data-export configuration, supplied by the host when authorities are composed, which\n * `capability:subject-data-export` requires. DERIVED, never authored: `deriveSubjectDataExportConfigurationArtifact`\n * (`assurance-host-implementation-artifacts.ts`, #2993) reads it off the resource configurations the application registers.\n */\nexport const SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_HOST_CONFIGURATION_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF = \"implementation-artifact-kind:application.subject-data-export-configuration\";\n/**\n * The review OCCURRENCE record — who reviewed the privileged-access population, when, and what they\n * concluded — supplied by the application as a host artifact (#202).\n *\n * A host artifact rather than something the engine records, because Wildo cannot witness a human\n * review. It can enumerate WHO holds privileged access\n * (`privileged-access-review.backend.utils.ts`); it cannot know that a person looked at that list,\n * nor what they decided. A framework that wrote a review record would be asserting a decision nobody\n * made — the same line the governed-document fact families draw between a derivation and a decision.\n *\n * Note the objective's own caveat, which this ref must not be read as escaping: the record is\n * retained as traceable evidence WITHOUT implying remediation completion. It proves a review\n * happened, never that what it found was fixed.\n */\nexport const PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_HOST_RECORD_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF = \"implementation-artifact-kind:application.privileged-access-review-record\";\n/** Stable semantic capability identity for the review the engine ENUMERATES for and the operator PERFORMS. */\nexport const PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF = \"capability:privileged-access-review\";\n\n/*\n * The scopes at which the engine can enumerate privileged access, DERIVED from the runtime vocabulary\n * it actually branches on rather than transcribed.\n *\n * A deliberate SUBSET of `ResourcePrimaryScope`, and the subset is the honest part: `USER_SELF` and\n * `ANONYMOUS` confer no privileged access, so claiming them would widen the capability to two scopes\n * the enumeration does not — and could not — cover. Written as enum MEMBERS so a rename moves it,\n * which is what the anchoring rule asks for; what it does not ask for is claiming every member of an\n * enum merely because it is closed.\n */\nconst PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_SCOPES = [ResourcePrimaryScope.APPLICATION, ResourcePrimaryScope.ORGANIZATIONS] as const;\n/** Stable semantic capability identity used by host composition to derive only selected proofs. */\nexport const SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF = \"capability:subject-data-export\";\n\nexport const INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_REF = \"assurance-authority-basis:wildo-safe-baseline-v1\";\n/**\n * The COMPATIBILITY GENERATION of this basis: two equal generations promise the same interpretation contract, so a\n * change that alters what a control MEANS advances it and every application re-accepts its programme deliberately\n * (`CLAUDE.md`, the assurance paragraph). An application pins it as `basisRef` + `basisVersion`.\n *\n * - 1: the generation every binding up to #1845 was accepted against.\n * - 2 (#1845): `WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION` also requires `capability:legal-hold` and `capability:audit-events`\n * and demands `evidence-requirement:legal-hold-record`. A programme accepted against 1 bound that objective to the\n * declared retention windows alone; under 2 the objective also claims that a legal hold suspends every deletion path\n * for its scope and that placing, releasing and honouring a hold is recorded.\n * - 2 kept (#2935): `WILDO.AI.MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT` moved to `objectiveVersion` 2 (every model call counted, a declared flow\n * a door) without advancing the generation. The objective version already refuses a programme accepted against\n * version 1: validated against the catalog, its binding is `UNKNOWN_OBJECTIVE` (\"absent from the supplied Wildo\n * objective catalog\"). And no committed programme binds the objective.\n * - 2 kept (#2846): `WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL` moved to `objectiveVersion` 2 (what a coding agent's brief\n * carries from outside the repository is screened or marked) and gained `capability:coding-brief-content-trust`, for\n * the same two reasons: a programme bound to version 1 is `UNKNOWN_OBJECTIVE` against the catalog, and no committed\n * programme binds the objective.\n * - 2 kept (#2990): an obligation may declare `sourceBasis: NONE_BY_DESIGN` for an objective the basis reviews under no\n * source requirement, and the six such bindings now say so. No control's meaning moved: every binding demands what it\n * demanded and every reviewed source requirement is the same row. A v3 programme needs one MECHANICAL addition,\n * `sourceBasis: REVIEWED_SOURCE_REQUIREMENTS` on each existing obligation (the field is required, so the absence of a\n * source can never be read as a default), which restates what the obligation already cited and changes no reading.\n * The change makes REPRESENTABLE an obligation the programme family refused, for objectives the basis already bound\n * under no source, so there is no control decision for an application to re-accept.\n * - 2 kept (#2994, #3008): `WILDO.OPERATIONS.AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT` moved to `objectiveVersion` 2 (an operation's\n * own declared limit records the first refusal of each declared window on MCP tool calls, agent function tools and chat\n * commands, where version 1 said an MCP refusal of it left no row) and gained the declared-policy subject and plane\n * vocabularies and evidence clause C5, for #2935's two reasons: a programme bound to version 1\n * is `UNKNOWN_OBJECTIVE` against the catalog, and no committed programme binds the objective. Measured 2026-10-20:\n * `git grep AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT HEAD -- examples` finds nothing, while the applications' assurance state\n * (`examples/<app>/.wildo-saas/state/assurance`) does name `MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT`, so the search reaches where a binding\n * would be recorded.\n * - 2 kept (#3030): `WILDO.AI.MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT` was AMENDED IN PLACE at `objectiveVersion` 2: its intent, evidence and\n * verification now name the three per-organization unit ceilings (embedding tokens, extraction pages, screening text\n * records) where they said those units were bounded by no limit, and the capability gained the unit vocabulary and the\n * three limit features. In place rather than a version, because no committed programme binds the objective: measured\n * 2026-10-21, a recursive grep for `MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT` under every `examples/<app>/specifications` finds nothing, and the only hits under\n * `examples/<app>/.wildo-saas/state/assurance` are coverage packs, committed in each application's own assurance\n * repository: a coverage pack is a derived report of what the basis maps, not a programme binding the objective.\n * - 2 kept (#2843): `WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT` moved to `objectiveVersion` 2 (an administrator can suspend an agent, and\n * every call to it is refused before its model runs) and gained the suspension vocabularies and evidence clauses C4 and\n * C5, for the same two reasons.\n * - 2 kept (#2949): `WILDO.OPERATIONS.AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT` moved to `objectiveVersion` 3 (the operation's own HTTP\n * route counts the declared policy per signed-in person or machine once authorized and records its refusals, naming\n * `http_route`, and counts anyone else per address, recording nothing) and\n * `WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING` to `objectiveVersion` 2 (a person's reports are bounded per window, and a repeat of an\n * open report answers with it, evidenced by the new clause C8), for #2935's two reasons. Measured 2026-10-20:\n * `git grep 'INCIDENT_HANDLING\\|AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT' HEAD -- examples` finds neither in a committed programme. The\n * capability gained the new plane by derivation from `OperationDispatchPlane`, not by a new vocabulary.\n * - 2 kept (#3328): `WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` moved to `objectiveVersion` 2 (one transactional store per\n * application, the isolation declaration that admitted a second removed), and its expectation, capability, evidence\n * and verification refs were renamed `single-transactional-store`, the capability now derived from\n * `PERSISTENCE_ADAPTER_TRANSACTION_OWNERSHIP`. For #2935's two reasons: a programme bound to version 1 is\n * `UNKNOWN_OBJECTIVE` against the catalog, and no committed programme binds the objective. Measured 2026-11-06:\n * `git grep TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY HEAD -- examples` finds nothing; the only hits under\n * `examples/<app>/.wildo-saas/state/assurance` are measurements, judged runs and snapshots in each application's own\n * assurance repository, which record what was measured then and bind nothing.\n * - 2 kept (#2296): `evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record` now applies to every application, where it\n * applied only to one that had built its own erasure lane. The engine changed, not the demand: since #2296 every\n * application has the core `dataSubjectRequests` resource, which declares the lane, so the text was corrected to what\n * is true. The clauses, their homes and what each measures are unchanged, and the one committed programme binding\n * `WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE` (Wonder Todos', measured 2026-11-09 with `git grep SUBJECT_ERASURE HEAD -- examples`)\n * had a lane before and has the engine's now, so its reading of the demand does not move.\n */\nexport const INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_VERSION = 2;\n/**\n * The implementation artifacts this basis is composed around, by ref: what a programme derived against it ATTESTS\n * (`authorityBases[].attestedArtifactRefs`), and what the published basis's `implementationRevision.artifacts`\n * inventory carries.\n *\n * ## Why the basis inventory is the source of truth, and the programme copies it (#2984)\n *\n * The one consumer of `attestedArtifactRefs` is `validateAssuranceProgramSpecification`, which refuses any attested ref\n * the host's basis inventory does not carry (`UNKNOWN_IMPLEMENTATION_ARTIFACT`). So the inventory is the reference and a\n * programme's attestation is a subset of it, never the other way round. The inventory is also the side that names\n * something real: Framework Knowledge generation composes the shipped basis from the authored\n * `assurance-authority-bases/<basis>/authority-basis.json`, which maps each of these refs to a repository file and fails\n * when one does not resolve. The programme generator used to stamp a stand-in, `source-artifact:wildo-assurance-authority-basis`,\n * that named no file and no inventory carried, so every generated programme was refused on it.\n *\n * Rejected: adding the stand-in to the inventory. It resolves to no file, so the generation path check would have to\n * exempt it, and an attestation that any programme satisfies by quoting one name checks nothing.\n * Rejected: having the host read the shipped basis and pass its inventory to the normalizer. The normalizer already\n * stamps the basis IDENTITY from the constants above rather than from a loaded file, so the artifact refs follow the\n * identity they belong to; a host fact would add a fourth hop through the companion and leave no honest value when\n * the host could not load the file.\n *\n * Only the REFS live here. Where each artifact sits in the repository stays in the authored Framework Knowledge file,\n * because repository locations never enter this contract. Framework Knowledge generation refuses an authored inventory\n * whose refs differ from this list, so the two cannot drift; the committed-programme gate checks the same.\n */\nexport const INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_IMPLEMENTATION_ARTIFACT_REFS = [\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.application-role-contract\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.audit-event-classification-contract\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.audit-event-contract\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.audit-log-service\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.engine-capability-contract\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.subject-export-contract\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.subject-export-orchestrator\",\n \"implementation-artifact:wildo.subject-export-system-access\",\n] as const;\n/** Owner-approved bounded HHS requirement identity; this does not establish HIPAA applicability or conformity. */\nexport const HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REQUIREMENT_REF = \"source-requirement:hipaa-security-privileged-access-review\";\nconst AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-08-03T00:00:00.000Z\";\nconst AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF = \"reviewer:wildo-assurance-authority\";\nconst HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-08-13T08:57:58.000Z\";\nconst HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF = \"reviewer:paul-cayon-assurance-owner\";\n/*\n * The 2026-09-01 mapping tranche — NIST, GDPR and HIPAA, decided by the owner.\n *\n * Stamped with the FRAMEWORK's own authority identity rather than a person's. `reviewer:paul-cayon-assurance-owner` is reserved for entries the owner personally\n * approved (today: the HIPAA privileged-access-review requirement above), and putting a person's ref on a mapping they have not read would be the fabricated review\n * this layer exists to refuse. The review record for these is the COMMIT — `one-source-of-truth.md` Rule 7: the author is the commit author, the instant is the commit\n * time, and independence is enforced by the forge rather than by bespoke code.\n */\nconst MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-01T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche — three objectives the audit trail already attests (attributed then to COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL; since 2026-09-14 to the application's own audit store). */\nconst AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche — objectives selected by CODE-MARKER coverage rather than by reading the catalog. */\nconst PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche — the three most heavily marked objectives that answer \"how much authority, and over which rows\". */\nconst AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/**\n * The 2026-09-17 authenticator-strength tranche (#1247) — what a FACTOR must prove, which no\n * registered source previously governed.\n *\n * The identity objectives were answered by general access-control requirements: whether\n * authentication happens, how authenticators are stored, whether a privileged action re-proves\n * identity. None of them governs the STRENGTH of a factor or the independence of two — the subject of\n * SP 800-63B — so the objectives read as though they covered authentication while the basis made no\n * claim about it.\n */\nconst AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-17T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche — how identity is re-proved, how its policy changes are evidenced, and when access ends. */\nconst IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche — the four privacy objectives a governed privacy notice quotes most directly. */\nconst DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 attribution tranche — what the trail must be able to say about isolation, egress, provisioning and client identity. */\nconst ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 declaration tranche — objectives satisfied by what a schema or config DECLARES, plus the trail that records the declaration changing. */\nconst DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 reachability tranche — objectives whose control is WHICH DOOR exists, and which values it refuses. */\nconst REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche — two objectives whose vocabulary existed and was only in the wrong package or unexported. */\nconst SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche — two objectives whose vocabulary is the SUBSTRATE the control runs against. */\nconst DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche — three objectives whose control is a DISTINCTION INSIDE one classification vocabulary. */\nconst DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/**\n * Which objectives the basis can carry an obligation for, and the expectation refs each one binds.\n *\n * ONE source for a fact two very different callers need. The basis composer below builds its three expectation-authority arrays from this; the compliance-programme\n * generation normalizer (`assurance-program-generation.schemas.ts`) reads it to STAMP an obligation's `implementationExpectationRefs`, `evidenceExpectationRefs` and\n * `verificationExpectationRefs` — all three `.min(1)` on every entry — and to REFUSE an objective that is not here.\n *\n * That refusal is the point. The objective catalog defines 49 objectives and this binds a SUBSET of them; the gap is tracked as #207. Do not quote a count from here\n * or from any prose — count the entries below, because every tranche that lands makes a written number wrong and a written number is what stops the next reader\n * measuring. Without the lookup a producer would be free to invent an expectation ref for any unbound objective, and the\n * result would validate: a programme claiming coverage the framework has never stated a demand for. Deriving the refs instead makes the\n * coverage ceiling mechanical rather than a sentence in an issue (#207).\n *\n * Growing this is FRAMEWORK authoring, not generation — see #207. Each entry says what an objective demands of an application, which is Wildo's decision to make.\n *\n * ## `sourceBasis` — an objective no registered source states (#2990)\n *\n * A binding whose objective the basis reviews under NO source requirement declares\n * `sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN`, and every other binding declares nothing. The\n * declaration is what makes the absence of source rows a DECISION: {@link createInitialAssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis}\n * refuses a binding with no reviewed row that does not declare it (a source mapping someone forgot), and one that\n * declares it while rows exist. A programme obligation for such an objective then declares the same basis and cites no\n * source; the validator accepts that only when the basis it reads reviews the objective under no source.\n */\nexport const ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS = [\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:privileged-access-review\",\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, and the second is what makes the binding honest (#202).\n *\n * `capability:audit-events` was the only one for as long as this objective had no implementation,\n * and on its own it says the wrong thing: audit events are bound to many objectives and record\n * that access CHANGED, never that anyone reviewed who holds it. The review capability is what\n * carries the part Wildo actually supplies — the enumeration — and the host-artifact requirement\n * that names the part it cannot: the occurrence record.\n */\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:privileged-access-review-occurrences\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:privileged-access-review\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:privileged-access-review\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * RISK TREATMENT — the one binding whose evidence is entirely DECLARED, and deliberately so.\n *\n * Nothing here rests on a runtime row. The signals are derived from committed configuration and\n * committed code, the posture is committed configuration, and the register is a committed file\n * whose acceptance IS the commit. So the whole obligation is readable from the repository at any\n * instant, which is what lets an application answer it on the day it is asked rather than after a\n * collection window.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:risk-treatment-declaration\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:risk-treatment-declaration\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:risk-treatment-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:risk-treatment-declaration\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:subject-data-export\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:subject-data-export-receipt\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:subject-data-export\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:subject-data-export\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:subject-erasure\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:subject-erasure\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:subject-erasure-execution\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:subject-erasure\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:subject-erasure\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * ERASURE PROPAGATION — what the erasure REACHED, accounted per store, as distinct from whether the\n * erasure LANE ran. \"Per store\" is bounded: the subject's dependent edges — direct, and every edge\n * below a dependent the erasure deletes, at any depth (#976) — and its registered external effects.\n * Below a dependent whose rows are retained the erasure walks nothing, so nothing there is claimed.\n * `WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE` above evidences intake, withdrawal, schedule and outcome\n * of a request, and its body says outright that it \"never\" evidences that the data is gone; this\n * objective is the per-store reading it deliberately leaves out (#602).\n *\n * TWO capabilities, and either alone is a false claim. `capability:erasure-propagation-report`\n * attests the per-edge and per-external-system accounting, which the engine returns on every erasure\n * whether or not an audit trail exists. `capability:audit-events` attests the durable per-store rows\n * — an erasure forwarded to a system of record, a recipient's erasure outcome — which only exist where the trail does.\n * Without the trail the accounting still operates and the external records cannot be attested, which\n * is exactly what UNDETERMINED means.\n *\n * The per-credential destruction record for a person's own third-party credentials is claimed too\n * (#975): the USERS erasure cascade removes those rows through the raw repository, and the credential\n * resource's cascade removal observer emits one deletion row per credential with the erasure reason —\n * only when the cascade declares itself an erasure, never for an administrator's hard delete of the\n * user. It is an audit row, so it rides `capability:audit-events` like the forwarded-erasure and recipient-outcome rows.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.ERASURE_PROPAGATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:erasure-propagation-accounting\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:erasure-propagation-report\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:erasure-propagation-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:erasure-propagation-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:erasure-propagation-accounting\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:erasure-propagation-accounting\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:security-event-emission\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:security-event-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:security-event-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:security-event-emission\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:security-event-emission\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:authorization-decision-audit\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:authorization-decision-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:authorization-decision-audit\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:authorization-decision-audit\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:multi-factor-authentication\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:multi-factor-authentication\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:multi-factor-enrolment\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:multi-factor-enrolment-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:multi-factor-authentication\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:multi-factor-authentication\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche — see the source-requirement block for the verified implementations ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution\",\n // Two capabilities: the actor VOCABULARY is what C1 declares (a named closed set whose anomaly member is distinct),\n // and the trail is where C3 and C4 count rows. The audit-events capability names event types, never actor kinds.\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-actor-attribution\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:auditable-event-actor-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:auditable-event-actor-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:auditable-event-actor-attribution\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-audit\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * SEGREGATION OF DUTIES — the rung above \"requested and time-bound\" for an act NO CUSTOMER CAN\n * APPROVE.\n *\n * Bound to the audit-events capability alone, deliberately. The refusal itself is a code path with\n * no capability behind it: an application does not switch it on, and there is nothing to declare.\n * What an application must be able to SHOW is the pair of signatures, and that is the trail — read through the\n * grant lifecycle vocabulary (2026-10-05, #2488), whose terminal members C3 counts.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation\",\n // The trail, plus the lifecycle vocabulary C3 discriminates on: the end of an authority is a REVOKED or EXPIRED\n // transition, so the basis names the transition set whole and a member added to it is a basis change, not drift.\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:access-grant-lifecycle\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:second-signature-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:second-signature-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * MAKER-CHECKER on a decision the product holds for review (#2488) — the separation SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES does not\n * state, since that one is an operator act signed by a second administrator.\n *\n * TWO capabilities. `HumanDecision_RefusalReason` is why a human-decision act was refused. Most members are the\n * decision space of the ONE predicate every door asks (`authorizeHumanDecisionActor`): `REQUESTER_MAY_NOT_ACT` is the\n * separation itself, `ELIGIBLE_ROLE_NOT_HELD` the role re-checked at the moment of acting. A few are decided by the\n * door before the predicate is asked: a decision outside the delivery's organization, a granting organization's\n * authentication policy (#2797), an actor whose authority lapsed (#2811). The audit trail is the record: each refusal\n * is a `HUMAN_DECISION_ANSWER_REFUSED` row carrying its `reason`.\n *\n * Bound to what the predicate covers, and the site says so: the decisions the human-decision planes raise, which since\n * #2288 include a person's operation its application declares `requiresApproval` on (the OPERATION_APPROVAL plane: the\n * same predicate, the same refusal row). An operation declared without it is applied at once, and nothing here claims\n * a review of one.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:requester-reviewer-separation\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:pending-decision-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:pending-decision-refusal-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:pending-decision-refusal-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:requester-reviewer-separation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:requester-reviewer-separation\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:credential-state-transition-record\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:credential-state-transition-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:credential-state-transition-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:credential-state-transition-record\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:credential-state-transition-record\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, and that is the point of this entry. The floor is what RETAINS the\n * administrator — a refusal — and the audit trail is what makes a breach visible when an erasure\n * acknowledgement is allowed to strand a scope anyway. Naming only the floor would claim\n * prevention the design deliberately does not always offer; naming only the audit would claim a\n * record of something nothing prevents.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:administrative-continuity-floor\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:administrative-continuity-breach-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:administrative-continuity-breach-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:administrative-continuity-floor\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities since 2026-09-12, and the history is worth keeping because the previous entry\n * was deliberately SHORT.\n *\n * It required `capability:operation-role-authorization` alone and said so explicitly: the half of\n * this control that most deserves an audit row did not produce one. Every\n * `assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling` call site is a custom-impl service, so a\n * `role_ceiling_exceeded` refusal never passed through `runAuthorizationPhase` and the denial\n * funnel never saw it (measured 2026-09-02, filed as #263). Requiring the audit capability then\n * would have made the programme claim a record that was not written.\n *\n * #263 closed: the gate now records through `AuthorizationsBackendService.recordRoleCeilingDenial`\n * — the same chokepoint, with the dedup ladder, the escalation rungs and the loss counters — under\n * `ResourceOperationDenialReason.ROLE_CEILING_EXCEEDED`, carrying the refused roles. So the record\n * exists and the claim is now true. The evidence requirement is added as a SECOND statement ref\n * rather than replacing the declaration one: the control has two halves, a declared ceiling and a\n * recorded refusal, and an application must evidence both.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:operation-role-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:operation-role-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\n \"evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record\",\n \"evidence-requirement:operation-role-declaration\",\n ],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:granted-authority-ceiling\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:scope-confined-query\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:organization-unit-scope-confinement\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:conferring-grant-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:conferring-grant-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:scope-confined-query\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:scope-confined-query\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, for the reason `ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY` has two: the grant machinery is\n * what CONFINES the delegation (PKCE proof-of-possession, exact redirect, a token carrying no\n * more than the grant declared) and the audit trail is what makes each decision READABLE — five\n * distinct events covering approval, refusal, persistence, issuance and a failed exchange.\n * Naming only the exchange would claim a deliberate authorization nobody can review afterwards.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:delegated-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:delegated-authorization-decision-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:delegated-authorization-decision-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:delegated-authorization-exchange\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:step-up-authentication\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:step-up-challenge-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:step-up-challenge-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:high-impact-action-reproof\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * NO new capability, deliberately. This objective's control is not a mechanism an application\n * selects — it is that a change to the authored authentication posture is DETECTED at startup and\n * evidenced once, which the audit trail already does through\n * `APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED`. Minting a second capability identity for the configuration\n * itself would ask an application to select something it cannot decline.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:authentication-posture-change-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:authentication-posture-change-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:authentication-posture-change-detection\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, and the objective's own wording is why: access is \"withdrawn when the\n * relationship conferring them ends, and restoring access is as attributable as removing it.\"\n * The status vocabulary is what WITHDRAWS; the audit trail is what makes the restoration\n * attributable. A withdrawal nobody can see reversed is half the control.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:access-withdrawal-on-conferring-status\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:conferring-relationship-withdrawal\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities. Concealment is what makes a retained row behave as deleted; the audit trail is\n * what makes the destruction DECISION deliberate, attributable and evidenced — and it is also the\n * only door onto a retained row, since the see-through read is audited. Either alone describes\n * half of an objective whose whole subject is destroying data on purpose and on a schedule.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:retained-record-concealment\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:destruction-decision-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:destruction-decision-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:purpose-limited-egress\",\n /*\n * The model boundary joined in #2839: what an agent's model is sent of a personal field is the same question as what\n * leaves for any other recipient, answered by the agent's declared treatment (`PersonalDataGuard` applies it in the\n * tool result path) rather than by the client install policy.\n */\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-personal-data-model-treatment\", \"capability:client-install-identifier-policy\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-model-boundary-personal-data\", \"evidence-requirement:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:purpose-limited-egress\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:purpose-limited-egress\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * THREE capabilities since #1845 (basis generation 2), and each names a different half.\n * `capability:declared-retention-window` is the PERIOD a class declares. `capability:legal-hold` is the EXCEPTION to\n * a period: a hold suspends every deletion path for its scope, and it is not a window, so naming the hold vocabulary\n * under the window capability would have claimed it as one. `capability:audit-events` attests the record a hold\n * leaves: `LEGAL_HOLD_PLACED` / `LEGAL_HOLD_RELEASED` are audit rows, and `legal-hold-record` C1 counts them.\n *\n * Two demands, one per half: `retention-window-declaration` (the windows are declared and enforced) and\n * `legal-hold-record` (placing and releasing a hold is recorded, and every deletion path reports what a hold kept).\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:declared-retention-window\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:declared-retention-window\", \"capability:legal-hold\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:retention-window-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:legal-hold-record\", \"evidence-requirement:retention-window-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:declared-retention-window\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:declared-retention-window\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, and here the audit trail is not merely corroborating — it IS the record. The\n * objective demands a decision recorded \"exactly once and never lost to a race, naming the\n * previous and the resulting value\", which is precisely what `.isAuditEvidence()` on the two\n * consent leaves produces through the single emission point every consent-changing verb routes\n * through. The vocabulary capability says WHAT may be decided; the audit says it was.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:single-consent-emission-point\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:consent-decision-record\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:consent-decision-transition-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:consent-decision-transition-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:single-consent-emission-point\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:single-consent-emission-point\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * CONSENT ENFORCEMENT (#2488) — the half CONSENT_RECORD's body disclaims (\"never that it was honoured\").\n *\n * TWO capabilities. `ConsentGateRefusal` is what a missing consent-gated purpose COSTS — nothing withheld, one\n * operation withheld, or the whole service withheld — and is the vocabulary `assertServiceConsentRequirementMet`\n * branches on through `consentGateCapabilityOwed`. INFORM is named beside the two refusals because the control is\n * that contrast: a declaration that only informs must withhold nothing. The audit trail is the record of a refusal:\n * `RESOURCE_OPERATION_DENIED` with the two consent denial reasons.\n *\n * The browser-provider half has no vocabulary the basis can reach: its decision is made by\n * `consentBasedProviderStopRefusal` in `@wildo-ai/external-connectors-public` and reported only as a diagnostic.\n * Its evidence is therefore the provider modules' own declarations, which the companion projection refuses, and the\n * body states that limit rather than this binding naming a console vocabulary.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_ENFORCEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:consent-gated-processing\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:consent-gate-enforcement\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:consent-gate-refusal-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:consent-gate-refusal-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:consent-gated-processing\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:consent-gated-processing\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * PURPOSE LIMITATION for a secondary use (#2488): exporting a tenant's agent-work decisions as evaluation data.\n *\n * TWO capabilities. `capability:secondary-use-authorization` names the four vocabularies the gate runs against,\n * each WHOLE: the authorization's status (only ACTIVE admits), the basis it names, why an export was refused, and\n * why an exported dataset may no longer be used. The audit trail records every change to the authorization and\n * every refused export; the export ledger, an engine store, carries the marking.\n *\n * Not bound: `EvaluationExportAuthorizationWriteRefusal` (the write rules) and the client-answer helper's private\n * vocabulary live in `saas-backend-lib`, which this package cannot name. Both are invariants over the status\n * transitions named here, and the verification body drives them.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SECONDARY_USE_AUTHORIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:authorized-secondary-use\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:secondary-use-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:secondary-use-authorization-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:secondary-use-authorization-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:authorized-secondary-use\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:authorized-secondary-use\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * LAWFUL BASIS — entirely DECLARED, like risk treatment. The evidence is the operator's committed\n * `operatorComplianceIdentity.lawfulBases`, so the demand is answerable from the repository at any\n * instant. One capability, because nothing at runtime records WHY a purpose is lawful: the\n * declaration is the record.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:lawful-basis-declaration\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:lawful-basis-declaration\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:lawful-basis-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:lawful-basis-declaration\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 attribution tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:caller-derived-tenancy\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:tenancy-derivation-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:tenancy-derivation-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:caller-derived-tenancy\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * NO new capability. This objective is ABOUT the audit trail rather than served by it: a\n * privileged action must be attributable and the authorization effect it had reconstructable\n * from the record itself, and the configuration deciding what the trail captures is governed as\n * part of the trail. There is nothing else for an application to select.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:self-describing-audit-record\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:reconstructable-authorization-effect\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:reconstructable-authorization-effect\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:self-describing-audit-record\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:self-describing-audit-record\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:outbound-call-recording\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:outbound-call-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:outbound-call-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:outbound-call-recording\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:outbound-call-recording\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The audit trail alone, and the reason is the same shape as `SESSION_ASSURANCE`: the control is\n * that the switches conferring directory authority are DECLARED rather than implied, and what\n * makes a declaration attestable is that its before/after values are audit evidence. Configuring\n * `defaultUnitRole` IS granting a role, and flipping `autoDeactivateUsers` off silently strands\n * access — both are reconstructable from the trail and from nowhere else.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:declared-directory-authority\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:directory-authority-switch-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:directory-authority-switch-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:declared-directory-authority\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:declared-directory-authority\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities: the provenance vocabulary says WHAT a client's identity rests on, and the\n * audit trail carries the objective's second half — that a client created by a party which\n * authenticated to nothing, and every refused assertion, are both recorded.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:verifiable-client-identity\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:client-registration-provenance\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:client-registration-provenance-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:client-registration-provenance-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:verifiable-client-identity\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:verifiable-client-identity\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 declaration tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:operation-serviceability\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:operation-implementation-coverage\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:operation-serviceability-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:operation-serviceability-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:operation-serviceability\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:operation-serviceability\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities — the mechanism AND its record. The second half arrived with #506.\n *\n * The mechanism is real and fail-closed: the upload handler awaits `initiateScan`, which awaits the\n * UPLOADED -> SCANNING transition before the pipeline fires, so a file on a `scanPolicy: 'required'`\n * field is already non-downloadable when the caller is told the upload succeeded (#433).\n *\n * The RECORD is now real too. `FileScanningBackendService` emits `FILE_MALWARE_DETECTED` when a\n * scanner concludes an infection and `FILE_MALWARE_SCAN_FAILED` when the scan could not run — two\n * events rather than one severity, because an infection means the control WORKED and a failure\n * means it did not RUN, and from outside they are indistinguishable (the file is non-downloadable\n * either way). Both are emitted after the terminal transition and carry the status the RECORD\n * holds, so the trail cannot describe a state the row does not.\n *\n * This binding previously named ONE capability with the absence stated at the site, because\n * binding `capability:audit-events` over an unwritten record would have made every programme\n * assert a record that is not written — the same reason `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE` binds\n * narrower. That reason is now discharged rather than waived.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:ingested-content-inspection\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:ingested-content-inspection\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:ingested-content-inspection\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:ingested-content-inspection\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:ingested-content-inspection\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:ingested-content-inspection\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * v2 (#3328): one transactional store per application, with no isolation declaration admitting a second. Every ref\n * was renamed with the mechanism (`declared-persistence-isolation` → `single-transactional-store`), because the old\n * names described a declaration that no longer exists.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:single-transactional-store\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:single-transactional-store\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:single-transactional-store\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:single-transactional-store\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:single-transactional-store\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:single-transactional-store\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * APPROVAL BEFORE PRESENTATION (#2538) — the governed-document approval gate, armed at Gate 3.\n *\n * TWO capabilities. `capability:governed-document-approval-gate` names the switch and the approval state it reads,\n * each WHOLE: UNARMED beside ARMED and UNAPPROVED beside APPROVED, because the control is those contrasts. The audit\n * trail is the record of what a person met: every GOVERNED_DOCUMENT_INTERACTION_RECORDED row names the approval state\n * of the release, so with the gate armed an UNAPPROVED row is a person who met a document nobody approved.\n *\n * No source requirement. None of the registered sources states that a legally binding document is approved before a\n * person is shown it or asked to accept it, and a mapping to the nearest text would assert a correspondence nobody\n * reviewed — the reason `BILLING.USAGE_REPORTING` and `NETWORK.OUTBOUND_TARGET_CONTROL` carry none either.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DOCUMENTS.APPROVAL_BEFORE_PRESENTATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:approval-before-presentation\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:governed-document-approval-gate\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:governed-document-presentation-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:governed-document-presentation-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:approval-before-presentation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:approval-before-presentation\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:personal-data-field-inventory\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:personal-data-field-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:personal-data-field-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:declared-personal-data-categories\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:provider-selection-opt-in\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:selected-processor-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:selected-processor-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:provider-selection-opt-in\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The AI half of third-party processing (#1564). `WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING` makes every\n * processor opt-in and names it; this objective asks what each AI component is FOR, which only the\n * declared use posture says. One capability: the declared posture over the AI capability vocabulary.\n * The processor register it also reads is an application specification, not an engine capability.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:declared-ai-component-use\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:ai-use-posture-declaration\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:third-party-ai-component-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:third-party-ai-component-declaration\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, the shape of `INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION`, which this is the AI-input twin of (#2292). The\n * screening vocabulary is what decides whether third-party content reaches the model; the audit trail is what makes a\n * withholding EVIDENCED, and the objective names the record. Either alone is a false claim: a screening nobody can\n * show happened, or a record of a decision no vocabulary bounds.\n *\n * Application governance scope (the catalog says why). Applicable to EVERY application, classifier selected or not:\n * the refusal of a turn that would bring a screening agent third-party content where nothing can screen is the\n * control operating, and it operates exactly when no classifier is selected.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_SCREENING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-untrusted-content-screening\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-untrusted-content-screening\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-untrusted-content-screening-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-untrusted-content-screening-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-untrusted-content-screening\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-untrusted-content-screening\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The output twin (#2292 Phase 3), on the same two halves for the same reason: the moderation vocabulary bounds WHAT\n * is judged (the four kinds of output, the harm categories and their ordered severities) and what the judgement can\n * conclude; the audit trail records each withholding. Applicable to every application, like the screening.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OUTPUT_MODERATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-output-moderation\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-output-moderation\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-output-moderation-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-output-moderation-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-output-moderation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-output-moderation\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The use DOMAIN of each AI use (#2838). One capability, the closed domain vocabulary the regulatory class is derived\n * from. No audit capability: the evidence is the committed declaration and the agents that run, not an audit row.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:declared-ai-use-domain\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:ai-use-domain-classification\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:ai-use-classification-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:ai-use-classification-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:ai-use-classification-declaration\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:ai-use-classification-declaration\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * What an agent's tools may do (#2839). One capability: the authority vocabulary every tool declares, which is what the\n * DECLARED evidence reads. No audit capability: a refused tool dispatch is recorded by the authorizer's own denial\n * funnel, which `WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT` already claims.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-tool-authority-confinement\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-tool-authority-declaration\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-tool-authority-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-tool-authority-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-tool-authority-confinement\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-tool-authority-confinement\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * People in front of what an agent does (#2839, version 2 #2843). TWO capabilities, the `INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION`\n * shape: the oversight vocabulary that decides WHO decides and which record suspends an agent, and the audit trail that\n * makes each decision, each suspension and each refused call EVIDENCED.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-human-oversight\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-human-oversight\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-human-oversight-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-human-oversight-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-human-oversight\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-human-oversight\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * What an organization's agents may spend (#2844, widened by #2935 and #3030). TWO capabilities: the spend-limit\n * vocabulary (the limits a plan grants: the generation allowance, the person ceiling and the three unit ceilings; the\n * doors that pay, the doors a person's ceiling counts and the door asked before each call, the units, the limit that\n * refused and why), and the audit trail that records refusals (`MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT_REFUSED`, written by the budget gate\n * itself: one row per refusal at every door and at a flow's step, and, for a unit-ceiling refusal of a call made in no\n * door, one row per organization, unit, reason and period in each process).\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:model-spend-limit\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:model-spend-limit\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:model-spend-limit-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:model-spend-limit-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:model-spend-limit\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:model-spend-limit\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * What an agent call did (#2841). ONE capability, the record's own vocabularies. No `capability:audit-events`: the\n * evidence is the engine's own store, read for a window through its door; the guardrails' audit rows are the\n * screening and moderation objectives' evidence, and claiming them here would count one row twice.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-operation-record\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-operation-record\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-operation-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-operation-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-operation-record\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-operation-record\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a person reported about an agent's reply, and how it was handled (#2842). TWO capabilities: the report's own\n * vocabularies (what a report says, how it moves and how it ends), and the audit trail, which records each step of\n * every report (received, triaged, closed) and is how the operator reads reports across organizations.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:agent-behavior-reports\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:agent-behavior-reports\", \"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:agent-behavior-reports\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:agent-behavior-reports\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:agent-behavior-reports\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:agent-behavior-reports\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities. `UserStatus` is the vocabulary that decides whether a principal may\n * authenticate at all; the audit trail is what makes the change EVIDENCED, which the objective\n * demands by name. The status also carries `.excludeFromUpdate()`, so the change cannot arrive\n * as a side effect of an unrelated write — a guard the vocabulary alone does not express.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:authentication-eligibility-status\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:authentication-eligibility-change-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:authentication-eligibility-change-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:guarded-authentication-eligibility\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:collection-export-recording\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:collection-export-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:collection-export-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:collection-export-recording\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:collection-export-recording\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:record-context-preservation\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:record-context-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:record-context-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:record-context-preservation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:record-context-preservation\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The audit trail alone, because the objective's exception is where its content lives: backend-only\n * material does not cross the client boundary EXCEPT at a single first exposure that is itself\n * audited. For SCHEMA-declared material the non-crossing half is a DTO-selection property with no vocabulary to\n * attest; the audited exception is the part a programme can carry.\n *\n * One neighbouring door DOES have a vocabulary, and it is deliberately not bound here (#2488):\n * `FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal` names why a provider's public configuration was refused before it reached\n * a browser (`SECRET_KEY`, a served value matching a secret, …). That material is declared backend-only by a\n * provider's SECRET CONTRACT, not by a schema, so it sits outside this objective's intent; binding it would widen\n * what the objective means rather than evidence it.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:audited-first-exposure\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:first-exposure-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:first-exposure-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:audited-first-exposure\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:audited-first-exposure\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 reachability tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n /*\n * TWO capabilities, and together they are the whole control. The VARIANT decides whether a door\n * faces a client at all; the ROLE GATE decides who may open the ones that do. `credit-pool TOP_UP`\n * was once an API_CALL gated on ORG_OWNER — a tenant owner could self-grant unlimited credits —\n * and the fix was to move it to INTERNAL_CALL, which is a reachability decision the role gate\n * alone cannot express.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:operation-reachability-gate\", \"capability:operation-role-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:credit-grant-reachability-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:credit-grant-reachability-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:system-gated-credit-grant\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The same pair, for the same reason: `ScopeFeatures` writes cannot be field-protected, because\n * the super-admin path must write them — so the ENTIRE self-grant boundary for paid entitlements\n * is one role gate on operations that stay non-client-reachable.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:operation-reachability-gate\", \"capability:operation-role-authorization\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:operator-gated-entitlement-write\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The sweep that LIFTS a time-boxed restriction, bound to the two status vocabularies it moves\n * between — a suspended user and a suspended membership. It reuses\n * `capability:authentication-eligibility-status` rather than minting a third: the statuses being\n * released are the same ones `IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE` attests being set, and two capability identities\n * for one vocabulary is what an application would have to select twice.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:authentication-eligibility-status\", \"capability:membership-eligibility-status\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:restriction-release-schedule\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:restriction-release-schedule\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:time-boxed-restriction-release\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:constrained-redirect-target\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:redirect-target-constraint\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:redirect-target-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:redirect-target-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:constrained-redirect-target\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:constrained-redirect-target\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:server-authored-token-claims\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:reserved-token-claim-authorship\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:reserved-claim-set-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:reserved-claim-set-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:server-authored-token-claims\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:server-authored-token-claims\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:startup-configuration-validation\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:field-authority-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:field-authority-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:boot-proven-field-authority\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * How the application's code was produced (#2845, widened by #2846). FOUR capabilities, because the claim has four\n * halves and any one alone is false: the session confinement (ceiling, the agent's measured escalation, the admitted\n * environments) says what an agent may do; the vendor declaration says who receives the source; the brief's content\n * trust says what the agent was shown and whether third-party text in it was screened; the accepted-change\n * attribution says who accepted the result. No audit capability: no coding run writes an audit row, and the record of\n * who accepted a change is the application's own git history, read by the DECLARED collector (C3).\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:ai-produced-change-control\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:accepted-change-attribution\", \"capability:coding-agent-session-confinement\", \"capability:coding-agent-vendor-declaration\", \"capability:coding-brief-content-trust\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:ai-produced-change-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:ai-produced-change-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:ai-produced-change-control\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:ai-produced-change-control\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:declared-uniqueness-verification\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:uniqueness-verification-outcome\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:uniqueness-verification-outcome\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:datastore-proven-uniqueness\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:self-reported-lifecycle-stage\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:lifecycle-stage-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:lifecycle-stage-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:stage-confers-no-capability\"],\n },\n /* ── 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:diagnosable-refusal\",\n // Two vocabularies, one per refusal surface. A thrown refusal carries an `ErrorType`; the inbound delivery door\n // ANSWERS rather than throws, and records which refusal it was in `InboundDeliveryRejectionReason` — the only\n // place a missing verification secret (a degradation) is told apart from a bad signature (a rejection), since\n // both answer the sender identically.\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:inbound-delivery-refusal-classification\", \"capability:refusal-classification\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:refusal-classification-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:refusal-classification-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:diagnosable-refusal\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:diagnosable-refusal\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:refusal-classification\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:over-limit-refusal-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:over-limit-refusal-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:bounded-unauthenticated-request\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * How fast an authenticated caller from outside the application may drive work (#2936, version 2 #2994). TWO\n * capabilities: the two limiters' own vocabularies (whom each counts), and the audit trail, which holds the\n * `EXTERNAL_TURN_RATE_LIMITED` row the throttle writes for the first refusal of each window and the\n * `OPERATION_RATE_LIMIT_REFUSED` row an operation's declared limit writes for each of its declared windows.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 3 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:authenticated-burst-limit\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\", \"capability:authenticated-burst-limit\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:authenticated-burst-limit-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:authenticated-burst-limit-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:authenticated-burst-limit\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:authenticated-burst-limit\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:named-constraint-conflict\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:refusal-classification\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:constraint-conflict-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:constraint-conflict-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:named-constraint-conflict\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:named-constraint-conflict\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:verifiable-key-retirement\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:key-retirement-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:key-retirement-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:bounded-retired-signing-key\"],\n },\n {\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:values-free-secret-contract\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:values-free-secret-contract\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:secret-contract-shape-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:secret-contract-shape-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:values-free-secret-contract\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:values-free-secret-contract\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The FORTY-NINTH, and the only one that needed the engine to grow a control rather than the\n * basis to find a vocabulary.\n *\n * Five candidate vocabularies were checked and eliminated by measurement: `SessionType` (the\n * eviction does not consult it), a revocation-reason enum (none existed in `saas-models`), the\n * configured axis (user type — an application-defined open string), and the ordering itself (an\n * ordering is not a set). What was actually missing was EVIDENCE: the eviction enforcing the cap\n * left only a debug line, so a security-relevant token-lifecycle act had no durable record at\n * all — which `CLAUDE.md`'s assurance-by-construction rule asks for by name.\n *\n * `CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SESSION_EVICTED` closes it, and the binding is honest because the\n * record carries `evictedIssuedAt`. The objective calls the FIFO ordering \"the property that\n * pushes a stolen chain out instead of a legitimate one\"; a record naming only the victim would\n * prove a session ended without proving the right one did. Naming when the retired chain was\n * issued is what makes the ordering reviewable from the trail rather than merely implemented.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:audit-events\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:session-eviction-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:session-eviction-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:bounded-concurrent-sessions\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The grant AXIS is the claim, not the table name. `RuntimePrincipalDatabaseGrantAxis` is the privilege\n * vocabulary both self-managed adapters translate, and the audit trail's place on the APPEND axis — with\n * a declaration that would put it on WRITE refused at parse and again at derivation — is what makes a\n * named principal unable to alter what it recorded.\n *\n * NO audit capability: a refused declaration is a configuration error at startup, not an audited act.\n * And the scope is stated in the intent rather than implied by the binding: the application backend owns\n * its database on every adapter, so its immutability is application-layer only.\n *\n * Second demand `tamper-evident-audit-store-account` (#298): the account the application writes its\n * TAMPER-EVIDENT store (immudb) with. The intent's exclusion is the backend's OWN database; immudb is a store the\n * platform provisions and the backend does not own, where the platform issues each application a confined\n * credential (#1696) — the per-principal credential the intent is about, on the one append-only store the backend\n * writes. Its evidence is the provider's own report through the compliance-state door, so the binding gains no\n * capability: the door answers in every application, and one declaring no such provider has an empty population.\n * No dogfood programme states this objective, so the authority basis generation does not advance.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.TAMPER_RESISTANCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:runtime-principal-grant-axes\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:runtime-principal-audit-grant-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:runtime-principal-audit-grant-declaration\", \"evidence-requirement:tamper-evident-audit-store-account\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * The durable record is the RUN OUTPUT, not an audit row: a repair is a subscription or invoice UPDATE\n * below the automatic audit floor. So the binding names the divergence vocabularies the recorded output\n * is total over, and no audit capability.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.BILLING.PROVIDER_RECONCILIATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:provider-billing-reconciliation\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:billing-reconciliation-divergence-accounting\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:billing-reconciliation-run-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:billing-reconciliation-run-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:provider-billing-reconciliation\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:provider-billing-reconciliation\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * `UsageRecordFlushState` is the vocabulary the flush branches on, and all three members carry the\n * claim: PENDING is retried, REPORTED means the provider accepted it, UNREPORTABLE means no money moved.\n * No audit event exists for a flush — the recorded run output is the evidence.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.BILLING.USAGE_REPORTING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:metered-usage-reporting\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:metered-usage-flush-state\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:usage-flush-run-record\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:usage-flush-run-record\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:metered-usage-reporting\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:metered-usage-reporting\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * NARROW, deliberately: no audit capability. Only two classes record a refusal (the MCP client and CIMD);\n * a refused webhook, SIEM, federated-IdP or push request is reported to its caller and logged, not written\n * as an audit row. Binding the trail would assert a record most classes do not write.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.NETWORK.OUTBOUND_TARGET_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:admitted-outbound-target\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:outbound-target-admission\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:outbound-target-admission-declaration\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:outbound-target-admission-declaration\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:admitted-outbound-target\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:admitted-outbound-target\"],\n },\n {\n /*\n * #3022. No audit capability, deliberately: every refusal is a startup, load or CLI refusal, and a misconfigured\n * application does not start, so there is no row to count. The committed configuration is the evidence (C1, derived\n * by the doors' own reader), and the refusals are driven (C2). NONE_BY_DESIGN: no reviewed source requirement is\n * mapped to it yet.\n */\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.CREDENTIAL_SCOPING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n sourceBasis: AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN,\n implementationExpectationRef: \"implementation-expectation:module-scoped-credential-release\",\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [\"capability:module-scoped-credential-release\"],\n evidenceExpectationRef: \"evidence-expectation:credential-scoping-refusal\",\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [\"evidence-requirement:credential-scoping-refusal\"],\n verificationExpectationRef: \"verification-expectation:module-scoped-credential-release\",\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [\"verification-requirement:module-scoped-credential-release\"],\n },\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * Every capability the basis can attest, minus the implementation revision the composer supplies.\n *\n * ONE source, for the same reason as {@link ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS}. The composer below turns these into `capabilityAuthorityDescriptors`; the\n * compliance-programme normalizer reads them to emit the `capabilityAuthorities` a programme must carry for every capability its implementation decisions select —\n * the family refuses a selection with no declared authority (`UNKNOWN_CAPABILITY`).\n *\n * `implementationRevision` is deliberately absent: it identifies the engine build being attested and is only known to the composer's caller.\n */\n/**\n * Which ENGINE CAPABILITY an authentication method's delivery channel depends on, or `null` when the\n * engine verifies it unaided.\n *\n * This exists so the three multi-factor capability entries below can be DERIVED from the factor\n * vocabulary rather than transcribing its members (#1247) — the rule the audit-event capability\n * adopted on 2026-09-14, and the reason `pnpm assurance:uncovered-surface` reports TRANSCRIPTION_DRIFT.\n * It is `Record<AuthMethod, …>` and therefore TOTAL: a method added to the vocabulary tomorrow is a\n * compile error here, where the procurement question has to be answered, instead of being silently\n * omitted from a hand-kept list.\n *\n * It answers ONE question — what must an application have BOUGHT for this method to work at all — and\n * deliberately not the two it is easy to conflate with:\n * - WHERE a method may sit (first factor, second, either) is `AUTH_METHOD_FACTOR_MAP`;\n * - HOW STRONG it is as a second factor is `isStrongSecondFactor`, which reads the proof CHANNEL.\n * `SMS_OTP` is procurement-dependent AND restricted; `EMAIL_OTP` is procurement-dependent AND weak;\n * `MAGIC_LINK` is procurement-dependent and is not a second factor at all. Three independent facts,\n * and the defect #1247 fixed was one field being read as though it carried all of them.\n */\nexport const AUTH_METHOD_DELIVERY_ENGINE_CAPABILITY: Record<AuthMethod, EngineCapability | null> = {\n // Engine-native: verified from material the engine itself holds, with no provider in the path.\n [AuthMethod.PASSWORD]: null,\n [AuthMethod.TOTP]: null,\n [AuthMethod.PASSKEY]: null,\n // Federated: the IDENTITY PROVIDER is the application's own configuration, never an engine\n // capability it buys — so there is nothing to procure and these are `null` rather than absent.\n [AuthMethod.EXTERNAL_OAUTH2]: null,\n [AuthMethod.ORG_SAML]: null,\n [AuthMethod.ORG_OPENID_CONNECT]: null,\n // Delivered to the person over a channel the application must have bought.\n [AuthMethod.SMS_OTP]: EngineCapability.SMS,\n [AuthMethod.EMAIL_OTP]: EngineCapability.EMAIL_TRANSACTIONAL,\n [AuthMethod.MAGIC_LINK]: EngineCapability.EMAIL_TRANSACTIONAL,\n};\n\n/**\n * The second factors the engine can verify, partitioned by what an application must have procured.\n *\n * Derived from `AuthUtils.getSecondFactorMethods()`, which is itself total over\n * `AUTH_METHOD_FACTOR_MAP` — so a second factor added to the engine belongs to exactly one of the\n * three multi-factor capability entries below, computably.\n *\n * ## Why the entries still WRITE their members out, when this function could have produced them\n *\n * `pnpm assurance:uncovered-surface` reads this file as TEXT. Its parser understands exactly two\n * shapes — a literal `` `prefix:${Enum.MEMBER}` ``, and `Object.values(Enum)…` meaning every member —\n * and a call to this function is neither. Measured: replacing the three literal arrays with calls took\n * the `auth-method` surface from 5 of 9 covered to 3, not because the basis said less but because the\n * one instrument that measures it went blind. A derivation nothing can read is less verifiable than a\n * transcription, not more.\n *\n * `Object.values(AuthMethod)` is not the escape either: the parser reads it as EVERY member, and these\n * capabilities cover a subset, so it would report 9 of 9 falsely — a green worse than the gap.\n *\n * So the refs are literal and the drift risk is closed by a PIN instead: the `partitions the engine's\n * second-factor vocabulary…` test in `assurance-authority-basis.schemas.test.ts` asserts the three\n * arrays are exactly this partition. Add a second factor to `AUTH_METHOD_FACTOR_MAP` and that test\n * fails naming it, which is where the procurement question belongs.\n */\nexport const secondFactorMethodsRequiring = (capability: EngineCapability | null): string[] =>\n AuthUtils.getSecondFactorMethods()\n .filter((method) => AUTH_METHOD_DELIVERY_ENGINE_CAPABILITY[method] === capability)\n .sort()\n .map((method) => `auth-method:${method}`);\n\nexport const ASSURANCE_CAPABILITY_AUTHORITIES = [\n {\n /*\n * Ingested-content inspection, anchored on the vocabulary the engine BRANCHES on.\n *\n * `FileStatus` is derived whole, deliberately: the members that are not the good outcome —\n * `INFECTED`, `QUARANTINED`, `FAILED` — are the substance of the claim, not its exceptions. Naming\n * only `CLEAN` would describe a system in which inspection never concludes anything else.\n *\n * It is the right vocabulary because the engine reads it for BOTH halves of the control: the scan\n * outcome (`FILE_STATUS_TRANSITIONS` maps SCANNING -> CLEAN | INFECTED | FAILED, and INFECTED ->\n * QUARANTINED) and servability (`FILE_DOWNLOADABLE_STATUSES`). A scan that concluded and a file that\n * may be served are the same decision expressed once.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the status vocabulary and the transition guard exist in every application. What\n * is operator-configured is whether a scanner is reachable (`InfraCapability.ANTIVIRUS_SCANNING`,\n * fulfilled by ClamAV, with YARA optional beside it) and whether a field declares `scanPolicy:\n * 'required'`. Exactly two axes, and that stayed accurate through the 2026-09-09 repair of the\n * application-wide switch: reachability IS the application-wide opt-in — `shouldScan` falls back to\n * `clamavScanner.isConfigured() || yaraScanner.isEnabled()` for a field that declares no policy — so\n * the first axis now carries a second consequence rather than a third axis being added. Before that\n * repair the fallback read a configuration path no schema declares and answered `false` in every\n * application, which is why this prose has never named a global flag. Deriving keeps the count at two;\n * a separately-declared boolean would have made it three, one of them able to disagree with the other.\n * NOT `REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY`: the engine slot that once spelled this was removed\n * in #292 because no provider token could fill it, so requiring it would make the objective\n * uncomposable for every application.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:ingested-content-inspection\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(FileStatus).sort().map((status) => `file-status:${status}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The application's OWN audit store (Layer 1), which every application has.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, and until 2026-09-14 it was not: this capability required\n * `EngineCapability.COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL`, a gate that arrived in `fc9dd93b` with no stated reason. That engine\n * capability is the Layer-2 provider FAN-OUT (`EngineCapabilityResolutionMode.FAN_OUT`) — its own documentation\n * says security events \"are recorded in the application's own database regardless\", and\n * `CompositeAuditLogSink` calls itself \"NOT the authoritative store\". No evidence or verification body demands\n * Layer-2 delivery; the security-event body says outright that it \"does not prove delivery to a Layer-2 sink\".\n *\n * The gate made the derivation contradict the evidence. On Wonder CRM, which does not enable the fan-out, it\n * derived 16 objectives NOT_APPLICABLE and 11 UNDETERMINED, while the application audit door returned 1,096\n * rows and the emitted-evidence collector recorded 48 measurements from them (#302, #297). #302's own\n * recollection read the control as operating at Layer 1 and still had to record `not_applicable_as_configured`.\n * A verdict that says \"there is nothing here to claim\" beside rows that exist is the over-claim's mirror image,\n * and it let an application escape every audit-attested objective by leaving an optional provider unconfigured.\n *\n * So an absent fan-out removes nothing an objective demands. Should a demand ever require EXTERNAL delivery or a\n * provider-backed tamper-evident destination, that is a separate capability requiring the engine capability,\n * bound only where it is demanded — never a condition on reading the store every application writes.\n *\n * The implementation refs are the engine's core event vocabulary derived WHOLE, because each member is a\n * literal-typed event class the store records. A member being listed does not claim it is EMITTED: an\n * `audit-event-unemitted` marker and each body's emitter check decide that, per member.\n */\n // Version 2 (2026-09-14): availability and implementation refs changed, so a programme accepted against version 1\n // is refused as a version mismatch rather than as an unexplained implementation difference.\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:audit-events\", capabilityVersion: 2 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(CoreAuditableEventType).sort().map((eventType) => `audit-event-type:${eventType}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * WHO an audited action is attributed to, as a closed vocabulary (#2488).\n *\n * `WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION`'s C1 is a DECLARED clause — \"the sentinel vocabulary as a named closed set\" — and a\n * declared clause is answered by what the basis names. Until 2026-10-05 the objective bound only\n * `capability:audit-events`, whose refs are event TYPES, so the set C1 asks about was named nowhere: a member added\n * to it, or the anomaly member merged into an ordinary one, changed no basis and was seen by nothing.\n *\n * Every member is named, the routine ones beside the anomaly, because the control is the CONTRAST: `UNATTRIBUTED`\n * (a principal was expected and could not be resolved) means something only against `SYSTEM` and\n * `UNAUTHENTICATED`, which are ordinary.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:audit-actor-attribution\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(AuditActorKind).map((kind) => `audit-actor-kind:${kind}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The steps of an access grant's life, as the trail records them (#2488).\n *\n * One vocabulary for both grant kinds: the per-tenant crossing grant and the application-wide two-person grant\n * write the same `PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE` event with a `transition` from this enum.\n * `WILDO.ACCESS.SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES`'s C3 counts the TERMINAL members (`REVOKED`, `EXPIRED`), so the set it\n * discriminates on is now named whole by the basis rather than only inside one clause's match.\n *\n * Naming the set claims nothing about any grant: that a transition EXISTS is not that it was recorded. The\n * clause's count decides the latter.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:access-grant-lifecycle\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(PlatformAccessGrantLifecycleTransition).map((transition) => `access-grant-transition:${transition}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Why a pending-decision act was refused (#2488), named WHOLE.\n *\n * `REQUESTER_MAY_NOT_ACT` is the separation `WILDO.ACCESS.REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION` states and the member its\n * C1 counts. The other members are the rest of the predicate's decision space, plus the refusals the door decides\n * before asking it (the delivery's organization, a granting organization's policy, an actor whose authority lapsed),\n * named so that a member added to either is a basis change. Always available: the predicate is engine code every\n * human-decision plane asks, with nothing to enable. Naming the set claims no refusal happened.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:pending-decision-authorization\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(HumanDecision_RefusalReason).map((reason) => `human-decision-refusal-reason:${reason}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a missing consent-gated purpose costs a person (#2488): nothing withheld (INFORM), the declaring operation\n * withheld, or the whole service withheld. Named WHOLE, INFORM included, because the enforcement is the contrast\n * between the members. Always available: an application that declares no requirement simply withholds nothing.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:consent-gate-enforcement\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ConsentGateRefusal).map((refusal) => `consent-gate-refusal:${refusal}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The governed-document approval gate (#2538) and the approval state it reads, each named WHOLE: the switch's two\n * positions, and the two states a release can be in. Always available: the gate is engine code every serving and\n * asking surface reads, and whether an application ARMED it is a declaration its evidence reads, not a capability\n * it enables. Naming the set claims nothing was withheld.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:governed-document-approval-gate\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(GovernedDocumentApprovalGate).map((position) => `governed-document-approval-gate:${position}`),\n ...Object.values(GovernedDocumentReleaseApprovalState).map((state) => `governed-document-release-approval-state:${state}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The gate on a secondary use of a tenant's agent-work decisions (#2488), as four vocabularies named WHOLE: the\n * authorization's status (only ACTIVE admits an export; NOT_GRANTED and REVOKED are the two ways of not holding\n * one), the basis it names, why an export was refused, and why an exported dataset may no longer be used. Always\n * available: an application that never exports simply holds no authorization.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:secondary-use-authorization\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(EvaluationExportAuthorizationStatus).map((status) => `evaluation-export-authorization-status:${status}`),\n ...Object.values(EvaluationExportBasis).map((basis) => `evaluation-export-basis:${basis}`),\n ...Object.values(EvaluationDatasetExportRefusalReason).map((reason) => `evaluation-dataset-export-refusal-reason:${reason}`),\n ...Object.values(EvaluationDatasetInvalidationReason).map((reason) => `evaluation-dataset-invalidation-reason:${reason}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Privileged-access review: the engine ENUMERATES, the operator DECIDES and RECORDS (#202).\n *\n * `ALWAYS_AVAILABLE` because the enumeration needs no engine capability to be switched on — roles\n * and memberships exist in every application, and `enumeratePrivilegedAccessPopulation` reads\n * them through the ordinary repositories.\n *\n * The host-artifact requirement is the whole point of the split: without it this capability would\n * read as \"Wildo reviews privileged access\", which is false and is the claim the objective's four\n * demands would then be quoted against. With it, an application that binds this objective must\n * declare where its review occurrences live, and one that cannot produce them fails to satisfy the\n * capability rather than silently claiming it.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF, capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_SCOPES].map((scope) => `privileged-access-scope:${scope}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_HOST_RECORD_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n identity: { capabilityRef: SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF, capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(SubjectExportPurpose).sort().map((purpose) => `subject-export-purpose:${purpose}`),\n profiles: [\n {\n profileRef: \"capability-profile:subject-data-export-safe-baseline-v1\",\n parameters: [{ parameterRef: \"parameter:export-format\", allowedOptionRefs: [\"option:json-machine-readable\"] }],\n },\n ],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_HOST_CONFIGURATION_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Erasure that RETAINS where the law requires it. `implementationRefs` name the two modes a resource may declare, so the capability is anchored to vocabulary the\n * engine actually branches on rather than to prose — the same discipline as `subject-export-purpose:` above. Since #1635 they also name the statutory\n * GROUND a resource may declare (`retentionPolicy.statutoryRetention`), on which an erasure keeps a business record restricted until its period ends,\n * or leaves it in use where the resource declares why (`staysInUseBecause`).\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:subject-erasure\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(ErasureRetentionMode).sort().map((mode) => `erasure-retention-mode:${mode}`),\n ...Object.values(StatutoryRetentionGround).sort().map((ground) => `statutory-retention-ground:${ground}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The per-store ACCOUNTING a subject erasure returns, named by the two vocabularies its receipt is\n * written in. `SubjectErasureDisposition` is what each dependent edge the erasure walks — direct, or below a\n * dependent it deletes (#976) — was classified as before anything ran; `SubjectErasureExternalEffectStatus` is what each registered\n * external effect answered. They are separate enums on purpose — a local edge commits with the\n * transaction and an external effect cannot — so they are named side by side rather than folded into one prefix.\n *\n * Both derived WHOLE, including the members that are not the good outcome: `UNCLASSIFIED` and\n * `UNSUPPORTED_DEFERRED` (an edge at any walked depth nobody classified, or one that would defer its teardown\n * to a queue, on which the orchestrator REFUSES before any write rather than guessing), and every status\n * that `isIncompleteSubjectErasureExternalEffect` reads as data still live at a third party.\n * `RESTRICTED_BY_DECLARATION` (#1123) is a leave-alone edge whose parent may not be deleted while its\n * rows exist; below a dependent the erasure deletes, such an edge with rows REFUSES the erasure. The claim\n * is that those outcomes surface as themselves at every depth the erasure walks — refused before any\n * write, or reported — and naming only the complete ones would describe an erasure that never meets a\n * store it cannot finish. Since #976 a descendant edge below a deleted dependent is classified by the\n * same classifier and reported in `descendantEdges`, so the dispositions are those of every walked edge.\n *\n * `ProviderCredentialDeletionReason.USER_ERASED` is anchored MEMBER-level, deliberately: it is the\n * reason the credential destruction record carries when an ERASURE destroyed the credential (#975).\n * The vocabulary's other members are revocations and a tenant purge — other controls' reasons — so\n * deriving the enum whole here would claim them for erasure propagation.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the report is the return value of every erasure. What an application decides is\n * whether it RETAINS that receipt — the engine persists none of it — which is why the evidence body\n * homes it on the application's own record.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:erasure-propagation-report\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(SubjectErasureDisposition).map((disposition) => `subject-erasure-disposition:${disposition}`),\n ...Object.values(SubjectErasureExternalEffectStatus).map((status) => `subject-erasure-external-effect-status:${status}`),\n `provider-credential-deletion-reason:${ProviderCredentialDeletionReason.USER_ERASED}`,\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The second factors that need NO procurement — today `TOTP` and `PASSKEY` — so ALWAYS_AVAILABLE is\n * a true statement about every application. They are written out rather than computed for the\n * reason recorded on `secondFactorMethodsRequiring`, which pins them.\n *\n * Until #1247 this entry named two methods by hand and the other two were simply ABSENT, with a\n * comment as the only record of why — that they depend on engine capabilities an application may\n * not have bought. That reasoning is about PROCUREMENT, and absence was doing double duty as though\n * it were a statement about STRENGTH: an application that HAS bought the email capability gets\n * `EMAIL_OTP` as a second factor, and the basis made no claim about it either way. The two now have\n * capability entries of their own, below, where `availability` STATES the procurement fact instead\n * of omission implying it — and because all three partition one derived set, a second factor added\n * to the engine lands in exactly one of them rather than quietly in none.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:multi-factor-authentication\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [`auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSKEY}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.TOTP}`],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The SMS second factor, whose availability is a PROCUREMENT fact and is stated as one (#1247).\n *\n * Deliberately NOT added to `WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR`'s `requiredCapabilityRefs`: that would\n * make the objective unclaimable by an application that never bought SMS, which is the opposite of\n * the truth — such an application has a perfectly good second factor in TOTP or a passkey. What\n * this entry does is let the basis SAY something about `SMS_OTP` where it previously said nothing.\n *\n * Its own strength is a separate question from its availability, and 800-63B-4 §3.2.9 answers it:\n * PSTN is the one RESTRICTED authenticator. The basis records availability here; the engine records\n * the strength judgement at `isStrongSecondFactor`, which excludes email rather than SMS.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:multi-factor-authentication-sms\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [`auth-method:${AuthMethod.SMS_OTP}`],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY, engineCapability: EngineCapability.SMS },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The email second factor. Same shape as the SMS entry, and the same non-membership in\n * `requiredCapabilityRefs` for the same reason.\n *\n * Strength, again separately: an email OTP shares its channel with a magic link and with password\n * recovery, so `isStrongSecondFactor` excludes it and `sharesProofChannel` stops it completing a\n * second factor beside another email-channel method. Availability and strength are two facts and\n * this field carries only the first.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:multi-factor-authentication-email\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [`auth-method:${AuthMethod.EMAIL_OTP}`],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY, engineCapability: EngineCapability.EMAIL_TRANSACTIONAL },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The administrative-continuity FLOORS, named by the two refusals that ARE the control.\n *\n * `AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode` is the closed vocabulary those refusals answer with, so the\n * implementation refs are the mechanism itself rather than a description of it — the same shape as\n * the erasure modes and auth methods above. A floor is engine-native and unconditional: an\n * application cannot decline to retain an administrator, which is why availability is\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE and no host artifact is required.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:administrative-continuity-floor\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode).sort().map((code) => `administrative-continuity:${code}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * \"How much authority\" — the ceiling on what a principal may grant, and the same declared\n * operation-role gate applied at a surface that is not a controller.\n *\n * `implementationRefs` name the two ROLE-TABLE SCOPES the ceiling resolves against, because that\n * split IS the mechanism: a held role is expanded through the hierarchy of the scope that granted\n * it, so an organization-scoped grant can never confer application-scoped authority. Naming the\n * individual roles instead would enumerate an application's own table, which is not the\n * framework's to attest. `USER_SELF` and `ANONYMOUS` are absent because neither carries a role\n * table for a ceiling to resolve against.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:operation-role-authorization\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [`authorization-role-scope:${ResourcePrimaryScope.APPLICATION}`, `authorization-role-scope:${ResourcePrimaryScope.ORGANIZATIONS}`],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What the operator DECIDED about each derived exposure — #300's Layer 2, named by both closed\n * vocabularies it runs on.\n *\n * TWO refs sets rather than one, because the capability is a PAIR and either alone describes\n * something else. The signal vocabulary says which exposures an application can take a position\n * on; the posture vocabulary says which positions exist. Naming only the signals would attest that\n * exposures are enumerated and say nothing about a decision having been made; naming only the\n * postures would attest a vocabulary of choices with nothing to choose about.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: both derivation and declaration are engine-native and need no provider. An\n * application that has declared nothing is COVERED by this capability and REPORTED as undeclared\n * by it — which is the distinction the whole layer turns on, and the reason absence is a finding\n * rather than a gap in the capability.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:risk-treatment-declaration\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(ApplicationRiskSignalRef).map((signalRef) => `risk-signal:${signalRef}`),\n ...Object.values(RiskTreatmentPosture).map((posture) => `risk-treatment-posture:${posture}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * \"Over which rows\" — the narrowing decision, named by the closed vocabulary it answers with.\n *\n * All four kinds are listed, including the two that do NOT narrow. The stamp records the decision\n * whatever it was, and an access review asking \"why does this person see this row\" needs\n * `ORGANIZATION_WIDE` and `NOT_NARROWED` as much as `UNIT_NARROWED` — an answer that only ever\n * recorded the confining cases could not distinguish a grant that reached everything from a\n * resource that never participated.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:organization-unit-scope-confinement\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind).sort().map((kind) => `organization-unit-narrowing:${kind}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The delegated exchange, named by the two grant types that carry a USER's authorization.\n *\n * `CLIENT_CREDENTIALS` is deliberately absent and its absence is the whole distinction: that grant\n * authenticates a machine acting as itself, so there is no user to authorize anything and nothing\n * for this objective to attest. Including it would make a delegated-authorization claim out of an\n * exchange no data subject ever saw.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:delegated-authorization\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [`oauth-grant-type:${OAuthGrantType.AUTHORIZATION_CODE}`, `oauth-grant-type:${OAuthGrantType.REFRESH_TOKEN}`],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The re-proof ceremony, named by the three factors `reAuthenticate` actually accepts.\n *\n * All three are engine-native, which is what makes this ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: `PASSWORD`, `TOTP` (a\n * code or a backup code, through the same anti-replay authority login uses) and `PASSKEY` (an\n * assertion produced under a STEP_UP ceremony whose challenge key a login assertion cannot\n * redeem).\n *\n * `SMS_OTP` and `EMAIL_OTP` are absent for a reason of their OWN, and this comment used to borrow\n * the multi-factor entry's — that they need a provider an application may not have bought. That is\n * true of them generally and is NOT why they are missing here: `reAuthenticate` refuses them\n * outright. Its trailing `else` accepts no method beyond the three above, so an application that\n * has bought both channels still cannot re-prove with either. Procurement is an availability fact\n * and belongs to `availability`; this is an absence of IMPLEMENTATION, which is what an\n * implementation ref is for. Corrected under #1247, where the same conflation was the defect.\n *\n * The SSO methods are absent because an IdP assertion is a first factor, not a re-proof that the\n * human is still present.\n *\n * This capability is DISTINCT from `capability:multi-factor-authentication` even though the two\n * overlap on `TOTP` and `PASSKEY`, and merging them would lose the distinction the objectives\n * draw: MFA asks whether a second factor was ever required, step-up asks whether identity was\n * re-proved for THIS action.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:step-up-authentication\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n /*\n * #2923: and the verdict every decision plane reaches on the proof an answer carries, when the decision requires a\n * step-up (`DecisionStepUpProofKind`, read by `checkDecisionStepUp` on the operation-approval, conversational,\n * actor/flow and representative-admission planes). Derived, so a verdict added to the vocabulary is anchored here.\n */\n implementationRefs: [\n `auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSKEY}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSWORD}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.TOTP}`,\n ...Object.values(DecisionStepUpProofKind).sort().map((kind) => `decision-step-up-proof:${kind}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Withdrawal when the conferring relationship ends, named by the closed status set the engine\n * branches on: `ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY`, read through\n * `isAuthorityConferringOrganizationStatus`.\n *\n * `TRIAL_EXPIRED` is deliberately NOT in that set and so is absent here — an expired trial stops\n * a tenant BUYING, not its members from administering what they already have, and listing it\n * would claim a withdrawal the engine does not perform. The refs are kept in step with the set\n * by construction rather than by memory: they are the enum members, not a transcription.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:access-withdrawal-on-conferring-status\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY].sort().map((status) => `organization-status-without-authority:${status}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * An erased-but-retained row behaving as deleted, named by the per-record marker that decides it.\n *\n * BOTH members are listed, and `ACTIVE` is not filler: the control is a two-valued rule, and the\n * predicate's hardest recovered defect was about which rows a marker's ABSENCE selects — Mongo's\n * `$ne` matches a null field while Postgres `<>` excludes it under three-valued logic, so the two\n * adapters disagreed about every pre-opt-in row until the SQL compilers were taught\n * `IS DISTINCT FROM`. Naming only `RETAINED` would describe the hidden half of a rule whose\n * difficulty is entirely in the visible half.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:retained-record-concealment\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n // retention-authority: N/A — these are CAPABILITY REFERENCES, not a re-expression of the rule.\n // DERIVED from `RetentionStatus`, not listed from it. Interpolating each member's symbol — which\n // is what stood here — keeps the string-literal checker quiet and leaves the LIST hand-written,\n // so a third status would be silently unclaimed: the drift `assurance-objective-binding.md`\n // calls invisible, since a basis is read by people who cannot check it. Nothing here branches on\n // a status or rebuilds the hide predicate; the total is the point.\n implementationRefs: Object.values(RetentionStatus).sort().map((status) => `retention-status:${status}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The device-stored pseudonymous identifier, named by the policy vocabulary that governs it.\n *\n * `DISABLED` is the DEFAULT and is the reason this capability is worth attesting at all: absent an\n * explicit application policy nothing is minted, sent, stored or recorded, and the backend\n * additionally REFUSES an inbound header — so a misconfigured client cannot start populating a\n * pseudonymous identifier in an application's retained audit trail without anyone opting in.\n * A capability listing only the collecting scopes would invert that reading.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:client-install-identifier-policy\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ClientInstanceIdScope).sort().map((scope) => `client-instance-id-scope:${scope}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Declared retention windows, named by the classes a window is declared PER.\n *\n * The classes are separate because their lawful windows differ, and the audit-trail class most of\n * all: it is the record an operator needs to DEFEND itself, which is the Art. 17(3) ground on\n * which erasure may lawfully be refused. Collapsing the classes here would let a shorter\n * customer-data window be read as governing the evidence that justifies keeping it.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:declared-retention-window\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(DataRetentionClass).sort().map((retentionClass) => `data-retention-class:${retentionClass}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Legal holds (#1634, bound by #1845): the EXCEPTION to a retention period. A hold suspends every deletion path for\n * its scope (the interactive deletes and scrubs refuse, the retention-class sweep skips, the subject erasure leaves the\n * rows as they are, the tenant purge and the file cleanup pass over them). Every path reads the same active holds,\n * fail-closed (`readActiveLegalHolds`): the row paths decide through `resolveLegalHeldRows`, and the tenant purge,\n * which asks which TENANTS a hold covers rather than which rows, through `resolveLegalHeldOrganizations`.\n *\n * Named by the seven closed vocabularies the mechanism branches on, each derived WHOLE:\n *\n * - `LegalHoldScopeKind`: what a hold covers (a tenant, rows of one resource, one data subject);\n * - `LegalHoldGround`: why (the Art. 17(3)(b) / (e) grounds), the ground the audit rows and an erasure report carry;\n * - `LegalHoldStatus`: ACTIVE and RELEASED, with no expiry state — a hold ends by decision, never by clock;\n * - `LegalHoldPlacementTier`: who placed it, and therefore the only tier that may release it;\n * - `LegalHolds_Operations`: the two verbs, the only writes a client reaches;\n * - `LegalHoldErrorCode`: the two refusals, including `legal_hold_state_unverifiable`, the fail-closed answer when\n * the holds cannot be read. Naming only the held refusal would describe a predicate that can always read;\n * - `LegalHoldSubjectAttributionKind`: which rows a data-subject hold covers, derived from the subject-export graph.\n * Its UNRESOLVABLE member HOLDS a row it cannot attribute, which is the over-preserving side of the guarantee.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the mechanism ships in every application and needs no engine capability or provider. Whether an\n * application ever PLACES a hold is a fact about its operation, which `legal-hold-record` reads.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:legal-hold\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldScopeKind).map((scopeKind) => `legal-hold-scope-kind:${scopeKind}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldGround).map((ground) => `legal-hold-ground:${ground}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldStatus).map((status) => `legal-hold-status:${status}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldPlacementTier).map((tier) => `legal-hold-placement-tier:${tier}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHolds_Operations).map((operation) => `legal-hold-operation:${operation}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldErrorCode).map((code) => `legal-hold-error-code:${code}`),\n ...Object.values(LegalHoldSubjectAttributionKind).map((kind) => `legal-hold-subject-attribution:${kind}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a subject may decide, named by the closed consent vocabulary the decision is held in.\n *\n * `ConsentPurpose` only (#534 — a SET of purposes, replacing the ordered `DataProcessingConsent`).\n * It is now the ONLY subject decision in the user privacy block, so this capability's\n * implementation set is total over what a subject can decide rather than a selection from it.\n *\n * ## History, kept because the exclusion it argued has dissolved rather than been overturned\n *\n * A `privacyLevel` field (MINIMAL / STANDARD / ENHANCED) sat beside the purposes under the same\n * audit decorator, and this note excluded it — first for a WRONG reason (\"a visibility\n * preference\"; the visibility enums are `UserProfileVisibility` and\n * `OrganizationProfileVisibility`, and that adjacency was the likely source of the mix-up), then\n * for a sound one: it had no production reader, and a field nothing reads cannot be evidence of\n * any control.\n *\n * #1280 removed the field outright. Researched against B2B practice: an end user of a B2B product\n * has no individual dial over product-usage collection — their employer is the controller and the\n * DPA governs — and on the website side the settled pattern is granular per-category consent,\n * which `ConsentPurpose` already is. A three-step ladder would have bundled those categories,\n * which is the shape the specificity requirement of consent exists to refuse.\n *\n * The lesson worth keeping for the next candidate: a decision leaf earns a place in this\n * capability's implementation set only if a lawful basis rests on it. Marking two fields with the\n * same audit decorator is not evidence that both are consent.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:consent-decision-record\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ConsentPurpose).sort().map((purpose) => `consent-purpose:${purpose}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The ground each processing purpose stands on, named by the closed Art. 6(1) vocabulary it is\n * declared in (#1288).\n *\n * Every member is listed because each carries a DIFFERENT obligation, which is what makes naming\n * them substantive rather than cosmetic: consent must be withdrawable, a legal obligation must be\n * nameable, and legitimate interests is lawful only where a balancing test was done — the one\n * member-level distinction the declaring schema already enforces, by refusing that basis without\n * an assessment. Found by #301's contract anchoring; its file carried no marker, so the\n * vocabulary window had never reached it.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the declaration is engine-native configuration and needs no provider. An\n * application that has declared nothing is COVERED by this capability and REPORTED as unanswered\n * by it, exactly as with risk treatment.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:lawful-basis-declaration\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(LawfulBasis).sort().map((basis) => `lawful-basis:${basis}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Tenancy derived from the caller, named by the execution types it is derived FROM.\n *\n * Every member is listed because each resolves tenancy differently and the differences are the\n * control: an `ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` is bound to one tenant, `PUBLIC_EXECUTION` has none,\n * `INTERNALLY_INITIATED_REQUEST` is the framework acting as itself. The objective's demand is\n * that this resolution is never OFFERED as a parameter — to a client, to an agent, or to a\n * retrieval surface — so the vocabulary being attested is precisely the set of answers the\n * runtime may reach without asking the request.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:caller-derived-tenancy\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ExecutionContext_ExecutionType).sort().map((executionType) => `execution-type:${executionType}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a client identity rests on, named by the two provenances a registration can have.\n *\n * `DYNAMIC` is the one the objective is about — a client that \"asserted its own name and redirect\n * URIs and proved nothing\", granted no roles, capped at identity scopes and always facing the\n * user's consent prompt. `OPERATOR` is listed with it because the control is the DISTINCTION:\n * a capability naming only the self-registered case could not attest that the other kind exists\n * and is treated differently, which is the whole posture.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:client-registration-provenance\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin).sort().map((origin) => `oauth-client-registration-origin:${origin}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Whether a declared operation is actually SERVICED, and whether a custom verb authored the\n * contract it exposes — the two verdicts the shared boot/request predicate answers with.\n *\n * BOTH vocabularies, because the objective has two halves and each is a different failure: an\n * operation that reports success having performed nothing, and a named verb that silently widens\n * into an unconstrained write. A capability naming only the first would leave the second\n * unattested while looking complete.\n *\n * `NOT_APPLICABLE` is listed with the coverage verdicts because the gate's REMIT is part of its\n * claim: naming only SERVICEABLE and UNSERVICEABLE would read as covering every operation, when\n * core operations and variants the service tier never enters are deliberately outside it.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:operation-implementation-coverage\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(ResourceOperationImplementationCoverage).sort().map((coverage) => `operation-implementation-coverage:${coverage}`),\n ...Object.values(ResourceOperationRequestContractBreadth).sort().map((breadth) => `operation-request-contract-breadth:${breadth}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * One transactional store per application (#3328), named by the classification the registry build refuses on: an\n * adapter that OWNS a transaction may only be the application's store, and one that owns none (read-through,\n * introspection) may sit beside it. Derived whole from `PERSISTENCE_ADAPTER_TRANSACTION_OWNERSHIP`, the map the\n * registry reads, so an adapter added to the enum is attested with its classification or fails to compile there.\n *\n * Replaced `capability:declared-persistence-isolation`, whose vocabulary was the removed isolation declaration.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:single-transactional-store\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(PersistenceAdapter).sort()\n .map((adapter) => `persistence-adapter-transaction-ownership:${adapter}:${PERSISTENCE_ADAPTER_TRANSACTION_OWNERSHIP[adapter]}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The categories a field may be DECLARED to hold, which is the whole objective: an inventory is\n * authored on the field itself and never inferred from its name, because pattern-matching\n * identifiers is a guess whose misses go silently undisclosed. The vocabulary is what an\n * application chooses from, so it is exactly what the capability attests.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:personal-data-field-inventory\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(PersonalDataCategory).sort().map((category) => `personal-data-category:${category}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Provider selection as the egress gate, named by the resolution modes a capability may be\n * satisfied through.\n *\n * The control is what happens with NO selection: nothing leaves, and the work is served locally.\n * So the attested mechanism is the resolution itself rather than any particular provider — and\n * deliberately not the `EngineCapability` list, which would be a hand-drawn subset of \"the ones\n * that cause egress\" and would drift the first time a capability changed shape.\n *\n * Selecting a processor includes selecting WHERE it processes (#3513), so the capability also names how a chosen\n * processing region is reached (`ProviderProcessingRegionReachKind`: the region selects the endpoint or the request\n * parameter the product uses, or it is the account's) and how it therefore holds (`ProcessingRegionHolding`: enforced,\n * attested or neither). Both are READ by a clause: the computed `recipients-and-processors` document fact states each\n * chosen region with its reach and holding (`chosenProcessingRegions`), so a published notice says which regions the\n * product enforces and which the operator only attests.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:provider-selection-opt-in\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(EngineCapabilityResolutionMode).sort().map((mode) => `engine-capability-resolution-mode:${mode}`),\n ...Object.values(ProcessingRegionHolding).sort().map((holding) => `processing-region-holding:${holding}`),\n ...Object.values(ProviderProcessingRegionReachKind).sort().map((kind) => `processing-region-reach:${kind}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Whether an AI use DECIDES something about a person, declared per AI capability (`aiUsePosture`) or, since #2838, on\n * every agent running on it (`FlowsActors_Agent.aiUse`).\n *\n * The refs are DERIVED from `AI_ENGINE_CAPABILITIES`, the vocabulary a document asks about, so a new AI\n * capability joins this capability by being named there rather than by anyone remembering it here.\n * Always available: the declaration surface is configuration, and an application enabling no AI\n * capability is simply asked nothing.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:ai-use-posture-declaration\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...AI_ENGINE_CAPABILITIES].sort().map((capability) => `engine-capability:${capability}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The use domain an AI use declares (`AiUseDomain`, #2838), the closed vocabulary its regulatory class is derived from\n * (`deriveAiUseRiskTier`), with the two vocabularies the evidence reads beside it: where each use is declared\n * (`AiUseDeclarationSource`) and the tier the derivation answers (`AiUseRiskTier`). The refs are DERIVED from the\n * enums, so a member added tomorrow joins the capability by being declared. Always available: the declaration is configuration and agent definitions, and an application\n * running no AI use is asked nothing.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:ai-use-domain-classification\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AiUseDeclarationSource).sort().map((source) => `ai-use-declaration-source:${source}`),\n ...Object.values(AiUseDomain).sort().map((domain) => `ai-use-domain:${domain}`),\n ...Object.values(AiUseRiskTier).sort().map((tier) => `ai-use-risk-tier:${tier}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * How a tool reaches the application's data (`FunctionToolAuthorityKind`, #2839), the vocabulary every tool declares\n * on `FunctionTool.authority`. Derived from the enum, so a kind added tomorrow joins the capability by being declared.\n * Always available: an application with no agents is an empty population, not an inapplicable objective (#2292's\n * precedent); a gate on an AI engine capability would also read a build-time-only capability as applicable.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-tool-authority-declaration\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n // With the turn triggers, because the claim covers what a turn started by content from outside is offered.\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AutonomousTurnTrigger).sort().map((trigger) => `autonomous-turn-trigger:${trigger}`),\n ...Object.values(FunctionToolAuthorityKind).sort().map((kind) => `function-tool-authority:${kind}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Who decides an agent's held action (`HumanDecision_RouteKind`, #2839): the person whose turn raised it, a role, or an\n * assignee. A ROLE or ASSIGNEE route refuses an answer from the requester, so a reviewer other than them decides.\n * Beside it (#2843), which record suspended an agent (one organization's, or the application's) and why a call was\n * refused for it (suspended, or a suspension that could not be read, which refuses rather than runs), each derived\n * whole from its enum.\n * Always available, for the same reason as the tool authority above.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-human-oversight\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n // With the consequence the join reads (a use that affects a person must reach a gate) and the planes it covers: the three\n // where an agent's or a held operation's action waits. NOT the representative-admission plane, which records a firm\n // admitting a representative, no AI action; naming the whole enum would claim it.\n implementationRefs: [\n // In the array's lexical order: the two `agent-suspension-` sets sort first (#2843).\n ...Object.values(AgentSuspensionRefusalReason).sort().map((reason) => `agent-suspension-refusal:${reason}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentSuspensionScope).sort().map((scope) => `agent-suspension-scope:${scope}`),\n ...Object.values(AiDecisionConsequence).sort().map((consequence) => `ai-decision-consequence:${consequence}`),\n `human-decision-plane:${HumanDecision_Plane.ACTOR_SYSTEM}`,\n `human-decision-plane:${HumanDecision_Plane.CONVERSATIONAL}`,\n `human-decision-plane:${HumanDecision_Plane.OPERATION_APPROVAL}`,\n ...Object.values(HumanDecision_RouteKind).sort().map((route) => `human-decision-route:${route}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The model-spend limits (#2844, #2935, #3030), derived whole from the engine's own vocabulary: the LIMIT features a plan\n * grants (the generation allowance, the person ceiling, and one ceiling per `ModelUsageUnit`, each derived through\n * `modelUsageCeilingFeatureIdOf` so a unit added tomorrow is claimed with its limit), the units themselves, the doors\n * that pay the organization allowance, the doors a person's ceiling counts and the doors asked before\n * EACH model call (each a `ModelSpendDoor` set filtered through the engine's own predicate, so a door that stops paying\n * or stops being asked leaves the ref set instead of being over-claimed), the limit that refused and why, and the limit\n * semantic that makes a grant engage. A call outside any door, and the estimate an unreported call is charged, are no\n * vocabulary and are stated in the intent and the evidence's limits instead. Always available: an application that grants neither limit has an uncapped population, which is\n * what the DECLARED evidence reports, not an inapplicable objective (#2292's precedent).\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:model-spend-limit\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n `model-spend-limit-feature:${A2A_PERSON_TOKEN_CEILING_FEATURE_ID}`,\n `model-spend-limit-feature:${A2A_TOKEN_BUDGET_FEATURE_ID}`,\n ...Object.values(ModelUsageUnit).map((unit) => `model-spend-limit-feature:${modelUsageCeilingFeatureIdOf(unit)}`),\n ...Object.values(ModelUsageUnit).map((unit) => `model-spend-usage-unit:${unit}`),\n ...Object.values(ModelSpendDoor).filter(modelSpendDoorChargesTokenBudget).sort().map((door) => `model-spend-door:${door}`),\n ...Object.values(ModelSpendDoor).filter(modelSpendDoorChargesPersonCeiling).sort().map((door) => `model-spend-person-ceiling-door:${door}`),\n ...Object.values(ModelSpendDoor).filter(modelSpendDoorAdmitsEachModelCall).sort().map((door) => `model-spend-per-call-door:${door}`),\n ...Object.values(TokenSpendCeiling).sort().map((ceiling) => `model-spend-ceiling:${ceiling}`),\n ...Object.values(A2ATokenBudgetDenialReason).sort().map((reason) => `model-spend-refusal-reason:${reason}`),\n // How a plan's grant composes with the definition default: CEILING is what makes a finite grant engage on a limit\n // whose default is unlimited, FLOOR the contrast. Named whole, because the semantic IS the decision.\n ...Object.values(FeatureLimitSemantic).sort().map((semantic) => `model-spend-limit-semantic:${semantic}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The burst throttle on the external agent transports (#2936), named by the one vocabulary it decides with: WHOM it\n * counts a caller against, derived whole. Every member is an owner (a person, an organization, the application),\n * and the machine credential is deliberately not one, which is the claim that a tenant cannot buy headroom by issuing\n * credentials. Beside it (#2994), whom an operation's own declared limit counts, also derived whole: the machine\n * credential first, else the person (through a client they delegated to, in the application, or as a linked chat\n * member; the organization and the application are defensive fallbacks the key keeps), the vocabulary its refusal row\n * names as `subjectKind`, and the planes it is enforced and recorded on (#3008: an MCP tool call, an agent's function\n * tool, a chat command), the row's `plane`. Two limiters with their own vocabularies, because the second counts\n * exactly what the first refuses to. The caps and windows of the two transports and the three chat doors are\n * engine-authored constants, not a vocabulary: C4 of the evidence reads them, and the rule that relaxes them in development and test only, from the\n * engine contract the application resolves (`@wildo-ai/saas-backend-lib/assurance-derivations`). The chat doors'\n * member buckets are keyed on the member and have no vocabulary of their own.\n *\n * Always available: the engine mounts the throttle on both transports in every application. An application that\n * exposes neither has no caller to bound, an empty population rather than an inapplicable objective.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:authenticated-burst-limit\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(ExternalTurnRatePrincipalKind).map((kind) => `external-turn-rate-principal-kind:${kind}`),\n ...Object.values(DeclaredRateLimitSubjectKind).map((kind) => `declared-rate-limit-subject-kind:${kind}`),\n ...Object.values(OperationDispatchPlane).map((plane) => `operation-dispatch-plane:${plane}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * A person's report of an agent's reply (#2842), named by its own vocabularies, each derived whole: what the reporter\n * says was wrong (the category), how serious it is (the severity, derived from the category), where it stands and how\n * it ended (the status and the outcome, including the dismissals, so the claim is not only of the \"good\" ending), what\n * a remedy link points at, and the verbs that move it. No `resource:` ref, for #2841's reason.\n *\n * Always available: the record exists in every application, and an application whose agents answer nobody has an\n * empty population, which the evidence reports as evidencing nothing either way (the AI objectives' precedent).\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-behavior-reports\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReportCategory).map((category) => `agent-behavior-report-category:${category}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReportSeverity).map((severity) => `agent-behavior-report-severity:${severity}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReportStatus).map((status) => `agent-behavior-report-status:${status}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReportOutcome).map((outcome) => `agent-behavior-report-outcome:${outcome}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReportRemedyKind).map((kind) => `agent-behavior-report-remedy-kind:${kind}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentBehaviorReports_Operations).map((operation) => `agent-behavior-report-operation:${operation}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The agent operation record (#2841), named by the vocabularies the record states and its evidence door counts: how a\n * call ended, the phase each tool call ended at, what screening concluded about a tool result, and the failure codes\n * an invocation can end with. Each derived whole: the end and the phase from their enums, the screening outcome from\n * the content-safety vocabulary (the screening capability names it too, as the DECISION; here it is what the record\n * states), the failure codes from `AGENT_INVOCATION_FAILURE_CODES`, the codomain of the runtime's own rule\n * (`agentInvocationFailureCodeOf` is typed by it), never a hand-picked subset of the conversation's whole vocabulary,\n * most of whose codes only a turn's door answers with.\n *\n * No `resource:` ref for the store: no capability names a resource type, and one member of that vocabulary would make\n * every other resource type uncovered surface of this objective.\n *\n * Always available: the engine writes the record for every agent call, whatever the agent declares. An application\n * with no agent is an empty population, which the evidence reports as evidencing nothing, not an inapplicable\n * objective.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-operation-record\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AgentOperationEnd).map((end) => `agent-operation-end:${end}`),\n ...Object.values(FlowsActors_ToolCallPhase).map((phase) => `agent-operation-tool-call-phase:${phase}`),\n ...Object.values(ContentSafetyScreeningOutcome).map((outcome) => `agent-operation-screening-outcome:${outcome}`),\n ...AGENT_INVOCATION_FAILURE_CODES.map((code) => `agent-operation-failure-code:${code}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What an agent's model is sent in place of a personal field's value (#2839): the treatments a model call can apply,\n * derived from the engine's own list, so a treatment admitted tomorrow joins by being admitted. Always available: an\n * agent declaring no treatment is the decision the evidence names, not an inapplicable capability.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-personal-data-model-treatment\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...FLOWS_ACTORS_PERSONAL_DATA_MODEL_TREATMENTS].sort().map((treatment) => `agent-personal-data-model-treatment:${treatment}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a coding agent's session may do (#2845), named by the three vocabularies the dispatch and the runner branch on:\n * the declared ceiling (`permissionAllowedByCeiling`, the runner), the agent's MEASURED escalation behaviour (the\n * dispatch refuses a narrower ceiling for an agent whose guards cannot fire, `agentClientProtocolInFlightGuardsCanFire`),\n * and the application environments a profile may admit (the environment gate). All three derived whole: the\n * non-escalating and the unrestricted members are named too, because the claim is a CONTRAST — a ceiling holds for an\n * agent that asks and is declared unrestricted for one that does not.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, not gated on `EngineCapability.AI_CODING_AGENT`: measured, no dispatch path reads that capability's\n * `enabled` flag, so a gate would read an application as out of scope while its coding agents still run. An\n * application whose code no agent writes is an empty population, the #2292 precedent.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:coding-agent-session-confinement\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AgentClientProtocol_PermissionCeiling).sort().map((ceiling) => `acp-permission-ceiling:${ceiling}`),\n ...Object.values(AgentClientProtocol_PermissionEscalationBehaviour).sort().map((behaviour) => `acp-permission-escalation:${behaviour}`),\n ...Object.values(APPLICATION_ENVIRONMENT).sort().map((environment) => `application-environment:${environment}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Who receives the application's source (#2845): a provider that runs a coding agent is refused at composition unless\n * its compliance profile is ESTABLISHED (`assertCodingAgentProvidersDeclareComplianceProfile`, which branches on\n * `ProviderComplianceDetermination` through `establishedProviderComplianceProfile`). The engine capability those\n * providers serve and the deployment model the evidence also reads stay unnamed: no guard branches on either (no\n * dispatch reads `AI_CODING_AGENT`'s enabled flag), so naming them would claim a decision nothing makes, and naming\n * one `EngineCapability` member would report its seventeen siblings as uncovered surface. Always available, for the\n * reason above.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:coding-agent-vendor-declaration\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...Object.values(ProviderComplianceDetermination).sort().map((determination) => `provider-compliance-determination:${determination}`)],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * What a coding agent's brief carries from outside the repository (#2846): every section declares who wrote it\n * (`MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceTrust`), and a THIRD_PARTY one says what screening concluded\n * (`MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceScreeningOutcome`), which the coding contract refuses to omit; and whether the catalog\n * could say which elements came from the web (`ResearchProvenanceCatalogReading`, #2846 review B2), since a reading\n * other than READ routes every served and website-plan element third-party. All derived whole, so a member added to\n * any of them joins the capability by being declared.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, deliberately not gated on `EngineCapability.AI_CONTENT_SAFETY`: the marking (the trust class, the\n * unscreened notice, the contract's refusal) runs in every application, and with no classifier bound the outcome is\n * UNSCREENED_NO_CLASSIFIER, which is the control operating. The runtime screening objective fails closed on a missing\n * classifier; the creation lane marks instead, because it never stops on a missing guard.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:coding-brief-content-trust\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceScreeningOutcome).sort().map((outcome) => `context-source-screening:${outcome}`),\n ...Object.values(MetaWorkflow_ContextSourceTrust).sort().map((trust) => `context-source-trust:${trust}`),\n ...Object.values(ResearchProvenanceCatalogReading).sort().map((reading) => `research-provenance-reading:${reading}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Who accepted a change (#2845): the accept origins and the autonomy postures that decide them. An automatic origin\n * is committed under the companion's identity and a person's under theirs (`accepted-change-commit`), and since M2\n * every commit names its origin, and an automatic one the posture it ran under, in trailers the collector reads from\n * the application's history. Both derived whole: the OPERATOR origin and the GUIDED posture are the contrast.\n * Always available: an application whose history holds no lane acceptance is an empty population.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:accepted-change-attribution\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(AcceptOrigin).sort().map((origin) => `accept-origin:${origin}`),\n ...Object.values(Journey_AutonomyPreset).sort().map((posture) => `autonomy-posture:${posture}`),\n ],\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Screening what an agent's model reads from third parties (#2292), named by the three vocabularies that decide it:\n * WHAT is screened (the scope an agent declares), WHERE a screened piece came from (the source the audit row\n * records), and what a screening CONCLUDED — only `clean` releases content, so the decision itself is in the set and\n * not only its inputs. Each derived whole, so a new source or outcome joins the capability by being declared.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, deliberately not REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY `AI_CONTENT_SAFETY`. Screening runs only through a\n * selected classifier, but the vocabulary and the fail-closed refusal exist in every application: with no classifier\n * selected, a turn that would bring a screening agent third-party content (offering it tools, or started by an\n * inbound delivery) is refused, and that refusal IS the control. Gating on the classifier would call an application NOT_APPLICABLE exactly where the refusal is what\n * protects it (and, beside the always-available audit trail, would make the demand UNDETERMINED rather than\n * either). An application where no agent declares screening is a genuinely empty population, answered as such.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-untrusted-content-screening\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(FlowsActors_PromptInjectionScreeningScope).map((scope) => `prompt-injection-screening-scope:${scope}`),\n ...Object.values(FlowsActors_ScreenedContentSource).map((source) => `screened-content-source:${source}`),\n ...Object.values(ContentSafetyScreeningOutcome).map((outcome) => `content-safety-screening-outcome:${outcome}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Moderating what an agent's model writes (#2292 Phase 3), named by WHAT is judged (the four output kinds, total\n * over what leaves a model), the harm categories and the ORDERED severity scale a policy withholds at, and what a\n * moderation CONCLUDED. ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, for the screening's reason: an agent whose policy no classifier can serve is\n * refused, and that refusal operates when none is selected.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:agent-output-moderation\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(FlowsActors_ModeratedOutputKind).map((kind) => `moderated-output-kind:${kind}`),\n ...Object.values(ContentSafety_HarmCategory).map((category) => `harm-category:${category}`),\n ...Object.values(ContentSafety_HarmSeverity).map((severity) => `harm-severity:${severity}`),\n ...Object.values(ContentSafetyModerationOutcome).map((outcome) => `content-safety-moderation-outcome:${outcome}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Whether a principal may authenticate at all, named by the status vocabulary that decides it.\n *\n * Every member is listed because the control is the TRANSITION between them, and a reviewer\n * reconstructing \"when did this account stop being able to log in\" needs the whole set — the\n * pending states as much as the terminal ones, since an invitation that never completes is\n * indistinguishable from a deactivation if only the active/deleted ends are attested.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:authentication-eligibility-status\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(UserStatus).sort().map((status) => `user-status:${status}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * WHICH DOOR EXISTS — the variant vocabulary that decides whether an operation faces a client at\n * all, before any question of who may open it.\n *\n * Every member is named because the control is the CHOICE among them. `INTERNAL_CALL` and\n * `REPOSITORY_ONLY` are the two that answer no HTTP request, and moving an operation onto one of\n * them is a different act from tightening its roles: `credit-pool TOP_UP` was an `API_CALL` gated\n * on ORG_OWNER, which let a tenant owner self-grant unlimited credits, and no role gate could have\n * fixed it — the legitimate caller is a billing webhook coming through the service tier.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:operation-reachability-gate\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ResourceOperationVariantType).sort().map((variantType) => `operation-variant-type:${variantType}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Whether a MEMBERSHIP confers what it names, distinct from whether its user may authenticate.\n *\n * Kept apart from `capability:authentication-eligibility-status` because the two answer different\n * questions about different rows: a fully ACTIVE user can hold a SUSPENDED membership in one\n * tenant, and merging the vocabularies would make a programme unable to say which of the two a\n * time-boxed restriction was placed on.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:membership-eligibility-status\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(OrganizationMemberStatus).sort().map((status) => `organization-member-status:${status}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The redirect-scheme denial list, READ from the guard's own set rather than transcribed.\n *\n * This is why `DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES` was exported: it is a closed vocabulary with one\n * named runtime source, and it was reachable by nothing outside its own module — so attesting the\n * control meant restating eleven schemes in a second list free to drift from the one the\n * validator actually branches on. Deriving it means the basis cannot describe a denial the guard\n * does not make, in either direction.\n *\n * The refused set is the honest thing to name. An allow-list would be the wrong shape: the guard\n * accepts any absolute URL that is not one of these, deliberately, because a strict https-only\n * rule breaks the native/CLI loopback flow and a reverse-DNS requirement would refuse conformant\n * clients like `cursor:`.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:redirect-target-constraint\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n /*\n * Sorted AFTER the prefix is applied, not before, and that is a real trap rather than style:\n * stripping the trailing colon REORDERS the set. Raw, `chrome-extension:` sorts before `chrome:`\n * (\"-\" < \":\"); stripped, `chrome` sorts before `chrome-extension`. Sorting the schemes first\n * produced a list the basis schema rejected as unsorted.\n */\n implementationRefs: [...DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES].map((scheme) => `refused-redirect-scheme:${scheme.replace(/:$/u, \"\")}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The claim names the ID-token builder OWNS, READ from the builder's own strip set.\n *\n * Naming the RESERVED set is the control: these are stripped from caller-supplied `extraClaims`\n * BEFORE they are spread, so a smuggled `nbf` cannot later make the token fail verification and a\n * forged `nonce` / `acr` / `amr` / `at_hash` cannot ride in. An allow-list of identity claims would\n * describe a different mechanism — one the scope-gated resolver performs elsewhere.\n *\n * Derived rather than transcribed, which is why the set had to leave `saas-backend-lib`. A second\n * list of fifteen claim names would be free to drift from the one the builder strips, and the\n * drift would be invisible: the basis would attest a claim as server-authored while the builder\n * let it through.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:reserved-token-claim-authorship\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [...OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES].map((claim) => `reserved-id-token-claim:${claim}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The startup validator that REFUSES a configuration before it can serve traffic, named by the\n * domains it validates.\n *\n * This is the shape `DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` already showed: a boot gate IS bindable when\n * the thing it checks has a vocabulary. Here the vocabulary is the domain set, and the severity\n * split (`ERROR` refuses, `WARNING` reports) is what makes \"refused before serving traffic\" a\n * claim rather than a hope.\n *\n * NOT every boot gate in the engine routes through this validator — the declared-unique-index\n * verification lives in the repositories registry and produces no `ConfigurationValidationIssue`,\n * which is why `DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS` is NOT bound to this capability. Binding it here would\n * claim a validation path it does not take.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:startup-configuration-validation\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ConfigurationValidationDomain).sort().map((domain) => `configuration-validation-domain:${domain}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * A declared uniqueness control PROVEN to exist in the datastore before traffic, named by the\n * adapters the proof runs against.\n *\n * The adapter set is the vocabulary because the verification is genuinely per-adapter and the two\n * halves are separate code — `verifyDeclaredMongoUniqueIndexes` and its PostgreSQL counterpart —\n * so \"which datastores has this been proven against\" is exactly the question a reader has. It is\n * also the axis on which the guarantee could silently become partial: an adapter added without a\n * verifier would make the objective true for some resources and not others.\n *\n * Distinct from `capability:startup-configuration-validation`, and deliberately not folded into\n * it: this gate emits no `ConfigurationValidationIssue`. It lives in the repositories registry,\n * and claiming the config validator's path for it would describe a route the check does not take.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:declared-uniqueness-verification\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(PersistenceAdapter).sort().map((adapter) => `persistence-adapter:${adapter}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The self-reported lifecycle stages, named so a programme can state what they do NOT confer.\n *\n * This capability is unusual and the wording matters: it attests a NEGATIVE. Every member is a\n * stage a user's own activity can move them into, and the control is that reaching one grants no\n * capability and cannot cross a scope boundary — authority comes only from a decision an\n * authorized party made. Naming the stages is how a reader learns which self-reported values\n * exist to be wrongly trusted; a capability naming a mechanism would imply the stages DO something.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:self-reported-lifecycle-stage\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(LifecycleStage).sort().map((stage) => `lifecycle-stage:${stage}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * How a refusal is CLASSIFIED — the one vocabulary three separate objectives are each a\n * distinction inside.\n *\n * | objective | the distinction it demands |\n * |---|---|\n * | `SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED` | a refusal carries a named type — `CONFIGURATION` for a validator whose dependency is unavailable, `VALIDATION` for rejected untrusted input — rather than surfacing as `UNCAUGHT_EXCEPTION`, which is how a degradation gets mistaken for a rejection |\n * | `OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT` | an over-limit request is `PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE` or `RATE_LIMIT`, NOT `INTERNAL` — a client error rather than a server failure |\n * | `OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS` | a constraint violation is `CONFLICT` carrying the identity that was violated, NOT the opaque `DATABASE` the driver would otherwise produce |\n *\n * Every member is named because the control in all three cases is a CONTRAST between members: the\n * good outcome only means something against the bad one it is not. A capability listing only the\n * client-error types would describe a system that never returns `INTERNAL`, which is a different\n * and false claim.\n *\n * This does NOT attest that any particular refusal is classified correctly — a mapping is not a\n * proof, and `UNKNOWN` is in the set precisely because the engine admits it cannot always tell.\n * What it attests is that the framework HAS one closed vocabulary for the answer, so a\n * misclassification is a wrong member rather than an unclassified crash.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:refusal-classification\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(ErrorType).sort().map((errorType) => `error-type:${errorType}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Why the inbound delivery door refused a request, before it became a delivery (#2488).\n *\n * The door ANSWERS rather than throws, so `capability:refusal-classification` never sees these refusals. It\n * deliberately answers `SECRET_NOT_CONFIGURED` and `SIGNATURE_INVALID` identically to the sender (a caller learns\n * nothing about the configuration), so the record is the ONLY place the two are told apart — which is exactly\n * `WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED`'s \"degradation not mistaken for a rejection\". Every member is named because that\n * contrast is the control.\n *\n * `ALWAYS_AVAILABLE`: the door exists in every application. One with no endpoint declared has an empty population,\n * which is a value and not an exemption.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:inbound-delivery-refusal-classification\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(InboundDeliveryRejectionReason).map((reason) => `inbound-delivery-rejection-reason:${reason}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Key management (#2891): every key the platform uses is named by a purpose, held by a custodian, and moved through\n * one audited lifecycle (created, published ahead, promoted, retired, destroyed, compromised), with the application\n * keeping the public half of every version it is signed with.\n *\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, the counterpart of `EngineCapability.KEY_MANAGEMENT` being always enabled: an application cannot\n * turn key management off, so no objective that requires this capability can be derived inapplicable by a\n * configuration choice. Named by the purposes, because the purpose is what a guarantee is about: a purpose added to\n * the vocabulary joins the capability with no edit here.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:purpose-bound-key-management\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(CryptoKey_Purpose).sort().map((purpose) => `key-purpose:${purpose}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * A rotated key that STOPS verifying at a declared instant, named by the keys the guarantee\n * applies to.\n *\n * The key set is the vocabulary because the retirement is PER KEY — `notAfter` is optional on\n * each — so \"which keys can be given a bounded life\" is the reader's question, and a key type\n * added without retirement support is exactly how the guarantee would become partial without\n * anything failing. Before this, a rotated key was time-unbounded in code and fenced only by the\n * token's own `exp`.\n *\n * BOTH directions are named. The private keys are what this application SIGNS with and the\n * public ones are the platform services it VERIFIES; retiring one of each is a different act with\n * a different blast radius, and a capability naming only the signing half would leave the\n * verification half unattested while looking complete.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:verifiable-key-retirement\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...APPLICATION_SIGNING_KEY_PURPOSES.map((key) => `signing-key:${key}`),\n ...Object.values(JwtPublicKeys).map((key) => `verification-key:${key}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * A provider's secret contract described WITHOUT its values, named by the fields an entry may\n * carry — and the control is what is NOT among them.\n *\n * `ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema` is a `z.strictObject`, so a `value` field is not\n * merely absent by convention: it is REFUSED at parse. That is what makes drift detectable\n * without persisting a secret — the shape can be compared because it never held one. Deriving\n * the refs from the schema's own shape means the capability cannot describe a field the contract\n * does not have, in either direction, and a field added there appears here automatically.\n *\n * The control lives in `platform-config-lib`, which this package must not depend on. It is\n * attestable anyway because the VOCABULARY is in `saas-models` — the shape that crosses the\n * companion-safe boundary — while only the digesting stayed on the platform side. That split is\n * why this objective needed no move at all, unlike the three that did.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:values-free-secret-contract\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.keys(ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema.shape).sort().map((field) => `secret-contract-field:${field}`),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The privilege axes a named runtime principal's database credential is built from. Derived whole: READ,\n * WRITE, APPEND and MAINTAIN are distinct verb sets, and APPEND is the one that makes evidence unalterable.\n * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE — the derivation and its refusal exist in every application; whether a principal is\n * issued an axis-scoped credential at all depends on the adapter, which the evidence body states.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:runtime-principal-grant-axes\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(RuntimePrincipalDatabaseGrantAxis).map((axis) => `runtime-principal-database-grant-axis:${axis}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Both reconciliation vocabularies, derived whole: what KIND of divergence was detected, and which\n * populations were met and not compared. The recorded run output is total over both.\n *\n * REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY BILLING: the sweep is registered only for an application with billing. The\n * runtime gate is the backend's `billing.enabled`, not this engine capability, and nothing forces the two\n * to agree — an application declaring BILLING without enabling it runs no sweep.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:billing-reconciliation-divergence-accounting\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(BillingReconciliationDivergenceKind).map((kind) => `billing-reconciliation-divergence-kind:${kind}`),\n ...Object.values(BillingReconciliationUncomparedPopulation).map((population) => `billing-reconciliation-uncompared-population:${population}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY, engineCapability: EngineCapability.BILLING },\n },\n {\n /*\n * Where each metered usage row stands with respect to the provider flush. REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY\n * BILLING, with the same caveat as reconciliation: the flush runs where the backend's `billing.enabled`.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:metered-usage-flush-state\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: Object.values(UsageRecordFlushState).map((state) => `usage-record-flush-state:${state}`).sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY, engineCapability: EngineCapability.BILLING },\n },\n {\n /*\n * The target classes (who chose the destination) and the admissions they resolve to. Both derived whole —\n * NONE and PRIVATE_NETWORK are as much the claim as LOOPBACK_ONLY. ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the resolver and the\n * pinned client exist in every application.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:outbound-target-admission\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(OutboundTargetClass).map((targetClass) => `outbound-target-class:${targetClass}`),\n ...Object.values(OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission).map((admission) => `outbound-private-address-admission:${admission}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n {\n /*\n * #3022: the keys a configuration may not author (the module owns where its credential goes) and the fields that name\n * a credential, each held to a rule the doors branch on. Both derived whole from the enums the doors read, so a field\n * added to the vocabulary joins the claim. The forbidden set the inherited environment is compared against\n * (`RUNTIME_SECRET_ENV_KEYS` and every provider's `secretsContract`) is deliberately NOT bound: it is a derived set in a\n * platform package this one does not depend on, and its completeness is the verification's\n * (`runtime-secret-env-keys.material-coverage.test.ts`). ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the refusals run at every startup and in the\n * CLI door, with nothing to enable.\n */\n identity: { capabilityRef: \"capability:module-scoped-credential-release\", capabilityVersion: 1 },\n capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,\n implementationRefs: [\n ...Object.values(ExternalProvider_ModuleOwnedConfigurationKey).map((key) => `module-owned-configuration-key:${key}`),\n ...Object.values(ProviderConfigurationCredentialField).map((field) => `credential-naming-field:${field}`),\n ].sort(),\n profiles: [],\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],\n availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },\n },\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * Canonical order, applied at composition rather than demanded of the authored constants above.\n *\n * The basis schema requires four of its arrays lexically sorted by semantic identity. Requiring the AUTHORED lists to be hand-sorted makes every added mapping a\n * chance to fail on form rather than on substance — and the failure surfaces as four opaque \"must be unique and lexically sorted\" issues rather than as anything about\n * the entry. Sorting here means an author appends where it reads best and the composer canonicalizes, which is the same split the compliance-programme normalizer makes.\n */\nconst byCanonicalIdentity = <T>(values: readonly T[], identity: (value: T) => string): T[] =>\n [...values].sort((left, right) => (identity(left) < identity(right) ? -1 : identity(left) > identity(right) ? 1 : 0));\n\n/*\n * ── 2026-09-24 source-coverage tranche (#452) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Three registered NIST sources were cited by no requirement authority, so their rights review bought\n * nothing and a US-only application had no US privacy authority behind the privacy objectives. Each\n * table below is authored rather than derived, and the authority-basis tests hold the twin tables\n * EXHAUSTIVE against the rows they twin — so a new SP 800-53 or HIPAA Security Rule row without its\n * twin reddens a test instead of going quietly uncited.\n *\n * Slugs stay DESCRIPTIVE, per every tranche above: no identifier from the source's own numbering, so\n * an edition that renumbers leaves them true. Section and subcategory numbers appear only in these\n * comments, as the trail a reviewer follows to check the mapping.\n */\nconst SOURCE_COVERAGE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-24T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The #1564 tranche: third-party AI components, and the PCI DSS service-provider list row. */\nconst AI_COMPONENTS_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-09-25T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The #2292 tranche: what an AI model reads from third parties screened, and what it writes moderated. */\nconst AI_CONTENT_SAFETY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-18T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The AI use classification tranche (#2838). */\nconst AI_USE_CLASSIFICATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-18T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The agent authority and human oversight tranche (#2839). */\nconst AGENT_AUTHORITY_AND_OVERSIGHT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-19T00:00:00.000Z\";\n/** The open AI sources tranche (#2837): the OWASP AI Exchange, the UK AI code, NIST AI 100-2 and the AI Act. */\nconst OPEN_AI_SOURCES_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-19T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\ninterface SourceCoverageRow {\n readonly requirementRef: string;\n readonly objective: { readonly objectiveRef: string; readonly objectiveVersion: number };\n /** How much of the requirement the objective answers, as reviewed (#2956). */\n readonly answer: AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswer;\n}\n\n/**\n * An SP 800-53A assessment-procedure row: it carries no grade of its own, because it assesses exactly the control its\n * SP 800-53 twin maps, so it answers exactly as much (#2956). {@link withAssessmentTwinAnswers} derives it.\n */\ntype AssessmentTwinRow = Omit<SourceCoverageRow, \"answer\">;\n\n/** A reviewed requirement the objective answers whole (#2956). */\nconst ANSWERED_IN_FULL: AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswer = { extent: AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswerExtent.FULL };\n\n/**\n * A reviewed requirement that asks for more than the objective delivers (#2956). `remainder` is what it asks that the\n * objective does not deliver, in Wildo's words: the reviewer's grade, read against the source's own text, kept as a field\n * a coverage pack can read rather than as prose beside the row.\n */\nconst answeredInPart = (remainder: string): AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswer => ({ extent: AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswerExtent.PARTIAL, remainder });\n\n/**\n * SP 800-53A twins — one assessment procedure per SP 800-53 row, SAME control, SAME objective.\n *\n * SP 800-53A provides an assessment procedure for each SP 800-53 control, and for each control in the\n * plan assessors \"select the corresponding assessment procedure\". So a mapping to a control\n * implies its procedure without any further judgement, which is why the twin is mechanical and why a\n * missing one is a defect rather than a choice. The slug is the control row's own descriptive suffix\n * with `-assessment` appended.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-53A Rev. 5, §3.2.2 \"Select Procedures to Assess the Security and Privacy Controls\"\n */\nconst NIST_800_53A_ASSESSMENT_PROCEDURE_ROWS: readonly AssessmentTwinRow[] = [\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-account-disable-on-relationship-end-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-account-enable-disable-authority-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-audit-of-access-decisions-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-audit-record-content-and-protection-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-audit-record-context-binding-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-authenticator-storage-protection-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-automated-account-management-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-concurrent-session-control-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-configuration-settings-enforcement-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-cryptographic-key-establishment-and-management-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-denial-of-service-resource-bounds-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-error-handling-diagnostics-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-information-flow-confinement-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-information-integrity-verification-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-least-privilege-authority-limit-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-malicious-code-protection-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-media-sanitization-and-disposal-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-reauthentication-for-privileged-action-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-shared-resource-isolation-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-temporary-account-expiry-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-transaction-authorization-separation-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-transaction-recovery-integrity-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 2 } },\n];\n\n/**\n * SP 800-66 twins — the implementation guidance for the SAME HIPAA Security Rule standard, one per\n * Security Rule row, same objective.\n *\n * SP 800-66 Rev. 2 §5 walks the Security Rule standard by standard, giving key activities for each, so\n * a Security Rule row has exactly one section of guidance behind it. The slug keeps the Security Rule\n * row's descriptive suffix. Which section each twins, so a reviewer can check it:\n *\n * | twin suffix | SP 800-66 Rev. 2 section |\n * |---|---|\n * | `privileged-access-review` | §5.1.4 Information Access Management — access establishment and modification |\n * | `access-authorization-recording` | §5.1.4 Information Access Management — access authorization |\n * | `workforce-access-termination` | §5.1.3 Workforce Security — termination procedures |\n * | `credential-management` | §5.1.5 Security Awareness and Training — password management |\n * | `authentication-controls` | §5.3.4 Person or Entity Authentication |\n * | `person-or-entity-reverification` | §5.3.4 Person or Entity Authentication |\n * | `transmission-confidentiality` | §5.3.5 Transmission Security |\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-66 Rev. 2, §5.1.3, §5.1.4, §5.1.5, §5.3.4, §5.3.5 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-66r2)\n *\n * Citing implementation guidance does not make the Security Rule applicable; applicability stays the\n * application's decision per source, exactly as for the Security Rule rows themselves.\n */\nconst NIST_800_66_SECURITY_RULE_GUIDANCE_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-access-authorization-recording\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective governs one kind of privileged access: platform administration that crosses into a tenant, which must be declared, \"\n + \"requested, approved and recorded. It does not cover the documented policy and procedures for granting workforce access, choosing the basis \"\n + \"and method of access control, keeping a list of the people who may approve access requests, or identifying all authorized users.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-authentication-controls\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective ensures enrolled second factors are verified through one replay-resistant authority and counted only when independent. It \"\n + \"does not cover identifying the access points that need authentication, weighing the authentication options, or choosing and implementing \"\n + \"methods (including when to require multi-factor) from the risk assessment; those are the organisation's own acts.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-credential-management\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The key activity is workforce training on creating, changing and safeguarding passwords, and on monitoring login attempts, with each \"\n + \"member's role built into awareness efforts. The objective makes credential transitions explicit and attributable but delivers none of that \"\n + \"training.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-person-or-entity-reverification\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective requires a fresh re-proof of identity before high-impact actions only. It does not cover verifying identity at every access \"\n + \"point that needs it, or selecting authentication methods from the entity's risk assessment.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-privileged-access-review\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective scopes and periodically reviews privileged access and keeps evidence, but explicitly does not claim that review findings \"\n + \"were fixed. It does not cover modifying access based on the review, standards and formal authorization before access is granted, or \"\n + \"reviewing ordinary (non-privileged) users' access; the review itself remains a human practice.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-transmission-confidentiality\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective keeps backend-only fields from crossing the client boundary. It does not cover encrypting protected data in transit, \"\n + \"integrity controls on transmitted data, identifying every transmission pathway, or the written transmission-security policy and \"\n + \"procedures.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-66-workforce-access-termination\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective withdraws access rights and credentials when the relationship ends, and restores access attributably. It does not cover \"\n + \"recovering physical access devices (badges, keys, cards), changing facility access codes, or the organisation's standard termination \"\n + \"procedures.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * Privacy Framework rows — one per privacy objective the Core can honestly speak to.\n *\n * Before this tranche every privacy objective was backed by GDPR alone, so an application operating\n * only in the United States had no US privacy authority behind any of them. Each row names the ONE\n * Core subcategory whose outcome the objective delivers; where the fit covers only part of the\n * objective, the row says which part rather than widening the claim.\n *\n * | objective | Core subcategory (Appendix A) | fit |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | `SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT` | CT.DM-P1 / CT.DM-P2 — data elements can be accessed for review, and for transmission or disclosure | the two halves of access and portability, one category |\n * | `SUBJECT_ERASURE` | CT.DM-P4 — data elements can be accessed for deletion | the deletion capability; intake and withdrawal of the request sit under CT.PO-P3, which this row does not claim |\n * | `ERASURE_PROPAGATION` | CM.AW-P5 — data corrections or deletions can be communicated to individuals or organizations in the data processing ecosystem | the external-store half; the per-relationship internal accounting has no Core counterpart |\n * | `STORAGE_LIMITATION` | CT.DM-P5 — data are destroyed according to policy | enforced retention windows are the policy |\n * | `DATA_MINIMIZATION` | CT.DP-P4 — configurations permit selective collection or disclosure of data elements | the Disassociated Processing category names data minimization among the principles it enables |\n * | `CONSENT_RECORD` | CT.PO-P1 — policies, processes and procedures for authorizing data processing (e.g., individual consent), revoking and maintaining authorizations | the runtime record the subcategory's policy and process maintain |\n * | `PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY` | ID.IM-P6 — data elements within the data actions are inventoried | declared on the field |\n * | `THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING` | ID.IM-P2 — owners or operators, including service providers, and their roles are inventoried | a processor is a role, and routing is opt-in by declaration |\n * | `COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT` | CM.AW-P4 — records of data disclosures and sharing are maintained | the bulk-export event IS the disclosure record |\n *\n * The fit column records why each row was mapped. How much of the requirement a row answers is its `answer` (#2956), graded\n * against the source's text, which this column predates.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST Privacy Framework Version 1.0 (NIST CSWP 01162020), Appendix A \"Privacy Framework Core\" — subcategories as tabulated above\n *\n * SKIPPED, deliberately: `WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS`. The Core has no notion of a legal ground for\n * processing. Its nearest outcome, ID.IM-P5 (purposes for the data actions are inventoried), is what\n * that objective PRESUPPOSES rather than what it demands — the basis per purpose and the balancing\n * assessment behind it — so citing it would claim coverage of the one part the framework does not\n * address. GDPR stays that objective's only authority.\n */\nconst NIST_PRIVACY_FRAMEWORK_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-data-access-for-deletion\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-data-access-for-review-and-transmission\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"CT.DM-P2 is not limited to the person the data describe: data elements are also to be reachable for transmission or disclosure to other \"\n + \"parties, such as a recipient organisation or an authority. The objective's export reaches the subject alone, so access for \"\n + \"disclosure to anyone else is not stated.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-data-element-inventory\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective records, on each stored field, which category of personal data it holds. It does not tie each data element to the data \"\n + \"actions (collection, transmission, disclosure, logging) that process it, and the subcategory asks for the inventory to be kept per data \"\n + \"action.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-deletion-communicated-across-ecosystem\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.ERASURE_PROPAGATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective covers deletions only. It does not communicate data corrections, and it does not tell individuals in the ecosystem (such as \"\n + \"data sources) that a deletion happened; its reporting is aimed at registered external erasure effects and stores, and it explicitly leaves \"\n + \"out derived copies.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-destruction-according-to-policy\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective enforces declared retention windows on resource rows. It does not state that data held outside rows (stored files, backups, \"\n + \"logs, third-party copies) is destroyed under the policy, and it does not cover writing the organisation's retention policy, which the \"\n + \"windows only formalise.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-disclosure-records\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Only bulk exports of a resource collection are recorded. Other disclosures and sharing (to processors, through subject exports or API \"\n + \"access) are not covered, the record does not name who received the data, and the objective does not say the records can themselves be \"\n + \"accessed for review or transmitted.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-processing-authorization-maintenance\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective records each consent decision exactly once. It does not establish the policies, processes and procedures for authorizing and \"\n + \"revoking processing, and it does not cover authorizations that come from organisational decisions rather than individual consent.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-selective-collection-and-disclosure\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Disclosure is limited for external processors and observability, and collection is selectable only for the device-stored pseudonymous \"\n + \"identifier. The objective does not state that configurations let the application or the individual choose, in general, which other data \"\n + \"elements are collected or disclosed.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-third-party-role-inventory\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective makes each external processor an explicit, opt-in provider selection per capability. It does not inventory the other owners \"\n + \"and operators the subcategory names (the organisation itself, partners, customers, developers), their roles toward each system or \"\n + \"component, or internal components.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI RMF 1.0 (NIST AI 100-1), added with `WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS` (#1564).\n *\n * One row, for the subcategory that asks internal risk controls \"for components of the AI system, including\n * third-party AI technologies\" to be \"identified and documented\" (MAP 4.2) — which is what the objective's\n * declarations discharge. The GOVERN 6 subcategories (policies for third-party AI risk, contingency for\n * high-risk third-party AI) ask for an organisation's policies and procedures, which no declaration of the\n * product can stand for, so they are deliberately not mapped.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MAP 4.2 and GOVERN 6.1–6.2 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-third-party-ai-components-identified\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"MAP 4.2 asks for the internal risk controls applied to each component, third-party AI included, to be identified and documented. The \"\n + \"objective lists the AI capabilities and the providers serving them but does not record which controls govern each.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI RMF 1.0, added with `WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION` (#2838).\n *\n * One row, for the subcategory asking that the intended purposes, the \"context-specific laws, norms and expectations\"\n * and the settings an AI system is deployed in be \"understood and documented\" (MAP 1.1). A declared use domain, with\n * its regulatory reading derived over the declared jurisdictions, is that documentation in a form a function can read.\n * The AI Act rows are in `EU_AI_ACT_ROWS` (#2837).\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MAP 1.1 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_USE_CLASSIFICATION_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-intended-purpose-and-legal-context-documented\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"MAP 1.1 also asks for these to be understood and documented: beneficial uses, deployment settings, the users and their expectations, \"\n + \"positive and negative impacts, assumptions and limitations, and test and evaluation metrics. The objective records only a use domain and \"\n + \"the EU AI Act reading derived from it.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The agent authority and human oversight tranche (#2839).\n *\n * - Human oversight: NIST AI RMF MAP 3.5, \"Processes for human oversight are defined, assessed, and documented\". The\n * approval gates, holds, deadlines and stop are those processes, in a form the evidence can read. MANAGE 2.4 (mechanisms\n * to \"supersede, disengage, or deactivate\" an AI system) waited for the administrator stop it asks for, and is mapped\n * with it below (`NIST_AI_RMF_AGENT_SUSPENSION_ROWS`, #2843).\n * - Authority confinement: SP 800-53 AC-6, least privilege \"for users (or processes acting on behalf of users)\", with its\n * 800-53A assessment twin. An agent's tool is exactly such a process, and AC-6's other row\n * (`nist-800-53-least-privilege-authority-limit`) stays with `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE`.\n *\n * - Data minimization at the model boundary: MEASURE 2.10, \"Privacy risk of the AI system ... is examined and documented\".\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MAP 3.5, MANAGE 2.4 and MEASURE 2.10 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1)\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.2.0, AC-6 \"Least Privilege\", read from the OSCAL catalog (usnistgov/oscal-content, NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.json)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_HUMAN_OVERSIGHT_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-human-oversight-processes-documented\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The subcategory asks for oversight processes that are defined, assessed and documented under the organisation's own policies. The \"\n + \"objective supplies the gates, holds, deadlines and stop those processes run on, but not the assessment of the processes or their alignment \"\n + \"with organisational policy.\",\n ),\n },\n // MEASURE 2.10, \"Privacy risk of the AI system ... is examined and documented\": the model boundary of data minimization.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-privacy-risk-examined\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The subcategory asks for the AI system's privacy risk to be examined and documented. The objective minimises what leaves each boundary but \"\n + \"does not examine or document the privacy risk itself.\",\n ),\n },\n];\nconst NIST_800_53_AGENT_AUTHORITY_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-least-privilege-processes-acting-for-users\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"An agent's tools are confined to the authority of the principal they act for. The control also asks that the agent's access be cut down to \"\n + \"what its assigned task needs, rather than inheriting everything that principal holds.\",\n ),\n },\n];\nconst NIST_800_53A_AGENT_AUTHORITY_ROWS: readonly AssessmentTwinRow[] = [\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-least-privilege-processes-acting-for-users-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n];\n\n/** The AI-produced change tranche (#2845). */\nconst AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-19T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/** The agent operation record tranche (#2841). */\nconst AI_OPERATION_RECORD_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-19T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/** The agent behaviour report tranche (#2842). */\nconst AI_INCIDENT_HANDLING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-19T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/** The agent suspension tranche (#2843). */\nconst AGENT_SUSPENSION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-20T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/**\n * NIST AI RMF 1.0, added with the administrator's suspension of an agent (#2843). One row, what it leaves out its `answer`:\n *\n * - MANAGE 2.4: mechanisms are in place and applied, and responsibilities are assigned and understood, to supersede,\n * disengage, or deactivate AI systems whose performance or outcomes are inconsistent with intended use. The suspension is\n * such a mechanism, for one organization or for the whole application, refused before the model runs.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MANAGE 2.4 (Table 4) (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1, read 2026-10-20)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_AGENT_SUSPENSION_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-ai-system-deactivation-mechanism\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The subcategory also asks that the responsibility for superseding, disengaging or deactivating a system be assigned and understood, and \"\n + \"that the mechanism be used when outcomes stray from the intended use. The objective supplies the suspension itself, for an \"\n + \"organization or the whole application; who holds that responsibility and when it is used are the operator's, and a suspension \"\n + \"does not stop a call already running.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/** The authenticated burst-limit tranche (#2936). */\nconst AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-20T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\n/**\n * The OWASP AI Exchange, added with `WILDO.OPERATIONS.AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT` (#2936). One row; what it leaves out is its `answer` (#2956):\n *\n * - 2.0 #RATE LIMIT: limit the rate of access to the model, preferably per actor (user, API key or session), and\n * \"Breaching a rate limit must trigger event logging and potential incident workflows.\" The throttle limits an A2A\n * agent's turns, which reach a model, and an MCP client's tool calls per minute, and logs the first breach of each\n * window as an audit row.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped: NIST SP 800-53 SC-5. Its statement protects against or limits the effects of\n * organization-defined denial-of-service events with organization-defined controls, and draws no line between an\n * authenticated and an unauthenticated request, so a second row beside `nist-800-53-denial-of-service-resource-bounds`\n * (which `WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT` holds) would split one control between two objectives on a reading the text\n * does not draw: the #2842 MANAGE 4.1 reasoning.\n *\n * spec-cite: OWASP AI Exchange, read 2026-10-20 — 2.0 #RATE LIMIT (https://owaspai.org/docs/2_threats_through_use/);\n * NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 SC-5 control statement, read 2026-10-20 from the publication linked at\n * https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5)\n */\nconst OWASP_AI_EXCHANGE_BURST_LIMIT_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-external-agent-access-rate-limited\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 3 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The transport throttle counts per owner, so an organization's keys share one window rather than one per actor; a per-actor count \"\n + \"exists only where an application declares an operation's own limit and the operation is called as an MCP tool, an agent tool \"\n + \"or a chat command (over REST the declared limit counts a source IP), and there is no total-use cap across actors. \"\n + \"A breach is logged but never routed to an incident workflow or alert, and no per-agent or per-session cap on tool calls and orchestration \"\n + \"steps ends a running turn or holds agents handling untrusted content to a tighter limit.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI RMF 1.0, added with `WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING` (#2842). Each row is the mechanism a practice runs on, and each row's `answer`\n * names what the subcategory asks beyond it (#2956):\n *\n * - MEASURE 3.3 (Table 3, p. 31): feedback processes for end users and impacted communities to report problems and\n * appeal system outcomes, established and integrated into evaluation metrics. The report is the reporting half, for the\n * people who use the application.\n * - MANAGE 4.3 (Table 4, p. 33): incidents and errors communicated to relevant actors, including affected communities,\n * and processes for tracking, responding to and recovering from them followed and documented. The record and its\n * lifecycle are the tracking and the documented response.\n *\n * - MANAGE 4.1 (Table 4, p. 33): post-deployment monitoring plans implemented, including mechanisms for\n * capturing and evaluating input from users and other relevant AI actors, appeal and override, decommissioning, incident\n * response, recovery and change management. The subcategory names two mechanisms this objective is: the capture and\n * evaluation of users' input (a report and its triage) and incident response (its outcome). `WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD` (#2841) maps\n * the same subcategory for the system's behaviour, under a row of its own: one requirement row names one objective, and\n * the text describes both.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MEASURE 3.3, MANAGE 4.3, MANAGE 4.1 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1, read from\n * the PDF 2026-10-19)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_INCIDENT_HANDLING_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-end-user-problem-reporting-established\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Impacted communities who are not users of the application have no reporting channel, there is no appeal of a system outcome, and reports \"\n + \"are not fed into any evaluation metric.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-incidents-tracked-and-responded-to\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Incidents are not communicated to relevant actors or affected communities beyond the audit rows, nobody is notified or paged, and recovery \"\n + \"from an incident is not covered.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-user-input-capture-and-incident-response-implemented\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Input from AI actors other than users is not captured, and the monitoring plans, appeal and override, decommissioning, recovery and change \"\n + \"management are not delivered. A report past its target is only counted, never escalated.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI RMF 1.0, added with `WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD` (#2841). Both rows are the per-call SUBSTRATE of a practice the\n * operator runs, never the practice:\n *\n * - MEASURE 2.4 (Table 3, p. 29): the functionality and behaviour of the system and its components are monitored in\n * production. The record states, for every agent call, the model that answered, the tools and how each ended, the\n * guardrails' verdicts and the end; the monitoring itself (who reads it, against what expectation) is the operator's.\n * - MANAGE 4.1 (Table 4, p. 33): post-deployment monitoring plans are implemented. Only the capture of what the\n * system did (the operation record) is answered; each row's `answer` names the rest (#2956).\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped: MEASURE 3.1 (identifying and tracking emergent risks over time is an organisational tracking\n * practice, and mapping it would claim the practice from the record) and MANAGE 2.4 (supersede, disengage or deactivate,\n * #2843's door, as the oversight tranche left it).\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0, MEASURE 2.4, MANAGE 4.1, MEASURE 3.1, MANAGE 2.4 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1,\n * read from the PDF 2026-10-19)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_RMF_OPERATION_RECORD_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-production-behaviour-monitored\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The record is the data a monitoring practice reads; the monitoring itself (who reviews it, against what expectation of behaviour) is the \"\n + \"operator's. The system's non-agent components are not covered, and calls made outside the agent runtime leave no record.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-rmf-post-deployment-monitoring-implemented\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Only the capture of what the agent runtime did is delivered. The monitoring plans themselves are not, nor are capture of users' and other \"\n + \"actors' input, appeal and override, decommissioning, incident response, recovery and change management; calls outside the agent runtime \"\n + \"leave no record.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST SP 800-218 (SSDF 1.1), activated by the first objective about how an application's code is PRODUCED (#2845). Three\n * tasks, each answered by the creation lane's coding-agent controls and read from the application's own declarations and\n * history:\n *\n * - PO.3.1 (specify the tools a toolchain must include and how they integrate; its Example 2: identify security tools to\n * integrate into the developer toolchain): the application declares which coding-agent providers and execution\n * profiles may write its code, and composition refuses one without an established compliance profile; since #2846 it\n * also declares the content-safety classifier its build-time toolchain screens third-party text through, integrated\n * where a coding brief is assembled. PO.3.2 (operating and hardening the tools) is the operator's installation\n * practice and is not mapped.\n * - PO.5.1 (separate and protect each environment involved in software development): a coding agent runs only in an\n * application environment its profile admits, and never in production on a guessed one.\n * - PS.1.1 (store all forms of code based on least privilege, so that only authorized personnel, tools and services have\n * access; its Example 2: track all changes with accountability to the individual account): the declared edits of an\n * agent that asks are confined by the ceiling and the task's write scope, and every change accepted through the lane's\n * accept door is committed under the identity of whoever accepted it.\n *\n * What each task asks beyond the lane's controls is that row's `answer` (#2956).\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped: PW.7 (code review). Under the decided YOLO posture the system commits and a person is notified,\n * so mapping review would claim one that did not happen; the attribution is what lets a reviewer see which changes no\n * person accepted. Nor PO.3.3 (configure tools to generate artefacts of their support of secure practices): a run's\n * screening outcomes are such artefacts, but they are per-run state nothing retains (C7), so mapping it would claim a\n * trail nothing keeps. Nor PW.4 (acquire, create and verify well-secured software components): it governs components\n * reused in the product, not third-party TEXT reaching an agent's input.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-218, SSDF Version 1.1, February 2022, Table 1 — PO.3.1 and its Example 2, PO.3.2, PO.3.3,\n * PO.5.1, PS.1.1 and its Example 2, PW.4, PW.7 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218, fetched 2026-10-19)\n */\nconst NIST_800_218_AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-218-code-access-least-privilege\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The task asks that all forms of code be stored so that only authorised personnel, tools and services can access them; repository access \"\n + \"control is not part of the objective, which confines a coding agent's declared edits and attributes accepted changes. Shell commands and \"\n + \"agents that never ask are only recorded afterwards, file reads are not confined, and a commit an agent makes itself is not attributed to \"\n + \"it.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-218-development-environment-separated\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective keeps coding agents out of production. Protecting each development environment (multi-factor access, network segmentation, \"\n + \"restricting connections, monitoring access) is the host's job and is not delivered.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-218-development-toolchain-specified\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Only the coding-agent providers, execution profiles and the build-time classifier are specified. The other tools each toolchain must \"\n + \"include to mitigate identified risks are not, and neither is how all its components integrate and exchange data.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI 600-1, the Generative AI profile, added with the content-safety objectives (#2292).\n *\n * ONE row: the content filters of MG-3.2-005, which \"flag problematic inputs and outputs\", are what the moderation does to\n * what the agent writes, the action's own subject (harmful generated content). The action is tagged with the information\n * integrity, harmful bias, dangerous content and obscene content risks, and not with Information Security, so its input\n * half was not read as the screening of injected instructions. A row doing that, with a join to §2.9, was retired in the\n * #2956 review (M4): the profile describes indirect prompt injection in §2.9 and names no runtime filter for it, and its\n * only action naming prompt injection is red-teaming (MS-2.7-007), an organisation's practice. AI 100-2 §3.4.4 carries\n * the screening instead.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped: MG-2.2-005, due diligence analysing GAI output \"for harmful content, potential\n * misinformation, and CBRN-related or NCII content\". Moderation discharges the harmful-content part only, and an\n * organisation's due-diligence act is not a runtime filter. Red-teaming, incident response and human moderation in the\n * same MANAGE subcategories are an organisation's practices.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 600-1, July 2024, §2.9 Information Security; MANAGE 3.2 MG-3.2-005 and its risk tags; MANAGE 2.2\n * MG-2.2-005; MEASURE 2.7 MS-2.7-007 (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.600-1, fetched 2026-10-18, the tags re-read 2026-10-20)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_600_1_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-600-1-problematic-output-filtered\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OUTPUT_MODERATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The action names false and illegal content alongside harmful and violent content. The objective withholds only what the policy's harm \"\n + \"categories judge, so misinformation and illegal content outside those categories are not filtered.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The open AI sources tranche (#2837): rows from four sources the epic registered, for the six `WILDO.AI.*` objectives\n * bound before them. Each source was read on 2026-10-19 and each row was graded against the objective's intent: only\n * rows where the source asks for what the intent states, or for a larger thing of which the intent is a stated part,\n * are filed. Where the intent is narrower, the row's `answer` names what it leaves out (#2956).\n *\n * Three objectives are conditional on a declaration (screening, moderation, and the approval gates), while every\n * source asks unconditionally. The row says the objective answers the requirement where the application declares the\n * control; the evidence bodies report an agent that does not.\n *\n * The OWASP AI Exchange (community guidance, CC0). Each locator below is a section of https://owaspai.org/docs/.\n * spec-cite: OWASP AI Exchange, read 2026-10-19 — 1.1 #AI PROGRAM; 1.3 #LEAST MODEL PRIVILEGE and #OVERSIGHT;\n * 2.0 #MONITOR USE (and its agentic incident lifecycle); 2.2 #PROMPT INJECTION I/O HANDLING (2.2.2 indirect prompt injection); 2.5 AI resource exhaustion,\n * #LIMIT RESOURCES; 3.0 #SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGE (https://owaspai.org/)\n */\nconst OWASP_AI_EXCHANGE_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n // 1.3 #LEAST MODEL PRIVILEGE: act with the rights of whoever is served, enforced in the backend and re-bound to the\n // initiating principal per call, never in model instructions.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-agent-acts-with-served-principal-authority\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The control also says that when the person served asks the AI system to provide information to others, those others' authorisation must be \"\n + \"taken into account. The objective bounds the tool by the caller's authority only and states nothing about the recipients.\",\n ),\n },\n // 1.1 #AI PROGRAM, its impact analysis: whether the law prohibits the type of application.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-ai-use-legal-class-assessed\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Only the EU AI Act reading is derived, and only as a candidate for a person to confirm. Other laws are not assessed, and the other \"\n + \"impact-analysis questions (transparency, privacy rights, bias, need for AI, data use for the purpose) are not answered.\",\n ),\n },\n // 3.0 #SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGE: a record of the external models and AI services in use.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-external-ai-services-recorded\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Model versions and lineage are not recorded, nor which external model served which system version. Integrity verification, vulnerability \"\n + \"monitoring and supplier evaluation are not done.\",\n ),\n },\n // 1.3 #OVERSIGHT, automated oversight: unwanted output detected and withheld before anyone receives it.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-harmful-output-detected-and-withheld\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OUTPUT_MODERATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Detection covers only the harm categories the policy names. Misinformation, dangerous information, sensitive data and suspicious actions, \"\n + \"which the automated-oversight list also names, are not detected by this objective.\",\n ),\n },\n // 1.3 #OVERSIGHT, human-in-the-loop: high-impact agent actions wait for a verified human approval enforced by the\n // infrastructure, not by model instructions.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-human-approval-before-high-impact-agent-actions\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The control also asks that every agent action be sorted into a risk tier before deployment, with the oversight each tier needs; that \"\n + \"a high-risk approval carry a unique token per request, tied to the exact action parameters, the approver and an expiry, refused when the parameters \"\n + \"change or the token has lapsed; and that the person approving be qualified and instructed for the decision. The objective holds \"\n + \"high-impact actions for a verified human decision and does not state those three.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.2 #PROMPT INJECTION I/O HANDLING, for indirect injection: third-party content (tool output, retrieved data) is\n // inspected for injected instructions before it reaches the model, and stopped on detection. Its direct-input, encoding\n // and escaping halves are not claimed.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-indirect-prompt-injection-screening\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_SCREENING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective detects and withholds injected instructions in tool results and inbound deliveries. It does not normalise or escape \"\n + \"untrusted text, label or delineate it by trust level, validate tool output against a schema, or inspect earlier turns and stored content \"\n + \"already in the context.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.2 #PROMPT INJECTION I/O HANDLING, for the creation lane (#2846): text a research step brought in from the web is\n // labelled by its source (THIRD_PARTY), delineated in its own brief sections that the host, above the data block, says\n // are never to be followed, inspected where the brief is assembled, and withheld from the brief on detection. Its own\n // requirement row, because one requirement binds one objective and the runtime row above is the application's agents'.\n // spec-cite: OWASP AI Exchange, read 2026-10-19 — 2.2.2 Indirect prompt injection; #PROMPT INJECTION I/O HANDLING;\n // #INPUT SEGREGATION (https://owaspai.org/docs/2_threats_through_use/)\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-coding-brief-indirect-prompt-injection-screening\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_CONTROL\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"A research step's evidence is inspected where it is produced, before a generation step reads it, and the elements a step wrote from it \"\n + \"when the brief is assembled and when the `wildo context elements` door answers (#2938); when no classifier answers, the text is passed marked rather than stopped, and text written after reading research-informed input is treated as \"\n + \"trusted, its input having been screened or marked before the writing model read it (#2937).\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.5 AI resource exhaustion, #LIMIT RESOURCES (#2844): limit the resources a single model input, and for agents each\n // agent or session, may use, and on a breach terminate cleanly and log an audit event.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-model-spend-bounded\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The bound is a per-period token allowance per organization and, in in-app chat, per person, with no cap per input, agent or session on \"\n + \"compute, tool calls or execution time. A spent allowance refuses the next turn or call rather than ending the running one; a call a \"\n + \"resource operation makes pays as the operation's principal, else from the organization its work is for, else from its \"\n + \"application, and is refused when none of them can pay; a call outside any turn, flow or operation is refused only when it is \"\n + \"attributed to an organization, and one attributed to none (the host's own tooling) is neither counted nor refused (#2957). Embeddings, document extraction and content screening are bounded per \"\n + \"organization by a ceiling of their own each, asked before every such call, and the ceilings are granted by plan, so an application \"\n + \"granting none leaves them unbounded (#3030).\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.0 #MONITOR USE (#2841): log model usage and system behaviour so an incident can be reconstructed; its processing\n // context (model version, errors) and its filtering or blocking actions are what the record holds.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-model-use-monitored\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The control also logs the user, the input and the output, which the record deliberately omits, and it asks for detection, correlation, \"\n + \"alerting and response, which are the operator's. Calls outside the agent runtime leave no record.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.0 #MONITOR USE, agentic incident lifecycle, its Detection and triage bullet (#2842): signals correlated from automated\n // monitoring, user reports and operator observation, classified by severity, scope and urgency, routed by severity, and\n // triage decisions logged with timestamps, rationale and assignee.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:owasp-ai-exchange-agentic-incident-detection-and-triage\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Only user reports are a signal, and nothing correlates them with automated monitoring or operator observation. Incidents are classified by \"\n + \"severity but not by scope or urgency, and no critical report is routed to containment or immediate human review.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The UK Code of Practice for the Cyber Security of AI (OGL v3.0). Its provisions say \"shall\" for a requirement and\n * \"should\" for a recommendation; every row below cites a \"shall\". No provision names prompt injection or output\n * filtering (the introduction names indirect prompt injection only as a risk), so it has no row for the moderation\n * objective, and the screening row cites the general resilience provision.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped for `WILDO.AI.INCIDENT_HANDLING` (#2842): 10.3 (supporting end-users during and after an incident)\n * and 12.2 (analysing the logs for undesired output) are \"should\" provisions; 6.5 is a \"shall\", and asks for an AI system\n * incident management plan and recovery plan, an organisational artefact no product mechanism stands for.\n * spec-cite: UK Code of Practice for the Cyber Security of AI, DSIT, 31 January 2025 — provisions 2.1, 2.2, 2.6, 4.3, 5.1 and 12.1\n * (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-cyber-security-code-of-practice/code-of-practice-for-the-cyber-security-of-ai);\n * provisions 6.5, 10.3 and 12.2 read the same day for the note above\n */\nconst UK_AI_CODE_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n // 5.1: a comprehensive inventory of assets and their interdependencies.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-ai-asset-inventory\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The inventory covers the AI capabilities and the providers serving them. The other assets (data, models, prompts, infrastructure) and \"\n + \"their interdependencies are not inventoried.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.1: the business purpose of an AI system documented before it is built.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-ai-purpose-documented\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The provision asks for a thorough assessment before building, documenting the AI security risks and mitigation strategies alongside the \"\n + \"business requirement. The objective records the declared use and its domain only.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.6: an AI system that interacts with other systems or data is given only the permissions its function needs, and those\n // permissions are risk-assessed.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-ai-system-permissions-limited-and-assessed\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"A tool is bounded by its caller's authority, which is a ceiling rather than only the permissions its function requires, and the \"\n + \"permissions granted are not risk-assessed.\",\n ),\n },\n // 2.2: the system resists adversarial attacks and unexpected input.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-resilience-to-adversarial-input\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_SCREENING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Screening third-party content for injected instructions is one defence against one class of adversarial input. Resistance to other \"\n + \"adversarial attacks, to unexpected input in general and to AI system failure is not covered.\",\n ),\n },\n // 4.3: where human oversight reduces a risk, technical measures for it are designed, verified and maintained.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-technical-measures-for-human-oversight\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.HUMAN_OVERSIGHT\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n },\n // 12.1 (#2841): system operators log system and user actions to support security compliance, incident investigations and\n // vulnerability remediation.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:uk-ai-code-system-and-user-actions-logged\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OPERATION_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The record logs what each agent invocation did; a person's actions and the system's other activity are not part of this objective. Calls \"\n + \"outside the agent runtime leave no record.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * NIST AI 100-2 E2025 is a taxonomy: its mitigation sections DESCRIBE what has been proposed and recommend nothing as\n * sufficient. Each row therefore reads \"the source describes this mitigation, and the objective is it\". Its GenAI part\n * says nothing of human-in-the-loop, so it has no oversight row.\n * spec-cite: NIST AI 100-2 E2025, March 2025 — §3.3.3 Mitigations, §3.4 Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks and its §3.4.4\n * Mitigations (https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-2e2025)\n */\nconst NIST_AI_100_2_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n // §3.3.3, detecting harmful generations with a classifier and terminating the interaction.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-100-2-harmful-generation-detected-and-terminated\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.OUTPUT_MODERATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The mitigation describes classifying generations as harmful or undesirable in general. The objective judges only the harm categories the \"\n + \"agent's policy names, so undesirable output outside those categories is not detected.\",\n ),\n },\n // §3.4.4, closing paragraph: design on the assumption that prompt injection is possible, for example with several models\n // holding different permissions, or reaching untrusted data only through well-defined interfaces.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-100-2-injection-assumed-system-design\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.AGENT_AUTHORITY_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Bounding a tool by its caller's authority still lets a model that read injected content act with that caller's full authority. The \"\n + \"objective does not split work across models holding different permissions, and it does not confine untrusted data to narrow interfaces, as \"\n + \"the paragraph's examples describe.\",\n ),\n },\n // §3.4.4: filtering instructions out of third-party data and detecting indirect injection.\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-ai-100-2-third-party-instruction-filtering\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_SCREENING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The AI Act. Two rows, both for the use classification, and both say KNOWING rather than complying: the objective\n * reports a use as a prohibited-practice or high-risk candidate for a person to confirm, never refuses it, and produces\n * neither the documented assessment of Art. 6(4) nor the registration of Art. 49(2). Art. 5 applies to every AI system;\n * the high-risk classification rule of Art. 6(2) is cited only as what identifies a candidate.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped:\n * - Arts. 14 (human oversight) and 26 (deployer obligations): they bind high-risk systems, which Wildo does not support\n * yet (#2851), and a row would claim coverage of a high-risk obligation.\n * - Art. 50 (transparency, applying since 2 August 2026): no objective answers it yet (#2840).\n * - Art. 4 (AI literacy): an organisation's act.\n * spec-cite: Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 — Art. 5(1), Art. 6(2) and Annex III,\n * Art. 6(4), Arts. 14, 26, 50 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj; article text read 2026-10-19 from the\n * consolidated reading at https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/ and checked against the OJ text of 2026/1744)\n */\nconst EU_AI_ACT_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:eu-ai-act-high-risk-candidate-use-identified\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective only flags a use as a high-risk candidate from its declared domain, for a person to confirm. It does not settle the \"\n + \"classification, it does not make the Art. 6(3) significant-risk assessment that can take an Annex III use out of the high-risk class, and \"\n + \"it does not cover the Art. 6(1) route for safety components of regulated products.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:eu-ai-act-prohibited-practice-identified\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AI.USE_CLASSIFICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Art. 5(1) prohibits the practices, while the objective reports a use in one of them as a candidate for a person to confirm and never stops \"\n + \"it. Its reading also rests on the declared domain rather than on the conditions each prohibition sets.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * PCI DSS v4.0.1, cited by reference only (#1564 part 3).\n *\n * One row: the requirement to maintain a list of the third-party service providers account data is shared\n * with (§12.8.1). `WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING` already discharges it — its evidence demand refuses a\n * runtime-selected provider missing from the processor register, the billing provider included — so a second\n * objective would state the same obligation twice. Written agreements, due diligence and monitoring (§12.8.2\n * to §12.8.4) are the operator's own acts and are not mapped. The responsibility split (§12.8.5) has a\n * framework half — the engine collects payment only through the provider's hosted checkout and billing\n * portal, so the application never receives card data — but it is a split between two contracting parties,\n * which no product declaration records, so it is not mapped either.\n *\n * spec-cite: N/A — requirement identifiers only, per the reference-only rights record; no PCI DSS text is quoted.\n */\nconst PCI_DSS_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:pci-dss-third-party-service-provider-list\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The intent makes each external provider an explicit opt-in selection. The requirement asks for more: the entity's own up-to-date record \"\n + \"of every outside service provider it shares account data with, whether or not the application selected that provider.\",\n ),\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The #2488 tranche: three objectives for markers that claimed an objective whose intent excluded what they guard.\n * Every source below was already registered and ACTIVE; nothing is added to the registry.\n *\n * | objective | source | what it maps to | fit |\n * |---|---|---|---|\n * | `SECONDARY_USE_AUTHORIZATION` | GDPR | Art. 5(1)(b) purpose limitation, Art. 6(4) compatibility of further processing, Art. 28(3)(a) a processor acts only on documented instructions | the two members of `EvaluationExportBasis` are the two conditions under which the further use is admissible; an export is refused without one |\n * | `SECONDARY_USE_AUTHORIZATION` | Privacy Framework | CT.PO-P1 — authorizing data processing (e.g., organizational decisions), revoking authorizations, and maintaining authorizations | as for `CONSENT_RECORD`: the runtime gate and record the subcategory's process maintains |\n * | `CONSENT_ENFORCEMENT` | GDPR | Art. 7(3) — consent can be withdrawn at any time, and withdrawing must be as easy as giving | the processing stops when the purpose is not granted; a browser provider that a withdrawal could not stop is never started |\n * | `CONSENT_ENFORCEMENT` | Privacy Framework | CT.PO-P3 — enabling individuals' data processing preferences | the enforcement the subcategory's procedures put in place |\n * | `REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION` | SP 800-53 | AC-5 Separation of Duties — define system access authorizations to support separation of duties | the predicate is the access authorization; separation is the requester never being among those it admits |\n * | `REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION` | SP 800-53A | the AC-5 assessment procedure | the mechanical twin the source-coverage guard requires |\n *\n * The fit column records why each row was mapped. How much of the requirement a row answers is its `answer` (#2956), graded\n * against the source's text, which this column predates.\n *\n * spec-cite: GDPR (EU) 2016/679, Art. 5(1)(b), Art. 6(4), Art. 7(3), Art. 28(3)(a) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj)\n * spec-cite: NIST Privacy Framework Version 1.0 (NIST CSWP 01162020), Appendix A — CT.PO-P1, CT.PO-P3\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, AC-5 Separation of Duties; SP 800-53A Rev. 5, AC-05\n *\n * Deliberately NOT mapped: GDPR Art. 6(1) for the secondary use. Neither basis member is a lawful ground; each is a\n * condition on FURTHER processing, which is why `WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS` was rejected as the home.\n */\nconst SEPARATION_AND_SECONDARY_USE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = \"2026-10-05T00:00:00.000Z\";\n\nconst GDPR_2488_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-compatible-further-processing\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SECONDARY_USE_AUTHORIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The controller has to carry out the compatibility assessment itself, weighing the link between the purposes, the context of collection, \"\n + \"the nature of the data, the consequences for the people concerned and the safeguards. The objective only requires that such an assessment \"\n + \"or instruction is recorded as the basis, and it covers one further use, exporting decision records as evaluation data.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-consent-withdrawal-effect\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_ENFORCEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Art. 7(3) also requires that the person is told about the right to withdraw before consenting, and that withdrawing is as easy as giving \"\n + \"consent. The objective stops the processing once consent is gone, but it does not state either of those two things.\",\n ),\n },\n];\nconst NIST_PRIVACY_FRAMEWORK_2488_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-further-use-authorization\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SECONDARY_USE_AUTHORIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective is a runtime gate and record for one further use, exporting decision records as evaluation data. It does not establish the \"\n + \"organisation's policies, processes and procedures for authorizing, revoking and maintaining authorizations, and it does not govern data \"\n + \"processing in general.\",\n ),\n },\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-privacy-individual-preference-enablement\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_ENFORCEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective enforces consent-based processing at runtime. It does not establish the organisation's policies and procedures, it does not \"\n + \"cover processing preferences other than consent, and it does not cover individuals' requests (access, correction, erasure).\",\n ),\n },\n];\nconst NIST_800_53_2488_ROWS: readonly SourceCoverageRow[] = [\n {\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-separation-of-duties\",\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective keeps a requester from acting on decisions their own work raised. Identifying and documenting which duties must be separated \"\n + \"is the organisation's job, and so is defining access authorizations that support that separation beyond the review decisions the product \"\n + \"holds.\",\n ),\n },\n];\nconst NIST_800_53A_2488_ROWS: readonly AssessmentTwinRow[] = [\n { requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53a-separation-of-duties-assessment\", objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.REQUESTER_REVIEWER_SEPARATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 } },\n];\n\n/** The registry locator for each tranche source — every tranche above cites the locator the registry records. */\nconst sourceCoverageRows = (sourceRef: string, canonicalLocator: string, rows: readonly SourceCoverageRow[], reviewedAt: string = SOURCE_COVERAGE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT) =>\n rows.map((row) => ({\n source: { sourceRef, sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: row.requirementRef,\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: row.objective,\n answer: row.answer,\n canonicalLocator,\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt,\n }));\n\nexport interface InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow {\n readonly source: { readonly sourceRef: string; readonly sourceVersion: number };\n readonly requirementRef: string;\n readonly requirementVersion: number;\n readonly objective: { readonly objectiveRef: string; readonly objectiveVersion: number };\n /** How much of the requirement the objective answers, as reviewed (#2956). */\n readonly answer: AssuranceSourceRequirementAnswer;\n readonly canonicalLocator: string;\n readonly reviewedByRef: string;\n readonly reviewedAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Every reviewed source-requirement row of the initial basis: which source a requirement comes from and which\n * objective it was reviewed against.\n *\n * A function of its own (not inline in the composer) because the rows are needed WITHOUT composing a basis: the\n * jurisdiction gate (`deriveObjectiveJurisdictionApplicability`, #2852) reads them in programme generation and\n * in the creation brief, neither of which holds an implementation revision. The rows depend on no composer\n * input, so moving them changed nothing they say.\n */\nexport function createInitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorities(): InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow[] {\n const reviewed: InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow[] = [\n {\n /*\n * Malicious-code protection. The slug is DESCRIPTIVE and carries no control identifier from the\n * source's own numbering — `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses those outside an authorized\n * mapping boundary, and a descriptive slug survives an edition that renumbers them.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-malicious-code-protection\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective inspects uploaded content before it can be served. It does not cover exit points, automatic updates to the protection \"\n + \"mechanism, periodic whole-system scans, alerting designated people on detection, or handling false positives.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * The RISK-TREATMENT rows (#269 proportionality check, 2026-09-17).\n *\n * Added after checking this lane against what the field expects rather than against its own\n * reasoning, and the correlation turned out to be closer than the design was: the CSF's GOVERN\n * function names, as three separate outcomes, the three things #300's layers produce.\n *\n * Every slug here is DESCRIPTIVE and carries no identifier from the source's own numbering, per\n * the rule stated on the malicious-code row above — a descriptive slug survives an edition that\n * renumbers, and `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses the other kind outside a mapping\n * boundary.\n *\n * ONE DIVERGENCE, RECORDED RATHER THAN SMOOTHED OVER. The third outcome asks for a standardized\n * method for \"calculating, documenting, categorizing and prioritizing\" risks. This framework\n * documents, categorizes and prioritizes — and deliberately does NOT calculate: the register\n * carries two qualitative bands and multiplies nothing, because Layer 1 asserts structurally\n * that it emits no score and a number derived from two judgements is the thing a reader trusts\n * without checking. The citation is made for the three it answers, and the fourth is a stated\n * difference rather than a silent one. A mapping that hid it would be the \"conformity assertion\"\n * this boundary's own caveat refuses to make.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-risk-appetite-and-tolerance-statements\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks for statements of how much risk the organisation is willing to accept and tolerate, established, communicated and \"\n + \"maintained over time. The objective derives the exposures and records the treatment chosen for each with its reasoning, but it \"\n + \"produces no appetite or tolerance statement, nor its communication or maintenance.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-risk-response-options-direction\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks for strategic direction, established and communicated, describing which risk response options are appropriate. The \"\n + \"objective records the response the operator chose for each exposure and why, but it does not set or communicate the direction that \"\n + \"governs those choices.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-risk-documentation-and-prioritization-method\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks for a standardized method for calculating, documenting, categorizing and prioritizing risks that is established and \"\n + \"communicated. The objective documents derived exposures and their treatments, but states neither a calculation (which the basis \"\n + \"records as deliberately absent) nor prioritization, and establishing and communicating the method is organisational.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-subject-access-portability\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Access also means telling the person the purposes, recipients, retention period, their other rights, the data's source, any automated \"\n + \"decision-making and any transfer safeguards; portability needs a structured, machine-readable format and, where feasible, direct \"\n + \"transfer to another controller. The objective states an audited, subject-isolated export, not this information, format or transfer.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REQUIREMENT_REF,\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The rule asks for policies and procedures, based on the entity's access authorization policies, to establish, document, review and \"\n + \"modify every user's right of access. The objective covers periodic review of privileged access only, and it is not the entity's \"\n + \"policies and procedures.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-govern-access-review\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome covers all access permissions, entitlements and authorizations, asks that they be defined in a policy and managed and \"\n + \"enforced as well as reviewed, and that they incorporate least privilege and separation of duties. The objective delivers periodic, \"\n + \"evidenced review of privileged access only; the policy, the non-privileged population and the review's practice by people remain the \"\n + \"operator's.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-01 mapping tranche: NIST, GDPR and HIPAA ──────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * A requirement is named by a DESCRIPTIVE slug, never by the source's own control identifier, and the locator is the one the registry already records for that\n * source. That is not decoration: `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses restricted external identifiers outside an authorized boundary, the rights records\n * govern what may be reproduced, and a slug that says what the requirement IS survives an edition change that renumbers it.\n *\n * Each entry binds ONE objective to ONE requirement of one source. Where two sources reach the same objective they are separate entries, because applicability\n * is decided per source by the application and collapsing them would decide it here.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-erasure-and-restriction\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not cover restriction of processing: holding contested or objected-to data in storage only, using it only on the \"\n + \"narrow Art. 18(2) grounds, and telling the person before a restriction is lifted. Nor does it cover deciding whether an erasure ground \"\n + \"applies, erasing without undue delay, or informing other controllers when the data were made public.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-security-event-logging\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that log records be generated across the organisation's platforms (hardware, operating systems, services) and made \"\n + \"available to a continuous monitoring capability. The objective covers typed events for the application's own security-relevant changes \"\n + \"and checks at boot that the delivery path exists, not logging across the rest of the platform or the monitoring that consumes it.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-of-access-decisions\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective records access decisions only. The control also asks for record generation across every auditable event type on defined \"\n + \"components, a way for designated people to choose which events each component logs, and records carrying the full content the \"\n + \"audit-record content control lists.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hipaa-security-authentication-controls\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The standard asks for procedures that verify every person or entity seeking access to ePHI. The objective only makes second-factor \"\n + \"verification sound (one replay-resistant, timing-safe authority, counting only independent proofs); it does not cover first-factor \"\n + \"authentication, authenticating entities, or the procedures themselves.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Three objectives whose control is ALREADY IMPLEMENTED by the audit trail, verified in source\n * before binding rather than inferred from the objective's wording:\n *\n * | objective | the implementation that attests it |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION` | every auditable-event payload carries an actor field, and `audit-actor.shared.schemas.ts` closes the no-user case with a SENTINEL vocabulary instead of a bare `'unknown'` |\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION` | `CoreAuditableEventType.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS`, emitted on every crossing with `admissionDeclared` separating a sanctioned one from an attempted one |\n * | `WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT` | `CoreAuditableEventType.FIELD_ACCESS`, which `audit-access-fields.backend.utils.ts` fires on CREATE for `isBackendOnly({ isReturnedAtCreation: true })` — a minted secret returned exactly once |\n *\n * All three bind `capability:audit-events`, so this tranche adds no capability authority: the\n * engine capability that attests them was already declared, and inventing a second identity for\n * the same mechanism would split what an application must select.\n *\n * The requirement slugs describe what the requirement IS and never carry a source's own control\n * identifier — `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses those outside an authorized boundary,\n * and a descriptive slug survives an edition that renumbers them.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-attributable-event-record\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that personnel activity and technology usage actually be monitored to find potentially adverse events. The objective \"\n + \"makes each security-relevant action attributable in the record, but performs no monitoring or analysis of that activity.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-accountability-demonstration\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The controller has to be able to show that every Art. 5(1) principle is respected, using technical and organisational measures it \"\n + \"reviews and updates. Recording who performed a security-relevant action is one piece of that evidence; it does not show lawfulness, \"\n + \"minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation or security, and it does not provide the data protection policies Art. 24(2) expects.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hhs-security-access-authorization-recording\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The rule asks for policies and procedures for granting any workforce member access to ePHI through a workstation, transaction, program \"\n + \"or process. The objective covers only platform-tier administrators crossing into a tenant, and it is a mechanism rather than the \"\n + \"entity's authorization policy.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-authenticator-disclosure-record\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that identities and credentials for users, services and hardware be managed by the organisation throughout. The \"\n + \"objective covers a single moment in a minted secret's life, its first disclosure, as an attributable audit event.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Selected by CODE-MARKER COVERAGE rather than by reading the catalog, which is a better\n * criterion than the previous tranche's: an objective carrying `assurance-control:` markers is\n * one the codebase itself claims to implement, and `check:assurance-control-boundary` already\n * validates every marker against the catalog. All 40 unbound objectives carry at least one; these\n * three are among the four most heavily marked (25, 20 and 19 sites).\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE` | the API-key and OAuth-client schemas plus the audit trail — the privileged grant's whole life is the record, which is why the evidence IS the audit event |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE` | the API-key custom implementation, the password-reset service and the audit trail |\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY` | its own `administrative-continuity.shared.schemas.ts`, the organization-owner and super-admin floors, and the CRITICAL breach record |\n *\n * `LEAST_PRIVILEGE` was deliberately NOT bound in THIS tranche: the generation contract's refusal\n * pin used it as its canonical UNBOUND objective, so binding it in the same change would have\n * silently turned that pin into a test of nothing. The authorization-confinement tranche below\n * binds it, and fixes the pin properly — it now DERIVES an unbound objective from the catalog\n * minus these bindings, so no future tranche can hollow it out by accident.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-privileged-grant-evidence\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that permissions be defined in a policy, enforced and reviewed, with least privilege and separation of duties. The \"\n + \"objective keeps durable evidence of every grant, widening, narrowing and revocation, which supports management and review but does not \"\n + \"itself define, enforce or review the permissions.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-credential-state-transitions\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome covers managing identities as well as credentials, for users, services and hardware. The objective covers the credential's \"\n + \"lifecycle transitions, theft response and effective revocation, but not the management of the identities themselves or hardware \"\n + \"credentials.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hhs-security-credential-management\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The rule asks for procedures, delivered through the workforce training program, for creating, changing and safeguarding passwords. The \"\n + \"objective makes credential issuance, rotation and revocation explicit and attributable, but it does not provide the procedures or the \"\n + \"training, or state rules for creating and safeguarding passwords.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-govern-accountable-role-retention\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that cybersecurity risk-management roles, responsibilities and authorities be established, communicated, understood \"\n + \"and enforced across the organisation. The objective only guarantees that every scope keeps a usable administrator; defining and \"\n + \"communicating who is responsible for what is organisational practice it does not deliver.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche ──────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * The three most heavily marked remaining objectives (21, 15 and 14 sites), and together they\n * answer the two halves of an access question that the already-bound audit objectives only\n * RECORD: how much authority a principal may hold, and which rows that authority reaches.\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE` | `role-ceiling.backend.utils.ts` (a caller cannot grant what it does not hold, resolved per role-table scope) and `authorizeInProgrammaticSurface` (a non-controller surface applies the operation's declared role gate through the SAME predicate) |\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT` | seven confinement modules under `security/authorizations/` plus the WRITE-side narrowing in BOTH resource repositories, and the `OrganizationUnitNarrowingStamp` that records why access was reached |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION` | the OIDC authorization-code service, `pkce.backend.utils.ts`, and five distinct OAuth consent/exchange audit events |\n *\n * NOT claimed, and this is why the LEAST_PRIVILEGE binding above requires no audit capability:\n * the role-ceiling refusal is raised from custom-impl services, outside `runAuthorizationPhase`,\n * so it produces no authorization-denial audit row. That is a gap in the engine rather than in\n * this mapping, and it is filed as one — binding around it here keeps the programme's claim\n * true, which is the only thing this layer can do about it.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-least-privilege-authority-limit\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective stops a principal from granting authority it does not hold, and applies the same role gate on every surface. It does not \"\n + \"ensure that each principal's access is limited to what its assigned tasks need, which depends on how the organisation designs and \"\n + \"assigns roles.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-least-privilege-enforcement\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that permissions be defined in a policy, managed and reviewed, and that separation of duties be incorporated \"\n + \"alongside least privilege. The objective enforces a grant ceiling and one shared operation-role gate across surfaces, but policy \"\n + \"definition, review and separation of duties are not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-information-flow-confinement\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective confines reads and writes inside the application to the scope the caller's grant reaches. It does not enforce approved \"\n + \"flow policies for information moving to and from connected systems.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-processing-confidentiality\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Art. 32 asks for security measures matched to the risk: encryption or pseudonymisation; ongoing integrity, availability and \"\n + \"resilience; restoring access after an incident; regular testing of the measures; and making sure people with access act only on the \"\n + \"controller's instructions. Narrowing queries to the scope the caller's grant reaches covers only part of confidentiality.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-delegated-access-authorization\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that access permissions be defined in a policy and reviewed, and that they incorporate separation of duties. The \"\n + \"objective enforces and audits delegated access on the user's recorded authorization and bounds the token to the declared grant, but \"\n + \"defining the policy, reviewing delegated grants and separation of duties are not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Three objectives about identity over TIME, where the tranches above covered identity at a\n * single decision: how it is re-proved for a high-impact act, how a change to the authored\n * policy is evidenced, and when the access it confers ends.\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION` | the per-operation `requiresStepUpAuthentication` flag on eight resource configs, `reAuthenticate` (PASSWORD / TOTP / PASSKEY), and the separate `PasskeyAuthenticationCeremony.STEP_UP` challenge key that makes a login assertion structurally unredeemable at the step-up door |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE` | the SSO connection and config schemas, and `APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED` — emitted at boot, by the system, when the resolved policy snapshot differs from the last one recorded |\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE` | `ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY` read through `isAuthorityConferringOrganizationStatus`, the organization custom implementation that withdraws credentials, and four audit events covering withdrawal and restoration |\n *\n * A correction landed with this tranche rather than beside it: the `requiresStepUpAuthentication`\n * docstring still said re-authentication was PASSWORD-only and warned authors away from\n * declaring the flag on operations SSO-only, passkey-only or directory-managed users perform.\n * TOTP and passkey re-auth have both shipped, so that advice had inverted — and it was the\n * advice a framework author would have read while deciding whether this objective was\n * satisfiable at all.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hhs-security-person-or-entity-reverification\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The standard asks the entity to verify that any person or entity seeking access to ePHI is who it claims to be, every time access is \"\n + \"sought, and to have procedures for doing so. A fresh re-proof before high-impact actions covers only part of that.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-reauthentication-for-privileged-action\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * Named by Wildo's own DESCRIPTIVE SLUG, never by the standard's section number — the mapping\n * module is explicit that this is not a control-identifier crosswalk. The slug says what the\n * requirement is about; the canonical locator says where to read it.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63b-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63b-distinct-authentication-factors\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not enforce the permitted composition: either a multi-factor authenticator, or one physical something-you-have \"\n + \"authenticator combined with a password or a biometric comparison. Nor does it state the other AAL2 obligations: at least one \"\n + \"replay-resistant authenticator, approved cryptography, and communication over authenticated protected channels.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63b-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63b-out-of-band-channel-separation\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not state the out-of-band mechanics: a separate, encrypted secondary channel on which the device authenticates \"\n + \"itself, never email; the secret transferred between the two channels rather than a bare approval; a random secret of at least six \"\n + \"digits, valid for 10 minutes and accepted once; and rate limiting that a new secret does not reset.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63b-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63b-authenticator-activation-verified\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not state that an authenticator whose activation flag shows no activation factor was used is counted as a single \"\n + \"factor, or that every authentication event requires the local activation factor to be presented and verified. Nor does it deliver the \"\n + \"activation-secret obligations: a minimum length, disabling the authenticator after no more than 10 failed activation attempts, \"\n + \"hardware-protected verification at AAL3, and erasing the activation secret after use.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * What step-up IS, in the source's own vocabulary: reauthentication.\n *\n * This binding first carried `…authenticator-activation-verified`, the same requirement the\n * multi-factor objective above cites — on the reasoning that a step-up also re-proves a factor\n * the person still holds AND still unlocks. True, and not expressible: a source requirement's\n * identity is `source@version:requirement@version` with the OBJECTIVE excluded, so the basis\n * binds each requirement to exactly ONE objective and refused the pair as a duplicate. That\n * refusal is right — two objectives citing one requirement would make \"which control does this\n * requirement land on\" unanswerable — and the fix is to cite the requirement that is actually\n * step-up's, not to borrow the neighbour's.\n *\n * spec-cite: NIST SP 800-63B-4 (https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html) carries a\n * `Reauthentication` subsection under EACH assurance level, stating what a session may be\n * extended with at that level. The slug is descriptive and names no section number, like every\n * requirement ref here — deliberately, since two fetches of that document disagreed about the\n * numbering and a section number nobody can confirm is exactly the fabricated-citation defect\n * `external-specification-citations.md` exists for. The per-AAL structure is what was verified.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63b-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63b-reauthentication-at-assurance-level\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective requires a fresh re-proof before a high-impact action. It does not deliver the periodic reauthentication the provision \"\n + \"mandates: an overall session timeout per assurance level and an inactivity timeout, the session ending when either expires, the \"\n + \"timeouts resetting on activity and on reauthentication, reauthentication at AAL3 meeting the initial-authentication requirements, and \"\n + \"the limits documented in a system security plan.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63b-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63b-phishing-resistant-authentication\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective makes the authentication posture explicit and evidences its changes; it does not deliver phishing resistance itself: an \"\n + \"authentication protocol with channel binding or verifier name binding under approved cryptography, at least one phishing-resistant \"\n + \"option offered at AAL2, and never treating a manually entered code as phishing-resistant.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * The FEDERATION volume, for the half of session assurance that is about what an assertion\n * carries between parties — which is the authority for the `amr` an application now publishes\n * and for the `acr` it deliberately does not.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-63c-4\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-63c-assertion-states-its-authentication\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not state what an assertion carries: the authentication time, the assurance level used at the identity provider or \"\n + \"an explicit statement that none is asserted, the intended federation assurance level, and the issuer, audience, issuance time, \"\n + \"validity window, assertion identifier and signature; nor that the provider reports the resulting level even when the request was not \"\n + \"met.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/c/4/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHENTICATOR_STRENGTH_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-govern-authentication-posture-change\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that the policy be reviewed and updated to reflect changes in requirements, threats, technology and mission, and \"\n + \"communicated, as well as enforced. The objective makes the authentication posture explicit and evidences each change from the runtime \"\n + \"that enforces it, but the review cadence, the decision to update and the communication of the policy are the operator's practice.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-account-disable-on-relationship-end\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective covers taking access away when the relationship behind it ends. The control also asks that accounts be disabled within a \"\n + \"defined time when they have expired, break policy, or have been inactive for a defined period.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hhs-security-workforce-access-termination\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The rule asks for procedures for ending access when a workforce member's employment or other arrangement ends, or when the workforce \"\n + \"clearance determination requires it. The objective withdraws access once the conferring relationship has ended in the system; it does \"\n + \"not provide the procedure that notices the departure, or the clearance determination.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * The four privacy objectives a governed privacy notice quotes most directly, which is why\n * they are worth binding even though three of them carry fewer markers than some alternatives:\n * an application's privacy notice has retention, minimisation and consent paragraphs whether or\n * not the programme can support them.\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE` | the single retention-hide authority consumed by both persistence adapters, the aggregation/charts surface and RAG retrieval; the organization-purge batch; and four destruction audit events |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION` | the embeddings and document-extraction services (the processor receives the payload and nothing identifying the requester), and the client-install identifier policy chokepoint that fails closed absent an application opt-in |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION` | three startup refusals in the config validator plus the resource-retention sweep |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD` | `.isAuditEvidence()` on the two consent leaves, the preferences RESET, and the single emission point every consent-changing verb routes through |\n *\n * A correction landed with this tranche for the same reason the last one's did:\n * `RetentionStatus.RETAINED` still described its own concealment as \"enforcement wired in a\n * later phase\" long after that phase shipped, and a reader deciding whether SECURE_LIFECYCLE\n * was satisfiable would have concluded the row was still visible.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-erasure-with-retention-carve-out\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The controller has to decide that one of the listed grounds applies (a legal obligation, public health, archiving or research, or \"\n + \"legal claims) and keep the data only to the extent that ground requires. The objective hides and freezes retained records and destroys \"\n + \"data on schedule, but it does not tie a retained record to a valid ground or limit retention to what that ground needs.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-media-sanitization-and-disposal\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective makes the destruction of records deliberate, attributable and scheduled, and hides erased-but-retained records. It does \"\n + \"not sanitise the underlying system media before disposal, release or reuse with defined techniques, or match sanitisation strength to \"\n + \"the information's security category.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-data-minimisation\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The principle covers all personal data the application collects and stores, which must be adequate, relevant and limited to what each \"\n + \"purpose needs. The objective only limits what leaves to processors, to observability surfaces and as a device identifier; it does not \"\n + \"decide which fields the application collects or keeps.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-storage-limitation\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The controller has to set each window to no longer than its purpose needs, and longer storage for archiving or research needs the Art. \"\n + \"89(1) safeguards. The objective enforces the windows that were declared, but it does not show that those windows are necessary.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-consent-demonstrability\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * The lawful-basis row (#1288). Art. 6(1) closes the set of grounds and conditions the sixth on a\n * balancing of interests; the transparency articles then require a notice to state the basis per\n * purpose. The objective answers the declaration half — it evidences what the operator DECLARED,\n * never that the declared ground is legally sound, which stays a qualified reviewer's judgement.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-lawful-basis-per-purpose\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"Art. 6(1) makes processing lawful only where a ground actually applies: the necessity tests are met and, for legitimate interests, the \"\n + \"person's rights do not override those interests. The objective records the declared basis and its balancing assessment, but whether \"\n + \"the basis is sound remains a qualified reviewer's judgement.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 attribution tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Five objectives about what the trail must be able to SAY. Four of them bind only\n * `capability:audit-events`, which is not thin coverage — it is the honest shape when the\n * control IS the record rather than a mechanism the record corroborates.\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION` | the resource-operations helper (a caller cannot widen its own scope), the MCP tool adapter (an agent is never offered its tenancy as a parameter), and both RAG chunk stores, where the predicate is evaluated INSIDE the traversal |\n * | `WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY` | the SSO config block that governs what the trail captures, and the services-registry handler that reconstructs a privileged action's authorization effect from the record rather than from role tables |\n * | `WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT` | the embeddings and document-extraction services (provider, model, usage and outcome per physical call) and the webhook test-endpoint probe (the initiating actor) |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING` | the SCIM provisioning switches carrying `.isAuditEvidence()`, and the declared department-to-unit bindings that make the directory authoritative over an authorization axis |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION` | the CIMD client-metadata service, the dynamic-registration path, and two audit events covering a client created by an unauthenticated party and every refused assertion |\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-shared-resource-isolation\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective derives tenant narrowing from the caller and applies it inside similarity search. It does not state that leftover \"\n + \"information in reused shared resources such as memory, storage or caches is prevented from passing to another tenant.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-record-content-and-protection\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective does not say that every record carries what happened, when, where, from what source, with what outcome, and every party \"\n + \"involved. Nor does it say the trail and its tools are protected from unauthorised access, change or deletion, or that designated \"\n + \"people are alerted when that happens.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-outbound-connection-monitoring\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that networks and network services be monitored to find potentially adverse events. The objective routes outbound \"\n + \"calls through named egresses and records each one so a reviewer can enumerate them, but it does not watch that traffic for anomalies \"\n + \"or cover network services beyond the application's own calls.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-automated-account-management\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-identify-service-identity-verification\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that identities of users, services and hardware be proofed and bound to credentials according to the context of the \"\n + \"interaction. The objective proofs only client identities, by demonstrated control of a domain, and records refusals; user and hardware \"\n + \"identities and context-dependent proofing strength are outside it.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 declaration tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Eight objectives satisfied by what a schema or configuration DECLARES, plus the trail that\n * records the declaration changing. This is where the marker-count method stops choosing for\n * you: every objective here carries one or two markers, so the ranking no longer discriminates\n * and each was decided by whether a real vocabulary exists to attest.\n *\n * | objective | what the markers sit on |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY` | the coverage predicate that startup validation and request-time refusal SHARE, so an operation blessed at boot cannot answer 2xx having performed nothing |\n * | `WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` | the registry build that refuses a non-atomic configuration (the isolation declaration it then admitted was removed by #3328) |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY` | the `PersonalDataCategory` decorator on the field itself |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING` | the document-extraction service, where no bytes leave unless a provider is selected and the local library otherwise serves every extraction |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE` | `UserStatus` carrying `.isAuditEvidence().excludeFromUpdate()`, so the change cannot arrive as a side effect of an unrelated write |\n * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT` | `CoreAuditableEventType.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT`, one event with `riskLevel` separating a page from a full result set |\n * | `WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION` | the audit service preserving actor and tenant across the trusted-system write, and the logger stamping `appSlug:env` |\n * | `WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY` | the backend-only exposure guard and the audited first exposure |\n *\n * `WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY` was blocked by a LAYERING problem rather than a\n * mapping one, and the fix was to move the boundary. Its vocabularies lived in\n * `saas-backend-lib`, which this package must not depend on — so a control that is real,\n * well-marked and enforced was unnameable from the layer obliged to describe it. They are\n * closed vocabularies rather than backend behaviour, so they now live in `saas-models` beside\n * the acknowledgement type that shares their marker; the resolvers that compute them did not\n * move. When an objective cannot be bound, check whether the obstacle is the EVIDENCE or the\n * package graph before recording it as uncovered.\n *\n * WHAT THIS TRANCHE LEAVES: fourteen objectives whose control is real but has no vocabulary a\n * capability could name from here — boot gates, a body-size cap, a conflict reference, an\n * open-redirect constraint. Binding them would mean inventing a capability identity per gate,\n * which is the plausible-coverage failure #207 exists to prevent. They need a decision about\n * whether the capability model should carry named GATES at all, not another tranche.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-declared-interface-integrity\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data at rest be protected. The objective protects one aspect \"\n + \"of integrity, that an operation never reports success it did not perform nor widens into writes over fields not exposed for update; \"\n + \"confidentiality, availability and other integrity threats are not addressed.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-transaction-recovery-integrity\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 2 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective refuses configurations whose cross-resource writes could not be atomic, which makes rollback possible. It does not state \"\n + \"any recovery mechanism that restores transactions after a failure, such as journaling or roll-forward.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-records-of-processing-categories\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The record must also describe the categories of data subjects, and it has to be kept as a written record of processing activities that \"\n + \"can be shown to the supervisory authority. Declaring personal-data categories on each field supplies only the data-category half of \"\n + \"that record.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-processor-engagement\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The controller may use only processors that give sufficient guarantees, each bound by a written contract stating the subject-matter, \"\n + \"duration and instructions, plus the Art. 28(3) duties: confidentiality, security, assistance, deletion or return at the end, and \"\n + \"audit; sub-processors need authorisation and the same obligations. Making routing opt-in does not establish any of these.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-account-enable-disable-authority\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective guards only the change to whether a principal may authenticate, which is enabling and disabling. Creating, modifying and \"\n + \"removing accounts, and the organisation's own policy and criteria for doing so, are not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:gdpr-bulk-disclosure-record\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The record of processing has to name the categories of recipients the data have been or will be disclosed to, including recipients in \"\n + \"third countries, kept in writing and shown to the supervisory authority on request. The export event names the resource, operation and \"\n + \"format, but not who received the data, and it does not keep the record of processing activities.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-record-context-binding\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective keeps the actor, tenant, application and environment on a record. It does not state a defined strength for that binding, \"\n + \"such as cryptographic, or give authorised people a way to establish who produced the information.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:hhs-security-transmission-confidentiality\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The standard asks for technical measures that protect ePHI against unauthorised access while it travels over an electronic network, \"\n + \"including encryption where appropriate and integrity controls that detect changes in transit. Keeping backend-only fields off the \"\n + \"client boundary does not protect the data that is transmitted, and it does not encrypt or check transmissions.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html\",\n reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 reachability tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Four objectives whose control is WHICH DOOR EXISTS, and which values it refuses. They were\n * classified as unbindable in the tranche above and that was WRONG — the mistake is worth\n * recording because it is the one this lane keeps making.\n *\n * The question asked was \"does this guard have its own vocabulary\", and the answer was no for\n * all four. The right question is \"which vocabulary names this mechanism\", and for three of them\n * it already existed and was already exported:\n *\n * | objective | the vocabulary that names it |\n * |---|---|\n * | `WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY` | `ResourceOperationVariantType` — `credit-pool TOP_UP` was an API_CALL gated on ORG_OWNER, letting a tenant owner self-grant credits; the fix was the VARIANT, which no role gate could express |\n * | `WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT` | the same pair — `ScopeFeatures` writes cannot be field-protected, so the whole self-grant boundary is one role gate on operations that stay non-client-reachable |\n * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND` | `UserStatus` + `OrganizationMemberStatus`, the two the reactivation sweep moves between |\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION` | `DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES`, which had to be EXPORTED — a closed vocabulary with one named source that nothing outside its module could reach |\n *\n * So of the fourteen the previous tranche left, four were a discovery failure rather than a\n * modelling limit. Before recording an objective as uncoverable, ask which existing vocabulary\n * describes the mechanism — the answer is often a capability that is already declared.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-transaction-authorization-separation\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective keeps credit increases behind system or payment authority, so no ordinary principal can grant itself value. Identifying \"\n + \"and documenting the duties that need separating, and defining access authorizations for them beyond credit grants, is not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-entitlement-change-authority\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that entitlements be defined in a policy, managed and reviewed, with least privilege and separation of duties. The \"\n + \"objective ensures entitlement writes pass only through an operator-gated door so no principal widens its own; defining, reviewing and \"\n + \"minimizing entitlements is not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-temporary-account-expiry\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The control asks that temporary and emergency accounts be removed or disabled automatically when their defined period ends. The \"\n + \"objective does the reverse: it automatically lifts a time-boxed restriction, and says nothing about temporary accounts expiring.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-redirect-target-constraint\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that identity assertions be protected, conveyed and verified. The objective constrains only where an OAuth flow may \"\n + \"deliver its result, a registered redirect target restricted to a safe absolute URL; protecting and verifying the assertion itself is \"\n + \"outside it.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Two objectives whose vocabulary EXISTED and was only in the wrong place — the third and\n * fourth time in four tranches, which is why the pattern is written down rather than fixed\n * quietly each time.\n *\n * | objective | where its vocabulary was | what moved |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY` | `OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES`, module-private in `saas-backend-lib` | moved to `saas-models` beside `OAuthGrantType`, which is the same kind of thing — an OIDC/OAuth protocol vocabulary. Having one consumer is a fact about usage, not about where a protocol constant belongs |\n * | `WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY` | `ConfigurationValidationDomain`, already exported | nothing — the boot validator's own domain vocabulary names the mechanism, exactly as `PersistenceAdapterTransactionOwnership` does for `DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` |\n *\n * The second one settles a question the previous tranche got wrong in prose: a BOOT GATE is not\n * inherently unbindable. It is bindable when the thing it checks has a vocabulary. What is not\n * bindable is a gate whose only description is its own name.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-assertion-integrity\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that identity assertions be protected, conveyed and verified as a whole. The objective only ensures the server alone \"\n + \"authors an ID token's protocol and security claims; how the assertion is protected in transit, conveyed and verified by its recipient \"\n + \"is not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-configuration-settings-enforcement\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective gives each server-owned field a single writer that is proven at boot. It does not establish and document the most \"\n + \"restrictive secure settings for system components, approve and record deviations from them, or monitor and control changes to them \"\n + \"under organisational procedure.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Two objectives whose vocabulary is the SUBSTRATE the control runs against rather than the\n * control's own machinery — the fifth and sixth time asking \"which vocabulary names this\"\n * rather than \"does this guard have one\" changed the answer.\n *\n * | objective | vocabulary | why the substrate is the right axis |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | `WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS` | `PersistenceAdapter` | the verification is genuinely per-adapter (two separate verifiers), so \"which datastores has this been proven against\" is the reader's question — and an adapter added without a verifier is exactly how the guarantee would become silently partial |\n * | `WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY` | `LifecycleStage` | the capability attests a NEGATIVE: naming the stages is how a reader learns which self-reported values exist to be wrongly trusted |\n *\n * The second is the only capability in the basis that attests something a vocabulary does NOT\n * do. That is deliberate — a capability naming a mechanism would imply the stages confer\n * something, which is the precise claim this objective exists to deny.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-information-integrity-verification\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective proves at boot that declared uniqueness and integrity constraints exist. It does not use integrity verification tools to \"\n + \"detect unauthorised changes to software, firmware or information, or take defined actions when such a change is found.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-authority-not-inferred-from-state\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that access permissions be defined in a policy, managed, enforced and reviewed with least privilege and separation of \"\n + \"duties. The objective ensures a self-reported lifecycle stage never confers authority or crosses a scope, which is one enforcement \"\n + \"property, not the policy, management or review of permissions.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n /*\n * ── 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n *\n * Three objectives that looked like three unrelated guards — a SAML availability check, a 32kb\n * body cap, a unique-constraint resolver — and are each a DISTINCTION INSIDE ONE VOCABULARY.\n * All three bind `capability:refusal-classification`, and re-reading their intents is what\n * showed it: every one of them is phrased as a contrast.\n *\n * | objective | its own words |\n * |---|---|\n * | `SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED` | \"stays diagnosable … without its degradation being mistaken for a rejection\" |\n * | `OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT` | \"answered as a client error rather than surfacing as a server failure\" |\n * | `OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS` | \"reported with the identity that was violated rather than as an opaque datastore failure\" |\n *\n * Each contrast is between two `ErrorType` members. That is why one capability serves all\n * three and why naming the whole enum is right: the good outcome only means something against\n * the bad one it is not.\n *\n * What this does NOT claim, stated at the capability: that any particular refusal is classified\n * CORRECTLY. `UNKNOWN` is in the set because the engine admits it cannot always tell. The claim\n * is that one closed vocabulary owns the answer, so a misclassification is a wrong member rather\n * than an unclassified crash.\n */\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-csf-2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-fail-secure-behaviour\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The outcome asks that mechanisms meet the organisation's resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations, which includes \"\n + \"keeping services available. The objective makes a control that cannot run refuse and stay diagnosable, which protects confidentiality \"\n + \"and integrity under degradation, but it neither establishes resilience requirements nor preserves availability.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-denial-of-service-resource-bounds\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective bounds what unauthenticated requests consume. Denial-of-service events from authenticated traffic, and the other event \"\n + \"types and controls an organisation defines, are not stated.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-error-handling-diagnostics\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective makes one error class, constraint conflicts, actionable. It does not state that error messages withhold information an \"\n + \"attacker could use, or that they are shown only to defined people or roles.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * The third package-placement unblock, and the weakest-argued of them — recorded as such. The\n * OIDC claim set was plainly a protocol vocabulary; these are Wildo's own key-purpose names.\n * What justifies the move independently of assurance is that they name identities crossing a\n * PROCESS boundary: the platform issues a token this application verifies, and this\n * application signs a webhook an integrator verifies. Both sides need the same names.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-cryptographic-key-establishment-and-management\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective bounds how long a retired signing key is trusted. It does not cover key generation, distribution, storage or access \"\n + \"against the organisation's key-management requirements, or keys other than token-signing keys.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * Attested from the engine even though the CONTROL lives in `platform-config-lib`, which this\n * package must not depend on. The vocabulary crosses the companion-safe boundary into\n * `saas-models` while only the digesting stayed on the platform side — so the objective that\n * looked structurally unreachable needed no move at all.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-authenticator-storage-protection\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: answeredInPart(\n \"The objective tracks the shape of a provider's secret contract without persisting the values. It does not ensure that no unencrypted \"\n + \"static secret is embedded in the application or in any other static storage.\",\n ),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n {\n /*\n * The forty-ninth binding, and the only one that required the ENGINE to change. The other\n * forty-eight were mapping work — finding the vocabulary that already named a control. This\n * one was a genuine coverage hole: the concurrent-session cap was enforced and untested-for\n * in the trail, so there was nothing to bind to until the eviction started emitting.\n */\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: \"source-requirement:nist-800-53-concurrent-session-control\",\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: { objectiveRef: \"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT\", objectiveVersion: 1 },\n answer: ANSWERED_IN_FULL,\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n },\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-sp-800-66-rev-2\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-66r2\", NIST_800_66_SECURITY_RULE_GUIDANCE_ROWS),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-privacy-framework-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.01162020\", NIST_PRIVACY_FRAMEWORK_ROWS),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:eu-gdpr-2016-679\", \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj\", GDPR_2488_ROWS, SEPARATION_AND_SECONDARY_USE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-privacy-framework-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.01162020\", NIST_PRIVACY_FRAMEWORK_2488_ROWS, SEPARATION_AND_SECONDARY_USE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\", NIST_800_53_2488_ROWS, SEPARATION_AND_SECONDARY_USE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_ROWS, AI_COMPONENTS_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_USE_CLASSIFICATION_ROWS, AI_USE_CLASSIFICATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_HUMAN_OVERSIGHT_ROWS, AGENT_AUTHORITY_AND_OVERSIGHT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_AGENT_SUSPENSION_ROWS, AGENT_SUSPENSION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_OPERATION_RECORD_ROWS, AI_OPERATION_RECORD_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-rmf-1.0\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1\", NIST_AI_RMF_INCIDENT_HANDLING_ROWS, AI_INCIDENT_HANDLING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final\", NIST_800_53_AGENT_AUTHORITY_ROWS, AGENT_AUTHORITY_AND_OVERSIGHT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-sp-800-218\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218\", NIST_800_218_AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_ROWS, AI_PRODUCED_CHANGE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-600-1\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.600-1\", NIST_AI_600_1_ROWS, AI_CONTENT_SAFETY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:pci-dss-4.0.1\", \"https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/document_library/\", PCI_DSS_ROWS, AI_COMPONENTS_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:owasp-ai-exchange\", \"https://owaspai.org/\", OWASP_AI_EXCHANGE_ROWS, OPEN_AI_SOURCES_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:owasp-ai-exchange\", \"https://owaspai.org/\", OWASP_AI_EXCHANGE_BURST_LIMIT_ROWS, AUTHENTICATED_BURST_LIMIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\n \"source:uk-ai-cyber-security-code-of-practice\",\n \"https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-cyber-security-code-of-practice/code-of-practice-for-the-cyber-security-of-ai\",\n UK_AI_CODE_ROWS,\n OPEN_AI_SOURCES_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,\n ),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:nist-ai-100-2-e2025\", \"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-2e2025\", NIST_AI_100_2_ROWS, OPEN_AI_SOURCES_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...sourceCoverageRows(\"source:eu-ai-act-2024-1689\", \"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj\", EU_AI_ACT_ROWS, OPEN_AI_SOURCES_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ];\n const twins = [\n ...withAssessmentTwinAnswers(NIST_800_53A_ASSESSMENT_PROCEDURE_ROWS, reviewed, SOURCE_COVERAGE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...withAssessmentTwinAnswers(NIST_800_53A_2488_ROWS, reviewed, SEPARATION_AND_SECONDARY_USE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ...withAssessmentTwinAnswers(NIST_800_53A_AGENT_AUTHORITY_ROWS, reviewed, AGENT_AUTHORITY_AND_OVERSIGHT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT),\n ];\n return byCanonicalIdentity([...reviewed, ...twins], (a) => `${a.source.sourceRef}@${a.source.sourceVersion}:${a.requirementRef}@${a.requirementVersion}`);\n}\n\n/**\n * The SP 800-53A twins of the reviewed SP 800-53 rows, each answering exactly as much as the control it assesses (#2956).\n *\n * SP 800-53A's procedure for a control assesses that control and nothing else, so a twin carries its control row's\n * grade by construction rather than a second grade a reviewer could let drift. The control row is found by the twin's\n * own slug (`nist-800-53a-<x>-assessment` twins `nist-800-53-<x>`), and a twin whose control is missing, or answers\n * another objective or objective version, refuses the basis: that is a twin of nothing. The resolution is\n * `resolveAssessmentTwinAnswer` (`assurance-assessment-twins.ts`, a module no entrypoint re-exports), tested on planted\n * twins.\n */\nfunction withAssessmentTwinAnswers(\n twins: readonly AssessmentTwinRow[],\n reviewed: readonly InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow[],\n reviewedAt: string,\n): InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow[] {\n return twins.map((twin) => ({\n source: { sourceRef: \"source:nist-sp-800-53a-rev-5-release-5.2.0\", sourceVersion: 1 },\n requirementRef: twin.requirementRef,\n requirementVersion: 1,\n objective: twin.objective,\n answer: resolveAssessmentTwinAnswer(twin, reviewed),\n canonicalLocator: \"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/a/r5/final\",\n reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,\n reviewedAt,\n }));\n}\n\n/**\n * The source basis an obligation for this objective declares, as the authority basis decides it (#2990): `NONE_BY_DESIGN`\n * when its binding declares that no registered source states it, `REVIEWED_SOURCE_REQUIREMENTS` otherwise.\n *\n * One reader for the programme normalizer and the creation brief, so neither re-derives it from the rows. Throws for an\n * objective the basis does not bind: no obligation can exist for it, and answering a basis for it would hide that.\n */\nexport function assuranceObjectiveSourceBasisFor(objective: {\n readonly objectiveRef: string;\n readonly objectiveVersion: number;\n}): AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis {\n const binding = ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS.find(\n (candidate) => candidate.objective.objectiveRef === objective.objectiveRef && candidate.objective.objectiveVersion === objective.objectiveVersion,\n );\n if (!binding) throw new Error(`The assurance authority basis binds no \"${objective.objectiveRef}@${objective.objectiveVersion}\", so it has no source basis.`);\n return \"sourceBasis\" in binding && binding.sourceBasis === AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN\n ? AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN\n : AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.REVIEWED_SOURCE_REQUIREMENTS;\n}\n\n/**\n * Every binding's declared source basis agrees with the reviewed source-requirement rows (#2990): `NONE_BY_DESIGN` exactly\n * when no row reviews the objective.\n *\n * Total over the bindings and refused by name, both ways. A binding with no row and no declaration is a source mapping\n * somebody forgot, which would otherwise let a programme bind the objective as answering no source; a declaration\n * beside rows denies a review the basis holds. Called by the composer, so no basis carrying either can be composed.\n */\nexport function assertDeclaredObjectiveSourceBasesAgreeWithReviewedRequirements(\n rows: readonly InitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorityRow[] = createInitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorities(),\n): void {\n const reviewedObjectiveKeys = new Set(rows.map((row) => `${row.objective.objectiveRef}@${row.objective.objectiveVersion}`));\n const problems = ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS.flatMap((binding) => {\n const key = `${binding.objective.objectiveRef}@${binding.objective.objectiveVersion}`;\n const declaredNone = assuranceObjectiveSourceBasisFor(binding.objective) === AssuranceProgramObligationSourceBasis.NONE_BY_DESIGN;\n if (declaredNone && reviewedObjectiveKeys.has(key)) return [`${key} declares no source by design, but source requirements are reviewed for it`];\n if (!declaredNone && !reviewedObjectiveKeys.has(key))\n return [`${key} is reviewed under no source requirement; declare sourceBasis NONE_BY_DESIGN on its binding if that is deliberate, or review its source`];\n return [];\n });\n if (problems.length > 0) throw new Error(`The assurance authority basis's source bases disagree with its reviewed requirements: ${problems.join(\"; \")}.`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Compose the source-neutral safe baseline around one Framework Knowledge-generated implementation revision.\n * Repository source locations never enter this contract; the generator resolves them before calling this function.\n */\nexport function createInitialAssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis(input: {\n readonly implementationRevision: AssuranceProgramSourceRevision;\n}): AssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis {\n const documentAuthorityCatalog = createInitialAssuranceDocumentAuthorityCatalog();\n const sourceRequirementAuthorities = createInitialAssuranceSourceRequirementAuthorities();\n assertDeclaredObjectiveSourceBasesAgreeWithReviewedRequirements(sourceRequirementAuthorities);\n const implementationRevisionIdentity = {\n sourceRevisionRef: input.implementationRevision.sourceRevisionRef,\n };\n return AssuranceProgramAuthorityBasisSchema.parse({\n schemaVersion: 1,\n basisRef: INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_REF,\n basisVersion: INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_VERSION,\n requestedSourceUses: [AssuranceSourceUse.STORE_METADATA],\n sourceRegistry: INITIAL_ASSURANCE_SOURCE_REGISTRY,\n documentAuthorityCatalog,\n objectiveCatalog: INITIAL_ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_CATALOG,\n implementationRevision: input.implementationRevision,\n capabilityAuthorityDescriptors: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_CAPABILITY_AUTHORITIES, (a) => `${a.identity.capabilityRef}@${a.identity.capabilityVersion}`).map(({ availability, ...authority }) => ({\n authority: {\n identity: authority.identity,\n capabilityKind: authority.capabilityKind,\n implementationRefs: [...authority.implementationRefs],\n implementationRevision: implementationRevisionIdentity,\n profiles: authority.profiles.map((profile) => ({ ...profile, parameters: profile.parameters.map((parameter) => ({ ...parameter, allowedOptionRefs: [...parameter.allowedOptionRefs] })) })),\n requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [...authority.requiredHostArtifactKindRefs],\n },\n availability,\n })),\n sourceRequirementAuthorities,\n implementationExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.implementationExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => ({\n identity: { expectationRef: binding.implementationExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },\n objective: binding.objective,\n requiredCapabilityRefs: [...binding.requiredCapabilityRefs],\n })),\n /*\n * Bodies are joined in by REQUIREMENT ref rather than authored here — ONE PER STATED DEMAND.\n *\n * This joined `requiredStatementEvidenceRefs[0]` until 2026-09-12, beside a comment claiming every\n * binding was \"1:1:1\". Neither survived `4ac83c1f`, which gave `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE` a second\n * demand that sorts first: the authority named `operation-role-declaration` composed with the body of\n * `authorization-decision-record`, and its own body reached no consumer. Measured rather than inferred —\n * compared through the body schema on both sides, 50 of 50 single-demand authorities carried their own\n * body and the one multi-demand authority did not — and reproduced on `pnpm assurance:collection-plan`,\n * which planned the wrong demand's clauses under the right demand's name.\n *\n * A requirement demanded by two objectives (`authorization-decision-record`, by\n * `AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT` and by `LEAST_PRIVILEGE`) correctly composes the same body twice: the\n * body belongs to the requirement, and applicability — which differs between those two objectives on\n * an application without the audit trail — belongs to the run.\n *\n * The join throws BY NAME on an unauthored demand, for every demand rather than the first: the schema\n * would refuse the authority anyway, and failing here names the requirement, which a Zod path cannot.\n */\n evidenceExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.evidenceExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => ({\n identity: { expectationRef: binding.evidenceExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },\n objective: binding.objective,\n requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [...binding.requiredStatementEvidenceRefs],\n requirementBodies: binding.requiredStatementEvidenceRefs.map((requirementRef) => {\n const body = ASSURANCE_EVIDENCE_REQUIREMENT_BODIES[requirementRef];\n if (!body) {\n throw new Error(`No evidence requirement body is authored for ${requirementRef} (demanded by ${binding.evidenceExpectationRef}).`);\n }\n return { requirementRef, body };\n }),\n })),\n /*\n * Bodies are joined in by REQUIREMENT ref, ONE PER STATED DEMAND THAT HAS ONE — since 2026-09-12.\n *\n * This joined `requiredStatementVerificationRefs[0]`, the same join that silently gave the evidence\n * tier's multi-demand authority another demand's body. Unlike the evidence tier, a demand here may\n * still compose with no body rather than refusing: the verification authority keeps bodies optional\n * per demand so an application's own basis can be partly authored. The framework's completeness is\n * held by a test beside this basis, not by a throw here.\n *\n * Until 2026-09-08 these refs were the expectation's OWN ref in 50 of 50 bindings — the demand\n * said \"to verify X, see X\" (#452). They now name `verification-requirement:*`, which is a\n * namespace a body can be written against.\n */\n verificationExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.verificationExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => ({\n identity: { expectationRef: binding.verificationExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },\n objective: binding.objective,\n requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [...binding.requiredStatementVerificationRefs],\n requirementBodies: binding.requiredStatementVerificationRefs.flatMap((requirementRef) => {\n const body = ASSURANCE_VERIFICATION_REQUIREMENT_BODIES[requirementRef];\n return body ? [{ requirementRef, body }] : [];\n }),\n })),\n });\n}\n"]}
|