@wildo-ai/saas-specifications 1.1.12 → 1.1.14
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-open-items.d.ts +48 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-open-items.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-open-items.js +69 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-open-items.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-validation.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-validation.js +12 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity-validation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity.schemas.d.ts +41 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity.schemas.js +41 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/application-maturity/application-maturity.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/computed-document-facts.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/computed-document-facts.schemas.js +28 -5
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/computed-document-facts.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/launch-blockers.schemas.d.ts +28 -3
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/launch-blockers.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/launch-blockers.schemas.js +32 -2
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/launch-blockers.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.schemas.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.schemas.js +10 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/index.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/index.js +2 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/functional-requirement.schemas.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/functional-requirement.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/functional-requirement.schemas.js +12 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/functional-requirement.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/non-functional-requirement.schemas.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/non-functional-requirement.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/non-functional-requirement.schemas.js +12 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/non-functional-requirement.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirement-engine-substance.schemas.d.ts +33 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirement-engine-substance.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirement-engine-substance.schemas.js +34 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirement-engine-substance.schemas.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-generation.schemas.js +13 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot.schemas.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.js +2 -0
- package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-open-compliance-coverage-pack.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-open-compliance-coverage-pack.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-open-compliance-coverage-pack.js +46 -25
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-open-compliance-coverage-pack.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-source-requirement-inventory.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-source-requirement-inventory.definitions.js +30 -3
- package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-source-requirement-inventory.definitions.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/applications.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/applications.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/applications.resource.specification.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/applications.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/application-access-grants.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/application-access-grants.resource.specification.js +2 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/application-access-grants.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/data-subject-requests.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/data-subject-requests.resource.specification.js +6 -2
- package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/data-subject-requests.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/siem-delivery-dlq.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/siem-delivery-dlq.resource.specification.js +6 -5
- package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/siem-delivery-dlq.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-specifications.registry.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-specifications.registry.js +4 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-specifications.registry.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/approval-seal.frontend-component.specification.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/approval-seal.frontend-component.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/approval-seal.frontend-component.specification.js +29 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/approval-seal.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/formatters/display-field-file.frontend-component.specification.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/data-display/formatters/display-field-file.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/flows-actors/low-level-ai-approval.frontend-component.specification.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/flows-actors/low-level-ai-approval.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/high-level-views/high-level-views-chart-dashboard-layout-editor.frontend-component.specification.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/high-level-views/high-level-views-chart-dashboard-layout-editor.frontend-component.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/high-level-views/high-level-views-chart-dashboard-layout-editor.frontend-component.specification.js +22 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/high-level-views/high-level-views-chart-dashboard-layout-editor.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/index.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/index.js +5 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/queue-messages.resource.specification.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/queue-messages.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/queue-messages.resource.specification.js +136 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/queue-messages.resource.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/inbound-deliveries.resource.specification.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/inbound-deliveries.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/inbound-deliveries.resource.specification.js +10 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/inbound-deliveries.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/inbound-email.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/inbound-email.resource.specification.js +4 -2
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/inbound-email.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/m2m-webhook-delivery-log.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/m2m-webhook-delivery-log.resource.specification.js +6 -5
- package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/m2m-webhook-delivery-log.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-custom-domains.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-custom-domains.resource.specification.js +2 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-custom-domains.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-dashboard-layouts.resource.specification.d.ts +30 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-dashboard-layouts.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-dashboard-layouts.resource.specification.js +131 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-dashboard-layouts.resource.specification.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.js +10 -7
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organizations.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organizations.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organizations.resource.specification.js +7 -7
- package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organizations.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/inbound-contacts.resource.specification.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/users.resource.specification.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/users.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +1 -1
- package/package.json +9 -9
package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/application-access-grants.resource.specification.js.map
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* Resource: `applicationAccessGrants` — Wildo SaaS engine specification (backend-only, application-scoped).\n *\n * Inputs:\n * - Schema: engine/saas-models/src/security/authorizations/application-access-grants.shared.schemas.ts\n * → `ApplicationAccessGrantSchema`\n * - Factory: engine/saas-models/src/security/authorizations/application-access-grants.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts\n * → `applicationAccessGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory`\n * - Custom operations: `ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations`\n *\n * ## Why this exists BESIDE `platformAccessGrants` rather than inside it\n *\n * The tenant grant governs an operator reaching into ONE named organization, and the organization\n * approves. That is the industry ceiling (Microsoft Customer Lockbox, Google Access Approval) and it\n * works. It cannot govern a read that names NO tenant — an enumeration of the whole user directory,\n * or of the cross-tenant audit trail when independent approval is configured — because there is no single customer to ask and no tenant for\n * the route to carry.\n *\n * Measured 2026-09-09: the NARROW act required a requested, justified, time-bound, tenant-approved\n * grant, while the WIDEST read required an administrator role and nothing else, at a strictly LOWER\n * role tier. This resource is the answer, and its one new idea is the TWO-PERSON RULE: the approval\n * comes from a second platform administrator, never the requester.\n *\n * Why backend-only: there is NO entry for `[CoreResourceType.APPLICATION_ACCESS_GRANTS]` in any\n * preset under engine/presets-components/src/config/resources/. The operator-facing queue is not\n * built yet; today the resource is consumed by the authorizer's admission predicate and by the\n * platform API.\n *\n * Why `APPLICATION` scope: the elevation belongs to the deployment, not to any tenant inside it. The\n * scope is expressed once, in the registry relationship APPLICATION → APPLICATION_ACCESS_GRANTS\n * carrying `isPrimaryScope: true`; the runtime config deliberately does not restate it.\n */\n\nimport { applicationAccessGrantsAdminResourceUIBehavior as applicationAccessGrantsUIBehaviorSource } from '@wildo-ai/presets-components';\nimport { LabelAudience } from '@wildo-ai/presets-components-models';\nimport type { ResourceUIBehaviorConfig } from '@wildo-ai/saas-frontend-lib/companion';\nimport {\n CodeDeclarationKind,\n CodeSymbolKind,\n FieldSemanticImportance,\n} from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\nimport {\n ApplicationAccessGrantSchema,\n ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations,\n CoreResourceOperation as Op,\n PlatformAccessGrantStatus,\n ResourcePrimaryScope,\n applicationAccessGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory,\n} from '@wildo-ai/saas-models';\nimport { HttpResponseStatusCode, resourceFrontendConfiguration, resourceSpecification, resourceSpecificationFromFrontendConfiguration } from '~wildo-specifications/_core';\nimport { EngineResourceSubDomain } from '../../engine-resource-sub-domain';\n\nconst APPLICATION_ACCESS_PENDING_GRANT_ID = 'application_access_grant_01J5Q2A3B4C5D6E7F8G9H0J1KL';\nconst APPLICATION_ACCESS_ACTIVE_GRANT_ID = 'application_access_grant_01J5Q2C4D5E6F7G8H9J0K1L2MN';\nconst APPLICATION_ACCESS_OPERATOR_USER_ID = 'user_01J5Q2E5F6G7H8J9K0L1M2N3PQ';\nconst APPLICATION_ACCESS_SECOND_ADMIN_USER_ID = 'user_01J5Q2G6H7J8K9L0M1N2P3Q4RS';\nconst APPLICATION_ACCESS_EXAMPLE_APPLICATION_ID = 'app_01J5Q2J7K8L9M0N1P2Q3R4S5TU';\n\nconst applicationAccessPendingGrantExample = {\n _id: APPLICATION_ACCESS_PENDING_GRANT_ID,\n applicationId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_EXAMPLE_APPLICATION_ID,\n operatorUserId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_OPERATOR_USER_ID,\n justification: 'Incident INC-5107 spans several tenants; I need the audit view, configured for independent approval, to find which are affected.',\n status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.PENDING_APPROVAL,\n expiresAt: '2026-09-09T13:30:00.000Z',\n createdAt: '2026-09-09T13:00:00.000Z',\n updatedAt: '2026-09-09T13:00:00.000Z',\n};\n\nconst applicationAccessActiveGrantExample = {\n ...applicationAccessPendingGrantExample,\n _id: APPLICATION_ACCESS_ACTIVE_GRANT_ID,\n status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.ACTIVE,\n approvedByUserId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_SECOND_ADMIN_USER_ID,\n approvedAt: '2026-09-09T13:04:00.000Z',\n decidedByUserId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_SECOND_ADMIN_USER_ID,\n decidedAt: '2026-09-09T13:04:00.000Z',\n updatedAt: '2026-09-09T13:04:00.000Z',\n};\n\ntype Cfg = ReturnType<typeof applicationAccessGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory>;\ntype Custom = NonNullable<Cfg['customOperation']>;\ntype Core = Cfg['coreOperations'][number];\ntype Main = Cfg['mainSchema'];\n\nconst applicationAccessGrantsUIBehavior = applicationAccessGrantsUIBehaviorSource as ResourceUIBehaviorConfig<Custom, Core, Main>;\n\n/**\n * Carries a frontend overlay since 2026-09-17. The mechanism shipped with no surface at all, which\n * is the worst possible shape for a two-person rule: its whole justification is that the\n * consequence becomes VISIBLE rather than prevented, and an elevation nobody can read makes nothing\n * visible. The narration below describes the review queue an administrator now actually reaches.\n */\nexport const applicationAccessGrantsResourceSpecification = resourceSpecificationFromFrontendConfiguration(\n resourceFrontendConfiguration(applicationAccessGrantsUIBehavior),\n resourceSpecification(\n applicationAccessGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory,\n ApplicationAccessGrantSchema,\n ({ schemaShape }) => ({\n purpose: 'Give a platform support team a justified, short-lived, second-signed way to perform application-wide reads that require elevation (the user directory and other enrolled surfaces, plus the audit viewer when its independent-approval policy is enabled), or, under its own purpose, a window in which the doors declared to overrule an organization may act on one named organization, such as releasing a vendor account it holds.',\n businessRole: 'The deployment\\'s application-wide access ledger. It answers who asked to see across every tenant, why, which SECOND administrator agreed, how long the window lasted, and how it ended.',\n lifecycleRole: 'A platform administrator requests, stating a reason. The request is never usable on creation. A DIFFERENT platform administrator approves or denies it; the requester may withdraw or refuse their own request but can never approve it. Either can revoke an active window early, and expiry ends it automatically. Completed requests remain available as access-review history.',\n audience: LabelAudience.ADMIN,\n subDomain: EngineResourceSubDomain.AUTH,\n\n codeHandling: {\n mainSchema: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'ApplicationAccessGrantSchema',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.SCHEMA,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.ZOD_SCHEMA,\n },\n resourceFactory: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'applicationAccessGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.FACTORY,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.FUNCTION,\n },\n resourceType: {\n enumDeclaration: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'CoreResourceType',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.ENUM,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.TYPESCRIPT_ENUM,\n },\n memberName: 'APPLICATION_ACCESS_GRANTS',\n },\n operationVocabulary: {\n coreEnum: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'CoreResourceOperation',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.ENUM,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.TYPESCRIPT_ENUM,\n },\n customEnum: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.ENUM,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.TYPESCRIPT_ENUM,\n },\n },\n notes: [\n 'The `status` vocabulary is SHARED with `platformAccessGrants` (`PlatformAccessGrantStatus`) rather than duplicated. The states really are the same states, and two enums holding the same five members is how a sweep, an admission predicate and a UI come to disagree about what `active` means.',\n 'There is no auto-approval and therefore no `autoApprovalReason` field. The tenant grant auto-approves when the tenant has not opted into approval or cannot approve — both statements about a NAMED tenant, and this row names none. A grant that could approve itself would make the two-person rule ceremonial.',\n 'No public CREATE or UPDATE. `requestAccess` is the only writer of a new row, and `approve` / `deny` / `revoke` / `expire` are the only status transitions. A generic CREATE would let a caller author their own `status` and mint an ACTIVE application-wide elevation with no second signature at all.',\n 'No DELETE, and one route-less DELETE_MANY. Nothing but the retention-class sweep removes a row: this is a REFERENCE child of the APPLICATION row that outlives it on purpose (#3355: deleting the application must not shorten the period its access evidence is kept for), and with no period the rows would outlive every statement the application makes about its access evidence. Bound to `AUDIT_LOGS` from creation. INTERNAL_CALL registers no route, so no caller can erase a grant from the record.',\n 'The lifecycle audit event is shared too: `CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE`, carrying `grantScope: application_wide` and no `targetOrganizationId`. One event so a reviewer asking \"what elevated access was granted, to whom, by whom?\" gets one query rather than a union of two they have to remember.',\n ],\n },\n\n fields: {\n _id: schemaShape._id.stringSpec({\n meaning: 'Identifier for one application-wide elevation request.',\n whyItMatters: 'The address of every subsequent decision, and the value the audit trail carries as `authorizingGrantId` when a read is admitted under it — which is what joins an operator\\'s reads to the two administrators who signed for them.',\n semanticRole: 'identifier',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n applicationId: schemaShape.applicationId.foreignKeySpec({\n meaning: 'The deployment this elevation is inside.',\n whyItMatters: 'Every row carries it, although the schema marks it optional: the application is part of the request path, so it is always known.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.CONTEXTUAL,\n }),\n operatorUserId: schemaShape.operatorUserId.foreignKeySpec({\n meaning: 'The platform administrator who requested the elevation.',\n whyItMatters: 'Server-authored from the session, never client-supplied, and it is the field the two-person rule measures against: `approve` refuses when the approver equals this value. An elevation whose subject the caller could choose would let one administrator mint application-wide access under another\\'s name and then sign it themselves.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n justification: schemaShape.justification.stringSpec({\n meaning: 'Why the operator needs to see across every tenant, in their own words.',\n whyItMatters: 'Required, and it carries more weight here than on the tenant grant: it is the ONLY thing the approving administrator has to decide on. A tenant grant\\'s approver knows their own tenant and their own support case; this approver knows nothing but this sentence. A second signature on an unstated reason is a countersignature on nothing.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n status: schemaShape.status.enumSpec({\n meaning: 'Where this elevation is in its lifecycle.',\n whyItMatters: 'Read together with `expiresAt`, never alone: the admission predicate accepts ACTIVE and then re-checks the window, so a grant whose window elapsed stops working whether or not anything has relabelled it. Every row starts PENDING_APPROVAL — there is no branch that reaches ACTIVE without a second administrator acting.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n enumDeclaration: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'PlatformAccessGrantStatus',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.ENUM,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.TYPESCRIPT_ENUM,\n },\n }),\n expiresAt: schemaShape.expiresAt.dateSpec({\n meaning: 'When the elevation stops working.',\n whyItMatters: 'The control, not the label. Server-authored from the requested duration and clamped to ONE HOUR — a quarter of the tenant grant\\'s ceiling, because this elevation reaches every customer at once and no customer can see or revoke it, so the clock is the only thing that ends it on its own.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n approvedByUserId: schemaShape.approvedByUserId.foreignKeySpec({\n meaning: 'The SECOND administrator who signed.',\n whyItMatters: 'The whole feature, as a field. It is optional in the schema because it is unset while pending and stays unset on a denied or revoked grant — never because an ACTIVE grant might lack one. The only writer of ACTIVE is `approve`, and `approve` refuses when this would equal `operatorUserId`.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n approvedAt: schemaShape.approvedAt.dateSpec({\n meaning: 'When the second administrator approved the elevation. Absent while it is pending and on a denied request.',\n temporalRole: 'occurred',\n }),\n decidedByUserId: schemaShape.decidedByUserId.foreignKeySpec({\n meaning: 'The administrator who made the last decision on the grant: approved, denied or revoked it.',\n whyItMatters: 'Answers who refused a request or ended a window early, which the approver field cannot, and keeps the last decision\\'s reason attached to the person who gave it. Written by `approve`, `deny` and `revoke`; expiry is not a decision and leaves it alone.',\n }),\n operatorName: schemaShape.operatorName.stringSpec({ meaning: 'The operator who requested the elevation, by name: `operatorUserId`\\'s label fallback. Resolved at read time from the person\\'s profile, else their account\\'s email (`forwardedUserName`, opted in for the operator only); never stored, so the row keeps only the id (#1852).', whyItMatters: 'A tenant administrator approving an operator usually may not read the operator\\'s account, so the reference alone could not say who is asking. Hidden from display: the person is shown through the foreign key, and this name is its label when the viewer may not read the user.' }),\n approvedByName: schemaShape.approvedByName.stringSpec({ meaning: 'The administrator who approved, by name: `approvedByUserId`\\'s label fallback. Resolved at read time from the person\\'s profile, and absent when they have none (`forwardedUserName`; never their email); never stored, so the row keeps only the id (#1852).', whyItMatters: 'Hidden from display: the person is shown through the foreign key, and this name is its label when the viewer may not read the user.' }),\n decidedByName: schemaShape.decidedByName.stringSpec({ meaning: 'The administrator who made the last decision, by name: `decidedByUserId`\\'s label fallback. Resolved at read time from the person\\'s profile, and absent when they have none (`forwardedUserName`; never their email); never stored, so the row keeps only the id (#1852).', whyItMatters: 'Hidden from display: the person is shown through the foreign key, and this name is its label when the viewer may not read the user.' }),\n decidedAt: schemaShape.decidedAt.dateSpec({\n meaning: 'When the last decision was made.',\n whyItMatters: 'Places a refusal or an early revocation in time against the access it ended.',\n temporalRole: 'occurred',\n }),\n purpose: schemaShape.purpose.enumSpec({\n meaning: 'What the elevation admits, and so what the second administrator signs for: tenant-spanning reads, or a window onto the doors declared to overrule an organization, on the organization in `targetOrganizationId`.',\n whyItMatters: 'The two acts are not one act. A read changes nothing and names no tenant; an overrule changes one organization\\'s rows against its will. A window approved for one never admits the other, so an approver who signed for reading the directory has not signed for releasing a tenant\\'s vendor account. Set at request time and never updated. A request that states none asks for reads.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n enumDeclaration: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'ApplicationAccessGrantPurpose',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.ENUM,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.TYPESCRIPT_ENUM,\n },\n }),\n targetOrganizationId: schemaShape.targetOrganizationId.stringSpec({\n meaning: 'The one organization a `tenant_overrule` elevation may act on. Absent on every other purpose.',\n whyItMatters: 'Names the tenant the second administrator agreed to overrule, so the window cannot be spent on another. Re-read at request time (an organization that does not exist is refused) and compared with the organization of the row the act would change.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n targetOrganizationName: schemaShape.targetOrganizationName.stringSpec({\n meaning: 'What the target organization was called when the overrule was requested. Absent on every other purpose.',\n whyItMatters: 'What the approver reads to know whom they are signing against. A snapshot, not a lookup: the approver holds no grant into that tenant, so resolving the id would be a crossing of its own. Written from the organization the request re-read; the id stays the authority the admission compares.',\n semanticRole: 'label',\n }),\n grantedMachineCredential: schemaShape.grantedMachineCredential.objectSpec({\n meaning: 'The one machine credential of this application — an API key or an OAuth client — the elevation is for, when it is for a machine rather than the requester.',\n whyItMatters: 'Under independent audit-read approval a machine could otherwise never read, since a grant was keyed on a user and a machine has none — so an assurance collector, the reader that policy most wants governed, was shut out. When set, the grant admits exactly that credential and NEVER the administrator who requested it: naming a machine must not be a way to mint oneself a window. Validated against the live credential at request time and never updated, because re-pointing a signed grant at another credential would be a grant nobody signed. Like any read grant it satisfies EVERY read that requires one — not only the audit viewer — so what the credential can actually read is still bounded by the roles it holds: give it the read-only audit-evidence reader role, which reaches the audit viewer and nothing else. A machine is never granted an overrule: that is a person\\'s decision.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.CONTEXTUAL,\n }),\n decisionReason: schemaShape.decisionReason.stringSpec({\n meaning: 'The reason given with the LAST decision — an approval, a refusal or a revocation — belonging to `decidedByUserId`. A decision given without one clears it.',\n whyItMatters: 'What a later reader needs to tell a refusal that was considered from one that was reflexive. Scrubbed on subject erasure, like the justification, because it is free text one administrator wrote about another\\'s request.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.CONTEXTUAL,\n }),\n },\n\n operations: {\n [Op.READ]: {\n purpose: 'Read one application-wide elevation request.',\n outcome: 'The request\\'s current state, including who asked, who signed and when the window closes.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The elevation request is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator. There is no tenant-side reader here — an application-wide elevation has no customer to show it to, which is exactly why its approval had to become a second signature.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.NOT_FOUND_404, when: 'No elevation request with the supplied id exists.' },\n ],\n idempotent: true,\n examples: [{\n title: 'Read a pending request',\n request: { applicationAccessGrantId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_PENDING_GRANT_ID },\n response: applicationAccessPendingGrantExample,\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [Op.LIST]: {\n purpose: 'List elevation requests — the pending queue a second administrator works from, and the history a reviewer reads.',\n outcome: 'A page of elevation requests.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'A page of elevation requests is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n ],\n idempotent: true,\n examples: [{\n title: 'Work the pending queue',\n request: { page: 1, limit: 20, sort: 'createdAt:desc' },\n // The framework's page envelope: the counts sit under `pagination` (#1838: they were at the top level).\n response: { data: [applicationAccessPendingGrantExample], pagination: { page: 1, limit: 20, total: 1, totalPages: 1 } },\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [Op.COUNT]: {\n purpose: 'Count elevation requests matching a filter.',\n outcome: 'A number — how many requests are pending a signature, or how many were granted in a period.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The count is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n ],\n idempotent: true,\n examples: [{\n title: 'How many requests are awaiting a second signature',\n request: { status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.PENDING_APPROVAL },\n response: { count: 1 },\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REQUEST_ACCESS]: {\n operationId: ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REQUEST_ACCESS,\n purpose: 'Ask for a short, justified window in which the tenant-spanning reads become available, or in which the doors declared to overrule an organization may act on one named organization.',\n outcome: 'A request in `pending_approval`, usable by nobody until a DIFFERENT platform administrator approves it. The window is recorded at creation and starts running then, so a request nobody signs simply lapses.',\n whenToUse: 'An operator needs an elevation-gated read that names no single tenant (the user directory, or the audit viewer with independent approval enabled, for a support case or incident spanning customers), or must overrule one organization through a door that declares it, such as releasing a vendor account the organization holds (`purpose: tenant_overrule`, `targetOrganizationId`).',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CREATED_201, meaning: 'The elevation request was recorded and awaits a second administrator.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.BAD_REQUEST_400, when: 'The justification is missing or empty. It is required because it is the only thing the approver has to decide on.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.BAD_REQUEST_400, when: '`grantedMachineCredential` names no active, unexpired API key or OAuth client of this application. The refusal does not say which condition failed.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.BAD_REQUEST_400, when: 'The purpose and the target do not fit: a `tenant_overrule` that names no organization, names one that does not exist, or binds a machine credential; or a read that names an organization.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n ],\n idempotent: false,\n examples: [{\n title: 'Ask to see across tenants for a multi-customer incident',\n request: {\n justification: 'Incident INC-5107 spans several tenants; I need the audit view, configured for independent approval, to find which are affected.',\n requestedDurationMinutes: 30,\n },\n response: applicationAccessPendingGrantExample,\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.CREATED_201,\n }],\n },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.APPROVE]: {\n operationId: ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.APPROVE,\n purpose: 'Sign another administrator\\'s request — the second signature.',\n outcome: 'The request becomes `active` and names the approver. Until the window closes what its purpose names becomes available to exactly one principal: the tenant-spanning reads, or the one overrule of the named organization, to the REQUESTER — or, for a read grant bound to a machine credential, to that credential and not the requester.',\n whenToUse: 'A platform administrator has read the requester\\'s justification and purpose (and, for an overrule, the organization it names) and agrees that act is warranted.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The elevation is now active, and its updated state — including the approver — is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.NOT_FOUND_404, when: 'No elevation request with the supplied id exists.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The caller IS the requester — a request cannot be approved by the person who raised it — or the request is no longer `pending_approval`.' },\n ],\n idempotent: false,\n examples: [{\n title: 'A second administrator signs',\n request: {\n applicationAccessGrantId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_PENDING_GRANT_ID,\n decisionReason: 'Reviewed against INC-5107; scope and window are proportionate.',\n },\n response: applicationAccessActiveGrantExample,\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.DENY]: {\n operationId: ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.DENY,\n purpose: 'Refuse a pending request.',\n outcome: 'The request becomes `denied` and cannot be retried; a later need requires a new request.',\n whenToUse: 'A platform administrator judges the reach unwarranted — or the requester themselves thinks better of it.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The request was denied, and its final state is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.NOT_FOUND_404, when: 'No elevation request with the supplied id exists.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The request is no longer `pending_approval`.' },\n ],\n idempotent: false,\n examples: [{\n title: 'Withdraw your own request',\n request: {\n applicationAccessGrantId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_PENDING_GRANT_ID,\n decisionReason: 'The affected tenants were identified from the incident channel; the wide read is no longer needed.',\n },\n response: {\n ...applicationAccessPendingGrantExample,\n status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.DENIED,\n decisionReason: 'The affected tenants were identified from the incident channel; the wide read is no longer needed.',\n updatedAt: '2026-09-09T13:06:00.000Z',\n },\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REVOKE]: {\n operationId: ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REVOKE,\n purpose: 'End a pending or active elevation early.',\n outcome: 'The elevation becomes `revoked` and the tenant-spanning reads stop immediately instead of remaining available until the recorded expiry.',\n whenToUse: 'The support work finished before the window did, or a reviewer decides the reach should end now.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The elevation was revoked, and its final state is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.NOT_FOUND_404, when: 'No elevation request with the supplied id exists.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The elevation is already denied, revoked or expired. Only a `pending_approval` or `active` one can be revoked.' },\n ],\n idempotent: false,\n examples: [{\n title: 'Close the window as soon as the incident is scoped',\n request: {\n applicationAccessGrantId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_ACTIVE_GRANT_ID,\n decisionReason: 'INC-5107 scoped to three tenants; per-tenant grants requested instead.',\n },\n response: {\n ...applicationAccessActiveGrantExample,\n status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.REVOKED,\n decisionReason: 'INC-5107 scoped to three tenants; per-tenant grants requested instead.',\n updatedAt: '2026-09-09T13:18:00.000Z',\n },\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.EXPIRE]: {\n operationId: ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.EXPIRE,\n purpose: 'Relabel an active elevation whose window has closed.',\n outcome: 'The elevation reads `expired` rather than `active` in the queue and the history.',\n whenToUse: 'Never by hand. The credential-expiry sweep dispatches it and nothing else does — there is no route and no affordance, because nobody needs a button that declares a date has passed.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The elevation was relabelled expired.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The elevation is not `active`. A denied or revoked one is terminal and must keep saying which — relabelling it would rewrite the decision history a reviewer reads.' },\n ],\n idempotent: false,\n examples: [{\n title: 'The sweep closes a lapsed window',\n request: {},\n response: {\n ...applicationAccessActiveGrantExample,\n status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.EXPIRED,\n updatedAt: '2026-09-09T13:31:00.000Z',\n },\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n },\n\n businessConstraints: [\n 'THE control: `approve` refuses when the approver is the requester. Enforced TWICE, and neither half alone is the control — the operation\\'s `enabledCondition` makes the affordance disappear so no console renders an Approve button on one\\'s own request, and the custom implementation makes the transition impossible so a future variant authored without that condition cannot transition silently. The comparison itself lives in ONE exported predicate, which fails CLOSED when either identity is missing: an approval reaching the check with no decider has no second person behind it, and the naive inline form would admit exactly that case.',\n 'Customer approval is the industry ceiling and is structurally unavailable here — there is no single customer to ask — so a second signature is the strongest control that exists for this act. That is why AUTO-APPROVAL was rejected even though it is the tenant grant\\'s own default posture: that default is defensible only because a tenant can opt in above it, and there is no such party here.',\n 'Application-wide directory and declared cross-tenant reads retain their elevation gate. The application audit viewer and the assurance evidence doors are the explicit policy exception: auditTrail.applicationReadAccess, when undeclared, follows the application\\'s shape in all environments (#2618): AuditApplicationReadAccess.INDEPENDENT_APPROVAL, which requires this grant, where the parties of some relationship kind are independent of the operator, and ROLE_BASED otherwise. Both modes keep administrator-role checks and crossing observations; role-based evidence carries no fabricated grant id. Grant requests themselves are never auto-approved.',\n 'The per-row tenant crossing is deliberately NOT gated on this grant. That door already works, approved by the customer it names; requiring an application-wide elevation there too would replace a customer-approvable control with a platform-internal one, which is a step DOWN the operator-access ladder.',\n 'Both grant resources are EXEMPT from the admission wholesale — this one and `platformAccessGrants`. An operator would otherwise need an application-wide grant in order to ask for one, and the second administrator would need one in order to read the queue and sign. The exemption is safe for the reason the tenant resource\\'s own bootstrap exemption is safe: these rows are the elevation ledger, they belong to no tenant, and reading them discloses no customer\\'s data.',\n 'Usability is EVALUATED, never read off `status`. A grant counts only when it is ACTIVE and `expiresAt` is still in the future, through the single predicate both grant resources share. The expiry sweep\\'s relabelling is bookkeeping for humans; if admission read the label, a lagging sweep would be an authorization hole rather than a stale display.',\n 'The window is SHORTER than a tenant elevation\\'s — 30 minutes by default against 60, one hour maximum against four — and the ORDER is the design rather than the numbers. A tenant elevation reaches one customer who can see and revoke it; this one reaches every customer and none of them can.',\n 'Terminal statuses are how an elevation ends. DENIED, EXPIRED and REVOKED are never edited back to life, and there is no delete verb of any kind: an elevation record either party could erase is not evidence.',\n ],\n }),\n { resourcePrimaryScope: ResourcePrimaryScope.APPLICATION },\n ),\n () => ({\n label: {\n purpose: 'The request\\'s justification, the one thing the approving administrator decides on. It is a summary field, so the list card carries it; naming a card by the request instant, when that was not a summary field, showed the raw id on every card (#2329). A row whose justification was masked on erasure is named by the instant it was made (a summary field since #3066, so the list carries it too), then by its id. The record carries the requesting operator only as a user id, and a synchronous label cannot resolve a name, so the operator is shown — resolved to the person — as the first row of the body and on the card instead.',\n },\n layout: {\n purpose: 'Three sections that separate the two identities the control exists to keep apart: `request` (who asked and why), `decision` (who signed and why), `window` (how long, and which credential it admits). Folding decision into request would put requester and approver in one block, which is precisely the distinction `applicationAccessGrantApproverIsDistinct` enforces.',\n displayPurpose: 'Read-only. Every state change goes through a named verb — request, approve, deny, revoke, expire — and none through a form, so there is deliberately no edit layout. The header carries the request instant and the status badge; the three titled cards follow, with no descriptions. Both identities resolve to the person. The decision reason and the machine credential hide when empty; the approver row stays, because on a pending request its emptiness is the answer.',\n summaryPurpose: 'A card titled with the record\\'s name (its justification, else the request instant, else its id), then who asked, the status badge, and the expiry labelled.',\n sections: {\n request: {\n purpose: 'The requesting operator and the stated justification. Status and the instant are the page header.',\n whenToUse: 'The review queue, and the first block of any single-grant read.',\n textSlots: {\n title: { purpose: 'Label the request block: who asked, and why.' },\n },\n },\n decision: {\n purpose: 'The second administrator and when they signed, the administrator who made the LAST decision (approved, denied or revoked) and when, and that decision\\u2019s reason. A denial or a revocation is read against its own decider, never against the approver.',\n whenToUse: 'Auditing whether an elevation was independently approved, and on what grounds.',\n textSlots: {\n title: { purpose: 'Label the signature block.' },\n },\n },\n window: {\n purpose: 'Expiry, and the machine credential the grant admits when it was requested for one.',\n whenToUse: 'Judging live exposure, and confirming a grant admits the credential it was meant to.',\n textSlots: {\n title: { purpose: 'Label the validity block.' },\n },\n },\n },\n },\n views: {\n [Op.LIST]: { purpose: 'The review queue, reached from Settings → Administration → Access grants. A `status` quick-filter over `createdAt` day buckets, because an unsigned request is the only row that needs anybody.', whenToUse: 'Signing off pending elevations, and reviewing what has been held recently.' },\n [Op.READ]: { purpose: 'One elevation in full, including both identities and the stated reasons.', whenToUse: 'Auditing a specific window after the fact.' },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REQUEST_ACCESS]: { purpose: 'The bootstrap verb. Writes PENDING_APPROVAL, never ACTIVE.', whenToUse: 'An operator needs an application-wide read and does not yet hold a window.' },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.APPROVE]: { purpose: 'The second signature; refuses the requester.', whenToUse: 'A different administrator has read the justification and accepts it.' },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.DENY]: { purpose: 'Terminal refusal, with a recorded reason.', whenToUse: 'The justification does not hold.' },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REVOKE]: { purpose: 'Ends an ACTIVE window before its expiry.', whenToUse: 'Circumstances changed, or the elevation is no longer needed.' },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.EXPIRE]: { purpose: 'ACTIVE → EXPIRED, dispatched by the credential-expiry sweep and by nothing else. Headless — no person invokes it.', whenToUse: 'Never by hand; use REVOKE to end a window early.' },\n },\n }),\n);\n"]}
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+
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* Resource: `applicationAccessGrants` — Wildo SaaS engine specification (backend-only, application-scoped).\n *\n * Inputs:\n * - Schema: engine/saas-models/src/security/authorizations/application-access-grants.shared.schemas.ts\n * → `ApplicationAccessGrantSchema`\n * - Factory: engine/saas-models/src/security/authorizations/application-access-grants.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts\n * → `applicationAccessGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory`\n * - Custom operations: `ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations`\n *\n * ## Why this exists BESIDE `platformAccessGrants` rather than inside it\n *\n * The tenant grant governs an operator reaching into ONE named organization, and the organization\n * approves. That is the industry ceiling (Microsoft Customer Lockbox, Google Access Approval) and it\n * works. It cannot govern a read that names NO tenant — an enumeration of the whole user directory,\n * or of the cross-tenant audit trail when independent approval is configured — because there is no single customer to ask and no tenant for\n * the route to carry.\n *\n * Measured 2026-09-09: the NARROW act required a requested, justified, time-bound, tenant-approved\n * grant, while the WIDEST read required an administrator role and nothing else, at a strictly LOWER\n * role tier. This resource is the answer, and its one new idea is the TWO-PERSON RULE: the approval\n * comes from a second platform administrator, never the requester.\n *\n * Why backend-only: there is NO entry for `[CoreResourceType.APPLICATION_ACCESS_GRANTS]` in any\n * preset under engine/presets-components/src/config/resources/. The operator-facing queue is not\n * built yet; today the resource is consumed by the authorizer's admission predicate and by the\n * platform API.\n *\n * Why `APPLICATION` scope: the elevation belongs to the deployment, not to any tenant inside it. The\n * scope is expressed once, in the registry relationship APPLICATION → APPLICATION_ACCESS_GRANTS\n * carrying `isPrimaryScope: true`; the runtime config deliberately does not restate it.\n */\n\nimport { applicationAccessGrantsAdminResourceUIBehavior as applicationAccessGrantsUIBehaviorSource } from '@wildo-ai/presets-components';\nimport { LabelAudience } from '@wildo-ai/presets-components-models';\nimport type { ResourceUIBehaviorConfig } from '@wildo-ai/saas-frontend-lib/companion';\nimport {\n CodeDeclarationKind,\n CodeSymbolKind,\n FieldSemanticImportance,\n} from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\nimport {\n ApplicationAccessGrantSchema,\n ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations,\n CoreResourceOperation as Op,\n PlatformAccessGrantStatus,\n ResourcePrimaryScope,\n applicationAccessGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory,\n} from '@wildo-ai/saas-models';\nimport { HttpResponseStatusCode, resourceFrontendConfiguration, resourceSpecification, resourceSpecificationFromFrontendConfiguration } from '~wildo-specifications/_core';\nimport { EngineResourceSubDomain } from '../../engine-resource-sub-domain';\n\nconst APPLICATION_ACCESS_PENDING_GRANT_ID = 'application_access_grant_01J5Q2A3B4C5D6E7F8G9H0J1KL';\nconst APPLICATION_ACCESS_ACTIVE_GRANT_ID = 'application_access_grant_01J5Q2C4D5E6F7G8H9J0K1L2MN';\nconst APPLICATION_ACCESS_OPERATOR_USER_ID = 'user_01J5Q2E5F6G7H8J9K0L1M2N3PQ';\nconst APPLICATION_ACCESS_SECOND_ADMIN_USER_ID = 'user_01J5Q2G6H7J8K9L0M1N2P3Q4RS';\nconst APPLICATION_ACCESS_EXAMPLE_APPLICATION_ID = 'app_01J5Q2J7K8L9M0N1P2Q3R4S5TU';\n\nconst applicationAccessPendingGrantExample = {\n _id: APPLICATION_ACCESS_PENDING_GRANT_ID,\n applicationId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_EXAMPLE_APPLICATION_ID,\n operatorUserId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_OPERATOR_USER_ID,\n justification: 'Incident INC-5107 spans several tenants; I need the audit view, configured for independent approval, to find which are affected.',\n status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.PENDING_APPROVAL,\n expiresAt: '2026-09-09T13:30:00.000Z',\n createdAt: '2026-09-09T13:00:00.000Z',\n updatedAt: '2026-09-09T13:00:00.000Z',\n};\n\nconst applicationAccessActiveGrantExample = {\n ...applicationAccessPendingGrantExample,\n _id: APPLICATION_ACCESS_ACTIVE_GRANT_ID,\n status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.ACTIVE,\n approvedByUserId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_SECOND_ADMIN_USER_ID,\n approvedAt: '2026-09-09T13:04:00.000Z',\n decidedByUserId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_SECOND_ADMIN_USER_ID,\n decidedAt: '2026-09-09T13:04:00.000Z',\n updatedAt: '2026-09-09T13:04:00.000Z',\n};\n\ntype Cfg = ReturnType<typeof applicationAccessGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory>;\ntype Custom = NonNullable<Cfg['customOperation']>;\ntype Core = Cfg['coreOperations'][number];\ntype Main = Cfg['mainSchema'];\n\nconst applicationAccessGrantsUIBehavior = applicationAccessGrantsUIBehaviorSource as ResourceUIBehaviorConfig<Custom, Core, Main>;\n\n/**\n * Carries a frontend overlay since 2026-09-17. The mechanism shipped with no surface at all, which\n * is the worst possible shape for a two-person rule: its whole justification is that the\n * consequence becomes VISIBLE rather than prevented, and an elevation nobody can read makes nothing\n * visible. The narration below describes the review queue an administrator now actually reaches.\n */\nexport const applicationAccessGrantsResourceSpecification = resourceSpecificationFromFrontendConfiguration(\n resourceFrontendConfiguration(applicationAccessGrantsUIBehavior),\n resourceSpecification(\n applicationAccessGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory,\n ApplicationAccessGrantSchema,\n ({ schemaShape }) => ({\n purpose: 'Give a platform support team a justified, short-lived, second-signed way to perform application-wide reads that require elevation (the user directory and other enrolled surfaces, plus the audit viewer when its independent-approval policy is enabled), or, under its own purpose, a window in which the doors declared to overrule an organization may act on one named organization, such as releasing a vendor account it holds.',\n businessRole: 'The deployment\\'s application-wide access ledger. It answers who asked to see across every tenant, why, which SECOND administrator agreed, how long the window lasted, and how it ended.',\n lifecycleRole: 'A platform administrator requests, stating a reason. The request is never usable on creation. A DIFFERENT platform administrator approves or denies it; the requester may withdraw or refuse their own request but can never approve it. Either can revoke an active window early, and expiry ends it automatically. Completed requests remain available as access-review history.',\n audience: LabelAudience.ADMIN,\n subDomain: EngineResourceSubDomain.AUTH,\n\n codeHandling: {\n mainSchema: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'ApplicationAccessGrantSchema',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.SCHEMA,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.ZOD_SCHEMA,\n },\n resourceFactory: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'applicationAccessGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.FACTORY,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.FUNCTION,\n },\n resourceType: {\n enumDeclaration: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'CoreResourceType',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.ENUM,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.TYPESCRIPT_ENUM,\n },\n memberName: 'APPLICATION_ACCESS_GRANTS',\n },\n operationVocabulary: {\n coreEnum: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'CoreResourceOperation',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.ENUM,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.TYPESCRIPT_ENUM,\n },\n customEnum: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.ENUM,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.TYPESCRIPT_ENUM,\n },\n },\n notes: [\n 'The `status` vocabulary is SHARED with `platformAccessGrants` (`PlatformAccessGrantStatus`) rather than duplicated. The states really are the same states, and two enums holding the same five members is how a sweep, an admission predicate and a UI come to disagree about what `active` means.',\n 'There is no auto-approval and therefore no `autoApprovalReason` field. The tenant grant auto-approves when the tenant has not opted into approval or cannot approve — both statements about a NAMED tenant, and this row names none. A grant that could approve itself would make the two-person rule ceremonial.',\n 'No public CREATE or UPDATE. `requestAccess` is the only writer of a new row, and `approve` / `deny` / `revoke` / `expire` are the only status transitions. A generic CREATE would let a caller author their own `status` and mint an ACTIVE application-wide elevation with no second signature at all.',\n 'No DELETE, and one route-less DELETE_MANY. Nothing but the retention-class sweep removes a row: this is a REFERENCE child of the APPLICATION row that outlives it on purpose (#3355: deleting the application must not shorten the period its access evidence is kept for), and with no period the rows would outlive every statement the application makes about its access evidence. Bound to `AUDIT_LOGS` from creation. INTERNAL_CALL registers no route, so no caller can erase a grant from the record.',\n 'The lifecycle audit event is shared too: `CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE`, carrying `grantScope: application_wide` and no `targetOrganizationId`. One event so a reviewer asking \"what elevated access was granted, to whom, by whom?\" gets one query rather than a union of two they have to remember.',\n ],\n },\n\n fields: {\n _id: schemaShape._id.stringSpec({\n meaning: 'Identifier for one application-wide elevation request.',\n whyItMatters: 'The address of every subsequent decision, and the value the audit trail carries as `authorizingGrantId` when a read is admitted under it — which is what joins an operator\\'s reads to the two administrators who signed for them.',\n semanticRole: 'identifier',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n applicationId: schemaShape.applicationId.foreignKeySpec({\n meaning: 'The deployment this elevation is inside.',\n whyItMatters: 'Every row carries it, although the schema marks it optional: the application is part of the request path, so it is always known.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.CONTEXTUAL,\n }),\n operatorUserId: schemaShape.operatorUserId.foreignKeySpec({\n meaning: 'The platform administrator who requested the elevation.',\n whyItMatters: 'Server-authored from the session, never client-supplied, and it is the field the two-person rule measures against: `approve` refuses when the approver equals this value. An elevation whose subject the caller could choose would let one administrator mint application-wide access under another\\'s name and then sign it themselves.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n justification: schemaShape.justification.stringSpec({\n meaning: 'Why the operator needs to see across every tenant, in their own words.',\n whyItMatters: 'Required, and it carries more weight here than on the tenant grant: it is the ONLY thing the approving administrator has to decide on. A tenant grant\\'s approver knows their own tenant and their own support case; this approver knows nothing but this sentence. A second signature on an unstated reason is a countersignature on nothing.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n status: schemaShape.status.enumSpec({\n meaning: 'Where this elevation is in its lifecycle.',\n whyItMatters: 'Read together with `expiresAt`, never alone: the admission predicate accepts ACTIVE and then re-checks the window, so a grant whose window elapsed stops working whether or not anything has relabelled it. Every row starts PENDING_APPROVAL — there is no branch that reaches ACTIVE without a second administrator acting.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n enumDeclaration: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'PlatformAccessGrantStatus',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.ENUM,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.TYPESCRIPT_ENUM,\n },\n }),\n expiresAt: schemaShape.expiresAt.dateSpec({\n meaning: 'When the elevation stops working.',\n whyItMatters: 'The control, not the label. Server-authored from the requested duration and clamped to ONE HOUR — a quarter of the tenant grant\\'s ceiling, because this elevation reaches every customer at once and no customer can see or revoke it, so the clock is the only thing that ends it on its own.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n approvedByUserId: schemaShape.approvedByUserId.foreignKeySpec({\n meaning: 'The SECOND administrator who signed.',\n whyItMatters: 'The whole feature, as a field. It is optional in the schema because it is unset while pending and stays unset on a denied or revoked grant — never because an ACTIVE grant might lack one. The only writer of ACTIVE is `approve`, and `approve` refuses when this would equal `operatorUserId`.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n approvedAt: schemaShape.approvedAt.dateSpec({\n meaning: 'When the second administrator approved the elevation. Absent while it is pending and on a denied request.',\n temporalRole: 'occurred',\n }),\n decidedByUserId: schemaShape.decidedByUserId.foreignKeySpec({\n meaning: 'The administrator who made the last decision on the grant: approved, denied or revoked it.',\n whyItMatters: 'Answers who refused a request or ended a window early, which the approver field cannot, and keeps the last decision\\'s reason attached to the person who gave it. Written by `approve`, `deny` and `revoke`; expiry is not a decision and leaves it alone.',\n }),\n operatorName: schemaShape.operatorName.stringSpec({ meaning: 'The operator who requested the elevation, by name: `operatorUserId`\\'s label fallback. Resolved at read time from the person\\'s profile, else their account\\'s email (`forwardedUserName`, opted in for the operator only); never stored, so the row keeps only the id (#1852).', whyItMatters: 'A tenant administrator approving an operator usually may not read the operator\\'s account, so the reference alone could not say who is asking. Hidden from display: the person is shown through the foreign key, and this name is its label when the viewer may not read the user.' }),\n approvedByName: schemaShape.approvedByName.stringSpec({ meaning: 'The administrator who approved, by name: `approvedByUserId`\\'s label fallback. Resolved at read time from the person\\'s profile, and absent when they have none (`forwardedUserName`; never their email); never stored, so the row keeps only the id (#1852).', whyItMatters: 'Hidden from display: the person is shown through the foreign key, and this name is its label when the viewer may not read the user.' }),\n decidedByName: schemaShape.decidedByName.stringSpec({ meaning: 'The administrator who made the last decision, by name: `decidedByUserId`\\'s label fallback. Resolved at read time from the person\\'s profile, and absent when they have none (`forwardedUserName`; never their email); never stored, so the row keeps only the id (#1852).', whyItMatters: 'Hidden from display: the person is shown through the foreign key, and this name is its label when the viewer may not read the user.' }),\n decidedAt: schemaShape.decidedAt.dateSpec({\n meaning: 'When the last decision was made.',\n whyItMatters: 'Places a refusal or an early revocation in time against the access it ended.',\n temporalRole: 'occurred',\n }),\n purpose: schemaShape.purpose.enumSpec({\n meaning: 'What the elevation admits, and so what the second administrator signs for: tenant-spanning reads, or a window onto the doors declared to overrule an organization, on the organization in `targetOrganizationId`.',\n whyItMatters: 'The two acts are not one act. A read changes nothing and names no tenant; an overrule changes one organization\\'s rows against its will. A window approved for one never admits the other, so an approver who signed for reading the directory has not signed for releasing a tenant\\'s vendor account. Set at request time and never updated. A request that states none asks for reads.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n enumDeclaration: {\n packageName: '@wildo-ai/saas-models',\n exportName: 'ApplicationAccessGrantPurpose',\n symbolKind: CodeSymbolKind.ENUM,\n declarationKind: CodeDeclarationKind.TYPESCRIPT_ENUM,\n },\n }),\n targetOrganizationId: schemaShape.targetOrganizationId.stringSpec({\n meaning: 'The one organization a `tenant_overrule` elevation may act on. Absent on every other purpose.',\n whyItMatters: 'Names the tenant the second administrator agreed to overrule, so the window cannot be spent on another. Re-read at request time (an organization that does not exist is refused) and compared with the organization of the row the act would change.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n }),\n targetOrganizationName: schemaShape.targetOrganizationName.stringSpec({\n meaning: 'What the target organization was called when the overrule was requested. Absent on every other purpose.',\n whyItMatters: 'What the approver reads to know whom they are signing against. A snapshot, not a lookup: the approver holds no grant into that tenant, so resolving the id would be a crossing of its own. Written from the organization the request re-read; the id stays the authority the admission compares.',\n semanticRole: 'label',\n }),\n grantedMachineCredential: schemaShape.grantedMachineCredential.objectSpec({\n meaning: 'The one machine credential of this application — an API key or an OAuth client — the elevation is for, when it is for a machine rather than the requester.',\n whyItMatters: 'Under independent audit-read approval a machine could otherwise never read, since a grant was keyed on a user and a machine has none — so an assurance collector, the reader that policy most wants governed, was shut out. When set, the grant admits exactly that credential and NEVER the administrator who requested it: naming a machine must not be a way to mint oneself a window. Validated against the live credential at request time and never updated, because re-pointing a signed grant at another credential would be a grant nobody signed. Like any read grant it satisfies EVERY read that requires one — not only the audit viewer — so what the credential can actually read is still bounded by the roles it holds: give it the read-only audit-evidence reader role, which reaches the audit viewer and nothing else. A machine is never granted an overrule: that is a person\\'s decision.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.CONTEXTUAL,\n }),\n decisionReason: schemaShape.decisionReason.stringSpec({\n meaning: 'The reason given with the LAST decision — an approval, a refusal or a revocation — belonging to `decidedByUserId`. A decision given without one clears it.',\n whyItMatters: 'What a later reader needs to tell a refusal that was considered from one that was reflexive. Scrubbed on subject erasure, like the justification, because it is free text one administrator wrote about another\\'s request.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.CONTEXTUAL,\n }),\n },\n\n operations: {\n [Op.READ]: {\n purpose: 'Read one application-wide elevation request.',\n outcome: 'The request\\'s current state, including who asked, who signed and when the window closes.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The elevation request is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator. There is no tenant-side reader here — an application-wide elevation has no customer to show it to, which is exactly why its approval had to become a second signature.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.NOT_FOUND_404, when: 'No elevation request with the supplied id exists.' },\n ],\n idempotent: true,\n examples: [{\n title: 'Read a pending request',\n request: { applicationAccessGrantId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_PENDING_GRANT_ID },\n response: applicationAccessPendingGrantExample,\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [Op.LIST]: {\n purpose: 'List elevation requests — the pending queue a second administrator works from, and the history a reviewer reads.',\n outcome: 'A page of elevation requests.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'A page of elevation requests is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n ],\n idempotent: true,\n examples: [{\n title: 'Work the pending queue',\n request: { page: 1, limit: 20, sort: 'createdAt:desc' },\n // The framework's page envelope: the counts sit under `pagination` (#1838: they were at the top level).\n response: { data: [applicationAccessPendingGrantExample], pagination: { page: 1, limit: 20, total: 1, totalPages: 1 } },\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [Op.COUNT]: {\n purpose: 'Count elevation requests matching a filter.',\n outcome: 'A number — how many requests are pending a signature, or how many were granted in a period.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The count is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n ],\n idempotent: true,\n examples: [{\n title: 'How many requests are awaiting a second signature',\n request: { status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.PENDING_APPROVAL },\n response: { count: 1 },\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REQUEST_ACCESS]: {\n operationId: ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REQUEST_ACCESS,\n purpose: 'Ask for a short, justified window in which the tenant-spanning reads become available, or in which the doors declared to overrule an organization may act on one named organization.',\n outcome: 'A request in `pending_approval`, usable by nobody until a DIFFERENT platform administrator approves it. The window is recorded at creation and starts running then, so a request nobody signs simply lapses.',\n whenToUse: 'An operator needs an elevation-gated read that names no single tenant (the user directory, or the audit viewer with independent approval enabled, for a support case or incident spanning customers), or must overrule one organization through a door that declares it, such as releasing a vendor account the organization holds (`purpose: tenant_overrule`, `targetOrganizationId`).',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CREATED_201, meaning: 'The elevation request was recorded and awaits a second administrator.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.BAD_REQUEST_400, when: 'The justification is missing or empty. It is required because it is the only thing the approver has to decide on.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.BAD_REQUEST_400, when: '`grantedMachineCredential` names no active, unexpired API key or OAuth client of this application. The refusal does not say which condition failed.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.BAD_REQUEST_400, when: 'The purpose and the target do not fit: a `tenant_overrule` that names no organization, names one that does not exist, or binds a machine credential; or a read that names an organization.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n ],\n idempotent: false,\n examples: [{\n title: 'Ask to see across tenants for a multi-customer incident',\n request: {\n justification: 'Incident INC-5107 spans several tenants; I need the audit view, configured for independent approval, to find which are affected.',\n requestedDurationMinutes: 30,\n },\n response: applicationAccessPendingGrantExample,\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.CREATED_201,\n }],\n },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.APPROVE]: {\n operationId: ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.APPROVE,\n purpose: 'Sign another administrator\\'s request — the second signature.',\n outcome: 'The request becomes `active` and names the approver. Until the window closes what its purpose names becomes available to exactly one principal: the tenant-spanning reads, or the one overrule of the named organization, to the REQUESTER — or, for a read grant bound to a machine credential, to that credential and not the requester.',\n whenToUse: 'A platform administrator has read the requester\\'s justification and purpose (and, for an overrule, the organization it names) and agrees that act is warranted.',\n importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The elevation is now active, and its updated state — including the approver — is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.NOT_FOUND_404, when: 'No elevation request with the supplied id exists.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller IS the requester — a request cannot be approved by the person who raised it.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The request is no longer `pending_approval`.' },\n ],\n idempotent: false,\n examples: [{\n title: 'A second administrator signs',\n request: {\n applicationAccessGrantId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_PENDING_GRANT_ID,\n decisionReason: 'Reviewed against INC-5107; scope and window are proportionate.',\n },\n response: applicationAccessActiveGrantExample,\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.DENY]: {\n operationId: ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.DENY,\n purpose: 'Refuse a pending request.',\n outcome: 'The request becomes `denied` and cannot be retried; a later need requires a new request.',\n whenToUse: 'A platform administrator judges the reach unwarranted — or the requester themselves thinks better of it.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The request was denied, and its final state is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.NOT_FOUND_404, when: 'No elevation request with the supplied id exists.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The request is no longer `pending_approval`.' },\n ],\n idempotent: false,\n examples: [{\n title: 'Withdraw your own request',\n request: {\n applicationAccessGrantId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_PENDING_GRANT_ID,\n decisionReason: 'The affected tenants were identified from the incident channel; the wide read is no longer needed.',\n },\n response: {\n ...applicationAccessPendingGrantExample,\n status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.DENIED,\n decisionReason: 'The affected tenants were identified from the incident channel; the wide read is no longer needed.',\n updatedAt: '2026-09-09T13:06:00.000Z',\n },\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REVOKE]: {\n operationId: ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REVOKE,\n purpose: 'End a pending or active elevation early.',\n outcome: 'The elevation becomes `revoked` and the tenant-spanning reads stop immediately instead of remaining available until the recorded expiry.',\n whenToUse: 'The support work finished before the window did, or a reviewer decides the reach should end now.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The elevation was revoked, and its final state is returned.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.FORBIDDEN_403, when: 'The caller is not a platform super-administrator.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.NOT_FOUND_404, when: 'No elevation request with the supplied id exists.' },\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The elevation is already denied, revoked or expired. Only a `pending_approval` or `active` one can be revoked.' },\n ],\n idempotent: false,\n examples: [{\n title: 'Close the window as soon as the incident is scoped',\n request: {\n applicationAccessGrantId: APPLICATION_ACCESS_ACTIVE_GRANT_ID,\n decisionReason: 'INC-5107 scoped to three tenants; per-tenant grants requested instead.',\n },\n response: {\n ...applicationAccessActiveGrantExample,\n status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.REVOKED,\n decisionReason: 'INC-5107 scoped to three tenants; per-tenant grants requested instead.',\n updatedAt: '2026-09-09T13:18:00.000Z',\n },\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.EXPIRE]: {\n operationId: ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.EXPIRE,\n purpose: 'Relabel an active elevation whose window has closed.',\n outcome: 'The elevation reads `expired` rather than `active` in the queue and the history.',\n whenToUse: 'Never by hand. The credential-expiry sweep dispatches it and nothing else does — there is no route and no affordance, because nobody needs a button that declares a date has passed.',\n responseStatuses: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The elevation was relabelled expired.' },\n ],\n errorScenarios: [\n { code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The elevation is not `active`. A denied or revoked one is terminal and must keep saying which — relabelling it would rewrite the decision history a reviewer reads.' },\n ],\n idempotent: false,\n examples: [{\n title: 'The sweep closes a lapsed window',\n request: {},\n response: {\n ...applicationAccessActiveGrantExample,\n status: PlatformAccessGrantStatus.EXPIRED,\n updatedAt: '2026-09-09T13:31:00.000Z',\n },\n forStatus: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200,\n }],\n },\n },\n\n businessConstraints: [\n 'THE control: `approve` refuses when the approver is the requester. Enforced TWICE, and neither half alone is the control — the operation\\'s `enabledCondition` makes the affordance disappear so no console renders an Approve button on one\\'s own request, and the custom implementation makes the transition impossible so a future variant authored without that condition cannot transition silently. The comparison itself lives in ONE exported predicate, which fails CLOSED when either identity is missing: an approval reaching the check with no decider has no second person behind it, and the naive inline form would admit exactly that case.',\n 'Customer approval is the industry ceiling and is structurally unavailable here — there is no single customer to ask — so a second signature is the strongest control that exists for this act. That is why AUTO-APPROVAL was rejected even though it is the tenant grant\\'s own default posture: that default is defensible only because a tenant can opt in above it, and there is no such party here.',\n 'Application-wide directory and declared cross-tenant reads retain their elevation gate. The application audit viewer and the assurance evidence doors are the explicit policy exception: auditTrail.applicationReadAccess, when undeclared, follows the application\\'s shape in all environments (#2618): AuditApplicationReadAccess.INDEPENDENT_APPROVAL, which requires this grant, where the parties of some relationship kind are independent of the operator, and ROLE_BASED otherwise. Both modes keep administrator-role checks and crossing observations; role-based evidence carries no fabricated grant id. Grant requests themselves are never auto-approved.',\n 'The per-row tenant crossing is deliberately NOT gated on this grant. That door already works, approved by the customer it names; requiring an application-wide elevation there too would replace a customer-approvable control with a platform-internal one, which is a step DOWN the operator-access ladder.',\n 'Both grant resources are EXEMPT from the admission wholesale — this one and `platformAccessGrants`. An operator would otherwise need an application-wide grant in order to ask for one, and the second administrator would need one in order to read the queue and sign. The exemption is safe for the reason the tenant resource\\'s own bootstrap exemption is safe: these rows are the elevation ledger, they belong to no tenant, and reading them discloses no customer\\'s data.',\n 'Usability is EVALUATED, never read off `status`. A grant counts only when it is ACTIVE and `expiresAt` is still in the future, through the single predicate both grant resources share. The expiry sweep\\'s relabelling is bookkeeping for humans; if admission read the label, a lagging sweep would be an authorization hole rather than a stale display.',\n 'The window is SHORTER than a tenant elevation\\'s — 30 minutes by default against 60, one hour maximum against four — and the ORDER is the design rather than the numbers. A tenant elevation reaches one customer who can see and revoke it; this one reaches every customer and none of them can.',\n 'Terminal statuses are how an elevation ends. DENIED, EXPIRED and REVOKED are never edited back to life, and there is no delete verb of any kind: an elevation record either party could erase is not evidence.',\n ],\n }),\n { resourcePrimaryScope: ResourcePrimaryScope.APPLICATION },\n ),\n () => ({\n label: {\n purpose: 'The request\\'s justification, the one thing the approving administrator decides on. It is a summary field, so the list card carries it; naming a card by the request instant, when that was not a summary field, showed the raw id on every card (#2329). A row whose justification was masked on erasure is named by the instant it was made (a summary field since #3066, so the list carries it too), then by its id. The record carries the requesting operator only as a user id, and a synchronous label cannot resolve a name, so the operator is shown — resolved to the person — as the first row of the body and on the card instead.',\n },\n layout: {\n purpose: 'Three sections that separate the two identities the control exists to keep apart: `request` (who asked and why), `decision` (who signed and why), `window` (how long, and which credential it admits). Folding decision into request would put requester and approver in one block, which is precisely the distinction `applicationAccessGrantApproverIsDistinct` enforces.',\n displayPurpose: 'Read-only. Every state change goes through a named verb — request, approve, deny, revoke, expire — and none through a form, so there is deliberately no edit layout. The header carries the request instant and the status badge; the three titled cards follow, with no descriptions. Both identities resolve to the person. The decision reason and the machine credential hide when empty; the approver row stays, because on a pending request its emptiness is the answer.',\n summaryPurpose: 'A card titled with the record\\'s name (its justification, else the request instant, else its id), then who asked, the status badge, and the expiry labelled.',\n sections: {\n request: {\n purpose: 'The requesting operator and the stated justification. Status and the instant are the page header.',\n whenToUse: 'The review queue, and the first block of any single-grant read.',\n textSlots: {\n title: { purpose: 'Label the request block: who asked, and why.' },\n },\n },\n decision: {\n purpose: 'The second administrator and when they signed, the administrator who made the LAST decision (approved, denied or revoked) and when, and that decision\\u2019s reason. A denial or a revocation is read against its own decider, never against the approver.',\n whenToUse: 'Auditing whether an elevation was independently approved, and on what grounds.',\n textSlots: {\n title: { purpose: 'Label the signature block.' },\n },\n },\n window: {\n purpose: 'Expiry, and the machine credential the grant admits when it was requested for one.',\n whenToUse: 'Judging live exposure, and confirming a grant admits the credential it was meant to.',\n textSlots: {\n title: { purpose: 'Label the validity block.' },\n },\n },\n },\n },\n views: {\n [Op.LIST]: { purpose: 'The review queue, reached from Settings → Administration → Access grants. A `status` quick-filter over `createdAt` day buckets, because an unsigned request is the only row that needs anybody.', whenToUse: 'Signing off pending elevations, and reviewing what has been held recently.' },\n [Op.READ]: { purpose: 'One elevation in full, including both identities and the stated reasons.', whenToUse: 'Auditing a specific window after the fact.' },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REQUEST_ACCESS]: { purpose: 'The bootstrap verb. Writes PENDING_APPROVAL, never ACTIVE.', whenToUse: 'An operator needs an application-wide read and does not yet hold a window.' },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.APPROVE]: { purpose: 'The second signature; refuses the requester.', whenToUse: 'A different administrator has read the justification and accepts it.' },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.DENY]: { purpose: 'Terminal refusal, with a recorded reason.', whenToUse: 'The justification does not hold.' },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.REVOKE]: { purpose: 'Ends an ACTIVE window before its expiry.', whenToUse: 'Circumstances changed, or the elevation is no longer needed.' },\n [ApplicationAccessGrants_Operations.EXPIRE]: { purpose: 'ACTIVE → EXPIRED, dispatched by the credential-expiry sweep and by nothing else. Headless — no person invokes it.', whenToUse: 'Never by hand; use REVOKE to end a window early.' },\n },\n }),\n);\n"]}
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package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/data-subject-requests.resource.specification.d.ts.map
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{"version":3,"file":"data-subject-requests.resource.specification.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/engine/compliance/resources/data-subject-requests.resource.specification.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AAUH,OAAO,EACL,qBAAqB,IAAI,EAAE,EAI3B,yBAAyB,EACzB,sBAAsB,EAGtB,wBAAwB,EACxB,8BAA8B,
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{"version":3,"file":"data-subject-requests.resource.specification.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/engine/compliance/resources/data-subject-requests.resource.specification.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AAUH,OAAO,EACL,qBAAqB,IAAI,EAAE,EAI3B,yBAAyB,EACzB,sBAAsB,EAGtB,wBAAwB,EACxB,8BAA8B,EAK/B,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAqE/B,eAAO,MAAM,wCAAwC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iCAydpD,CAAC"}
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package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/data-subject-requests.resource.specification.js
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import { dataSubjectRequestsResourceUIBehavior as dataSubjectRequestsUIBehaviorSource } from '@wildo-ai/presets-components';
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import { LabelAudience } from '@wildo-ai/presets-components-models';
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import { CodeDeclarationKind, CodeSymbolKind, FieldSemanticImportance, } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';
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18
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import { CoreResourceOperation as Op, DATA_SUBJECT_ERASURE_GRACE_WINDOW_DAYS, DATA_SUBJECT_EXPORT_AVAILABILITY_DAYS, DATA_SUBJECT_REQUEST_DEADLINE_SAFETY_MARGIN_DAYS, DataSubjectRequestChannel, DataSubjectRequestKind, DataSubjectRequestRefusalCode, DataSubjectRequestSchema, DataSubjectRequestStatus, DataSubjectRequests_Operations, ResourcePrimaryScope, CoreUserNotificationTarget, dataSubjectRequestsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory as dataSubjectRequestsFactory, } from '@wildo-ai/saas-models';
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import { CoreResourceOperation as Op, DATA_SUBJECT_ERASURE_GRACE_WINDOW_DAYS, DATA_SUBJECT_EXPORT_AVAILABILITY_DAYS, DATA_SUBJECT_REQUEST_DEADLINE_SAFETY_MARGIN_DAYS, DataSubjectRequestChannel, DataSubjectRequestKind, DataSubjectRequestRefusalCode, DataSubjectRequestSchema, DataSubjectRequestStatus, DataSubjectRequests_Operations, ErrorCustomMessageReference, ResourcePrimaryScope, CoreUserNotificationTarget, dataSubjectRequestsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory as dataSubjectRequestsFactory, } from '@wildo-ai/saas-models';
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import { HttpResponseStatusCode, ResourceOperationScheduledExecutionVariantType, resourceFrontendConfiguration, resourceSpecification, resourceSpecificationFromFrontendConfiguration, } from '../../../_core/index.js';
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import { EngineResourceSubDomain } from '../../engine-resource-sub-domain.js';
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const dataSubjectRequestsUIBehavior = dataSubjectRequestsUIBehaviorSource;
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@@ -358,6 +358,9 @@ export const dataSubjectRequestsResourceSpecification = resourceSpecificationFro
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358
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importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,
|
|
359
359
|
responseStatuses: [{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The request was withdrawn and returned in cancelled state.' }],
|
|
360
360
|
errorScenarios: [
|
|
361
|
+
{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The request is no longer waiting to be carried out (it is not scheduled or received): the engine refuses on the operation\'s condition before it runs.', customMessageReference: ErrorCustomMessageReference.SERVICE_RESOURCE_OPERATION_DISABLED },
|
|
362
|
+
{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The request moved after this one was admitted (another withdrawal, or the sweep carried it out), so nothing was written. Read it again.', customMessageReference: ErrorCustomMessageReference.VERSION_CONFLICT },
|
|
363
|
+
// Re-checked on the row the condition judged, so a client normally meets the two rows above, never this code.
|
|
361
364
|
{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, errorCode: DataSubjectRequestRefusalCode.NOT_WITHDRAWABLE, when: 'The request is already cancelled, completed or failed, so it can no longer be withdrawn.' },
|
|
362
365
|
{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.NOT_FOUND_404, when: 'No request with that id is visible to the signed-in person.' },
|
|
363
366
|
],
|
|
@@ -446,6 +449,7 @@ export const dataSubjectRequestsResourceSpecification = resourceSpecificationFro
|
|
|
446
449
|
responseStatuses: [{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The request can be downloaded now.' }],
|
|
447
450
|
errorScenarios: [
|
|
448
451
|
{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.NOT_FOUND_404, when: 'No request with that id belongs to the signed-in person.' },
|
|
452
|
+
{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, when: 'The request is not an export available for download (still being prepared, expired, or not an export at all): the engine refuses on the operation\'s condition before it runs. NOT_DOWNLOADABLE arrives instead for a copy whose download window ended before the sweep withdrew it, and always from the streaming route, which the condition does not guard.', customMessageReference: ErrorCustomMessageReference.SERVICE_RESOURCE_OPERATION_DISABLED },
|
|
449
453
|
{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.CONFLICT_409, errorCode: DataSubjectRequestRefusalCode.NOT_DOWNLOADABLE, when: 'The request is not a copy of the person\'s data, or its download window ended.' },
|
|
450
454
|
],
|
|
451
455
|
idempotent: true,
|
|
@@ -454,7 +458,7 @@ export const dataSubjectRequestsResourceSpecification = resourceSpecificationFro
|
|
|
454
458
|
[DataSubjectRequests_Operations.SWEEP_DUE_REQUESTS]: {
|
|
455
459
|
operationId: DataSubjectRequests_Operations.SWEEP_DUE_REQUESTS,
|
|
456
460
|
purpose: 'Carry out every due erasure through the engine\'s system-level subject-erasure door and record what happened, and mark expired every copy whose download window ended.',
|
|
457
|
-
outcome: 'Each due request is attempted and marked COMPLETED, COMPLETES_AT_VENDOR, EXTERNAL_WORK_OWED or FAILED with a receipt; a legal hold, an unexecuted edge, an incomplete external effect, an unconfirmed severance, a session that did not end or a thrown erasure makes it FAILED for an operator.',
|
|
461
|
+
outcome: 'Each due request is attempted and marked COMPLETED, COMPLETES_AT_VENDOR, EXTERNAL_WORK_OWED or FAILED with a receipt; a legal hold, an unexecuted edge, an incomplete external effect, an unconfirmed severance, a session that did not end or a thrown erasure makes it FAILED for an operator. An organization the person owned and was the only member of goes with them (#3786): it is marked for deletion before the erasure, the purge removes it at the end of the tenant retention window, and the receipt names it with that date. An organization someone else still belongs to keeps the owner-floor refusal (`LAST_ORGANIZATION_OWNER`), recorded as FAILED until another owner is appointed.',
|
|
458
462
|
importance: FieldSemanticImportance.PRIMARY,
|
|
459
463
|
responseStatuses: [{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.OK_200, meaning: 'The run\'s counters; every due request was attempted and requests not yet due were left scheduled.' }],
|
|
460
464
|
errorScenarios: [{ code: HttpResponseStatusCode.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR_500, when: 'The sweep could not list scheduled requests or acquire system access. A failed erasure is caught and recorded as FAILED; a failed receipt write is logged and leaves the request scheduled.' }],
|