@wildo-ai/saas-specifications 1.1.1 → 1.1.3

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (633) hide show
  1. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-asset.schemas.d.ts +4 -6
  2. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-asset.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  3. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-asset.schemas.js +4 -12
  4. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-asset.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  5. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-generation.schemas.d.ts +5 -3
  6. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  7. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-generation.schemas.js +5 -2
  8. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  9. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-snapshot.schemas.d.ts +10 -3
  10. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-snapshot.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  11. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-snapshot.schemas.js +10 -2
  12. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand-snapshot.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  14. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  15. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand.family-aspects.js +51 -0
  16. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  17. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  18. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-generation.schemas.js +15 -5
  19. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  20. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-validation.d.ts +40 -3
  21. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  22. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-validation.js +85 -6
  23. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan-task-graph-validation.js.map +1 -1
  24. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  25. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  26. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan.family-aspects.js +28 -0
  27. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  28. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  29. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot-generation.schemas.js +10 -4
  30. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  31. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot-validation.d.ts +15 -0
  32. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  33. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model-lite-snapshot-validation.js.map +1 -1
  34. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  35. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  36. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model.family-aspects.js +21 -0
  37. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  38. package/dist/esm/_core/chart-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  39. package/dist/esm/_core/chart-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  40. package/dist/esm/_core/chart-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  41. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.d.ts +85 -0
  42. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  43. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.js +41 -0
  44. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  45. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.d.ts +178 -2
  46. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  47. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.js +115 -9
  48. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  49. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-documents.family-aspects.d.ts +12 -0
  50. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-documents.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  51. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-documents.family-aspects.js +47 -0
  52. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-documents.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  53. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/document-fact-specification-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  54. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/document-fact-specification-generation.schemas.js +8 -3
  55. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/document-fact-specification-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  56. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.family-aspects.d.ts +21 -0
  57. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  58. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.family-aspects.js +40 -0
  59. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  60. package/dist/esm/_core/composite-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  61. package/dist/esm/_core/composite-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  62. package/dist/esm/_core/composite-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  63. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  64. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  65. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan.family-aspects.js +32 -0
  66. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  67. package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  68. package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  69. package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  70. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-charter.schemas.d.ts +6 -7
  71. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-charter.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  72. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-charter.schemas.js +6 -13
  73. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-charter.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  74. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-validation.d.ts +0 -11
  75. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  76. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-validation.js +0 -19
  77. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-persona-validation.js.map +1 -1
  78. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-role-template.schemas.d.ts +1 -2
  79. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-role-template.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  80. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-role-template.schemas.js +1 -2
  81. package/dist/esm/_core/expert-personas/expert-role-template.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  82. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.registry.d.ts +18 -0
  83. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.registry.d.ts.map +1 -0
  84. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.registry.js +60 -0
  85. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.registry.js.map +1 -0
  86. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.schemas.d.ts +122 -0
  87. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -0
  88. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.schemas.js +15 -0
  89. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.schemas.js.map +1 -0
  90. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/capability-map-output-set-generation.schemas.d.ts +11 -11
  91. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-drafts.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  92. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-drafts.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  93. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-drafts.family-aspects.js +25 -0
  94. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-drafts.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  95. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-specification-drafts-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  96. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-specification-drafts-generation.schemas.js +17 -4
  97. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-specification-drafts-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  98. package/dist/esm/_core/flows-actors-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  99. package/dist/esm/_core/flows-actors-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  100. package/dist/esm/_core/flows-actors-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  101. package/dist/esm/_core/frontend-component-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  102. package/dist/esm/_core/frontend-component-specification.schemas.js +19 -1
  103. package/dist/esm/_core/frontend-component-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  104. package/dist/esm/_core/full-custom-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  105. package/dist/esm/_core/full-custom-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  106. package/dist/esm/_core/full-custom-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  107. package/dist/esm/_core/guidance-flow-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  108. package/dist/esm/_core/guidance-flow-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  109. package/dist/esm/_core/guidance-flow-specification.schemas.js +14 -0
  110. package/dist/esm/_core/guidance-flow-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  111. package/dist/esm/_core/index.d.ts +3 -0
  112. package/dist/esm/_core/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  113. package/dist/esm/_core/index.js +3 -0
  114. package/dist/esm/_core/index.js.map +1 -1
  115. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts +22 -22
  116. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  117. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.js +5 -40
  118. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  119. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-validation.d.ts +15 -0
  120. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  121. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-validation.js.map +1 -1
  122. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market.family-aspects.d.ts +9 -0
  123. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  124. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market.family-aspects.js +227 -0
  125. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  126. package/dist/esm/_core/onboarding-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  127. package/dist/esm/_core/onboarding-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  128. package/dist/esm/_core/onboarding-view-specification.schemas.js +14 -0
  129. package/dist/esm/_core/onboarding-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  130. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  131. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-generation.schemas.js +11 -5
  132. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  133. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-validation.d.ts +66 -9
  134. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  135. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-validation.js +62 -20
  136. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan-validation.js.map +1 -1
  137. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  138. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  139. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.family-aspects.js +31 -0
  140. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  141. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.schemas.d.ts +4 -1
  142. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  143. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.schemas.js +4 -1
  144. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  145. package/dist/esm/_core/provider-specification.schemas.d.ts +82 -0
  146. package/dist/esm/_core/provider-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -0
  147. package/dist/esm/_core/provider-specification.schemas.js +144 -0
  148. package/dist/esm/_core/provider-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -0
  149. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  150. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-generation.schemas.js +13 -8
  151. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  152. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-validation.d.ts +15 -0
  153. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  154. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements-snapshot-validation.js.map +1 -1
  155. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements.family-aspects.d.ts +9 -0
  156. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  157. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements.family-aspects.js +40 -0
  158. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  159. package/dist/esm/_core/resource-specification.schemas.d.ts +22 -0
  160. package/dist/esm/_core/resource-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  161. package/dist/esm/_core/resource-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  162. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  163. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot-generation.schemas.js +7 -2
  164. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  165. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot-validation.d.ts +15 -0
  166. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  167. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap-snapshot-validation.js.map +1 -1
  168. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  169. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  170. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap.family-aspects.js +26 -0
  171. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  172. package/dist/esm/_core/utils/family-ref-stamping.d.ts +64 -0
  173. package/dist/esm/_core/utils/family-ref-stamping.d.ts.map +1 -0
  174. package/dist/esm/_core/utils/family-ref-stamping.js +73 -0
  175. package/dist/esm/_core/utils/family-ref-stamping.js.map +1 -0
  176. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  177. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-snapshot-generation.schemas.js +23 -9
  178. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision-snapshot-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  179. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision.family-aspects.d.ts +11 -0
  180. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  181. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision.family-aspects.js +63 -0
  182. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  183. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-coding-tasks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +0 -4
  184. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-coding-tasks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  185. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-fact-specification.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +193 -38
  186. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-fact-specification.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  187. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-fact-specification.application-creation.schemas.js +157 -57
  188. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-fact-specification.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  189. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-release-policy-specification.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +3 -3
  190. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-release-policy-specification.application-creation.schemas.js +3 -3
  191. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-release-policy-specification.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  192. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-specification-family-identity.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +38 -4
  193. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-specification-family-identity.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  194. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-specification-family-identity.application-creation.schemas.js +37 -3
  195. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-specification-family-identity.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  196. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-facts.family-aspects.d.ts +12 -0
  197. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-facts.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  198. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-facts.family-aspects.js +37 -0
  199. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-facts.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  200. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-release-policy.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  201. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-release-policy.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  202. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-release-policy.family-aspects.js +23 -0
  203. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-release-policy.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  204. package/dist/esm/application-creation/journey.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +18 -6
  205. package/dist/esm/application-creation/journey.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  206. package/dist/esm/application-creation/journey.application-creation.schemas.js +18 -6
  207. package/dist/esm/application-creation/journey.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  208. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +101 -85
  209. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  210. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.js +171 -86
  211. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  212. package/dist/esm/application-creation/structured-artifact-landing.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +2 -0
  213. package/dist/esm/application-creation/structured-artifact-landing.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  214. package/dist/esm/application-creation/structured-artifact-landing.application-creation.schemas.js +2 -0
  215. package/dist/esm/application-creation/structured-artifact-landing.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  216. package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.d.ts +11 -0
  217. package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.d.ts.map +1 -1
  218. package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.js +11 -0
  219. package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.js.map +1 -1
  220. package/dist/esm/assurance/application-document-publication.schemas.d.ts +20 -6
  221. package/dist/esm/assurance/application-document-publication.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  222. package/dist/esm/assurance/application-document-publication.schemas.js +26 -10
  223. package/dist/esm/assurance/application-document-publication.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  224. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.d.ts +999 -2
  225. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  226. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js +2127 -61
  227. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  228. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.schemas.d.ts +26 -0
  229. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  230. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  231. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.definitions.js +18 -3
  232. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  233. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.schemas.d.ts +32 -2
  234. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  235. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.schemas.js +32 -2
  236. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  237. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.d.ts +36 -0
  238. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -0
  239. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.js +859 -0
  240. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.js.map +1 -0
  241. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-external-framework-mapping.d.ts +90 -0
  242. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-external-framework-mapping.d.ts.map +1 -0
  243. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-external-framework-mapping.js +134 -0
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@@ -1,11 +1,41 @@
1
- import { EngineCapability, SubjectExportPurpose } from "@wildo-ai/saas-models";
1
+ import { AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode, AuthMethod, ClientInstanceIdScope, ConfigurationValidationDomain, DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES, DataProcessingConsent, DataRetentionClass, EngineCapability, EngineCapabilityResolutionMode, ErasureRetentionMode, ErrorType, FileStatus, JwtPrivateKeys, JwtPublicKeys, ExecutionContext_ExecutionType, LifecycleStage, OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin, OAuthGrantType, OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES, ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY, OrganizationMemberStatus, PersonalDataCategory, ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema, OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind, PersistenceAdapter, ResourceOperationImplementationCoverage, ResourceOperationRequestContractBreadth, ResourceOperationVariantType, ResourcePersistenceAdapterIsolation, ResourcePrimaryScope, RetentionStatus, SubjectExportPurpose, UserStatus, } from "@wildo-ai/saas-models";
2
2
  import { AssuranceProgramAuthorityBasisSchema, AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind, } from "./assurance-authority-basis.schemas.js";
3
3
  import { AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind } from "./assurance-program.schemas.js";
4
+ import { ASSURANCE_EVIDENCE_REQUIREMENT_BODIES } from "./assurance-evidence-requirement-bodies.definitions.js";
5
+ import { ASSURANCE_VERIFICATION_REQUIREMENT_BODIES } from "./assurance-verification-requirement-bodies.definitions.js";
4
6
  import { INITIAL_ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_CATALOG } from "./assurance-objective-catalog.definitions.js";
5
7
  import { createInitialAssuranceDocumentAuthorityCatalog } from "./assurance-document-system.definitions.js";
6
8
  import { INITIAL_ASSURANCE_SOURCE_REGISTRY } from "./assurance-source-registry.definitions.js";
7
9
  import { AssuranceSourceUse } from "./assurance-sources.schemas.js";
8
10
  export const SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_HOST_CONFIGURATION_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF = "implementation-artifact-kind:application.subject-data-export-configuration";
11
+ /**
12
+ * The review OCCURRENCE record — who reviewed the privileged-access population, when, and what they
13
+ * concluded — supplied by the application as a host artifact (#202).
14
+ *
15
+ * A host artifact rather than something the engine records, because Wildo cannot witness a human
16
+ * review. It can enumerate WHO holds privileged access
17
+ * (`privileged-access-review.backend.utils.ts`); it cannot know that a person looked at that list,
18
+ * nor what they decided. A framework that wrote a review record would be asserting a decision nobody
19
+ * made — the same line the governed-document fact families draw between a derivation and a decision.
20
+ *
21
+ * Note the objective's own caveat, which this ref must not be read as escaping: the record is
22
+ * retained as traceable evidence WITHOUT implying remediation completion. It proves a review
23
+ * happened, never that what it found was fixed.
24
+ */
25
+ export const PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_HOST_RECORD_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF = "implementation-artifact-kind:application.privileged-access-review-record";
26
+ /** Stable semantic capability identity for the review the engine ENUMERATES for and the operator PERFORMS. */
27
+ export const PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF = "capability:privileged-access-review";
28
+ /*
29
+ * The scopes at which the engine can enumerate privileged access, DERIVED from the runtime vocabulary
30
+ * it actually branches on rather than transcribed.
31
+ *
32
+ * A deliberate SUBSET of `ResourcePrimaryScope`, and the subset is the honest part: `USER_SELF` and
33
+ * `ANONYMOUS` confer no privileged access, so claiming them would widen the capability to two scopes
34
+ * the enumeration does not — and could not — cover. Written as enum MEMBERS so a rename moves it,
35
+ * which is what the anchoring rule asks for; what it does not ask for is claiming every member of an
36
+ * enum merely because it is closed.
37
+ */
38
+ const PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_SCOPES = [ResourcePrimaryScope.APPLICATION, ResourcePrimaryScope.ORGANIZATIONS];
9
39
  /** Stable semantic capability identity used by host composition to derive only selected proofs. */
10
40
  export const SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF = "capability:subject-data-export";
11
41
  export const INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_REF = "assurance-authority-basis:wildo-safe-baseline-v1";
@@ -16,6 +46,1309 @@ const AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-08-03T00:00:00.000Z";
16
46
  const AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF = "reviewer:wildo-assurance-authority";
17
47
  const HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-08-13T08:57:58.000Z";
18
48
  const HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF = "reviewer:paul-cayon-assurance-owner";
49
+ /*
50
+ * The 2026-09-01 mapping tranche — NIST, GDPR and HIPAA, decided by the owner.
51
+ *
52
+ * Stamped with the FRAMEWORK's own authority identity rather than a person's. `reviewer:paul-cayon-assurance-owner` is reserved for entries the owner personally
53
+ * approved (today: the HIPAA privileged-access-review requirement above), and putting a person's ref on a mapping they have not read would be the fabricated review
54
+ * this layer exists to refuse. The review record for these is the COMMIT — `one-source-of-truth.md` Rule 7: the author is the commit author, the instant is the commit
55
+ * time, and independence is enforced by the forge rather than by bespoke code.
56
+ */
57
+ const MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-01T00:00:00.000Z";
58
+ /** The 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche — three objectives the COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL capability already attests. */
59
+ const AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
60
+ /** The 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche — objectives selected by CODE-MARKER coverage rather than by reading the catalog. */
61
+ const PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
62
+ /** The 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche — the three most heavily marked objectives that answer "how much authority, and over which rows". */
63
+ const AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
64
+ /** The 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche — how identity is re-proved, how its policy changes are evidenced, and when access ends. */
65
+ const IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
66
+ /** The 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche — the four privacy objectives a governed privacy notice quotes most directly. */
67
+ const DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
68
+ /** The 2026-09-02 attribution tranche — what the trail must be able to say about isolation, egress, provisioning and client identity. */
69
+ const ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
70
+ /** The 2026-09-02 declaration tranche — objectives satisfied by what a schema or config DECLARES, plus the trail that records the declaration changing. */
71
+ const DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
72
+ /** The 2026-09-02 reachability tranche — objectives whose control is WHICH DOOR exists, and which values it refuses. */
73
+ const REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
74
+ /** The 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche — two objectives whose vocabulary existed and was only in the wrong package or unexported. */
75
+ const SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
76
+ /** The 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche — two objectives whose vocabulary is the SUBSTRATE the control runs against. */
77
+ const DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
78
+ /** The 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche — three objectives whose control is a DISTINCTION INSIDE one classification vocabulary. */
79
+ const DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
80
+ /**
81
+ * Which objectives the basis can carry an obligation for, and the expectation refs each one binds.
82
+ *
83
+ * ONE source for a fact two very different callers need. The basis composer below builds its three expectation-authority arrays from this; the compliance-programme
84
+ * generation normalizer (`assurance-program-generation.schemas.ts`) reads it to STAMP an obligation's `implementationExpectationRefs`, `evidenceExpectationRefs` and
85
+ * `verificationExpectationRefs` — all three `.min(1)` on every entry — and to REFUSE an objective that is not here.
86
+ *
87
+ * That refusal is the point. The objective catalog defines 49 objectives and this binds a SUBSET of them; the gap is tracked as #207. Do not quote a count from here
88
+ * or from any prose — count the entries below, because every tranche that lands makes a written number wrong and a written number is what stops the next reader
89
+ * measuring. Without the lookup a producer would be free to invent an expectation ref for any unbound objective, and the
90
+ * result would validate: a programme claiming coverage the framework has never stated a demand for. Deriving the refs instead makes the
91
+ * coverage ceiling mechanical rather than a sentence in an issue (#207).
92
+ *
93
+ * Growing this is FRAMEWORK authoring, not generation — see #207. Each entry says what an objective demands of an application, which is Wildo's decision to make.
94
+ */
95
+ export const ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS = [
96
+ {
97
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW", objectiveVersion: 1 },
98
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:privileged-access-review",
99
+ /*
100
+ * TWO capabilities, and the second is what makes the binding honest (#202).
101
+ *
102
+ * `capability:audit-events` was the only one for as long as this objective had no implementation,
103
+ * and on its own it says the wrong thing: audit events are bound to many objectives and record
104
+ * that access CHANGED, never that anyone reviewed who holds it. The review capability is what
105
+ * carries the part Wildo actually supplies — the enumeration — and the host-artifact requirement
106
+ * that names the part it cannot: the occurrence record.
107
+ */
108
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF],
109
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:privileged-access-review-occurrences",
110
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence"],
111
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:privileged-access-review",
112
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:privileged-access-review"],
113
+ },
114
+ {
115
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
116
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:subject-data-export",
117
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: [SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF],
118
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:subject-data-export-receipt",
119
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt"],
120
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:subject-data-export",
121
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:subject-data-export"],
122
+ },
123
+ {
124
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
125
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:subject-erasure",
126
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:subject-erasure"],
127
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:subject-erasure-execution",
128
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record"],
129
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:subject-erasure",
130
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:subject-erasure"],
131
+ },
132
+ {
133
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
134
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:security-event-emission",
135
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
136
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:security-event-record",
137
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:security-event-record"],
138
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:security-event-emission",
139
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:security-event-emission"],
140
+ },
141
+ {
142
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
143
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:authorization-decision-audit",
144
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
145
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:authorization-decision-record",
146
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record"],
147
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:authorization-decision-audit",
148
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:authorization-decision-audit"],
149
+ },
150
+ {
151
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR", objectiveVersion: 1 },
152
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:multi-factor-authentication",
153
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:multi-factor-authentication"],
154
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:multi-factor-enrolment",
155
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:multi-factor-enrolment-record"],
156
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:multi-factor-authentication",
157
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:multi-factor-authentication"],
158
+ },
159
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche — see the source-requirement block for the verified implementations ── */
160
+ {
161
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
162
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution",
163
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
164
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:auditable-event-actor-record",
165
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:auditable-event-actor-record"],
166
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution",
167
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:auditable-event-actor-attribution"],
168
+ },
169
+ {
170
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
171
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration",
172
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
173
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record",
174
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record"],
175
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration",
176
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration"],
177
+ },
178
+ {
179
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
180
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit",
181
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
182
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-record",
183
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-record"],
184
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit",
185
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-audit"],
186
+ },
187
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
188
+ {
189
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
190
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence",
191
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
192
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record",
193
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record"],
194
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence",
195
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence"],
196
+ },
197
+ {
198
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
199
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:credential-state-transition-record",
200
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
201
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:credential-state-transition-record",
202
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"],
203
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:credential-state-transition-record",
204
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"],
205
+ },
206
+ {
207
+ /*
208
+ * TWO capabilities, and that is the point of this entry. The floor is what RETAINS the
209
+ * administrator — a refusal — and the audit trail is what makes a breach visible when an erasure
210
+ * acknowledgement is allowed to strand a scope anyway. Naming only the floor would claim
211
+ * prevention the design deliberately does not always offer; naming only the audit would claim a
212
+ * record of something nothing prevents.
213
+ */
214
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
215
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor",
216
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:administrative-continuity-floor", "capability:audit-events"],
217
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:administrative-continuity-breach-record",
218
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:administrative-continuity-breach-record"],
219
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor",
220
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:administrative-continuity-floor"],
221
+ },
222
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
223
+ {
224
+ /*
225
+ * ONE capability, and the omission is the honest part. `capability:audit-events` is NOT required
226
+ * here, because the half of this control that most deserves an audit row does not produce one:
227
+ * every `assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling` call site is a custom-impl service, so its
228
+ * `role_ceiling_exceeded` refusal never passes through `runAuthorizationPhase` and the denial
229
+ * funnel never sees it (measured 2026-09-02, filed separately). Requiring the audit capability
230
+ * would make the programme claim a record that is not written.
231
+ */
232
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
233
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling",
234
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:operation-role-authorization"],
235
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:operation-role-declaration",
236
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:operation-role-declaration"],
237
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling",
238
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:granted-authority-ceiling"],
239
+ },
240
+ {
241
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
242
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:scope-confined-query",
243
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:organization-unit-scope-confinement"],
244
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:conferring-grant-record",
245
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:conferring-grant-record"],
246
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:scope-confined-query",
247
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:scope-confined-query"],
248
+ },
249
+ {
250
+ /*
251
+ * TWO capabilities, for the reason `ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY` has two: the grant machinery is
252
+ * what CONFINES the delegation (PKCE proof-of-possession, exact redirect, a token carrying no
253
+ * more than the grant declared) and the audit trail is what makes each decision READABLE — five
254
+ * distinct events covering approval, refusal, persistence, issuance and a failed exchange.
255
+ * Naming only the exchange would claim a deliberate authorization nobody can review afterwards.
256
+ */
257
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
258
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange",
259
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:delegated-authorization"],
260
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:delegated-authorization-decision-record",
261
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:delegated-authorization-decision-record"],
262
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange",
263
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:delegated-authorization-exchange"],
264
+ },
265
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
266
+ {
267
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
268
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof",
269
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:step-up-authentication"],
270
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:step-up-challenge-record",
271
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:step-up-challenge-record"],
272
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof",
273
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:high-impact-action-reproof"],
274
+ },
275
+ {
276
+ /*
277
+ * NO new capability, deliberately. This objective's control is not a mechanism an application
278
+ * selects — it is that a change to the authored authentication posture is DETECTED at startup and
279
+ * evidenced once, which the audit trail already does through
280
+ * `APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED`. Minting a second capability identity for the configuration
281
+ * itself would ask an application to select something it cannot decline.
282
+ */
283
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
284
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection",
285
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
286
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:authentication-posture-change-record",
287
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:authentication-posture-change-record"],
288
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection",
289
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:authentication-posture-change-detection"],
290
+ },
291
+ {
292
+ /*
293
+ * TWO capabilities, and the objective's own wording is why: access is "withdrawn when the
294
+ * relationship conferring them ends, and restoring access is as attributable as removing it."
295
+ * The status vocabulary is what WITHDRAWS; the audit trail is what makes the restoration
296
+ * attributable. A withdrawal nobody can see reversed is half the control.
297
+ */
298
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
299
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal",
300
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:access-withdrawal-on-conferring-status", "capability:audit-events"],
301
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record",
302
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record"],
303
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal",
304
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:conferring-relationship-withdrawal"],
305
+ },
306
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
307
+ {
308
+ /*
309
+ * TWO capabilities. Concealment is what makes a retained row behave as deleted; the audit trail is
310
+ * what makes the destruction DECISION deliberate, attributable and evidenced — and it is also the
311
+ * only door onto a retained row, since the see-through read is audited. Either alone describes
312
+ * half of an objective whose whole subject is destroying data on purpose and on a schedule.
313
+ */
314
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
315
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment",
316
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:retained-record-concealment"],
317
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:destruction-decision-record",
318
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:destruction-decision-record"],
319
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment",
320
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment"],
321
+ },
322
+ {
323
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
324
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:purpose-limited-egress",
325
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:client-install-identifier-policy"],
326
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration",
327
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration"],
328
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:purpose-limited-egress",
329
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:purpose-limited-egress"],
330
+ },
331
+ {
332
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
333
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:declared-retention-window",
334
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:declared-retention-window"],
335
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:retention-window-declaration",
336
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:retention-window-declaration"],
337
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:declared-retention-window",
338
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:declared-retention-window"],
339
+ },
340
+ {
341
+ /*
342
+ * TWO capabilities, and here the audit trail is not merely corroborating — it IS the record. The
343
+ * objective demands a decision recorded "exactly once and never lost to a race, naming the
344
+ * previous and the resulting value", which is precisely what `.isAuditEvidence()` on the two
345
+ * consent leaves produces through the single emission point every consent-changing verb routes
346
+ * through. The vocabulary capability says WHAT may be decided; the audit says it was.
347
+ */
348
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD", objectiveVersion: 1 },
349
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:single-consent-emission-point",
350
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:consent-decision-record"],
351
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:consent-decision-transition-record",
352
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:consent-decision-transition-record"],
353
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:single-consent-emission-point",
354
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:single-consent-emission-point"],
355
+ },
356
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 attribution tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
357
+ {
358
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
359
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy",
360
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:caller-derived-tenancy"],
361
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:tenancy-derivation-declaration",
362
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:tenancy-derivation-declaration"],
363
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy",
364
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:caller-derived-tenancy"],
365
+ },
366
+ {
367
+ /*
368
+ * NO new capability. This objective is ABOUT the audit trail rather than served by it: a
369
+ * privileged action must be attributable and the authorization effect it had reconstructable
370
+ * from the record itself, and the configuration deciding what the trail captures is governed as
371
+ * part of the trail. There is nothing else for an application to select.
372
+ */
373
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
374
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:self-describing-audit-record",
375
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
376
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:reconstructable-authorization-effect",
377
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:reconstructable-authorization-effect"],
378
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:self-describing-audit-record",
379
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:self-describing-audit-record"],
380
+ },
381
+ {
382
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
383
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:outbound-call-recording",
384
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
385
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:outbound-call-record",
386
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:outbound-call-record"],
387
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:outbound-call-recording",
388
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:outbound-call-recording"],
389
+ },
390
+ {
391
+ /*
392
+ * The audit trail alone, and the reason is the same shape as `SESSION_ASSURANCE`: the control is
393
+ * that the switches conferring directory authority are DECLARED rather than implied, and what
394
+ * makes a declaration attestable is that its before/after values are audit evidence. Configuring
395
+ * `defaultUnitRole` IS granting a role, and flipping `autoDeactivateUsers` off silently strands
396
+ * access — both are reconstructable from the trail and from nowhere else.
397
+ */
398
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING", objectiveVersion: 1 },
399
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:declared-directory-authority",
400
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
401
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:directory-authority-switch-record",
402
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:directory-authority-switch-record"],
403
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:declared-directory-authority",
404
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:declared-directory-authority"],
405
+ },
406
+ {
407
+ /*
408
+ * TWO capabilities: the provenance vocabulary says WHAT a client's identity rests on, and the
409
+ * audit trail carries the objective's second half — that a client created by a party which
410
+ * authenticated to nothing, and every refused assertion, are both recorded.
411
+ */
412
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
413
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:verifiable-client-identity",
414
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:client-registration-provenance"],
415
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:client-registration-provenance-record",
416
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:client-registration-provenance-record"],
417
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:verifiable-client-identity",
418
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:verifiable-client-identity"],
419
+ },
420
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 declaration tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
421
+ {
422
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
423
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:operation-serviceability",
424
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:operation-implementation-coverage"],
425
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:operation-serviceability-declaration",
426
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:operation-serviceability-declaration"],
427
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:operation-serviceability",
428
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:operation-serviceability"],
429
+ },
430
+ {
431
+ /*
432
+ * TWO capabilities — the mechanism AND its record. The second half arrived with #506.
433
+ *
434
+ * The mechanism is real and fail-closed: the upload handler awaits `initiateScan`, which awaits the
435
+ * UPLOADED -> SCANNING transition before the pipeline fires, so a file on a `scanPolicy: 'required'`
436
+ * field is already non-downloadable when the caller is told the upload succeeded (#433).
437
+ *
438
+ * The RECORD is now real too. `FileScanningBackendService` emits `FILE_MALWARE_DETECTED` when a
439
+ * scanner concludes an infection and `FILE_MALWARE_SCAN_FAILED` when the scan could not run — two
440
+ * events rather than one severity, because an infection means the control WORKED and a failure
441
+ * means it did not RUN, and from outside they are indistinguishable (the file is non-downloadable
442
+ * either way). Both are emitted after the terminal transition and carry the status the RECORD
443
+ * holds, so the trail cannot describe a state the row does not.
444
+ *
445
+ * This binding previously named ONE capability with the absence stated at the site, because
446
+ * binding `capability:audit-events` over an unwritten record would have made every programme
447
+ * assert a record that is not written — the same reason `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE` binds
448
+ * narrower. That reason is now discharged rather than waived.
449
+ */
450
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
451
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:ingested-content-inspection",
452
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:ingested-content-inspection"],
453
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:ingested-content-inspection",
454
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:ingested-content-inspection"],
455
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:ingested-content-inspection",
456
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:ingested-content-inspection"],
457
+ },
458
+ {
459
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
460
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:declared-persistence-isolation",
461
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:declared-persistence-isolation"],
462
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:persistence-isolation-declaration",
463
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:persistence-isolation-declaration"],
464
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:declared-persistence-isolation",
465
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:declared-persistence-isolation"],
466
+ },
467
+ {
468
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
469
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories",
470
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:personal-data-field-inventory"],
471
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:personal-data-field-declaration",
472
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:personal-data-field-declaration"],
473
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories",
474
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:declared-personal-data-categories"],
475
+ },
476
+ {
477
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING", objectiveVersion: 1 },
478
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in",
479
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:provider-selection-opt-in"],
480
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:selected-processor-declaration",
481
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:selected-processor-declaration"],
482
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in",
483
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:provider-selection-opt-in"],
484
+ },
485
+ {
486
+ /*
487
+ * TWO capabilities. `UserStatus` is the vocabulary that decides whether a principal may
488
+ * authenticate at all; the audit trail is what makes the change EVIDENCED, which the objective
489
+ * demands by name. The status also carries `.excludeFromUpdate()`, so the change cannot arrive
490
+ * as a side effect of an unrelated write — a guard the vocabulary alone does not express.
491
+ */
492
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
493
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility",
494
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:authentication-eligibility-status"],
495
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:authentication-eligibility-change-record",
496
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:authentication-eligibility-change-record"],
497
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility",
498
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:guarded-authentication-eligibility"],
499
+ },
500
+ {
501
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
502
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:collection-export-recording",
503
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
504
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:collection-export-record",
505
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:collection-export-record"],
506
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:collection-export-recording",
507
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:collection-export-recording"],
508
+ },
509
+ {
510
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
511
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:record-context-preservation",
512
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
513
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:record-context-record",
514
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:record-context-record"],
515
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:record-context-preservation",
516
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:record-context-preservation"],
517
+ },
518
+ {
519
+ /*
520
+ * The audit trail alone, because the objective's exception is where its content lives: backend-only
521
+ * material does not cross the client boundary EXCEPT at a single first exposure that is itself
522
+ * audited. The non-crossing half is a DTO-selection property with no vocabulary to attest; the
523
+ * audited exception is the part a programme can carry.
524
+ */
525
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
526
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:audited-first-exposure",
527
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
528
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:first-exposure-record",
529
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:first-exposure-record"],
530
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:audited-first-exposure",
531
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:audited-first-exposure"],
532
+ },
533
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 reachability tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
534
+ {
535
+ /*
536
+ * TWO capabilities, and together they are the whole control. The VARIANT decides whether a door
537
+ * faces a client at all; the ROLE GATE decides who may open the ones that do. `credit-pool TOP_UP`
538
+ * was once an API_CALL gated on ORG_OWNER — a tenant owner could self-grant unlimited credits —
539
+ * and the fix was to move it to INTERNAL_CALL, which is a reachability decision the role gate
540
+ * alone cannot express.
541
+ */
542
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
543
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant",
544
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:operation-reachability-gate", "capability:operation-role-authorization"],
545
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:credit-grant-reachability-declaration",
546
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:credit-grant-reachability-declaration"],
547
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant",
548
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:system-gated-credit-grant"],
549
+ },
550
+ {
551
+ /*
552
+ * The same pair, for the same reason: `ScopeFeatures` writes cannot be field-protected, because
553
+ * the super-admin path must write them — so the ENTIRE self-grant boundary for paid entitlements
554
+ * is one role gate on operations that stay non-client-reachable.
555
+ */
556
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
557
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write",
558
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:operation-reachability-gate", "capability:operation-role-authorization"],
559
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration",
560
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration"],
561
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write",
562
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:operator-gated-entitlement-write"],
563
+ },
564
+ {
565
+ /*
566
+ * The sweep that LIFTS a time-boxed restriction, bound to the two status vocabularies it moves
567
+ * between — a suspended user and a suspended membership. It reuses
568
+ * `capability:authentication-eligibility-status` rather than minting a third: the statuses being
569
+ * released are the same ones `IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE` attests being set, and two capability identities
570
+ * for one vocabulary is what an application would have to select twice.
571
+ */
572
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND", objectiveVersion: 1 },
573
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release",
574
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:authentication-eligibility-status", "capability:membership-eligibility-status"],
575
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:restriction-release-schedule",
576
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:restriction-release-schedule"],
577
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release",
578
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:time-boxed-restriction-release"],
579
+ },
580
+ {
581
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
582
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:constrained-redirect-target",
583
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:redirect-target-constraint"],
584
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:redirect-target-declaration",
585
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:redirect-target-declaration"],
586
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:constrained-redirect-target",
587
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:constrained-redirect-target"],
588
+ },
589
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
590
+ {
591
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
592
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:server-authored-token-claims",
593
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:reserved-token-claim-authorship"],
594
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:reserved-claim-set-declaration",
595
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:reserved-claim-set-declaration"],
596
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:server-authored-token-claims",
597
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:server-authored-token-claims"],
598
+ },
599
+ {
600
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
601
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority",
602
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:startup-configuration-validation"],
603
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:field-authority-declaration",
604
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:field-authority-declaration"],
605
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority",
606
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:boot-proven-field-authority"],
607
+ },
608
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
609
+ {
610
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS", objectiveVersion: 1 },
611
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness",
612
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:declared-uniqueness-verification"],
613
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:uniqueness-verification-outcome",
614
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:uniqueness-verification-outcome"],
615
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness",
616
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:datastore-proven-uniqueness"],
617
+ },
618
+ {
619
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
620
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability",
621
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:self-reported-lifecycle-stage"],
622
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:lifecycle-stage-declaration",
623
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:lifecycle-stage-declaration"],
624
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability",
625
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:stage-confers-no-capability"],
626
+ },
627
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
628
+ {
629
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED", objectiveVersion: 1 },
630
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:diagnosable-refusal",
631
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:refusal-classification"],
632
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:refusal-classification-record",
633
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:refusal-classification-record"],
634
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:diagnosable-refusal",
635
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:diagnosable-refusal"],
636
+ },
637
+ {
638
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
639
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request",
640
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:refusal-classification"],
641
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:over-limit-refusal-record",
642
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:over-limit-refusal-record"],
643
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request",
644
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:bounded-unauthenticated-request"],
645
+ },
646
+ {
647
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS", objectiveVersion: 1 },
648
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:named-constraint-conflict",
649
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:refusal-classification"],
650
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:constraint-conflict-record",
651
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:constraint-conflict-record"],
652
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:named-constraint-conflict",
653
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:named-constraint-conflict"],
654
+ },
655
+ {
656
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
657
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key",
658
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:verifiable-key-retirement"],
659
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:key-retirement-declaration",
660
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:key-retirement-declaration"],
661
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key",
662
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:bounded-retired-signing-key"],
663
+ },
664
+ {
665
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
666
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:values-free-secret-contract",
667
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:values-free-secret-contract"],
668
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:secret-contract-shape-declaration",
669
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:secret-contract-shape-declaration"],
670
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:values-free-secret-contract",
671
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:values-free-secret-contract"],
672
+ },
673
+ {
674
+ /*
675
+ * The FORTY-NINTH, and the only one that needed the engine to grow a control rather than the
676
+ * basis to find a vocabulary.
677
+ *
678
+ * Five candidate vocabularies were checked and eliminated by measurement: `SessionType` (the
679
+ * eviction does not consult it), a revocation-reason enum (none existed in `saas-models`), the
680
+ * configured axis (user type — an application-defined open string), and the ordering itself (an
681
+ * ordering is not a set). What was actually missing was EVIDENCE: the eviction enforcing the cap
682
+ * left only a debug line, so a security-relevant token-lifecycle act had no durable record at
683
+ * all — which `CLAUDE.md`'s assurance-by-construction rule asks for by name.
684
+ *
685
+ * `CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SESSION_EVICTED` closes it, and the binding is honest because the
686
+ * record carries `evictedIssuedAt`. The objective calls the FIFO ordering "the property that
687
+ * pushes a stolen chain out instead of a legitimate one"; a record naming only the victim would
688
+ * prove a session ended without proving the right one did. Naming when the retired chain was
689
+ * issued is what makes the ordering reviewable from the trail rather than merely implemented.
690
+ */
691
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
692
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions",
693
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
694
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:session-eviction-record",
695
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:session-eviction-record"],
696
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions",
697
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-requirement:bounded-concurrent-sessions"],
698
+ },
699
+ ];
700
+ /**
701
+ * Every capability the basis can attest, minus the implementation revision the composer supplies.
702
+ *
703
+ * ONE source, for the same reason as {@link ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS}. The composer below turns these into `capabilityAuthorityDescriptors`; the
704
+ * compliance-programme normalizer reads them to emit the `capabilityAuthorities` a programme must carry for every capability its implementation decisions select —
705
+ * the family refuses a selection with no declared authority (`UNKNOWN_CAPABILITY`).
706
+ *
707
+ * `implementationRevision` is deliberately absent: it identifies the engine build being attested and is only known to the composer's caller.
708
+ */
709
+ export const ASSURANCE_CAPABILITY_AUTHORITIES = [
710
+ {
711
+ /*
712
+ * Ingested-content inspection, anchored on the vocabulary the engine BRANCHES on.
713
+ *
714
+ * `FileStatus` is derived whole, deliberately: the members that are not the good outcome —
715
+ * `INFECTED`, `QUARANTINED`, `FAILED` — are the substance of the claim, not its exceptions. Naming
716
+ * only `CLEAN` would describe a system in which inspection never concludes anything else.
717
+ *
718
+ * It is the right vocabulary because the engine reads it for BOTH halves of the control: the scan
719
+ * outcome (`FILE_STATUS_TRANSITIONS` maps SCANNING -> CLEAN | INFECTED | FAILED, and INFECTED ->
720
+ * QUARANTINED) and servability (`FILE_DOWNLOADABLE_STATUSES`). A scan that concluded and a file that
721
+ * may be served are the same decision expressed once.
722
+ *
723
+ * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: the status vocabulary and the transition guard exist in every application. What
724
+ * is operator-configured is whether a scanner is reachable (`InfraCapability.ANTIVIRUS_SCANNING`,
725
+ * fulfilled by ClamAV, with YARA optional beside it) and whether a field declares `scanPolicy:
726
+ * 'required'`. Exactly two axes, and that stayed accurate through the 2026-09-09 repair of the
727
+ * application-wide switch: reachability IS the application-wide opt-in — `shouldScan` falls back to
728
+ * `clamavScanner.isConfigured() || yaraScanner.isEnabled()` for a field that declares no policy — so
729
+ * the first axis now carries a second consequence rather than a third axis being added. Before that
730
+ * repair the fallback read a configuration path no schema declares and answered `false` in every
731
+ * application, which is why this prose has never named a global flag. Deriving keeps the count at two;
732
+ * a separately-declared boolean would have made it three, one of them able to disagree with the other.
733
+ * NOT `REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY`: the engine slot that once spelled this was removed
734
+ * in #292 because no provider token could fill it, so requiring it would make the objective
735
+ * uncomposable for every application.
736
+ */
737
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:ingested-content-inspection", capabilityVersion: 1 },
738
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
739
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(FileStatus).sort().map((status) => `file-status:${status}`),
740
+ profiles: [],
741
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
742
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
743
+ },
744
+ {
745
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:audit-events", capabilityVersion: 1 },
746
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
747
+ implementationRefs: [`engine-capability:${EngineCapability.COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL}`],
748
+ profiles: [],
749
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
750
+ availability: {
751
+ kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY,
752
+ engineCapability: EngineCapability.COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL,
753
+ },
754
+ },
755
+ {
756
+ /*
757
+ * Privileged-access review: the engine ENUMERATES, the operator DECIDES and RECORDS (#202).
758
+ *
759
+ * `ALWAYS_AVAILABLE` because the enumeration needs no engine capability to be switched on — roles
760
+ * and memberships exist in every application, and `enumeratePrivilegedAccessPopulation` reads
761
+ * them through the ordinary repositories.
762
+ *
763
+ * The host-artifact requirement is the whole point of the split: without it this capability would
764
+ * read as "Wildo reviews privileged access", which is false and is the claim the objective's four
765
+ * demands would then be quoted against. With it, an application that binds this objective must
766
+ * declare where its review occurrences live, and one that cannot produce them fails to satisfy the
767
+ * capability rather than silently claiming it.
768
+ */
769
+ identity: { capabilityRef: PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF, capabilityVersion: 1 },
770
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
771
+ implementationRefs: [...PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_SCOPES].map((scope) => `privileged-access-scope:${scope}`).sort(),
772
+ profiles: [],
773
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_HOST_RECORD_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF],
774
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
775
+ },
776
+ {
777
+ identity: { capabilityRef: SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF, capabilityVersion: 1 },
778
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
779
+ implementationRefs: [`subject-export-purpose:${SubjectExportPurpose.ACCESS_ART_15}`, `subject-export-purpose:${SubjectExportPurpose.PORTABILITY_ART_20}`],
780
+ profiles: [
781
+ {
782
+ profileRef: "capability-profile:subject-data-export-safe-baseline-v1",
783
+ parameters: [{ parameterRef: "parameter:export-format", allowedOptionRefs: ["option:json-machine-readable"] }],
784
+ },
785
+ ],
786
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_HOST_CONFIGURATION_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF],
787
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
788
+ },
789
+ {
790
+ /*
791
+ * Erasure that RETAINS where the law requires it. `implementationRefs` name the two modes a resource may declare, so the capability is anchored to vocabulary the
792
+ * engine actually branches on rather than to prose — the same discipline as `subject-export-purpose:` above.
793
+ */
794
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:subject-erasure", capabilityVersion: 1 },
795
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
796
+ implementationRefs: [
797
+ `erasure-retention-mode:${ErasureRetentionMode.RETAIN_AND_IMPERSONALIZE}`,
798
+ `erasure-retention-mode:${ErasureRetentionMode.RETAIN_ONLY}`,
799
+ ],
800
+ profiles: [],
801
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
802
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
803
+ },
804
+ {
805
+ /*
806
+ * Second factors that need NO provider procurement. `SMS_OTP` and `EMAIL_OTP` are deliberately absent: they depend on the SMS and transactional-email engine
807
+ * capabilities, so naming them here would claim availability an application may not have bought. TOTP and passkeys are engine-native and always there.
808
+ */
809
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:multi-factor-authentication", capabilityVersion: 1 },
810
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
811
+ implementationRefs: [`auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSKEY}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.TOTP}`],
812
+ profiles: [],
813
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
814
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
815
+ },
816
+ {
817
+ /*
818
+ * The administrative-continuity FLOORS, named by the two refusals that ARE the control.
819
+ *
820
+ * `AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode` is the closed vocabulary those refusals answer with, so the
821
+ * implementation refs are the mechanism itself rather than a description of it — the same shape as
822
+ * the erasure modes and auth methods above. A floor is engine-native and unconditional: an
823
+ * application cannot decline to retain an administrator, which is why availability is
824
+ * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE and no host artifact is required.
825
+ */
826
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:administrative-continuity-floor", capabilityVersion: 1 },
827
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
828
+ implementationRefs: [
829
+ `administrative-continuity:${AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode.LAST_APPLICATION_SUPER_ADMIN}`,
830
+ `administrative-continuity:${AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode.LAST_ORGANIZATION_OWNER}`,
831
+ ],
832
+ profiles: [],
833
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
834
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
835
+ },
836
+ {
837
+ /*
838
+ * "How much authority" — the ceiling on what a principal may grant, and the same declared
839
+ * operation-role gate applied at a surface that is not a controller.
840
+ *
841
+ * `implementationRefs` name the two ROLE-TABLE SCOPES the ceiling resolves against, because that
842
+ * split IS the mechanism: a held role is expanded through the hierarchy of the scope that granted
843
+ * it, so an organization-scoped grant can never confer application-scoped authority. Naming the
844
+ * individual roles instead would enumerate an application's own table, which is not the
845
+ * framework's to attest. `USER_SELF` and `ANONYMOUS` are absent because neither carries a role
846
+ * table for a ceiling to resolve against.
847
+ */
848
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:operation-role-authorization", capabilityVersion: 1 },
849
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
850
+ implementationRefs: [`authorization-role-scope:${ResourcePrimaryScope.APPLICATION}`, `authorization-role-scope:${ResourcePrimaryScope.ORGANIZATIONS}`],
851
+ profiles: [],
852
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
853
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
854
+ },
855
+ {
856
+ /*
857
+ * "Over which rows" — the narrowing decision, named by the closed vocabulary it answers with.
858
+ *
859
+ * All four kinds are listed, including the two that do NOT narrow. The stamp records the decision
860
+ * whatever it was, and an access review asking "why does this person see this row" needs
861
+ * `ORGANIZATION_WIDE` and `NOT_NARROWED` as much as `UNIT_NARROWED` — an answer that only ever
862
+ * recorded the confining cases could not distinguish a grant that reached everything from a
863
+ * resource that never participated.
864
+ */
865
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:organization-unit-scope-confinement", capabilityVersion: 1 },
866
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
867
+ implementationRefs: [
868
+ `organization-unit-narrowing:${OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind.DENIED}`,
869
+ `organization-unit-narrowing:${OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind.NOT_NARROWED}`,
870
+ `organization-unit-narrowing:${OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind.ORGANIZATION_WIDE}`,
871
+ `organization-unit-narrowing:${OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind.UNIT_NARROWED}`,
872
+ ],
873
+ profiles: [],
874
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
875
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
876
+ },
877
+ {
878
+ /*
879
+ * The delegated exchange, named by the two grant types that carry a USER's authorization.
880
+ *
881
+ * `CLIENT_CREDENTIALS` is deliberately absent and its absence is the whole distinction: that grant
882
+ * authenticates a machine acting as itself, so there is no user to authorize anything and nothing
883
+ * for this objective to attest. Including it would make a delegated-authorization claim out of an
884
+ * exchange no data subject ever saw.
885
+ */
886
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:delegated-authorization", capabilityVersion: 1 },
887
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
888
+ implementationRefs: [`oauth-grant-type:${OAuthGrantType.AUTHORIZATION_CODE}`, `oauth-grant-type:${OAuthGrantType.REFRESH_TOKEN}`],
889
+ profiles: [],
890
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
891
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
892
+ },
893
+ {
894
+ /*
895
+ * The re-proof ceremony, named by the three factors `reAuthenticate` actually accepts.
896
+ *
897
+ * All three are engine-native, which is what makes this ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: `PASSWORD`, `TOTP` (a
898
+ * code or a backup code, through the same anti-replay authority login uses) and `PASSKEY` (an
899
+ * assertion produced under a STEP_UP ceremony whose challenge key a login assertion cannot
900
+ * redeem). `SMS_OTP` and `EMAIL_OTP` are absent for the same reason they are absent from
901
+ * `capability:multi-factor-authentication` — they need a provider an application may not have
902
+ * bought — and the SSO methods are absent because an IdP assertion is a first factor, not a
903
+ * re-proof that the human is still present.
904
+ *
905
+ * This capability is DISTINCT from `capability:multi-factor-authentication` even though the two
906
+ * overlap on `TOTP` and `PASSKEY`, and merging them would lose the distinction the objectives
907
+ * draw: MFA asks whether a second factor was ever required, step-up asks whether identity was
908
+ * re-proved for THIS action.
909
+ */
910
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:step-up-authentication", capabilityVersion: 1 },
911
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
912
+ implementationRefs: [`auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSKEY}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSWORD}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.TOTP}`],
913
+ profiles: [],
914
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
915
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
916
+ },
917
+ {
918
+ /*
919
+ * Withdrawal when the conferring relationship ends, named by the closed status set the engine
920
+ * branches on: `ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY`, read through
921
+ * `isAuthorityConferringOrganizationStatus`.
922
+ *
923
+ * `TRIAL_EXPIRED` is deliberately NOT in that set and so is absent here — an expired trial stops
924
+ * a tenant BUYING, not its members from administering what they already have, and listing it
925
+ * would claim a withdrawal the engine does not perform. The refs are kept in step with the set
926
+ * by construction rather than by memory: they are the enum members, not a transcription.
927
+ */
928
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:access-withdrawal-on-conferring-status", capabilityVersion: 1 },
929
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
930
+ implementationRefs: [...ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY].sort().map((status) => `organization-status-without-authority:${status}`),
931
+ profiles: [],
932
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
933
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
934
+ },
935
+ {
936
+ /*
937
+ * An erased-but-retained row behaving as deleted, named by the per-record marker that decides it.
938
+ *
939
+ * BOTH members are listed, and `ACTIVE` is not filler: the control is a two-valued rule, and the
940
+ * predicate's hardest recovered defect was about which rows a marker's ABSENCE selects — Mongo's
941
+ * `$ne` matches a null field while Postgres `<>` excludes it under three-valued logic, so the two
942
+ * adapters disagreed about every pre-opt-in row until the SQL compilers were taught
943
+ * `IS DISTINCT FROM`. Naming only `RETAINED` would describe the hidden half of a rule whose
944
+ * difficulty is entirely in the visible half.
945
+ */
946
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:retained-record-concealment", capabilityVersion: 1 },
947
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
948
+ implementationRefs: [`retention-status:${RetentionStatus.ACTIVE}`, `retention-status:${RetentionStatus.RETAINED}`],
949
+ profiles: [],
950
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
951
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
952
+ },
953
+ {
954
+ /*
955
+ * The device-stored pseudonymous identifier, named by the policy vocabulary that governs it.
956
+ *
957
+ * `DISABLED` is the DEFAULT and is the reason this capability is worth attesting at all: absent an
958
+ * explicit application policy nothing is minted, sent, stored or recorded, and the backend
959
+ * additionally REFUSES an inbound header — so a misconfigured client cannot start populating a
960
+ * pseudonymous identifier in an application's retained audit trail without anyone opting in.
961
+ * A capability listing only the collecting scopes would invert that reading.
962
+ */
963
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:client-install-identifier-policy", capabilityVersion: 1 },
964
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
965
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ClientInstanceIdScope).sort().map((scope) => `client-instance-id-scope:${scope}`),
966
+ profiles: [],
967
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
968
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
969
+ },
970
+ {
971
+ /*
972
+ * Declared retention windows, named by the classes a window is declared PER.
973
+ *
974
+ * The classes are separate because their lawful windows differ, and the audit-trail class most of
975
+ * all: it is the record an operator needs to DEFEND itself, which is the Art. 17(3) ground on
976
+ * which erasure may lawfully be refused. Collapsing the classes here would let a shorter
977
+ * customer-data window be read as governing the evidence that justifies keeping it.
978
+ */
979
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:declared-retention-window", capabilityVersion: 1 },
980
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
981
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(DataRetentionClass).sort().map((retentionClass) => `data-retention-class:${retentionClass}`),
982
+ profiles: [],
983
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
984
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
985
+ },
986
+ {
987
+ /*
988
+ * What a subject may decide, named by the closed consent vocabulary the decision is held in.
989
+ *
990
+ * `DataProcessingConsent` only — NOT `PrivacyLevel`, which sits beside it under the same audit
991
+ * decorator. They are marked together because both are the subject's own decisions worth
992
+ * recording, but only one is a CONSENT decision: privacy level is a visibility preference, and
993
+ * folding it in would make a programme claim consent coverage for a field no lawful basis rests
994
+ * on.
995
+ */
996
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:consent-decision-record", capabilityVersion: 1 },
997
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
998
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(DataProcessingConsent).sort().map((consent) => `data-processing-consent:${consent}`),
999
+ profiles: [],
1000
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1001
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1002
+ },
1003
+ {
1004
+ /*
1005
+ * Tenancy derived from the caller, named by the execution types it is derived FROM.
1006
+ *
1007
+ * Every member is listed because each resolves tenancy differently and the differences are the
1008
+ * control: an `ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` is bound to one tenant, `PUBLIC_EXECUTION` has none,
1009
+ * `INTERNALLY_INITIATED_REQUEST` is the framework acting as itself. The objective's demand is
1010
+ * that this resolution is never OFFERED as a parameter — to a client, to an agent, or to a
1011
+ * retrieval surface — so the vocabulary being attested is precisely the set of answers the
1012
+ * runtime may reach without asking the request.
1013
+ */
1014
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:caller-derived-tenancy", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1015
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1016
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ExecutionContext_ExecutionType).sort().map((executionType) => `execution-type:${executionType}`),
1017
+ profiles: [],
1018
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1019
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1020
+ },
1021
+ {
1022
+ /*
1023
+ * What a client identity rests on, named by the two provenances a registration can have.
1024
+ *
1025
+ * `DYNAMIC` is the one the objective is about — a client that "asserted its own name and redirect
1026
+ * URIs and proved nothing", granted no roles, capped at identity scopes and always facing the
1027
+ * user's consent prompt. `OPERATOR` is listed with it because the control is the DISTINCTION:
1028
+ * a capability naming only the self-registered case could not attest that the other kind exists
1029
+ * and is treated differently, which is the whole posture.
1030
+ */
1031
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:client-registration-provenance", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1032
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1033
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin).sort().map((origin) => `oauth-client-registration-origin:${origin}`),
1034
+ profiles: [],
1035
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1036
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1037
+ },
1038
+ {
1039
+ /*
1040
+ * Whether a declared operation is actually SERVICED, and whether a custom verb authored the
1041
+ * contract it exposes — the two verdicts the shared boot/request predicate answers with.
1042
+ *
1043
+ * BOTH vocabularies, because the objective has two halves and each is a different failure: an
1044
+ * operation that reports success having performed nothing, and a named verb that silently widens
1045
+ * into an unconstrained write. A capability naming only the first would leave the second
1046
+ * unattested while looking complete.
1047
+ *
1048
+ * `NOT_APPLICABLE` is listed with the coverage verdicts because the gate's REMIT is part of its
1049
+ * claim: naming only SERVICEABLE and UNSERVICEABLE would read as covering every operation, when
1050
+ * core operations and variants the service tier never enters are deliberately outside it.
1051
+ */
1052
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:operation-implementation-coverage", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1053
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1054
+ implementationRefs: [
1055
+ ...Object.values(ResourceOperationImplementationCoverage).sort().map((coverage) => `operation-implementation-coverage:${coverage}`),
1056
+ ...Object.values(ResourceOperationRequestContractBreadth).sort().map((breadth) => `operation-request-contract-breadth:${breadth}`),
1057
+ ].sort(),
1058
+ profiles: [],
1059
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1060
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1061
+ },
1062
+ {
1063
+ /*
1064
+ * The isolation a resource must declare before it may sit on a non-default adapter, so a
1065
+ * configuration whose cross-resource writes could not be atomic is refused when the registry is
1066
+ * BUILT rather than discovered under load.
1067
+ */
1068
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:declared-persistence-isolation", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1069
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1070
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ResourcePersistenceAdapterIsolation).sort().map((isolation) => `persistence-adapter-isolation:${isolation}`),
1071
+ profiles: [],
1072
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1073
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1074
+ },
1075
+ {
1076
+ /*
1077
+ * The categories a field may be DECLARED to hold, which is the whole objective: an inventory is
1078
+ * authored on the field itself and never inferred from its name, because pattern-matching
1079
+ * identifiers is a guess whose misses go silently undisclosed. The vocabulary is what an
1080
+ * application chooses from, so it is exactly what the capability attests.
1081
+ */
1082
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:personal-data-field-inventory", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1083
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1084
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(PersonalDataCategory).sort().map((category) => `personal-data-category:${category}`),
1085
+ profiles: [],
1086
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1087
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1088
+ },
1089
+ {
1090
+ /*
1091
+ * Provider selection as the egress gate, named by the resolution modes a capability may be
1092
+ * satisfied through.
1093
+ *
1094
+ * The control is what happens with NO selection: nothing leaves, and the work is served locally.
1095
+ * So the attested mechanism is the resolution itself rather than any particular provider — and
1096
+ * deliberately not the `EngineCapability` list, which would be a hand-drawn subset of "the ones
1097
+ * that cause egress" and would drift the first time a capability changed shape.
1098
+ */
1099
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:provider-selection-opt-in", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1100
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1101
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(EngineCapabilityResolutionMode).sort().map((mode) => `engine-capability-resolution-mode:${mode}`),
1102
+ profiles: [],
1103
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1104
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1105
+ },
1106
+ {
1107
+ /*
1108
+ * Whether a principal may authenticate at all, named by the status vocabulary that decides it.
1109
+ *
1110
+ * Every member is listed because the control is the TRANSITION between them, and a reviewer
1111
+ * reconstructing "when did this account stop being able to log in" needs the whole set — the
1112
+ * pending states as much as the terminal ones, since an invitation that never completes is
1113
+ * indistinguishable from a deactivation if only the active/deleted ends are attested.
1114
+ */
1115
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:authentication-eligibility-status", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1116
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1117
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(UserStatus).sort().map((status) => `user-status:${status}`),
1118
+ profiles: [],
1119
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1120
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1121
+ },
1122
+ {
1123
+ /*
1124
+ * WHICH DOOR EXISTS — the variant vocabulary that decides whether an operation faces a client at
1125
+ * all, before any question of who may open it.
1126
+ *
1127
+ * Every member is named because the control is the CHOICE among them. `INTERNAL_CALL` and
1128
+ * `REPOSITORY_ONLY` are the two that answer no HTTP request, and moving an operation onto one of
1129
+ * them is a different act from tightening its roles: `credit-pool TOP_UP` was an `API_CALL` gated
1130
+ * on ORG_OWNER, which let a tenant owner self-grant unlimited credits, and no role gate could have
1131
+ * fixed it — the legitimate caller is a billing webhook coming through the service tier.
1132
+ */
1133
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:operation-reachability-gate", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1134
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1135
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ResourceOperationVariantType).sort().map((variantType) => `operation-variant-type:${variantType}`),
1136
+ profiles: [],
1137
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1138
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1139
+ },
1140
+ {
1141
+ /*
1142
+ * Whether a MEMBERSHIP confers what it names, distinct from whether its user may authenticate.
1143
+ *
1144
+ * Kept apart from `capability:authentication-eligibility-status` because the two answer different
1145
+ * questions about different rows: a fully ACTIVE user can hold a SUSPENDED membership in one
1146
+ * tenant, and merging the vocabularies would make a programme unable to say which of the two a
1147
+ * time-boxed restriction was placed on.
1148
+ */
1149
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:membership-eligibility-status", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1150
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1151
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(OrganizationMemberStatus).sort().map((status) => `organization-member-status:${status}`),
1152
+ profiles: [],
1153
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1154
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1155
+ },
1156
+ {
1157
+ /*
1158
+ * The redirect-scheme denial list, READ from the guard's own set rather than transcribed.
1159
+ *
1160
+ * This is why `DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES` was exported: it is a closed vocabulary with one
1161
+ * named runtime source, and it was reachable by nothing outside its own module — so attesting the
1162
+ * control meant restating eleven schemes in a second list free to drift from the one the
1163
+ * validator actually branches on. Deriving it means the basis cannot describe a denial the guard
1164
+ * does not make, in either direction.
1165
+ *
1166
+ * The refused set is the honest thing to name. An allow-list would be the wrong shape: the guard
1167
+ * accepts any absolute URL that is not one of these, deliberately, because a strict https-only
1168
+ * rule breaks the native/CLI loopback flow and a reverse-DNS requirement would refuse conformant
1169
+ * clients like `cursor:`.
1170
+ */
1171
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:redirect-target-constraint", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1172
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1173
+ /*
1174
+ * Sorted AFTER the prefix is applied, not before, and that is a real trap rather than style:
1175
+ * stripping the trailing colon REORDERS the set. Raw, `chrome-extension:` sorts before `chrome:`
1176
+ * ("-" < ":"); stripped, `chrome` sorts before `chrome-extension`. Sorting the schemes first
1177
+ * produced a list the basis schema rejected as unsorted.
1178
+ */
1179
+ implementationRefs: [...DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES].map((scheme) => `refused-redirect-scheme:${scheme.replace(/:$/u, "")}`).sort(),
1180
+ profiles: [],
1181
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1182
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1183
+ },
1184
+ {
1185
+ /*
1186
+ * The claim names the ID-token builder OWNS, READ from the builder's own strip set.
1187
+ *
1188
+ * Naming the RESERVED set is the control: these are stripped from caller-supplied `extraClaims`
1189
+ * BEFORE they are spread, so a smuggled `nbf` cannot later make the token fail verification and a
1190
+ * forged `nonce` / `acr` / `amr` / `at_hash` cannot ride in. An allow-list of identity claims would
1191
+ * describe a different mechanism — one the scope-gated resolver performs elsewhere.
1192
+ *
1193
+ * Derived rather than transcribed, which is why the set had to leave `saas-backend-lib`. A second
1194
+ * list of fifteen claim names would be free to drift from the one the builder strips, and the
1195
+ * drift would be invisible: the basis would attest a claim as server-authored while the builder
1196
+ * let it through.
1197
+ */
1198
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:reserved-token-claim-authorship", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1199
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1200
+ implementationRefs: [...OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES].map((claim) => `reserved-id-token-claim:${claim}`).sort(),
1201
+ profiles: [],
1202
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1203
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1204
+ },
1205
+ {
1206
+ /*
1207
+ * The startup validator that REFUSES a configuration before it can serve traffic, named by the
1208
+ * domains it validates.
1209
+ *
1210
+ * This is the shape `DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` already showed: a boot gate IS bindable when
1211
+ * the thing it checks has a vocabulary. Here the vocabulary is the domain set, and the severity
1212
+ * split (`ERROR` refuses, `WARNING` reports) is what makes "refused before serving traffic" a
1213
+ * claim rather than a hope.
1214
+ *
1215
+ * NOT every boot gate in the engine routes through this validator — the declared-unique-index
1216
+ * verification lives in the repositories registry and produces no `ConfigurationValidationIssue`,
1217
+ * which is why `DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS` is NOT bound to this capability. Binding it here would
1218
+ * claim a validation path it does not take.
1219
+ */
1220
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:startup-configuration-validation", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1221
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1222
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ConfigurationValidationDomain).sort().map((domain) => `configuration-validation-domain:${domain}`),
1223
+ profiles: [],
1224
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1225
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1226
+ },
1227
+ {
1228
+ /*
1229
+ * A declared uniqueness control PROVEN to exist in the datastore before traffic, named by the
1230
+ * adapters the proof runs against.
1231
+ *
1232
+ * The adapter set is the vocabulary because the verification is genuinely per-adapter and the two
1233
+ * halves are separate code — `verifyDeclaredMongoUniqueIndexes` and its PostgreSQL counterpart —
1234
+ * so "which datastores has this been proven against" is exactly the question a reader has. It is
1235
+ * also the axis on which the guarantee could silently become partial: an adapter added without a
1236
+ * verifier would make the objective true for some resources and not others.
1237
+ *
1238
+ * Distinct from `capability:startup-configuration-validation`, and deliberately not folded into
1239
+ * it: this gate emits no `ConfigurationValidationIssue`. It lives in the repositories registry,
1240
+ * and claiming the config validator's path for it would describe a route the check does not take.
1241
+ */
1242
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:declared-uniqueness-verification", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1243
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1244
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(PersistenceAdapter).sort().map((adapter) => `persistence-adapter:${adapter}`),
1245
+ profiles: [],
1246
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1247
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1248
+ },
1249
+ {
1250
+ /*
1251
+ * The self-reported lifecycle stages, named so a programme can state what they do NOT confer.
1252
+ *
1253
+ * This capability is unusual and the wording matters: it attests a NEGATIVE. Every member is a
1254
+ * stage a user's own activity can move them into, and the control is that reaching one grants no
1255
+ * capability and cannot cross a scope boundary — authority comes only from a decision an
1256
+ * authorized party made. Naming the stages is how a reader learns which self-reported values
1257
+ * exist to be wrongly trusted; a capability naming a mechanism would imply the stages DO something.
1258
+ */
1259
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:self-reported-lifecycle-stage", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1260
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1261
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(LifecycleStage).sort().map((stage) => `lifecycle-stage:${stage}`),
1262
+ profiles: [],
1263
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1264
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1265
+ },
1266
+ {
1267
+ /*
1268
+ * How a refusal is CLASSIFIED — the one vocabulary three separate objectives are each a
1269
+ * distinction inside.
1270
+ *
1271
+ * | objective | the distinction it demands |
1272
+ * |---|---|
1273
+ * | `SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED` | a refusal carries a named type — `CONFIGURATION` for a validator whose dependency is unavailable, `VALIDATION` for rejected untrusted input — rather than surfacing as `UNCAUGHT_EXCEPTION`, which is how a degradation gets mistaken for a rejection |
1274
+ * | `OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT` | an over-limit request is `PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE` or `RATE_LIMIT`, NOT `INTERNAL` — a client error rather than a server failure |
1275
+ * | `OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS` | a constraint violation is `CONFLICT` carrying the identity that was violated, NOT the opaque `DATABASE` the driver would otherwise produce |
1276
+ *
1277
+ * Every member is named because the control in all three cases is a CONTRAST between members: the
1278
+ * good outcome only means something against the bad one it is not. A capability listing only the
1279
+ * client-error types would describe a system that never returns `INTERNAL`, which is a different
1280
+ * and false claim.
1281
+ *
1282
+ * This does NOT attest that any particular refusal is classified correctly — a mapping is not a
1283
+ * proof, and `UNKNOWN` is in the set precisely because the engine admits it cannot always tell.
1284
+ * What it attests is that the framework HAS one closed vocabulary for the answer, so a
1285
+ * misclassification is a wrong member rather than an unclassified crash.
1286
+ */
1287
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:refusal-classification", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1288
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1289
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ErrorType).sort().map((errorType) => `error-type:${errorType}`),
1290
+ profiles: [],
1291
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1292
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1293
+ },
1294
+ {
1295
+ /*
1296
+ * A rotated key that STOPS verifying at a declared instant, named by the keys the guarantee
1297
+ * applies to.
1298
+ *
1299
+ * The key set is the vocabulary because the retirement is PER KEY — `notAfter` is optional on
1300
+ * each — so "which keys can be given a bounded life" is the reader's question, and a key type
1301
+ * added without retirement support is exactly how the guarantee would become partial without
1302
+ * anything failing. Before this, a rotated key was time-unbounded in code and fenced only by the
1303
+ * token's own `exp`.
1304
+ *
1305
+ * BOTH directions are named. The private keys are what this application SIGNS with and the
1306
+ * public ones are the platform services it VERIFIES; retiring one of each is a different act with
1307
+ * a different blast radius, and a capability naming only the signing half would leave the
1308
+ * verification half unattested while looking complete.
1309
+ */
1310
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:verifiable-key-retirement", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1311
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1312
+ implementationRefs: [
1313
+ ...Object.values(JwtPrivateKeys).map((key) => `signing-key:${key}`),
1314
+ ...Object.values(JwtPublicKeys).map((key) => `verification-key:${key}`),
1315
+ ].sort(),
1316
+ profiles: [],
1317
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1318
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1319
+ },
1320
+ {
1321
+ /*
1322
+ * A provider's secret contract described WITHOUT its values, named by the four fields an entry
1323
+ * may carry — and the control is what is NOT among them.
1324
+ *
1325
+ * `ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema` is a `z.strictObject`, so a `value` field is not
1326
+ * merely absent by convention: it is REFUSED at parse. That is what makes drift detectable
1327
+ * without persisting a secret — the shape can be compared because it never held one. Deriving
1328
+ * the refs from the schema's own shape means the capability cannot describe a field the contract
1329
+ * does not have, in either direction, and a field added there appears here automatically.
1330
+ *
1331
+ * The control lives in `platform-config-lib`, which this package must not depend on. It is
1332
+ * attestable anyway because the VOCABULARY is in `saas-models` — the shape that crosses the
1333
+ * companion-safe boundary — while only the digesting stayed on the platform side. That split is
1334
+ * why this objective needed no move at all, unlike the three that did.
1335
+ */
1336
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:values-free-secret-contract", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1337
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1338
+ implementationRefs: Object.keys(ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema.shape).sort().map((field) => `secret-contract-field:${field}`),
1339
+ profiles: [],
1340
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1341
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1342
+ },
1343
+ ];
1344
+ /**
1345
+ * Canonical order, applied at composition rather than demanded of the authored constants above.
1346
+ *
1347
+ * The basis schema requires four of its arrays lexically sorted by semantic identity. Requiring the AUTHORED lists to be hand-sorted makes every added mapping a
1348
+ * chance to fail on form rather than on substance — and the failure surfaces as four opaque "must be unique and lexically sorted" issues rather than as anything about
1349
+ * the entry. Sorting here means an author appends where it reads best and the composer canonicalizes, which is the same split the compliance-programme normalizer makes.
1350
+ */
1351
+ const byCanonicalIdentity = (values, identity) => [...values].sort((left, right) => (identity(left) < identity(right) ? -1 : identity(left) > identity(right) ? 1 : 0));
19
1352
  /**
20
1353
  * Compose the source-neutral safe baseline around one Framework Knowledge-generated implementation revision.
21
1354
  * Repository source locations never enter this contract; the generator resolves them before calling this function.
@@ -34,42 +1367,32 @@ export function createInitialAssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis(input) {
34
1367
  documentAuthorityCatalog,
35
1368
  objectiveCatalog: INITIAL_ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_CATALOG,
36
1369
  implementationRevision: input.implementationRevision,
37
- capabilityAuthorityDescriptors: [
38
- {
39
- authority: {
40
- identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:audit-events", capabilityVersion: 1 },
41
- capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
42
- implementationRefs: [`engine-capability:${EngineCapability.COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL}`],
43
- implementationRevision: implementationRevisionIdentity,
44
- profiles: [],
45
- requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
46
- },
47
- availability: {
48
- kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY,
49
- engineCapability: EngineCapability.COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL,
50
- },
51
- },
52
- {
53
- authority: {
54
- identity: { capabilityRef: SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF, capabilityVersion: 1 },
55
- capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
56
- implementationRefs: [
57
- `subject-export-purpose:${SubjectExportPurpose.ACCESS_ART_15}`,
58
- `subject-export-purpose:${SubjectExportPurpose.PORTABILITY_ART_20}`,
59
- ],
60
- implementationRevision: implementationRevisionIdentity,
61
- profiles: [
62
- {
63
- profileRef: "capability-profile:subject-data-export-safe-baseline-v1",
64
- parameters: [{ parameterRef: "parameter:export-format", allowedOptionRefs: ["option:json-machine-readable"] }],
65
- },
66
- ],
67
- requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_HOST_CONFIGURATION_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF],
68
- },
69
- availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1370
+ capabilityAuthorityDescriptors: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_CAPABILITY_AUTHORITIES, (a) => `${a.identity.capabilityRef}@${a.identity.capabilityVersion}`).map(({ availability, ...authority }) => ({
1371
+ authority: {
1372
+ identity: authority.identity,
1373
+ capabilityKind: authority.capabilityKind,
1374
+ implementationRefs: [...authority.implementationRefs],
1375
+ implementationRevision: implementationRevisionIdentity,
1376
+ profiles: authority.profiles.map((profile) => ({ ...profile, parameters: profile.parameters.map((parameter) => ({ ...parameter, allowedOptionRefs: [...parameter.allowedOptionRefs] })) })),
1377
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [...authority.requiredHostArtifactKindRefs],
1378
+ },
1379
+ availability,
1380
+ })),
1381
+ sourceRequirementAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity([
1382
+ {
1383
+ /*
1384
+ * Malicious-code protection. The slug is DESCRIPTIVE and carries no control identifier from the
1385
+ * source's own numbering — `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses those outside an authorized
1386
+ * mapping boundary, and a descriptive slug survives an edition that renumbers them.
1387
+ */
1388
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1389
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-malicious-code-protection",
1390
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1391
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1392
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1393
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1394
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,
70
1395
  },
71
- ],
72
- sourceRequirementAuthorities: [
73
1396
  {
74
1397
  source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
75
1398
  requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-subject-access-portability",
@@ -97,43 +1420,786 @@ export function createInitialAssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis(input) {
97
1420
  reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
98
1421
  reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,
99
1422
  },
100
- ],
101
- implementationExpectationAuthorities: [
1423
+ /*
1424
+ * ── 2026-09-01 mapping tranche: NIST, GDPR and HIPAA ──────────────────────────────────────
1425
+ *
1426
+ * A requirement is named by a DESCRIPTIVE slug, never by the source's own control identifier, and the locator is the one the registry already records for that
1427
+ * source. That is not decoration: `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses restricted external identifiers outside an authorized boundary, the rights records
1428
+ * govern what may be reproduced, and a slug that says what the requirement IS survives an edition change that renumbers it.
1429
+ *
1430
+ * Each entry binds ONE objective to ONE requirement of one source. Where two sources reach the same objective they are separate entries, because applicability
1431
+ * is decided per source by the application and collapsing them would decide it here.
1432
+ */
102
1433
  {
103
- identity: { expectationRef: "implementation-expectation:privileged-access-review", expectationVersion: 1 },
104
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW", objectiveVersion: 1 },
105
- requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
1434
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1435
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-erasure-and-restriction",
1436
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1437
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1438
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1439
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1440
+ reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
106
1441
  },
107
1442
  {
108
- identity: { expectationRef: "implementation-expectation:subject-data-export", expectationVersion: 1 },
109
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
110
- requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:subject-data-export"],
1443
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1444
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-security-event-logging",
1445
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1446
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1447
+ canonicalLocator: "https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29",
1448
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1449
+ reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
111
1450
  },
112
- ],
113
- evidenceExpectationAuthorities: [
114
1451
  {
115
- identity: { expectationRef: "evidence-expectation:privileged-access-review-occurrences", expectationVersion: 1 },
116
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW", objectiveVersion: 1 },
117
- requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence"],
1452
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1453
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-of-access-decisions",
1454
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1455
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1456
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1457
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1458
+ reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
118
1459
  },
119
1460
  {
120
- identity: { expectationRef: "evidence-expectation:subject-data-export-receipt", expectationVersion: 1 },
121
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
122
- requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt"],
1461
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1462
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hipaa-security-authentication-controls",
1463
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1464
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1465
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html",
1466
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1467
+ reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
123
1468
  },
124
- ],
125
- verificationExpectationAuthorities: [
1469
+ /*
1470
+ * ── 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1471
+ *
1472
+ * Three objectives whose control is ALREADY IMPLEMENTED by the audit trail, verified in source
1473
+ * before binding rather than inferred from the objective's wording:
1474
+ *
1475
+ * | objective | the implementation that attests it |
1476
+ * |---|---|
1477
+ * | `WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION` | every auditable-event payload carries an actor field, and `audit-actor.shared.schemas.ts` closes the no-user case with a SENTINEL vocabulary instead of a bare `'unknown'` |
1478
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION` | `CoreAuditableEventType.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS`, emitted on every crossing with `admissionDeclared` separating a sanctioned one from an attempted one |
1479
+ * | `WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT` | `CoreAuditableEventType.FIELD_ACCESS`, which `audit-access-fields.backend.utils.ts` fires on CREATE for `isBackendOnly({ isReturnedAtCreation: true })` — a minted secret returned exactly once |
1480
+ *
1481
+ * All three bind `capability:audit-events`, so this tranche adds no capability authority: the
1482
+ * engine capability that attests them was already declared, and inventing a second identity for
1483
+ * the same mechanism would split what an application must select.
1484
+ *
1485
+ * The requirement slugs describe what the requirement IS and never carry a source's own control
1486
+ * identifier — `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses those outside an authorized boundary,
1487
+ * and a descriptive slug survives an edition that renumbers them.
1488
+ */
126
1489
  {
127
- identity: { expectationRef: "verification-expectation:privileged-access-review", expectationVersion: 1 },
128
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW", objectiveVersion: 1 },
129
- requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:privileged-access-review"],
1490
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1491
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-attributable-event-record",
1492
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1493
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1494
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1495
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1496
+ reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
130
1497
  },
131
1498
  {
132
- identity: { expectationRef: "verification-expectation:subject-data-export", expectationVersion: 1 },
133
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
134
- requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:subject-data-export"],
1499
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1500
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-accountability-demonstration",
1501
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1502
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1503
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1504
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1505
+ reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
135
1506
  },
136
- ],
1507
+ {
1508
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1509
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hhs-security-access-authorization-recording",
1510
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1511
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1512
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html",
1513
+ reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,
1514
+ reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1515
+ },
1516
+ {
1517
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1518
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-authenticator-disclosure-record",
1519
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1520
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1521
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1522
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1523
+ reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1524
+ },
1525
+ /*
1526
+ * ── 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────
1527
+ *
1528
+ * Selected by CODE-MARKER COVERAGE rather than by reading the catalog, which is a better
1529
+ * criterion than the previous tranche's: an objective carrying `assurance-control:` markers is
1530
+ * one the codebase itself claims to implement, and `check:assurance-control-boundary` already
1531
+ * validates every marker against the catalog. All 40 unbound objectives carry at least one; these
1532
+ * three are among the four most heavily marked (25, 20 and 19 sites).
1533
+ *
1534
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1535
+ * |---|---|
1536
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE` | the API-key and OAuth-client schemas plus the audit trail — the privileged grant's whole life is the record, which is why the evidence IS the audit event |
1537
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE` | the API-key custom implementation, the password-reset service and the audit trail |
1538
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY` | its own `administrative-continuity.shared.schemas.ts`, the organization-owner and super-admin floors, and the CRITICAL breach record |
1539
+ *
1540
+ * `LEAST_PRIVILEGE` was deliberately NOT bound in THIS tranche: the generation contract's refusal
1541
+ * pin used it as its canonical UNBOUND objective, so binding it in the same change would have
1542
+ * silently turned that pin into a test of nothing. The authorization-confinement tranche below
1543
+ * binds it, and fixes the pin properly — it now DERIVES an unbound objective from the catalog
1544
+ * minus these bindings, so no future tranche can hollow it out by accident.
1545
+ */
1546
+ {
1547
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1548
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-privileged-grant-evidence",
1549
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1550
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1551
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1552
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1553
+ reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1554
+ },
1555
+ {
1556
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1557
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-credential-state-transitions",
1558
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1559
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1560
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1561
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1562
+ reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1563
+ },
1564
+ {
1565
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1566
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hhs-security-credential-management",
1567
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1568
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1569
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html",
1570
+ reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,
1571
+ reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1572
+ },
1573
+ {
1574
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1575
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-govern-accountable-role-retention",
1576
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1577
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1578
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1579
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1580
+ reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1581
+ },
1582
+ /*
1583
+ * ── 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche ──────────────────────────────────────────
1584
+ *
1585
+ * The three most heavily marked remaining objectives (21, 15 and 14 sites), and together they
1586
+ * answer the two halves of an access question that the already-bound audit objectives only
1587
+ * RECORD: how much authority a principal may hold, and which rows that authority reaches.
1588
+ *
1589
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1590
+ * |---|---|
1591
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE` | `role-ceiling.backend.utils.ts` (a caller cannot grant what it does not hold, resolved per role-table scope) and `authorizeInProgrammaticSurface` (a non-controller surface applies the operation's declared role gate through the SAME predicate) |
1592
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT` | seven confinement modules under `security/authorizations/` plus the WRITE-side narrowing in BOTH resource repositories, and the `OrganizationUnitNarrowingStamp` that records why access was reached |
1593
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION` | the OIDC authorization-code service, `pkce.backend.utils.ts`, and five distinct OAuth consent/exchange audit events |
1594
+ *
1595
+ * NOT claimed, and this is why the LEAST_PRIVILEGE binding above requires no audit capability:
1596
+ * the role-ceiling refusal is raised from custom-impl services, outside `runAuthorizationPhase`,
1597
+ * so it produces no authorization-denial audit row. That is a gap in the engine rather than in
1598
+ * this mapping, and it is filed as one — binding around it here keeps the programme's claim
1599
+ * true, which is the only thing this layer can do about it.
1600
+ */
1601
+ {
1602
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1603
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-least-privilege-authority-limit",
1604
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1605
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1606
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1607
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1608
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1609
+ },
1610
+ {
1611
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1612
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-least-privilege-enforcement",
1613
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1614
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1615
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1616
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1617
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1618
+ },
1619
+ {
1620
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1621
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-information-flow-confinement",
1622
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1623
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1624
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1625
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1626
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1627
+ },
1628
+ {
1629
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1630
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-processing-confidentiality",
1631
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1632
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1633
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1634
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1635
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1636
+ },
1637
+ {
1638
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1639
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-delegated-access-authorization",
1640
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1641
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1642
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1643
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1644
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1645
+ },
1646
+ /*
1647
+ * ── 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
1648
+ *
1649
+ * Three objectives about identity over TIME, where the tranches above covered identity at a
1650
+ * single decision: how it is re-proved for a high-impact act, how a change to the authored
1651
+ * policy is evidenced, and when the access it confers ends.
1652
+ *
1653
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1654
+ * |---|---|
1655
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION` | the per-operation `requiresStepUpAuthentication` flag on eight resource configs, `reAuthenticate` (PASSWORD / TOTP / PASSKEY), and the separate `PasskeyAuthenticationCeremony.STEP_UP` challenge key that makes a login assertion structurally unredeemable at the step-up door |
1656
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE` | the SSO connection and config schemas, and `APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED` — emitted at boot, by the system, when the resolved policy snapshot differs from the last one recorded |
1657
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE` | `ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY` read through `isAuthorityConferringOrganizationStatus`, the organization custom implementation that withdraws credentials, and four audit events covering withdrawal and restoration |
1658
+ *
1659
+ * A correction landed with this tranche rather than beside it: the `requiresStepUpAuthentication`
1660
+ * docstring still said re-authentication was PASSWORD-only and warned authors away from
1661
+ * declaring the flag on operations SSO-only, passkey-only or directory-managed users perform.
1662
+ * TOTP and passkey re-auth have both shipped, so that advice had inverted — and it was the
1663
+ * advice a framework author would have read while deciding whether this objective was
1664
+ * satisfiable at all.
1665
+ */
1666
+ {
1667
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1668
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hhs-security-person-or-entity-reverification",
1669
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1670
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1671
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html",
1672
+ reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,
1673
+ reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1674
+ },
1675
+ {
1676
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1677
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-reauthentication-for-privileged-action",
1678
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1679
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1680
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1681
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1682
+ reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1683
+ },
1684
+ {
1685
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1686
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-govern-authentication-posture-change",
1687
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1688
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1689
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1690
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1691
+ reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1692
+ },
1693
+ {
1694
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1695
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-account-disable-on-relationship-end",
1696
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1697
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1698
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1699
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1700
+ reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1701
+ },
1702
+ {
1703
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1704
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hhs-security-workforce-access-termination",
1705
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1706
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1707
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html",
1708
+ reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,
1709
+ reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1710
+ },
1711
+ /*
1712
+ * ── 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1713
+ *
1714
+ * The four privacy objectives a governed privacy notice quotes most directly, which is why
1715
+ * they are worth binding even though three of them carry fewer markers than some alternatives:
1716
+ * an application's privacy notice has retention, minimisation and consent paragraphs whether or
1717
+ * not the programme can support them.
1718
+ *
1719
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1720
+ * |---|---|
1721
+ * | `WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE` | the single retention-hide authority consumed by both persistence adapters, the aggregation/charts surface and RAG retrieval; the organization-purge batch; and four destruction audit events |
1722
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION` | the embeddings and document-extraction services (the processor receives the payload and nothing identifying the requester), and the client-install identifier policy chokepoint that fails closed absent an application opt-in |
1723
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION` | three startup refusals in the config validator plus the resource-retention sweep |
1724
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD` | `.isAuditEvidence()` on the two consent leaves, the preferences RESET, and the single emission point every consent-changing verb routes through |
1725
+ *
1726
+ * A correction landed with this tranche for the same reason the last one's did:
1727
+ * `RetentionStatus.RETAINED` still described its own concealment as "enforcement wired in a
1728
+ * later phase" long after that phase shipped, and a reader deciding whether SECURE_LIFECYCLE
1729
+ * was satisfiable would have concluded the row was still visible.
1730
+ */
1731
+ {
1732
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1733
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-erasure-with-retention-carve-out",
1734
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1735
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1736
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1737
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1738
+ reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1739
+ },
1740
+ {
1741
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1742
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-media-sanitization-and-disposal",
1743
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1744
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1745
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1746
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1747
+ reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1748
+ },
1749
+ {
1750
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1751
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-data-minimisation",
1752
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1753
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1754
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1755
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1756
+ reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1757
+ },
1758
+ {
1759
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1760
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-storage-limitation",
1761
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1762
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1763
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1764
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1765
+ reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1766
+ },
1767
+ {
1768
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1769
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-consent-demonstrability",
1770
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1771
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1772
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1773
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1774
+ reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1775
+ },
1776
+ /*
1777
+ * ── 2026-09-02 attribution tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1778
+ *
1779
+ * Five objectives about what the trail must be able to SAY. Four of them bind only
1780
+ * `capability:audit-events`, which is not thin coverage — it is the honest shape when the
1781
+ * control IS the record rather than a mechanism the record corroborates.
1782
+ *
1783
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1784
+ * |---|---|
1785
+ * | `WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION` | the resource-operations helper (a caller cannot widen its own scope), the MCP tool adapter (an agent is never offered its tenancy as a parameter), and both RAG chunk stores, where the predicate is evaluated INSIDE the traversal |
1786
+ * | `WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY` | the SSO config block that governs what the trail captures, and the services-registry handler that reconstructs a privileged action's authorization effect from the record rather than from role tables |
1787
+ * | `WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT` | the embeddings and document-extraction services (provider, model, usage and outcome per physical call) and the webhook test-endpoint probe (the initiating actor) |
1788
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING` | the SCIM provisioning switches carrying `.isAuditEvidence()`, and the declared department-to-unit bindings that make the directory authoritative over an authorization axis |
1789
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION` | the CIMD client-metadata service, the dynamic-registration path, and two audit events covering a client created by an unauthenticated party and every refused assertion |
1790
+ */
1791
+ {
1792
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1793
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-shared-resource-isolation",
1794
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1795
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1796
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1797
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1798
+ reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1799
+ },
1800
+ {
1801
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1802
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-record-content-and-protection",
1803
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1804
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1805
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1806
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1807
+ reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1808
+ },
1809
+ {
1810
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1811
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-outbound-connection-monitoring",
1812
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1813
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1814
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1815
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1816
+ reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1817
+ },
1818
+ {
1819
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1820
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-automated-account-management",
1821
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1822
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1823
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1824
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1825
+ reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1826
+ },
1827
+ {
1828
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1829
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-identify-service-identity-verification",
1830
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1831
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1832
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1833
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1834
+ reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1835
+ },
1836
+ /*
1837
+ * ── 2026-09-02 declaration tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1838
+ *
1839
+ * Eight objectives satisfied by what a schema or configuration DECLARES, plus the trail that
1840
+ * records the declaration changing. This is where the marker-count method stops choosing for
1841
+ * you: every objective here carries one or two markers, so the ranking no longer discriminates
1842
+ * and each was decided by whether a real vocabulary exists to attest.
1843
+ *
1844
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1845
+ * |---|---|
1846
+ * | `WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY` | the coverage predicate that startup validation and request-time refusal SHARE, so an operation blessed at boot cannot answer 2xx having performed nothing |
1847
+ * | `WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` | the isolation declaration and the registry build that refuses a non-atomic configuration |
1848
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY` | the `PersonalDataCategory` decorator on the field itself |
1849
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING` | the document-extraction service, where no bytes leave unless a provider is selected and the local library otherwise serves every extraction |
1850
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE` | `UserStatus` carrying `.isAuditEvidence().excludeFromUpdate()`, so the change cannot arrive as a side effect of an unrelated write |
1851
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT` | `CoreAuditableEventType.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT`, one event with `riskLevel` separating a page from a full result set |
1852
+ * | `WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION` | the audit service preserving actor and tenant across the trusted-system write, and the logger stamping `appSlug:env` |
1853
+ * | `WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY` | the backend-only exposure guard and the audited first exposure |
1854
+ *
1855
+ * `WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY` was blocked by a LAYERING problem rather than a
1856
+ * mapping one, and the fix was to move the boundary. Its vocabularies lived in
1857
+ * `saas-backend-lib`, which this package must not depend on — so a control that is real,
1858
+ * well-marked and enforced was unnameable from the layer obliged to describe it. They are
1859
+ * closed vocabularies rather than backend behaviour, so they now live in `saas-models` beside
1860
+ * the acknowledgement type that shares their marker; the resolvers that compute them did not
1861
+ * move. When an objective cannot be bound, check whether the obstacle is the EVIDENCE or the
1862
+ * package graph before recording it as uncovered.
1863
+ *
1864
+ * WHAT THIS TRANCHE LEAVES: fourteen objectives whose control is real but has no vocabulary a
1865
+ * capability could name from here — boot gates, a body-size cap, a conflict reference, an
1866
+ * open-redirect constraint. Binding them would mean inventing a capability identity per gate,
1867
+ * which is the plausible-coverage failure #207 exists to prevent. They need a decision about
1868
+ * whether the capability model should carry named GATES at all, not another tranche.
1869
+ */
1870
+ {
1871
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1872
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-declared-interface-integrity",
1873
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1874
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1875
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1876
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1877
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1878
+ },
1879
+ {
1880
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1881
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-transaction-recovery-integrity",
1882
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1883
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1884
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1885
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1886
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1887
+ },
1888
+ {
1889
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1890
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-records-of-processing-categories",
1891
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1892
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1893
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1894
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1895
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1896
+ },
1897
+ {
1898
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1899
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-processor-engagement",
1900
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1901
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1902
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1903
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1904
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1905
+ },
1906
+ {
1907
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1908
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-account-enable-disable-authority",
1909
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1910
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1911
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1912
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1913
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1914
+ },
1915
+ {
1916
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1917
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-bulk-disclosure-record",
1918
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1919
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1920
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1921
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1922
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1923
+ },
1924
+ {
1925
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1926
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-record-context-binding",
1927
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1928
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1929
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1930
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1931
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1932
+ },
1933
+ {
1934
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1935
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hhs-security-transmission-confidentiality",
1936
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1937
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1938
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html",
1939
+ reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,
1940
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1941
+ },
1942
+ /*
1943
+ * ── 2026-09-02 reachability tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1944
+ *
1945
+ * Four objectives whose control is WHICH DOOR EXISTS, and which values it refuses. They were
1946
+ * classified as unbindable in the tranche above and that was WRONG — the mistake is worth
1947
+ * recording because it is the one this lane keeps making.
1948
+ *
1949
+ * The question asked was "does this guard have its own vocabulary", and the answer was no for
1950
+ * all four. The right question is "which vocabulary names this mechanism", and for three of them
1951
+ * it already existed and was already exported:
1952
+ *
1953
+ * | objective | the vocabulary that names it |
1954
+ * |---|---|
1955
+ * | `WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY` | `ResourceOperationVariantType` — `credit-pool TOP_UP` was an API_CALL gated on ORG_OWNER, letting a tenant owner self-grant credits; the fix was the VARIANT, which no role gate could express |
1956
+ * | `WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT` | the same pair — `ScopeFeatures` writes cannot be field-protected, so the whole self-grant boundary is one role gate on operations that stay non-client-reachable |
1957
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND` | `UserStatus` + `OrganizationMemberStatus`, the two the reactivation sweep moves between |
1958
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION` | `DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES`, which had to be EXPORTED — a closed vocabulary with one named source that nothing outside its module could reach |
1959
+ *
1960
+ * So of the fourteen the previous tranche left, four were a discovery failure rather than a
1961
+ * modelling limit. Before recording an objective as uncoverable, ask which existing vocabulary
1962
+ * describes the mechanism — the answer is often a capability that is already declared.
1963
+ */
1964
+ {
1965
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1966
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-transaction-authorization-separation",
1967
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1968
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1969
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1970
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1971
+ reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1972
+ },
1973
+ {
1974
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1975
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-entitlement-change-authority",
1976
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1977
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1978
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1979
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1980
+ reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1981
+ },
1982
+ {
1983
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1984
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-temporary-account-expiry",
1985
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1986
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1987
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1988
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1989
+ reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1990
+ },
1991
+ {
1992
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1993
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-redirect-target-constraint",
1994
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1995
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1996
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1997
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1998
+ reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1999
+ },
2000
+ /*
2001
+ * ── 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
2002
+ *
2003
+ * Two objectives whose vocabulary EXISTED and was only in the wrong place — the third and
2004
+ * fourth time in four tranches, which is why the pattern is written down rather than fixed
2005
+ * quietly each time.
2006
+ *
2007
+ * | objective | where its vocabulary was | what moved |
2008
+ * |---|---|---|
2009
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY` | `OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES`, module-private in `saas-backend-lib` | moved to `saas-models` beside `OAuthGrantType`, which is the same kind of thing — an OIDC/OAuth protocol vocabulary. Having one consumer is a fact about usage, not about where a protocol constant belongs |
2010
+ * | `WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY` | `ConfigurationValidationDomain`, already exported | nothing — the boot validator's own domain vocabulary names the mechanism, exactly as `ResourcePersistenceAdapterIsolation` does for `DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` |
2011
+ *
2012
+ * The second one settles a question the previous tranche got wrong in prose: a BOOT GATE is not
2013
+ * inherently unbindable. It is bindable when the thing it checks has a vocabulary. What is not
2014
+ * bindable is a gate whose only description is its own name.
2015
+ */
2016
+ {
2017
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2018
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-assertion-integrity",
2019
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2020
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2021
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
2022
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2023
+ reviewedAt: SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2024
+ },
2025
+ {
2026
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2027
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-configuration-settings-enforcement",
2028
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2029
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2030
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2031
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2032
+ reviewedAt: SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2033
+ },
2034
+ /*
2035
+ * ── 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
2036
+ *
2037
+ * Two objectives whose vocabulary is the SUBSTRATE the control runs against rather than the
2038
+ * control's own machinery — the fifth and sixth time asking "which vocabulary names this"
2039
+ * rather than "does this guard have one" changed the answer.
2040
+ *
2041
+ * | objective | vocabulary | why the substrate is the right axis |
2042
+ * |---|---|---|
2043
+ * | `WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS` | `PersistenceAdapter` | the verification is genuinely per-adapter (two separate verifiers), so "which datastores has this been proven against" is the reader's question — and an adapter added without a verifier is exactly how the guarantee would become silently partial |
2044
+ * | `WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY` | `LifecycleStage` | the capability attests a NEGATIVE: naming the stages is how a reader learns which self-reported values exist to be wrongly trusted |
2045
+ *
2046
+ * The second is the only capability in the basis that attests something a vocabulary does NOT
2047
+ * do. That is deliberate — a capability naming a mechanism would imply the stages confer
2048
+ * something, which is the precise claim this objective exists to deny.
2049
+ */
2050
+ {
2051
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2052
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-information-integrity-verification",
2053
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2054
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2055
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2056
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2057
+ reviewedAt: DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2058
+ },
2059
+ {
2060
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2061
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-authority-not-inferred-from-state",
2062
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2063
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2064
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
2065
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2066
+ reviewedAt: DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2067
+ },
2068
+ /*
2069
+ * ── 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────
2070
+ *
2071
+ * Three objectives that looked like three unrelated guards — a SAML availability check, a 32kb
2072
+ * body cap, a unique-constraint resolver — and are each a DISTINCTION INSIDE ONE VOCABULARY.
2073
+ * All three bind `capability:refusal-classification`, and re-reading their intents is what
2074
+ * showed it: every one of them is phrased as a contrast.
2075
+ *
2076
+ * | objective | its own words |
2077
+ * |---|---|
2078
+ * | `SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED` | "stays diagnosable … without its degradation being mistaken for a rejection" |
2079
+ * | `OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT` | "answered as a client error rather than surfacing as a server failure" |
2080
+ * | `OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS` | "reported with the identity that was violated rather than as an opaque datastore failure" |
2081
+ *
2082
+ * Each contrast is between two `ErrorType` members. That is why one capability serves all
2083
+ * three and why naming the whole enum is right: the good outcome only means something against
2084
+ * the bad one it is not.
2085
+ *
2086
+ * What this does NOT claim, stated at the capability: that any particular refusal is classified
2087
+ * CORRECTLY. `UNKNOWN` is in the set because the engine admits it cannot always tell. The claim
2088
+ * is that one closed vocabulary owns the answer, so a misclassification is a wrong member rather
2089
+ * than an unclassified crash.
2090
+ */
2091
+ {
2092
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2093
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-fail-secure-behaviour",
2094
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2095
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2096
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
2097
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2098
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2099
+ },
2100
+ {
2101
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2102
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-denial-of-service-resource-bounds",
2103
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2104
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2105
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2106
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2107
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2108
+ },
2109
+ {
2110
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2111
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-error-handling-diagnostics",
2112
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2113
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2114
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2115
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2116
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2117
+ },
2118
+ {
2119
+ /*
2120
+ * The third package-placement unblock, and the weakest-argued of them — recorded as such. The
2121
+ * OIDC claim set was plainly a protocol vocabulary; these are Wildo's own key-purpose names.
2122
+ * What justifies the move independently of assurance is that they name identities crossing a
2123
+ * PROCESS boundary: the platform issues a token this application verifies, and this
2124
+ * application signs a webhook an integrator verifies. Both sides need the same names.
2125
+ */
2126
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2127
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-cryptographic-key-establishment-and-management",
2128
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2129
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2130
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2131
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2132
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2133
+ },
2134
+ {
2135
+ /*
2136
+ * Attested from the engine even though the CONTROL lives in `platform-config-lib`, which this
2137
+ * package must not depend on. The vocabulary crosses the companion-safe boundary into
2138
+ * `saas-models` while only the digesting stayed on the platform side — so the objective that
2139
+ * looked structurally unreachable needed no move at all.
2140
+ */
2141
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2142
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-authenticator-storage-protection",
2143
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2144
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2145
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2146
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2147
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2148
+ },
2149
+ {
2150
+ /*
2151
+ * The forty-ninth binding, and the only one that required the ENGINE to change. The other
2152
+ * forty-eight were mapping work — finding the vocabulary that already named a control. This
2153
+ * one was a genuine coverage hole: the concurrent-session cap was enforced and untested-for
2154
+ * in the trail, so there was nothing to bind to until the eviction started emitting.
2155
+ */
2156
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2157
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-concurrent-session-control",
2158
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2159
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2160
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2161
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2162
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2163
+ },
2164
+ ], (a) => `${a.source.sourceRef}@${a.source.sourceVersion}:${a.requirementRef}@${a.requirementVersion}`),
2165
+ implementationExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.implementationExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => ({
2166
+ identity: { expectationRef: binding.implementationExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },
2167
+ objective: binding.objective,
2168
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: [...binding.requiredCapabilityRefs],
2169
+ })),
2170
+ /*
2171
+ * A body is joined in by REQUIREMENT ref rather than authored here.
2172
+ *
2173
+ * Every binding is 1:1:1 — one evidence requirement each — so the single `requiredStatementEvidenceRefs`
2174
+ * entry is the key. Spread conditionally so a demand with no body yet composes to exactly the object it
2175
+ * composed to before, which is what keeps the pinned fixture lists untouched while the 49 are authored.
2176
+ */
2177
+ evidenceExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.evidenceExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => {
2178
+ const body = ASSURANCE_EVIDENCE_REQUIREMENT_BODIES[binding.requiredStatementEvidenceRefs[0] ?? ""];
2179
+ return {
2180
+ identity: { expectationRef: binding.evidenceExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },
2181
+ objective: binding.objective,
2182
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [...binding.requiredStatementEvidenceRefs],
2183
+ ...(body ? { body } : {}),
2184
+ };
2185
+ }),
2186
+ /*
2187
+ * A body is joined in by REQUIREMENT ref, exactly as on the evidence tier above, and spread
2188
+ * conditionally so a demand with no body yet composes to what it composed to before.
2189
+ *
2190
+ * Until 2026-09-08 these refs were the expectation's OWN ref in 50 of 50 bindings — the demand
2191
+ * said "to verify X, see X" (#452). They now name `verification-requirement:*`, which is a
2192
+ * namespace a body can be written against.
2193
+ */
2194
+ verificationExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.verificationExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => {
2195
+ const body = ASSURANCE_VERIFICATION_REQUIREMENT_BODIES[binding.requiredStatementVerificationRefs[0] ?? ""];
2196
+ return {
2197
+ identity: { expectationRef: binding.verificationExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },
2198
+ objective: binding.objective,
2199
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [...binding.requiredStatementVerificationRefs],
2200
+ ...(body ? { body } : {}),
2201
+ };
2202
+ }),
137
2203
  });
138
2204
  }
139
2205
  //# sourceMappingURL=assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js.map