@wildo-ai/saas-specifications 1.1.0 → 1.1.2

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (423) hide show
  1. package/dist/assurance/external-framework-mapping.json +980 -0
  2. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  3. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  4. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand.family-aspects.js +51 -0
  5. package/dist/esm/_core/brand/brand.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  6. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  7. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  8. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan.family-aspects.js +28 -0
  9. package/dist/esm/_core/build-plan/build-plan.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  10. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  11. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  12. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model.family-aspects.js +21 -0
  13. package/dist/esm/_core/business-model-lite/business-model.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  14. package/dist/esm/_core/chart-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  15. package/dist/esm/_core/chart-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  16. package/dist/esm/_core/chart-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  17. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.d.ts +85 -0
  18. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  19. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.js +41 -0
  20. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  21. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.d.ts +168 -2
  22. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  23. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.js +98 -9
  24. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-document-candidate.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  25. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-documents.family-aspects.d.ts +12 -0
  26. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-documents.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  27. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-documents.family-aspects.js +47 -0
  28. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/compliance-documents.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  29. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/document-fact-specification-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  30. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/document-fact-specification-generation.schemas.js +8 -3
  31. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/document-fact-specification-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  32. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.family-aspects.d.ts +21 -0
  33. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  34. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.family-aspects.js +40 -0
  35. package/dist/esm/_core/compliance-documents/processor-register.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  36. package/dist/esm/_core/composite-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  37. package/dist/esm/_core/composite-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  38. package/dist/esm/_core/composite-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  39. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  40. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  41. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan.family-aspects.js +32 -0
  42. package/dist/esm/_core/domain-plan/domain-plan.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  43. package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  44. package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  45. package/dist/esm/_core/execution-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  46. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.registry.d.ts +18 -0
  47. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.registry.d.ts.map +1 -0
  48. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.registry.js +60 -0
  49. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.registry.js.map +1 -0
  50. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.schemas.d.ts +122 -0
  51. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -0
  52. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.schemas.js +15 -0
  53. package/dist/esm/_core/family-aspects.schemas.js.map +1 -0
  54. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/capability-map-output-set-generation.schemas.d.ts +11 -11
  55. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-drafts.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  56. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-drafts.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  57. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-drafts.family-aspects.js +25 -0
  58. package/dist/esm/_core/feature-drafts/feature-drafts.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  59. package/dist/esm/_core/flows-actors-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  60. package/dist/esm/_core/flows-actors-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  61. package/dist/esm/_core/flows-actors-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  62. package/dist/esm/_core/frontend-component-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  63. package/dist/esm/_core/frontend-component-specification.schemas.js +19 -1
  64. package/dist/esm/_core/frontend-component-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  65. package/dist/esm/_core/full-custom-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  66. package/dist/esm/_core/full-custom-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  67. package/dist/esm/_core/full-custom-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  68. package/dist/esm/_core/guidance-flow-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  69. package/dist/esm/_core/guidance-flow-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  70. package/dist/esm/_core/guidance-flow-specification.schemas.js +14 -0
  71. package/dist/esm/_core/guidance-flow-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  72. package/dist/esm/_core/index.d.ts +2 -0
  73. package/dist/esm/_core/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  74. package/dist/esm/_core/index.js +2 -0
  75. package/dist/esm/_core/index.js.map +1 -1
  76. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market-snapshot-generation.schemas.d.ts +22 -22
  77. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market.family-aspects.d.ts +9 -0
  78. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  79. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market.family-aspects.js +227 -0
  80. package/dist/esm/_core/market/market.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  81. package/dist/esm/_core/onboarding-view-specification.schemas.d.ts +11 -0
  82. package/dist/esm/_core/onboarding-view-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  83. package/dist/esm/_core/onboarding-view-specification.schemas.js +14 -0
  84. package/dist/esm/_core/onboarding-view-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  85. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  86. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  87. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.family-aspects.js +31 -0
  88. package/dist/esm/_core/placement-plan/placement-plan.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  89. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements.family-aspects.d.ts +9 -0
  90. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  91. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements.family-aspects.js +40 -0
  92. package/dist/esm/_core/requirements/requirements.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  93. package/dist/esm/_core/resource-specification.schemas.d.ts +22 -0
  94. package/dist/esm/_core/resource-specification.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  95. package/dist/esm/_core/resource-specification.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  96. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  97. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  98. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap.family-aspects.js +26 -0
  99. package/dist/esm/_core/roadmap/roadmap.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  100. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision.family-aspects.d.ts +11 -0
  101. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  102. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision.family-aspects.js +63 -0
  103. package/dist/esm/_core/vision/vision.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  104. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-fact-specification.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +188 -33
  105. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-fact-specification.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  106. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-fact-specification.application-creation.schemas.js +158 -57
  107. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-document-fact-specification.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  108. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-specification-family-identity.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +38 -4
  109. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-specification-family-identity.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  110. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-specification-family-identity.application-creation.schemas.js +37 -3
  111. package/dist/esm/application-creation/application-specification-family-identity.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  112. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-facts.family-aspects.d.ts +12 -0
  113. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-facts.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  114. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-facts.family-aspects.js +37 -0
  115. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-facts.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  116. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-release-policy.family-aspects.d.ts +3 -0
  117. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-release-policy.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  118. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-release-policy.family-aspects.js +23 -0
  119. package/dist/esm/application-creation/document-release-policy.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  120. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +93 -62
  121. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  122. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.js +114 -59
  123. package/dist/esm/application-creation/playbooks.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  124. package/dist/esm/application-creation/structured-artifact-landing.application-creation.schemas.d.ts +2 -0
  125. package/dist/esm/application-creation/structured-artifact-landing.application-creation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  126. package/dist/esm/application-creation/structured-artifact-landing.application-creation.schemas.js +2 -0
  127. package/dist/esm/application-creation/structured-artifact-landing.application-creation.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  128. package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.d.ts +11 -0
  129. package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.d.ts.map +1 -1
  130. package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.js +11 -0
  131. package/dist/esm/application-creation.exports.js.map +1 -1
  132. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.d.ts +976 -2
  133. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  134. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js +2026 -61
  135. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  136. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.schemas.d.ts +1 -0
  137. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-authority-basis.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  138. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  139. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.definitions.js +18 -3
  140. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  141. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.schemas.d.ts +32 -2
  142. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  143. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.schemas.js +32 -2
  144. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-document-system.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  145. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-external-framework-mapping.d.ts +90 -0
  146. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-external-framework-mapping.d.ts.map +1 -0
  147. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-external-framework-mapping.js +134 -0
  148. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-external-framework-mapping.js.map +1 -0
  149. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-objective-catalog.definitions.d.ts +71 -1
  150. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-objective-catalog.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  151. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-objective-catalog.definitions.js +545 -5
  152. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-objective-catalog.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  153. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program-generation.schemas.d.ts +141 -0
  154. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program-generation.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -0
  155. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program-generation.schemas.js +377 -0
  156. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program-generation.schemas.js.map +1 -0
  157. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program.family-aspects.d.ts +13 -0
  158. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  159. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program.family-aspects.js +16 -0
  160. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  161. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program.schemas.d.ts +30 -6
  162. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  163. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program.schemas.js +29 -6
  164. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-program.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  165. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-source-registry.definitions.d.ts +1 -0
  166. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-source-registry.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  167. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-source-registry.definitions.js +12 -0
  168. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-source-registry.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  169. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-sources.schemas.d.ts +76 -0
  170. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-sources.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  171. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-sources.schemas.js +59 -0
  172. package/dist/esm/assurance/assurance-sources.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  173. package/dist/esm/assurance/document-publication.family-aspects.d.ts +29 -0
  174. package/dist/esm/assurance/document-publication.family-aspects.d.ts.map +1 -0
  175. package/dist/esm/assurance/document-publication.family-aspects.js +48 -0
  176. package/dist/esm/assurance/document-publication.family-aspects.js.map +1 -0
  177. package/dist/esm/assurance.exports.d.ts +2 -0
  178. package/dist/esm/assurance.exports.d.ts.map +1 -1
  179. package/dist/esm/assurance.exports.js +2 -0
  180. package/dist/esm/assurance.exports.js.map +1 -1
  181. package/dist/esm/companion-exports.d.ts +19 -2
  182. package/dist/esm/companion-exports.d.ts.map +1 -1
  183. package/dist/esm/companion-exports.js.map +1 -1
  184. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-api-keys.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  185. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-api-keys.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  186. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-api-keys.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  187. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-metadata.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  188. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-metadata.resource.specification.js +3 -1
  189. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-metadata.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  190. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-oauth-clients.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  191. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-oauth-clients.resource.specification.js +3 -1
  192. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-oauth-clients.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  193. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-versions.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  194. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-versions.resource.specification.js +3 -1
  195. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/application-versions.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  196. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/applications.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  197. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/applications.resource.specification.js +3 -1
  198. package/dist/esm/engine/applications/resources/applications.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  199. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/consumable-tokens.resource.specification.d.ts +36 -0
  200. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/consumable-tokens.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -0
  201. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/consumable-tokens.resource.specification.js +193 -0
  202. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/consumable-tokens.resource.specification.js.map +1 -0
  203. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/oauth-consent-grants.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  204. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/oauth-consent-grants.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  205. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/oauth-consent-grants.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  206. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/oauth-consent-grants.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  207. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/organization-api-keys.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  208. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/organization-api-keys.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  209. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/organization-api-keys.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  210. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/organization-oauth-clients.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  211. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/organization-oauth-clients.resource.specification.js +3 -1
  212. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/organization-oauth-clients.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  213. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/platform-access-grants.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  214. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/platform-access-grants.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  215. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/platform-access-grants.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  216. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/platform-access-grants.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  217. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/scim-provisioning-config.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  218. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/scim-provisioning-config.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  219. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/scim-provisioning-config.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  220. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/scim-tokens.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  221. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/scim-tokens.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  222. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/scim-tokens.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  223. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/siem-delivery-dlq.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  224. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/siem-delivery-dlq.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  225. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/siem-delivery-dlq.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  226. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/siem-export-config.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  227. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/siem-export-config.resource.specification.js +6 -4
  228. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/siem-export-config.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  229. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/sso-config.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  230. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/sso-config.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  231. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/sso-config.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  232. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/sso-connections.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  233. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/sso-connections.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  234. package/dist/esm/engine/auth/resources/sso-connections.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  235. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/billing-accounts.resource.specification.d.ts +2 -2
  236. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/billing-accounts.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  237. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/billing-accounts.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  238. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/billing-accounts.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  239. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/credit-pools.resource.specification.d.ts +8 -8
  240. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/credit-pools.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  241. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/credit-pools.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  242. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/credit-pools.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  243. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/invoice-refs.resource.specification.d.ts +2 -2
  244. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/invoice-refs.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  245. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/invoice-refs.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  246. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/invoice-refs.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  247. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/prices.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  248. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/prices.resource.specification.js +3 -1
  249. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/prices.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  250. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/products.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  251. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/products.resource.specification.js +3 -1
  252. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/products.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  253. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/promotions.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  254. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/promotions.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  255. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/promotions.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  256. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/referrals.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  257. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/referrals.resource.specification.js +3 -1
  258. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/referrals.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  259. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/subscriptions.resource.specification.d.ts +6 -6
  260. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/subscriptions.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  261. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/subscriptions.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  262. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/subscriptions.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  263. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/usage-records.resource.specification.d.ts +6 -6
  264. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/usage-records.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  265. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/usage-records.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  266. package/dist/esm/engine/billing/resources/usage-records.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  267. package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/audit-logs.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  268. package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/audit-logs.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  269. package/dist/esm/engine/compliance/resources/audit-logs.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  270. package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-specifications.registry.d.ts.map +1 -1
  271. package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-specifications.registry.js +5 -0
  272. package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-specifications.registry.js.map +1 -1
  273. package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-sub-domain.d.ts +63 -0
  274. package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-sub-domain.d.ts.map +1 -0
  275. package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-sub-domain.js +87 -0
  276. package/dist/esm/engine/engine-resource-sub-domain.js.map +1 -0
  277. package/dist/esm/engine/errors/error-messages.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  278. package/dist/esm/engine/errors/error-messages.specification.js +30 -1
  279. package/dist/esm/engine/errors/error-messages.specification.js.map +1 -1
  280. package/dist/esm/engine/features/resources/application-features.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  281. package/dist/esm/engine/features/resources/application-features.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  282. package/dist/esm/engine/features/resources/application-features.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  283. package/dist/esm/engine/features/resources/organization-features.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  284. package/dist/esm/engine/features/resources/organization-features.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  285. package/dist/esm/engine/features/resources/organization-features.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  286. package/dist/esm/engine/features/resources/user-features.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  287. package/dist/esm/engine/features/resources/user-features.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  288. package/dist/esm/engine/features/resources/user-features.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  289. package/dist/esm/engine/features/resources/user-features.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  290. package/dist/esm/engine/files/resources/files.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  291. package/dist/esm/engine/files/resources/files.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  292. package/dist/esm/engine/files/resources/files.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  293. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/a2a-push-delivery-log.resource.specification.d.ts +3 -3
  294. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/a2a-push-delivery-log.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  295. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/a2a-push-delivery-log.resource.specification.js +12 -0
  296. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/a2a-push-delivery-log.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  297. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/a2a-token-budget-state.resource.specification.d.ts +3 -3
  298. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/a2a-token-budget-state.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  299. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/a2a-token-budget-state.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  300. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/a2a-token-budget-state.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  301. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/flow-actor-executions.resource.specification.d.ts +3 -3
  302. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/flow-actor-executions.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  303. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/flow-actor-executions.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  304. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/flow-actor-executions.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  305. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/flow-actor-tasks.resource.specification.d.ts +3 -3
  306. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/flow-actor-tasks.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  307. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/flow-actor-tasks.resource.specification.js +3 -1
  308. package/dist/esm/engine/flows-actors/resources/flow-actor-tasks.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  309. package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/app/public-layout-main-container.frontend-component.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  310. package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/app/public-layout-main-container.frontend-component.specification.js +8 -3
  311. package/dist/esm/engine/frontend-components/app/public-layout-main-container.frontend-component.specification.js.map +1 -1
  312. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/guidance-state.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  313. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/guidance-state.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  314. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/guidance-state.resource.specification.js +3 -0
  315. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/guidance-state.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  316. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/lifecycle-state.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  317. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/lifecycle-state.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  318. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/lifecycle-state.resource.specification.js +3 -0
  319. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/lifecycle-state.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  320. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/progression-state.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  321. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/progression-state.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  322. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/progression-state.resource.specification.js +3 -0
  323. package/dist/esm/engine/guidance/resources/progression-state.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  324. package/dist/esm/engine/index.d.ts +1 -0
  325. package/dist/esm/engine/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  326. package/dist/esm/engine/index.js +1 -0
  327. package/dist/esm/engine/index.js.map +1 -1
  328. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/data-seed-runs.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  329. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/data-seed-runs.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  330. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/data-seed-runs.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  331. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/external-data-pipeline-states.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  332. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/external-data-pipeline-states.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  333. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/external-data-pipeline-states.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  334. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/job-executions.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  335. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/job-executions.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  336. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/job-executions.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  337. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/job-payload-storage.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  338. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/job-payload-storage.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  339. package/dist/esm/engine/infrastructure/resources/job-payload-storage.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  340. package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/m2m-webhook-delivery-log.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  341. package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/m2m-webhook-delivery-log.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  342. package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/m2m-webhook-delivery-log.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  343. package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/notification-badges.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  344. package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/notification-badges.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  345. package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/notification-badges.resource.specification.js +3 -0
  346. package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/notification-badges.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  347. package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/webhook-config.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  348. package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/webhook-config.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  349. package/dist/esm/engine/notifications/resources/webhook-config.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  350. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  351. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  352. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  353. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-members.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  354. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-notifications.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  355. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-notifications.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  356. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-notifications.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  357. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-preferences.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  358. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-preferences.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  359. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-preferences.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  360. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-profiles.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  361. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-profiles.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  362. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-profiles.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  363. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-unit-members.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  364. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-unit-members.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  365. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-unit-members.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  366. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-units.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  367. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-units.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  368. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organization-units.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  369. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organizations.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  370. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organizations.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  371. package/dist/esm/engine/organizations/resources/organizations.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  372. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/anonymous-users.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  373. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/anonymous-users.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  374. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/anonymous-users.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  375. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/inbound-contacts.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  376. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/inbound-contacts.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  377. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/inbound-contacts.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  378. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/inbound-contacts.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  379. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-credentials.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  380. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-credentials.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  381. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-credentials.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  382. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-credentials.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  383. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-identity-links.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  384. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-identity-links.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  385. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-identity-links.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  386. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-identity-links.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  387. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-preferences.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  388. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-preferences.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  389. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-preferences.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  390. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-preferences.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  391. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-profiles.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  392. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-profiles.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  393. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-profiles.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  394. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-profiles.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  395. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self-preferences.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  396. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self-preferences.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  397. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self-preferences.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  398. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self-preferences.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  399. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self-profiles.resource.specification.d.ts +1 -1
  400. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self-profiles.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  401. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self-profiles.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  402. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self-profiles.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  403. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  404. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self.resource.specification.js +3 -1
  405. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/user-self.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  406. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/users.resource.specification.d.ts.map +1 -1
  407. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/users.resource.specification.js +2 -0
  408. package/dist/esm/engine/users/resources/users.resource.specification.js.map +1 -1
  409. package/dist/esm/technical-documentation/engine-documentation-specification-catalog.companion.d.ts +5 -0
  410. package/dist/esm/technical-documentation/engine-documentation-specification-catalog.companion.d.ts.map +1 -1
  411. package/dist/esm/technical-documentation/engine-documentation-specification-catalog.companion.js +385 -9
  412. package/dist/esm/technical-documentation/engine-documentation-specification-catalog.companion.js.map +1 -1
  413. package/dist/esm/technical-documentation/technical-documentation-units.schemas.js +1 -1
  414. package/dist/esm/technical-documentation/technical-documentation-units.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  415. package/dist/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +1 -0
  416. package/package.json +8 -8
  417. package/dist/esm/.builder.pid +0 -9
  418. package/dist/esm/_core/business-coverage/coverage-findings-validation.d.ts +0 -0
  419. package/dist/esm/_core/business-coverage/coverage-findings-validation.d.ts.map +0 -0
  420. package/dist/esm/_core/business-coverage/coverage-findings-validation.js.map +0 -0
  421. package/dist/esm/_core/business-coverage/coverage-findings.schemas.d.ts +0 -0
  422. package/dist/esm/_core/business-coverage/coverage-findings.schemas.d.ts.map +0 -0
  423. package/dist/esm/_core/business-coverage/coverage-findings.schemas.js.map +0 -0
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
1
- import { EngineCapability, SubjectExportPurpose } from "@wildo-ai/saas-models";
1
+ import { AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode, AuthMethod, ClientInstanceIdScope, ConfigurationValidationDomain, DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES, DataProcessingConsent, DataRetentionClass, EngineCapability, EngineCapabilityResolutionMode, ErasureRetentionMode, ErrorType, JwtPrivateKeys, JwtPublicKeys, ExecutionContext_ExecutionType, LifecycleStage, OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin, OAuthGrantType, OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES, ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY, OrganizationMemberStatus, PersonalDataCategory, ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema, OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind, PersistenceAdapter, ResourceOperationImplementationCoverage, ResourceOperationRequestContractBreadth, ResourceOperationVariantType, ResourcePersistenceAdapterIsolation, ResourcePrimaryScope, RetentionStatus, SubjectExportPurpose, UserStatus, } from "@wildo-ai/saas-models";
2
2
  import { AssuranceProgramAuthorityBasisSchema, AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind, } from "./assurance-authority-basis.schemas.js";
3
3
  import { AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind } from "./assurance-program.schemas.js";
4
4
  import { INITIAL_ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_CATALOG } from "./assurance-objective-catalog.definitions.js";
@@ -6,6 +6,34 @@ import { createInitialAssuranceDocumentAuthorityCatalog } from "./assurance-docu
6
6
  import { INITIAL_ASSURANCE_SOURCE_REGISTRY } from "./assurance-source-registry.definitions.js";
7
7
  import { AssuranceSourceUse } from "./assurance-sources.schemas.js";
8
8
  export const SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_HOST_CONFIGURATION_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF = "implementation-artifact-kind:application.subject-data-export-configuration";
9
+ /**
10
+ * The review OCCURRENCE record — who reviewed the privileged-access population, when, and what they
11
+ * concluded — supplied by the application as a host artifact (#202).
12
+ *
13
+ * A host artifact rather than something the engine records, because Wildo cannot witness a human
14
+ * review. It can enumerate WHO holds privileged access
15
+ * (`privileged-access-review.backend.utils.ts`); it cannot know that a person looked at that list,
16
+ * nor what they decided. A framework that wrote a review record would be asserting a decision nobody
17
+ * made — the same line the governed-document fact families draw between a derivation and a decision.
18
+ *
19
+ * Note the objective's own caveat, which this ref must not be read as escaping: the record is
20
+ * retained as traceable evidence WITHOUT implying remediation completion. It proves a review
21
+ * happened, never that what it found was fixed.
22
+ */
23
+ export const PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_HOST_RECORD_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF = "implementation-artifact-kind:application.privileged-access-review-record";
24
+ /** Stable semantic capability identity for the review the engine ENUMERATES for and the operator PERFORMS. */
25
+ export const PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF = "capability:privileged-access-review";
26
+ /*
27
+ * The scopes at which the engine can enumerate privileged access, DERIVED from the runtime vocabulary
28
+ * it actually branches on rather than transcribed.
29
+ *
30
+ * A deliberate SUBSET of `ResourcePrimaryScope`, and the subset is the honest part: `USER_SELF` and
31
+ * `ANONYMOUS` confer no privileged access, so claiming them would widen the capability to two scopes
32
+ * the enumeration does not — and could not — cover. Written as enum MEMBERS so a rename moves it,
33
+ * which is what the anchoring rule asks for; what it does not ask for is claiming every member of an
34
+ * enum merely because it is closed.
35
+ */
36
+ const PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_SCOPES = [ResourcePrimaryScope.APPLICATION, ResourcePrimaryScope.ORGANIZATIONS];
9
37
  /** Stable semantic capability identity used by host composition to derive only selected proofs. */
10
38
  export const SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF = "capability:subject-data-export";
11
39
  export const INITIAL_ASSURANCE_AUTHORITY_BASIS_REF = "assurance-authority-basis:wildo-safe-baseline-v1";
@@ -16,6 +44,1247 @@ const AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-08-03T00:00:00.000Z";
16
44
  const AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF = "reviewer:wildo-assurance-authority";
17
45
  const HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-08-13T08:57:58.000Z";
18
46
  const HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF = "reviewer:paul-cayon-assurance-owner";
47
+ /*
48
+ * The 2026-09-01 mapping tranche — NIST, GDPR and HIPAA, decided by the owner.
49
+ *
50
+ * Stamped with the FRAMEWORK's own authority identity rather than a person's. `reviewer:paul-cayon-assurance-owner` is reserved for entries the owner personally
51
+ * approved (today: the HIPAA privileged-access-review requirement above), and putting a person's ref on a mapping they have not read would be the fabricated review
52
+ * this layer exists to refuse. The review record for these is the COMMIT — `one-source-of-truth.md` Rule 7: the author is the commit author, the instant is the commit
53
+ * time, and independence is enforced by the forge rather than by bespoke code.
54
+ */
55
+ const MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-01T00:00:00.000Z";
56
+ /** The 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche — three objectives the COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL capability already attests. */
57
+ const AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
58
+ /** The 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche — objectives selected by CODE-MARKER coverage rather than by reading the catalog. */
59
+ const PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
60
+ /** The 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche — the three most heavily marked objectives that answer "how much authority, and over which rows". */
61
+ const AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
62
+ /** The 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche — how identity is re-proved, how its policy changes are evidenced, and when access ends. */
63
+ const IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
64
+ /** The 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche — the four privacy objectives a governed privacy notice quotes most directly. */
65
+ const DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
66
+ /** The 2026-09-02 attribution tranche — what the trail must be able to say about isolation, egress, provisioning and client identity. */
67
+ const ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
68
+ /** The 2026-09-02 declaration tranche — objectives satisfied by what a schema or config DECLARES, plus the trail that records the declaration changing. */
69
+ const DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
70
+ /** The 2026-09-02 reachability tranche — objectives whose control is WHICH DOOR exists, and which values it refuses. */
71
+ const REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
72
+ /** The 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche — two objectives whose vocabulary existed and was only in the wrong package or unexported. */
73
+ const SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
74
+ /** The 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche — two objectives whose vocabulary is the SUBSTRATE the control runs against. */
75
+ const DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
76
+ /** The 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche — three objectives whose control is a DISTINCTION INSIDE one classification vocabulary. */
77
+ const DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT = "2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z";
78
+ /**
79
+ * Which objectives the basis can carry an obligation for, and the expectation refs each one binds.
80
+ *
81
+ * ONE source for a fact two very different callers need. The basis composer below builds its three expectation-authority arrays from this; the compliance-programme
82
+ * generation normalizer (`assurance-program-generation.schemas.ts`) reads it to STAMP an obligation's `implementationExpectationRefs`, `evidenceExpectationRefs` and
83
+ * `verificationExpectationRefs` — all three `.min(1)` on every entry — and to REFUSE an objective that is not here.
84
+ *
85
+ * That refusal is the point. The objective catalog defines 49 objectives and this binds a SUBSET of them; the gap is tracked as #207. Do not quote a count from here
86
+ * or from any prose — count the entries below, because every tranche that lands makes a written number wrong and a written number is what stops the next reader
87
+ * measuring. Without the lookup a producer would be free to invent an expectation ref for any unbound objective, and the
88
+ * result would validate: a programme claiming coverage the framework has never stated a demand for. Deriving the refs instead makes the
89
+ * coverage ceiling mechanical rather than a sentence in an issue (#207).
90
+ *
91
+ * Growing this is FRAMEWORK authoring, not generation — see #207. Each entry says what an objective demands of an application, which is Wildo's decision to make.
92
+ */
93
+ export const ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS = [
94
+ {
95
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW", objectiveVersion: 1 },
96
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:privileged-access-review",
97
+ /*
98
+ * TWO capabilities, and the second is what makes the binding honest (#202).
99
+ *
100
+ * `capability:audit-events` was the only one for as long as this objective had no implementation,
101
+ * and on its own it says the wrong thing: audit events are bound to many objectives and record
102
+ * that access CHANGED, never that anyone reviewed who holds it. The review capability is what
103
+ * carries the part Wildo actually supplies — the enumeration — and the host-artifact requirement
104
+ * that names the part it cannot: the occurrence record.
105
+ */
106
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF],
107
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:privileged-access-review-occurrences",
108
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence"],
109
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:privileged-access-review",
110
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:privileged-access-review"],
111
+ },
112
+ {
113
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
114
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:subject-data-export",
115
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: [SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF],
116
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:subject-data-export-receipt",
117
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt"],
118
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:subject-data-export",
119
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:subject-data-export"],
120
+ },
121
+ {
122
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
123
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:subject-erasure",
124
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:subject-erasure"],
125
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:subject-erasure-execution",
126
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record"],
127
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:subject-erasure",
128
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:subject-erasure"],
129
+ },
130
+ {
131
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
132
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:security-event-emission",
133
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
134
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:security-event-record",
135
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:security-event-record"],
136
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:security-event-emission",
137
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:security-event-emission"],
138
+ },
139
+ {
140
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
141
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:authorization-decision-audit",
142
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
143
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:authorization-decision-record",
144
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record"],
145
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:authorization-decision-audit",
146
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:authorization-decision-audit"],
147
+ },
148
+ {
149
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR", objectiveVersion: 1 },
150
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:multi-factor-authentication",
151
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:multi-factor-authentication"],
152
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:multi-factor-enrolment",
153
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:multi-factor-enrolment-record"],
154
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:multi-factor-authentication",
155
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:multi-factor-authentication"],
156
+ },
157
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche — see the source-requirement block for the verified implementations ── */
158
+ {
159
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
160
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution",
161
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
162
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:auditable-event-actor-record",
163
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:auditable-event-actor-record"],
164
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution",
165
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution"],
166
+ },
167
+ {
168
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
169
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration",
170
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
171
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record",
172
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record"],
173
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration",
174
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration"],
175
+ },
176
+ {
177
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
178
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit",
179
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
180
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-record",
181
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-record"],
182
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit",
183
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit"],
184
+ },
185
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
186
+ {
187
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
188
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence",
189
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
190
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record",
191
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record"],
192
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence",
193
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence"],
194
+ },
195
+ {
196
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
197
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:credential-state-transition-record",
198
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
199
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:credential-state-transition-record",
200
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"],
201
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:credential-state-transition-record",
202
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:credential-state-transition-record"],
203
+ },
204
+ {
205
+ /*
206
+ * TWO capabilities, and that is the point of this entry. The floor is what RETAINS the
207
+ * administrator — a refusal — and the audit trail is what makes a breach visible when an erasure
208
+ * acknowledgement is allowed to strand a scope anyway. Naming only the floor would claim
209
+ * prevention the design deliberately does not always offer; naming only the audit would claim a
210
+ * record of something nothing prevents.
211
+ */
212
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
213
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor",
214
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:administrative-continuity-floor", "capability:audit-events"],
215
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:administrative-continuity-breach-record",
216
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:administrative-continuity-breach-record"],
217
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor",
218
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor"],
219
+ },
220
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
221
+ {
222
+ /*
223
+ * ONE capability, and the omission is the honest part. `capability:audit-events` is NOT required
224
+ * here, because the half of this control that most deserves an audit row does not produce one:
225
+ * every `assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling` call site is a custom-impl service, so its
226
+ * `role_ceiling_exceeded` refusal never passes through `runAuthorizationPhase` and the denial
227
+ * funnel never sees it (measured 2026-09-02, filed separately). Requiring the audit capability
228
+ * would make the programme claim a record that is not written.
229
+ */
230
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
231
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling",
232
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:operation-role-authorization"],
233
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:operation-role-declaration",
234
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:operation-role-declaration"],
235
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling",
236
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling"],
237
+ },
238
+ {
239
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
240
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:scope-confined-query",
241
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:organization-unit-scope-confinement"],
242
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:conferring-grant-record",
243
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:conferring-grant-record"],
244
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:scope-confined-query",
245
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:scope-confined-query"],
246
+ },
247
+ {
248
+ /*
249
+ * TWO capabilities, for the reason `ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY` has two: the grant machinery is
250
+ * what CONFINES the delegation (PKCE proof-of-possession, exact redirect, a token carrying no
251
+ * more than the grant declared) and the audit trail is what makes each decision READABLE — five
252
+ * distinct events covering approval, refusal, persistence, issuance and a failed exchange.
253
+ * Naming only the exchange would claim a deliberate authorization nobody can review afterwards.
254
+ */
255
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
256
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange",
257
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:delegated-authorization"],
258
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:delegated-authorization-decision-record",
259
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:delegated-authorization-decision-record"],
260
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange",
261
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange"],
262
+ },
263
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
264
+ {
265
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
266
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof",
267
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:step-up-authentication"],
268
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:step-up-challenge-record",
269
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:step-up-challenge-record"],
270
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof",
271
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof"],
272
+ },
273
+ {
274
+ /*
275
+ * NO new capability, deliberately. This objective's control is not a mechanism an application
276
+ * selects — it is that a change to the authored authentication posture is DETECTED at startup and
277
+ * evidenced once, which the audit trail already does through
278
+ * `APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED`. Minting a second capability identity for the configuration
279
+ * itself would ask an application to select something it cannot decline.
280
+ */
281
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
282
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection",
283
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
284
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:authentication-posture-change-record",
285
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:authentication-posture-change-record"],
286
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection",
287
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection"],
288
+ },
289
+ {
290
+ /*
291
+ * TWO capabilities, and the objective's own wording is why: access is "withdrawn when the
292
+ * relationship conferring them ends, and restoring access is as attributable as removing it."
293
+ * The status vocabulary is what WITHDRAWS; the audit trail is what makes the restoration
294
+ * attributable. A withdrawal nobody can see reversed is half the control.
295
+ */
296
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
297
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal",
298
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:access-withdrawal-on-conferring-status", "capability:audit-events"],
299
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record",
300
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record"],
301
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal",
302
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal"],
303
+ },
304
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
305
+ {
306
+ /*
307
+ * TWO capabilities. Concealment is what makes a retained row behave as deleted; the audit trail is
308
+ * what makes the destruction DECISION deliberate, attributable and evidenced — and it is also the
309
+ * only door onto a retained row, since the see-through read is audited. Either alone describes
310
+ * half of an objective whose whole subject is destroying data on purpose and on a schedule.
311
+ */
312
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
313
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment",
314
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:retained-record-concealment"],
315
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:destruction-decision-record",
316
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:destruction-decision-record"],
317
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment",
318
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment"],
319
+ },
320
+ {
321
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
322
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:purpose-limited-egress",
323
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:client-install-identifier-policy"],
324
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration",
325
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration"],
326
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:purpose-limited-egress",
327
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:purpose-limited-egress"],
328
+ },
329
+ {
330
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
331
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:declared-retention-window",
332
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:declared-retention-window"],
333
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:retention-window-declaration",
334
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:retention-window-declaration"],
335
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:declared-retention-window",
336
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:declared-retention-window"],
337
+ },
338
+ {
339
+ /*
340
+ * TWO capabilities, and here the audit trail is not merely corroborating — it IS the record. The
341
+ * objective demands a decision recorded "exactly once and never lost to a race, naming the
342
+ * previous and the resulting value", which is precisely what `.isAuditEvidence()` on the two
343
+ * consent leaves produces through the single emission point every consent-changing verb routes
344
+ * through. The vocabulary capability says WHAT may be decided; the audit says it was.
345
+ */
346
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD", objectiveVersion: 1 },
347
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:single-consent-emission-point",
348
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:consent-decision-record"],
349
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:consent-decision-transition-record",
350
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:consent-decision-transition-record"],
351
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:single-consent-emission-point",
352
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:single-consent-emission-point"],
353
+ },
354
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 attribution tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
355
+ {
356
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
357
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy",
358
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:caller-derived-tenancy"],
359
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:tenancy-derivation-declaration",
360
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:tenancy-derivation-declaration"],
361
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy",
362
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy"],
363
+ },
364
+ {
365
+ /*
366
+ * NO new capability. This objective is ABOUT the audit trail rather than served by it: a
367
+ * privileged action must be attributable and the authorization effect it had reconstructable
368
+ * from the record itself, and the configuration deciding what the trail captures is governed as
369
+ * part of the trail. There is nothing else for an application to select.
370
+ */
371
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
372
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:self-describing-audit-record",
373
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
374
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:reconstructable-authorization-effect",
375
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:reconstructable-authorization-effect"],
376
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:self-describing-audit-record",
377
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:self-describing-audit-record"],
378
+ },
379
+ {
380
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
381
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:outbound-call-recording",
382
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
383
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:outbound-call-record",
384
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:outbound-call-record"],
385
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:outbound-call-recording",
386
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:outbound-call-recording"],
387
+ },
388
+ {
389
+ /*
390
+ * The audit trail alone, and the reason is the same shape as `SESSION_ASSURANCE`: the control is
391
+ * that the switches conferring directory authority are DECLARED rather than implied, and what
392
+ * makes a declaration attestable is that its before/after values are audit evidence. Configuring
393
+ * `defaultUnitRole` IS granting a role, and flipping `autoDeactivateUsers` off silently strands
394
+ * access — both are reconstructable from the trail and from nowhere else.
395
+ */
396
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING", objectiveVersion: 1 },
397
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:declared-directory-authority",
398
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
399
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:directory-authority-switch-record",
400
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:directory-authority-switch-record"],
401
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:declared-directory-authority",
402
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:declared-directory-authority"],
403
+ },
404
+ {
405
+ /*
406
+ * TWO capabilities: the provenance vocabulary says WHAT a client's identity rests on, and the
407
+ * audit trail carries the objective's second half — that a client created by a party which
408
+ * authenticated to nothing, and every refused assertion, are both recorded.
409
+ */
410
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
411
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:verifiable-client-identity",
412
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:client-registration-provenance"],
413
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:client-registration-provenance-record",
414
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:client-registration-provenance-record"],
415
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:verifiable-client-identity",
416
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:verifiable-client-identity"],
417
+ },
418
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 declaration tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
419
+ {
420
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
421
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:operation-serviceability",
422
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:operation-implementation-coverage"],
423
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:operation-serviceability-declaration",
424
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:operation-serviceability-declaration"],
425
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:operation-serviceability",
426
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:operation-serviceability"],
427
+ },
428
+ {
429
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
430
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:declared-persistence-isolation",
431
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:declared-persistence-isolation"],
432
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:persistence-isolation-declaration",
433
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:persistence-isolation-declaration"],
434
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:declared-persistence-isolation",
435
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:declared-persistence-isolation"],
436
+ },
437
+ {
438
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
439
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories",
440
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:personal-data-field-inventory"],
441
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:personal-data-field-declaration",
442
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:personal-data-field-declaration"],
443
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories",
444
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories"],
445
+ },
446
+ {
447
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING", objectiveVersion: 1 },
448
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in",
449
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:provider-selection-opt-in"],
450
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:selected-processor-declaration",
451
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:selected-processor-declaration"],
452
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in",
453
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in"],
454
+ },
455
+ {
456
+ /*
457
+ * TWO capabilities. `UserStatus` is the vocabulary that decides whether a principal may
458
+ * authenticate at all; the audit trail is what makes the change EVIDENCED, which the objective
459
+ * demands by name. The status also carries `.excludeFromUpdate()`, so the change cannot arrive
460
+ * as a side effect of an unrelated write — a guard the vocabulary alone does not express.
461
+ */
462
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
463
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility",
464
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events", "capability:authentication-eligibility-status"],
465
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:authentication-eligibility-change-record",
466
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:authentication-eligibility-change-record"],
467
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility",
468
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility"],
469
+ },
470
+ {
471
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
472
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:collection-export-recording",
473
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
474
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:collection-export-record",
475
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:collection-export-record"],
476
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:collection-export-recording",
477
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:collection-export-recording"],
478
+ },
479
+ {
480
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
481
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:record-context-preservation",
482
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
483
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:record-context-record",
484
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:record-context-record"],
485
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:record-context-preservation",
486
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:record-context-preservation"],
487
+ },
488
+ {
489
+ /*
490
+ * The audit trail alone, because the objective's exception is where its content lives: backend-only
491
+ * material does not cross the client boundary EXCEPT at a single first exposure that is itself
492
+ * audited. The non-crossing half is a DTO-selection property with no vocabulary to attest; the
493
+ * audited exception is the part a programme can carry.
494
+ */
495
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
496
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:audited-first-exposure",
497
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
498
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:first-exposure-record",
499
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:first-exposure-record"],
500
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:audited-first-exposure",
501
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:audited-first-exposure"],
502
+ },
503
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 reachability tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
504
+ {
505
+ /*
506
+ * TWO capabilities, and together they are the whole control. The VARIANT decides whether a door
507
+ * faces a client at all; the ROLE GATE decides who may open the ones that do. `credit-pool TOP_UP`
508
+ * was once an API_CALL gated on ORG_OWNER — a tenant owner could self-grant unlimited credits —
509
+ * and the fix was to move it to INTERNAL_CALL, which is a reachability decision the role gate
510
+ * alone cannot express.
511
+ */
512
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
513
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant",
514
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:operation-reachability-gate", "capability:operation-role-authorization"],
515
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:credit-grant-reachability-declaration",
516
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:credit-grant-reachability-declaration"],
517
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant",
518
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant"],
519
+ },
520
+ {
521
+ /*
522
+ * The same pair, for the same reason: `ScopeFeatures` writes cannot be field-protected, because
523
+ * the super-admin path must write them — so the ENTIRE self-grant boundary for paid entitlements
524
+ * is one role gate on operations that stay non-client-reachable.
525
+ */
526
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
527
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write",
528
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:operation-reachability-gate", "capability:operation-role-authorization"],
529
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration",
530
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration"],
531
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write",
532
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write"],
533
+ },
534
+ {
535
+ /*
536
+ * The sweep that LIFTS a time-boxed restriction, bound to the two status vocabularies it moves
537
+ * between — a suspended user and a suspended membership. It reuses
538
+ * `capability:authentication-eligibility-status` rather than minting a third: the statuses being
539
+ * released are the same ones `IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE` attests being set, and two capability identities
540
+ * for one vocabulary is what an application would have to select twice.
541
+ */
542
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND", objectiveVersion: 1 },
543
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release",
544
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:authentication-eligibility-status", "capability:membership-eligibility-status"],
545
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:restriction-release-schedule",
546
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:restriction-release-schedule"],
547
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release",
548
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release"],
549
+ },
550
+ {
551
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
552
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:constrained-redirect-target",
553
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:redirect-target-constraint"],
554
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:redirect-target-declaration",
555
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:redirect-target-declaration"],
556
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:constrained-redirect-target",
557
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:constrained-redirect-target"],
558
+ },
559
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
560
+ {
561
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
562
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:server-authored-token-claims",
563
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:reserved-token-claim-authorship"],
564
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:reserved-claim-set-declaration",
565
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:reserved-claim-set-declaration"],
566
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:server-authored-token-claims",
567
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:server-authored-token-claims"],
568
+ },
569
+ {
570
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
571
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority",
572
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:startup-configuration-validation"],
573
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:field-authority-declaration",
574
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:field-authority-declaration"],
575
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority",
576
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority"],
577
+ },
578
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
579
+ {
580
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS", objectiveVersion: 1 },
581
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness",
582
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:declared-uniqueness-verification"],
583
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:uniqueness-verification-outcome",
584
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:uniqueness-verification-outcome"],
585
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness",
586
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness"],
587
+ },
588
+ {
589
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
590
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability",
591
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:self-reported-lifecycle-stage"],
592
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:lifecycle-stage-declaration",
593
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:lifecycle-stage-declaration"],
594
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability",
595
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability"],
596
+ },
597
+ /* ── 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche — see the source-requirement block for the marker evidence ── */
598
+ {
599
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED", objectiveVersion: 1 },
600
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:diagnosable-refusal",
601
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:refusal-classification"],
602
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:refusal-classification-record",
603
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:refusal-classification-record"],
604
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:diagnosable-refusal",
605
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:diagnosable-refusal"],
606
+ },
607
+ {
608
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
609
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request",
610
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:refusal-classification"],
611
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:over-limit-refusal-record",
612
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:over-limit-refusal-record"],
613
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request",
614
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request"],
615
+ },
616
+ {
617
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS", objectiveVersion: 1 },
618
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:named-constraint-conflict",
619
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:refusal-classification"],
620
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:constraint-conflict-record",
621
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:constraint-conflict-record"],
622
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:named-constraint-conflict",
623
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:named-constraint-conflict"],
624
+ },
625
+ {
626
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
627
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key",
628
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:verifiable-key-retirement"],
629
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:key-retirement-declaration",
630
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:key-retirement-declaration"],
631
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key",
632
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key"],
633
+ },
634
+ {
635
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
636
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:values-free-secret-contract",
637
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:values-free-secret-contract"],
638
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:secret-contract-shape-declaration",
639
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:secret-contract-shape-declaration"],
640
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:values-free-secret-contract",
641
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:values-free-secret-contract"],
642
+ },
643
+ {
644
+ /*
645
+ * The FORTY-NINTH, and the only one that needed the engine to grow a control rather than the
646
+ * basis to find a vocabulary.
647
+ *
648
+ * Five candidate vocabularies were checked and eliminated by measurement: `SessionType` (the
649
+ * eviction does not consult it), a revocation-reason enum (none existed in `saas-models`), the
650
+ * configured axis (user type — an application-defined open string), and the ordering itself (an
651
+ * ordering is not a set). What was actually missing was EVIDENCE: the eviction enforcing the cap
652
+ * left only a debug line, so a security-relevant token-lifecycle act had no durable record at
653
+ * all — which `CLAUDE.md`'s assurance-by-construction rule asks for by name.
654
+ *
655
+ * `CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SESSION_EVICTED` closes it, and the binding is honest because the
656
+ * record carries `evictedIssuedAt`. The objective calls the FIFO ordering "the property that
657
+ * pushes a stolen chain out instead of a legitimate one"; a record naming only the victim would
658
+ * prove a session ended without proving the right one did. Naming when the retired chain was
659
+ * issued is what makes the ordering reviewable from the trail rather than merely implemented.
660
+ */
661
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
662
+ implementationExpectationRef: "implementation-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions",
663
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
664
+ evidenceExpectationRef: "evidence-expectation:session-eviction-record",
665
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:session-eviction-record"],
666
+ verificationExpectationRef: "verification-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions",
667
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions"],
668
+ },
669
+ ];
670
+ /**
671
+ * Every capability the basis can attest, minus the implementation revision the composer supplies.
672
+ *
673
+ * ONE source, for the same reason as {@link ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS}. The composer below turns these into `capabilityAuthorityDescriptors`; the
674
+ * compliance-programme normalizer reads them to emit the `capabilityAuthorities` a programme must carry for every capability its implementation decisions select —
675
+ * the family refuses a selection with no declared authority (`UNKNOWN_CAPABILITY`).
676
+ *
677
+ * `implementationRevision` is deliberately absent: it identifies the engine build being attested and is only known to the composer's caller.
678
+ */
679
+ export const ASSURANCE_CAPABILITY_AUTHORITIES = [
680
+ {
681
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:audit-events", capabilityVersion: 1 },
682
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
683
+ implementationRefs: [`engine-capability:${EngineCapability.COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL}`],
684
+ profiles: [],
685
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
686
+ availability: {
687
+ kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY,
688
+ engineCapability: EngineCapability.COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL,
689
+ },
690
+ },
691
+ {
692
+ /*
693
+ * Privileged-access review: the engine ENUMERATES, the operator DECIDES and RECORDS (#202).
694
+ *
695
+ * `ALWAYS_AVAILABLE` because the enumeration needs no engine capability to be switched on — roles
696
+ * and memberships exist in every application, and `enumeratePrivilegedAccessPopulation` reads
697
+ * them through the ordinary repositories.
698
+ *
699
+ * The host-artifact requirement is the whole point of the split: without it this capability would
700
+ * read as "Wildo reviews privileged access", which is false and is the claim the objective's four
701
+ * demands would then be quoted against. With it, an application that binds this objective must
702
+ * declare where its review occurrences live, and one that cannot produce them fails to satisfy the
703
+ * capability rather than silently claiming it.
704
+ */
705
+ identity: { capabilityRef: PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_CAPABILITY_REF, capabilityVersion: 1 },
706
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
707
+ implementationRefs: [...PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_SCOPES].map((scope) => `privileged-access-scope:${scope}`).sort(),
708
+ profiles: [],
709
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_HOST_RECORD_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF],
710
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
711
+ },
712
+ {
713
+ identity: { capabilityRef: SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF, capabilityVersion: 1 },
714
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
715
+ implementationRefs: [`subject-export-purpose:${SubjectExportPurpose.ACCESS_ART_15}`, `subject-export-purpose:${SubjectExportPurpose.PORTABILITY_ART_20}`],
716
+ profiles: [
717
+ {
718
+ profileRef: "capability-profile:subject-data-export-safe-baseline-v1",
719
+ parameters: [{ parameterRef: "parameter:export-format", allowedOptionRefs: ["option:json-machine-readable"] }],
720
+ },
721
+ ],
722
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_HOST_CONFIGURATION_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF],
723
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
724
+ },
725
+ {
726
+ /*
727
+ * Erasure that RETAINS where the law requires it. `implementationRefs` name the two modes a resource may declare, so the capability is anchored to vocabulary the
728
+ * engine actually branches on rather than to prose — the same discipline as `subject-export-purpose:` above.
729
+ */
730
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:subject-erasure", capabilityVersion: 1 },
731
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
732
+ implementationRefs: [
733
+ `erasure-retention-mode:${ErasureRetentionMode.RETAIN_AND_IMPERSONALIZE}`,
734
+ `erasure-retention-mode:${ErasureRetentionMode.RETAIN_ONLY}`,
735
+ ],
736
+ profiles: [],
737
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
738
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
739
+ },
740
+ {
741
+ /*
742
+ * Second factors that need NO provider procurement. `SMS_OTP` and `EMAIL_OTP` are deliberately absent: they depend on the SMS and transactional-email engine
743
+ * capabilities, so naming them here would claim availability an application may not have bought. TOTP and passkeys are engine-native and always there.
744
+ */
745
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:multi-factor-authentication", capabilityVersion: 1 },
746
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
747
+ implementationRefs: [`auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSKEY}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.TOTP}`],
748
+ profiles: [],
749
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
750
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
751
+ },
752
+ {
753
+ /*
754
+ * The administrative-continuity FLOORS, named by the two refusals that ARE the control.
755
+ *
756
+ * `AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode` is the closed vocabulary those refusals answer with, so the
757
+ * implementation refs are the mechanism itself rather than a description of it — the same shape as
758
+ * the erasure modes and auth methods above. A floor is engine-native and unconditional: an
759
+ * application cannot decline to retain an administrator, which is why availability is
760
+ * ALWAYS_AVAILABLE and no host artifact is required.
761
+ */
762
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:administrative-continuity-floor", capabilityVersion: 1 },
763
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
764
+ implementationRefs: [
765
+ `administrative-continuity:${AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode.LAST_APPLICATION_SUPER_ADMIN}`,
766
+ `administrative-continuity:${AdministrativeContinuityErrorCode.LAST_ORGANIZATION_OWNER}`,
767
+ ],
768
+ profiles: [],
769
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
770
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
771
+ },
772
+ {
773
+ /*
774
+ * "How much authority" — the ceiling on what a principal may grant, and the same declared
775
+ * operation-role gate applied at a surface that is not a controller.
776
+ *
777
+ * `implementationRefs` name the two ROLE-TABLE SCOPES the ceiling resolves against, because that
778
+ * split IS the mechanism: a held role is expanded through the hierarchy of the scope that granted
779
+ * it, so an organization-scoped grant can never confer application-scoped authority. Naming the
780
+ * individual roles instead would enumerate an application's own table, which is not the
781
+ * framework's to attest. `USER_SELF` and `ANONYMOUS` are absent because neither carries a role
782
+ * table for a ceiling to resolve against.
783
+ */
784
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:operation-role-authorization", capabilityVersion: 1 },
785
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
786
+ implementationRefs: [`authorization-role-scope:${ResourcePrimaryScope.APPLICATION}`, `authorization-role-scope:${ResourcePrimaryScope.ORGANIZATIONS}`],
787
+ profiles: [],
788
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
789
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
790
+ },
791
+ {
792
+ /*
793
+ * "Over which rows" — the narrowing decision, named by the closed vocabulary it answers with.
794
+ *
795
+ * All four kinds are listed, including the two that do NOT narrow. The stamp records the decision
796
+ * whatever it was, and an access review asking "why does this person see this row" needs
797
+ * `ORGANIZATION_WIDE` and `NOT_NARROWED` as much as `UNIT_NARROWED` — an answer that only ever
798
+ * recorded the confining cases could not distinguish a grant that reached everything from a
799
+ * resource that never participated.
800
+ */
801
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:organization-unit-scope-confinement", capabilityVersion: 1 },
802
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
803
+ implementationRefs: [
804
+ `organization-unit-narrowing:${OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind.DENIED}`,
805
+ `organization-unit-narrowing:${OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind.NOT_NARROWED}`,
806
+ `organization-unit-narrowing:${OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind.ORGANIZATION_WIDE}`,
807
+ `organization-unit-narrowing:${OrganizationUnitNarrowingDecisionKind.UNIT_NARROWED}`,
808
+ ],
809
+ profiles: [],
810
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
811
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
812
+ },
813
+ {
814
+ /*
815
+ * The delegated exchange, named by the two grant types that carry a USER's authorization.
816
+ *
817
+ * `CLIENT_CREDENTIALS` is deliberately absent and its absence is the whole distinction: that grant
818
+ * authenticates a machine acting as itself, so there is no user to authorize anything and nothing
819
+ * for this objective to attest. Including it would make a delegated-authorization claim out of an
820
+ * exchange no data subject ever saw.
821
+ */
822
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:delegated-authorization", capabilityVersion: 1 },
823
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
824
+ implementationRefs: [`oauth-grant-type:${OAuthGrantType.AUTHORIZATION_CODE}`, `oauth-grant-type:${OAuthGrantType.REFRESH_TOKEN}`],
825
+ profiles: [],
826
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
827
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
828
+ },
829
+ {
830
+ /*
831
+ * The re-proof ceremony, named by the three factors `reAuthenticate` actually accepts.
832
+ *
833
+ * All three are engine-native, which is what makes this ALWAYS_AVAILABLE: `PASSWORD`, `TOTP` (a
834
+ * code or a backup code, through the same anti-replay authority login uses) and `PASSKEY` (an
835
+ * assertion produced under a STEP_UP ceremony whose challenge key a login assertion cannot
836
+ * redeem). `SMS_OTP` and `EMAIL_OTP` are absent for the same reason they are absent from
837
+ * `capability:multi-factor-authentication` — they need a provider an application may not have
838
+ * bought — and the SSO methods are absent because an IdP assertion is a first factor, not a
839
+ * re-proof that the human is still present.
840
+ *
841
+ * This capability is DISTINCT from `capability:multi-factor-authentication` even though the two
842
+ * overlap on `TOTP` and `PASSKEY`, and merging them would lose the distinction the objectives
843
+ * draw: MFA asks whether a second factor was ever required, step-up asks whether identity was
844
+ * re-proved for THIS action.
845
+ */
846
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:step-up-authentication", capabilityVersion: 1 },
847
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
848
+ implementationRefs: [`auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSKEY}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.PASSWORD}`, `auth-method:${AuthMethod.TOTP}`],
849
+ profiles: [],
850
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
851
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
852
+ },
853
+ {
854
+ /*
855
+ * Withdrawal when the conferring relationship ends, named by the closed status set the engine
856
+ * branches on: `ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY`, read through
857
+ * `isAuthorityConferringOrganizationStatus`.
858
+ *
859
+ * `TRIAL_EXPIRED` is deliberately NOT in that set and so is absent here — an expired trial stops
860
+ * a tenant BUYING, not its members from administering what they already have, and listing it
861
+ * would claim a withdrawal the engine does not perform. The refs are kept in step with the set
862
+ * by construction rather than by memory: they are the enum members, not a transcription.
863
+ */
864
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:access-withdrawal-on-conferring-status", capabilityVersion: 1 },
865
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
866
+ implementationRefs: [...ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY].sort().map((status) => `organization-status-without-authority:${status}`),
867
+ profiles: [],
868
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
869
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
870
+ },
871
+ {
872
+ /*
873
+ * An erased-but-retained row behaving as deleted, named by the per-record marker that decides it.
874
+ *
875
+ * BOTH members are listed, and `ACTIVE` is not filler: the control is a two-valued rule, and the
876
+ * predicate's hardest recovered defect was about which rows a marker's ABSENCE selects — Mongo's
877
+ * `$ne` matches a null field while Postgres `<>` excludes it under three-valued logic, so the two
878
+ * adapters disagreed about every pre-opt-in row until the SQL compilers were taught
879
+ * `IS DISTINCT FROM`. Naming only `RETAINED` would describe the hidden half of a rule whose
880
+ * difficulty is entirely in the visible half.
881
+ */
882
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:retained-record-concealment", capabilityVersion: 1 },
883
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
884
+ implementationRefs: [`retention-status:${RetentionStatus.ACTIVE}`, `retention-status:${RetentionStatus.RETAINED}`],
885
+ profiles: [],
886
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
887
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
888
+ },
889
+ {
890
+ /*
891
+ * The device-stored pseudonymous identifier, named by the policy vocabulary that governs it.
892
+ *
893
+ * `DISABLED` is the DEFAULT and is the reason this capability is worth attesting at all: absent an
894
+ * explicit application policy nothing is minted, sent, stored or recorded, and the backend
895
+ * additionally REFUSES an inbound header — so a misconfigured client cannot start populating a
896
+ * pseudonymous identifier in an application's retained audit trail without anyone opting in.
897
+ * A capability listing only the collecting scopes would invert that reading.
898
+ */
899
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:client-install-identifier-policy", capabilityVersion: 1 },
900
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
901
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ClientInstanceIdScope).sort().map((scope) => `client-instance-id-scope:${scope}`),
902
+ profiles: [],
903
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
904
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
905
+ },
906
+ {
907
+ /*
908
+ * Declared retention windows, named by the classes a window is declared PER.
909
+ *
910
+ * The classes are separate because their lawful windows differ, and the audit-trail class most of
911
+ * all: it is the record an operator needs to DEFEND itself, which is the Art. 17(3) ground on
912
+ * which erasure may lawfully be refused. Collapsing the classes here would let a shorter
913
+ * customer-data window be read as governing the evidence that justifies keeping it.
914
+ */
915
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:declared-retention-window", capabilityVersion: 1 },
916
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
917
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(DataRetentionClass).sort().map((retentionClass) => `data-retention-class:${retentionClass}`),
918
+ profiles: [],
919
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
920
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
921
+ },
922
+ {
923
+ /*
924
+ * What a subject may decide, named by the closed consent vocabulary the decision is held in.
925
+ *
926
+ * `DataProcessingConsent` only — NOT `PrivacyLevel`, which sits beside it under the same audit
927
+ * decorator. They are marked together because both are the subject's own decisions worth
928
+ * recording, but only one is a CONSENT decision: privacy level is a visibility preference, and
929
+ * folding it in would make a programme claim consent coverage for a field no lawful basis rests
930
+ * on.
931
+ */
932
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:consent-decision-record", capabilityVersion: 1 },
933
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
934
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(DataProcessingConsent).sort().map((consent) => `data-processing-consent:${consent}`),
935
+ profiles: [],
936
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
937
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
938
+ },
939
+ {
940
+ /*
941
+ * Tenancy derived from the caller, named by the execution types it is derived FROM.
942
+ *
943
+ * Every member is listed because each resolves tenancy differently and the differences are the
944
+ * control: an `ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` is bound to one tenant, `PUBLIC_EXECUTION` has none,
945
+ * `INTERNALLY_INITIATED_REQUEST` is the framework acting as itself. The objective's demand is
946
+ * that this resolution is never OFFERED as a parameter — to a client, to an agent, or to a
947
+ * retrieval surface — so the vocabulary being attested is precisely the set of answers the
948
+ * runtime may reach without asking the request.
949
+ */
950
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:caller-derived-tenancy", capabilityVersion: 1 },
951
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
952
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ExecutionContext_ExecutionType).sort().map((executionType) => `execution-type:${executionType}`),
953
+ profiles: [],
954
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
955
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
956
+ },
957
+ {
958
+ /*
959
+ * What a client identity rests on, named by the two provenances a registration can have.
960
+ *
961
+ * `DYNAMIC` is the one the objective is about — a client that "asserted its own name and redirect
962
+ * URIs and proved nothing", granted no roles, capped at identity scopes and always facing the
963
+ * user's consent prompt. `OPERATOR` is listed with it because the control is the DISTINCTION:
964
+ * a capability naming only the self-registered case could not attest that the other kind exists
965
+ * and is treated differently, which is the whole posture.
966
+ */
967
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:client-registration-provenance", capabilityVersion: 1 },
968
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
969
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin).sort().map((origin) => `oauth-client-registration-origin:${origin}`),
970
+ profiles: [],
971
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
972
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
973
+ },
974
+ {
975
+ /*
976
+ * Whether a declared operation is actually SERVICED, and whether a custom verb authored the
977
+ * contract it exposes — the two verdicts the shared boot/request predicate answers with.
978
+ *
979
+ * BOTH vocabularies, because the objective has two halves and each is a different failure: an
980
+ * operation that reports success having performed nothing, and a named verb that silently widens
981
+ * into an unconstrained write. A capability naming only the first would leave the second
982
+ * unattested while looking complete.
983
+ *
984
+ * `NOT_APPLICABLE` is listed with the coverage verdicts because the gate's REMIT is part of its
985
+ * claim: naming only SERVICEABLE and UNSERVICEABLE would read as covering every operation, when
986
+ * core operations and variants the service tier never enters are deliberately outside it.
987
+ */
988
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:operation-implementation-coverage", capabilityVersion: 1 },
989
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
990
+ implementationRefs: [
991
+ ...Object.values(ResourceOperationImplementationCoverage).sort().map((coverage) => `operation-implementation-coverage:${coverage}`),
992
+ ...Object.values(ResourceOperationRequestContractBreadth).sort().map((breadth) => `operation-request-contract-breadth:${breadth}`),
993
+ ].sort(),
994
+ profiles: [],
995
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
996
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
997
+ },
998
+ {
999
+ /*
1000
+ * The isolation a resource must declare before it may sit on a non-default adapter, so a
1001
+ * configuration whose cross-resource writes could not be atomic is refused when the registry is
1002
+ * BUILT rather than discovered under load.
1003
+ */
1004
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:declared-persistence-isolation", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1005
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1006
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ResourcePersistenceAdapterIsolation).sort().map((isolation) => `persistence-adapter-isolation:${isolation}`),
1007
+ profiles: [],
1008
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1009
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1010
+ },
1011
+ {
1012
+ /*
1013
+ * The categories a field may be DECLARED to hold, which is the whole objective: an inventory is
1014
+ * authored on the field itself and never inferred from its name, because pattern-matching
1015
+ * identifiers is a guess whose misses go silently undisclosed. The vocabulary is what an
1016
+ * application chooses from, so it is exactly what the capability attests.
1017
+ */
1018
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:personal-data-field-inventory", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1019
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1020
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(PersonalDataCategory).sort().map((category) => `personal-data-category:${category}`),
1021
+ profiles: [],
1022
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1023
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1024
+ },
1025
+ {
1026
+ /*
1027
+ * Provider selection as the egress gate, named by the resolution modes a capability may be
1028
+ * satisfied through.
1029
+ *
1030
+ * The control is what happens with NO selection: nothing leaves, and the work is served locally.
1031
+ * So the attested mechanism is the resolution itself rather than any particular provider — and
1032
+ * deliberately not the `EngineCapability` list, which would be a hand-drawn subset of "the ones
1033
+ * that cause egress" and would drift the first time a capability changed shape.
1034
+ */
1035
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:provider-selection-opt-in", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1036
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1037
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(EngineCapabilityResolutionMode).sort().map((mode) => `engine-capability-resolution-mode:${mode}`),
1038
+ profiles: [],
1039
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1040
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1041
+ },
1042
+ {
1043
+ /*
1044
+ * Whether a principal may authenticate at all, named by the status vocabulary that decides it.
1045
+ *
1046
+ * Every member is listed because the control is the TRANSITION between them, and a reviewer
1047
+ * reconstructing "when did this account stop being able to log in" needs the whole set — the
1048
+ * pending states as much as the terminal ones, since an invitation that never completes is
1049
+ * indistinguishable from a deactivation if only the active/deleted ends are attested.
1050
+ */
1051
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:authentication-eligibility-status", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1052
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1053
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(UserStatus).sort().map((status) => `user-status:${status}`),
1054
+ profiles: [],
1055
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1056
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1057
+ },
1058
+ {
1059
+ /*
1060
+ * WHICH DOOR EXISTS — the variant vocabulary that decides whether an operation faces a client at
1061
+ * all, before any question of who may open it.
1062
+ *
1063
+ * Every member is named because the control is the CHOICE among them. `INTERNAL_CALL` and
1064
+ * `REPOSITORY_ONLY` are the two that answer no HTTP request, and moving an operation onto one of
1065
+ * them is a different act from tightening its roles: `credit-pool TOP_UP` was an `API_CALL` gated
1066
+ * on ORG_OWNER, which let a tenant owner self-grant unlimited credits, and no role gate could have
1067
+ * fixed it — the legitimate caller is a billing webhook coming through the service tier.
1068
+ */
1069
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:operation-reachability-gate", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1070
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1071
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ResourceOperationVariantType).sort().map((variantType) => `operation-variant-type:${variantType}`),
1072
+ profiles: [],
1073
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1074
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1075
+ },
1076
+ {
1077
+ /*
1078
+ * Whether a MEMBERSHIP confers what it names, distinct from whether its user may authenticate.
1079
+ *
1080
+ * Kept apart from `capability:authentication-eligibility-status` because the two answer different
1081
+ * questions about different rows: a fully ACTIVE user can hold a SUSPENDED membership in one
1082
+ * tenant, and merging the vocabularies would make a programme unable to say which of the two a
1083
+ * time-boxed restriction was placed on.
1084
+ */
1085
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:membership-eligibility-status", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1086
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1087
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(OrganizationMemberStatus).sort().map((status) => `organization-member-status:${status}`),
1088
+ profiles: [],
1089
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1090
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1091
+ },
1092
+ {
1093
+ /*
1094
+ * The redirect-scheme denial list, READ from the guard's own set rather than transcribed.
1095
+ *
1096
+ * This is why `DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES` was exported: it is a closed vocabulary with one
1097
+ * named runtime source, and it was reachable by nothing outside its own module — so attesting the
1098
+ * control meant restating eleven schemes in a second list free to drift from the one the
1099
+ * validator actually branches on. Deriving it means the basis cannot describe a denial the guard
1100
+ * does not make, in either direction.
1101
+ *
1102
+ * The refused set is the honest thing to name. An allow-list would be the wrong shape: the guard
1103
+ * accepts any absolute URL that is not one of these, deliberately, because a strict https-only
1104
+ * rule breaks the native/CLI loopback flow and a reverse-DNS requirement would refuse conformant
1105
+ * clients like `cursor:`.
1106
+ */
1107
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:redirect-target-constraint", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1108
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1109
+ /*
1110
+ * Sorted AFTER the prefix is applied, not before, and that is a real trap rather than style:
1111
+ * stripping the trailing colon REORDERS the set. Raw, `chrome-extension:` sorts before `chrome:`
1112
+ * ("-" < ":"); stripped, `chrome` sorts before `chrome-extension`. Sorting the schemes first
1113
+ * produced a list the basis schema rejected as unsorted.
1114
+ */
1115
+ implementationRefs: [...DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES].map((scheme) => `refused-redirect-scheme:${scheme.replace(/:$/u, "")}`).sort(),
1116
+ profiles: [],
1117
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1118
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1119
+ },
1120
+ {
1121
+ /*
1122
+ * The claim names the ID-token builder OWNS, READ from the builder's own strip set.
1123
+ *
1124
+ * Naming the RESERVED set is the control: these are stripped from caller-supplied `extraClaims`
1125
+ * BEFORE they are spread, so a smuggled `nbf` cannot later make the token fail verification and a
1126
+ * forged `nonce` / `acr` / `amr` / `at_hash` cannot ride in. An allow-list of identity claims would
1127
+ * describe a different mechanism — one the scope-gated resolver performs elsewhere.
1128
+ *
1129
+ * Derived rather than transcribed, which is why the set had to leave `saas-backend-lib`. A second
1130
+ * list of fifteen claim names would be free to drift from the one the builder strips, and the
1131
+ * drift would be invisible: the basis would attest a claim as server-authored while the builder
1132
+ * let it through.
1133
+ */
1134
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:reserved-token-claim-authorship", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1135
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1136
+ implementationRefs: [...OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES].map((claim) => `reserved-id-token-claim:${claim}`).sort(),
1137
+ profiles: [],
1138
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1139
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1140
+ },
1141
+ {
1142
+ /*
1143
+ * The startup validator that REFUSES a configuration before it can serve traffic, named by the
1144
+ * domains it validates.
1145
+ *
1146
+ * This is the shape `DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` already showed: a boot gate IS bindable when
1147
+ * the thing it checks has a vocabulary. Here the vocabulary is the domain set, and the severity
1148
+ * split (`ERROR` refuses, `WARNING` reports) is what makes "refused before serving traffic" a
1149
+ * claim rather than a hope.
1150
+ *
1151
+ * NOT every boot gate in the engine routes through this validator — the declared-unique-index
1152
+ * verification lives in the repositories registry and produces no `ConfigurationValidationIssue`,
1153
+ * which is why `DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS` is NOT bound to this capability. Binding it here would
1154
+ * claim a validation path it does not take.
1155
+ */
1156
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:startup-configuration-validation", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1157
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1158
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ConfigurationValidationDomain).sort().map((domain) => `configuration-validation-domain:${domain}`),
1159
+ profiles: [],
1160
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1161
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1162
+ },
1163
+ {
1164
+ /*
1165
+ * A declared uniqueness control PROVEN to exist in the datastore before traffic, named by the
1166
+ * adapters the proof runs against.
1167
+ *
1168
+ * The adapter set is the vocabulary because the verification is genuinely per-adapter and the two
1169
+ * halves are separate code — `verifyDeclaredMongoUniqueIndexes` and its PostgreSQL counterpart —
1170
+ * so "which datastores has this been proven against" is exactly the question a reader has. It is
1171
+ * also the axis on which the guarantee could silently become partial: an adapter added without a
1172
+ * verifier would make the objective true for some resources and not others.
1173
+ *
1174
+ * Distinct from `capability:startup-configuration-validation`, and deliberately not folded into
1175
+ * it: this gate emits no `ConfigurationValidationIssue`. It lives in the repositories registry,
1176
+ * and claiming the config validator's path for it would describe a route the check does not take.
1177
+ */
1178
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:declared-uniqueness-verification", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1179
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1180
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(PersistenceAdapter).sort().map((adapter) => `persistence-adapter:${adapter}`),
1181
+ profiles: [],
1182
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1183
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1184
+ },
1185
+ {
1186
+ /*
1187
+ * The self-reported lifecycle stages, named so a programme can state what they do NOT confer.
1188
+ *
1189
+ * This capability is unusual and the wording matters: it attests a NEGATIVE. Every member is a
1190
+ * stage a user's own activity can move them into, and the control is that reaching one grants no
1191
+ * capability and cannot cross a scope boundary — authority comes only from a decision an
1192
+ * authorized party made. Naming the stages is how a reader learns which self-reported values
1193
+ * exist to be wrongly trusted; a capability naming a mechanism would imply the stages DO something.
1194
+ */
1195
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:self-reported-lifecycle-stage", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1196
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1197
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(LifecycleStage).sort().map((stage) => `lifecycle-stage:${stage}`),
1198
+ profiles: [],
1199
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1200
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1201
+ },
1202
+ {
1203
+ /*
1204
+ * How a refusal is CLASSIFIED — the one vocabulary three separate objectives are each a
1205
+ * distinction inside.
1206
+ *
1207
+ * | objective | the distinction it demands |
1208
+ * |---|---|
1209
+ * | `SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED` | a refusal carries a named type — `CONFIGURATION` for a validator whose dependency is unavailable, `VALIDATION` for rejected untrusted input — rather than surfacing as `UNCAUGHT_EXCEPTION`, which is how a degradation gets mistaken for a rejection |
1210
+ * | `OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT` | an over-limit request is `PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE` or `RATE_LIMIT`, NOT `INTERNAL` — a client error rather than a server failure |
1211
+ * | `OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS` | a constraint violation is `CONFLICT` carrying the identity that was violated, NOT the opaque `DATABASE` the driver would otherwise produce |
1212
+ *
1213
+ * Every member is named because the control in all three cases is a CONTRAST between members: the
1214
+ * good outcome only means something against the bad one it is not. A capability listing only the
1215
+ * client-error types would describe a system that never returns `INTERNAL`, which is a different
1216
+ * and false claim.
1217
+ *
1218
+ * This does NOT attest that any particular refusal is classified correctly — a mapping is not a
1219
+ * proof, and `UNKNOWN` is in the set precisely because the engine admits it cannot always tell.
1220
+ * What it attests is that the framework HAS one closed vocabulary for the answer, so a
1221
+ * misclassification is a wrong member rather than an unclassified crash.
1222
+ */
1223
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:refusal-classification", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1224
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1225
+ implementationRefs: Object.values(ErrorType).sort().map((errorType) => `error-type:${errorType}`),
1226
+ profiles: [],
1227
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1228
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1229
+ },
1230
+ {
1231
+ /*
1232
+ * A rotated key that STOPS verifying at a declared instant, named by the keys the guarantee
1233
+ * applies to.
1234
+ *
1235
+ * The key set is the vocabulary because the retirement is PER KEY — `notAfter` is optional on
1236
+ * each — so "which keys can be given a bounded life" is the reader's question, and a key type
1237
+ * added without retirement support is exactly how the guarantee would become partial without
1238
+ * anything failing. Before this, a rotated key was time-unbounded in code and fenced only by the
1239
+ * token's own `exp`.
1240
+ *
1241
+ * BOTH directions are named. The private keys are what this application SIGNS with and the
1242
+ * public ones are the platform services it VERIFIES; retiring one of each is a different act with
1243
+ * a different blast radius, and a capability naming only the signing half would leave the
1244
+ * verification half unattested while looking complete.
1245
+ */
1246
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:verifiable-key-retirement", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1247
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1248
+ implementationRefs: [
1249
+ ...Object.values(JwtPrivateKeys).map((key) => `signing-key:${key}`),
1250
+ ...Object.values(JwtPublicKeys).map((key) => `verification-key:${key}`),
1251
+ ].sort(),
1252
+ profiles: [],
1253
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1254
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1255
+ },
1256
+ {
1257
+ /*
1258
+ * A provider's secret contract described WITHOUT its values, named by the four fields an entry
1259
+ * may carry — and the control is what is NOT among them.
1260
+ *
1261
+ * `ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema` is a `z.strictObject`, so a `value` field is not
1262
+ * merely absent by convention: it is REFUSED at parse. That is what makes drift detectable
1263
+ * without persisting a secret — the shape can be compared because it never held one. Deriving
1264
+ * the refs from the schema's own shape means the capability cannot describe a field the contract
1265
+ * does not have, in either direction, and a field added there appears here automatically.
1266
+ *
1267
+ * The control lives in `platform-config-lib`, which this package must not depend on. It is
1268
+ * attestable anyway because the VOCABULARY is in `saas-models` — the shape that crosses the
1269
+ * companion-safe boundary — while only the digesting stayed on the platform side. That split is
1270
+ * why this objective needed no move at all, unlike the three that did.
1271
+ */
1272
+ identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:values-free-secret-contract", capabilityVersion: 1 },
1273
+ capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
1274
+ implementationRefs: Object.keys(ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema.shape).sort().map((field) => `secret-contract-field:${field}`),
1275
+ profiles: [],
1276
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
1277
+ availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1278
+ },
1279
+ ];
1280
+ /**
1281
+ * Canonical order, applied at composition rather than demanded of the authored constants above.
1282
+ *
1283
+ * The basis schema requires four of its arrays lexically sorted by semantic identity. Requiring the AUTHORED lists to be hand-sorted makes every added mapping a
1284
+ * chance to fail on form rather than on substance — and the failure surfaces as four opaque "must be unique and lexically sorted" issues rather than as anything about
1285
+ * the entry. Sorting here means an author appends where it reads best and the composer canonicalizes, which is the same split the compliance-programme normalizer makes.
1286
+ */
1287
+ const byCanonicalIdentity = (values, identity) => [...values].sort((left, right) => (identity(left) < identity(right) ? -1 : identity(left) > identity(right) ? 1 : 0));
19
1288
  /**
20
1289
  * Compose the source-neutral safe baseline around one Framework Knowledge-generated implementation revision.
21
1290
  * Repository source locations never enter this contract; the generator resolves them before calling this function.
@@ -34,42 +1303,18 @@ export function createInitialAssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis(input) {
34
1303
  documentAuthorityCatalog,
35
1304
  objectiveCatalog: INITIAL_ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_CATALOG,
36
1305
  implementationRevision: input.implementationRevision,
37
- capabilityAuthorityDescriptors: [
38
- {
39
- authority: {
40
- identity: { capabilityRef: "capability:audit-events", capabilityVersion: 1 },
41
- capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
42
- implementationRefs: [`engine-capability:${EngineCapability.COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL}`],
43
- implementationRevision: implementationRevisionIdentity,
44
- profiles: [],
45
- requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [],
46
- },
47
- availability: {
48
- kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.REQUIRES_ENGINE_CAPABILITY,
49
- engineCapability: EngineCapability.COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL,
50
- },
51
- },
52
- {
53
- authority: {
54
- identity: { capabilityRef: SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_CAPABILITY_REF, capabilityVersion: 1 },
55
- capabilityKind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityKind.ENGINE,
56
- implementationRefs: [
57
- `subject-export-purpose:${SubjectExportPurpose.ACCESS_ART_15}`,
58
- `subject-export-purpose:${SubjectExportPurpose.PORTABILITY_ART_20}`,
59
- ],
60
- implementationRevision: implementationRevisionIdentity,
61
- profiles: [
62
- {
63
- profileRef: "capability-profile:subject-data-export-safe-baseline-v1",
64
- parameters: [{ parameterRef: "parameter:export-format", allowedOptionRefs: ["option:json-machine-readable"] }],
65
- },
66
- ],
67
- requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT_HOST_CONFIGURATION_ARTIFACT_KIND_REF],
68
- },
69
- availability: { kind: AssuranceProgramCapabilityAvailabilityKind.ALWAYS_AVAILABLE },
1306
+ capabilityAuthorityDescriptors: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_CAPABILITY_AUTHORITIES, (a) => `${a.identity.capabilityRef}@${a.identity.capabilityVersion}`).map(({ availability, ...authority }) => ({
1307
+ authority: {
1308
+ identity: authority.identity,
1309
+ capabilityKind: authority.capabilityKind,
1310
+ implementationRefs: [...authority.implementationRefs],
1311
+ implementationRevision: implementationRevisionIdentity,
1312
+ profiles: authority.profiles.map((profile) => ({ ...profile, parameters: profile.parameters.map((parameter) => ({ ...parameter, allowedOptionRefs: [...parameter.allowedOptionRefs] })) })),
1313
+ requiredHostArtifactKindRefs: [...authority.requiredHostArtifactKindRefs],
70
1314
  },
71
- ],
72
- sourceRequirementAuthorities: [
1315
+ availability,
1316
+ })),
1317
+ sourceRequirementAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity([
73
1318
  {
74
1319
  source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
75
1320
  requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-subject-access-portability",
@@ -97,43 +1342,763 @@ export function createInitialAssuranceProgramAuthorityBasis(input) {
97
1342
  reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
98
1343
  reviewedAt: AUTHORITY_REVIEWED_AT,
99
1344
  },
100
- ],
101
- implementationExpectationAuthorities: [
1345
+ /*
1346
+ * ── 2026-09-01 mapping tranche: NIST, GDPR and HIPAA ──────────────────────────────────────
1347
+ *
1348
+ * A requirement is named by a DESCRIPTIVE slug, never by the source's own control identifier, and the locator is the one the registry already records for that
1349
+ * source. That is not decoration: `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses restricted external identifiers outside an authorized boundary, the rights records
1350
+ * govern what may be reproduced, and a slug that says what the requirement IS survives an edition change that renumbers it.
1351
+ *
1352
+ * Each entry binds ONE objective to ONE requirement of one source. Where two sources reach the same objective they are separate entries, because applicability
1353
+ * is decided per source by the application and collapsing them would decide it here.
1354
+ */
102
1355
  {
103
- identity: { expectationRef: "implementation-expectation:privileged-access-review", expectationVersion: 1 },
104
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW", objectiveVersion: 1 },
105
- requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:audit-events"],
1356
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1357
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-erasure-and-restriction",
1358
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1359
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1360
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1361
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1362
+ reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
106
1363
  },
107
1364
  {
108
- identity: { expectationRef: "implementation-expectation:subject-data-export", expectationVersion: 1 },
109
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
110
- requiredCapabilityRefs: ["capability:subject-data-export"],
1365
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1366
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-security-event-logging",
1367
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1368
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1369
+ canonicalLocator: "https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29",
1370
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1371
+ reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
111
1372
  },
112
- ],
113
- evidenceExpectationAuthorities: [
114
1373
  {
115
- identity: { expectationRef: "evidence-expectation:privileged-access-review-occurrences", expectationVersion: 1 },
116
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW", objectiveVersion: 1 },
117
- requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence"],
1374
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1375
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-of-access-decisions",
1376
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1377
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1378
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1379
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1380
+ reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
118
1381
  },
119
1382
  {
120
- identity: { expectationRef: "evidence-expectation:subject-data-export-receipt", expectationVersion: 1 },
121
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
122
- requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: ["evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt"],
1383
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1384
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hipaa-security-authentication-controls",
1385
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1386
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1387
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html",
1388
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1389
+ reviewedAt: MAPPING_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
123
1390
  },
124
- ],
125
- verificationExpectationAuthorities: [
1391
+ /*
1392
+ * ── 2026-09-02 audit-trail tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1393
+ *
1394
+ * Three objectives whose control is ALREADY IMPLEMENTED by the audit trail, verified in source
1395
+ * before binding rather than inferred from the objective's wording:
1396
+ *
1397
+ * | objective | the implementation that attests it |
1398
+ * |---|---|
1399
+ * | `WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION` | every auditable-event payload carries an actor field, and `audit-actor.shared.schemas.ts` closes the no-user case with a SENTINEL vocabulary instead of a bare `'unknown'` |
1400
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION` | `CoreAuditableEventType.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS`, emitted on every crossing with `admissionDeclared` separating a sanctioned one from an attempted one |
1401
+ * | `WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT` | `CoreAuditableEventType.FIELD_ACCESS`, which `audit-access-fields.backend.utils.ts` fires on CREATE for `isBackendOnly({ isReturnedAtCreation: true })` — a minted secret returned exactly once |
1402
+ *
1403
+ * All three bind `capability:audit-events`, so this tranche adds no capability authority: the
1404
+ * engine capability that attests them was already declared, and inventing a second identity for
1405
+ * the same mechanism would split what an application must select.
1406
+ *
1407
+ * The requirement slugs describe what the requirement IS and never carry a source's own control
1408
+ * identifier — `check:assurance-control-boundary` refuses those outside an authorized boundary,
1409
+ * and a descriptive slug survives an edition that renumbers them.
1410
+ */
126
1411
  {
127
- identity: { expectationRef: "verification-expectation:privileged-access-review", expectationVersion: 1 },
128
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW", objectiveVersion: 1 },
129
- requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:privileged-access-review"],
1412
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1413
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-attributable-event-record",
1414
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1415
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1416
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1417
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1418
+ reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
130
1419
  },
131
1420
  {
132
- identity: { expectationRef: "verification-expectation:subject-data-export", expectationVersion: 1 },
133
- objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
134
- requiredStatementVerificationRefs: ["verification-expectation:subject-data-export"],
1421
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1422
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-accountability-demonstration",
1423
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1424
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1425
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1426
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1427
+ reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
135
1428
  },
136
- ],
1429
+ {
1430
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1431
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hhs-security-access-authorization-recording",
1432
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1433
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1434
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html",
1435
+ reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,
1436
+ reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1437
+ },
1438
+ {
1439
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1440
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-authenticator-disclosure-record",
1441
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1442
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1443
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1444
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1445
+ reviewedAt: AUDIT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1446
+ },
1447
+ /*
1448
+ * ── 2026-09-02 privileged-lifecycle tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────
1449
+ *
1450
+ * Selected by CODE-MARKER COVERAGE rather than by reading the catalog, which is a better
1451
+ * criterion than the previous tranche's: an objective carrying `assurance-control:` markers is
1452
+ * one the codebase itself claims to implement, and `check:assurance-control-boundary` already
1453
+ * validates every marker against the catalog. All 40 unbound objectives carry at least one; these
1454
+ * three are among the four most heavily marked (25, 20 and 19 sites).
1455
+ *
1456
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1457
+ * |---|---|
1458
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE` | the API-key and OAuth-client schemas plus the audit trail — the privileged grant's whole life is the record, which is why the evidence IS the audit event |
1459
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE` | the API-key custom implementation, the password-reset service and the audit trail |
1460
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY` | its own `administrative-continuity.shared.schemas.ts`, the organization-owner and super-admin floors, and the CRITICAL breach record |
1461
+ *
1462
+ * `LEAST_PRIVILEGE` was deliberately NOT bound in THIS tranche: the generation contract's refusal
1463
+ * pin used it as its canonical UNBOUND objective, so binding it in the same change would have
1464
+ * silently turned that pin into a test of nothing. The authorization-confinement tranche below
1465
+ * binds it, and fixes the pin properly — it now DERIVES an unbound objective from the catalog
1466
+ * minus these bindings, so no future tranche can hollow it out by accident.
1467
+ */
1468
+ {
1469
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1470
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-privileged-grant-evidence",
1471
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1472
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1473
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1474
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1475
+ reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1476
+ },
1477
+ {
1478
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1479
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-credential-state-transitions",
1480
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1481
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1482
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1483
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1484
+ reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1485
+ },
1486
+ {
1487
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1488
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hhs-security-credential-management",
1489
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1490
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1491
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html",
1492
+ reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,
1493
+ reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1494
+ },
1495
+ {
1496
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1497
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-govern-accountable-role-retention",
1498
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1499
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1500
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1501
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1502
+ reviewedAt: PRIVILEGED_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1503
+ },
1504
+ /*
1505
+ * ── 2026-09-02 authorization-confinement tranche ──────────────────────────────────────────
1506
+ *
1507
+ * The three most heavily marked remaining objectives (21, 15 and 14 sites), and together they
1508
+ * answer the two halves of an access question that the already-bound audit objectives only
1509
+ * RECORD: how much authority a principal may hold, and which rows that authority reaches.
1510
+ *
1511
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1512
+ * |---|---|
1513
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE` | `role-ceiling.backend.utils.ts` (a caller cannot grant what it does not hold, resolved per role-table scope) and `authorizeInProgrammaticSurface` (a non-controller surface applies the operation's declared role gate through the SAME predicate) |
1514
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT` | seven confinement modules under `security/authorizations/` plus the WRITE-side narrowing in BOTH resource repositories, and the `OrganizationUnitNarrowingStamp` that records why access was reached |
1515
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION` | the OIDC authorization-code service, `pkce.backend.utils.ts`, and five distinct OAuth consent/exchange audit events |
1516
+ *
1517
+ * NOT claimed, and this is why the LEAST_PRIVILEGE binding above requires no audit capability:
1518
+ * the role-ceiling refusal is raised from custom-impl services, outside `runAuthorizationPhase`,
1519
+ * so it produces no authorization-denial audit row. That is a gap in the engine rather than in
1520
+ * this mapping, and it is filed as one — binding around it here keeps the programme's claim
1521
+ * true, which is the only thing this layer can do about it.
1522
+ */
1523
+ {
1524
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1525
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-least-privilege-authority-limit",
1526
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1527
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1528
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1529
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1530
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1531
+ },
1532
+ {
1533
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1534
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-least-privilege-enforcement",
1535
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1536
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1537
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1538
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1539
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1540
+ },
1541
+ {
1542
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1543
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-information-flow-confinement",
1544
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1545
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1546
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1547
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1548
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1549
+ },
1550
+ {
1551
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1552
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-processing-confidentiality",
1553
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1554
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1555
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1556
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1557
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1558
+ },
1559
+ {
1560
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1561
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-delegated-access-authorization",
1562
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1563
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1564
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1565
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1566
+ reviewedAt: AUTHORIZATION_CONFINEMENT_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1567
+ },
1568
+ /*
1569
+ * ── 2026-09-02 identity-posture tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
1570
+ *
1571
+ * Three objectives about identity over TIME, where the tranches above covered identity at a
1572
+ * single decision: how it is re-proved for a high-impact act, how a change to the authored
1573
+ * policy is evidenced, and when the access it confers ends.
1574
+ *
1575
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1576
+ * |---|---|
1577
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION` | the per-operation `requiresStepUpAuthentication` flag on eight resource configs, `reAuthenticate` (PASSWORD / TOTP / PASSKEY), and the separate `PasskeyAuthenticationCeremony.STEP_UP` challenge key that makes a login assertion structurally unredeemable at the step-up door |
1578
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE` | the SSO connection and config schemas, and `APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED` — emitted at boot, by the system, when the resolved policy snapshot differs from the last one recorded |
1579
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE` | `ORGANIZATION_STATUSES_WITHOUT_AUTHORITY` read through `isAuthorityConferringOrganizationStatus`, the organization custom implementation that withdraws credentials, and four audit events covering withdrawal and restoration |
1580
+ *
1581
+ * A correction landed with this tranche rather than beside it: the `requiresStepUpAuthentication`
1582
+ * docstring still said re-authentication was PASSWORD-only and warned authors away from
1583
+ * declaring the flag on operations SSO-only, passkey-only or directory-managed users perform.
1584
+ * TOTP and passkey re-auth have both shipped, so that advice had inverted — and it was the
1585
+ * advice a framework author would have read while deciding whether this objective was
1586
+ * satisfiable at all.
1587
+ */
1588
+ {
1589
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1590
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hhs-security-person-or-entity-reverification",
1591
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1592
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1593
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html",
1594
+ reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,
1595
+ reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1596
+ },
1597
+ {
1598
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1599
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-reauthentication-for-privileged-action",
1600
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1601
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1602
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1603
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1604
+ reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1605
+ },
1606
+ {
1607
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1608
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-govern-authentication-posture-change",
1609
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1610
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1611
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1612
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1613
+ reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1614
+ },
1615
+ {
1616
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1617
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-account-disable-on-relationship-end",
1618
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1619
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1620
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1621
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1622
+ reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1623
+ },
1624
+ {
1625
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1626
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hhs-security-workforce-access-termination",
1627
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1628
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1629
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html",
1630
+ reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,
1631
+ reviewedAt: IDENTITY_POSTURE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1632
+ },
1633
+ /*
1634
+ * ── 2026-09-02 data-lifecycle tranche ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1635
+ *
1636
+ * The four privacy objectives a governed privacy notice quotes most directly, which is why
1637
+ * they are worth binding even though three of them carry fewer markers than some alternatives:
1638
+ * an application's privacy notice has retention, minimisation and consent paragraphs whether or
1639
+ * not the programme can support them.
1640
+ *
1641
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1642
+ * |---|---|
1643
+ * | `WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE` | the single retention-hide authority consumed by both persistence adapters, the aggregation/charts surface and RAG retrieval; the organization-purge batch; and four destruction audit events |
1644
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION` | the embeddings and document-extraction services (the processor receives the payload and nothing identifying the requester), and the client-install identifier policy chokepoint that fails closed absent an application opt-in |
1645
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION` | three startup refusals in the config validator plus the resource-retention sweep |
1646
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD` | `.isAuditEvidence()` on the two consent leaves, the preferences RESET, and the single emission point every consent-changing verb routes through |
1647
+ *
1648
+ * A correction landed with this tranche for the same reason the last one's did:
1649
+ * `RetentionStatus.RETAINED` still described its own concealment as "enforcement wired in a
1650
+ * later phase" long after that phase shipped, and a reader deciding whether SECURE_LIFECYCLE
1651
+ * was satisfiable would have concluded the row was still visible.
1652
+ */
1653
+ {
1654
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1655
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-erasure-with-retention-carve-out",
1656
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1657
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1658
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1659
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1660
+ reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1661
+ },
1662
+ {
1663
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1664
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-media-sanitization-and-disposal",
1665
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1666
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1667
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1668
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1669
+ reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1670
+ },
1671
+ {
1672
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1673
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-data-minimisation",
1674
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1675
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1676
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1677
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1678
+ reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1679
+ },
1680
+ {
1681
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1682
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-storage-limitation",
1683
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1684
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1685
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1686
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1687
+ reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1688
+ },
1689
+ {
1690
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1691
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-consent-demonstrability",
1692
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1693
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1694
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1695
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1696
+ reviewedAt: DATA_LIFECYCLE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1697
+ },
1698
+ /*
1699
+ * ── 2026-09-02 attribution tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1700
+ *
1701
+ * Five objectives about what the trail must be able to SAY. Four of them bind only
1702
+ * `capability:audit-events`, which is not thin coverage — it is the honest shape when the
1703
+ * control IS the record rather than a mechanism the record corroborates.
1704
+ *
1705
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1706
+ * |---|---|
1707
+ * | `WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION` | the resource-operations helper (a caller cannot widen its own scope), the MCP tool adapter (an agent is never offered its tenancy as a parameter), and both RAG chunk stores, where the predicate is evaluated INSIDE the traversal |
1708
+ * | `WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY` | the SSO config block that governs what the trail captures, and the services-registry handler that reconstructs a privileged action's authorization effect from the record rather than from role tables |
1709
+ * | `WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT` | the embeddings and document-extraction services (provider, model, usage and outcome per physical call) and the webhook test-endpoint probe (the initiating actor) |
1710
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING` | the SCIM provisioning switches carrying `.isAuditEvidence()`, and the declared department-to-unit bindings that make the directory authoritative over an authorization axis |
1711
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION` | the CIMD client-metadata service, the dynamic-registration path, and two audit events covering a client created by an unauthenticated party and every refused assertion |
1712
+ */
1713
+ {
1714
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1715
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-shared-resource-isolation",
1716
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1717
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1718
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1719
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1720
+ reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1721
+ },
1722
+ {
1723
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1724
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-record-content-and-protection",
1725
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1726
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1727
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1728
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1729
+ reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1730
+ },
1731
+ {
1732
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1733
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-detect-outbound-connection-monitoring",
1734
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1735
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1736
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1737
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1738
+ reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1739
+ },
1740
+ {
1741
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1742
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-automated-account-management",
1743
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1744
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1745
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1746
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1747
+ reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1748
+ },
1749
+ {
1750
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1751
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-identify-service-identity-verification",
1752
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1753
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1754
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1755
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1756
+ reviewedAt: ATTRIBUTION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1757
+ },
1758
+ /*
1759
+ * ── 2026-09-02 declaration tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1760
+ *
1761
+ * Eight objectives satisfied by what a schema or configuration DECLARES, plus the trail that
1762
+ * records the declaration changing. This is where the marker-count method stops choosing for
1763
+ * you: every objective here carries one or two markers, so the ranking no longer discriminates
1764
+ * and each was decided by whether a real vocabulary exists to attest.
1765
+ *
1766
+ * | objective | what the markers sit on |
1767
+ * |---|---|
1768
+ * | `WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY` | the coverage predicate that startup validation and request-time refusal SHARE, so an operation blessed at boot cannot answer 2xx having performed nothing |
1769
+ * | `WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` | the isolation declaration and the registry build that refuses a non-atomic configuration |
1770
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY` | the `PersonalDataCategory` decorator on the field itself |
1771
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING` | the document-extraction service, where no bytes leave unless a provider is selected and the local library otherwise serves every extraction |
1772
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE` | `UserStatus` carrying `.isAuditEvidence().excludeFromUpdate()`, so the change cannot arrive as a side effect of an unrelated write |
1773
+ * | `WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT` | `CoreAuditableEventType.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT`, one event with `riskLevel` separating a page from a full result set |
1774
+ * | `WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION` | the audit service preserving actor and tenant across the trusted-system write, and the logger stamping `appSlug:env` |
1775
+ * | `WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY` | the backend-only exposure guard and the audited first exposure |
1776
+ *
1777
+ * `WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY` was blocked by a LAYERING problem rather than a
1778
+ * mapping one, and the fix was to move the boundary. Its vocabularies lived in
1779
+ * `saas-backend-lib`, which this package must not depend on — so a control that is real,
1780
+ * well-marked and enforced was unnameable from the layer obliged to describe it. They are
1781
+ * closed vocabularies rather than backend behaviour, so they now live in `saas-models` beside
1782
+ * the acknowledgement type that shares their marker; the resolvers that compute them did not
1783
+ * move. When an objective cannot be bound, check whether the obstacle is the EVIDENCE or the
1784
+ * package graph before recording it as uncovered.
1785
+ *
1786
+ * WHAT THIS TRANCHE LEAVES: fourteen objectives whose control is real but has no vocabulary a
1787
+ * capability could name from here — boot gates, a body-size cap, a conflict reference, an
1788
+ * open-redirect constraint. Binding them would mean inventing a capability identity per gate,
1789
+ * which is the plausible-coverage failure #207 exists to prevent. They need a decision about
1790
+ * whether the capability model should carry named GATES at all, not another tranche.
1791
+ */
1792
+ {
1793
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1794
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-declared-interface-integrity",
1795
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1796
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1797
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1798
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1799
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1800
+ },
1801
+ {
1802
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1803
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-transaction-recovery-integrity",
1804
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1805
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1806
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1807
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1808
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1809
+ },
1810
+ {
1811
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1812
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-records-of-processing-categories",
1813
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1814
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1815
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1816
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1817
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1818
+ },
1819
+ {
1820
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1821
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-processor-engagement",
1822
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1823
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1824
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1825
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1826
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1827
+ },
1828
+ {
1829
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1830
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-account-enable-disable-authority",
1831
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1832
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1833
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1834
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1835
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1836
+ },
1837
+ {
1838
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:eu-gdpr-2016-679", sourceVersion: 1 },
1839
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:gdpr-bulk-disclosure-record",
1840
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1841
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1842
+ canonicalLocator: "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj",
1843
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1844
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1845
+ },
1846
+ {
1847
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1848
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-audit-record-context-binding",
1849
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1850
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1851
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1852
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1853
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1854
+ },
1855
+ {
1856
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:hhs-hipaa-security-rule", sourceVersion: 1 },
1857
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:hhs-security-transmission-confidentiality",
1858
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1859
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1860
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html",
1861
+ reviewedByRef: HHS_SECURITY_PRIVILEGED_ACCESS_REVIEW_REVIEWER_REF,
1862
+ reviewedAt: DECLARATION_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1863
+ },
1864
+ /*
1865
+ * ── 2026-09-02 reachability tranche ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1866
+ *
1867
+ * Four objectives whose control is WHICH DOOR EXISTS, and which values it refuses. They were
1868
+ * classified as unbindable in the tranche above and that was WRONG — the mistake is worth
1869
+ * recording because it is the one this lane keeps making.
1870
+ *
1871
+ * The question asked was "does this guard have its own vocabulary", and the answer was no for
1872
+ * all four. The right question is "which vocabulary names this mechanism", and for three of them
1873
+ * it already existed and was already exported:
1874
+ *
1875
+ * | objective | the vocabulary that names it |
1876
+ * |---|---|
1877
+ * | `WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY` | `ResourceOperationVariantType` — `credit-pool TOP_UP` was an API_CALL gated on ORG_OWNER, letting a tenant owner self-grant credits; the fix was the VARIANT, which no role gate could express |
1878
+ * | `WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT` | the same pair — `ScopeFeatures` writes cannot be field-protected, so the whole self-grant boundary is one role gate on operations that stay non-client-reachable |
1879
+ * | `WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND` | `UserStatus` + `OrganizationMemberStatus`, the two the reactivation sweep moves between |
1880
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION` | `DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES`, which had to be EXPORTED — a closed vocabulary with one named source that nothing outside its module could reach |
1881
+ *
1882
+ * So of the fourteen the previous tranche left, four were a discovery failure rather than a
1883
+ * modelling limit. Before recording an objective as uncoverable, ask which existing vocabulary
1884
+ * describes the mechanism — the answer is often a capability that is already declared.
1885
+ */
1886
+ {
1887
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1888
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-transaction-authorization-separation",
1889
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1890
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1891
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1892
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1893
+ reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1894
+ },
1895
+ {
1896
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1897
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-entitlement-change-authority",
1898
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1899
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1900
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1901
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1902
+ reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1903
+ },
1904
+ {
1905
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1906
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-temporary-account-expiry",
1907
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1908
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1909
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1910
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1911
+ reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1912
+ },
1913
+ {
1914
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1915
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-redirect-target-constraint",
1916
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1917
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1918
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1919
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1920
+ reviewedAt: REACHABILITY_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1921
+ },
1922
+ /*
1923
+ * ── 2026-09-02 server-authorship tranche ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
1924
+ *
1925
+ * Two objectives whose vocabulary EXISTED and was only in the wrong place — the third and
1926
+ * fourth time in four tranches, which is why the pattern is written down rather than fixed
1927
+ * quietly each time.
1928
+ *
1929
+ * | objective | where its vocabulary was | what moved |
1930
+ * |---|---|---|
1931
+ * | `WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY` | `OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES`, module-private in `saas-backend-lib` | moved to `saas-models` beside `OAuthGrantType`, which is the same kind of thing — an OIDC/OAuth protocol vocabulary. Having one consumer is a fact about usage, not about where a protocol constant belongs |
1932
+ * | `WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY` | `ConfigurationValidationDomain`, already exported | nothing — the boot validator's own domain vocabulary names the mechanism, exactly as `ResourcePersistenceAdapterIsolation` does for `DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY` |
1933
+ *
1934
+ * The second one settles a question the previous tranche got wrong in prose: a BOOT GATE is not
1935
+ * inherently unbindable. It is bindable when the thing it checks has a vocabulary. What is not
1936
+ * bindable is a gate whose only description is its own name.
1937
+ */
1938
+ {
1939
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1940
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-assertion-integrity",
1941
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1942
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1943
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1944
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1945
+ reviewedAt: SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1946
+ },
1947
+ {
1948
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1949
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-configuration-settings-enforcement",
1950
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1951
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1952
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1953
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1954
+ reviewedAt: SERVER_AUTHORSHIP_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1955
+ },
1956
+ /*
1957
+ * ── 2026-09-02 declared-substrate tranche ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
1958
+ *
1959
+ * Two objectives whose vocabulary is the SUBSTRATE the control runs against rather than the
1960
+ * control's own machinery — the fifth and sixth time asking "which vocabulary names this"
1961
+ * rather than "does this guard have one" changed the answer.
1962
+ *
1963
+ * | objective | vocabulary | why the substrate is the right axis |
1964
+ * |---|---|---|
1965
+ * | `WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS` | `PersistenceAdapter` | the verification is genuinely per-adapter (two separate verifiers), so "which datastores has this been proven against" is the reader's question — and an adapter added without a verifier is exactly how the guarantee would become silently partial |
1966
+ * | `WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY` | `LifecycleStage` | the capability attests a NEGATIVE: naming the stages is how a reader learns which self-reported values exist to be wrongly trusted |
1967
+ *
1968
+ * The second is the only capability in the basis that attests something a vocabulary does NOT
1969
+ * do. That is deliberate — a capability naming a mechanism would imply the stages confer
1970
+ * something, which is the precise claim this objective exists to deny.
1971
+ */
1972
+ {
1973
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1974
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-information-integrity-verification",
1975
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1976
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1977
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
1978
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1979
+ reviewedAt: DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1980
+ },
1981
+ {
1982
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
1983
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-authority-not-inferred-from-state",
1984
+ requirementVersion: 1,
1985
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
1986
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
1987
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
1988
+ reviewedAt: DECLARED_SUBSTRATE_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
1989
+ },
1990
+ /*
1991
+ * ── 2026-09-02 diagnosable-refusal tranche ────────────────────────────────────────────────
1992
+ *
1993
+ * Three objectives that looked like three unrelated guards — a SAML availability check, a 32kb
1994
+ * body cap, a unique-constraint resolver — and are each a DISTINCTION INSIDE ONE VOCABULARY.
1995
+ * All three bind `capability:refusal-classification`, and re-reading their intents is what
1996
+ * showed it: every one of them is phrased as a contrast.
1997
+ *
1998
+ * | objective | its own words |
1999
+ * |---|---|
2000
+ * | `SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED` | "stays diagnosable … without its degradation being mistaken for a rejection" |
2001
+ * | `OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT` | "answered as a client error rather than surfacing as a server failure" |
2002
+ * | `OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS` | "reported with the identity that was violated rather than as an opaque datastore failure" |
2003
+ *
2004
+ * Each contrast is between two `ErrorType` members. That is why one capability serves all
2005
+ * three and why naming the whole enum is right: the good outcome only means something against
2006
+ * the bad one it is not.
2007
+ *
2008
+ * What this does NOT claim, stated at the capability: that any particular refusal is classified
2009
+ * CORRECTLY. `UNKNOWN` is in the set because the engine admits it cannot always tell. The claim
2010
+ * is that one closed vocabulary owns the answer, so a misclassification is a wrong member rather
2011
+ * than an unclassified crash.
2012
+ */
2013
+ {
2014
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-csf-2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2015
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-csf-protect-fail-secure-behaviour",
2016
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2017
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2018
+ canonicalLocator: "https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework",
2019
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2020
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2021
+ },
2022
+ {
2023
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2024
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-denial-of-service-resource-bounds",
2025
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2026
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2027
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2028
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2029
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2030
+ },
2031
+ {
2032
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2033
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-error-handling-diagnostics",
2034
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2035
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2036
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2037
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2038
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2039
+ },
2040
+ {
2041
+ /*
2042
+ * The third package-placement unblock, and the weakest-argued of them — recorded as such. The
2043
+ * OIDC claim set was plainly a protocol vocabulary; these are Wildo's own key-purpose names.
2044
+ * What justifies the move independently of assurance is that they name identities crossing a
2045
+ * PROCESS boundary: the platform issues a token this application verifies, and this
2046
+ * application signs a webhook an integrator verifies. Both sides need the same names.
2047
+ */
2048
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2049
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-cryptographic-key-establishment-and-management",
2050
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2051
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2052
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2053
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2054
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2055
+ },
2056
+ {
2057
+ /*
2058
+ * Attested from the engine even though the CONTROL lives in `platform-config-lib`, which this
2059
+ * package must not depend on. The vocabulary crosses the companion-safe boundary into
2060
+ * `saas-models` while only the digesting stayed on the platform side — so the objective that
2061
+ * looked structurally unreachable needed no move at all.
2062
+ */
2063
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2064
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-authenticator-storage-protection",
2065
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2066
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2067
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2068
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2069
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2070
+ },
2071
+ {
2072
+ /*
2073
+ * The forty-ninth binding, and the only one that required the ENGINE to change. The other
2074
+ * forty-eight were mapping work — finding the vocabulary that already named a control. This
2075
+ * one was a genuine coverage hole: the concurrent-session cap was enforced and untested-for
2076
+ * in the trail, so there was nothing to bind to until the eviction started emitting.
2077
+ */
2078
+ source: { sourceRef: "source:nist-sp-800-53-rev-5-release-5.2.0", sourceVersion: 1 },
2079
+ requirementRef: "source-requirement:nist-800-53-concurrent-session-control",
2080
+ requirementVersion: 1,
2081
+ objective: { objectiveRef: "WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT", objectiveVersion: 1 },
2082
+ canonicalLocator: "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final",
2083
+ reviewedByRef: AUTHORITY_REVIEWER_REF,
2084
+ reviewedAt: DIAGNOSABLE_REFUSAL_TRANCHE_REVIEWED_AT,
2085
+ },
2086
+ ], (a) => `${a.source.sourceRef}@${a.source.sourceVersion}:${a.requirementRef}@${a.requirementVersion}`),
2087
+ implementationExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.implementationExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => ({
2088
+ identity: { expectationRef: binding.implementationExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },
2089
+ objective: binding.objective,
2090
+ requiredCapabilityRefs: [...binding.requiredCapabilityRefs],
2091
+ })),
2092
+ evidenceExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.evidenceExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => ({
2093
+ identity: { expectationRef: binding.evidenceExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },
2094
+ objective: binding.objective,
2095
+ requiredStatementEvidenceRefs: [...binding.requiredStatementEvidenceRefs],
2096
+ })),
2097
+ verificationExpectationAuthorities: byCanonicalIdentity(ASSURANCE_OBJECTIVE_EXPECTATION_BINDINGS, (b) => `${b.verificationExpectationRef}@1`).map((binding) => ({
2098
+ identity: { expectationRef: binding.verificationExpectationRef, expectationVersion: 1 },
2099
+ objective: binding.objective,
2100
+ requiredStatementVerificationRefs: [...binding.requiredStatementVerificationRefs],
2101
+ })),
137
2102
  });
138
2103
  }
139
2104
  //# sourceMappingURL=assurance-authority-basis.definitions.js.map