@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.5 → 1.1.6

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/siem/siem-export-config.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Only the\n * ORGANIZATION variant drives delivery today: the sole SIEM producer\n * (`AuditEventDispatcherBackendService`) fans out per authenticated tenant (org) and reads\n * this config via `loadSiemExportConfig(ec, ORGANIZATION, orgId)`. An app super-admin CAN\n * create/enable `APPLICATION_SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG` (it has its own custom-impl +\n * APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN roles), but NO producer emits app-scoped deliveries, so an enabled\n * app config silently delivers nothing. The APP variant is RESERVED / DORMANT until an\n * app-scoped producer is built — see `AuditEventDispatcherBackendService.\n * dispatchToOrganizationAuditSinks` for the rationale + the wiring it would need. (When\n * that producer lands, or if this trap is hardened sooner, the app config surface should\n * be gated/hidden until delivery actually works.)\n *\n * @see auth-data-model-audit.md §2D\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { SiemExportProjectionDeclarationSchema } from '../../../compliance/audit-trails/audit-export-projection.shared.schemas';\nimport { WildoHeaderKeys } from '../../../requests/header-keys.shared';\nimport { AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS } from '../authentication.shared.schemas';\nimport { declarePolymorphicSchemas } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.schemas';\n\nexport const SIEMAuthMethod = {\n  BEARER_TOKEN: 'bearer_token',\n  API_KEY_HEADER: 'api_key_header',\n  HMAC_SHA256: 'hmac_sha256',\n  NONE: 'none',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * The wire formats a tenant's SIEM export can request.\n *\n * `OCSF` is the JSON-native security schema the category has standardised on (ITU ratification track\n * to June 2026), and it is a PEER of the two text formats rather than a replacement: CEF and LEEF stay\n * for tenants whose SIEM wants them. The difference that matters is representational — a\n * security-audit envelope maps onto an OCSF CLASS natively, where CEF can only force it into a\n * `csN` custom-string slot.\n */\nexport const SIEMEventFormat = {\n  JSON_STRUCTURED: 'json_structured',\n  CEF: 'cef',\n  LEEF: 'leef',\n  OCSF: 'ocsf',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SIEMEventCategory = {\n  AUTHENTICATION: 'authentication',\n  AUTHORIZATION: 'authorization',\n  USER_LIFECYCLE: 'user_lifecycle',\n  ORG_MANAGEMENT: 'org_management',\n  DATA_ACCESS: 'data_access',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SIEMFilterSeverity = {\n  INFO: 'info',\n  WARNING: 'warning',\n  CRITICAL: 'critical',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SiemExportConfigBaseSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  enabled: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField(),\n\n  // Destination for exported audit events. The empty string is the DISABLED /\n  // not-yet-configured state (paired with `enabled: false`) and is the default\n  // for a freshly-seeded config — so the union MUST admit `''`. A bare\n  // `z.url().default('')` is self-contradictory: `z.url()` rejects `''`, so the\n  // default value fails output re-validation and every unconfigured row 500s on\n  // READ (`transformOutput`). Accept a real URL OR the empty sentinel.\n  webhookUrl: z.url().or(z.literal('')).default(''),\n\n  authMethod: z.enum(SIEMAuthMethod).default(SIEMAuthMethod.NONE),\n  /**\n   * User-provided secret used to authenticate outbound webhook deliveries to the\n   * customer's SIEM endpoint (bearer token, API-key value, etc.).\n   *\n   * `.isWriteOnlySecret()` gives this the framework's write-then-masked-secret\n   * contract: it stays in the CREATE/UPDATE request DTO (the operator supplies\n   * and rotates it) and in the response DTO (so the UI renders a masked\n   * placeholder), but the framework redacts it to `••••••••` at the client\n   * boundary and treats a round-tripped `••••••••` on write as \"keep the existing\n   * secret\". The real value is retained for backend internal reads only — the\n   * webhook dispatcher reads it via `readAsSystem` to sign deliveries. Do NOT use\n   * `.isBackendOnly()` here: that strips the field from every client DTO, dropping\n   * the operator's typed value before it is stored and leaving the presets a field\n   * they cannot resolve.\n   */\n  authCredential: z.string().optional().isWriteOnlySecret(),\n  authHeaderName: z.string().default(WildoHeaderKeys.API_KEY),\n\n  eventFormat: z.enum(SIEMEventFormat).default(SIEMEventFormat.JSON_STRUCTURED),\n\n  eventFilter: z.object({\n    categories: z.array(z.enum(SIEMEventCategory)).default([\n      SIEMEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION,\n      SIEMEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION,\n      SIEMEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE,\n      SIEMEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT,\n      SIEMEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS,\n    ]),\n    severityMinimum: z.enum(SIEMFilterSeverity).default(SIEMFilterSeverity.INFO),\n    specificEventTypes: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  }),\n\n  /*\n   * Three knobs, and the two that were removed are the reason to read this.\n   *\n   * `retryAttempts`, `retryBackoffSeconds` and `timeoutSeconds` are honoured — the delivery worker\n   * reads all three (`siem-webhook-delivery.backend.service`, at the retry ceiling, the exponential\n   * backoff and the request deadline).\n   *\n   * `batchSize` and `batchWindowSeconds` are honoured TOO, as of #1379 — but they were not always,\n   * and the history is the reason to read this rather than trivia. They spent months appearing in\n   * the delivery service only as fields of its parameter TYPE: declared, passed, never consulted.\n   * That is the shape which makes an inert knob hardest to see, because it has a \"reader\" that\n   * decides nothing. The worker posted ONE event per HTTP request whatever they said, and the\n   * customer documentation warned an operator not to size a receiver or a billing estimate on\n   * either — a warning being what you write when the control is missing.\n   *\n   * They were deleted in `be001548` rather than kept as a disclosed \"reserved\" knob, on the\n   * principle that a receiver sized on `batchSize: 100` is sized wrong and a documented warning is\n   * not a control. They are back now because the control exists: a durable collector groups pending\n   * events per destination and sends them as one request, so the two numbers decide how many events\n   * a request may carry and how long a partly-filled one waits.\n   *\n   * The pairing that matters: `batchSize: 1` — the DEFAULT — means no batching at all, the window is\n   * never consulted, and the wire is byte-for-byte what it was before any of this existed.\n   */\n  delivery: z.object({\n    /**\n     * The MOST events one HTTP request may carry. `1` — the default — is one request per event,\n     * which is what this destination gets until its operator asks for anything else.\n     *\n     * The number means what it says: the collector claims at most this many pending events for one\n     * request and sends no more, so a receiver sized on `batchSize: 50` receives at most fifty. A\n     * burst larger than this becomes several requests of this size rather than one oversized body.\n     *\n     * Capped at 100 because the body is the sum of its events and collector endpoints commonly\n     * refuse a payload around a megabyte: a hundred CEF lines sits comfortably under that, where a\n     * thousand would not. Raising the cap is a decision about the receiver, not about this engine.\n     *\n     * At `1` the delivery path is byte-for-byte what it was before batching existed — the event is\n     * sent alone, framed as itself, and {@link batchWindowSeconds} is never consulted.\n     */\n    batchSize: z.number().int().min(1).max(100).default(1),\n    /**\n     * How long a partly-filled batch waits for company before it is sent anyway.\n     *\n     * ONLY consulted when {@link batchSize} is greater than 1 — at the default of 1 there is no\n     * batch to fill, so a lone event is never held. That is the pairing to know: this field cannot\n     * delay anything on a destination that has not opted into batching.\n     *\n     * It bounds how stale an exported security event may be, which is why the ceiling is a minute\n     * rather than the five that the retry backoff allows. A SOC's detection latency is the thing\n     * being spent here.\n     */\n    batchWindowSeconds: z.preprocess(\n      /*\n       * A stored value BELOW the floor is LEGACY, and is normalised to the default rather than\n       * refused. Measured 2026-09-21 on the dogfood application: 17 of 17 rows carry\n       * `batchWindowSeconds: 0`, and so do wonder-crm's and the platform's.\n       *\n       * They were written by the seed's `delivery: {}` under the PRE-`be001548` schema, whose\n       * default for this field was 0 — back when nothing read it. Re-adding the field in #1379 with\n       * a floor of 1 made every one of those rows unreadable: `transformOutput` re-validates stored\n       * data against the CURRENT schema, so every read of every organization's SIEM export config\n       * threw, which is `loadSiemExportConfig` — the per-organization audit routing lookup.\n       *\n       * **The floor cannot simply be widened to 0, and the reason is in the collector**: \"A window\n       * of 0 would make the flush job race the append's own transaction; the window is floored at 1\n       * second by the schema\". `.min(1)` is load-bearing, so 0 is not a value this contract may\n       * hold — which is exactly why coercing it is honest rather than lax. It cannot be WRITTEN\n       * either: a create or update carrying 0 still fails the inner schema, because preprocess only\n       * substitutes the value that reaches it and the floor below still judges everything else.\n       *\n       * Neither of the framework's two repair mechanisms can reach these rows, which is why the\n       * normalisation lives here. A seed version bump does not: `AFTER_CREATE` \"fires once and\n       * cannot reach backwards\", and the lazy backfill is \"first access creates the row, never\n       * re-applied\". A SQL data migration would cover the three PostgreSQL surfaces and leave every\n       * Mongo-backed application broken.\n       *\n       * Matched on EXACTLY 0, never `< 1`. The first version of this coercion took anything below\n       * the floor, and a probe immediately showed it accepting `-3` as 5 — a coercion that had\n       * quietly become permission, which is the shape this repository forbids under \"never present\n       * suppression as repair\". A negative, a fraction and anything above the ceiling are still\n       * refused outright; 0 alone is the value the old schema actually wrote.\n       *\n       * The residual, stated rather than hidden: read and write share this schema, so an operator\n       * who TYPES 0 gets 5 instead of a validation error. That is the cost of the trade, and it is\n       * the right way round against every read of every organization's export config throwing.\n       *\n       * Mapped to `undefined` rather than to a literal so `.default(5)` stays the single source of\n       * the value. Removable once no deployment can hold a pre-#1379 row.\n       */\n      (value) => (value === 0 ? undefined : value),\n      z.number().int().min(1).max(60).default(5),\n    ),\n    retryAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(5).default(3),\n    retryBackoffSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(300).default(30),\n    timeoutSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(60).default(10),\n  }),\n\n  customHeaders: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).optional(),\n\n  /**\n   * What this destination may RECEIVE — the per-destination half of the audit-export projection\n   * (#1380). The vocabulary, the floor and the resolution live in\n   * `compliance/audit-trails/audit-export-projection.shared.schemas`; this field is only where a\n   * tenant declares its own narrowing.\n   *\n   * **`.optional()` on purpose, and the absent case is FULL disclosure.** Two destinations on one\n   * tenant can hold different agreements, so the declaration belongs here rather than on the\n   * application — but every row that exists today has none, and reading an absent declaration as\n   * \"disclose nothing\" would silently strip live feeds down to the floor. An operator narrows\n   * deliberately; the framework does not narrow on their behalf. See `FULL_AUDIT_EXPORT_PROJECTION`\n   * for why that fail-OPEN is right in this one place.\n   *\n   * This is NOT the revival of `includeRawEventData` / `includeDeviceContext` below. Those were two\n   * booleans beside the retry policy that nothing read; this resolves against a contract that is\n   * total over the envelope AND total over the event vocabulary, is applied once at the ENQUEUE\n   * SEAM — before the event is signed and queued, so all four wire formats carry it identically and\n   * no producer can reach the queue around it — and cannot trim the floor.\n   */\n  exportProjection: SiemExportProjectionDeclarationSchema.optional(),\n\n  /*\n   * `includeRawEventData` and `includeDeviceContext` were REMOVED here, and neither was ever read.\n   *\n   * Both defaulted `true`, both rendered as switches on the SIEM pane with a description underneath,\n   * and the complete set of mentions was: this declaration, the display and edit templates, the\n   * specification, the customer documentation, the i18n labels — and FOUR test files, where each\n   * appears as a field of a config FIXTURE rather than as a behaviour under assertion. The envelope\n   * builders in `compliance/audit-trails` contain no `includeRaw`, no `rawEvent` and no\n   * `deviceContext` at all: what an exported event carries is decided by the projection contract,\n   * the same shape for every sink.\n   *\n   * They are worth naming apart from the other dead switches on these panes, because these two had\n   * `booleanUI({ showDescription: true })` — so an operator got a switch, a label AND a sentence\n   * explaining what it did, for a flag that did nothing. Being the best-presented control on the\n   * page is not evidence of being one.\n   *\n   * Removing them is not a loss of the capability they named. Choosing what an export carries is a\n   * real feature with a design — a projection the application declares — and it would be built on\n   * the envelope contract, not on two booleans beside the retry policy.\n   *\n   * Absence is pinned in `authentication-knobs-have-readers.test.ts`.\n   */\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type SiemExportConfigBase = z.infer<typeof SiemExportConfigBaseSchema>;\n\nexport const siemExportConfigPolymorphicDeclaration = declarePolymorphicSchemas({\n  baseResourceType: 'siemExportConfig',\n  baseFieldIdentifier: 'siemExportConfigId',\n  baseEnumKey: 'SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG',\n  baseSchema: SiemExportConfigBaseSchema,\n  variants: AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS,\n});\n"]}
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Only the\n * ORGANIZATION variant drives delivery today: the sole SIEM producer\n * (`AuditEventDispatcherBackendService`) fans out per authenticated tenant (org) and reads\n * this config via `loadSiemExportConfig(ec, ORGANIZATION, orgId)`. An app super-admin CAN\n * create/enable `APPLICATION_SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG` (it has its own custom-impl +\n * APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN roles), but NO producer emits app-scoped deliveries, so an enabled\n * app config silently delivers nothing. The APP variant is RESERVED / DORMANT until an\n * app-scoped producer is built — see `AuditEventDispatcherBackendService.\n * dispatchToOrganizationAuditSinks` for the rationale + the wiring it would need. (When\n * that producer lands, or if this trap is hardened sooner, the app config surface should\n * be gated/hidden until delivery actually works.)\n *\n * @see auth-data-model-audit.md §2D\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { SiemExportProjectionDeclarationSchema } from '../../../compliance/audit-trails/audit-export-projection.shared.schemas';\nimport { WildoHeaderKeys } from '../../../requests/header-keys.shared';\nimport { AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS } from '../authentication.shared.schemas';\nimport { declarePolymorphicSchemas } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.schemas';\n\nexport const SIEMAuthMethod = {\n  BEARER_TOKEN: 'bearer_token',\n  API_KEY_HEADER: 'api_key_header',\n  HMAC_SHA256: 'hmac_sha256',\n  NONE: 'none',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * The wire formats a tenant's SIEM export can request.\n *\n * `OCSF` is the JSON-native security schema the category has standardised on (ITU ratification track\n * to June 2026), and it is a PEER of the two text formats rather than a replacement: CEF and LEEF stay\n * for tenants whose SIEM wants them. The difference that matters is representational — a\n * security-audit envelope maps onto an OCSF CLASS natively, where CEF can only force it into a\n * `csN` custom-string slot.\n */\nexport const SIEMEventFormat = {\n  JSON_STRUCTURED: 'json_structured',\n  CEF: 'cef',\n  LEEF: 'leef',\n  OCSF: 'ocsf',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SIEMEventCategory = {\n  AUTHENTICATION: 'authentication',\n  AUTHORIZATION: 'authorization',\n  USER_LIFECYCLE: 'user_lifecycle',\n  ORG_MANAGEMENT: 'org_management',\n  DATA_ACCESS: 'data_access',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SIEMFilterSeverity = {\n  INFO: 'info',\n  WARNING: 'warning',\n  CRITICAL: 'critical',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SiemExportConfigBaseSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  enabled: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField(),\n\n  // Destination for exported audit events. The empty string is the DISABLED /\n  // not-yet-configured state (paired with `enabled: false`) and is the default\n  // for a freshly-seeded config — so the union MUST admit `''`. A bare\n  // `z.url().default('')` is self-contradictory: `z.url()` rejects `''`, so the\n  // default value fails output re-validation and every unconfigured row 500s on\n  // READ (`transformOutput`). Accept a real URL OR the empty sentinel.\n  webhookUrl: z.url().or(z.literal('')).default(''),\n\n  authMethod: z.enum(SIEMAuthMethod).default(SIEMAuthMethod.NONE),\n  /**\n   * User-provided secret used to authenticate outbound webhook deliveries to the\n   * customer's SIEM endpoint (bearer token, API-key value, etc.).\n   *\n   * `.isWriteOnlySecret()` gives this the framework's write-then-masked-secret\n   * contract: it stays in the CREATE/UPDATE request DTO (the operator supplies\n   * and rotates it) and in the response DTO (so the UI renders a masked\n   * placeholder), but the framework redacts it to `••••••••` at the client\n   * boundary and treats a round-tripped `••••••••` on write as \"keep the existing\n   * secret\". The real value is retained for backend internal reads only — the\n   * webhook dispatcher reads it via `readAsSystem` to sign deliveries. Do NOT use\n   * `.isBackendOnly()` here: that strips the field from every client DTO, dropping\n   * the operator's typed value before it is stored and leaving the presets a field\n   * they cannot resolve.\n   */\n  authCredential: z.string().optional().isWriteOnlySecret(),\n  authHeaderName: z.string().default(WildoHeaderKeys.API_KEY),\n\n  eventFormat: z.enum(SIEMEventFormat).default(SIEMEventFormat.JSON_STRUCTURED),\n\n  eventFilter: z.object({\n    categories: z.array(z.enum(SIEMEventCategory)).default([\n      SIEMEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION,\n      SIEMEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION,\n      SIEMEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE,\n      SIEMEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT,\n      SIEMEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS,\n    ]).describe(\"The event categories exported to this destination.\"),\n    severityMinimum: z.enum(SIEMFilterSeverity).default(SIEMFilterSeverity.INFO).describe(\"The least severe event exported. Less severe events are not sent.\"),\n    specificEventTypes: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe(\"An optional allow-list of event types, matched exactly: no substring or wildcard matching.\"),\n  }),\n\n  /*\n   * Three knobs, and the two that were removed are the reason to read this.\n   *\n   * `retryAttempts`, `retryBackoffSeconds` and `timeoutSeconds` are honoured — the delivery worker\n   * reads all three (`siem-webhook-delivery.backend.service`, at the retry ceiling, the exponential\n   * backoff and the request deadline).\n   *\n   * `batchSize` and `batchWindowSeconds` are honoured TOO, as of #1379 — but they were not always,\n   * and the history is the reason to read this rather than trivia. They spent months appearing in\n   * the delivery service only as fields of its parameter TYPE: declared, passed, never consulted.\n   * That is the shape which makes an inert knob hardest to see, because it has a \"reader\" that\n   * decides nothing. The worker posted ONE event per HTTP request whatever they said, and the\n   * customer documentation warned an operator not to size a receiver or a billing estimate on\n   * either — a warning being what you write when the control is missing.\n   *\n   * They were deleted in `be001548` rather than kept as a disclosed \"reserved\" knob, on the\n   * principle that a receiver sized on `batchSize: 100` is sized wrong and a documented warning is\n   * not a control. They are back now because the control exists: a durable collector groups pending\n   * events per destination and sends them as one request, so the two numbers decide how many events\n   * a request may carry and how long a partly-filled one waits.\n   *\n   * The pairing that matters: `batchSize: 1` — the DEFAULT — means no batching at all, the window is\n   * never consulted, and the wire is byte-for-byte what it was before any of this existed.\n   */\n  delivery: z.object({\n    /**\n     * The MOST events one HTTP request may carry. `1` — the default — is one request per event,\n     * which is what this destination gets until its operator asks for anything else.\n     *\n     * The number means what it says: the collector claims at most this many pending events for one\n     * request and sends no more, so a receiver sized on `batchSize: 50` receives at most fifty. A\n     * burst larger than this becomes several requests of this size rather than one oversized body.\n     *\n     * Capped at 100 because the body is the sum of its events and collector endpoints commonly\n     * refuse a payload around a megabyte: a hundred CEF lines sits comfortably under that, where a\n     * thousand would not. Raising the cap is a decision about the receiver, not about this engine.\n     *\n     * At `1` the delivery path is byte-for-byte what it was before batching existed — the event is\n     * sent alone, framed as itself, and {@link batchWindowSeconds} is never consulted.\n     */\n    batchSize: z.number().int().min(1).max(100).default(1).describe(\"The most events one request may carry, up to 100. `1`, the default, sends one request per event.\"),\n    /**\n     * How long a partly-filled batch waits for company before it is sent anyway.\n     *\n     * ONLY consulted when {@link batchSize} is greater than 1 — at the default of 1 there is no\n     * batch to fill, so a lone event is never held. That is the pairing to know: this field cannot\n     * delay anything on a destination that has not opted into batching.\n     *\n     * It bounds how stale an exported security event may be, which is why the ceiling is a minute\n     * rather than the five that the retry backoff allows. A SOC's detection latency is the thing\n     * being spent here.\n     */\n    batchWindowSeconds: z.preprocess(\n      /*\n       * A stored value BELOW the floor is LEGACY, and is normalised to the default rather than\n       * refused. Measured 2026-09-21 on the dogfood application: 17 of 17 rows carry\n       * `batchWindowSeconds: 0`, and so do wonder-crm's and the platform's.\n       *\n       * They were written by the seed's `delivery: {}` under the PRE-`be001548` schema, whose\n       * default for this field was 0 — back when nothing read it. Re-adding the field in #1379 with\n       * a floor of 1 made every one of those rows unreadable: `transformOutput` re-validates stored\n       * data against the CURRENT schema, so every read of every organization's SIEM export config\n       * threw, which is `loadSiemExportConfig` — the per-organization audit routing lookup.\n       *\n       * **The floor cannot simply be widened to 0, and the reason is in the collector**: \"A window\n       * of 0 would make the flush job race the append's own transaction; the window is floored at 1\n       * second by the schema\". `.min(1)` is load-bearing, so 0 is not a value this contract may\n       * hold — which is exactly why coercing it is honest rather than lax. It cannot be WRITTEN\n       * either: a create or update carrying 0 still fails the inner schema, because preprocess only\n       * substitutes the value that reaches it and the floor below still judges everything else.\n       *\n       * Neither of the framework's two repair mechanisms can reach these rows, which is why the\n       * normalisation lives here. A seed version bump does not: `AFTER_CREATE` \"fires once and\n       * cannot reach backwards\", and the lazy backfill is \"first access creates the row, never\n       * re-applied\". A SQL data migration would cover the three PostgreSQL surfaces and leave every\n       * Mongo-backed application broken.\n       *\n       * Matched on EXACTLY 0, never `< 1`. The first version of this coercion took anything below\n       * the floor, and a probe immediately showed it accepting `-3` as 5 — a coercion that had\n       * quietly become permission, which is the shape this repository forbids under \"never present\n       * suppression as repair\". A negative, a fraction and anything above the ceiling are still\n       * refused outright; 0 alone is the value the old schema actually wrote.\n       *\n       * The residual, stated rather than hidden: read and write share this schema, so an operator\n       * who TYPES 0 gets 5 instead of a validation error. That is the cost of the trade, and it is\n       * the right way round against every read of every organization's export config throwing.\n       *\n       * Mapped to `undefined` rather than to a literal so `.default(5)` stays the single source of\n       * the value. Removable once no deployment can hold a pre-#1379 row.\n       */\n      (value) => (value === 0 ? undefined : value),\n      z.number().int().min(1).max(60).default(5),\n    ).describe(\"How long, in seconds, a partly filled batch waits before it is sent anyway. Used only when `batchSize` is above 1.\"),\n    retryAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(5).default(3).describe(\"How many times a failed delivery is retried.\"),\n    retryBackoffSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(300).default(30).describe(\"The base delay before a retry, in seconds. Retries back off exponentially from it.\"),\n    timeoutSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(60).default(10).describe(\"How long one delivery request may take, in seconds.\"),\n  }),\n\n  customHeaders: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).optional(),\n\n  /**\n   * What this destination may RECEIVE — the per-destination half of the audit-export projection\n   * (#1380). The vocabulary, the floor and the resolution live in\n   * `compliance/audit-trails/audit-export-projection.shared.schemas`; this field is only where a\n   * tenant declares its own narrowing.\n   *\n   * **`.optional()` on purpose, and the absent case is FULL disclosure.** Two destinations on one\n   * tenant can hold different agreements, so the declaration belongs here rather than on the\n   * application — but every row that exists today has none, and reading an absent declaration as\n   * \"disclose nothing\" would silently strip live feeds down to the floor. An operator narrows\n   * deliberately; the framework does not narrow on their behalf. See `FULL_AUDIT_EXPORT_PROJECTION`\n   * for why that fail-OPEN is right in this one place.\n   *\n   * This is NOT the revival of `includeRawEventData` / `includeDeviceContext` below. Those were two\n   * booleans beside the retry policy that nothing read; this resolves against a contract that is\n   * total over the envelope AND total over the event vocabulary, is applied once at the ENQUEUE\n   * SEAM — before the event is signed and queued, so all four wire formats carry it identically and\n   * no producer can reach the queue around it — and cannot trim the floor.\n   */\n  exportProjection: SiemExportProjectionDeclarationSchema.optional(),\n\n  /*\n   * `includeRawEventData` and `includeDeviceContext` were REMOVED here, and neither was ever read.\n   *\n   * Both defaulted `true`, both rendered as switches on the SIEM pane with a description underneath,\n   * and the complete set of mentions was: this declaration, the display and edit templates, the\n   * specification, the customer documentation, the i18n labels — and FOUR test files, where each\n   * appears as a field of a config FIXTURE rather than as a behaviour under assertion. The envelope\n   * builders in `compliance/audit-trails` contain no `includeRaw`, no `rawEvent` and no\n   * `deviceContext` at all: what an exported event carries is decided by the projection contract,\n   * the same shape for every sink.\n   *\n   * They are worth naming apart from the other dead switches on these panes, because these two had\n   * `booleanUI({ showDescription: true })` — so an operator got a switch, a label AND a sentence\n   * explaining what it did, for a flag that did nothing. Being the best-presented control on the\n   * page is not evidence of being one.\n   *\n   * Removing them is not a loss of the capability they named. Choosing what an export carries is a\n   * real feature with a design — a projection the application declares — and it would be built on\n   * the envelope contract, not on two booleans beside the retry policy.\n   *\n   * Absence is pinned in `authentication-knobs-have-readers.test.ts`.\n   */\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type SiemExportConfigBase = z.infer<typeof SiemExportConfigBaseSchema>;\n\nexport const siemExportConfigPolymorphicDeclaration = declarePolymorphicSchemas({\n  baseResourceType: 'siemExportConfig',\n  baseFieldIdentifier: 'siemExportConfigId',\n  baseEnumKey: 'SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG',\n  baseSchema: SiemExportConfigBaseSchema,\n  variants: AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS,\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../src/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAoB,MAAM,sDAAsD,CAAC;AAC/G,OAAO,EAEL,4BAA4B,EAC7B,MAAM,6CAA6C,CAAC;AAkBrD,oBAAY,oBAAoB;IAC9B,YAAY,gBAAgB;IAC5B,aAAa,iBAAiB;IAC9B,aAAa,iBAAiB;CAC/B;AAmCD,eAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B;;iBAE1C,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;;iBAE3C,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;;iBAE3C,CAAC;AAEH;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;;;;;;;;IAG3C,2EAA2E;;IAE3E,qDAAqD;;kBAErD,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,iCAAiC;;;;;;;;;IAI5C;;;;OAIG;;kBAEH,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,iCAAiC;;IAE5C,iFAAiF;;kBAEjF,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,6BAA6B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC7F,MAAM,MAAM,8BAA8B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/F,MAAM,MAAM,8BAA8B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC;AAE/F;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,6BAA6B,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;IAGnD,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;CACvE,CAEA,CAAC;AAIF,eAAO,MAAM,6BAA6B,wQA0PzC,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ const SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN = /^(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-)(\.(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1
 const SsoConfig_DomainSelector = z.string()
     .min(4)
     .max(253)
-    .regex(SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN, 'Provide a DNS hostname with at least two labels, e.g. "customer.com".');
+    .regex(SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN, 'Provide a DNS hostname with at least two labels, e.g. "customer.com".')
+    .describe("The email domain, as a DNS hostname with at least two labels, such as `customer.com`.");
 /*
  * ── `z.object`, NOT `z.strictObject` — and that is a CONTRACT, not a relaxation ────────────────
  *
@@ -77,28 +78,28 @@ export const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainRequestDto = z.object({
  * SCIM token mint uses for its one-time plaintext.
  */
 export const SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({
-    domain: z.string(),
-    status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus),
+    domain: z.string().describe("The domain that was claimed."),
+    status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus).describe("The domain's verification status after the claim: `pending` until the DNS record is checked."),
     /** The DNS name the TXT record goes on: `_wildo-verification.<domain>`. */
-    dnsName: z.string(),
+    dnsName: z.string().describe("Where to publish the TXT record: `_wildo-verification.<domain>`."),
     /** The exact TXT value to publish. Revealed once. */
-    dnsRecordValue: z.string().isEphemeral(),
+    dnsRecordValue: z.string().isEphemeral().describe("The exact TXT value to publish, returned only in this response. Claiming the domain again issues a new value and invalidates this one."),
 });
 export const SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({
-    domain: z.string(),
-    status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus),
-    dnsName: z.string(),
+    domain: z.string().describe("The domain that was checked."),
+    status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus).describe("The result of this check: `verified` when a TXT record at `dnsName` matched the claim's value, otherwise `failed`."),
+    dnsName: z.string().describe("The DNS name that was queried for the TXT record."),
     /**
      * Every TXT record found at `dnsName`, so a failed check is diagnosable without a second tool.
      * These are public DNS records of a domain the caller is claiming to own — echoing them discloses
      * nothing the caller could not resolve themselves.
      */
-    dnsRecordsFound: z.array(z.string()),
+    dnsRecordsFound: z.array(z.string()).describe("Every TXT record found at `dnsName`, so a failed check can be diagnosed."),
 });
 export const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({
-    domain: z.string(),
+    domain: z.string().describe("The domain whose claim was removed."),
     /** True once the domain holds no claim, no status and no nonce in this scope. */
-    revoked: z.boolean(),
+    revoked: z.boolean().describe("`true` once the domain holds no claim, verification status or pending value in this scope."),
 });
 /**
  * The variant type the SSO-config UPDATE runs on — the one named source read by this configuration and
@@ -161,7 +162,7 @@ export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurat
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
                     polymorphicRole: {
-                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],
                         [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
                     },
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurat
                     variantType: SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE[CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE],
                     isDefault: true,
                     polymorphicRole: {
-                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],
                         [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
                     },
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
@@ -325,7 +326,7 @@ export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurat
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
                     polymorphicRole: {
-                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],
                         [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
                     },
                     // HIGH, not CRITICAL: a claim grants NOTHING. It records `pending` and mints a nonce, and
@@ -341,7 +342,7 @@ export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurat
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
                     polymorphicRole: {
-                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],
                         [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
                     },
                     // CRITICAL: this is the transition that hands a tenant SSO routing control over EVERY
@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurat
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
                     polymorphicRole: {
-                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],
                         [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
                     },
                     // CRITICAL for the same reason as VERIFY, from the other side: revocation is what makes a

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* SSO Config Resource Configuration — Polymorphic\n *\n * Produces 2 factory functions (ORG + APP) via the polymorphic factory.\n * Spread into the registry factory map:\n *   ...ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation, CoreResourceType } from '../../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport {\n  ResourceOperationRiskLevel,\n  ResourceOperationVariantType,\n} from '../../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CORE_ORG_ROLES, CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { DomainVerificationStatus, ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration } from './sso-config.shared.schemas';\n\n// ── Domain-ownership operations ──────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// Enterprise domain routing sends every `@customer.com` sign-in to that customer's identity\n// provider. Reaching the VERIFIED state used to require an out-of-band database write, which made\n// enterprise onboarding a support ticket forever (#424). These three operations are the door.\n//\n// They are entity-level operations on a resource that is a ONE-to-ONE COMPOSITION under its scope,\n// so the URL builder omits the id segment and the scope in the path selects the row:\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/claim-domain\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/verify-domain\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/revoke-domain\n\nexport enum SsoConfig_Operations {\n  CLAIM_DOMAIN = 'claimDomain',\n  VERIFY_DOMAIN = 'verifyDomain',\n  REVOKE_DOMAIN = 'revokeDomain',\n}\n\n/**\n * A DNS hostname, syntactically. Two labels minimum — a single label is not a domain anyone can\n * publish a TXT record under, and accepting one would mint a challenge that can never be answered.\n *\n * Case is NOT normalised here. The backend lowercases before every read and every write, because\n * that is where the stored map keys are decided; doing it in two places would make the request\n * contract look like the authority when it is not.\n */\nconst SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN = /^(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-)(\\.(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-))+$/;\n\nconst SsoConfig_DomainSelector = z.string()\n  .min(4)\n  .max(253)\n  .regex(SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN, 'Provide a DNS hostname with at least two labels, e.g. \"customer.com\".');\n\n/*\n * ── `z.object`, NOT `z.strictObject` — and that is a CONTRACT, not a relaxation ────────────────\n *\n * These three shipped as `strictObject` and every claim answered **400 `unrecognized_keys:\n * [\"domains\"]`**, measured over HTTP on 2026-09-09. The framework MERGES a PREFIX hook's returned\n * patch into the request payload and re-parses the result against THIS schema — so the `domains`\n * block the planner just computed arrived at a schema that knows only `domain`, and a strict schema\n * refuses what it does not recognise. A prefix that contributes a persisted field is therefore\n * structurally incompatible with a strict request DTO; every sibling lifecycle verb in the engine\n * (`organizations.requestDeletion`, `activate`, `restore`) uses `z.object` for exactly this reason.\n *\n * `z.object` STRIPS the unrecognised key instead of refusing it, which on its own would turn the\n * 400 into the quieter defect — 200 having persisted nothing. What closes that half is\n * `authoritativeFields: ['domains']` on each custom-implementation registration, which re-attaches\n * the hook's value after the strip and makes a caller-supplied `domains` be overwritten rather than\n * honoured. The two halves are one decision; neither works alone.\n */\nexport const SsoConfig_ClaimDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_VerifyDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\n/**\n * The claim response is the ONLY disclosure of the challenge nonce.\n *\n * `domainVerificationTokens` is `.isBackendOnly()`, so no READ of the config ever returns it — an\n * operator who loses this response claims again, which mints a new nonce and invalidates the old\n * one. `.isEphemeral()` marks `dnsRecordValue` as a revealed-once secret, the same contract the\n * SCIM token mint uses for its one-time plaintext.\n */\nexport const SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string(),\n  status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus),\n  /** The DNS name the TXT record goes on: `_wildo-verification.<domain>`. */\n  dnsName: z.string(),\n  /** The exact TXT value to publish. Revealed once. */\n  dnsRecordValue: z.string().isEphemeral(),\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string(),\n  status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus),\n  dnsName: z.string(),\n  /**\n   * Every TXT record found at `dnsName`, so a failed check is diagnosable without a second tool.\n   * These are public DNS records of a domain the caller is claiming to own — echoing them discloses\n   * nothing the caller could not resolve themselves.\n   */\n  dnsRecordsFound: z.array(z.string()),\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string(),\n  /** True once the domain holds no claim, no status and no nonce in this scope. */\n  revoked: z.boolean(),\n});\n\nexport type SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto>;\nexport type SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto>;\nexport type SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto>;\n\n/**\n * The variant type the SSO-config UPDATE runs on — the one named source read by this configuration and\n * by the `socialCredentialOverrides` secret-preservation custom-impl registered on that write.\n *\n * A custom implementation is keyed by `(resource, operation, variantType)`, so the two restating the\n * value by hand is the drift this removes: the dispatch silently stops finding the PREFIX, and every\n * save wipes the per-override `clientSecret` and signedJwt ids. Same shape, and the same reason, as\n * `SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE` (#953).\n *\n * `UPDATE` is `API_CALL`: the administrator's edit door. It was `INTERNAL_CALL` — route-less — which\n * made an SSO policy something only a backend service could change, and the comment there said only\n * that no public surface had been BUILT, never that one would be wrong. Three public PUTs already\n * mutate this row (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain`, #424) under the same roles, and\n * SIEM export config — a scope-level security record holding sealed credentials — has carried this\n * door since #953. Field-level protection is variant-agnostic: `.isWriteOnlySecret()` and\n * `.isBackendOnly()` hold identically on either path.\n *\n * The route-less state was not merely a missing feature. `pickInlineFieldWriteOperation`'s pins record\n * what it cost: with no addressable literal `update`, the frontend's update resolution fell through to\n * whatever custom verb borrowed UPDATE semantics, so every writable field on the SSO settings pane\n * rendered as a live control bound to `claimDomain`.\n */\nexport const SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE: Readonly<{\n  // Exact members, not the enum: a variant is a union DISCRIMINATED by `variantType`, so a value typed\n  // as the whole enum matches no member of it.\n  [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL;\n}> = {\n  [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n};\n\n// ── Polymorphic Factory ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations(\n  ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration,\n  {\n    isSystemResource: true,\n    customOperation: SsoConfig_Operations,\n    // The auth runtime loads the org SSO config via `readAsSystem` during login,\n    // before the user's roles/membership are established (READ). When the row is\n    // absent — a provisioned / migrated / pre-seed org that bypassed the\n    // `afterCreate` default-seed — that same userless login path lazily\n    // materialises the disabled-default row via `createAsSystem` (CREATE); see\n    // `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.loadSSOConfig`. Both are system-context\n    // (the logging-in user is not the config's admin owner), so the resource opts\n    // BOTH verbs in.\n    //\n    // `list` is the DOMAIN-EXCLUSIVITY probe and nothing else (#424). At most one scope may hold a\n    // domain VERIFIED, or a `@customer.com` sign-in routes non-deterministically to whichever\n    // config the lookup happens to reach first. Answering \"does another scope already hold this\n    // domain\" is unavoidably a cross-scope read, and the two candidates that avoid this grant are\n    // both worse:\n    //   - `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.getAllOrganizationIds()` enumerates an IN-MEMORY\n    //     CACHE of scopes whose config has been loaded, so it under-reports on a cold process. An\n    //     exclusivity check built on it answers \"nobody else holds it\" from an incomplete\n    //     population — the negative-result failure that produces a confident wrong answer;\n    //   - reaching the repository directly bypasses the `systemAccessPolicy` opt-in AND the\n    //     `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_*` audit event, which is a bigger grant wearing a smaller name.\n    systemAccessPolicy: {\n      read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n      create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n      list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    },\n    coreOperations: [CoreResourceOperation.READ, CoreResourceOperation.LIST, CoreResourceOperation.CREATE, CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE, CoreResourceOperation.DELETE],\n    operationsConfiguration: {\n      [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (INTERNAL_CALL, NO HTTP route): the per-scope config row is\n      // materialised by the framework default-seed (repository tier) OR — when that\n      // was bypassed (provisioned / migrated / pre-seed org) — lazily by the\n      // userless login path via `createAsSystem` (`systemAccessPolicy.create` opts\n      // it in). Must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY: `createAsSystem` resolves CREATE via\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL but\n      // NOT REPOSITORY_ONLY — a repository-only CREATE throws\n      // `RESOURCES_REGISTRY_OPERATION_PATH_NOT_FOUND` (INTERNAL / critical, and\n      // self-alerting on mere construction) on every login for a config-less org.\n      // No public HTTP create surface (config is seeded/bootstrapped, never\n      // self-serve). Same fix as the SCIM-tokens READ/UPDATE. Admin tier / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (INTERNAL_CALL, NO HTTP route): the ONE caller is the domain-exclusivity\n      // probe described on `systemAccessPolicy.list` above, reached through\n      // `SystemAccessService.listAsSystem`. It must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY for the same reason the\n      // CREATE and UPDATE below are not: `listAsSystem` resolves the verb through\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL and rejects\n      // REPOSITORY_ONLY. There is deliberately no API_CALL variant — one tenant enumerating every\n      // other tenant's SSO policy is the opposite of what this resource is for, and the probe that\n      // needs the enumeration answers a single yes/no question and returns no row to a caller.\n      //\n      // Admin tier / MEDIUM — and MEDIUM rather than HIGH is a correction, not a downgrade. This\n      // shipped at HIGH and was the FIRST read-shaped HIGH operation in the catalogue, which broke\n      // the measurement `resource-operation-audit-emission.backend.test.ts` calls \"the one the whole\n      // design rests on\": `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` is deliberately not emitted for a read, and\n      // `FIELD_ACCESS` fires only on a disclosed marked field — so a read declared inside\n      // `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR` promises evidence that CANNOT exist on either axis, and the\n      // most dangerous read in the catalogue would be the one leaving no trace.\n      //\n      // The crossing is nonetheless recorded, on the axis that can carry it: the probe reaches this\n      // verb through `SystemAccessService.listAsSystem`, which emits its own `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_*`\n      // event — that is precisely why the comment on `systemAccessPolicy.list` above refuses the\n      // repository shortcut. So the declaration moves to where the evidence actually is instead of\n      // claiming a row nothing writes.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        }],\n      },\n      // The administrator's edit door, and the only write path for this policy row. Two kinds of\n      // caller reach it and both resolve the SAME default: an admin editing the settings pane, over\n      // the HTTP route this variant now carries; and a backend caller holding no operation —\n      // `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.saveSSOConfig`, `initiateDomainVerification`,\n      // `verifyDomainOwnership` — dispatching via `ServicesRegistryHandler.update` with the ADMIN's\n      // EC, preserving admin audit attribution. `getServiceOperationPathDefault` honours API_CALL\n      // exactly as it honoured INTERNAL_CALL, so nothing on the service path changes.\n      //\n      // It WAS `INTERNAL_CALL` — route-less — and the comment here recorded only that no public\n      // surface had been built, never an argument that one would be wrong. See\n      // `SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE` for why it moved, and for what the missing route cost the\n      // settings pane. An earlier note warned against \"simplifying\" the variant on the theory that\n      // nothing called it; that warning was right and is moot — the domain workflow it was holding\n      // the door open for exists (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain` below).\n      // Must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY: `.update()` resolves the op via\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL but NOT\n      // REPOSITORY_ONLY — a repository-only UPDATE throws\n      // `RESOURCES_REGISTRY_OPERATION_PATH_NOT_FOUND` (INTERNAL / critical) on any admin\n      // domain edit (and, post lazy-create fix, `loadSSOConfig` always materialises a row,\n      // so `saveSSOConfig` reliably hits THIS update branch). The variant type is read from\n      // `SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE`, which the `socialCredentialOverrides`\n      // write-only-secret-preservation custom-impl (`createSsoConfigUpdateFactories`) reads too, so\n      // they move together — the custom-impl dispatch key encodes variantType, and a drift on either\n      // side silently drops the PREFIX and wipes per-override secrets on every save. Hard-code a\n      // variant type here instead and that lockstep is a comment again.\n      // Same fix as the CREATE above + the SCIM-tokens READ/UPDATE. Admin tier / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE[CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE],\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n      // onParentDelete cascade so this one-per-scope SSO-config row is physically\n      // removed when its owning org/app is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n      // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any scope with a\n      // config row. This deletes the whole row; domain mutation is not currently a\n      // public operation. Admin tier (ORG_ADMIN / APP super-admin) / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      /*\n       * ─── The three domain-ownership doors (#424) ────────────────────────────────────────────\n       *\n       * ## Why the tenant's own admin, and NOT a platform operator\n       *\n       * None of the three declares `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration`, and that is a\n       * decision rather than an omission. A platform operator crossing into a tenant is justified\n       * when the tenant CANNOT act for itself — `organizationMembers.grantOwnership` repairs a\n       * tenant with no owner. Domain ownership is the opposite shape: the party who must prove it\n       * is the party who controls the DNS, and the operator controls neither the DNS nor the\n       * business relationship. A crossing here would let a platform administrator hand one tenant\n       * routing control over every sign-in at a domain, with the tenant's own admins unable to see\n       * why. The ambient reach `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md` forbids is\n       * exactly this.\n       *\n       * ## Why each is UPDATE-like\n       *\n       * All three mutate `domains` on the scope's single config row, so they borrow UPDATE and get\n       * a PUT that carries a body. The domain travels in the BODY, never in the URL: a domain name\n       * is a customer identity, and a GET would write it into every access log between the operator\n       * and the server.\n       *\n       * ## Where the work happens\n       *\n       * Each is implemented as a PREFIX that returns the new `domains` object, which the core\n       * UPDATE persists — the organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE shape. Deliberately NOT `OVERRIDE_ALL`:\n       * that mode returns before the framework's post-operation lane and would therefore emit NO\n       * `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` audit event, which is the one control that makes a\n       * privileged configuration change with cross-tenant reach accountable. See\n       * `sso-config-domain-verification.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`.\n       *\n       * ## What the trail carries\n       *\n       * All three sit at or above `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so no `auditableEvent` declaration\n       * is needed. `domains.verifiedDomains`, `domains.ssoEnabledDomains` and\n       * `domains.domainVerificationStatus` are `.isAuditEvidence()`, so the row carries the\n       * before/after of the claimed set and the status map — i.e. WHICH domain moved, and to what.\n       * `domains.domainVerificationTokens` is not marked and must never be: it is the challenge\n       * nonce, and the ledger it would land in cannot be scrubbed.\n       *\n       * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE — a verified domain decides which\n       * identity provider authenticates every principal at that domain.\n       * assurance-control: WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY — the domain-ownership trail.\n       */\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.CLAIM_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // HIGH, not CRITICAL: a claim grants NOTHING. It records `pending` and mints a nonce, and\n          // every routing reader gates on `verified`. The step that confers authority is VERIFY.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_ClaimDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.VERIFY_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // CRITICAL: this is the transition that hands a tenant SSO routing control over EVERY\n          // person who signs in with an address at the domain — including people who are not that\n          // tenant's members.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_VerifyDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.REVOKE_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // CRITICAL for the same reason as VERIFY, from the other side: revocation is what makes a\n          // domain claimable by a different scope, so it is the hinge of every hand-over.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_RevokeDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n    },\n  },\n);\n"]}
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* SSO Config Resource Configuration — Polymorphic\n *\n * Produces 2 factory functions (ORG + APP) via the polymorphic factory.\n * Spread into the registry factory map:\n *   ...ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation, CoreResourceType } from '../../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport {\n  ResourceOperationRiskLevel,\n  ResourceOperationVariantType,\n} from '../../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CORE_ORG_ROLES, CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { DomainVerificationStatus, ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration } from './sso-config.shared.schemas';\n\n// ── Domain-ownership operations ──────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// Enterprise domain routing sends every `@customer.com` sign-in to that customer's identity\n// provider. Reaching the VERIFIED state used to require an out-of-band database write, which made\n// enterprise onboarding a support ticket forever (#424). These three operations are the door.\n//\n// They are entity-level operations on a resource that is a ONE-to-ONE COMPOSITION under its scope,\n// so the URL builder omits the id segment and the scope in the path selects the row:\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/claim-domain\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/verify-domain\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/revoke-domain\n\nexport enum SsoConfig_Operations {\n  CLAIM_DOMAIN = 'claimDomain',\n  VERIFY_DOMAIN = 'verifyDomain',\n  REVOKE_DOMAIN = 'revokeDomain',\n}\n\n/**\n * A DNS hostname, syntactically. Two labels minimum — a single label is not a domain anyone can\n * publish a TXT record under, and accepting one would mint a challenge that can never be answered.\n *\n * Case is NOT normalised here. The backend lowercases before every read and every write, because\n * that is where the stored map keys are decided; doing it in two places would make the request\n * contract look like the authority when it is not.\n */\nconst SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN = /^(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-)(\\.(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-))+$/;\n\nconst SsoConfig_DomainSelector = z.string()\n  .min(4)\n  .max(253)\n  .regex(SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN, 'Provide a DNS hostname with at least two labels, e.g. \"customer.com\".')\n  .describe(\"The email domain, as a DNS hostname with at least two labels, such as `customer.com`.\");\n\n/*\n * ── `z.object`, NOT `z.strictObject` — and that is a CONTRACT, not a relaxation ────────────────\n *\n * These three shipped as `strictObject` and every claim answered **400 `unrecognized_keys:\n * [\"domains\"]`**, measured over HTTP on 2026-09-09. The framework MERGES a PREFIX hook's returned\n * patch into the request payload and re-parses the result against THIS schema — so the `domains`\n * block the planner just computed arrived at a schema that knows only `domain`, and a strict schema\n * refuses what it does not recognise. A prefix that contributes a persisted field is therefore\n * structurally incompatible with a strict request DTO; every sibling lifecycle verb in the engine\n * (`organizations.requestDeletion`, `activate`, `restore`) uses `z.object` for exactly this reason.\n *\n * `z.object` STRIPS the unrecognised key instead of refusing it, which on its own would turn the\n * 400 into the quieter defect — 200 having persisted nothing. What closes that half is\n * `authoritativeFields: ['domains']` on each custom-implementation registration, which re-attaches\n * the hook's value after the strip and makes a caller-supplied `domains` be overwritten rather than\n * honoured. The two halves are one decision; neither works alone.\n */\nexport const SsoConfig_ClaimDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_VerifyDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\n/**\n * The claim response is the ONLY disclosure of the challenge nonce.\n *\n * `domainVerificationTokens` is `.isBackendOnly()`, so no READ of the config ever returns it — an\n * operator who loses this response claims again, which mints a new nonce and invalidates the old\n * one. `.isEphemeral()` marks `dnsRecordValue` as a revealed-once secret, the same contract the\n * SCIM token mint uses for its one-time plaintext.\n */\nexport const SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string().describe(\"The domain that was claimed.\"),\n  status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus).describe(\"The domain's verification status after the claim: `pending` until the DNS record is checked.\"),\n  /** The DNS name the TXT record goes on: `_wildo-verification.<domain>`. */\n  dnsName: z.string().describe(\"Where to publish the TXT record: `_wildo-verification.<domain>`.\"),\n  /** The exact TXT value to publish. Revealed once. */\n  dnsRecordValue: z.string().isEphemeral().describe(\"The exact TXT value to publish, returned only in this response. Claiming the domain again issues a new value and invalidates this one.\"),\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string().describe(\"The domain that was checked.\"),\n  status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus).describe(\"The result of this check: `verified` when a TXT record at `dnsName` matched the claim's value, otherwise `failed`.\"),\n  dnsName: z.string().describe(\"The DNS name that was queried for the TXT record.\"),\n  /**\n   * Every TXT record found at `dnsName`, so a failed check is diagnosable without a second tool.\n   * These are public DNS records of a domain the caller is claiming to own — echoing them discloses\n   * nothing the caller could not resolve themselves.\n   */\n  dnsRecordsFound: z.array(z.string()).describe(\"Every TXT record found at `dnsName`, so a failed check can be diagnosed.\"),\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string().describe(\"The domain whose claim was removed.\"),\n  /** True once the domain holds no claim, no status and no nonce in this scope. */\n  revoked: z.boolean().describe(\"`true` once the domain holds no claim, verification status or pending value in this scope.\"),\n});\n\nexport type SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto>;\nexport type SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto>;\nexport type SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto>;\n\n/**\n * The variant type the SSO-config UPDATE runs on — the one named source read by this configuration and\n * by the `socialCredentialOverrides` secret-preservation custom-impl registered on that write.\n *\n * A custom implementation is keyed by `(resource, operation, variantType)`, so the two restating the\n * value by hand is the drift this removes: the dispatch silently stops finding the PREFIX, and every\n * save wipes the per-override `clientSecret` and signedJwt ids. Same shape, and the same reason, as\n * `SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE` (#953).\n *\n * `UPDATE` is `API_CALL`: the administrator's edit door. It was `INTERNAL_CALL` — route-less — which\n * made an SSO policy something only a backend service could change, and the comment there said only\n * that no public surface had been BUILT, never that one would be wrong. Three public PUTs already\n * mutate this row (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain`, #424) under the same roles, and\n * SIEM export config — a scope-level security record holding sealed credentials — has carried this\n * door since #953. Field-level protection is variant-agnostic: `.isWriteOnlySecret()` and\n * `.isBackendOnly()` hold identically on either path.\n *\n * The route-less state was not merely a missing feature. `pickInlineFieldWriteOperation`'s pins record\n * what it cost: with no addressable literal `update`, the frontend's update resolution fell through to\n * whatever custom verb borrowed UPDATE semantics, so every writable field on the SSO settings pane\n * rendered as a live control bound to `claimDomain`.\n */\nexport const SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE: Readonly<{\n  // Exact members, not the enum: a variant is a union DISCRIMINATED by `variantType`, so a value typed\n  // as the whole enum matches no member of it.\n  [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL;\n}> = {\n  [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n};\n\n// ── Polymorphic Factory ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations(\n  ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration,\n  {\n    isSystemResource: true,\n    customOperation: SsoConfig_Operations,\n    // The auth runtime loads the org SSO config via `readAsSystem` during login,\n    // before the user's roles/membership are established (READ). When the row is\n    // absent — a provisioned / migrated / pre-seed org that bypassed the\n    // `afterCreate` default-seed — that same userless login path lazily\n    // materialises the disabled-default row via `createAsSystem` (CREATE); see\n    // `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.loadSSOConfig`. Both are system-context\n    // (the logging-in user is not the config's admin owner), so the resource opts\n    // BOTH verbs in.\n    //\n    // `list` is the DOMAIN-EXCLUSIVITY probe and nothing else (#424). At most one scope may hold a\n    // domain VERIFIED, or a `@customer.com` sign-in routes non-deterministically to whichever\n    // config the lookup happens to reach first. Answering \"does another scope already hold this\n    // domain\" is unavoidably a cross-scope read, and the two candidates that avoid this grant are\n    // both worse:\n    //   - `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.getAllOrganizationIds()` enumerates an IN-MEMORY\n    //     CACHE of scopes whose config has been loaded, so it under-reports on a cold process. An\n    //     exclusivity check built on it answers \"nobody else holds it\" from an incomplete\n    //     population — the negative-result failure that produces a confident wrong answer;\n    //   - reaching the repository directly bypasses the `systemAccessPolicy` opt-in AND the\n    //     `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_*` audit event, which is a bigger grant wearing a smaller name.\n    systemAccessPolicy: {\n      read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n      create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n      list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    },\n    coreOperations: [CoreResourceOperation.READ, CoreResourceOperation.LIST, CoreResourceOperation.CREATE, CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE, CoreResourceOperation.DELETE],\n    operationsConfiguration: {\n      [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (INTERNAL_CALL, NO HTTP route): the per-scope config row is\n      // materialised by the framework default-seed (repository tier) OR — when that\n      // was bypassed (provisioned / migrated / pre-seed org) — lazily by the\n      // userless login path via `createAsSystem` (`systemAccessPolicy.create` opts\n      // it in). Must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY: `createAsSystem` resolves CREATE via\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL but\n      // NOT REPOSITORY_ONLY — a repository-only CREATE throws\n      // `RESOURCES_REGISTRY_OPERATION_PATH_NOT_FOUND` (INTERNAL / critical, and\n      // self-alerting on mere construction) on every login for a config-less org.\n      // No public HTTP create surface (config is seeded/bootstrapped, never\n      // self-serve). Same fix as the SCIM-tokens READ/UPDATE. Admin tier / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (INTERNAL_CALL, NO HTTP route): the ONE caller is the domain-exclusivity\n      // probe described on `systemAccessPolicy.list` above, reached through\n      // `SystemAccessService.listAsSystem`. It must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY for the same reason the\n      // CREATE and UPDATE below are not: `listAsSystem` resolves the verb through\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL and rejects\n      // REPOSITORY_ONLY. There is deliberately no API_CALL variant — one tenant enumerating every\n      // other tenant's SSO policy is the opposite of what this resource is for, and the probe that\n      // needs the enumeration answers a single yes/no question and returns no row to a caller.\n      //\n      // Admin tier / MEDIUM — and MEDIUM rather than HIGH is a correction, not a downgrade. This\n      // shipped at HIGH and was the FIRST read-shaped HIGH operation in the catalogue, which broke\n      // the measurement `resource-operation-audit-emission.backend.test.ts` calls \"the one the whole\n      // design rests on\": `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` is deliberately not emitted for a read, and\n      // `FIELD_ACCESS` fires only on a disclosed marked field — so a read declared inside\n      // `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR` promises evidence that CANNOT exist on either axis, and the\n      // most dangerous read in the catalogue would be the one leaving no trace.\n      //\n      // The crossing is nonetheless recorded, on the axis that can carry it: the probe reaches this\n      // verb through `SystemAccessService.listAsSystem`, which emits its own `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_*`\n      // event — that is precisely why the comment on `systemAccessPolicy.list` above refuses the\n      // repository shortcut. So the declaration moves to where the evidence actually is instead of\n      // claiming a row nothing writes.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        }],\n      },\n      // The administrator's edit door, and the only write path for this policy row. Two kinds of\n      // caller reach it and both resolve the SAME default: an admin editing the settings pane, over\n      // the HTTP route this variant now carries; and a backend caller holding no operation —\n      // `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.saveSSOConfig`, `initiateDomainVerification`,\n      // `verifyDomainOwnership` — dispatching via `ServicesRegistryHandler.update` with the ADMIN's\n      // EC, preserving admin audit attribution. `getServiceOperationPathDefault` honours API_CALL\n      // exactly as it honoured INTERNAL_CALL, so nothing on the service path changes.\n      //\n      // It WAS `INTERNAL_CALL` — route-less — and the comment here recorded only that no public\n      // surface had been built, never an argument that one would be wrong. See\n      // `SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE` for why it moved, and for what the missing route cost the\n      // settings pane. An earlier note warned against \"simplifying\" the variant on the theory that\n      // nothing called it; that warning was right and is moot — the domain workflow it was holding\n      // the door open for exists (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain` below).\n      // Must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY: `.update()` resolves the op via\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL but NOT\n      // REPOSITORY_ONLY — a repository-only UPDATE throws\n      // `RESOURCES_REGISTRY_OPERATION_PATH_NOT_FOUND` (INTERNAL / critical) on any admin\n      // domain edit (and, post lazy-create fix, `loadSSOConfig` always materialises a row,\n      // so `saveSSOConfig` reliably hits THIS update branch). The variant type is read from\n      // `SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE`, which the `socialCredentialOverrides`\n      // write-only-secret-preservation custom-impl (`createSsoConfigUpdateFactories`) reads too, so\n      // they move together — the custom-impl dispatch key encodes variantType, and a drift on either\n      // side silently drops the PREFIX and wipes per-override secrets on every save. Hard-code a\n      // variant type here instead and that lockstep is a comment again.\n      // Same fix as the CREATE above + the SCIM-tokens READ/UPDATE. Admin tier / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE[CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE],\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n      // onParentDelete cascade so this one-per-scope SSO-config row is physically\n      // removed when its owning org/app is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n      // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any scope with a\n      // config row. This deletes the whole row; domain mutation is not currently a\n      // public operation. Admin tier (ORG_ADMIN / APP super-admin) / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      /*\n       * ─── The three domain-ownership doors (#424) ────────────────────────────────────────────\n       *\n       * ## Why the tenant's own admin, and NOT a platform operator\n       *\n       * None of the three declares `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration`, and that is a\n       * decision rather than an omission. A platform operator crossing into a tenant is justified\n       * when the tenant CANNOT act for itself — `organizationMembers.grantOwnership` repairs a\n       * tenant with no owner. Domain ownership is the opposite shape: the party who must prove it\n       * is the party who controls the DNS, and the operator controls neither the DNS nor the\n       * business relationship. A crossing here would let a platform administrator hand one tenant\n       * routing control over every sign-in at a domain, with the tenant's own admins unable to see\n       * why. The ambient reach `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md` forbids is\n       * exactly this.\n       *\n       * ## Why each is UPDATE-like\n       *\n       * All three mutate `domains` on the scope's single config row, so they borrow UPDATE and get\n       * a PUT that carries a body. The domain travels in the BODY, never in the URL: a domain name\n       * is a customer identity, and a GET would write it into every access log between the operator\n       * and the server.\n       *\n       * ## Where the work happens\n       *\n       * Each is implemented as a PREFIX that returns the new `domains` object, which the core\n       * UPDATE persists — the organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE shape. Deliberately NOT `OVERRIDE_ALL`:\n       * that mode returns before the framework's post-operation lane and would therefore emit NO\n       * `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` audit event, which is the one control that makes a\n       * privileged configuration change with cross-tenant reach accountable. See\n       * `sso-config-domain-verification.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`.\n       *\n       * ## What the trail carries\n       *\n       * All three sit at or above `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so no `auditableEvent` declaration\n       * is needed. `domains.verifiedDomains`, `domains.ssoEnabledDomains` and\n       * `domains.domainVerificationStatus` are `.isAuditEvidence()`, so the row carries the\n       * before/after of the claimed set and the status map — i.e. WHICH domain moved, and to what.\n       * `domains.domainVerificationTokens` is not marked and must never be: it is the challenge\n       * nonce, and the ledger it would land in cannot be scrubbed.\n       *\n       * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE — a verified domain decides which\n       * identity provider authenticates every principal at that domain.\n       * assurance-control: WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY — the domain-ownership trail.\n       */\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.CLAIM_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // HIGH, not CRITICAL: a claim grants NOTHING. It records `pending` and mints a nonce, and\n          // every routing reader gates on `verified`. The step that confers authority is VERIFY.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_ClaimDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.VERIFY_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // CRITICAL: this is the transition that hands a tenant SSO routing control over EVERY\n          // person who signs in with an address at the domain — including people who are not that\n          // tenant's members.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_VerifyDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.REVOKE_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // CRITICAL for the same reason as VERIFY, from the other side: revocation is what makes a\n          // domain claimable by a different scope, so it is the hinge of every hand-over.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_RevokeDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n    },\n  },\n);\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.schemas.js

@@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
     // accounts and exclude THAT from policies. The reading that a role is the wrong unit is this
     // repository's, not a quotation.
     enforcement: z.object({
-        requireSSO: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField(),
-        allowPasswordFallback: z.boolean().default(true),
-        graceLoginAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(10).default(3),
-    }).isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),
+        requireSSO: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField().describe("Whether members whose email domain is SSO-enabled must sign in through single sign-on."),
+        allowPasswordFallback: z.boolean().default(true).describe("While SSO is required, whether a password sign-in is still accepted within the grace allowance. `false` refuses every password sign-in except a break-glass account's."),
+        graceLoginAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(10).default(3).describe("How many password sign-ins each member may still make after SSO becomes required, from 0 to 10. 0 allows none."),
+    }).isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence().describe("Whether and how strictly single sign-on is required."),
     // NOT marked, deliberately: this block carries `domainVerificationTokens`, which is
     // `.isBackendOnly()` — a SECRET. `.isAuditEvidence()` on a parent object records the WHOLE object
     // before/after, so marking `domains` would copy live verification tokens into audit rows that
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
          * is a schema change plus a data migration for a field whose every reader now goes through the
          * helper. The name is no longer what a new reader reaches.
          */
-        verifiedDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),
-        ssoEnabledDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),
+        verifiedDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence().describe("Every domain this scope has claimed, verified or not. Whether a domain is verified is `domainVerificationStatus`, not membership of this list."),
+        ssoEnabledDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence().describe("The verified domains whose members are routed to this scope's identity provider at sign-in."),
         /*
          * `domainHinting` and `allowExternalDomains` were REMOVED here, and both were read by nothing.
          *
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
          * distinguish "a tenant claimed a domain" from "a tenant gained SSO routing control over every
          * address at it".
          */
-        domainVerificationStatus: z.record(z.string(), z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus)).default({}).isAuditEvidence(),
+        domainVerificationStatus: z.record(z.string(), z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus)).default({}).isAuditEvidence().describe("The verification status of each claimed domain, keyed by domain."),
         /**
          * The DNS-TXT challenge nonce per claimed domain. `.isBackendOnly()` — never leaves the backend
          * through a resource READ, and never enters the audit trail (see the block comment above).
@@ -122,8 +122,9 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
          * as an `.isEphemeral()` field, because the operator cannot publish a record they cannot see.
          * A lost token is recovered by claiming again, which mints a new one — there is no re-read.
          */
-        domainVerificationTokens: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).default({}).isBackendOnly(),
-    }),
+        domainVerificationTokens: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).default({}).isBackendOnly()
+            .describe('The DNS TXT challenge value for each claimed domain, keyed by domain. Never returned by a read: the value is shown once, in the claim response, and claiming again issues a new one. An update keeps the stored values whatever it sends.'),
+    }).describe("The domains this scope has claimed and verified, and which of them use single sign-on. Changed only by the claim, verify and revoke domain operations: an update may repeat it unchanged, and any other change is refused."),
     /*
      * `provisioning` was REMOVED here, and the reason is that it decided NOTHING.
      *
@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
      * ## What actually decides, and why there are two of them rather than three
      *
      * Just-in-time provisioning on an INTERACTIVE sign-in reads the CONNECTION, not this row:
-     * `SsoConnectionSchema.{autoCreateUsers, autoVerifyEmail, defaultRole, roleMapping, groupMapping}`,
+     * `SsoConnectionSchema.{autoCreateUsers, defaultRole, roleMapping, groupMapping}`,
      * assembled once per connection by `oauth2-connection-resolver` and `saml-authentication` and
      * carried into `provisionEnterpriseUser`. Per connection is the right grain — two IdPs bound to
      * one tenant may legitimately differ.
@@ -184,8 +185,8 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
      *   an operator could set two different limits and neither the lower nor the later would win.
      */
     sessionSettings: z.object({
-        singleLogoutEnabled: z.boolean().default(true),
-    }).isAuditEvidence(),
+        singleLogoutEnabled: z.boolean().default(true).describe("Whether signing out through the identity provider also ends the session here, and the reverse. `false` withholds the logout endpoint from the service-provider metadata."),
+    }).isAuditEvidence().describe("Session behaviour for single sign-on."),
     /*
      * `auditConfig` was REMOVED here — all five fields, and the assurance marker that stood over them.
      *
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
      */
     emergencyAccess: z.object({
         /** Off switch. `true` with an empty list grants nothing — the list is what confers the bypass. */
-        enabled: z.boolean().default(true),
+        enabled: z.boolean().default(true).describe("Whether the break-glass accounts may use their bypass. Enabled with an empty list grants nothing."),
         /**
          * The email addresses that may bypass SSO enforcement. An authority LIST: adding an entry grants
          * a standing password path into a tenant that has otherwise required SSO.
@@ -258,13 +259,13 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
          * stored apart from any individual, and a validation drill every 90 days; none of that is
          * enforceable from here, and all of it is what makes this list safe to have.
          */
-        breakGlassAccounts: z.array(z.email()).default([]),
-    }).isAuditEvidence(),
+        breakGlassAccounts: z.array(z.email()).default([]).describe("The email addresses that may still sign in with a password when SSO is required, for when the identity provider cannot be reached. Each one is a standing way in with a password alone, so keep the list short and review it; every use is audited at critical severity."),
+    }).isAuditEvidence().describe("Break-glass: named accounts exempt from the SSO requirement."),
     oauth2ProviderRestrictions: z.object({
-        allowedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]),
-        blockedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]),
-        requireEnterpriseSSOOnly: z.boolean().default(false),
-    }).isAuditEvidence(),
+        allowedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]).describe("When not empty, the only social sign-in providers members may use."),
+        blockedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]).describe("Social sign-in providers members may not use. This wins over `allowedProviders`."),
+        requireEnterpriseSSOOnly: z.boolean().default(false).describe("Whether every social sign-in provider is refused, leaving only enterprise single sign-on."),
+    }).isAuditEvidence().describe("Which social sign-in providers (Google, GitHub and so on) this scope's members may use."),
     /**
      * Per-scope social provider credential overrides (P3).
      *
@@ -299,12 +300,14 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
      * @see sso-config.custom-impl — prefixCoreOperations UPDATE handler
      */
     socialCredentialOverrides: z.array(z.object({
-        providerRef: z.string().min(1),
-        clientId: z.string().min(1),
-        clientSecret: z.string().min(1).isWriteOnlySecret(),
-        signedJwtKeyId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly(),
-        signedJwtTeamId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly(),
-    })).default([]).refine((arr) => new Set(arr.map(o => o.providerRef)).size === arr.length, { message: 'Duplicate providerRef in socialCredentialOverrides' }),
+        providerRef: z.string().min(1).describe("The social provider these credentials are for. Each provider may appear once."),
+        clientId: z.string().min(1).describe("The client id of this scope's own app registered at the provider."),
+        clientSecret: z.string().min(1).isWriteOnlySecret().describe("The client secret of that app. Write-only: reads return a mask, and sending the mask back keeps the stored value."),
+        signedJwtKeyId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly()
+            .describe('For a provider whose client secret is a signed JWT, such as Sign in with Apple: the id of the private key that signs it. Write-only: never returned by a read, and kept when an update omits it. Absent: the application\'s own value is used.'),
+        signedJwtTeamId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly()
+            .describe('For a provider whose client secret is a signed JWT, such as Sign in with Apple: the developer team id that owns the signing key. Write-only: never returned by a read, and kept when an update omits it. Absent: the application\'s own value is used.'),
+    })).default([]).refine((arr) => new Set(arr.map(o => o.providerRef)).size === arr.length, { message: 'Duplicate providerRef in socialCredentialOverrides' }).describe("This scope's own OAuth app credentials for social providers, replacing the application's. Endpoints, scopes and profile mapping still come from the provider."),
     createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
     updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
 });