@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.3 → 1.1.5

package/dist/esm/external-providers/frontend-provider-public-config.shared.js

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/**
+ * How an APPLICATION supplies a frontend provider's public configuration — the
+ * keys a picker needs that only the application can know (a Drive `appId`, a
+ * OneDrive `clientId`) — and the two guards that keep that channel from
+ * carrying anything else.
+ *
+ * ## The gap this closes
+ *
+ * A frontend provider's `publicConfig` was HARD-CODED on the engine's provider
+ * module and projected verbatim onto the wire. The only way to set a picker's
+ * `appId` was to edit engine code. The backend never had that problem: an
+ * application authors `providerConfigurations[providerRef][protocolKind]` in
+ * `wildo.saas.config.ts`, and SSO's public OAuth client id already travels that
+ * way, keyed by the protocol (`sso_oauth2`).
+ *
+ * This file gives the frontend the same channel, keyed by the same vocabulary:
+ * `providerConfigurations[providerRef][frontend_sdk]`. One authority for
+ * "what an application configured for this provider", read by both sides.
+ *
+ * ## Two guards, because `publicConfig` is served to every browser
+ *
+ * 1. **Only DECLARED keys cross.** A provider module declares the keys it reads
+ *    (`publicConfigSchema` — see `defineFrontendPublicConfigSchema` below, which
+ *    is what makes those keys READABLE without running the schema). A key the
+ *    module never declared is refused with the provider and key named, at the
+ *    two places the overlay runs: `wildo config sync` and the backend's
+ *    fallback projection. A misspelled `apiId` therefore fails where it was
+ *    typed, instead of silently contributing nothing and leaving a picker that
+ *    reports "no appId" at the moment a user opens it.
+ *
+ * 2. **A secret never crosses.** A frontend provider owns no secrets by
+ *    construction (`secretsContractShape: []`), so the only way one reaches a
+ *    browser is an author typing the BACKEND module's secret into the frontend
+ *    bag. The overlay refuses any key whose name matches a slug or an
+ *    environment-variable name from the same vendor's backend secrets
+ *    contract — `GOOGLE_OAUTH2_CLIENT_SECRET` cannot be typed into the bag that
+ *    every visitor downloads.
+ *
+ * Both guards are decisions about NAMES, so they run wherever the names are
+ * known and need no schema execution. Value VALIDATION (is `appId` a string?)
+ * is the schema's job and runs where the schema is: at hydration (FE-8) and, on
+ * the backend fallback, before serving.
+ *
+ * ## Why the overlay is a pure function in this package
+ *
+ * It has THREE call sites that must agree — the companion walk in
+ * `platform-config-lib`, the backend fallback in `saas-backend-lib`, and any
+ * future producer of a `FrontendProviderEntry` — and #380 already paid once for
+ * a projection that landed on one site and not another. A function both import
+ * cannot be applied differently by each.
+ */
+/**
+ * The key under `providerConfigurations[providerRef]` an application uses to
+ * supply a frontend provider's public configuration.
+ *
+ * The protocol kind's WIRE value, exactly as SSO's channel is keyed by ITS
+ * protocol kind (`sso_oauth2`): the bag is per-provider, per-protocol, and a
+ * frontend module speaks `FRONTEND_SDK`.
+ *
+ * The owning source is `ExternalProvider_ExchangeProtocol_Kind.FRONTEND_SDK` in
+ * `@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models`, and this literal is pinned to it by
+ * `__tests__/frontend-provider-public-config.shared.test.ts`. It is written out
+ * rather than imported because this file is in the
+ * `@wildo-ai/saas-models/public-runtime` closure, which K-3 forbids from
+ * importing that package — an import it carried from #394 P3 until #607 put the
+ * whole external-connectors model tree into every browser provider bundle.
+ * `BUILTIN_PROVIDER_PROTOCOL` is the same arrangement for the same boundary.
+ */
+// semantic-literal-boundary: browser-safe wire value of ExternalProvider_ExchangeProtocol_Kind.FRONTEND_SDK, pinned by test (#607)
+export const FRONTEND_PROVIDER_PUBLIC_CONFIG_KEY = 'frontend_sdk';
+/** Why an application-supplied public-config bag was refused. */
+export var FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal;
+(function (FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal) {
+    /** A key the provider module does not declare — almost always a misspelling. */
+    FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal["UNDECLARED_KEY"] = "UNDECLARED_KEY";
+    /** A key naming a secret from the same vendor's backend contract. Never negotiable. */
+    FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal["SECRET_KEY"] = "SECRET_KEY";
+    /** The supplied bag is not a plain object — a string, an array, `null`. */
+    FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal["NOT_AN_OBJECT"] = "NOT_AN_OBJECT";
+})(FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal || (FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal = {}));
+export class FrontendProviderPublicConfigError extends Error {
+    providerRef;
+    refusal;
+    keys;
+    constructor(providerRef, refusal, keys, message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.providerRef = providerRef;
+        this.refusal = refusal;
+        this.keys = keys;
+        this.name = 'FrontendProviderPublicConfigError';
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Merges what the application supplied over what the module authored, refusing
+ * the two classes of key that must never reach a browser.
+ *
+ * Supplied values WIN over authored ones for the same key: the module's value is
+ * a default, and an application that names a key means it. Absent `supplied`
+ * returns the authored bag untouched — an application that configured nothing
+ * is the ordinary case, not a refusal.
+ */
+export function overlayFrontendProviderPublicConfig(input) {
+    const { providerRef, authored, supplied, declaredKeys, forbiddenKeys } = input;
+    if (supplied === undefined)
+        return authored;
+    if (typeof supplied !== 'object' || supplied === null || Array.isArray(supplied)) {
+        throw new FrontendProviderPublicConfigError(providerRef, FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal.NOT_AN_OBJECT, [], `providerConfigurations.${providerRef}.${FRONTEND_PROVIDER_PUBLIC_CONFIG_KEY} must be an object of public `
+            + `keys, got ${Array.isArray(supplied) ? 'an array' : typeof supplied}.`);
+    }
+    const suppliedKeys = Object.keys(supplied);
+    // Guard 2 runs FIRST and unconditionally: a secret is refused even when the
+    // module has no introspectable schema, because that is not the module's call.
+    const secretKeys = suppliedKeys.filter((key) => forbiddenKeys.has(key));
+    if (secretKeys.length > 0) {
+        throw new FrontendProviderPublicConfigError(providerRef, FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal.SECRET_KEY, secretKeys, `providerConfigurations.${providerRef}.${FRONTEND_PROVIDER_PUBLIC_CONFIG_KEY} names ${secretKeys.map((key) => `"${key}"`).join(', ')}, `
+            + `which is a SECRET of the "${providerRef}" backend provider. A frontend provider's public configuration is `
+            + 'served to every browser; a secret belongs in the deployment environment under its `envVarName`, and '
+            + 'nowhere else.');
+    }
+    if (declaredKeys !== undefined) {
+        const declared = new Set(declaredKeys);
+        const undeclared = suppliedKeys.filter((key) => !declared.has(key));
+        if (undeclared.length > 0) {
+            throw new FrontendProviderPublicConfigError(providerRef, FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal.UNDECLARED_KEY, undeclared, `providerConfigurations.${providerRef}.${FRONTEND_PROVIDER_PUBLIC_CONFIG_KEY} names ${undeclared.map((key) => `"${key}"`).join(', ')}, `
+                + `which the "${providerRef}" frontend provider does not declare. It declares: `
+                + `${declaredKeys.length > 0 ? declaredKeys.map((key) => `"${key}"`).join(', ') : '(nothing)'}. `
+                + 'A key the provider never reads would be served to every browser and used by nothing.');
+        }
+    }
+    return { ...(authored ?? {}), ...supplied };
+}
+/**
+ * The value kinds a public-config key may declare. Scalars only, on purpose: a
+ * public key is an identifier or a flag, and a structured value here is a
+ * design smell — a provider that needs one has a capability-level shape
+ * (`FrontendFilePickerPublicConfigSchema`) to declare it in.
+ */
+export var FrontendPublicConfigValueKind;
+(function (FrontendPublicConfigValueKind) {
+    FrontendPublicConfigValueKind["STRING"] = "string";
+    FrontendPublicConfigValueKind["NUMBER"] = "number";
+    FrontendPublicConfigValueKind["BOOLEAN"] = "boolean";
+})(FrontendPublicConfigValueKind || (FrontendPublicConfigValueKind = {}));
+/**
+ * Declares a frontend provider's public-config keys ONCE and gets both halves:
+ * a strict Standard Schema v1 validator (the CODE half hydration runs) and the
+ * key list (the DATA half the companion walk reads).
+ *
+ * Dependency-free by design. It lives here because the engine's provider modules
+ * live in `@wildo-ai/external-connectors-public`, whose bare-specifier allow-list
+ * holds exactly one entry — this package's `/public-runtime` — so those modules
+ * can declare a schema without that package growing a validation library. An
+ * application module may still use Zod (a Zod object satisfies Standard Schema
+ * and its `shape` keys are read the same way).
+ *
+ * Strict: an unknown key is an issue, never ignored. Silently ignoring is the
+ * defect FE-8 closed — a renamed key yielding `undefined` and a picker that
+ * accepts more than it should with no error anywhere.
+ */
+export function defineFrontendPublicConfigSchema(keys) {
+    const declaredKeys = Object.freeze(Object.keys(keys));
+    return {
+        declaredKeys,
+        '~standard': {
+            version: 1,
+            vendor: 'wildo',
+            validate(value) {
+                if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) {
+                    return { issues: [{ message: 'public configuration must be an object' }] };
+                }
+                const record = value;
+                const issues = [];
+                for (const key of Object.keys(record)) {
+                    if (!(key in keys))
+                        issues.push({ message: 'unknown key', path: [key] });
+                }
+                for (const [key, spec] of Object.entries(keys)) {
+                    const present = record[key];
+                    if (present === undefined) {
+                        if (spec.required === true)
+                            issues.push({ message: 'required', path: [key] });
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    if (typeof present !== spec.kind) {
+                        issues.push({ message: `expected a ${spec.kind}, got ${typeof present}`, path: [key] });
+                    }
+                }
+                return issues.length > 0 ? { issues } : { value: record };
+            },
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Reads the declared keys off a provider's `publicConfigSchema`, whatever
+ * library produced it.
+ *
+ * Two shapes are recognised, and the order matters: a schema built by
+ * `defineFrontendPublicConfigSchema` states its keys outright; a Zod object
+ * exposes them as `shape`. Anything else — a hand-written Standard Schema, a
+ * library without introspection — yields `undefined`, which the overlay reads
+ * as "cannot enforce here" rather than as "declares nothing". That distinction
+ * is load-bearing: an empty list refuses EVERY supplied key.
+ */
+export function readDeclaredPublicConfigKeys(schema) {
+    if (typeof schema !== 'object' || schema === null)
+        return undefined;
+    const candidate = schema;
+    if (Array.isArray(candidate.declaredKeys) && candidate.declaredKeys.every((key) => typeof key === 'string')) {
+        return candidate.declaredKeys;
+    }
+    if (typeof candidate.shape === 'object' && candidate.shape !== null) {
+        return Object.keys(candidate.shape);
+    }
+    return undefined;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=frontend-provider-public-config.shared.js.map

package/dist/esm/external-providers/frontend-provider-public-config.shared.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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The gap this closes\n *\n * A frontend provider's `publicConfig` was HARD-CODED on the engine's provider\n * module and projected verbatim onto the wire. The only way to set a picker's\n * `appId` was to edit engine code. The backend never had that problem: an\n * application authors `providerConfigurations[providerRef][protocolKind]` in\n * `wildo.saas.config.ts`, and SSO's public OAuth client id already travels that\n * way, keyed by the protocol (`sso_oauth2`).\n *\n * This file gives the frontend the same channel, keyed by the same vocabulary:\n * `providerConfigurations[providerRef][frontend_sdk]`. One authority for\n * \"what an application configured for this provider\", read by both sides.\n *\n * ## Two guards, because `publicConfig` is served to every browser\n *\n * 1. **Only DECLARED keys cross.** A provider module declares the keys it reads\n *    (`publicConfigSchema` — see `defineFrontendPublicConfigSchema` below, which\n *    is what makes those keys READABLE without running the schema). A key the\n *    module never declared is refused with the provider and key named, at the\n *    two places the overlay runs: `wildo config sync` and the backend's\n *    fallback projection. A misspelled `apiId` therefore fails where it was\n *    typed, instead of silently contributing nothing and leaving a picker that\n *    reports \"no appId\" at the moment a user opens it.\n *\n * 2. **A secret never crosses.** A frontend provider owns no secrets by\n *    construction (`secretsContractShape: []`), so the only way one reaches a\n *    browser is an author typing the BACKEND module's secret into the frontend\n *    bag. The overlay refuses any key whose name matches a slug or an\n *    environment-variable name from the same vendor's backend secrets\n *    contract — `GOOGLE_OAUTH2_CLIENT_SECRET` cannot be typed into the bag that\n *    every visitor downloads.\n *\n * Both guards are decisions about NAMES, so they run wherever the names are\n * known and need no schema execution. Value VALIDATION (is `appId` a string?)\n * is the schema's job and runs where the schema is: at hydration (FE-8) and, on\n * the backend fallback, before serving.\n *\n * ## Why the overlay is a pure function in this package\n *\n * It has THREE call sites that must agree — the companion walk in\n * `platform-config-lib`, the backend fallback in `saas-backend-lib`, and any\n * future producer of a `FrontendProviderEntry` — and #380 already paid once for\n * a projection that landed on one site and not another. A function both import\n * cannot be applied differently by each.\n */\n\n/**\n * The key under `providerConfigurations[providerRef]` an application uses to\n * supply a frontend provider's public configuration.\n *\n * The protocol kind's WIRE value, exactly as SSO's channel is keyed by ITS\n * protocol kind (`sso_oauth2`): the bag is per-provider, per-protocol, and a\n * frontend module speaks `FRONTEND_SDK`.\n *\n * The owning source is `ExternalProvider_ExchangeProtocol_Kind.FRONTEND_SDK` in\n * `@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models`, and this literal is pinned to it by\n * `__tests__/frontend-provider-public-config.shared.test.ts`. It is written out\n * rather than imported because this file is in the\n * `@wildo-ai/saas-models/public-runtime` closure, which K-3 forbids from\n * importing that package — an import it carried from #394 P3 until #607 put the\n * whole external-connectors model tree into every browser provider bundle.\n * `BUILTIN_PROVIDER_PROTOCOL` is the same arrangement for the same boundary.\n */\n// semantic-literal-boundary: browser-safe wire value of ExternalProvider_ExchangeProtocol_Kind.FRONTEND_SDK, pinned by test (#607)\nexport const FRONTEND_PROVIDER_PUBLIC_CONFIG_KEY: string = 'frontend_sdk';\n\n/** Why an application-supplied public-config bag was refused. */\nexport enum FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal {\n  /** A key the provider module does not declare — almost always a misspelling. */\n  UNDECLARED_KEY = 'UNDECLARED_KEY',\n  /** A key naming a secret from the same vendor's backend contract. Never negotiable. */\n  SECRET_KEY = 'SECRET_KEY',\n  /** The supplied bag is not a plain object — a string, an array, `null`. */\n  NOT_AN_OBJECT = 'NOT_AN_OBJECT',\n}\n\nexport class FrontendProviderPublicConfigError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    readonly providerRef: string,\n    readonly refusal: FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal,\n    readonly keys: readonly string[],\n    message: string,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'FrontendProviderPublicConfigError';\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface OverlayFrontendProviderPublicConfigInput {\n  readonly providerRef: string;\n  /** What the provider module authored — its own defaults, e.g. `{ authProviderRef: 'google' }`. */\n  readonly authored: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined;\n  /** What the application supplied under `providerConfigurations[providerRef][frontend_sdk]`. */\n  readonly supplied: unknown;\n  /**\n   * The keys the provider module declares it reads. `undefined` means the\n   * module declared no introspectable schema, so guard 1 cannot run HERE and\n   * hydration's validation is the gate; an empty array means the module\n   * declares it reads NOTHING, so every supplied key is refused.\n   */\n  readonly declaredKeys: readonly string[] | undefined;\n  /** Slugs and environment-variable names of the same vendor's backend secrets. */\n  readonly forbiddenKeys: ReadonlySet<string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Merges what the application supplied over what the module authored, refusing\n * the two classes of key that must never reach a browser.\n *\n * Supplied values WIN over authored ones for the same key: the module's value is\n * a default, and an application that names a key means it. Absent `supplied`\n * returns the authored bag untouched — an application that configured nothing\n * is the ordinary case, not a refusal.\n */\nexport function overlayFrontendProviderPublicConfig(\n  input: OverlayFrontendProviderPublicConfigInput,\n): Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined {\n  const { providerRef, authored, supplied, declaredKeys, forbiddenKeys } = input;\n\n  if (supplied === undefined) return authored;\n\n  if (typeof supplied !== 'object' || supplied === null || Array.isArray(supplied)) {\n    throw new FrontendProviderPublicConfigError(\n      providerRef,\n      FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal.NOT_AN_OBJECT,\n      [],\n      `providerConfigurations.${providerRef}.${FRONTEND_PROVIDER_PUBLIC_CONFIG_KEY} must be an object of public `\n      + `keys, got ${Array.isArray(supplied) ? 'an array' : typeof supplied}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const suppliedKeys = Object.keys(supplied);\n\n  // Guard 2 runs FIRST and unconditionally: a secret is refused even when the\n  // module has no introspectable schema, because that is not the module's call.\n  const secretKeys = suppliedKeys.filter((key) => forbiddenKeys.has(key));\n  if (secretKeys.length > 0) {\n    throw new FrontendProviderPublicConfigError(\n      providerRef,\n      FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal.SECRET_KEY,\n      secretKeys,\n      `providerConfigurations.${providerRef}.${FRONTEND_PROVIDER_PUBLIC_CONFIG_KEY} names ${secretKeys.map((key) => `\"${key}\"`).join(', ')}, `\n      + `which is a SECRET of the \"${providerRef}\" backend provider. A frontend provider's public configuration is `\n      + 'served to every browser; a secret belongs in the deployment environment under its `envVarName`, and '\n      + 'nowhere else.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (declaredKeys !== undefined) {\n    const declared = new Set(declaredKeys);\n    const undeclared = suppliedKeys.filter((key) => !declared.has(key));\n    if (undeclared.length > 0) {\n      throw new FrontendProviderPublicConfigError(\n        providerRef,\n        FrontendProviderPublicConfigRefusal.UNDECLARED_KEY,\n        undeclared,\n        `providerConfigurations.${providerRef}.${FRONTEND_PROVIDER_PUBLIC_CONFIG_KEY} names ${undeclared.map((key) => `\"${key}\"`).join(', ')}, `\n        + `which the \"${providerRef}\" frontend provider does not declare. It declares: `\n        + `${declaredKeys.length > 0 ? declaredKeys.map((key) => `\"${key}\"`).join(', ') : '(nothing)'}. `\n        + 'A key the provider never reads would be served to every browser and used by nothing.',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { ...(authored ?? {}), ...(supplied as Record<string, unknown>) };\n}\n\n/**\n * The value kinds a public-config key may declare. Scalars only, on purpose: a\n * public key is an identifier or a flag, and a structured value here is a\n * design smell — a provider that needs one has a capability-level shape\n * (`FrontendFilePickerPublicConfigSchema`) to declare it in.\n */\nexport enum FrontendPublicConfigValueKind {\n  STRING = 'string',\n  NUMBER = 'number',\n  BOOLEAN = 'boolean',\n}\n\nexport interface FrontendPublicConfigKeySpec {\n  readonly kind: FrontendPublicConfigValueKind;\n  /** Absent = optional. Picker keys are usually optional: a missing one is reported when the picker opens, not by dropping the provider. */\n  readonly required?: boolean;\n  /** For the person writing `wildo.saas.config.ts`. Not validated; surfaced in refusals. */\n  readonly description?: string;\n}\n\n/** A Standard Schema v1 validator that ALSO says which keys it declares. */\nexport interface FrontendPublicConfigSchema<TOutput = Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>> {\n  readonly '~standard': {\n    readonly version: 1;\n    readonly vendor: 'wildo';\n    validate(value: unknown):\n      | { readonly value: TOutput }\n      | { readonly issues: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly message: string; readonly path?: ReadonlyArray<PropertyKey> }> };\n  };\n  /**\n   * The keys this schema admits, readable without running it.\n   *\n   * This is the DATA half of the declaration, and it is why this helper exists\n   * rather than \"use Zod\": Standard Schema v1 exposes `validate` and nothing\n   * else, so a schema alone cannot tell the companion walk which keys an\n   * application may supply — and the walk runs in Node, from a projected\n   * contribution, without the module. `projectFrontendProviderContribution`\n   * mirrors this list onto the entry as `publicConfigKeys`.\n   */\n  readonly declaredKeys: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Declares a frontend provider's public-config keys ONCE and gets both halves:\n * a strict Standard Schema v1 validator (the CODE half hydration runs) and the\n * key list (the DATA half the companion walk reads).\n *\n * Dependency-free by design. It lives here because the engine's provider modules\n * live in `@wildo-ai/external-connectors-public`, whose bare-specifier allow-list\n * holds exactly one entry — this package's `/public-runtime` — so those modules\n * can declare a schema without that package growing a validation library. An\n * application module may still use Zod (a Zod object satisfies Standard Schema\n * and its `shape` keys are read the same way).\n *\n * Strict: an unknown key is an issue, never ignored. Silently ignoring is the\n * defect FE-8 closed — a renamed key yielding `undefined` and a picker that\n * accepts more than it should with no error anywhere.\n */\nexport function defineFrontendPublicConfigSchema(\n  keys: Readonly<Record<string, FrontendPublicConfigKeySpec>>,\n): FrontendPublicConfigSchema {\n  const declaredKeys = Object.freeze(Object.keys(keys));\n\n  return {\n    declaredKeys,\n    '~standard': {\n      version: 1,\n      vendor: 'wildo',\n      validate(value: unknown) {\n        if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) {\n          return { issues: [{ message: 'public configuration must be an object' }] };\n        }\n        const record = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n        const issues: Array<{ message: string; path?: PropertyKey[] }> = [];\n\n        for (const key of Object.keys(record)) {\n          if (!(key in keys)) issues.push({ message: 'unknown key', path: [key] });\n        }\n        for (const [key, spec] of Object.entries(keys)) {\n          const present = record[key];\n          if (present === undefined) {\n            if (spec.required === true) issues.push({ message: 'required', path: [key] });\n            continue;\n          }\n          if (typeof present !== spec.kind) {\n            issues.push({ message: `expected a ${spec.kind}, got ${typeof present}`, path: [key] });\n          }\n        }\n\n        return issues.length > 0 ? { issues } : { value: record };\n      },\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads the declared keys off a provider's `publicConfigSchema`, whatever\n * library produced it.\n *\n * Two shapes are recognised, and the order matters: a schema built by\n * `defineFrontendPublicConfigSchema` states its keys outright; a Zod object\n * exposes them as `shape`. Anything else — a hand-written Standard Schema, a\n * library without introspection — yields `undefined`, which the overlay reads\n * as \"cannot enforce here\" rather than as \"declares nothing\". That distinction\n * is load-bearing: an empty list refuses EVERY supplied key.\n */\nexport function readDeclaredPublicConfigKeys(schema: unknown): readonly string[] | undefined {\n  if (typeof schema !== 'object' || schema === null) return undefined;\n  const candidate = schema as { declaredKeys?: unknown; shape?: unknown };\n  if (Array.isArray(candidate.declaredKeys) && candidate.declaredKeys.every((key) => typeof key === 'string')) {\n    return candidate.declaredKeys as readonly string[];\n  }\n  if (typeof candidate.shape === 'object' && candidate.shape !== null) {\n    return Object.keys(candidate.shape as Record<string, unknown>);\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n"]}

package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-authentication-assurance.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/** Policy for an otherwise valid external login that cannot demonstrate required MFA. */
+export declare enum ExternalAssuranceEnforcement {
+    WARN = "warn",
+    STRICT = "strict"
+}
+/** Do not collapse contractual delegation, measured MFA and warning admission into one boolean. */
+export declare enum ExternalAssuranceDecision {
+    NOT_REQUIRED = "not_required",
+    DELEGATED = "delegated",
+    VERIFIED_MFA = "verified_mfa",
+    WARNED = "warned",
+    REFUSED = "refused"
+}
+export declare enum ExternalAssuranceReason {
+    POLICY_NOT_REQUIRED = "policy_not_required",
+    ENTERPRISE_DELEGATION = "enterprise_delegation",
+    SESSION_MFA = "session_mfa",
+    EVIDENCE_MISSING = "evidence_missing",
+    EVIDENCE_INSUFFICIENT = "evidence_insufficient",
+    METHOD_REQUIREMENT_UNPROVEN = "method_requirement_unproven"
+}
+/** Safe decision summary: no upstream token, raw claims, nonce, or user profile. */
+export declare const ExternalAssuranceAssessmentSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    decision: z.ZodEnum<typeof ExternalAssuranceDecision>;
+    reason: z.ZodEnum<typeof ExternalAssuranceReason>;
+    enforcement: z.ZodEnum<typeof ExternalAssuranceEnforcement>;
+}, z.core.$strip>;
+export type ExternalAssuranceAssessment = z.infer<typeof ExternalAssuranceAssessmentSchema>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=provider-authentication-assurance.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-authentication-assurance.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-authentication-assurance.shared.schemas.js

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/** Policy for an otherwise valid external login that cannot demonstrate required MFA. */
+export var ExternalAssuranceEnforcement;
+(function (ExternalAssuranceEnforcement) {
+    ExternalAssuranceEnforcement["WARN"] = "warn";
+    ExternalAssuranceEnforcement["STRICT"] = "strict";
+})(ExternalAssuranceEnforcement || (ExternalAssuranceEnforcement = {}));
+/** Do not collapse contractual delegation, measured MFA and warning admission into one boolean. */
+export var ExternalAssuranceDecision;
+(function (ExternalAssuranceDecision) {
+    ExternalAssuranceDecision["NOT_REQUIRED"] = "not_required";
+    ExternalAssuranceDecision["DELEGATED"] = "delegated";
+    ExternalAssuranceDecision["VERIFIED_MFA"] = "verified_mfa";
+    ExternalAssuranceDecision["WARNED"] = "warned";
+    ExternalAssuranceDecision["REFUSED"] = "refused";
+})(ExternalAssuranceDecision || (ExternalAssuranceDecision = {}));
+export var ExternalAssuranceReason;
+(function (ExternalAssuranceReason) {
+    ExternalAssuranceReason["POLICY_NOT_REQUIRED"] = "policy_not_required";
+    ExternalAssuranceReason["ENTERPRISE_DELEGATION"] = "enterprise_delegation";
+    ExternalAssuranceReason["SESSION_MFA"] = "session_mfa";
+    ExternalAssuranceReason["EVIDENCE_MISSING"] = "evidence_missing";
+    ExternalAssuranceReason["EVIDENCE_INSUFFICIENT"] = "evidence_insufficient";
+    ExternalAssuranceReason["METHOD_REQUIREMENT_UNPROVEN"] = "method_requirement_unproven";
+})(ExternalAssuranceReason || (ExternalAssuranceReason = {}));
+/** Safe decision summary: no upstream token, raw claims, nonce, or user profile. */
+export const ExternalAssuranceAssessmentSchema = z.object({
+    decision: z.enum(ExternalAssuranceDecision),
+    reason: z.enum(ExternalAssuranceReason),
+    enforcement: z.enum(ExternalAssuranceEnforcement),
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=provider-authentication-assurance.shared.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-authentication-assurance.shared.schemas.js.map

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package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-browser-operations.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/**
+ * WHICH provider operations a signed-in person's browser may trigger — the application's decision (#367).
+ *
+ * ## The question this answers, and why nothing else did
+ *
+ * A provider operation runs on the backend, through `ProviderOperationExecutorBackendService`, because
+ * the credential it spends must never travel to a browser. A custom backend service reaches it through
+ * a generated typed client. A custom FRONTEND component had no way to reach it at all, and the door
+ * that gives it one has to answer a question no existing engine surface answers: *which operations may
+ * a browser trigger, for whom, and on whose account*.
+ *
+ * The answer is a DECLARATION, authored in the application's SaaS config beside `providers.connections`
+ * and with the same standing: both are the application's decisions about providers, as opposed to what
+ * a vendor's catalogue says it can support.
+ *
+ * ## Fail closed, by construction
+ *
+ * An operation absent from this map is NOT reachable from a browser. There is no default, no
+ * "READ operations are fine" shortcut — classification is not sufficient: a READ still spends a tenant's
+ * credential, can page a vendor's whole account, and returns whatever the vendor holds. The map is the
+ * only thing that opens the door, one operation at a time.
+ *
+ * ## Rejected: a flag on the operation in the provider catalogue
+ *
+ * The catalogue is generated from third-party sources and overwritten on every regeneration, and it
+ * describes the VENDOR. Letting it decide what a browser may trigger would let a scraped listing grant
+ * access in every application that installs the provider — and a regeneration could grant or revoke it
+ * without anyone opening the application.
+ */
+import { ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope } from '@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models';
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/** @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.providers.browser-operation-policy facet:layer:shared facet:family:config facet:audience:app-developer */
+/**
+ * One browser-reachable operation.
+ *
+ * ## `connections` — whose account a browser-triggered call may spend
+ *
+ * Owner-scope × delegation pairs, in the vocabulary the catalogue, `providers.connections`, the connect
+ * leg and the resolver already share. NARROWING ONLY: a call must satisfy this list AND the provider's
+ * admissible connections as `providers.connections` narrows them. Naming a shape the provider does not
+ * admit grants nothing.
+ *
+ * Every call still passes the target-authorization port before anything is spent — a person may name
+ * only an organization they belong to organization-wide, and only their own user account. This list
+ * narrows further; it can never widen what that port allows.
+ *
+ * ## `allowedRoles` — who may trigger it
+ *
+ * Role keys, resolved through the LIVE role hierarchy (a custom role inheriting from a listed one
+ * qualifies), and read in the scope of the ACCOUNT BEING SPENT:
+ *
+ * | target | roles are read from |
+ * |---|---|
+ * | `organization` | the caller's organization-WIDE roles in THAT organization — a unit-scoped grant never counts |
+ * | `application` | the caller's application roles |
+ * | `user` | not applicable — a person acting on their own account holds no role over it, so declaring roles on a policy that admits `user` refuses those calls |
+ *
+ * Absent means any signed-in caller the target-authorization port admits. That is a legitimate choice
+ * for a person's own account or a member acting for their own tenant, and it is REFUSED at parse time
+ * when the policy admits an `application`-owned connection: without roles, every signed-in person could
+ * spend the application's own vendor account.
+ */
+export declare const ProviderBrowserOperationPolicySchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    connections: z.ZodArray<z.ZodObject<{
+        ownerScope: z.ZodEnum<typeof ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope>;
+        delegation: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof import("@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models").ExternalProvider_Connection_DelegationMode>>;
+    }, z.core.$strip>>;
+    allowedRoles: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+export type ProviderBrowserOperationPolicy = z.infer<typeof ProviderBrowserOperationPolicySchema>;
+/**
+ * `providerRef` → `operationId` → policy. The operation id is the catalogue's own, exactly as a typed
+ * client or an ETL binding reference names it.
+ *
+ * Absent is an EMPTY map — nothing is browser-reachable — never "everything".
+ */
+export declare const ProviderBrowserOperationPoliciesSchema: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodObject<{
+    connections: z.ZodArray<z.ZodObject<{
+        ownerScope: z.ZodEnum<typeof ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope>;
+        delegation: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof import("@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models").ExternalProvider_Connection_DelegationMode>>;
+    }, z.core.$strip>>;
+    allowedRoles: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+}, z.core.$strict>>>>;
+export type ProviderBrowserOperationPolicies = z.infer<typeof ProviderBrowserOperationPoliciesSchema>;
+/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.providers.browser-operation-policy */
+//# sourceMappingURL=provider-browser-operations.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-browser-operations.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-browser-operations.shared.schemas.js

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/**
+ * WHICH provider operations a signed-in person's browser may trigger — the application's decision (#367).
+ *
+ * ## The question this answers, and why nothing else did
+ *
+ * A provider operation runs on the backend, through `ProviderOperationExecutorBackendService`, because
+ * the credential it spends must never travel to a browser. A custom backend service reaches it through
+ * a generated typed client. A custom FRONTEND component had no way to reach it at all, and the door
+ * that gives it one has to answer a question no existing engine surface answers: *which operations may
+ * a browser trigger, for whom, and on whose account*.
+ *
+ * The answer is a DECLARATION, authored in the application's SaaS config beside `providers.connections`
+ * and with the same standing: both are the application's decisions about providers, as opposed to what
+ * a vendor's catalogue says it can support.
+ *
+ * ## Fail closed, by construction
+ *
+ * An operation absent from this map is NOT reachable from a browser. There is no default, no
+ * "READ operations are fine" shortcut — classification is not sufficient: a READ still spends a tenant's
+ * credential, can page a vendor's whole account, and returns whatever the vendor holds. The map is the
+ * only thing that opens the door, one operation at a time.
+ *
+ * ## Rejected: a flag on the operation in the provider catalogue
+ *
+ * The catalogue is generated from third-party sources and overwritten on every regeneration, and it
+ * describes the VENDOR. Letting it decide what a browser may trigger would let a scraped listing grant
+ * access in every application that installs the provider — and a regeneration could grant or revoke it
+ * without anyone opening the application.
+ */
+import { ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope, ExternalProvider_ConnectionShapeSchema, } from '@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models';
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/** @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.providers.browser-operation-policy facet:layer:shared facet:family:config facet:audience:app-developer */
+/**
+ * One browser-reachable operation.
+ *
+ * ## `connections` — whose account a browser-triggered call may spend
+ *
+ * Owner-scope × delegation pairs, in the vocabulary the catalogue, `providers.connections`, the connect
+ * leg and the resolver already share. NARROWING ONLY: a call must satisfy this list AND the provider's
+ * admissible connections as `providers.connections` narrows them. Naming a shape the provider does not
+ * admit grants nothing.
+ *
+ * Every call still passes the target-authorization port before anything is spent — a person may name
+ * only an organization they belong to organization-wide, and only their own user account. This list
+ * narrows further; it can never widen what that port allows.
+ *
+ * ## `allowedRoles` — who may trigger it
+ *
+ * Role keys, resolved through the LIVE role hierarchy (a custom role inheriting from a listed one
+ * qualifies), and read in the scope of the ACCOUNT BEING SPENT:
+ *
+ * | target | roles are read from |
+ * |---|---|
+ * | `organization` | the caller's organization-WIDE roles in THAT organization — a unit-scoped grant never counts |
+ * | `application` | the caller's application roles |
+ * | `user` | not applicable — a person acting on their own account holds no role over it, so declaring roles on a policy that admits `user` refuses those calls |
+ *
+ * Absent means any signed-in caller the target-authorization port admits. That is a legitimate choice
+ * for a person's own account or a member acting for their own tenant, and it is REFUSED at parse time
+ * when the policy admits an `application`-owned connection: without roles, every signed-in person could
+ * spend the application's own vendor account.
+ */
+export const ProviderBrowserOperationPolicySchema = z.strictObject({
+    connections: z.array(ExternalProvider_ConnectionShapeSchema).min(1),
+    allowedRoles: z.array(z.string().trim().min(1)).min(1).optional(),
+}).superRefine((policy, ctx) => {
+    const admitsApplicationAccount = policy.connections.some((shape) => shape.ownerScope === ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope.APPLICATION);
+    if (admitsApplicationAccount && policy.allowedRoles === undefined) {
+        ctx.addIssue({
+            code: 'custom',
+            path: ['allowedRoles'],
+            message: 'A browser-reachable operation that may spend the APPLICATION-owned connection must declare `allowedRoles`. '
+                + 'Without it every signed-in person could spend the application\'s own vendor account.',
+        });
+    }
+});
+/**
+ * `providerRef` → `operationId` → policy. The operation id is the catalogue's own, exactly as a typed
+ * client or an ETL binding reference names it.
+ *
+ * Absent is an EMPTY map — nothing is browser-reachable — never "everything".
+ */
+export const ProviderBrowserOperationPoliciesSchema = z.record(z.string().min(1), z.record(z.string().min(1), ProviderBrowserOperationPolicySchema)).default(() => ({}));
+/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.providers.browser-operation-policy */
+//# sourceMappingURL=provider-browser-operations.shared.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-browser-operations.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"provider-browser-operations.shared.schemas.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/external-providers/provider-browser-operations.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA4BG;AAEH,OAAO,EACL,sCAAsC,EACtC,sCAAsC,GACvC,MAAM,sCAAsC,CAAC;AAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAExB,kJAAkJ;AAClJ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,oCAAoC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;IACjE,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,sCAAsC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACnE,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;CAClE,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE;IAC7B,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,CACtD,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,KAAK,sCAAsC,CAAC,WAAW,CACnF,CAAC;IACF,IAAI,wBAAwB,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QAClE,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;YACX,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ;YACd,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;YACtB,OAAO,EACL,6GAA6G;kBAC3G,sFAAsF;SAC3F,CAAC,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;AACH,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAGH;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAC5D,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EACjB,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,oCAAoC,CAAC,CAClE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEtB,4EAA4E","sourcesContent":["/**\n * WHICH provider operations a signed-in person's browser may trigger — the application's decision (#367).\n *\n * ## The question this answers, and why nothing else did\n *\n * A provider operation runs on the backend, through `ProviderOperationExecutorBackendService`, because\n * the credential it spends must never travel to a browser. A custom backend service reaches it through\n * a generated typed client. A custom FRONTEND component had no way to reach it at all, and the door\n * that gives it one has to answer a question no existing engine surface answers: *which operations may\n * a browser trigger, for whom, and on whose account*.\n *\n * The answer is a DECLARATION, authored in the application's SaaS config beside `providers.connections`\n * and with the same standing: both are the application's decisions about providers, as opposed to what\n * a vendor's catalogue says it can support.\n *\n * ## Fail closed, by construction\n *\n * An operation absent from this map is NOT reachable from a browser. There is no default, no\n * \"READ operations are fine\" shortcut — classification is not sufficient: a READ still spends a tenant's\n * credential, can page a vendor's whole account, and returns whatever the vendor holds. The map is the\n * only thing that opens the door, one operation at a time.\n *\n * ## Rejected: a flag on the operation in the provider catalogue\n *\n * The catalogue is generated from third-party sources and overwritten on every regeneration, and it\n * describes the VENDOR. Letting it decide what a browser may trigger would let a scraped listing grant\n * access in every application that installs the provider — and a regeneration could grant or revoke it\n * without anyone opening the application.\n */\n\nimport {\n  ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope,\n  ExternalProvider_ConnectionShapeSchema,\n} from '@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models';\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\n/** @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.providers.browser-operation-policy facet:layer:shared facet:family:config facet:audience:app-developer */\n/**\n * One browser-reachable operation.\n *\n * ## `connections` — whose account a browser-triggered call may spend\n *\n * Owner-scope × delegation pairs, in the vocabulary the catalogue, `providers.connections`, the connect\n * leg and the resolver already share. NARROWING ONLY: a call must satisfy this list AND the provider's\n * admissible connections as `providers.connections` narrows them. Naming a shape the provider does not\n * admit grants nothing.\n *\n * Every call still passes the target-authorization port before anything is spent — a person may name\n * only an organization they belong to organization-wide, and only their own user account. This list\n * narrows further; it can never widen what that port allows.\n *\n * ## `allowedRoles` — who may trigger it\n *\n * Role keys, resolved through the LIVE role hierarchy (a custom role inheriting from a listed one\n * qualifies), and read in the scope of the ACCOUNT BEING SPENT:\n *\n * | target | roles are read from |\n * |---|---|\n * | `organization` | the caller's organization-WIDE roles in THAT organization — a unit-scoped grant never counts |\n * | `application` | the caller's application roles |\n * | `user` | not applicable — a person acting on their own account holds no role over it, so declaring roles on a policy that admits `user` refuses those calls |\n *\n * Absent means any signed-in caller the target-authorization port admits. That is a legitimate choice\n * for a person's own account or a member acting for their own tenant, and it is REFUSED at parse time\n * when the policy admits an `application`-owned connection: without roles, every signed-in person could\n * spend the application's own vendor account.\n */\nexport const ProviderBrowserOperationPolicySchema = z.strictObject({\n  connections: z.array(ExternalProvider_ConnectionShapeSchema).min(1),\n  allowedRoles: z.array(z.string().trim().min(1)).min(1).optional(),\n}).superRefine((policy, ctx) => {\n  const admitsApplicationAccount = policy.connections.some(\n    (shape) => shape.ownerScope === ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope.APPLICATION,\n  );\n  if (admitsApplicationAccount && policy.allowedRoles === undefined) {\n    ctx.addIssue({\n      code: 'custom',\n      path: ['allowedRoles'],\n      message:\n        'A browser-reachable operation that may spend the APPLICATION-owned connection must declare `allowedRoles`. '\n        + 'Without it every signed-in person could spend the application\\'s own vendor account.',\n    });\n  }\n});\nexport type ProviderBrowserOperationPolicy = z.infer<typeof ProviderBrowserOperationPolicySchema>;\n\n/**\n * `providerRef` → `operationId` → policy. The operation id is the catalogue's own, exactly as a typed\n * client or an ETL binding reference names it.\n *\n * Absent is an EMPTY map — nothing is browser-reachable — never \"everything\".\n */\nexport const ProviderBrowserOperationPoliciesSchema = z.record(\n  z.string().min(1),\n  z.record(z.string().min(1), ProviderBrowserOperationPolicySchema),\n).default(() => ({}));\nexport type ProviderBrowserOperationPolicies = z.infer<typeof ProviderBrowserOperationPoliciesSchema>;\n/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.providers.browser-operation-policy */\n"]}

package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-capability.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
 /**
- * `ProviderCapability` — open, app-extensible enum of standardized
- * behaviors that providers implement.
+ * `ProviderCapability` — the closed vocabulary of standardized behaviors
+ * a provider claims to implement.
  *
  * Distinct from `EngineCapability` (closed, engine-defined slots that
- * may require fulfillment). See the analysis glossary in
- * `.cursor/plans/provider-registration-refactor-draft-analysis.md` §14
- * for the full naming rationale; this file is the canonical Phase-0
- * authoring surface called out in §Phase 0.2 of the implementation
- * plan.
+ * may require fulfillment): a provider CLAIMS a `ProviderCapability`, and
+ * `PROVIDER_CAPABILITY_TO_ENGINE_CAPABILITY` projects the claims that fill
+ * an engine slot.
  *
- * Built-in values use SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE; app-augmented values SHOULD
- * use kebab-case + domain prefix (e.g. `'live-chat-handoff'`,
- * `'search-index'`). The two namespaces never collide by construction.
+ * This header described the vocabulary as "open, app-extensible", with a
+ * kebab-case convention for app-augmented values, until 2026-09-12. The
+ * augmentation point was removed by #502 (see below), so no second namespace
+ * exists; the `.cursor/plans/` citation it carried named a directory that no
+ * longer exists.
  */
 /** @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.provider-capabilities facet:kind:api facet:audience:app-developer
  *
@@ -105,9 +105,10 @@ export declare const BUILTIN_PROVIDER_CAPABILITY: {
 /** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.provider-capabilities */
 export type BuiltinProviderCapability = (typeof BUILTIN_PROVIDER_CAPABILITY)[keyof typeof BUILTIN_PROVIDER_CAPABILITY];
 /**
- * Union of every possible provider capability — the closed built-in set
- * plus any app-side augmentations. Consumers (registries, transformers,
- * lock-file digests) accept this union.
+ * Every provider capability — exactly the closed built-in set. There is no
+ * app-side augmentation (removed by #502, see above), so this is a name for
+ * `BuiltinProviderCapability` that consumers (the provider registries, the
+ * provider component registry, lock-file digests) accept.
  */
 export type ProviderCapability = BuiltinProviderCapability;
 //# sourceMappingURL=provider-capability.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-capability.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"provider-capability.shared.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/external-providers/provider-capability.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AAEH;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B;;;;IAItC;;;;;;;;OAQG;;;IAGH,sEAAsE;;;;IAItE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAcG;;IAEH;;;;;;;;;;OAUG;;;;;;;;IAQH;;;;;OAKG;;IAEH;;;;;OAKG;;IAEH;;;;;;;OAOG;;CAEK,CAAC;AACX,+DAA+D;AAE/D,MAAM,MAAM,yBAAyB,GACnC,CAAC,OAAO,2BAA2B,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,2BAA2B,CAAC,CAAC;AAiBjF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/external-providers/provider-capability.shared.schemas.js

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
 /**
- * `ProviderCapability` — open, app-extensible enum of standardized
- * behaviors that providers implement.
+ * `ProviderCapability` — the closed vocabulary of standardized behaviors
+ * a provider claims to implement.
  *
  * Distinct from `EngineCapability` (closed, engine-defined slots that
- * may require fulfillment). See the analysis glossary in
- * `.cursor/plans/provider-registration-refactor-draft-analysis.md` §14
- * for the full naming rationale; this file is the canonical Phase-0
- * authoring surface called out in §Phase 0.2 of the implementation
- * plan.
+ * may require fulfillment): a provider CLAIMS a `ProviderCapability`, and
+ * `PROVIDER_CAPABILITY_TO_ENGINE_CAPABILITY` projects the claims that fill
+ * an engine slot.
  *
- * Built-in values use SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE; app-augmented values SHOULD
- * use kebab-case + domain prefix (e.g. `'live-chat-handoff'`,
- * `'search-index'`). The two namespaces never collide by construction.
+ * This header described the vocabulary as "open, app-extensible", with a
+ * kebab-case convention for app-augmented values, until 2026-09-12. The
+ * augmentation point was removed by #502 (see below), so no second namespace
+ * exists; the `.cursor/plans/` citation it carried named a directory that no
+ * longer exists.
  */
 /** @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.provider-capabilities facet:kind:api facet:audience:app-developer
  *