@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.3 → 1.1.4

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Application OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for managing application-scoped registered OAuth\n * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`\n * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE plus a REPOSITORY_ONLY\n * DELETE (onParentDelete cascade) and custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The\n * DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS custom ops from api-keys are\n * intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OAuthClientApplicationSchema,\n  OAuthClientStatus,\n} from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\n// Sort and filter fields for application OAuth clients\n\n// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities\nconst APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),\n  hasExpiration: z.boolean(),\n  lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage\n  expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration\n};\n\n// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities\nconst APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt', 'status'] as const;\n\n// Custom operations enum for application OAuth clients\nexport enum AppOAuthClients_Operations {\n  ROTATE = 'rotate', // Generate new secret and invalidate old one\n  REGENERATE = 'regenerate', // Generate new secret without invalidating old one\n  EXPIRE = 'expire', // ACTIVE → EXPIRED once `expiresAt` has passed (dispatched by the sweep, not by an operator)\n}\n\ntype AppOAuthClientsCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE;\n\n/*\nApplication OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const appOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof AppOAuthClients_Operations,\n  AppOAuthClientsCoreOperations,\n  typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OAuthClientApplicationSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true, // Application OAuth clients are a core system resource\n\n  /**\n   * CREATE only, and opened for exactly one caller: RFC 7591 dynamic client registration\n   * (`POST /oauth/register`), which has no principal to act as and therefore cannot go through the\n   * ordinary API_CALL path.\n   *\n   * Modelled on `anonymousUsers`, the closest analogue in the framework — another resource whose rows\n   * are created for an unauthenticated caller through a server-side door, and which opts into\n   * `create` and nothing else. READ / UPDATE / DELETE stay refused: a system door on a\n   * credential-bearing resource should be exactly as wide as its one use.\n   *\n   * ⚠️ KNOWN CONSEQUENCE, stated rather than discovered later: the role-ceiling gate in\n   * `buildOAuthClientMintHandlers` lives on the API_CALL CREATE variant, so it does NOT run on this\n   * door. The registration endpoint therefore carries that duty itself — it REFUSES a request that\n   * mentions `roles` and writes `roles: []` explicitly. Any FUTURE `createAsSystem` caller on this\n   * resource inherits the same obligation and gets no help from the framework in remembering it.\n   */\n  systemAccessPolicy: { create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    // DELETE is REPOSITORY_ONLY (no HTTP route): powers the composition\n    // onParentDelete cascade so client rows are physically removed when their\n    // owning application is deleted. Without it the cascade throws\n    // ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application that still has OAuth-client rows.\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: AppOAuthClients_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: false,\n          searchableFields: [],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n    // onParentDelete cascade so OAuth-client rows are physically removed when their\n    // owning application is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n    // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application\n    // that still has client rows. Super-admin/HIGH: the app OAuth-client admin tier.\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * ACTIVE → EXPIRED, dispatched by the credential-expiry sweep once `expiresAt` has passed\n     * (#413). INTERNAL_CALL, so no HTTP route is mounted and no frontend affordance is offered:\n     * the sweep is the only caller, and there is no reason for a human to declare that a date has\n     * passed.\n     *\n     * It exists so the sweep writes through a guarded door rather than setting `status` directly.\n     * The ACTIVE-only precondition lives in the paired prefix implementation\n     * (`oauth-clients.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`) — an INACTIVE client was retired by an\n     * administrator, and relabelling it EXPIRED would erase who ended it.\n     */\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.EXPIRE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // EMPTY BY CONTRACT, not by omission. The credential-expiry sweep dispatches this verb with `{}`\n          // and the paired prefix implementation forces the status transition itself, so there is no field\n          // a caller may supply. Declaring nothing is NOT the same as declaring this: an operation without\n          // a `requestDto` inherits the resource's ENTIRE update contract, which would let an INTERNAL_CALL\n          // that accepts nothing advertise every field — `status` included, the one field this verb owns.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input\n          // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the\n          // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns\n          // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller\n          // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all\n          // be writable through \"regenerate\". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those\n          // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate\n          // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.\n          // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code\n          // exfiltration primitive.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  },\n});\n"]}
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* Application OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for managing application-scoped registered OAuth\n * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`\n * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE plus a REPOSITORY_ONLY\n * DELETE (onParentDelete cascade) and custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The\n * DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS custom ops from api-keys are\n * intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OAuthClientApplicationSchema,\n  OAuthClientStatus,\n} from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\n// Sort and filter fields for application OAuth clients\n\n// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities\nconst APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),\n  hasExpiration: z.boolean(),\n  lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage\n  expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration\n};\n\n// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities\nconst APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt', 'status'] as const;\n\n// Custom operations enum for application OAuth clients\nexport enum AppOAuthClients_Operations {\n  ROTATE = 'rotate', // Generate new secret and invalidate old one\n  REGENERATE = 'regenerate', // Generate new secret without invalidating old one\n  EXPIRE = 'expire', // ACTIVE → EXPIRED once `expiresAt` has passed (dispatched by the sweep, not by an operator)\n}\n\ntype AppOAuthClientsCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE;\n\n/*\nApplication OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const appOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof AppOAuthClients_Operations,\n  AppOAuthClientsCoreOperations,\n  typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OAuthClientApplicationSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true, // Application OAuth clients are a core system resource\n\n  /**\n   * CREATE only, and opened for exactly one caller: RFC 7591 dynamic client registration\n   * (`POST /oauth/register`), which has no principal to act as and therefore cannot go through the\n   * ordinary API_CALL path.\n   *\n   * Modelled on `anonymousUsers`, the closest analogue in the framework — another resource whose rows\n   * are created for an unauthenticated caller through a server-side door, and which opts into\n   * `create` and nothing else. READ / UPDATE / DELETE stay refused: a system door on a\n   * credential-bearing resource should be exactly as wide as its one use.\n   *\n   * ⚠️ KNOWN CONSEQUENCE, stated rather than discovered later: the role-ceiling gate in\n   * `buildOAuthClientMintHandlers` lives on the API_CALL CREATE variant, so it does NOT run on this\n   * door. The registration endpoint therefore carries that duty itself — it REFUSES a request that\n   * mentions `roles` and writes `roles: []` explicitly. Any FUTURE `createAsSystem` caller on this\n   * resource inherits the same obligation and gets no help from the framework in remembering it.\n   */\n  systemAccessPolicy: { create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    // DELETE is REPOSITORY_ONLY (no HTTP route): powers the composition\n    // onParentDelete cascade so client rows are physically removed when their\n    // owning application is deleted. Without it the cascade throws\n    // ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application that still has OAuth-client rows.\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: AppOAuthClients_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: false,\n          searchableFields: [],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n    // onParentDelete cascade so OAuth-client rows are physically removed when their\n    // owning application is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n    // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application\n    // that still has client rows. Super-admin/HIGH: the app OAuth-client admin tier.\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * ACTIVE → EXPIRED, dispatched by the credential-expiry sweep once `expiresAt` has passed\n     * (#413). INTERNAL_CALL, so no HTTP route is mounted and no frontend affordance is offered:\n     * the sweep is the only caller, and there is no reason for a human to declare that a date has\n     * passed.\n     *\n     * It exists so the sweep writes through a guarded door rather than setting `status` directly.\n     * The ACTIVE-only precondition lives in the paired prefix implementation\n     * (`oauth-clients.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`) — an INACTIVE client was retired by an\n     * administrator, and relabelling it EXPIRED would erase who ended it.\n     */\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.EXPIRE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // EMPTY BY CONTRACT, not by omission. The credential-expiry sweep dispatches this verb with `{}`\n          // and the paired prefix implementation forces the status transition itself, so there is no field\n          // a caller may supply. Declaring nothing is NOT the same as declaring this: an operation without\n          // a `requestDto` inherits the resource's ENTIRE update contract, which would let an INTERNAL_CALL\n          // that accepts nothing advertise every field — `status` included, the one field this verb owns.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input\n          // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the\n          // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns\n          // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller\n          // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all\n          // be writable through \"regenerate\". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those\n          // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate\n          // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.\n          // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code\n          // exfiltration primitive.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  },\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Organization OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for managing organization-scoped registered OAuth\n * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`\n * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE/DELETE/COUNT plus\n * custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS\n * custom ops from api-keys are intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,\n  OAuthClientStatus,\n} from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\n// Sort and filter fields for organization OAuth clients\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'name', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt'] as const;\n\n// Org members get basic filter fields\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),\n  name: z.string(),\n  organizationId: z.string(),\n  hasExpiration: z.boolean(),\n};\n\n// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  ...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n  lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage\n  expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration\n  createdAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by creation date\n  updatedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by update date\n};\n\n// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = [...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS, 'status'] as const;\n\n// Custom operations enum for organization OAuth clients\nexport enum OrgOAuthClients_Operations {\n  ROTATE = 'rotate', // Generate new secret and invalidate old one\n  REGENERATE = 'regenerate', // Generate new secret without invalidating old one\n  EXPIRE = 'expire', // ACTIVE → EXPIRED once `expiresAt` has passed (dispatched by the sweep, not by an operator)\n}\n\ntype OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT;\n\n/*\nOrganization OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const orgOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof OrgOAuthClients_Operations,\n  OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations,\n  typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true, // Organization OAuth clients are a core system resource\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: OrgOAuthClients_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          // Feature usage accounting counts org OAuth clients through the\n          // repository layer. This operation does not need public HTTP exposure.\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Organization admins can view\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also view\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list to see clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also list\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can create clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can create for any org\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to\n          // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (it exists\n          // nowhere else after this response — only its SHA-256 hash is persisted).\n          // Security decision: an app-super-admin creating a client for another org\n          // DOES receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of\n          // the default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can delete clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          haveBulkOperation: true,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can delete any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          haveBulkOperation: true,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * ACTIVE → EXPIRED, dispatched by the credential-expiry sweep once `expiresAt` has passed\n     * (#413). INTERNAL_CALL, so no HTTP route is mounted and no frontend affordance is offered:\n     * the sweep is the only caller, and there is no reason for a human to declare that a date has\n     * passed.\n     *\n     * It exists so the sweep writes through a guarded door rather than setting `status` directly.\n     * The ACTIVE-only precondition lives in the paired prefix implementation\n     * (`oauth-clients.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`) — an INACTIVE client was retired by an\n     * administrator, and relabelling it EXPIRED would erase who ended it.\n     */\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.EXPIRE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // EMPTY BY CONTRACT, not by omission. The credential-expiry sweep dispatches this verb with `{}`\n          // and the paired prefix implementation forces the status transition itself, so there is no field\n          // a caller may supply. Declaring nothing is NOT the same as declaring this: an operation without\n          // a `requestDto` inherits the resource's ENTIRE update contract, which would let an INTERNAL_CALL\n          // that accepts nothing advertise every field — `status` included, the one field this verb owns.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can rotate secrets\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can rotate any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Request AND response both MIRROR the org-admin\n          // default:\n          //  - requestDto: an app-super-admin can choose the same future\n          //    `oldSecretInvalidationDate` window as an org admin. Without it the\n          //    admin variant would build no request DTO and the impl could only\n          //    default the invalidation to now — silently denying the future-window\n          //    capability the default variant exposes.\n          //  - customResponseDto: without it the admin response falls back to\n          //    `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (plus the\n          //    rotated-out client's id + invalidation date). Security decision: an\n          //    app-super-admin rotating another org's client DOES receive the\n          //    plaintext so they can relay it to the org.\n          // Keep both in sync with the default variant above.\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can regenerate secrets\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input\n          // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the\n          // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns\n          // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller\n          // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all\n          // be writable through \"regenerate\". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those\n          // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate\n          // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.\n          // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code\n          // exfiltration primitive.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can regenerate any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to\n          // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret`. Security\n          // decision: an app-super-admin regenerating another org's client DOES\n          // receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of the\n          // default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.\n          // `requestDto` mirrors the default variant too: no caller input, so the\n          // cross-tenant variant cannot rewrite `redirectUris` / `roles` through \"regenerate\".\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          searchableFields: ['name', 'description'],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          searchableFields: ['name', 'description', 'clientId'],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n  },\n});\n"]}
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* Organization OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for managing organization-scoped registered OAuth\n * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`\n * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE/DELETE/COUNT plus\n * custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS\n * custom ops from api-keys are intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,\n  OAuthClientStatus,\n} from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\n// Sort and filter fields for organization OAuth clients\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'name', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt'] as const;\n\n// Org members get basic filter fields\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),\n  name: z.string(),\n  organizationId: z.string(),\n  hasExpiration: z.boolean(),\n};\n\n// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  ...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n  lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage\n  expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration\n  createdAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by creation date\n  updatedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by update date\n};\n\n// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = [...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS, 'status'] as const;\n\n// Custom operations enum for organization OAuth clients\nexport enum OrgOAuthClients_Operations {\n  ROTATE = 'rotate', // Generate new secret and invalidate old one\n  REGENERATE = 'regenerate', // Generate new secret without invalidating old one\n  EXPIRE = 'expire', // ACTIVE → EXPIRED once `expiresAt` has passed (dispatched by the sweep, not by an operator)\n}\n\ntype OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT;\n\n/*\nOrganization OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const orgOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof OrgOAuthClients_Operations,\n  OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations,\n  typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true, // Organization OAuth clients are a core system resource\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: OrgOAuthClients_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          // Feature usage accounting counts org OAuth clients through the\n          // repository layer. This operation does not need public HTTP exposure.\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Organization admins can view\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also view\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list to see clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also list\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can create clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can create for any org\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to\n          // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (it exists\n          // nowhere else after this response — only its SHA-256 hash is persisted).\n          // Security decision: an app-super-admin creating a client for another org\n          // DOES receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of\n          // the default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can delete clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          haveBulkOperation: true,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can delete any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          haveBulkOperation: true,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * ACTIVE → EXPIRED, dispatched by the credential-expiry sweep once `expiresAt` has passed\n     * (#413). INTERNAL_CALL, so no HTTP route is mounted and no frontend affordance is offered:\n     * the sweep is the only caller, and there is no reason for a human to declare that a date has\n     * passed.\n     *\n     * It exists so the sweep writes through a guarded door rather than setting `status` directly.\n     * The ACTIVE-only precondition lives in the paired prefix implementation\n     * (`oauth-clients.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`) — an INACTIVE client was retired by an\n     * administrator, and relabelling it EXPIRED would erase who ended it.\n     */\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.EXPIRE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // EMPTY BY CONTRACT, not by omission. The credential-expiry sweep dispatches this verb with `{}`\n          // and the paired prefix implementation forces the status transition itself, so there is no field\n          // a caller may supply. Declaring nothing is NOT the same as declaring this: an operation without\n          // a `requestDto` inherits the resource's ENTIRE update contract, which would let an INTERNAL_CALL\n          // that accepts nothing advertise every field — `status` included, the one field this verb owns.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can rotate secrets\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can rotate any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Request AND response both MIRROR the org-admin\n          // default:\n          //  - requestDto: an app-super-admin can choose the same future\n          //    `oldSecretInvalidationDate` window as an org admin. Without it the\n          //    admin variant would build no request DTO and the impl could only\n          //    default the invalidation to now — silently denying the future-window\n          //    capability the default variant exposes.\n          //  - customResponseDto: without it the admin response falls back to\n          //    `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (plus the\n          //    rotated-out client's id + invalidation date). Security decision: an\n          //    app-super-admin rotating another org's client DOES receive the\n          //    plaintext so they can relay it to the org.\n          // Keep both in sync with the default variant above.\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can regenerate secrets\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input\n          // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the\n          // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns\n          // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller\n          // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all\n          // be writable through \"regenerate\". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those\n          // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate\n          // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.\n          // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code\n          // exfiltration primitive.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can regenerate any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to\n          // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret`. Security\n          // decision: an app-super-admin regenerating another org's client DOES\n          // receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of the\n          // default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.\n          // `requestDto` mirrors the default variant too: no caller input, so the\n          // cross-tenant variant cannot rewrite `redirectUris` / `roles` through \"regenerate\".\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          searchableFields: ['name', 'description'],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          searchableFields: ['name', 'description', 'clientId'],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n  },\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* OAuth Client Shared Schemas\n *\n * Frontend/backend shared schemas + DTOs for the registered OAuth-client\n * credential resource (`organizationOAuthClients`, `applicationOAuthClients`).\n * Backend-specific logic (secret minting/hashing, mint pipeline) stays in\n * saas-backend-lib.\n *\n * This resource is a FAITHFUL MIRROR of the api-keys resource\n * (`api-keys.shared.schemas.ts`): the same long-lived secret + rotation-grace\n * shape, the same server-managed strip-seam contract, the same org|app scope\n * split. It exists as its OWN resource (not a variant of api-keys) because the\n * request-auth choke point routes a presented secret to a DISTINCT principal\n * by the plaintext prefix (`oc_org_`/`oc_app_` vs the api-key `sk_org_`/`sk_app_`)\n * — an OAuth client and an api-key both authenticate the SAME machine principal\n * (`ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` / `APPLICATION_MACHINE`); they are distinct credential types, an api-key acts\n * as an api-key principal.\n *\n * OIDC authorization code, interactive consent, persistent consent grants,\n * exact redirect allowlists and public/confidential client classification are\n * implemented. The resource remains the registered-client authority; issued\n * codes, tokens and user consent records have their own runtime/storage owners.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { RolesSchema } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { ApiKeyScope } from '../api-keys/api-keys.shared.schemas';\n\n// ===============================\n// OAUTH CLIENT ENUMS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Lifecycle status of a registered OAuth client. Mirrors `ApiKeyStatus`: an\n * INACTIVE or EXPIRED client cannot mint tokens at the request-auth choke point.\n */\nexport enum OAuthClientStatus {\n  ACTIVE = 'active',\n  INACTIVE = 'inactive',\n  EXPIRED = 'expired',\n}\n\n/**\n * OAuth 2.0 grant types a registered client may be authorized to use. The trunk\n * resource ships CLIENT_CREDENTIALS (the machine-to-machine front); the\n * AUTHORIZATION_CODE / REFRESH_TOKEN arms are declared here so the OIDC branch can\n * enable them per-client via `allowedGrants` without a schema reshape.\n */\n/**\n * How a client got registered — a TRUST classification, not a bookkeeping detail.\n *\n * Kept separate from `ApiKeyScope` on purpose. `scope` answers \"which of this application's scopes\n * owns the credential\", and both of its members imply someone with standing inside the application\n * created it. This enum answers \"did anyone vouch for this client at all\", and the two questions\n * became independent the moment an anonymous caller could register one.\n *\n * semantic-literal-boundary: a closed Wildo vocabulary with one named runtime source. Every schema,\n * default, comparison and mapping over registration provenance derives from THIS enum.\n */\nexport enum OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin {\n  /**\n   * Created by a principal with standing in this application — an organization administrator\n   * through the org-clients API, a platform operator, or a seed. **The default**, so nothing that\n   * existed before dynamic registration changes posture.\n   */\n  OPERATOR = 'operator',\n  /**\n   * Self-registered by an anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint.\n   *\n   * The client asserted its own name and redirect URIs and proved nothing. It is granted no roles,\n   * capped at identity scopes, and always faces the user's consent prompt.\n   */\n  DYNAMIC = 'dynamic',\n}\n\nexport enum OAuthGrantType {\n  CLIENT_CREDENTIALS = 'client_credentials',\n  AUTHORIZATION_CODE = 'authorization_code',\n  REFRESH_TOKEN = 'refresh_token',\n}\n\n/**\n * How a registered OAuth client authenticates AT THIS APP'S token endpoint (OIDC\n * `token_endpoint_auth_method`) — the PROVIDER-side classification of OUR clients. Deliberately\n * DISTINCT from `OAuth2_TokenEndpoint_AuthMethod` in `external-connectors-models`, which describes how\n * Wildo-as-CLIENT authenticates to an EXTERNAL IdP's token endpoint (the opposite direction); the two\n * are separate concepts even though they share the OAuth wire vocabulary. Values are the OIDC-registered\n * method names advertised in the discovery document's `token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`.\n *\n * - `NONE` — a PUBLIC client: no client secret at the token endpoint; the authorization_code exchange\n *   relies on mandatory PKCE (S256) + exact redirect_uri (the OAuth 2.1 baseline for SPA / native /\n *   agent clients). This is the default because a client is public unless its\n *   server-side secret-retention and token authentication method are explicit.\n * - `CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC` / `CLIENT_SECRET_POST` — a CONFIDENTIAL client: it MUST present its\n *   `client_secret` (via HTTP Basic, or the request body, respectively) at the token endpoint, as\n *   defense-in-depth on top of PKCE. Both map to \"confidential\" for enforcement — the basic-vs-body\n *   distinction is a per-request transport choice the token endpoint already accepts either way.\n */\nexport enum OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod {\n  NONE = 'none',\n  CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC = 'client_secret_basic',\n  CLIENT_SECRET_POST = 'client_secret_post',\n}\n\n/**\n * The single semantic authority for the public-vs-confidential decision: a client is CONFIDENTIAL\n * (must present its secret at the token endpoint) iff its `tokenEndpointAuthMethod` is not `NONE`.\n * Every enforcement site (authorization_code secret check, revocation client-auth) derives from this\n * helper rather than re-deciding, so the classification never drifts.\n */\nexport function isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod(method: OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod): boolean {\n  return method !== OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE;\n}\n\n/**\n * Safe redirect-URI policy for a registered OAuth client — the anti-open-redirect / anti-XSS gate\n * on every entry of the `redirectUris` allowlist.\n *\n * The authorization_code flow matches a request's `redirect_uri` by EXACT string against this\n * allowlist, and the authorize handler then emits the matched value as the browser's navigation\n * target (`redirect_to`). A registered entry is therefore a literal, user-navigated URL, so the\n * allowlist must never contain a scheme or shape that can execute script or redirect off-origin:\n *\n *  - `https:` — allowed for any host/port (the standard for web / SPA / agent RPs).\n *  - `http:`  — allowed ONLY for a loopback host (`localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1`), per OAuth 2.1\n *               + RFC 8252 (native / CLI / dev clients); loopback is unreachable by a network\n *               attacker, so plain http there is safe.\n *  - a PRIVATE-USE URI scheme (`cursor:`, `com.example.app:`) — allowed, because that is how a native\n *               app receives the code on a platform with no loopback listener. See below.\n *  - everything else — `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, and plain `http:` to a\n *               NON-loopback host — is REJECTED.\n *  - a fragment (`#…`) is REJECTED (RFC 6749 §3.1.2: a redirect endpoint URI MUST NOT include one).\n *  - embedded credentials (`https://user:pass@host`) are REJECTED (a phishing / host-confusion vector).\n *  - leading/trailing whitespace is REJECTED — the WHATWG `URL` constructor silently trims it, so a\n *    padded value would parse to a different string than the one exact-matched at authorize time.\n *\n * ## Private-use schemes: why they were added on 2026-08-11\n *\n * This policy previously refused every non-http(s) scheme, and the note here said to extend it\n * \"deliberately\" if an app ever needed one. A real client made that concrete: Cursor registered\n * `cursor://anysphere.cursor-mcp/oauth/callback` and was refused, which means **no native MCP client\n * using a custom-scheme callback could register with a Wildo application at all.** None of our own\n * lanes could have found it — every one of them registers `http://localhost/...`.\n *\n * The standard sanctions the pattern: native apps \"MAY use whichever redirect option suits their\n * needs best, taking into account platform-specific implementation details\", and private-use URI\n * scheme redirection is one of the three named options.\n * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 7 and § 7.1 (Private-Use URI Scheme Redirection).\n *\n * The known weakness is NOT that such a URI is unsafe to navigate to — it is that the code may reach\n * the wrong recipient: \"A limitation of using private-use URI schemes for redirect URIs is that\n * multiple apps can typically register the same scheme, which makes it indeterminate as to which app\n * will receive the authorization code.\"\n * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 8.1 (Protecting the Authorization Code).\n *\n * That is an interception risk, and PKCE is the mitigation the same section prescribes. This server\n * REQUIRES PKCE and advertises `S256` alone, so a code delivered to the wrong app is unusable without\n * the verifier. Refusing the scheme outright bought no protection PKCE does not already provide, and\n * cost the entire native-client ecosystem.\n *\n * What is still refused is what actually executes or reads local state — the danger is the SCHEME's\n * capability, not its unfamiliarity, so the check is a denylist of dangerous schemes rather than an\n * allowlist of known apps. An allowlist is impossible here by construction: the set of legitimate app\n * schemes is open, and every entry would be a new client the framework has to be taught about.\n *\n * Rejected alternatives: `z.string().url()` (the original guard) accepts every dangerous scheme; a\n * strict https-only rule is too tight for the native/CLI loopback flow; requiring a reverse-DNS\n * scheme (`com.example.app:`, which RFC 8252 § 7.1 RECOMMENDS) was rejected because it would still\n * refuse `cursor:` — the recommendation binds the app author, not the authorization server, and a\n * server that enforces it rejects conformant clients for a style violation.\n *\n * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION — registered OAuth redirect targets are constrained to\n * safe absolute URLs, closing an open-redirect / stored-XSS delegation primitive.\n */\n/*\n * EXPORTED as of 2026-09-02, and the export is the point rather than a convenience.\n *\n * This is a closed vocabulary with one named runtime source — the shape `CLAUDE.md` asks for — and it\n * was reachable by nothing outside this file, so the assurance authority basis could not attest\n * `WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION` against the set the guard actually branches on. It would\n * have had to transcribe the schemes into a second list, free to drift from this one, which is the\n * failure the single-source rule exists to prevent.\n *\n * Nothing else may BRANCH on it: the validator below is the only enforcement site. A reader is a\n * reader — the basis names the members so a programme can say which schemes are refused.\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  // Executes script in the navigating context — the open-redirect-to-XSS primitive this guard exists\n  // to close.\n  'javascript:',\n  'vbscript:',\n  // Carries its own payload, so the \"redirect target\" IS attacker-authored content.\n  'data:',\n  'blob:',\n  // Reads local state rather than handing the code to an application.\n  'file:',\n  'filesystem:',\n  // Browser-internal surfaces; never a native app's callback.\n  'about:',\n  'chrome:',\n  'chrome-extension:',\n  'moz-extension:',\n  'view-source:',\n]);\n\n/**\n * The WHATWG \"special\" schemes, minus the two handled explicitly above.\n *\n * These are web-platform schemes with defined network semantics — never a native app's private-use\n * callback. Refusing them is what keeps \"private-use scheme\" meaning what it says: an app-owned\n * scheme, not any string that happens to parse. `ftp:` in particular was pinned as refused before\n * private-use schemes were admitted, and it stays refused.\n */\nconst NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['ftp:', 'ws:', 'wss:', 'file:']);\n\n/** RFC 3986 § 3.1 scheme grammar: ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / \"+\" / \"-\" / \".\" ), plus the WHATWG colon. */\nconst RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN = /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:$/;\n\nexport function isSafeOAuthRedirectUri(value: string): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0 || value !== value.trim()) return false;\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(value);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (url.hash) return false;\n  if (url.username || url.password) return false;\n  if (url.protocol === 'https:') return true;\n  if (url.protocol === 'http:') {\n    const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();\n    return host === 'localhost' || host === '127.0.0.1' || host === '::1' || host === '[::1]';\n  }\n  // A private-use scheme for a native app. Refused only when the scheme itself confers a dangerous\n  // capability; the shape is otherwise held to the same rules as an https target (no fragment, no\n  // embedded credentials, both checked above), and interception is answered by mandatory PKCE.\n  const scheme = url.protocol.toLowerCase();\n  if (DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) return false;\n  if (NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) return false;\n  return RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN.test(scheme);\n}\n\n// ===============================\n// CORE OAUTH CLIENT SCHEMAS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Base schema for extension (needs to be z.object for `.extend()` to work).\n *\n * `scope` reuses `ApiKeyScope` (ORGANIZATION|APPLICATION) — the same primary-scope\n * split as api-keys; the org/app variants narrow it to a literal + add the FK.\n *\n * SECRET + ROTATION GRACE (`hashedSecret`/`secretPrefix`/`previous*`) mirror the\n * api-key `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix`/`previous*` fields VERBATIM (same decorators,\n * same server-managed strip-seam contract). Unlike api-keys — which declare\n * `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix` on the concrete org/app variant schemas — the OAuth\n * client keeps them on the base: every scope persists the identical secret shape,\n * so a single base declaration is the honest single source of truth.\n */\nexport const OAuthClientSchemaBase = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(), // == clientId\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(100).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  description: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n  scope: z.enum(ApiKeyScope).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — the roles an OAuth client acts with. Same reasoning as the API-key\n  // authority field: roles are the single authorization axis, so their before/after IS the\n  // evidence. assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  roles: z.array(RolesSchema).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),\n  // OIDC IDENTITY scopes this client may request in the authorization_code flow (e.g. `openid`,\n  // `profile`, `email`) — validated against the requested `scope` when minting the ID token /\n  // serving `/oauth/userinfo`. This is IDENTITY only: it is NOT an authorization axis. Authorization\n  // is roles-only (scope-based authorization was deleted 2026-07-21 — do NOT re-introduce it). Empty\n  // for pure client_credentials machine clients (they carry no scopes; their access is roles-only).\n  allowedScopes: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  // Grant types this client is authorized to use. Defaults to the machine front.\n  allowedGrants: z.array(z.enum(OAuthGrantType)).default([OAuthGrantType.CLIENT_CREDENTIALS]),\n  // OIDC authorization_code: exact-match allowlist of redirect URIs. Empty for pure\n  // client_credentials clients. An authorization request's `redirect_uri` MUST equal one of\n  // these by EXACT string match (no wildcards / no substring) — the anti-open-redirect guard.\n  // Each entry is additionally constrained to a SAFE absolute URL by `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`\n  // (https anywhere · http loopback only · no javascript:/data:/fragment/embedded-credentials) so a\n  // malicious registered entry cannot become a stored-XSS / off-origin redirect navigation target.\n  redirectUris: z\n    .array(\n      z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {\n        message: 'redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',\n      }),\n    )\n    // Bounded. RFC 7591 sets no limit, and one is needed here because `/oauth/register` accepts this\n    // array from an ANONYMOUS caller: without a ceiling a single registration can carry an arbitrary\n    // number of URIs, and the per-IP registration limit bounds how MANY registrations happen, not how\n    // large each one is. 50 is far above any real client — several environments times a few loopback\n    // ports — so this constrains only abuse. Every entry is independently constrained by\n    // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`, so this is a storage bound, not an authorization one.\n    .max(50)\n    .default([]),\n  // OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0: exact-match allowlist of POST-LOGOUT redirect URIs (revocation-C). When\n  // an RP calls `/oauth/end-session` with a `post_logout_redirect_uri`, that value MUST equal one of these\n  // by EXACT string match — the SAME anti-open-redirect discipline as `redirectUris` (no wildcards, no\n  // substring). A non-matching value is refused and the OP lands the user on its own logged-out page rather\n  // than redirecting back to the RP. Empty for clients that never drive an interactive logout (pure\n  // client_credentials machines). Each entry is independently held to a SAFE absolute URL by\n  // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri` (https anywhere · http loopback only · no fragment/embedded-credentials), and\n  // the array is `.max(50)`-bounded for the same anonymous-`/oauth/register` abuse reason as `redirectUris`.\n  // spec-cite: OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0 §2 (`post_logout_redirect_uri` MUST have been\n  // registered with the OP).\n  postLogoutRedirectUris: z\n    .array(\n      z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {\n        message: 'post_logout_redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',\n      }),\n    )\n    .max(50)\n    .default([]),\n  // OIDC INTERACTIVE CONSENT gate. When TRUE, the authorization_code flow requires EXPLICIT user\n  // consent before a code is minted: `/oauth/authorize` returns `consent_required` (with a single-use\n  // consent-request token + the client/resource/scope details) instead of auto-issuing the code, and\n  // the user must approve at `/oauth/authorize/decision`. Defaults FALSE = a first-party / trusted\n  // client whose consent is auto-granted (the pre-consent behavior, so machine + trusted clients are\n  // UNAFFECTED). Set TRUE for a THIRD-PARTY client that acts on the user's behalf and must therefore\n  // be explicitly authorized by the user before it can obtain a delegated token. The gate is\n  // SERVER-owned (a client property, never a request parameter) so a third-party client cannot\n  // suppress its own consent prompt.\n  requiresConsent: z.boolean().default(false),\n  // OIDC `token_endpoint_auth_method` — PUBLIC (`NONE`, the default: PKCE-only, no secret at the token\n  // endpoint) vs CONFIDENTIAL (`CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC`/`POST`: the authorization_code exchange AND token\n  // revocation REQUIRE the client to present its `client_secret`, defense-in-depth over PKCE). Default\n  // `NONE` is the safe default: a server-side confidential client must opt into\n  // a secret-bearing token-endpoint method explicitly.\n  // Settable at create/update — flipping a client confidential simply starts requiring the secret it\n  // already has. The public-vs-confidential decision is derived ONLY via\n  // `isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod`, never by re-comparing the enum inline.\n  tokenEndpointAuthMethod: z.enum(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod).default(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE).isSummaryField(),\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — whether this client's delegated access is live.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus).default(OAuthClientStatus.ACTIVE).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),\n  expiresAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  lastUsedAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Client secret ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // `hashedSecret` is the lookup key for the client-credentials token exchange\n  // (the request-auth choke point resolves a presented secret against it on every\n  // exchange). Without an index this is an O(n) collection scan; the compound\n  // unique guarantees only one active row per hash — cryptographically near-\n  // impossible to collide by accident, but a uniqueness contract avoids two rows\n  // being returned to the resolver on a hash collision and prevents shadow-client\n  // duplicates during rotation. Backend-only (a secret hash, never surfaced except\n  // once at creation via `isReturnedAtCreation`, which the mint postfix correlates\n  // the one-time plaintext against). `.excludeFrom{Create,Update}()` — the client\n  // never supplies it; the mint impl is the single server-side choke point.\n  hashedSecret: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isUnique().isBackendOnly({ isReturnedAtCreation: true }).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 chars of the plaintext secret — persisted + shown in lists\n  // (`.isSummaryField()`) so an admin can identify a client without revealing the\n  // secret. Server-managed.\n  secretPrefix: z.string().length(8).isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Rotation grace window ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // When a client secret is ROTATED or REGENERATEd, the PRIOR secret is retained\n  // here so it keeps authenticating during an overlap window — callers can migrate\n  // to the new secret without a hard cutover. The client-credentials exchange\n  // resolves a presented secret against the current `hashedSecret` OR this\n  // `previousHashedSecret` while the window is open (`previousSecretInvalidationDate`\n  // is null or in the future) AND the client is ACTIVE. All three are server-managed\n  // by the rotate/regenerate impls only — never client-settable\n  // (`.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`).\n  //\n  // `previousHashedSecret` — `sha256` of the prior secret; the auth path looks a\n  // presented secret up against it, so it is `.isDBIndexed()`. Backend-only (a\n  // secret hash, never surfaced). Absent until the first rotation.\n  previousHashedSecret: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 chars of the prior secret — retained for support/audit display while\n  // the previous secret is still valid (not a secret, so surfaced). Overwritten on\n  // the next rotation.\n  previousSecretPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // When the previous secret stops authenticating. `null`/absent = no scheduled\n  // invalidation (REGENERATE overlap — the prior secret stays valid until the next\n  // rotation). A future date (ROTATE `oldSecretInvalidationDate`) = honored until\n  // then, then rejected. `now`/past (ROTATE default) = immediate hard cutover.\n  // Surfaced so operators can see when the old secret dies.\n  previousSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Registration access token (RFC 7592) ──────────────────────────────────\n  // The credential a DYNAMICALLY REGISTERED client uses to read, update or delete\n  // its own registration at the client configuration endpoint. Issued once, at\n  // registration, and returned exactly once in the 201 body.\n  //\n  // \"registration_access_token: REQUIRED. String containing the access token to be\n  // used at the client configuration endpoint to perform subsequent operations upon\n  // the client registration.\" … \"The client MUST use its registration access token\n  // in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token.\"\n  // spec-cite: RFC 7592 §3 (Client Information Response) and §2 (Client Configuration Endpoint).\n  //\n  // SEPARATE FROM `hashedSecret`, deliberately, and not merely for tidiness. They\n  // authenticate different things: the client secret authenticates the CLIENT at the\n  // token endpoint, while this authenticates a caller's standing to administer the\n  // client's own REGISTRATION. A dynamically registered client is public\n  // (`token_endpoint_auth_method=none`) and never uses its secret at all, so folding\n  // the two together would give a credential two unrelated powers and make\n  // \"rotate the secret\" silently mean \"revoke management access\".\n  //\n  // ABSENT on every client that is not dynamically registered — an operator- or\n  // organization-registered client is administered through the ordinary authenticated\n  // resource surface, not through RFC 7592.\n  //\n  // `sha256` hex, matching every other token in this framework: deterministic so a\n  // presented Bearer token resolves by re-hashing and matching, and safe because the\n  // plaintext is 32 random bytes rather than a password.\n  registrationAccessTokenHash: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 characters of the plaintext, so an operator can identify which token a\n  // client holds without seeing it — the same affordance `secretPrefix` provides for\n  // the client secret. Not a secret; surfaced.\n  registrationAccessTokenPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── How this client came to exist ─────────────────────────────────────────\n  // WHO registered this client, which is a different question from WHERE the row lives.\n  //\n  // Every other client on this collection was created by someone with standing in this application:\n  // an organization administrator, or a platform operator. A DYNAMIC client was created by an\n  // anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint, and proved nothing about itself.\n  //\n  // The field exists because the STORAGE LOCATION can no longer carry that meaning. A dynamically\n  // registered client has no organization, so it must live on the APPLICATION collection — and\n  // `scope: APPLICATION` otherwise means \"platform-operator first-party\", the most trusted posture\n  // there is. Without this discriminator a stranger's client would inherit that trust purely from\n  // where it was filed. `ResolvedAuthorizationClient` reads it and maps DYNAMIC to\n  // `AuthorizationClientTenancy.UNAFFILIATED`, so the authorize path treats it like a CIMD client:\n  // always consent, identity scopes only.\n  //\n  // `.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()` is load-bearing, not hygiene: this is a TRUST\n  // CLASSIFICATION, and a caller who could set it could file itself as OPERATOR. Only the\n  // registration endpoint writes it, through the system door. Authenticated\n  // administrative registration receives OPERATOR by default because that\n  // administrator vouches for the client.\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — a change here changes how much this client is trusted.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  registrationOrigin: z.enum(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin)\n    .default(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin.OPERATOR)\n    .isDBIndexed()\n    .isSummaryField()\n    .excludeFromCreate()\n    .excludeFromUpdate()\n    .isAuditEvidence(),\n\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientBase = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientSchemaBase>;\n\nexport const OAuthClientOrganizationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({\n  scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.ORGANIZATION),\n  organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientOrganization = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema>;\n\nexport const OAuthClientApplicationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({\n  scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.APPLICATION),\n  applicationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientApplication = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema>;\n"]}
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* OAuth Client Shared Schemas\n *\n * Frontend/backend shared schemas + DTOs for the registered OAuth-client\n * credential resource (`organizationOAuthClients`, `applicationOAuthClients`).\n * Backend-specific logic (secret minting/hashing, mint pipeline) stays in\n * saas-backend-lib.\n *\n * This resource is a FAITHFUL MIRROR of the api-keys resource\n * (`api-keys.shared.schemas.ts`): the same long-lived secret + rotation-grace\n * shape, the same server-managed strip-seam contract, the same org|app scope\n * split. It exists as its OWN resource (not a variant of api-keys) because the\n * request-auth choke point routes a presented secret to a DISTINCT principal\n * by the plaintext prefix (`oc_org_`/`oc_app_` vs the api-key `sk_org_`/`sk_app_`)\n * — an OAuth client and an api-key both authenticate the SAME machine principal\n * (`ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` / `APPLICATION_MACHINE`); they are distinct credential types, an api-key acts\n * as an api-key principal.\n *\n * OIDC authorization code, interactive consent, persistent consent grants,\n * exact redirect allowlists and public/confidential client classification are\n * implemented. The resource remains the registered-client authority; issued\n * codes, tokens and user consent records have their own runtime/storage owners.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { RolesSchema } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { ApiKeyScope } from '../api-keys/api-keys.shared.schemas';\n\n// ===============================\n// OAUTH CLIENT ENUMS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Lifecycle status of a registered OAuth client. Mirrors `ApiKeyStatus`: an\n * INACTIVE or EXPIRED client cannot mint tokens at the request-auth choke point.\n */\nexport enum OAuthClientStatus {\n  ACTIVE = 'active',\n  INACTIVE = 'inactive',\n  EXPIRED = 'expired',\n}\n\n/**\n * OAuth 2.0 grant types a registered client may be authorized to use. The trunk\n * resource ships CLIENT_CREDENTIALS (the machine-to-machine front); the\n * AUTHORIZATION_CODE / REFRESH_TOKEN arms are declared here so the OIDC branch can\n * enable them per-client via `allowedGrants` without a schema reshape.\n */\n/**\n * How a client got registered — a TRUST classification, not a bookkeeping detail.\n *\n * Kept separate from `ApiKeyScope` on purpose. `scope` answers \"which of this application's scopes\n * owns the credential\", and both of its members imply someone with standing inside the application\n * created it. This enum answers \"did anyone vouch for this client at all\", and the two questions\n * became independent the moment an anonymous caller could register one.\n *\n * semantic-literal-boundary: a closed Wildo vocabulary with one named runtime source. Every schema,\n * default, comparison and mapping over registration provenance derives from THIS enum.\n */\nexport enum OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin {\n  /**\n   * Created by a principal with standing in this application — an organization administrator\n   * through the org-clients API, a platform operator, or a seed. **The default**, so nothing that\n   * existed before dynamic registration changes posture.\n   */\n  OPERATOR = 'operator',\n  /**\n   * Self-registered by an anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint.\n   *\n   * The client asserted its own name and redirect URIs and proved nothing. It is granted no roles,\n   * capped at identity scopes, and always faces the user's consent prompt.\n   */\n  DYNAMIC = 'dynamic',\n}\n\nexport enum OAuthGrantType {\n  CLIENT_CREDENTIALS = 'client_credentials',\n  AUTHORIZATION_CODE = 'authorization_code',\n  REFRESH_TOKEN = 'refresh_token',\n}\n\n/**\n * How a registered OAuth client authenticates AT THIS APP'S token endpoint (OIDC\n * `token_endpoint_auth_method`) — the PROVIDER-side classification of OUR clients. Deliberately\n * DISTINCT from `OAuth2_TokenEndpoint_AuthMethod` in `external-connectors-models`, which describes how\n * Wildo-as-CLIENT authenticates to an EXTERNAL IdP's token endpoint (the opposite direction); the two\n * are separate concepts even though they share the OAuth wire vocabulary. Values are the OIDC-registered\n * method names advertised in the discovery document's `token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`.\n *\n * - `NONE` — a PUBLIC client: no client secret at the token endpoint; the authorization_code exchange\n *   relies on mandatory PKCE (S256) + exact redirect_uri (the OAuth 2.1 baseline for SPA / native /\n *   agent clients). This is the default because a client is public unless its\n *   server-side secret-retention and token authentication method are explicit.\n * - `CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC` / `CLIENT_SECRET_POST` — a CONFIDENTIAL client: it MUST present its\n *   `client_secret` (via HTTP Basic, or the request body, respectively) at the token endpoint, as\n *   defense-in-depth on top of PKCE. Both map to \"confidential\" for enforcement — the basic-vs-body\n *   distinction is a per-request transport choice the token endpoint already accepts either way.\n */\nexport enum OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod {\n  NONE = 'none',\n  CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC = 'client_secret_basic',\n  CLIENT_SECRET_POST = 'client_secret_post',\n}\n\n/**\n * The single semantic authority for the public-vs-confidential decision: a client is CONFIDENTIAL\n * (must present its secret at the token endpoint) iff its `tokenEndpointAuthMethod` is not `NONE`.\n * Every enforcement site (authorization_code secret check, revocation client-auth) derives from this\n * helper rather than re-deciding, so the classification never drifts.\n */\nexport function isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod(method: OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod): boolean {\n  return method !== OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE;\n}\n\n/**\n * Safe redirect-URI policy for a registered OAuth client — the anti-open-redirect / anti-XSS gate\n * on every entry of the `redirectUris` allowlist.\n *\n * The authorization_code flow matches a request's `redirect_uri` by EXACT string against this\n * allowlist, and the authorize handler then emits the matched value as the browser's navigation\n * target (`redirect_to`). A registered entry is therefore a literal, user-navigated URL, so the\n * allowlist must never contain a scheme or shape that can execute script or redirect off-origin:\n *\n *  - `https:` — allowed for any host/port (the standard for web / SPA / agent RPs).\n *  - `http:`  — allowed ONLY for a loopback host (`localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1`), per OAuth 2.1\n *               + RFC 8252 (native / CLI / dev clients); loopback is unreachable by a network\n *               attacker, so plain http there is safe.\n *  - a PRIVATE-USE URI scheme (`cursor:`, `com.example.app:`) — allowed, because that is how a native\n *               app receives the code on a platform with no loopback listener. See below.\n *  - everything else — `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, and plain `http:` to a\n *               NON-loopback host — is REJECTED.\n *  - a fragment (`#…`) is REJECTED (RFC 6749 §3.1.2: a redirect endpoint URI MUST NOT include one).\n *  - embedded credentials (`https://user:pass@host`) are REJECTED (a phishing / host-confusion vector).\n *  - leading/trailing whitespace is REJECTED — the WHATWG `URL` constructor silently trims it, so a\n *    padded value would parse to a different string than the one exact-matched at authorize time.\n *\n * ## Private-use schemes: why they were added on 2026-08-11\n *\n * This policy previously refused every non-http(s) scheme, and the note here said to extend it\n * \"deliberately\" if an app ever needed one. A real client made that concrete: Cursor registered\n * `cursor://anysphere.cursor-mcp/oauth/callback` and was refused, which means **no native MCP client\n * using a custom-scheme callback could register with a Wildo application at all.** None of our own\n * lanes could have found it — every one of them registers `http://localhost/...`.\n *\n * The standard sanctions the pattern: native apps \"MAY use whichever redirect option suits their\n * needs best, taking into account platform-specific implementation details\", and private-use URI\n * scheme redirection is one of the three named options.\n * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 7 and § 7.1 (Private-Use URI Scheme Redirection).\n *\n * The known weakness is NOT that such a URI is unsafe to navigate to — it is that the code may reach\n * the wrong recipient: \"A limitation of using private-use URI schemes for redirect URIs is that\n * multiple apps can typically register the same scheme, which makes it indeterminate as to which app\n * will receive the authorization code.\"\n * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 8.1 (Protecting the Authorization Code).\n *\n * That is an interception risk, and PKCE is the mitigation the same section prescribes. This server\n * REQUIRES PKCE and advertises `S256` alone, so a code delivered to the wrong app is unusable without\n * the verifier. Refusing the scheme outright bought no protection PKCE does not already provide, and\n * cost the entire native-client ecosystem.\n *\n * What is still refused is what actually executes or reads local state — the danger is the SCHEME's\n * capability, not its unfamiliarity, so the check is a denylist of dangerous schemes rather than an\n * allowlist of known apps. An allowlist is impossible here by construction: the set of legitimate app\n * schemes is open, and every entry would be a new client the framework has to be taught about.\n *\n * Rejected alternatives: `z.string().url()` (the original guard) accepts every dangerous scheme; a\n * strict https-only rule is too tight for the native/CLI loopback flow; requiring a reverse-DNS\n * scheme (`com.example.app:`, which RFC 8252 § 7.1 RECOMMENDS) was rejected because it would still\n * refuse `cursor:` — the recommendation binds the app author, not the authorization server, and a\n * server that enforces it rejects conformant clients for a style violation.\n *\n * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION — registered OAuth redirect targets are constrained to\n * safe absolute URLs, closing an open-redirect / stored-XSS delegation primitive.\n */\n/*\n * EXPORTED as of 2026-09-02, and the export is the point rather than a convenience.\n *\n * This is a closed vocabulary with one named runtime source — the shape `CLAUDE.md` asks for — and it\n * was reachable by nothing outside this file, so the assurance authority basis could not attest\n * `WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION` against the set the guard actually branches on. It would\n * have had to transcribe the schemes into a second list, free to drift from this one, which is the\n * failure the single-source rule exists to prevent.\n *\n * Nothing else may BRANCH on it: the validator below is the only enforcement site. A reader is a\n * reader — the basis names the members so a programme can say which schemes are refused.\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  // Executes script in the navigating context — the open-redirect-to-XSS primitive this guard exists\n  // to close.\n  'javascript:',\n  'vbscript:',\n  // Carries its own payload, so the \"redirect target\" IS attacker-authored content.\n  'data:',\n  'blob:',\n  // Reads local state rather than handing the code to an application.\n  'file:',\n  'filesystem:',\n  // Browser-internal surfaces; never a native app's callback.\n  'about:',\n  'chrome:',\n  'chrome-extension:',\n  'moz-extension:',\n  'view-source:',\n]);\n\n/**\n * The WHATWG \"special\" schemes, minus the two handled explicitly above.\n *\n * These are web-platform schemes with defined network semantics — never a native app's private-use\n * callback. Refusing them is what keeps \"private-use scheme\" meaning what it says: an app-owned\n * scheme, not any string that happens to parse. `ftp:` in particular was pinned as refused before\n * private-use schemes were admitted, and it stays refused.\n */\nconst NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['ftp:', 'ws:', 'wss:', 'file:']);\n\n/** RFC 3986 § 3.1 scheme grammar: ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / \"+\" / \"-\" / \".\" ), plus the WHATWG colon. */\nconst RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN = /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:$/;\n\nexport function isSafeOAuthRedirectUri(value: string): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0 || value !== value.trim()) return false;\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(value);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (url.hash) return false;\n  if (url.username || url.password) return false;\n  if (url.protocol === 'https:') return true;\n  if (url.protocol === 'http:') {\n    const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();\n    return host === 'localhost' || host === '127.0.0.1' || host === '::1' || host === '[::1]';\n  }\n  // A private-use scheme for a native app. Refused only when the scheme itself confers a dangerous\n  // capability; the shape is otherwise held to the same rules as an https target (no fragment, no\n  // embedded credentials, both checked above), and interception is answered by mandatory PKCE.\n  const scheme = url.protocol.toLowerCase();\n  if (DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) return false;\n  if (NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) return false;\n  return RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN.test(scheme);\n}\n\n// ===============================\n// CORE OAUTH CLIENT SCHEMAS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Base schema for extension (needs to be z.object for `.extend()` to work).\n *\n * `scope` reuses `ApiKeyScope` (ORGANIZATION|APPLICATION) — the same primary-scope\n * split as api-keys; the org/app variants narrow it to a literal + add the FK.\n *\n * SECRET + ROTATION GRACE (`hashedSecret`/`secretPrefix`/`previous*`) mirror the\n * api-key `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix`/`previous*` fields VERBATIM (same decorators,\n * same server-managed strip-seam contract). Unlike api-keys — which declare\n * `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix` on the concrete org/app variant schemas — the OAuth\n * client keeps them on the base: every scope persists the identical secret shape,\n * so a single base declaration is the honest single source of truth.\n */\nexport const OAuthClientSchemaBase = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(), // == clientId\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(100).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  description: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n  scope: z.enum(ApiKeyScope).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — the roles an OAuth client acts with. Same reasoning as the API-key\n  // authority field: roles are the single authorization axis, so their before/after IS the\n  // evidence. assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  roles: z.array(RolesSchema).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),\n  // OIDC IDENTITY scopes this client may request in the authorization_code flow (e.g. `openid`,\n  // `profile`, `email`) — validated against the requested `scope` when minting the ID token /\n  // serving `/oauth/userinfo`. This is IDENTITY only: it is NOT an authorization axis. Authorization\n  // is roles-only (scope-based authorization was deleted 2026-07-21 — do NOT re-introduce it). Empty\n  // for pure client_credentials machine clients (they carry no scopes; their access is roles-only).\n  allowedScopes: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  // Grant types this client is authorized to use. Defaults to the machine front.\n  allowedGrants: z.array(z.enum(OAuthGrantType)).default([OAuthGrantType.CLIENT_CREDENTIALS]),\n  // OIDC authorization_code: exact-match allowlist of redirect URIs. Empty for pure\n  // client_credentials clients. An authorization request's `redirect_uri` MUST equal one of\n  // these by EXACT string match (no wildcards / no substring) — the anti-open-redirect guard.\n  // Each entry is additionally constrained to a SAFE absolute URL by `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`\n  // (https anywhere · http loopback only · no javascript:/data:/fragment/embedded-credentials) so a\n  // malicious registered entry cannot become a stored-XSS / off-origin redirect navigation target.\n  redirectUris: z\n    .array(\n      z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {\n        message: 'redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',\n      }),\n    )\n    // Bounded. RFC 7591 sets no limit, and one is needed here because `/oauth/register` accepts this\n    // array from an ANONYMOUS caller: without a ceiling a single registration can carry an arbitrary\n    // number of URIs, and the per-IP registration limit bounds how MANY registrations happen, not how\n    // large each one is. 50 is far above any real client — several environments times a few loopback\n    // ports — so this constrains only abuse. Every entry is independently constrained by\n    // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`, so this is a storage bound, not an authorization one.\n    .max(50)\n    .default([]),\n  // OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0: exact-match allowlist of POST-LOGOUT redirect URIs (revocation-C). When\n  // an RP calls `/oauth/end-session` with a `post_logout_redirect_uri`, that value MUST equal one of these\n  // by EXACT string match — the SAME anti-open-redirect discipline as `redirectUris` (no wildcards, no\n  // substring). A non-matching value is refused and the OP lands the user on its own logged-out page rather\n  // than redirecting back to the RP. Empty for clients that never drive an interactive logout (pure\n  // client_credentials machines). Each entry is independently held to a SAFE absolute URL by\n  // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri` (https anywhere · http loopback only · no fragment/embedded-credentials), and\n  // the array is `.max(50)`-bounded for the same anonymous-`/oauth/register` abuse reason as `redirectUris`.\n  // spec-cite: OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0 §2 (`post_logout_redirect_uri` MUST have been\n  // registered with the OP).\n  postLogoutRedirectUris: z\n    .array(\n      z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {\n        message: 'post_logout_redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',\n      }),\n    )\n    .max(50)\n    .default([]),\n  // OIDC INTERACTIVE CONSENT gate. When TRUE, the authorization_code flow requires EXPLICIT user\n  // consent before a code is minted: `/oauth/authorize` returns `consent_required` (with a single-use\n  // consent-request token + the client/resource/scope details) instead of auto-issuing the code, and\n  // the user must approve at `/oauth/authorize/decision`. Defaults FALSE = a first-party / trusted\n  // client whose consent is auto-granted (the pre-consent behavior, so machine + trusted clients are\n  // UNAFFECTED). Set TRUE for a THIRD-PARTY client that acts on the user's behalf and must therefore\n  // be explicitly authorized by the user before it can obtain a delegated token. The gate is\n  // SERVER-owned (a client property, never a request parameter) so a third-party client cannot\n  // suppress its own consent prompt.\n  requiresConsent: z.boolean().default(false),\n  // OIDC `token_endpoint_auth_method` — PUBLIC (`NONE`, the default: PKCE-only, no secret at the token\n  // endpoint) vs CONFIDENTIAL (`CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC`/`POST`: the authorization_code exchange AND token\n  // revocation REQUIRE the client to present its `client_secret`, defense-in-depth over PKCE). Default\n  // `NONE` is the safe default: a server-side confidential client must opt into\n  // a secret-bearing token-endpoint method explicitly.\n  // Settable at create/update — flipping a client confidential simply starts requiring the secret it\n  // already has. The public-vs-confidential decision is derived ONLY via\n  // `isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod`, never by re-comparing the enum inline.\n  tokenEndpointAuthMethod: z.enum(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod).default(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE).isSummaryField(),\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — whether this client's delegated access is live.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus).default(OAuthClientStatus.ACTIVE).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),\n  expiresAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  lastUsedAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Client secret ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // `hashedSecret` is the lookup key for the client-credentials token exchange\n  // (the request-auth choke point resolves a presented secret against it on every\n  // exchange). Without an index this is an O(n) collection scan; the compound\n  // unique guarantees only one active row per hash — cryptographically near-\n  // impossible to collide by accident, but a uniqueness contract avoids two rows\n  // being returned to the resolver on a hash collision and prevents shadow-client\n  // duplicates during rotation. Backend-only (a secret hash, never surfaced except\n  // once at creation via `isReturnedAtCreation`, which the mint postfix correlates\n  // the one-time plaintext against). `.excludeFrom{Create,Update}()` — the client\n  // never supplies it; the mint impl is the single server-side choke point.\n  hashedSecret: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isUnique().isBackendOnly({ isReturnedAtCreation: true }).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 chars of the plaintext secret — persisted + shown in lists\n  // (`.isSummaryField()`) so an admin can identify a client without revealing the\n  // secret. Server-managed.\n  secretPrefix: z.string().length(8).isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Rotation grace window ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // When a client secret is ROTATED or REGENERATEd, the PRIOR secret is retained\n  // here so it keeps authenticating during an overlap window — callers can migrate\n  // to the new secret without a hard cutover. The client-credentials exchange\n  // resolves a presented secret against the current `hashedSecret` OR this\n  // `previousHashedSecret` while the window is open (`previousSecretInvalidationDate`\n  // is null or in the future) AND the client is ACTIVE. All three are server-managed\n  // by the rotate/regenerate impls only — never client-settable\n  // (`.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`).\n  //\n  // `previousHashedSecret` — `sha256` of the prior secret; the auth path looks a\n  // presented secret up against it, so it is `.isDBIndexed()`. Backend-only (a\n  // secret hash, never surfaced). Absent until the first rotation.\n  previousHashedSecret: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 chars of the prior secret — retained for support/audit display while\n  // the previous secret is still valid (not a secret, so surfaced). Overwritten on\n  // the next rotation.\n  previousSecretPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // When the previous secret stops authenticating. `null`/absent = no scheduled\n  // invalidation (REGENERATE overlap — the prior secret stays valid until the next\n  // rotation). A future date (ROTATE `oldSecretInvalidationDate`) = honored until\n  // then, then rejected. `now`/past (ROTATE default) = immediate hard cutover.\n  // Surfaced so operators can see when the old secret dies.\n  previousSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Registration access token (RFC 7592) ──────────────────────────────────\n  // The credential a DYNAMICALLY REGISTERED client uses to read, update or delete\n  // its own registration at the client configuration endpoint. Issued once, at\n  // registration, and returned exactly once in the 201 body.\n  //\n  // \"registration_access_token: REQUIRED. String containing the access token to be\n  // used at the client configuration endpoint to perform subsequent operations upon\n  // the client registration.\" … \"The client MUST use its registration access token\n  // in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token.\"\n  // spec-cite: RFC 7592 §3 (Client Information Response) and §2 (Client Configuration Endpoint).\n  //\n  // SEPARATE FROM `hashedSecret`, deliberately, and not merely for tidiness. They\n  // authenticate different things: the client secret authenticates the CLIENT at the\n  // token endpoint, while this authenticates a caller's standing to administer the\n  // client's own REGISTRATION. A dynamically registered client is public\n  // (`token_endpoint_auth_method=none`) and never uses its secret at all, so folding\n  // the two together would give a credential two unrelated powers and make\n  // \"rotate the secret\" silently mean \"revoke management access\".\n  //\n  // ABSENT on every client that is not dynamically registered — an operator- or\n  // organization-registered client is administered through the ordinary authenticated\n  // resource surface, not through RFC 7592.\n  //\n  // `sha256` hex, matching every other token in this framework: deterministic so a\n  // presented Bearer token resolves by re-hashing and matching, and safe because the\n  // plaintext is 32 random bytes rather than a password.\n  registrationAccessTokenHash: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 characters of the plaintext, so an operator can identify which token a\n  // client holds without seeing it — the same affordance `secretPrefix` provides for\n  // the client secret. Not a secret; surfaced.\n  registrationAccessTokenPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── How this client came to exist ─────────────────────────────────────────\n  // WHO registered this client, which is a different question from WHERE the row lives.\n  //\n  // Every other client on this collection was created by someone with standing in this application:\n  // an organization administrator, or a platform operator. A DYNAMIC client was created by an\n  // anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint, and proved nothing about itself.\n  //\n  // The field exists because the STORAGE LOCATION can no longer carry that meaning. A dynamically\n  // registered client has no organization, so it must live on the APPLICATION collection — and\n  // `scope: APPLICATION` otherwise means \"platform-operator first-party\", the most trusted posture\n  // there is. Without this discriminator a stranger's client would inherit that trust purely from\n  // where it was filed. `ResolvedAuthorizationClient` reads it and maps DYNAMIC to\n  // `AuthorizationClientTenancy.UNAFFILIATED`, so the authorize path treats it like a CIMD client:\n  // always consent, identity scopes only.\n  //\n  // `.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()` is load-bearing, not hygiene: this is a TRUST\n  // CLASSIFICATION, and a caller who could set it could file itself as OPERATOR. Only the\n  // registration endpoint writes it, through the system door. Authenticated\n  // administrative registration receives OPERATOR by default because that\n  // administrator vouches for the client.\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — a change here changes how much this client is trusted.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  registrationOrigin: z.enum(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin)\n    .default(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin.OPERATOR)\n    .isDBIndexed()\n    .isSummaryField()\n    .excludeFromCreate()\n    .excludeFromUpdate()\n    .isAuditEvidence(),\n\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientBase = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientSchemaBase>;\n\nexport const OAuthClientOrganizationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({\n  scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.ORGANIZATION),\n  organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientOrganization = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema>;\n\nexport const OAuthClientApplicationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({\n  scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.APPLICATION),\n  applicationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientApplication = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema>;\n"]}

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package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-consent-grants.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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It is\n * CREATED (via the system write primitive) when a user APPROVES an interactive-consent request AND\n * opts to remember the app, and READ at `/oauth/authorize` to SKIP re-prompting when an existing grant\n * already covers the requested scopes. The user can list their grants (\"authorized apps\") and revoke\n * one.\n *\n * USER-scoped: owned by `userId` (USER_SELF primary scope, derived from the `USERS → OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTS`\n * composition relationship). One grant per `(userId, clientId, resource)` — a re-consent UPDATES the\n * granted scopes rather than creating a duplicate. `resource` participates in the grain because two\n * authorize requests from the same client for different RFC 8707 resources (distinct A2A / MCP agent\n * endpoints) are genuinely distinct delegations; an OIDC-only login carries no `resource` and yields a\n * single resource-less grant.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { PersonalDataCategory } from '../../compliance/privacy/personal-data-category.shared.schemas';\nimport { RedactionType } from '../../compliance/privacy/redaction.shared.schemas';\nimport { addImpersonalizeWith } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\n\nexport const OAuthConsentGrantSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /** FK → USERS — the user who granted consent (the USER_SELF scope owner). */\n  userId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  /** The registered OAuth client (`_id`, `oc_*`) the user authorized. Part of the business key. */\n  clientId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /**\n   * The RFC 8707 `resource` (the target A2A / MCP agent endpoint) this grant covers. Absent for an\n   * OIDC-only login with no delegation. Part of the business key — a grant authorizes one client for\n   * one resource, so different agent endpoints require separate, explicit consent.\n   */\n  resource: z.string().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /**\n   * The IDENTITY scopes the user granted (e.g. `openid`, `profile`, `email`). A later authorize whose\n   * requested scopes are a SUBSET of these skips the prompt; a request for a scope NOT in the grant\n   * re-prompts (silent scope expansion is forbidden). Identity only — scopes carry no authorization\n   * weight (authorization is roles-only).\n   */\n  // USAGE — what this person authorized a third-party client to reach on their behalf, and when.\n  // A consent record is an observation of a decision they made, not an attribute of them.\n  // RESET on erasure — returns this field to its schema default. It holds which scopes this person authorized a third-party client to reach,\n  // which the category above correctly declares as personal data. RESET rather than REMOVE or MASK\n  // because the field is non-nullable WITH a `.default()`: REMOVE needs a clearable field and MASK\n  // needs a string. The value comes from the schema, so there is no second copy to drift.\n  scopes: addImpersonalizeWith(\n  z.array(z.string()).default([]).dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.USAGE),\n    RedactionType.RESET,\n  ),\n\n  /**\n   * Expiry. The authorize lookup ignores a grant past this instant, fail-closed to a fresh consent\n   * prompt.\n   *\n   * SET ON EVERY AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT since 2026-09-08 (#465) — on creation and again on every widen,\n   * because a widen is the user approving again and a re-affirmation should restart the clock. It\n   * was declared here with a reader and NO WRITER before that, so a remembered approval lived until\n   * the person revoked it while the field read to an operator as a policy knob that existed.\n   *\n   * Still optional on the SCHEMA, for two reasons that are not the same: grants created before that\n   * date carry none and must keep working (an absent expiry means \"never\", which is what they were\n   * granted under), and a resource may be written by a path that has no operator policy in hand.\n   */\n  expiresAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed(),\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n}).businessKeySet([\n  'userId',\n  'clientId',\n  'resource',\n]);\n\n/**\n * How long a remembered consent lasts when the application authors no policy of its own.\n *\n * **180 days**, and the reasoning matters more than the number. A remembered consent is a standing\n * delegation of authority to a third party, so it should lapse on its own if nobody re-affirms it —\n * but a prompt the user meets every few weeks trains them to click through, which makes the consent\n * screen worth less rather than more. Half a year is long enough not to nag and short enough that an\n * authorization the user has forgotten about does not outlive their interest in the client by years.\n *\n * An application overrides it with `auth.consentGrantLifetimeDays`. There is deliberately no way to\n * express \"never expires\": that was the state this default replaced, and it was not chosen.\n */\nexport const OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANT_DEFAULT_LIFETIME_DAYS = 180;\n\nexport type OAuthConsentGrant = z.infer<typeof OAuthConsentGrantSchema>;\n"]}
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One grant per `(userId, clientId, resource)` — a re-consent UPDATES the\n * granted scopes rather than creating a duplicate. `resource` participates in the grain because two\n * authorize requests from the same client for different RFC 8707 resources (distinct A2A / MCP agent\n * endpoints) are genuinely distinct delegations; an OIDC-only login carries no `resource` and yields a\n * single resource-less grant.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { PersonalDataCategory } from '../../compliance/privacy/personal-data-category.shared.schemas';\nimport { RedactionType } from '../../compliance/privacy/redaction.shared.schemas';\nimport { addImpersonalizeWith } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\n\nexport const OAuthConsentGrantSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /** FK → USERS — the user who granted consent (the USER_SELF scope owner). */\n  userId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  /** The registered OAuth client (`_id`, `oc_*`) the user authorized. Part of the business key. */\n  clientId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /**\n   * The RFC 8707 `resource` (the target A2A / MCP agent endpoint) this grant covers. Absent for an\n   * OIDC-only login with no delegation. Part of the business key — a grant authorizes one client for\n   * one resource, so different agent endpoints require separate, explicit consent.\n   */\n  resource: z.string().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /**\n   * The IDENTITY scopes the user granted (e.g. `openid`, `profile`, `email`). A later authorize whose\n   * requested scopes are a SUBSET of these skips the prompt; a request for a scope NOT in the grant\n   * re-prompts (silent scope expansion is forbidden). Identity only — scopes carry no authorization\n   * weight (authorization is roles-only).\n   */\n  // USAGE — what this person authorized a third-party client to reach on their behalf, and when.\n  // A consent record is an observation of a decision they made, not an attribute of them.\n  // RESET on erasure — returns this field to its schema default. It holds which scopes this person authorized a third-party client to reach,\n  // which the category above correctly declares as personal data. RESET rather than REMOVE or MASK\n  // because the field is non-nullable WITH a `.default()`: REMOVE needs a clearable field and MASK\n  // needs a string. The value comes from the schema, so there is no second copy to drift.\n  scopes: addImpersonalizeWith(\n  z.array(z.string()).default([]).dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.USAGE),\n    RedactionType.RESET,\n  ),\n\n  /**\n   * Expiry. The authorize lookup ignores a grant past this instant, fail-closed to a fresh consent\n   * prompt.\n   *\n   * SET ON EVERY AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT since 2026-09-08 (#465) — on creation and again on every widen,\n   * because a widen is the user approving again and a re-affirmation should restart the clock. It\n   * was declared here with a reader and NO WRITER before that, so a remembered approval lived until\n   * the person revoked it while the field read to an operator as a policy knob that existed.\n   *\n   * Still optional on the SCHEMA, for two reasons that are not the same: grants created before that\n   * date carry none and must keep working (an absent expiry means \"never\", which is what they were\n   * granted under), and a resource may be written by a path that has no operator policy in hand.\n   */\n  expiresAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed(),\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n}).businessKeySet([\n  'userId',\n  'clientId',\n  'resource',\n]);\n\n/**\n * How long a remembered consent lasts when the application authors no policy of its own.\n *\n * **180 days**, and the reasoning matters more than the number. A remembered consent is a standing\n * delegation of authority to a third party, so it should lapse on its own if nobody re-affirms it —\n * but a prompt the user meets every few weeks trains them to click through, which makes the consent\n * screen worth less rather than more. Half a year is long enough not to nag and short enough that an\n * authorization the user has forgotten about does not outlive their interest in the client by years.\n *\n * An application overrides it with `auth.consentGrantLifetimeDays`. There is deliberately no way to\n * express \"never expires\": that was the state this default replaced, and it was not chosen.\n */\nexport const OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANT_DEFAULT_LIFETIME_DAYS = 180;\n\nexport type OAuthConsentGrant = z.infer<typeof OAuthConsentGrantSchema>;\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-resource-server.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/testing/resource-config-builders.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/testing.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/users/anonymous-user-marketing-metadata.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/users/anonymous-users.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/users/anonymous-users.shared.schema.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/users/inbound-contacts.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/users/inbound-contacts.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/users/user-credentials.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/users/user-credentials.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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