@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.0 → 1.1.2

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import { CoreConsumableTokenTypes, ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode, } from '../s
 import { DurationUnit } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';
 import { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas.js';
 import { DataPortabilityProvenance } from '../compliance/privacy/subject-export.shared.schemas.js';
+import { ErasureRetentionMode, ResourceDataSubjectKind } from '../compliance/privacy/impersonalization.shared.schemas.js';
 // Custom operations enum for organization members.
 // NOTE: cross-organization member transfer is intentionally NOT a framework
 // capability — moving a member between organizations is a tenant-boundary
@@ -111,6 +112,26 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
      * Subject-export disclosure. The subject's OWN membership rows (org, roles, title) — not other members' data.
      */
     portabilityPolicy: { defaultProvenance: DataPortabilityProvenance.OBSERVED },
+    /**
+     * Subject erasure RETAINS this row and scrubs the person's contact and professional details.
+   *
+   * The membership survives because it is the tenant's record of who belonged to it and under what
+   * authority; what does not survive is `userEmail` and `userTitle`, the denormalized copies of the
+   * person held here so a row can be read without resolving the user.
+   *
+   * `roles` is deliberately NOT scrubbed. It is this application's authorization vocabulary rather than
+   * personal data — the field's own comment says so — and emptying it could leave a tenant with no
+   * administrator, which the administrative-continuity floors would refuse, making an erasure fail closed
+   * on a tenant. Keeping it means that interaction never arises.
+     */
+    retentionPolicy: {
+        mode: ErasureRetentionMode.RETAIN_AND_IMPERSONALIZE,
+    },
+    /**
+     * Erasing one of these rows revokes NO session. A membership is a record ABOUT a person's place in a
+   *  tenant, not the person — their session ends through the `USERS` row, which is `SELF_PRINCIPAL`.
+     */
+    dataSubjectPolicy: { kind: ResourceDataSubjectKind.NO_PRINCIPAL },
     coreOperations: [
         CoreResourceOperation.READ,
         CoreResourceOperation.LIST,
@@ -119,9 +140,32 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
         CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
         CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,
         CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,
+        // Route-less; `retentionPolicy` requires READ + LIST + UPDATE_MANY.
+        CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY,
     ],
     customOperation: OrganizationMembers_Operations,
     operationsConfiguration: {
+        /*
+    
+         * Route-less retention plumbing — INTERNAL_CALL registers no route, so no API surface is added, and it
+    
+         * must not be REPOSITORY_ONLY: the retention primitives resolve through `getServiceOperationPathDefault`,
+    
+         * which matches only INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL. LIST is LOW (a read-shaped op may not claim the
+    
+         * HIGH/CRITICAL band, which carries an audit-emission obligation); UPDATE_MANY is CRITICAL — it is the
+    
+         * verb the impersonalize writer uses to stamp the retention markers.
+    
+         */
+        [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY]: {
+            variants: [{
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,
+                }],
+        },
         [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {
             variants: [
                 {

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

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* Organization Members Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for organization member management.\n * Comprehensive member lifecycle and role management.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OrganizationMemberSchema,\n  OrganizationMemberStatus,\n} from './organization-members.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship, DefaultDeleteResponseSchema } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport {\n  CoreConsumableTokenTypes,\n  ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode,\n} from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas';\nimport type {\n  TokenRevocationConfig,\n} from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas';\nimport { DurationUnit } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\n\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { DataPortabilityProvenance } from '../compliance/privacy/subject-export.shared.schemas';\n\n// Custom operations enum for organization members.\n// NOTE: cross-organization member transfer is intentionally NOT a framework\n// capability — moving a member between organizations is a tenant-boundary\n// crossing the framework does not sanction. Re-invite the identity in the\n// target organization instead.\n//\n// A membership row IS the invitation (there is no separate invitation resource):\n//   - CREATE      = invite (creates an `INVITED` row + mints the accept token).\n//   - REVOKE      = inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership.\n//   - RESEND      = re-mint + re-send the accept token for an `INVITED` membership.\n//   - SUSPEND/REACTIVATE = lifecycle of an ACTIVE/SUSPENDED member.\n// Invitee-side accept/reject is the tokenized `/auth/acceptInvitation` flow\n// (auth controller + `Auth_Invitation` screen), NOT a resource operation.\n//\n// ROLE CHANGES ARE `UPDATE`, NOT A DEDICATED VERB. `PROMOTE` / `DEMOTE` were declared here\n// as `ORG_ADMIN`-gated `riskLevel: HIGH` operations taking `{ newRole, reason }`, and were\n// removed on 2026-08-01: they were ROUTED but never implemented, so the request fell through\n// to the generic core UPDATE, which persists only fields the resource schema declares.\n// `newRole` is not one, so every call answered **HTTP 200 having changed nothing** — and the\n// dangerous direction is DEMOTE: an admin demotes a compromised account, is told 200 OK, and\n// the account keeps its privileges. Re-declaring an explicit role-change verb is legitimate,\n// but only WITH a custom implementation that writes `roles` and calls\n// `assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling` — a custom implementation is addressed by an EXACT\n// operation path, so it does NOT inherit the UPDATE variant's ceiling gate. Follow the\n// organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE pattern (a `prefixCoreOperations` hook returning the field\n// patch the core UPDATE persists). See\n// `.claude/plans/routed-unimplemented-operations-fail-closed.md`.\n//\n// GRANT_OWNERSHIP is the ONE exception to \"role changes are UPDATE\", and it exists for a reason\n// UPDATE structurally cannot serve: it is the only operation on this resource a caller who is NOT a\n// member of the organization may perform. See its config entry below.\nexport enum OrganizationMembers_Operations {\n  SUSPEND = 'suspend',\n  REACTIVATE = 'reactivate',\n  REVOKE = 'revoke',\n  RESEND = 'resend',\n  GRANT_OWNERSHIP = 'grantOwnership',\n}\n\n/**\n * One semantic definition for invalidating an organization invitation.\n *\n * REVOKE attaches it declaratively, so HTTP and trusted service callers enter\n * the same transactional revocation pipeline. Ordinary DELETE is\n * intentionally excluded: it removes a non-INVITED membership, which has no\n * invitation token to revoke.\n */\nexport const ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION = {\n  tokenTypes: [\n    CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n  ],\n  relatedIdField: '_id',\n} satisfies TokenRevocationConfig;\n\n/**\n * One predicate owns both invitation-token generation and invitation-email\n * dispatch. Keeping the two declarative side effects on the same named gate\n * prevents the polymorphic CREATE operation from drifting: an ACTIVE direct\n * add must produce neither an accept token nor an invitation email.\n */\nconst isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation = ({\n  currentObject,\n}: {\n  currentObject: Record<string, unknown>;\n}): boolean =>\n  currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED;\n\nconst ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS = ['status', 'role', 'joinedAt'];\n\nconst ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OrganizationMemberStatus),\n  role: z.string(),\n};\n\ntype OrganizationMembersCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT;\n\n/*\nOrganization Members Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof OrganizationMembers_Operations,\n  OrganizationMembersCoreOperations,\n  typeof OrganizationMemberSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OrganizationMemberSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true,\n\n  // create: invitation-accept was the historical opt-in; now the org-admin INVITE, SSO/SCIM\n  //   JIT, and org-auto-create-on-registration all create members in-process with explicit\n  //   `userId` + `organizationId` FKs on a request-context-less EC (stripped by the\n  //   client-shaped CREATE DTO, re-attached by `createAsSystem`).\n  // read/list: the invitee's own pending-invitation inbox reads INVITED rows cross-org\n  //   BEFORE the invitee is a scoped member — authorized by `userId`-ownership at the\n  //   entry point (`listMyPendingInvitations`/`loadOwnedPendingInvitation`), not org role.\n  // update: invitation ACCEPTANCE flips INVITED → ACTIVE in-process; the invitee is not an\n  //   org admin, so the status flip goes through the trusted system path.\n  systemAccessPolicy: {\n    exportSubject: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    update: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Subject-export disclosure. The subject's OWN membership rows (org, roles, title) — not other members' data.\n   */\n  portabilityPolicy: { defaultProvenance: DataPortabilityProvenance.OBSERVED },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: OrganizationMembers_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // CREATE is POLYMORPHIC — two intents on one op:\n    //  • INVITE (BRANCH B): the org admin supplies `userEmail` (the strict identity\n    //    anchor); the CREATE prefix find-or-creates the `User` by it (`PENDING_INVITATION`\n    //    if new) and FORCES `status: INVITED`. A single-use accept token is minted AFTER the\n    //    row is created (relatedId = the membership `_id`, STABLE across `INVITED → ACTIVE`\n    //    so the emailed link never orphans); the pipeline injects it into the invite email and\n    //    the dispatcher builds the accept link (`emailLinkPath → /invitation?token=…`, consumed\n    //    by `/auth/acceptInvitation`). No `grantedRoles`: the accept handler reads the\n    //    membership's own `roles` when it flips the row to ACTIVE.\n    //  • DIRECT-ADD (BRANCH A): the caller supplies `userId` (founder org-owner grant,\n    //    SSO-JIT, SCIM) and the row persists `ACTIVE` — there is nothing to accept.\n    // Token generation and notification dispatch share one named predicate.\n    // The INVITE branch mints one accept token and sends one post-commit email;\n    // the ACTIVE direct-add branch does neither.\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can invite members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators (userEmail + roles +\n          // organizationUnitsMembership + userTitle; userId/status/invitedByUserId/\n          // invitedAt are server-injected via `.excludeFromCreate()`).\n          tokenGeneration: {\n            tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n            consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,\n            expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },\n            relatedIdField: '_id',\n            emailLinkPath: '/invitation',\n            // Mint the accept token for real invites only — never for an ACTIVE direct-add.\n            condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n          },\n        }\n      ],\n      // Deliver the invite email to the INVITEE (`userEmail`) via the\n      // email-by-address path — the invitee may be a brand-new `PENDING_INVITATION`\n      // user with no session. Carries the `acceptUrl` (`/invitation?token=…`) built\n      // from the token minted above. `target: USER_SELF` is retained only so the\n      // derived template ref stays `…create.user-self` and the accept link routes to\n      // the main (non-admin) app.\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can read member info\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list organization members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          // `userEmail` is a denormalized, immutable own-field (mirror of the linked\n          // user's email, captured at membership creation). First/last name are NOT\n          // denormalized onto the member row — they live on `USER_PROFILES` and are\n          // mutable there — so they are searched RELATIONALLY: the framework runs a\n          // secondary match on `USER_PROFILES` (its own searchable fields) and folds\n          // the matching `userId`s into an `$in` on this row's `userId`. The member\n          // query stays org-scoped, so this is tenant-safe; names are never stale\n          // because they are read live from the profile at search time. See\n          // SearchableRelationDescriptor in resources-config.shared.schemas.ts.\n          searchableFields: [\n            'userEmail',\n            {\n              localField: 'userId',\n              relatedResource: CoreResourceType.USER_PROFILES,\n              relatedJoinField: 'userId',\n              fields: ['firstName', 'lastName'],\n            },\n          ],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can update member details\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          //\n          // Audited despite being below the HIGH/CRITICAL floor: since PROMOTE / DEMOTE were removed\n          // (2026-08-01), **this operation IS the only org-member role-change path**, and a role\n          // change is an access-control decision whatever the verb's risk level says. MEDIUM is the\n          // right answer for the UI axis riskLevel primarily serves — updating a member's details\n          // does not deserve a danger-zone affordance or a typed confirmation — but it is the wrong\n          // answer for the evidence axis, and this flag is exactly that divergence.\n          //\n          // This also closes the follow-up left open by the routed-unimplemented-operations sweep:\n          // `CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED` is declared and classified but\n          // emitted by nothing, so org-member role changes produced no trail at all. The generic\n          // mechanism covers it — with `roles` marked as audit evidence, the row carries the before\n          // and after sets — rather than adding a sixth hand-rolled emission.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant/revocation.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can remove members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // Accepted/non-pending members use ordinary DELETE. A pending invite\n          // is cancelled through REVOKE, which atomically revokes its accept\n          // token. Keeping the vocabularies disjoint avoids making every\n          // active-member removal token-coupled.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status !== OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * The higher-tier repair door for the organization-owner floor — the second half of the\n     * industry pattern described in `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md`.\n     *\n     * ## Why this cannot be UPDATE\n     *\n     * The floor refuses to let the last `ORG_OWNER` be removed, demoted or deactivated. That is the\n     * correct tenant-tier answer, but on its own it converts every mistake that DID strand a tenant\n     * — a direct database edit, a restore from a mid-erasure backup, an acknowledged erasure under\n     * GDPR Art. 17, a seed that authored no owner — into a permanent lockout, because\n     * `validateParentScopeAccess` denies a non-member on ORGANIZATIONS scope and there is no\n     * `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN` bypass. Both denials are pinned in\n     * `cross-tenant-super-admin-reach.mongo.integration.test.ts`. So no tenant member can grant the\n     * role (they would need the authority they just lost) and no platform administrator can reach\n     * the row at all. GitHub solves this with an Enterprise owner one tier up; this is that tier.\n     *\n     * ## Why it is a distinct verb rather than a flag on UPDATE\n     *\n     * `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration` relaxes the SCOPE check for the variant that carries\n     * it. Putting it on generic UPDATE would open every field of every membership row in every\n     * tenant to a cross-tenant caller. The whole safety argument is that the opened surface is\n     * exactly one field with one direction, so it is authored as its own operation whose custom\n     * implementation ignores the payload for anything but the justification.\n     *\n     * ## Deliberate narrowness\n     *\n     * - **Promotes an EXISTING member** (Microsoft Loop's rule). It cannot mint a membership, so it\n     *   never creates an identity inside a tenant nobody owns.\n     * - **Additive only.** It adds the owner-conferring role; it cannot remove roles, so it can\n     *   never be used to demote and is not a second path through the floor.\n     * - **`justification` is required**, not optional. This is a break-glass action against a tenant\n     *   the operator is not a member of; the audit row is worth nothing without the why. `AC-2(7)`\n     *   asks for privileged assignment to be monitored — the trail IS the control here, since by\n     *   construction no authorization check downstream can second-guess the caller.\n     *\n     * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY — restore administrability of a scope\n     * that has no usable administrator.\n     * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant.\n     */\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.GRANT_OWNERSHIP]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          // Platform tier only. This is the role set the operation-roles gate checks INDEPENDENTLY\n          // of the scope admission below: a caller holding this key at ORGANIZATIONS scope resolves\n          // it against the organization role table, which does not contain it, and is denied there.\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // THE cross-tenant admission. Without it the operation is unreachable by the only\n          // principal it exists for, because a platform administrator is by definition not a member\n          // of the stranded tenant.\n          admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            justification: z.string().min(1).max(1000),\n          }),\n          // No `auditableEvent` declaration: CRITICAL is inside `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so the\n          // event emits on the risk level alone and `auditBelowRiskFloor` would be inert here. The\n          // before/after role sets ride along because `roles` carries `.isAuditEvidence()` — which is\n          // what makes the trail answer the question that matters about this door: WHO was made an\n          // owner of a tenant, by a caller who was not in it.\n        },\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          // The tenant learns that its ownership changed from outside. An operator repairing a\n          // stranded tenant is legitimate; an operator quietly granting themselves an ally inside a\n          // customer's tenant is not, and the difference is only visible to the tenant if it is told.\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.SUSPEND]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can suspend members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            suspensionReason: z.string().min(1).max(500),\n            suspensionEndDate: z.date().optional()\n          }),\n          // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (ACTIVE → SUSPENDED, carrying\n          // `suspensionEndDate` onto the row's `scheduledReactivationAt`). SUSPEND is legal only\n          // from ACTIVE: an INVITED row has not accepted yet — cancel it with REVOKE, which also\n          // revokes the accept token — and an INACTIVE one is already out.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.ACTIVE,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REACTIVATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can reactivate members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            reason: z.string().max(500).optional()\n          }),\n          // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (SUSPENDED → ACTIVE, clearing any\n          // pending `scheduledReactivationAt`). Legal only from SUSPENDED: reactivating an INVITED\n          // row would skip acceptance and grant a membership nobody agreed to.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.SUSPENDED,\n          // MEDIUM sits below `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so without this the RESTORE half of the\n          // pair would go untrailed while SUSPEND (CRITICAL) is recorded — a trail showing every\n          // suspension and none of the lifts, which reads as a member still suspended a year after\n          // they were reinstated. The risk level answers \"how alarming is the affordance\"; this\n          // answers \"is it evidence an auditor needs\", and for the inverse of a CRITICAL verb it is.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // REVOKE — inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership. The exact\n    // custom implementation DELETES the row and atomically revokes its accept\n    // token. The paired PENDING_INVITATION user is retained here and reaped by\n    // deferred hygiene only after it is old and still has no memberships:\n    // point-operation cleanup cannot predicate-lock \"zero memberships\" against\n    // a concurrent invitation insert under Mongo snapshot isolation. `reason`\n    // is captured in the audit payload, not persisted on the deleted row.\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REVOKE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            reason: z.string().max(500).optional()\n          }),\n          tokenRevocation:\n            ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION,\n          // REVOKE has an exact API custom registration; `resourceOperationLike`\n          // selects DELETE persistence/DTO semantics but does not inherit the\n          // core DELETE custom implementation. Its real return is the delete\n          // envelope, declared explicitly so output validation matches runtime.\n          customResponseDto: DefaultDeleteResponseSchema,\n          // Only a still-pending invite can be revoked — an ACTIVE member is removed\n          // via DELETE, not \"revoked\". Gates the roster action (paired with the preset's\n          // `WHEN_AVAILABLE`, the button shows only on INVITED rows) AND fail-closes the\n          // backend (`services-registry-handler` throws SERVICE_RESOURCE_OPERATION_DISABLED\n          // → 403 if invoked on a non-INVITED row).\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        },\n      ],\n      // Two emails (distinct templates, disambiguated by `customNotificationRef`):\n      //  • the INVITEE (`recipientEmailField: 'userEmail'`) — \"your invitation was revoked\";\n      //  • the ADMIN/initiator (`USER_SELF`) — confirmation of the action.\n      // Both USER_SELF+EMAIL, so each MUST carry a unique `customNotificationRef`.\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          customNotificationRef: 'invitee',\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          customNotificationRef: 'admin',\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // RESEND — re-mint the accept token (revoking any prior one for this membership)\n    // and re-send the invite email with the fresh accept link. Only valid while the\n    // membership is `INVITED`.\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.RESEND]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          tokenGeneration: {\n            tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n            consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,\n            expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },\n            relatedIdField: '_id',\n            revokeExistingForSameRelated: true,\n            emailLinkPath: '/invitation',\n            condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n          },\n          // Resend is meaningful only while the invite is pending. Same dual enforcement\n          // as REVOKE: hides the roster action on non-INVITED rows and 403s server-side.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  },\n});\n"]}
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* Organization Members Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for organization member management.\n * Comprehensive member lifecycle and role management.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OrganizationMemberSchema,\n  OrganizationMemberStatus,\n} from './organization-members.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship, DefaultDeleteResponseSchema } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport {\n  CoreConsumableTokenTypes,\n  ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode,\n} from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas';\nimport type {\n  TokenRevocationConfig,\n} from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas';\nimport { DurationUnit } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\n\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { DataPortabilityProvenance } from '../compliance/privacy/subject-export.shared.schemas';\nimport { ErasureRetentionMode, ResourceDataSubjectKind } from '../compliance/privacy/impersonalization.shared.schemas';\n\n// Custom operations enum for organization members.\n// NOTE: cross-organization member transfer is intentionally NOT a framework\n// capability — moving a member between organizations is a tenant-boundary\n// crossing the framework does not sanction. Re-invite the identity in the\n// target organization instead.\n//\n// A membership row IS the invitation (there is no separate invitation resource):\n//   - CREATE      = invite (creates an `INVITED` row + mints the accept token).\n//   - REVOKE      = inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership.\n//   - RESEND      = re-mint + re-send the accept token for an `INVITED` membership.\n//   - SUSPEND/REACTIVATE = lifecycle of an ACTIVE/SUSPENDED member.\n// Invitee-side accept/reject is the tokenized `/auth/acceptInvitation` flow\n// (auth controller + `Auth_Invitation` screen), NOT a resource operation.\n//\n// ROLE CHANGES ARE `UPDATE`, NOT A DEDICATED VERB. `PROMOTE` / `DEMOTE` were declared here\n// as `ORG_ADMIN`-gated `riskLevel: HIGH` operations taking `{ newRole, reason }`, and were\n// removed on 2026-08-01: they were ROUTED but never implemented, so the request fell through\n// to the generic core UPDATE, which persists only fields the resource schema declares.\n// `newRole` is not one, so every call answered **HTTP 200 having changed nothing** — and the\n// dangerous direction is DEMOTE: an admin demotes a compromised account, is told 200 OK, and\n// the account keeps its privileges. Re-declaring an explicit role-change verb is legitimate,\n// but only WITH a custom implementation that writes `roles` and calls\n// `assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling` — a custom implementation is addressed by an EXACT\n// operation path, so it does NOT inherit the UPDATE variant's ceiling gate. Follow the\n// organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE pattern (a `prefixCoreOperations` hook returning the field\n// patch the core UPDATE persists). See\n// `.claude/plans/routed-unimplemented-operations-fail-closed.md`.\n//\n// GRANT_OWNERSHIP is the ONE exception to \"role changes are UPDATE\", and it exists for a reason\n// UPDATE structurally cannot serve: it is the only operation on this resource a caller who is NOT a\n// member of the organization may perform. See its config entry below.\nexport enum OrganizationMembers_Operations {\n  SUSPEND = 'suspend',\n  REACTIVATE = 'reactivate',\n  REVOKE = 'revoke',\n  RESEND = 'resend',\n  GRANT_OWNERSHIP = 'grantOwnership',\n}\n\n/**\n * One semantic definition for invalidating an organization invitation.\n *\n * REVOKE attaches it declaratively, so HTTP and trusted service callers enter\n * the same transactional revocation pipeline. Ordinary DELETE is\n * intentionally excluded: it removes a non-INVITED membership, which has no\n * invitation token to revoke.\n */\nexport const ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION = {\n  tokenTypes: [\n    CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n  ],\n  relatedIdField: '_id',\n} satisfies TokenRevocationConfig;\n\n/**\n * One predicate owns both invitation-token generation and invitation-email\n * dispatch. Keeping the two declarative side effects on the same named gate\n * prevents the polymorphic CREATE operation from drifting: an ACTIVE direct\n * add must produce neither an accept token nor an invitation email.\n */\nconst isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation = ({\n  currentObject,\n}: {\n  currentObject: Record<string, unknown>;\n}): boolean =>\n  currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED;\n\nconst ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS = ['status', 'role', 'joinedAt'];\n\nconst ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OrganizationMemberStatus),\n  role: z.string(),\n};\n\ntype OrganizationMembersCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT\n  // Route-less; `retentionPolicy` requires READ + LIST + UPDATE_MANY.\n  | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY;\n\n/*\nOrganization Members Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof OrganizationMembers_Operations,\n  OrganizationMembersCoreOperations,\n  typeof OrganizationMemberSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OrganizationMemberSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true,\n\n  // create: invitation-accept was the historical opt-in; now the org-admin INVITE, SSO/SCIM\n  //   JIT, and org-auto-create-on-registration all create members in-process with explicit\n  //   `userId` + `organizationId` FKs on a request-context-less EC (stripped by the\n  //   client-shaped CREATE DTO, re-attached by `createAsSystem`).\n  // read/list: the invitee's own pending-invitation inbox reads INVITED rows cross-org\n  //   BEFORE the invitee is a scoped member — authorized by `userId`-ownership at the\n  //   entry point (`listMyPendingInvitations`/`loadOwnedPendingInvitation`), not org role.\n  // update: invitation ACCEPTANCE flips INVITED → ACTIVE in-process; the invitee is not an\n  //   org admin, so the status flip goes through the trusted system path.\n  systemAccessPolicy: {\n    exportSubject: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    update: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Subject-export disclosure. The subject's OWN membership rows (org, roles, title) — not other members' data.\n   */\n  portabilityPolicy: { defaultProvenance: DataPortabilityProvenance.OBSERVED },\n\n  /**\n   * Subject erasure RETAINS this row and scrubs the person's contact and professional details.\n *\n * The membership survives because it is the tenant's record of who belonged to it and under what\n * authority; what does not survive is `userEmail` and `userTitle`, the denormalized copies of the\n * person held here so a row can be read without resolving the user.\n *\n * `roles` is deliberately NOT scrubbed. It is this application's authorization vocabulary rather than\n * personal data — the field's own comment says so — and emptying it could leave a tenant with no\n * administrator, which the administrative-continuity floors would refuse, making an erasure fail closed\n * on a tenant. Keeping it means that interaction never arises.\n   */\n  retentionPolicy: {\n    mode: ErasureRetentionMode.RETAIN_AND_IMPERSONALIZE,\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Erasing one of these rows revokes NO session. A membership is a record ABOUT a person's place in a\n *  tenant, not the person — their session ends through the `USERS` row, which is `SELF_PRINCIPAL`.\n   */\n  dataSubjectPolicy: { kind: ResourceDataSubjectKind.NO_PRINCIPAL },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,\n    // Route-less; `retentionPolicy` requires READ + LIST + UPDATE_MANY.\n    CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY,\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: OrganizationMembers_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n\n    /*\n\n     * Route-less retention plumbing — INTERNAL_CALL registers no route, so no API surface is added, and it\n\n     * must not be REPOSITORY_ONLY: the retention primitives resolve through `getServiceOperationPathDefault`,\n\n     * which matches only INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL. LIST is LOW (a read-shaped op may not claim the\n\n     * HIGH/CRITICAL band, which carries an audit-emission obligation); UPDATE_MANY is CRITICAL — it is the\n\n     * verb the impersonalize writer uses to stamp the retention markers.\n\n     */\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY]: {\n\n      variants: [{\n\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n\n        isDefault: true,\n\n        roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n\n        riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n\n      }],\n\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // CREATE is POLYMORPHIC — two intents on one op:\n    //  • INVITE (BRANCH B): the org admin supplies `userEmail` (the strict identity\n    //    anchor); the CREATE prefix find-or-creates the `User` by it (`PENDING_INVITATION`\n    //    if new) and FORCES `status: INVITED`. A single-use accept token is minted AFTER the\n    //    row is created (relatedId = the membership `_id`, STABLE across `INVITED → ACTIVE`\n    //    so the emailed link never orphans); the pipeline injects it into the invite email and\n    //    the dispatcher builds the accept link (`emailLinkPath → /invitation?token=…`, consumed\n    //    by `/auth/acceptInvitation`). No `grantedRoles`: the accept handler reads the\n    //    membership's own `roles` when it flips the row to ACTIVE.\n    //  • DIRECT-ADD (BRANCH A): the caller supplies `userId` (founder org-owner grant,\n    //    SSO-JIT, SCIM) and the row persists `ACTIVE` — there is nothing to accept.\n    // Token generation and notification dispatch share one named predicate.\n    // The INVITE branch mints one accept token and sends one post-commit email;\n    // the ACTIVE direct-add branch does neither.\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can invite members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators (userEmail + roles +\n          // organizationUnitsMembership + userTitle; userId/status/invitedByUserId/\n          // invitedAt are server-injected via `.excludeFromCreate()`).\n          tokenGeneration: {\n            tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n            consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,\n            expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },\n            relatedIdField: '_id',\n            emailLinkPath: '/invitation',\n            // Mint the accept token for real invites only — never for an ACTIVE direct-add.\n            condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n          },\n        }\n      ],\n      // Deliver the invite email to the INVITEE (`userEmail`) via the\n      // email-by-address path — the invitee may be a brand-new `PENDING_INVITATION`\n      // user with no session. Carries the `acceptUrl` (`/invitation?token=…`) built\n      // from the token minted above. `target: USER_SELF` is retained only so the\n      // derived template ref stays `…create.user-self` and the accept link routes to\n      // the main (non-admin) app.\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can read member info\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list organization members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          // `userEmail` is a denormalized, immutable own-field (mirror of the linked\n          // user's email, captured at membership creation). First/last name are NOT\n          // denormalized onto the member row — they live on `USER_PROFILES` and are\n          // mutable there — so they are searched RELATIONALLY: the framework runs a\n          // secondary match on `USER_PROFILES` (its own searchable fields) and folds\n          // the matching `userId`s into an `$in` on this row's `userId`. The member\n          // query stays org-scoped, so this is tenant-safe; names are never stale\n          // because they are read live from the profile at search time. See\n          // SearchableRelationDescriptor in resources-config.shared.schemas.ts.\n          searchableFields: [\n            'userEmail',\n            {\n              localField: 'userId',\n              relatedResource: CoreResourceType.USER_PROFILES,\n              relatedJoinField: 'userId',\n              fields: ['firstName', 'lastName'],\n            },\n          ],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can update member details\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          //\n          // Audited despite being below the HIGH/CRITICAL floor: since PROMOTE / DEMOTE were removed\n          // (2026-08-01), **this operation IS the only org-member role-change path**, and a role\n          // change is an access-control decision whatever the verb's risk level says. MEDIUM is the\n          // right answer for the UI axis riskLevel primarily serves — updating a member's details\n          // does not deserve a danger-zone affordance or a typed confirmation — but it is the wrong\n          // answer for the evidence axis, and this flag is exactly that divergence.\n          //\n          // This also closes the follow-up left open by the routed-unimplemented-operations sweep:\n          // `CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED` is declared and classified but\n          // emitted by nothing, so org-member role changes produced no trail at all. The generic\n          // mechanism covers it — with `roles` marked as audit evidence, the row carries the before\n          // and after sets — rather than adding a sixth hand-rolled emission.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant/revocation.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can remove members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // Accepted/non-pending members use ordinary DELETE. A pending invite\n          // is cancelled through REVOKE, which atomically revokes its accept\n          // token. Keeping the vocabularies disjoint avoids making every\n          // active-member removal token-coupled.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status !== OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * The higher-tier repair door for the organization-owner floor — the second half of the\n     * industry pattern described in `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md`.\n     *\n     * ## Why this cannot be UPDATE\n     *\n     * The floor refuses to let the last `ORG_OWNER` be removed, demoted or deactivated. That is the\n     * correct tenant-tier answer, but on its own it converts every mistake that DID strand a tenant\n     * — a direct database edit, a restore from a mid-erasure backup, an acknowledged erasure under\n     * GDPR Art. 17, a seed that authored no owner — into a permanent lockout, because\n     * `validateParentScopeAccess` denies a non-member on ORGANIZATIONS scope and there is no\n     * `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN` bypass. Both denials are pinned in\n     * `cross-tenant-super-admin-reach.mongo.integration.test.ts`. So no tenant member can grant the\n     * role (they would need the authority they just lost) and no platform administrator can reach\n     * the row at all. GitHub solves this with an Enterprise owner one tier up; this is that tier.\n     *\n     * ## Why it is a distinct verb rather than a flag on UPDATE\n     *\n     * `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration` relaxes the SCOPE check for the variant that carries\n     * it. Putting it on generic UPDATE would open every field of every membership row in every\n     * tenant to a cross-tenant caller. The whole safety argument is that the opened surface is\n     * exactly one field with one direction, so it is authored as its own operation whose custom\n     * implementation ignores the payload for anything but the justification.\n     *\n     * ## Deliberate narrowness\n     *\n     * - **Promotes an EXISTING member** (Microsoft Loop's rule). It cannot mint a membership, so it\n     *   never creates an identity inside a tenant nobody owns.\n     * - **Additive only.** It adds the owner-conferring role; it cannot remove roles, so it can\n     *   never be used to demote and is not a second path through the floor.\n     * - **`justification` is required**, not optional. This is a break-glass action against a tenant\n     *   the operator is not a member of; the audit row is worth nothing without the why. `AC-2(7)`\n     *   asks for privileged assignment to be monitored — the trail IS the control here, since by\n     *   construction no authorization check downstream can second-guess the caller.\n     *\n     * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY — restore administrability of a scope\n     * that has no usable administrator.\n     * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant.\n     */\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.GRANT_OWNERSHIP]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          // Platform tier only. This is the role set the operation-roles gate checks INDEPENDENTLY\n          // of the scope admission below: a caller holding this key at ORGANIZATIONS scope resolves\n          // it against the organization role table, which does not contain it, and is denied there.\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // THE cross-tenant admission. Without it the operation is unreachable by the only\n          // principal it exists for, because a platform administrator is by definition not a member\n          // of the stranded tenant.\n          admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            justification: z.string().min(1).max(1000),\n          }),\n          // No `auditableEvent` declaration: CRITICAL is inside `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so the\n          // event emits on the risk level alone and `auditBelowRiskFloor` would be inert here. The\n          // before/after role sets ride along because `roles` carries `.isAuditEvidence()` — which is\n          // what makes the trail answer the question that matters about this door: WHO was made an\n          // owner of a tenant, by a caller who was not in it.\n        },\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          // The tenant learns that its ownership changed from outside. An operator repairing a\n          // stranded tenant is legitimate; an operator quietly granting themselves an ally inside a\n          // customer's tenant is not, and the difference is only visible to the tenant if it is told.\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.SUSPEND]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can suspend members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            suspensionReason: z.string().min(1).max(500),\n            suspensionEndDate: z.date().optional()\n          }),\n          // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (ACTIVE → SUSPENDED, carrying\n          // `suspensionEndDate` onto the row's `scheduledReactivationAt`). SUSPEND is legal only\n          // from ACTIVE: an INVITED row has not accepted yet — cancel it with REVOKE, which also\n          // revokes the accept token — and an INACTIVE one is already out.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.ACTIVE,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REACTIVATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can reactivate members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            reason: z.string().max(500).optional()\n          }),\n          // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (SUSPENDED → ACTIVE, clearing any\n          // pending `scheduledReactivationAt`). Legal only from SUSPENDED: reactivating an INVITED\n          // row would skip acceptance and grant a membership nobody agreed to.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.SUSPENDED,\n          // MEDIUM sits below `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so without this the RESTORE half of the\n          // pair would go untrailed while SUSPEND (CRITICAL) is recorded — a trail showing every\n          // suspension and none of the lifts, which reads as a member still suspended a year after\n          // they were reinstated. The risk level answers \"how alarming is the affordance\"; this\n          // answers \"is it evidence an auditor needs\", and for the inverse of a CRITICAL verb it is.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // REVOKE — inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership. The exact\n    // custom implementation DELETES the row and atomically revokes its accept\n    // token. The paired PENDING_INVITATION user is retained here and reaped by\n    // deferred hygiene only after it is old and still has no memberships:\n    // point-operation cleanup cannot predicate-lock \"zero memberships\" against\n    // a concurrent invitation insert under Mongo snapshot isolation. `reason`\n    // is captured in the audit payload, not persisted on the deleted row.\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REVOKE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            reason: z.string().max(500).optional()\n          }),\n          tokenRevocation:\n            ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION,\n          // REVOKE has an exact API custom registration; `resourceOperationLike`\n          // selects DELETE persistence/DTO semantics but does not inherit the\n          // core DELETE custom implementation. Its real return is the delete\n          // envelope, declared explicitly so output validation matches runtime.\n          customResponseDto: DefaultDeleteResponseSchema,\n          // Only a still-pending invite can be revoked — an ACTIVE member is removed\n          // via DELETE, not \"revoked\". Gates the roster action (paired with the preset's\n          // `WHEN_AVAILABLE`, the button shows only on INVITED rows) AND fail-closes the\n          // backend (`services-registry-handler` throws SERVICE_RESOURCE_OPERATION_DISABLED\n          // → 403 if invoked on a non-INVITED row).\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        },\n      ],\n      // Two emails (distinct templates, disambiguated by `customNotificationRef`):\n      //  • the INVITEE (`recipientEmailField: 'userEmail'`) — \"your invitation was revoked\";\n      //  • the ADMIN/initiator (`USER_SELF`) — confirmation of the action.\n      // Both USER_SELF+EMAIL, so each MUST carry a unique `customNotificationRef`.\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          customNotificationRef: 'invitee',\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          customNotificationRef: 'admin',\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // RESEND — re-mint the accept token (revoking any prior one for this membership)\n    // and re-send the invite email with the fresh accept link. Only valid while the\n    // membership is `INVITED`.\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.RESEND]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          tokenGeneration: {\n            tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n            consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,\n            expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },\n            relatedIdField: '_id',\n            revokeExistingForSameRelated: true,\n            emailLinkPath: '/invitation',\n            condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n          },\n          // Resend is meaningful only while the invite is pending. Same dual enforcement\n          // as REVOKE: hides the roster action on non-INVITED rows and 403s server-side.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  },\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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+{"version":3,"file":"organization-members.shared.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/organizations/organization-members.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA;;;;GAIG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAExB,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAkB,MAAM,iDAAiD,CAAC;AAQjG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,oBAAY,wBAAwB;IAClC,OAAO,YAAY;IACnB,MAAM,WAAW;IACjB,QAAQ,aAAa;IACrB,SAAS,cAAc;CACxB;AAED,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBAiLnC,CAAC;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.schemas.js

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import { CORE_ORG_ROLES, OrgRolesSchema } from '../security/authorizations/roles
 import { forwardedLabel } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
 import { CoreResourceType } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions.js';
 import { PersonalDataCategory } from '../compliance/privacy/personal-data-category.shared.schemas.js';
+import { RedactionType } from '../compliance/privacy/redaction.shared.schemas.js';
+import { addImpersonalizeWith } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';
 /**
  * Organization member lifecycle status.
  *
@@ -72,8 +74,15 @@ export const OrganizationMemberSchema = z.object({
      * auto-rendered display cards/columns (the user-facing email is surfaced by
      * resolving the `userId` reference) — it still renders on the CREATE form.
      */
-    userEmail: z.email().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isHidden({ display: true }).excludeFromUpdate()
-        .dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.CONTACT_DETAILS),
+    // REMOVE on erasure. A denormalized copy of the person's email, held here so a membership row can be
+    // read without resolving the user — which is exactly what makes it personal data this row HOLDS rather
+    // than a link it carries. Clearable (`.optional()`), so REMOVE resolves to a removed key.
+    //
+    // `roles` beside it is deliberately NOT scrubbed: it is this application's authorization vocabulary,
+    // not personal data, and emptying it could strand a tenant with no administrator — the interaction the
+    // administrative-continuity floors exist to refuse. Keeping it means that interaction never arises.
+    userEmail: addImpersonalizeWith(z.email().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isHidden({ display: true }).excludeFromUpdate()
+        .dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.CONTACT_DETAILS), RedactionType.REMOVE),
     organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),
     /*
      * `organizationUnitsMembership` (an embedded `[{ organizationUnitId, role }]` array) was REMOVED
@@ -149,8 +158,10 @@ export const OrganizationMemberSchema = z.object({
     scheduledReactivationAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
     // The person's role in the customer's organization — their working life, not this application's
     // authorization model (`roles` is that, and it is a closed vocabulary rather than personal data).
-    userTitle: z.string().max(100).optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField()
-        .dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.PROFESSIONAL),
+    // REMOVE on erasure — the person's role in the customer's organization is a fact about their working
+    // life, which is why it carries PROFESSIONAL. Clearable (`.optional()`).
+    userTitle: addImpersonalizeWith(z.string().max(100).optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField()
+        .dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.PROFESSIONAL), RedactionType.REMOVE),
     /**
      * The `User._id` of the org admin who issued the invite. Server-set by the invite
      * CREATE prefix from the execution-context actor; absent on direct/system

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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SSO JIT / SCIM provisioning find-or-activate an existing `INVITED`\n * row rather than blind-creating a second `ACTIVE` one.\n *\n * - `INVITED`  — membership extended, invitee has not yet accepted. Paired with a\n *   `User` in `PENDING_INVITATION` status when the invitee has no account yet.\n * - `ACTIVE`   — accepted / directly provisioned membership.\n * - `INACTIVE` — deactivated (e.g. SCIM deprovision).\n * - `SUSPENDED` — temporarily suspended (optionally time-boxed).\n *\n * Invite OUTCOMES (declined / revoked / expired) are NOT statuses — the row is\n * deleted and the event recorded in the audit trail (keeps this enum about\n * membership, not invitation bookkeeping).\n */\nexport enum OrganizationMemberStatus {\n  INVITED = 'INVITED',\n  ACTIVE = 'ACTIVE',\n  INACTIVE = 'INACTIVE',\n  SUSPENDED = 'SUSPENDED'\n}\n\nexport const OrganizationMemberSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n  /**\n   * FK to the member `User`. ALWAYS present on a persisted row (a membership with\n   * no member is meaningless) — even an `INVITED` invitee has an eagerly-created\n   * `User` in `PENDING_INVITATION` status, so this FK is never null.\n   *\n   * SERVER-INJECTED on create (`.excludeFromCreate()`), via one of two paths:\n   *   - Invite (org-admin CREATE): the admin supplies {@link userEmail} instead;\n   *     the CREATE prefix find-or-creates the user by normalized email and injects\n   *     the resolved `_id` here (email is the strict unique identity anchor — see\n   *     `User.email.isUnique()`).\n   *   - System provisioning (invite-acceptance / SSO JIT / SCIM): passes `userId`\n   *     directly through `createAsSystem`, which re-attaches this context FK past\n   *     the strict-DTO strip.\n   * `.excludeFromUpdate()` keeps the member↔user binding immutable.\n   */\n  userId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /**\n   * The linked user's email — DUAL ROLE:\n   *\n   *   1. INVITE CREATE INPUT. On the org-admin invite CREATE the admin supplies\n   *      an email (not a `userId`); the CREATE prefix normalizes it, find-or-creates\n   *      the `User` by it (unique identity anchor), and derives {@link userId}. This\n   *      is why the field is client-writable on CREATE (no `.excludeFromCreate()`).\n   *   2. DENORMALIZED IMMUTABLE COPY. After creation it is the immutable mirror of\n   *      `USERS.email` (which is `.excludeFromUpdate()`, so this copy never drifts).\n   *      It feeds member SEARCH (`searchableFields: ['userEmail']` — no async hop)\n   *      and the {@link instanceLabel} fallback when the related profile/name is\n   *      unavailable (e.g. a `PENDING_INVITATION` invitee has no `USER_PROFILE` yet).\n   *\n   * For system creates (SSO/SCIM/acceptance) that pass `userId` instead of an\n   * email, the CREATE prefix DERIVES this value from the authoritative user record,\n   * so it is `.optional()` at the input boundary. `.excludeFromUpdate()` keeps it\n   * immutable post-creation. `.isHidden({ display: true })` keeps it out of\n   * auto-rendered display cards/columns (the user-facing email is surfaced by\n   * resolving the `userId` reference) — it still renders on the CREATE form.\n   */\n  userEmail: z.email().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isHidden({ display: true }).excludeFromUpdate()\n    .dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.CONTACT_DETAILS),\n  organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /*\n   * `organizationUnitsMembership` (an embedded `[{ organizationUnitId, role }]` array) was REMOVED\n   * here on 2026-07-31 and promoted to the `ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS` junction resource\n   * (plan decision D-B5). The array could not be queried portably — a dot-path filter into an\n   * array field resolves to NULL on PostgreSQL and the LIST summary projection strips the field —\n   * so every \"who is assigned to this unit?\" question failed OPEN, it could not carry a registered\n   * relationship (no cascade), and it admitted two conflicting roles for the same unit. Read unit\n   * assignments through `ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS` filtered by `organizationMemberId`.\n   */\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — this member's authority INSIDE the organization. Roles are the\n  // framework's single authorization axis, so a change here is an access-control decision and the\n  // before/after sets ARE the evidence: a trail that records only \"roles changed\" proves nothing\n  // about what authority resulted. Safe to record in full — a role name is vocabulary, not personal\n  // data, so it carries no erasure obligation into the immutable audit ledger.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  roles: z.array(OrgRolesSchema).default([CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER]).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),\n  /**\n   * Server-owned lifecycle state. Default `ACTIVE` covers direct/system\n   * provisioning (SSO JIT / SCIM / self-registration org-owner grant), while\n   * the org-admin invite CREATE prefix forces `INVITED`.\n   *\n   * Neither CREATE nor generic UPDATE may accept this field from a client:\n   * lifecycle transitions carry security side effects that a field update\n   * cannot reproduce. In particular, invitation acceptance must validate and\n   * consume the invitation token, grant the derived user type, and serialize\n   * against revocation; suspension/reactivation likewise have dedicated\n   * operations. Keeping status out of both DTOs makes those trusted transition\n   * operations the only way to change it.\n   */\n  status: z.enum(OrganizationMemberStatus)\n    .default(OrganizationMemberStatus.ACTIVE)\n    .isDBIndexed()\n    .isSummaryField()\n    .excludeFromCreate()\n    .excludeFromUpdate()\n    // Lifecycle state gates access as surely as roles do — a SUSPENDED member is denied, an ACTIVE\n    // one is not — so a suspension or reactivation is an authorization event and its before/after\n    // values are the evidence. The enum's values are closed vocabulary, never personal data, so\n    // recording them carries no GDPR Art. 17 obligation into the immutable ledger — the same\n    // reasoning `UserSchema.status` records. Without this the framework's\n    // `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` event notes only that `status` was among the changed fields,\n    // never what it changed FROM or TO, which is the half an access review actually reads.\n    // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n    .isAuditEvidence(),\n  /**\n   * When an automated sweep must return this membership to `ACTIVE`.\n   *\n   * Set by SUSPEND when the caller time-boxes the suspension (`suspensionEndDate` in that verb's\n   * request contract), cleared by REACTIVATE. Absent means the suspension is indefinite and only a\n   * deliberate REACTIVATE lifts it — which is the default, since an unbounded suspension is the\n   * safer reading of \"suspend\".\n   *\n   * NAMED FOR THE EFFECT, NOT THE CAUSE. `scheduledReactivationAt` says what the system will do;\n   * a `suspensionEndsAt` would describe only the suspension branch while the identical field on\n   * `USERS` also serves self-service deactivation. One concept, one name across both resources,\n   * so the reactivation sweep reads the same field everywhere. The request contracts keep their\n   * own caller-facing vocabulary and the transition hook translates — the same split\n   * `ORGANIZATION_UNITS` MOVE uses (`newParentUnitId` in, `parentUnitId` + `path` persisted).\n   *\n   * Server-owned on both sides (`.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`): only the transition\n   * operations write it, exactly as for {@link status} above. Indexed because the sweep's whole\n   * query is \"rows whose scheduled reactivation has passed\".\n   *\n   * ⚠️ A value here is a PROMISE the framework keeps: the reactivation batch is what makes it\n   * true. Persisting the date without that sweep would be the same defect as a verb that answers\n   * success and writes nothing — an authored intention nothing honors.\n   */\n  // Deliberately NOT `.isAuditEvidence()`. The rationale that briefly sat here — \"lifecycle state\n  // gates access as surely as roles do\" — is true of {@link status}, which is where it now lives.\n  // This field decides nothing about what the principal may do; it is a scheduling detail, and the\n  // transition's audit row already records the resulting status.\n  scheduledReactivationAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // The person's role in the customer's organization — their working life, not this application's\n  // authorization model (`roles` is that, and it is a closed vocabulary rather than personal data).\n  userTitle: z.string().max(100).optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField()\n    .dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.PROFESSIONAL),\n  /**\n   * The `User._id` of the org admin who issued the invite. Server-set by the invite\n   * CREATE prefix from the execution-context actor; absent on direct/system\n   * provisioning. Immutable. Feeds the audit trail and the user-facing \"invited by\"\n   * cue in the pending-invitations inbox.\n   *\n   * PROVENANCE STAMP, NOT a navigable FK — deliberately a plain indexed string (same\n   * idiom as `scim-tokens.createdByUserId`), NOT `.isForeignKey()`. The primary\n   * member↔user link is `userId` (registered M2M relationship); adding `.isForeignKey()`\n   * here would demand a SECOND `ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS → USERS` relationship (else the\n   * registry warns \"cannot be resolved to a resource type\") and would graft nested-route /\n   * parent-scope machinery onto a field that only records who clicked \"invite\". Resolve\n   * the inviter's display name with a bounded lookup at render time if the cue needs it.\n   */\n  invitedByUserId: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /**\n   * When the invite was issued. Server-set by the invite CREATE prefix; absent on\n   * direct/system provisioning. Immutable. Used by the inbox ordering and the\n   * expiry-reap CRON batch.\n   */\n  invitedAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /**\n   * Computed instance label — the linked user's name, forwarded live from\n   * `USER_PROFILES`. A junction row has no inherent name; its identity is the\n   * related party. {@link forwardedLabel} resolves it SERVER-SIDE at read time\n   * (joining `userId` → `USER_PROFILES.userId`, rendering `firstName lastName`)\n   * and projects it onto the summary/read DTO via the virtual-field pipeline, so\n   * the frontend label is a plain field ref (`getFrontendResourceLabel:\n   * ['instanceLabel']`). Never stale (read live), never denormalized, tenant-safe\n   * (a bounded system read over the userIds already on the org-scoped page). NOT\n   * persisted (virtual). When the profile/name is unavailable it falls back to the\n   * immutable {@link userEmail} (`fallbackField`) rather than a raw id.\n   */\n  instanceLabel: forwardedLabel({\n    localField: 'userId',\n    relatedResource: CoreResourceType.USER_PROFILES,\n    relatedJoinField: 'userId',\n    fields: ['firstName', 'lastName'],\n    fallbackField: 'userEmail',\n  }),\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n}).businessKeySet([\n  'userId',\n  'organizationId',\n]);\nexport type OrganizationMember = z.infer<typeof OrganizationMemberSchema>;\n"]}
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SSO JIT / SCIM provisioning find-or-activate an existing `INVITED`\n * row rather than blind-creating a second `ACTIVE` one.\n *\n * - `INVITED`  — membership extended, invitee has not yet accepted. Paired with a\n *   `User` in `PENDING_INVITATION` status when the invitee has no account yet.\n * - `ACTIVE`   — accepted / directly provisioned membership.\n * - `INACTIVE` — deactivated (e.g. SCIM deprovision).\n * - `SUSPENDED` — temporarily suspended (optionally time-boxed).\n *\n * Invite OUTCOMES (declined / revoked / expired) are NOT statuses — the row is\n * deleted and the event recorded in the audit trail (keeps this enum about\n * membership, not invitation bookkeeping).\n */\nexport enum OrganizationMemberStatus {\n  INVITED = 'INVITED',\n  ACTIVE = 'ACTIVE',\n  INACTIVE = 'INACTIVE',\n  SUSPENDED = 'SUSPENDED'\n}\n\nexport const OrganizationMemberSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n  /**\n   * FK to the member `User`. ALWAYS present on a persisted row (a membership with\n   * no member is meaningless) — even an `INVITED` invitee has an eagerly-created\n   * `User` in `PENDING_INVITATION` status, so this FK is never null.\n   *\n   * SERVER-INJECTED on create (`.excludeFromCreate()`), via one of two paths:\n   *   - Invite (org-admin CREATE): the admin supplies {@link userEmail} instead;\n   *     the CREATE prefix find-or-creates the user by normalized email and injects\n   *     the resolved `_id` here (email is the strict unique identity anchor — see\n   *     `User.email.isUnique()`).\n   *   - System provisioning (invite-acceptance / SSO JIT / SCIM): passes `userId`\n   *     directly through `createAsSystem`, which re-attaches this context FK past\n   *     the strict-DTO strip.\n   * `.excludeFromUpdate()` keeps the member↔user binding immutable.\n   */\n  userId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /**\n   * The linked user's email — DUAL ROLE:\n   *\n   *   1. INVITE CREATE INPUT. On the org-admin invite CREATE the admin supplies\n   *      an email (not a `userId`); the CREATE prefix normalizes it, find-or-creates\n   *      the `User` by it (unique identity anchor), and derives {@link userId}. This\n   *      is why the field is client-writable on CREATE (no `.excludeFromCreate()`).\n   *   2. DENORMALIZED IMMUTABLE COPY. After creation it is the immutable mirror of\n   *      `USERS.email` (which is `.excludeFromUpdate()`, so this copy never drifts).\n   *      It feeds member SEARCH (`searchableFields: ['userEmail']` — no async hop)\n   *      and the {@link instanceLabel} fallback when the related profile/name is\n   *      unavailable (e.g. a `PENDING_INVITATION` invitee has no `USER_PROFILE` yet).\n   *\n   * For system creates (SSO/SCIM/acceptance) that pass `userId` instead of an\n   * email, the CREATE prefix DERIVES this value from the authoritative user record,\n   * so it is `.optional()` at the input boundary. `.excludeFromUpdate()` keeps it\n   * immutable post-creation. `.isHidden({ display: true })` keeps it out of\n   * auto-rendered display cards/columns (the user-facing email is surfaced by\n   * resolving the `userId` reference) — it still renders on the CREATE form.\n   */\n  // REMOVE on erasure. A denormalized copy of the person's email, held here so a membership row can be\n  // read without resolving the user — which is exactly what makes it personal data this row HOLDS rather\n  // than a link it carries. Clearable (`.optional()`), so REMOVE resolves to a removed key.\n  //\n  // `roles` beside it is deliberately NOT scrubbed: it is this application's authorization vocabulary,\n  // not personal data, and emptying it could strand a tenant with no administrator — the interaction the\n  // administrative-continuity floors exist to refuse. Keeping it means that interaction never arises.\n  userEmail: addImpersonalizeWith(\n    z.email().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isHidden({ display: true }).excludeFromUpdate()\n      .dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.CONTACT_DETAILS),\n    RedactionType.REMOVE,\n  ),\n  organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /*\n   * `organizationUnitsMembership` (an embedded `[{ organizationUnitId, role }]` array) was REMOVED\n   * here on 2026-07-31 and promoted to the `ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS` junction resource\n   * (plan decision D-B5). The array could not be queried portably — a dot-path filter into an\n   * array field resolves to NULL on PostgreSQL and the LIST summary projection strips the field —\n   * so every \"who is assigned to this unit?\" question failed OPEN, it could not carry a registered\n   * relationship (no cascade), and it admitted two conflicting roles for the same unit. Read unit\n   * assignments through `ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS` filtered by `organizationMemberId`.\n   */\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — this member's authority INSIDE the organization. Roles are the\n  // framework's single authorization axis, so a change here is an access-control decision and the\n  // before/after sets ARE the evidence: a trail that records only \"roles changed\" proves nothing\n  // about what authority resulted. Safe to record in full — a role name is vocabulary, not personal\n  // data, so it carries no erasure obligation into the immutable audit ledger.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  roles: z.array(OrgRolesSchema).default([CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER]).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),\n  /**\n   * Server-owned lifecycle state. Default `ACTIVE` covers direct/system\n   * provisioning (SSO JIT / SCIM / self-registration org-owner grant), while\n   * the org-admin invite CREATE prefix forces `INVITED`.\n   *\n   * Neither CREATE nor generic UPDATE may accept this field from a client:\n   * lifecycle transitions carry security side effects that a field update\n   * cannot reproduce. In particular, invitation acceptance must validate and\n   * consume the invitation token, grant the derived user type, and serialize\n   * against revocation; suspension/reactivation likewise have dedicated\n   * operations. Keeping status out of both DTOs makes those trusted transition\n   * operations the only way to change it.\n   */\n  status: z.enum(OrganizationMemberStatus)\n    .default(OrganizationMemberStatus.ACTIVE)\n    .isDBIndexed()\n    .isSummaryField()\n    .excludeFromCreate()\n    .excludeFromUpdate()\n    // Lifecycle state gates access as surely as roles do — a SUSPENDED member is denied, an ACTIVE\n    // one is not — so a suspension or reactivation is an authorization event and its before/after\n    // values are the evidence. The enum's values are closed vocabulary, never personal data, so\n    // recording them carries no GDPR Art. 17 obligation into the immutable ledger — the same\n    // reasoning `UserSchema.status` records. Without this the framework's\n    // `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` event notes only that `status` was among the changed fields,\n    // never what it changed FROM or TO, which is the half an access review actually reads.\n    // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n    .isAuditEvidence(),\n  /**\n   * When an automated sweep must return this membership to `ACTIVE`.\n   *\n   * Set by SUSPEND when the caller time-boxes the suspension (`suspensionEndDate` in that verb's\n   * request contract), cleared by REACTIVATE. Absent means the suspension is indefinite and only a\n   * deliberate REACTIVATE lifts it — which is the default, since an unbounded suspension is the\n   * safer reading of \"suspend\".\n   *\n   * NAMED FOR THE EFFECT, NOT THE CAUSE. `scheduledReactivationAt` says what the system will do;\n   * a `suspensionEndsAt` would describe only the suspension branch while the identical field on\n   * `USERS` also serves self-service deactivation. One concept, one name across both resources,\n   * so the reactivation sweep reads the same field everywhere. The request contracts keep their\n   * own caller-facing vocabulary and the transition hook translates — the same split\n   * `ORGANIZATION_UNITS` MOVE uses (`newParentUnitId` in, `parentUnitId` + `path` persisted).\n   *\n   * Server-owned on both sides (`.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`): only the transition\n   * operations write it, exactly as for {@link status} above. Indexed because the sweep's whole\n   * query is \"rows whose scheduled reactivation has passed\".\n   *\n   * ⚠️ A value here is a PROMISE the framework keeps: the reactivation batch is what makes it\n   * true. Persisting the date without that sweep would be the same defect as a verb that answers\n   * success and writes nothing — an authored intention nothing honors.\n   */\n  // Deliberately NOT `.isAuditEvidence()`. The rationale that briefly sat here — \"lifecycle state\n  // gates access as surely as roles do\" — is true of {@link status}, which is where it now lives.\n  // This field decides nothing about what the principal may do; it is a scheduling detail, and the\n  // transition's audit row already records the resulting status.\n  scheduledReactivationAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // The person's role in the customer's organization — their working life, not this application's\n  // authorization model (`roles` is that, and it is a closed vocabulary rather than personal data).\n  // REMOVE on erasure — the person's role in the customer's organization is a fact about their working\n  // life, which is why it carries PROFESSIONAL. Clearable (`.optional()`).\n  userTitle: addImpersonalizeWith(\n    z.string().max(100).optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField()\n    .dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.PROFESSIONAL),\n    RedactionType.REMOVE,\n  ),\n  /**\n   * The `User._id` of the org admin who issued the invite. Server-set by the invite\n   * CREATE prefix from the execution-context actor; absent on direct/system\n   * provisioning. Immutable. Feeds the audit trail and the user-facing \"invited by\"\n   * cue in the pending-invitations inbox.\n   *\n   * PROVENANCE STAMP, NOT a navigable FK — deliberately a plain indexed string (same\n   * idiom as `scim-tokens.createdByUserId`), NOT `.isForeignKey()`. The primary\n   * member↔user link is `userId` (registered M2M relationship); adding `.isForeignKey()`\n   * here would demand a SECOND `ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS → USERS` relationship (else the\n   * registry warns \"cannot be resolved to a resource type\") and would graft nested-route /\n   * parent-scope machinery onto a field that only records who clicked \"invite\". Resolve\n   * the inviter's display name with a bounded lookup at render time if the cue needs it.\n   */\n  invitedByUserId: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /**\n   * When the invite was issued. Server-set by the invite CREATE prefix; absent on\n   * direct/system provisioning. Immutable. Used by the inbox ordering and the\n   * expiry-reap CRON batch.\n   */\n  invitedAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /**\n   * Computed instance label — the linked user's name, forwarded live from\n   * `USER_PROFILES`. A junction row has no inherent name; its identity is the\n   * related party. {@link forwardedLabel} resolves it SERVER-SIDE at read time\n   * (joining `userId` → `USER_PROFILES.userId`, rendering `firstName lastName`)\n   * and projects it onto the summary/read DTO via the virtual-field pipeline, so\n   * the frontend label is a plain field ref (`getFrontendResourceLabel:\n   * ['instanceLabel']`). Never stale (read live), never denormalized, tenant-safe\n   * (a bounded system read over the userIds already on the org-scoped page). NOT\n   * persisted (virtual). When the profile/name is unavailable it falls back to the\n   * immutable {@link userEmail} (`fallbackField`) rather than a raw id.\n   */\n  instanceLabel: forwardedLabel({\n    localField: 'userId',\n    relatedResource: CoreResourceType.USER_PROFILES,\n    relatedJoinField: 'userId',\n    fields: ['firstName', 'lastName'],\n    fallbackField: 'userEmail',\n  }),\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n}).businessKeySet([\n  'userId',\n  'organizationId',\n]);\nexport type OrganizationMember = z.infer<typeof OrganizationMemberSchema>;\n"]}

package/dist/esm/organizations/organizations.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/organizations/organizations.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -506,16 +506,24 @@ export const organizationResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resource
          * way — they are a denormalized grant on the user row — so they are reconciled here, and
          * `restore` re-grants them.
          *
-         * ## Audience limitation inherited from the DELETE door this replaces
-         *
-         * ⚠️ KNOWN, accepted deliberately. Re-authentication proves identity by PASSWORD only today,
-         * and the framework DESTROYS `passwordHash` + passkeys for directory-managed (SCIM) users as a
-         * compliance control (`_reconcileLocalCredentialsForDirectoryManaged`). So an ORG_ADMIN of a
-         * directory-managed organization cannot satisfy the step-up gate and is refused. That is
-         * fail-closed on the most destructive action available to a tenant, and the refusal is
-         * diagnosable — the step-up round-trip ends in an explicit "No password set for this account".
-         * Extending re-authentication to TOTP (which IS preserved for directory-managed users) removes
-         * the limitation; until then such a tenant is marked through the `admin` variant below.
+         * ## Audience limitation inherited from the DELETE door this replaces — now CLOSED
+         *
+         * This used to read: re-authentication proves identity by PASSWORD only, the framework DESTROYS
+         * `passwordHash` + passkeys for directory-managed (SCIM) users as a compliance control
+         * (`_reconcileLocalCredentialsForDirectoryManaged`), so an ORG_ADMIN of a directory-managed
+         * organization could not satisfy the step-up gate and was refused — and it named the fix as
+         * future work, routing such a tenant through the `admin` variant below.
+         *
+         * That fix SHIPPED. `AuthMethodManagementBackendService.reAuthenticate` accepts PASSWORD, TOTP
+         * and PASSKEY. `AuthMethod.TOTP` means "an enrolled second factor" — a TOTP code or a backup
+         * code — verified through `AuthMfaBackendService.verifyEnrolledSecondFactor`, the same single
+         * authority the login second-factor step uses, anti-replay included. It was chosen precisely
+         * because the SCIM reconciliation PRESERVES it: a second factor sitting on top of the IdP first
+         * factor survives deprovisioning by design.
+         *
+         * So a directory-managed ORG_ADMIN can satisfy this gate itself, and does NOT need the `admin`
+         * variant to start a teardown. That variant remains for platform-operator use, not as the
+         * workaround for a limitation that no longer exists.
          *
          * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-authentication before a high-impact
          * action; the tenant loses its access rights at the moment of the decision, not at the moment