@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.0.1 → 1.1.1

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

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+/**
+ * Organization OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration
+ *
+ * Resource configuration for managing organization-scoped registered OAuth
+ * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`
+ * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE/DELETE/COUNT plus
+ * custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS
+ * custom ops from api-keys are intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { OAuthClientOrganizationSchema, OAuthClientStatus, } from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions.js';
+import { ResourceOperationRiskLevel } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions.js';
+import { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas.js';
+import { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory.js';
+import { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas.js';
+// Sort and filter fields for organization OAuth clients
+const ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'name', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt'];
+// Org members get basic filter fields
+const ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS = {
+    status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),
+    name: z.string(),
+    organizationId: z.string(),
+    hasExpiration: z.boolean(),
+};
+// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities
+const ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {
+    ...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,
+    lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage
+    expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration
+    createdAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by creation date
+    updatedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by update date
+};
+// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities
+const ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = [...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS, 'status'];
+// Custom operations enum for organization OAuth clients
+export var OrgOAuthClients_Operations;
+(function (OrgOAuthClients_Operations) {
+    OrgOAuthClients_Operations["ROTATE"] = "rotate";
+    OrgOAuthClients_Operations["REGENERATE"] = "regenerate";
+})(OrgOAuthClients_Operations || (OrgOAuthClients_Operations = {}));
+/*
+Organization OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory
+*/
+export const orgOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization({
+    mainSchema: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,
+    resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION,
+    resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION],
+    resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,
+    isSystemResource: true, // Organization OAuth clients are a core system resource
+    coreOperations: [
+        CoreResourceOperation.READ,
+        CoreResourceOperation.LIST,
+        CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,
+        CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,
+        CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,
+        CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,
+    ],
+    customOperation: OrgOAuthClients_Operations,
+    operationsConfiguration: {
+        [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    // Feature usage accounting counts org OAuth clients through the
+                    // repository layer. This operation does not need public HTTP exposure.
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                },
+            ],
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Organization admins can view
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                },
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: false,
+                    variantKey: "admin",
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also view
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list to see clients
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                },
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: false,
+                    variantKey: "admin",
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also list
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can create clients
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    // requestDto auto-derived from decorators
+                    customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({
+                        plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()
+                    }),
+                },
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: false,
+                    variantKey: "admin",
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can create for any org
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each
+                    // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to
+                    // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (it exists
+                    // nowhere else after this response — only its SHA-256 hash is persisted).
+                    // Security decision: an app-super-admin creating a client for another org
+                    // DOES receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of
+                    // the default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.
+                    customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({
+                        plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()
+                    }),
+                }
+            ],
+            userNotifications: [
+                {
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,
+                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                },
+                {
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,
+                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can delete clients
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    haveBulkOperation: true,
+                },
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: false,
+                    variantKey: "admin",
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can delete any org clients
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    haveBulkOperation: true,
+                }
+            ],
+            userNotifications: [
+                {
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,
+                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                },
+                {
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,
+                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can rotate secrets
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default
+                    // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded
+                    // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be
+                    // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement
+                    // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.
+                    //
+                    // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a
+                    // regenerate "keeps the prior secret working" (see its own declaration), so it is additive
+                    // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.
+                    //
+                    // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a
+                    // high-impact action.
+                    requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,
+                    resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+                    requestDto: z.object({
+                        oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())
+                    }),
+                    customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({
+                        plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),
+                        oldClientId: z.string(),
+                        oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()
+                    }),
+                },
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: false,
+                    variantKey: "admin",
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can rotate any org clients
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default
+                    // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded
+                    // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be
+                    // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement
+                    // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.
+                    //
+                    // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a
+                    // regenerate "keeps the prior secret working" (see its own declaration), so it is additive
+                    // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.
+                    //
+                    // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a
+                    // high-impact action.
+                    requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,
+                    resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+                    // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each
+                    // variant builds its own. Request AND response both MIRROR the org-admin
+                    // default:
+                    //  - requestDto: an app-super-admin can choose the same future
+                    //    `oldSecretInvalidationDate` window as an org admin. Without it the
+                    //    admin variant would build no request DTO and the impl could only
+                    //    default the invalidation to now — silently denying the future-window
+                    //    capability the default variant exposes.
+                    //  - customResponseDto: without it the admin response falls back to
+                    //    `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (plus the
+                    //    rotated-out client's id + invalidation date). Security decision: an
+                    //    app-super-admin rotating another org's client DOES receive the
+                    //    plaintext so they can relay it to the org.
+                    // Keep both in sync with the default variant above.
+                    requestDto: z.object({
+                        oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())
+                    }),
+                    customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({
+                        plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),
+                        oldClientId: z.string(),
+                        oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()
+                    }),
+                }
+            ],
+            userNotifications: [
+                {
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,
+                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                },
+                {
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,
+                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can regenerate secrets
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
+                    resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+                    // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its
+                    // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously
+                    // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.
+                    // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps
+                    // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly
+                    // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the
+                    // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.
+                    // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.
+                    auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },
+                    // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input
+                    // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the
+                    // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns
+                    // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller
+                    // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all
+                    // be writable through "regenerate". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those
+                    // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate
+                    // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.
+                    // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code
+                    // exfiltration primitive.
+                    // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.
+                    requestDto: z.object({}),
+                    customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({
+                        plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),
+                    }),
+                },
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: false,
+                    variantKey: "admin",
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can regenerate any org clients
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
+                    resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+                    // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its
+                    // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously
+                    // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.
+                    // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps
+                    // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly
+                    // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the
+                    // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.
+                    // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.
+                    auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },
+                    // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each
+                    // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to
+                    // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret`. Security
+                    // decision: an app-super-admin regenerating another org's client DOES
+                    // receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of the
+                    // default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.
+                    // `requestDto` mirrors the default variant too: no caller input, so the
+                    // cross-tenant variant cannot rewrite `redirectUris` / `roles` through "regenerate".
+                    requestDto: z.object({}),
+                    customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({
+                        plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),
+                    }),
+                }
+            ],
+            userNotifications: [
+                {
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,
+                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                    isSearchable: true,
+                    searchableFields: ['name', 'description'],
+                    searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },
+                    filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,
+                    sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS,
+                    maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,
+                },
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: false,
+                    variantKey: "admin",
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                    isSearchable: true,
+                    searchableFields: ['name', 'description', 'clientId'],
+                    searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },
+                    filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,
+                    sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,
+                    maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,
+                }
+            ],
+        },
+    },
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

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* Organization OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for managing organization-scoped registered OAuth\n * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`\n * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE/DELETE/COUNT plus\n * custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS\n * custom ops from api-keys are intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,\n  OAuthClientStatus,\n} from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\n// Sort and filter fields for organization OAuth clients\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'name', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt'] as const;\n\n// Org members get basic filter fields\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),\n  name: z.string(),\n  organizationId: z.string(),\n  hasExpiration: z.boolean(),\n};\n\n// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  ...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n  lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage\n  expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration\n  createdAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by creation date\n  updatedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by update date\n};\n\n// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = [...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS, 'status'] as const;\n\n// Custom operations enum for organization OAuth clients\nexport enum OrgOAuthClients_Operations {\n  ROTATE = 'rotate', // Generate new secret and invalidate old one\n  REGENERATE = 'regenerate', // Generate new secret without invalidating old one\n}\n\ntype OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT;\n\n/*\nOrganization OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const orgOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof OrgOAuthClients_Operations,\n  OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations,\n  typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true, // Organization OAuth clients are a core system resource\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: OrgOAuthClients_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          // Feature usage accounting counts org OAuth clients through the\n          // repository layer. This operation does not need public HTTP exposure.\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Organization admins can view\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also view\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list to see clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also list\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can create clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can create for any org\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to\n          // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (it exists\n          // nowhere else after this response — only its SHA-256 hash is persisted).\n          // Security decision: an app-super-admin creating a client for another org\n          // DOES receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of\n          // the default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can delete clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          haveBulkOperation: true,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can delete any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          haveBulkOperation: true,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can rotate secrets\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can rotate any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Request AND response both MIRROR the org-admin\n          // default:\n          //  - requestDto: an app-super-admin can choose the same future\n          //    `oldSecretInvalidationDate` window as an org admin. Without it the\n          //    admin variant would build no request DTO and the impl could only\n          //    default the invalidation to now — silently denying the future-window\n          //    capability the default variant exposes.\n          //  - customResponseDto: without it the admin response falls back to\n          //    `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (plus the\n          //    rotated-out client's id + invalidation date). Security decision: an\n          //    app-super-admin rotating another org's client DOES receive the\n          //    plaintext so they can relay it to the org.\n          // Keep both in sync with the default variant above.\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can regenerate secrets\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input\n          // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the\n          // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns\n          // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller\n          // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all\n          // be writable through \"regenerate\". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those\n          // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate\n          // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.\n          // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code\n          // exfiltration primitive.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can regenerate any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to\n          // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret`. Security\n          // decision: an app-super-admin regenerating another org's client DOES\n          // receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of the\n          // default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.\n          // `requestDto` mirrors the default variant too: no caller input, so the\n          // cross-tenant variant cannot rewrite `redirectUris` / `roles` through \"regenerate\".\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          searchableFields: ['name', 'description'],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          searchableFields: ['name', 'description', 'clientId'],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n  },\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/**
+ * OAuth Client Shared Schemas
+ *
+ * Frontend/backend shared schemas + DTOs for the registered OAuth-client
+ * credential resource (`organizationOAuthClients`, `applicationOAuthClients`).
+ * Backend-specific logic (secret minting/hashing, mint pipeline) stays in
+ * saas-backend-lib.
+ *
+ * This resource is a FAITHFUL MIRROR of the api-keys resource
+ * (`api-keys.shared.schemas.ts`): the same long-lived secret + rotation-grace
+ * shape, the same server-managed strip-seam contract, the same org|app scope
+ * split. It exists as its OWN resource (not a variant of api-keys) because the
+ * request-auth choke point routes a presented secret to a DISTINCT principal
+ * by the plaintext prefix (`oc_org_`/`oc_app_` vs the api-key `sk_org_`/`sk_app_`)
+ * — an OAuth client and an api-key both authenticate the SAME machine principal
+ * (`ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` / `APPLICATION_MACHINE`); they are distinct credential types, an api-key acts
+ * as an api-key principal.
+ *
+ * OIDC authorization code, interactive consent, persistent consent grants,
+ * exact redirect allowlists and public/confidential client classification are
+ * implemented. The resource remains the registered-client authority; issued
+ * codes, tokens and user consent records have their own runtime/storage owners.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { ApiKeyScope } from '../api-keys/api-keys.shared.schemas';
+/**
+ * Lifecycle status of a registered OAuth client. Mirrors `ApiKeyStatus`: an
+ * INACTIVE or EXPIRED client cannot mint tokens at the request-auth choke point.
+ */
+export declare enum OAuthClientStatus {
+    ACTIVE = "active",
+    INACTIVE = "inactive",
+    EXPIRED = "expired"
+}
+/**
+ * OAuth 2.0 grant types a registered client may be authorized to use. The trunk
+ * resource ships CLIENT_CREDENTIALS (the machine-to-machine front); the
+ * AUTHORIZATION_CODE / REFRESH_TOKEN arms are declared here so the OIDC branch can
+ * enable them per-client via `allowedGrants` without a schema reshape.
+ */
+/**
+ * How a client got registered — a TRUST classification, not a bookkeeping detail.
+ *
+ * Kept separate from `ApiKeyScope` on purpose. `scope` answers "which of this application's scopes
+ * owns the credential", and both of its members imply someone with standing inside the application
+ * created it. This enum answers "did anyone vouch for this client at all", and the two questions
+ * became independent the moment an anonymous caller could register one.
+ *
+ * semantic-literal-boundary: a closed Wildo vocabulary with one named runtime source. Every schema,
+ * default, comparison and mapping over registration provenance derives from THIS enum.
+ */
+export declare enum OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin {
+    /**
+     * Created by a principal with standing in this application — an organization administrator
+     * through the org-clients API, a platform operator, or a seed. **The default**, so nothing that
+     * existed before dynamic registration changes posture.
+     */
+    OPERATOR = "operator",
+    /**
+     * Self-registered by an anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint.
+     *
+     * The client asserted its own name and redirect URIs and proved nothing. It is granted no roles,
+     * capped at identity scopes, and always faces the user's consent prompt.
+     */
+    DYNAMIC = "dynamic"
+}
+export declare enum OAuthGrantType {
+    CLIENT_CREDENTIALS = "client_credentials",
+    AUTHORIZATION_CODE = "authorization_code",
+    REFRESH_TOKEN = "refresh_token"
+}
+/**
+ * How a registered OAuth client authenticates AT THIS APP'S token endpoint (OIDC
+ * `token_endpoint_auth_method`) — the PROVIDER-side classification of OUR clients. Deliberately
+ * DISTINCT from `OAuth2_TokenEndpoint_AuthMethod` in `external-connectors-models`, which describes how
+ * Wildo-as-CLIENT authenticates to an EXTERNAL IdP's token endpoint (the opposite direction); the two
+ * are separate concepts even though they share the OAuth wire vocabulary. Values are the OIDC-registered
+ * method names advertised in the discovery document's `token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`.
+ *
+ * - `NONE` — a PUBLIC client: no client secret at the token endpoint; the authorization_code exchange
+ *   relies on mandatory PKCE (S256) + exact redirect_uri (the OAuth 2.1 baseline for SPA / native /
+ *   agent clients). This is the default because a client is public unless its
+ *   server-side secret-retention and token authentication method are explicit.
+ * - `CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC` / `CLIENT_SECRET_POST` — a CONFIDENTIAL client: it MUST present its
+ *   `client_secret` (via HTTP Basic, or the request body, respectively) at the token endpoint, as
+ *   defense-in-depth on top of PKCE. Both map to "confidential" for enforcement — the basic-vs-body
+ *   distinction is a per-request transport choice the token endpoint already accepts either way.
+ */
+export declare enum OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod {
+    NONE = "none",
+    CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC = "client_secret_basic",
+    CLIENT_SECRET_POST = "client_secret_post"
+}
+/**
+ * The single semantic authority for the public-vs-confidential decision: a client is CONFIDENTIAL
+ * (must present its secret at the token endpoint) iff its `tokenEndpointAuthMethod` is not `NONE`.
+ * Every enforcement site (authorization_code secret check, revocation client-auth) derives from this
+ * helper rather than re-deciding, so the classification never drifts.
+ */
+export declare function isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod(method: OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod): boolean;
+export declare function isSafeOAuthRedirectUri(value: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Base schema for extension (needs to be z.object for `.extend()` to work).
+ *
+ * `scope` reuses `ApiKeyScope` (ORGANIZATION|APPLICATION) — the same primary-scope
+ * split as api-keys; the org/app variants narrow it to a literal + add the FK.
+ *
+ * SECRET + ROTATION GRACE (`hashedSecret`/`secretPrefix`/`previous*`) mirror the
+ * api-key `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix`/`previous*` fields VERBATIM (same decorators,
+ * same server-managed strip-seam contract). Unlike api-keys — which declare
+ * `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix` on the concrete org/app variant schemas — the OAuth
+ * client keeps them on the base: every scope persists the identical secret shape,
+ * so a single base declaration is the honest single source of truth.
+ */
+export declare const OAuthClientSchemaBase: z.ZodObject<{
+    _id: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
+    name: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
+    description: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    scope: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodEnum<typeof ApiKeyScope>>>;
+    roles: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodEnum<typeof import("../..").CORE_APP_ROLES>, z.ZodEnum<typeof import("../..").CORE_ORG_ROLES>, z.ZodString]>>>>;
+    allowedScopes: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    allowedGrants: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthGrantType>>>;
+    redirectUris: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    postLogoutRedirectUris: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    requiresConsent: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod>>>;
+    status: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthClientStatus>>>>>;
+    expiresAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    lastUsedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>>;
+    createdAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>>;
+    updatedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>;
+    hashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    secretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>;
+    previousHashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    previousSecretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
+    previousSecretInvalidationDate: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    registrationOrigin: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin>>>>>>>;
+}, z.core.$strip>;
+export type OAuthClientBase = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientSchemaBase>;
+export declare const OAuthClientOrganizationSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    _id: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
+    name: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
+    description: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    roles: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodEnum<typeof import("../..").CORE_APP_ROLES>, z.ZodEnum<typeof import("../..").CORE_ORG_ROLES>, z.ZodString]>>>>;
+    allowedScopes: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    allowedGrants: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthGrantType>>>;
+    redirectUris: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    postLogoutRedirectUris: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    requiresConsent: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod>>>;
+    status: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthClientStatus>>>>>;
+    expiresAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    lastUsedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>>;
+    createdAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>>;
+    updatedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>;
+    hashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    secretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>;
+    previousHashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    previousSecretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
+    previousSecretInvalidationDate: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    registrationOrigin: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin>>>>>>>;
+    scope: z.ZodLiteral<ApiKeyScope.ORGANIZATION>;
+    organizationId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
+}, z.core.$strip>;
+export type OAuthClientOrganization = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema>;
+export declare const OAuthClientApplicationSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    _id: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
+    name: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
+    description: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    roles: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodEnum<typeof import("../..").CORE_APP_ROLES>, z.ZodEnum<typeof import("../..").CORE_ORG_ROLES>, z.ZodString]>>>>;
+    allowedScopes: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    allowedGrants: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthGrantType>>>;
+    redirectUris: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    postLogoutRedirectUris: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    requiresConsent: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod>>>;
+    status: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthClientStatus>>>>>;
+    expiresAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    lastUsedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>>;
+    createdAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>>;
+    updatedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>;
+    hashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    secretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>;
+    previousHashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    previousSecretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
+    previousSecretInvalidationDate: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    registrationOrigin: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin>>>>>>>;
+    scope: z.ZodLiteral<ApiKeyScope.APPLICATION>;
+    applicationId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
+}, z.core.$strip>;
+export type OAuthClientApplication = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauth-clients.shared.schemas.d.ts.map