@wildo-ai/saas-backend-lib 1.1.2 → 1.1.4

package/dist/esm/security/connected-accounts/services/organization-provider-credential-store.backend.service.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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* The organization-provider-credential STORE — the port implementation the registry consults.\n *\n * ## What makes the isolation structural rather than a filter\n *\n * Three independent mechanisms have to agree before a credential is handed back, and none of them\n * is a predicate somebody has to remember to write at each call site:\n *\n * 1. **The scope FK is injected by the context machinery.** The read goes through `readAsSystem`\n *    with the organization in the system scope map, so `buildContextualFilter` adds the tenant\n *    clause itself. A caller cannot omit it, because the caller never writes it.\n * 2. **The filter names the organization explicitly as well.** Belt and braces, deliberately: the\n *    contextual filter is injected by a mechanism that exists TWICE (a Mongo implementation and a\n *    PostgreSQL one), so a regression in one adapter is a bypass in that adapter alone. The explicit\n *    clause is adapter-independent and would still scope the read.\n * 3. **The envelope is BOUND to the row identity.** Even a read that returned another tenant's row\n *    would fail to OPEN it — the associated data is the organization, provider and slug, so the seal\n *    itself refuses. This is the one that holds when the other two are wrong, which is why it exists.\n *\n * ## The store never accepts a caller-supplied organization from a request\n *\n * `organizationId` arrives from the calling code's trusted execution scope. The port cannot verify\n * it — nothing at this tier can — so the honest statement is that the guarantee holds one level up,\n * and the envelope binding is what keeps a mistake there from becoming a cross-tenant credential\n * disclosure rather than merely a failed read.\n */\n\nimport { inject, injectable, optional } from 'inversify';\nimport {\n  CoreResourceType,\n  ProviderCredentialResolutionSource,\n  ProviderCredentialValidationState,\n  serializeProviderOAuth2Grant,\n  type ProviderOAuth2Grant,\n  type OrganizationProviderCredential,\n} from '@wildo-ai/saas-models';\n\nimport { ExternalProvider_Connection_DelegationMode, ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope } from '@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models';\n\nimport { SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES } from '~wildo-backend-lib/inject/models/service-types';\nimport type { LoggerService } from '~wildo-backend-lib/monitoring/logger/services/logger.service';\nimport type { AppConfigurationService } from '~wildo-backend-lib/config/services/app-configuration.backend.service';\nimport type { SystemAccessBackendService } from '~wildo-backend-lib/base-classes/services/services/system-access.backend.service';\nimport type { AuditLogsBackendService } from '~wildo-backend-lib/compliance/audit-trails/services/audit-logs.backend.service';\nimport { describeCaughtError } from '~wildo-backend-lib/errors/utils/error-log-level-classification.backend.utils';\n\nimport {\n  ProviderCredentialEnvelopeError,\n  openProviderCredential,\n} from '../utils/provider-credential-envelope.backend.utils';\nimport { resolveStoredCredentialValue } from '../utils/stored-credential-value.backend.utils';\nimport { providerOAuth2GrantWasPermanentlyRejected } from './provider-oauth2-exchange.backend';\nimport type { ProviderOAuth2RefresherPort } from '../provider-oauth2-refresher.port';\nimport type {\n  OrganizationProviderCredentialQuery,\n  OrganizationProviderCredentialResolution,\n  OrganizationProviderCredentialResolverPort,\n} from '../organization-provider-credential-resolver.port';\n\n@injectable()\nexport class OrganizationProviderCredentialStoreBackendService implements OrganizationProviderCredentialResolverPort {\n  constructor(\n    @inject(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.Logger) private readonly logger: LoggerService,\n    @inject(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.AppConfigService) private readonly appConfigService: AppConfigurationService,\n    @inject(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.SystemAccessService) private readonly systemAccess: SystemAccessBackendService,\n    /**\n     * OPTIONAL and lazily used, mirroring `SystemAccessBackendService`'s own treatment of it: audit\n     * emission must never be the reason a provider call fails, and a minimal test container must\n     * still be able to construct this service.\n     */\n    @inject(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.AuditLogsService) @optional() private readonly auditLogs?: AuditLogsBackendService,\n    /**\n     * Appended LAST, deliberately: a parameter inserted mid-signature silently reassigns every\n     * positional argument after it, and this constructor is called positionally by several harnesses.\n     *\n     * OPTIONAL, and its absence is not a degradation — a store without one resolves every pasted\n     * credential and every non-expiring token exactly as before. Only an EXPIRING grant needs it, and\n     * that case refuses by name rather than sending a stale token.\n     */\n    @inject(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.ProviderOAuth2Refresher) @optional() private readonly refresher?: ProviderOAuth2RefresherPort,\n  ) {}\n\n  /**\n   * The organization's own credential, opened, or `undefined` when the tenant has not set one.\n   *\n   * See the port's JSDoc for why \"absent\" returns and \"present but unopenable\" throws.\n   */\n  public async resolveOrganizationCredential(\n    query: OrganizationProviderCredentialQuery,\n  ): Promise<OrganizationProviderCredentialResolution | undefined> {\n    const row = await this.readCredentialRow(query);\n    if (!row) {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n\n    // A disabled credential is a tenant's deliberate \"do not spend this\" and must read as ABSENT, so\n    // the registry falls through to the deployment environment exactly as it would for a tenant that\n    // never configured one. Throwing instead would make disabling a credential break the integration\n    // rather than park it, which is the opposite of what an operator reaches for during an incident.\n    if (row.enabled === false) {\n      this.logger.debug?.(\n        '[organization-provider-credential] credential is disabled; treating as absent',\n        { organizationId: query.organizationId, providerRef: query.providerRef, secretSlug: query.secretSlug },\n      );\n      return undefined;\n    }\n\n    const plaintext = openProviderCredential(\n      row.secretValue,\n      this.appConfigService.secrets.security.session.encryptionKey,\n      {\n        ownerScope: ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope.ORGANIZATION,\n        ownerId: query.organizationId,\n        providerRef: query.providerRef,\n        secretSlug: query.secretSlug,\n      },\n    );\n\n    // What is STORED is not always what goes on the wire: an OAuth2 grant is a JSON document whose\n    // access token is one field. Returning the plaintext directly would put that document on the\n    // wire as a bearer token, and the vendor's 401 would name a credential problem rather than a\n    // serialization one. One shared resolver, because both stores hold both shapes.\n    const describeRow = `organization '${query.organizationId}', provider '${query.providerRef}', slug '${query.secretSlug}'`;\n    const resolved = resolveStoredCredentialValue(plaintext, describeRow, this.refresher !== undefined);\n    if (resolved.needsRefresh) {\n      // The renewal round trip and the write-back, in that order. The exchange belongs to the\n      // refresher (it needs the contract and the application's registration); persisting belongs\n      // here (it needs the table, the envelope key and the scope map). Neither half is where the\n      // other's inputs are, which is why this is two components rather than one.\n      const renewed = await this.renewOrRetire(row._id, query, {\n        providerRef: query.providerRef,\n        secretSlug: query.secretSlug,\n        target: {\n          ownerScope: ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope.ORGANIZATION,\n          ownerId: query.organizationId,\n          delegation: ExternalProvider_Connection_DelegationMode.SERVICE,\n        },\n        grant: resolved.grant!,\n        // From the ROW. The authorization record that first held these expired ten minutes after\n        // the connect; a templated token URL is still templated an hour later, so without this a\n        // Microsoft or regional connection renews into `needs a value for 'cloud'`.\n        connectionParameters: row.connectionParameters,\n      });\n      await this.persistRenewedGrant(query, row._id, renewed);\n      return { value: renewed.accessToken, credentialId: row._id };\n    }\n\n    return { value: resolved.wireValue, credentialId: row._id };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The row, read through the system door.\n   *\n   * `readAsSystem` bypasses the CALLER's role check, not the tenant boundary — an outbound provider\n   * call legitimately happens on a batch, a queue consumer or an anonymous webhook return leg, none\n   * of which holds an ORG_ADMIN role, and all of which must still resolve the tenant's credential.\n   * The organization travels in the system scope map, which is the channel both the contextual\n   * filter and the enrichment actually consume.\n   */\n  private async readCredentialRow(\n    query: OrganizationProviderCredentialQuery,\n  ): Promise<OrganizationProviderCredential | null> {\n    return this.systemAccess.readAsSystem<OrganizationProviderCredential>(\n      CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n      {\n        organizationId: query.organizationId,\n        providerRef: query.providerRef,\n        secretSlug: query.secretSlug,\n      },\n      { scopeContext: { organizationId: query.organizationId } },\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Record that a credential was spent, and what the provider thought of it.\n   *\n   * Best-effort in both halves and deliberately so: an outbound provider call has already happened\n   * by the time this runs, and failing the caller because a bookkeeping write did not land would\n   * turn a successful integration into an error. Every failure is logged with the row named.\n   *\n   * The audit event is emitted for BOTH sources, including the deployment-environment fallback,\n   * because \"this tenant is silently acting as the shared principal\" is the condition worth seeing\n   * and it is invisible if only the interesting case is recorded.\n   */\n  public async recordCredentialUse(use: {\n    organizationId: string;\n    providerRef: string;\n    secretSlug: string;\n    source: ProviderCredentialResolutionSource;\n    credentialId?: string;\n    /** What the provider said. Absent means the outcome is not yet known to the caller. */\n    outcome?: { accepted: boolean; providerMessage?: string };\n  }): Promise<void> {\n    await this.emitUseAudit(use);\n\n    // Only a tenant's OWN credential has a row to stamp. A deployment-environment resolution has\n    // nothing to write to, and inventing a row for it would create a credential the tenant never set.\n    if (use.source !== ProviderCredentialResolutionSource.ORGANIZATION_CREDENTIAL || !use.credentialId) {\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const now = new Date();\n    const patch: Record<string, unknown> = { lastUsedAt: now };\n    if (use.outcome) {\n      patch.validationState = use.outcome.accepted\n        ? ProviderCredentialValidationState.VALID\n        : ProviderCredentialValidationState.INVALID;\n      patch.lastValidatedAt = now;\n      // Truncated to the schema's own bound. The provider's message describes the CREDENTIAL's\n      // status and must never be derived from the credential itself — a caller passing the secret\n      // here would publish it to a client-readable field, which is why this is documented at the\n      // one place a provider string enters the row.\n      patch.validationError = use.outcome.accepted\n        ? undefined\n        : (use.outcome.providerMessage ?? '').slice(0, 500) || undefined;\n    }\n\n    try {\n      await this.systemAccess.updateAsSystem(\n        CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n        use.credentialId,\n        patch,\n        {\n          scopeContext: { organizationId: use.organizationId },\n          /*\n           * `lastUsedAt`, `lastValidatedAt` and `validationError` are all\n           * `.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`, so the repository's strict `requestDto.parse`\n           * drops them before persistence unless they are allow-listed here.\n           *\n           * The automatic diff that populates this list covers fields a custom-impl PREFIX hook\n           * injected — which is how `secretSetAt` reaches the row on a write. Nothing populates it\n           * for a payload a caller passes directly, which is what this is, so the omission was\n           * silent in the worst way: `validationState` is NOT excluded and moved correctly, so the\n           * row went INVALID while the timestamp and the provider's explanation of WHY vanished.\n           * A person looking at a credential marked invalid with no reason and no last-use time is\n           * being told less than the code believes it recorded.\n           */\n          preserveServerInjectedFields: ['lastUsedAt', 'lastValidatedAt', 'validationError'],\n        },\n      );\n    } catch (error) {\n      this.logger.warn?.(\n        '[organization-provider-credential] failed to record credential use',\n        {\n          organizationId: use.organizationId,\n          providerRef: use.providerRef,\n          secretSlug: use.secretSlug,\n          credentialId: use.credentialId,\n          error: describeCaughtError(error),\n        },\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async emitUseAudit(use: {\n    organizationId: string;\n    providerRef: string;\n    secretSlug: string;\n    source: ProviderCredentialResolutionSource;\n    credentialId?: string;\n  }): Promise<void> {\n    if (!this.auditLogs) {\n      return;\n    }\n    try {\n      await this.auditLogs.logOrganizationProviderCredentialUsed({\n        organizationId: use.organizationId,\n        providerRef: use.providerRef,\n        secretSlug: use.secretSlug,\n        resolvedFrom: use.source,\n        credentialId: use.credentialId,\n      });\n    } catch (error) {\n      this.logger.warn?.(\n        '[organization-provider-credential] failed to emit credential-use audit event',\n        {\n          organizationId: use.organizationId,\n          providerRef: use.providerRef,\n          error: describeCaughtError(error),\n        },\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n\n  /**\n   * Record a grant the authorization exchange just minted, replacing one already stored.\n   *\n   * The plaintext goes in and the resource's own WRITE DOOR seals it — the same hook that seals a\n   * credential a person types, and the same reason `persistRenewedGrant` hands over plaintext:\n   * `createAsSystem` / `updateAsSystem` reach the SERVICE tier, so a pre-sealed value arrives at\n   * that hook and the envelope refuses to double-seal.\n   *\n   * ## Reconnecting REPLACES rather than adding a second row\n   *\n   * The business key is (organizationId, providerRef, secretSlug) and it is UNIQUE, so a second connect would\n   * violate the index. Read-then-write is a race, and the honest statement is that the index is what\n   * decides it: two simultaneous connects mean one of them loses, which is the correct outcome —\n   * a person who authorized twice gets one connection, not two half-connections.\n   *\n   * @returns the credential row's id, so the caller can name it in an audit event.\n   */\n  public async storeGrant(\n    query: OrganizationProviderCredentialQuery,\n    grant: ProviderOAuth2Grant,\n    connectionParameters?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,\n  ): Promise<string> {\n    const existing = await this.readCredentialRow(query);\n    const secretValue = serializeProviderOAuth2Grant(grant);\n    const scopeContext = { organizationId: query.organizationId };\n\n    if (existing) {\n      // `connectionParameters` is `.excludeFromUpdate()` — it describes the ACCOUNT the grant is\n      // for, and re-authorizing against a different directory is a different connection. A\n      // reconnect that changed them would point the refresh somewhere the token was not issued.\n      await this.systemAccess.updateAsSystem(\n        CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n        existing._id,\n        {\n          secretValue,\n          enabled: true,\n          // Clearing the mark is part of reconnecting, not a separate concern. A row retired by\n          // `renewOrRetire` would otherwise keep `validationState: INVALID` forever — so somebody\n          // who did exactly what the screen told them to do would reconnect successfully and still\n          // be shown a broken connection.\n          validationState: ProviderCredentialValidationState.UNVALIDATED,\n          validationError: undefined,\n        },\n        { scopeContext, preserveServerInjectedFields: ['validationError'] },\n      );\n      await this.emitConnectionGranted(query, grant, existing._id, true);\n      return existing._id;\n    }\n\n    const created = await this.systemAccess.createAsSystem<OrganizationProviderCredential>(\n      CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n      {\n        organizationId: query.organizationId,\n        providerRef: query.providerRef,\n        secretSlug: query.secretSlug,\n        secretValue,\n        ...(connectionParameters === undefined ? {} : { connectionParameters }),\n      },\n      { scopeContext },\n    );\n    await this.emitConnectionGranted(query, grant, created._id, false);\n    return created._id;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Store a credential somebody TYPED, as opposed to one an exchange minted.\n   *\n   * The other half of `storeGrant`, and separate from it because the two differ in every way that\n   * matters: a grant is a JSON document with an expiry and a refresh token, this is one opaque value;\n   * a grant arrives from a vendor, this arrives from a person; a grant can be renewed, this can only\n   * be replaced. Serialising a typed key through the grant envelope would put\n   * `wildo-oauth2-grant:{...}` on the wire as a bearer token.\n   *\n   * PLAINTEXT to the write door, which seals. Handing a pre-sealed value to `createAsSystem` reaches\n   * the service tier where the sealing hook refuses to double-seal — so the write would throw after\n   * the person had already typed their key.\n   *\n   * Replaces rather than duplicates: the business key is (owner, provider, slug), so re-entering a\n   * rotated key is the ordinary case and a second create would violate the index. Re-entering also\n   * RE-ENABLES and clears any validation mark, because somebody who has just supplied a working key\n   * should not be shown a broken connection.\n   */\n  public async storeDeclaredSecret(query: OrganizationProviderCredentialQuery, secretValue: string): Promise<string> {\n    const existing = await this.readCredentialRow(query);\n    const scopeContext = { organizationId: query.organizationId };\n\n    if (existing) {\n      await this.systemAccess.updateAsSystem(\n        CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n        existing._id,\n        {\n          secretValue,\n          enabled: true,\n          validationState: ProviderCredentialValidationState.UNVALIDATED,\n          validationError: undefined,\n        },\n        { scopeContext, preserveServerInjectedFields: ['validationError'] },\n      );\n      return existing._id;\n    }\n\n    const created = await this.systemAccess.createAsSystem<OrganizationProviderCredential>(\n      CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n      {\n        organizationId: query.organizationId,\n        providerRef: query.providerRef,\n        secretSlug: query.secretSlug,\n        secretValue,\n      },\n      { scopeContext },\n    );\n    return created._id;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Renew the grant, and RETIRE the connection when the vendor says it is finished.\n   *\n   * Without this the refresh call was unguarded, and the failure was slow and silent in the worst\n   * direction. A vendor that permanently rejects a refresh token — the person removed the app at the\n   * vendor, an administrator revoked it, the token aged past its absolute lifetime — throws, the\n   * error propagates out of the resolve, and NOTHING touches the row. `validationState` stays where\n   * it was, so the connected-accounts screen goes on showing the account as connected, every call\n   * fails identically forever, and the person is never told the one thing they could act on.\n   *\n   * Only `invalid_grant` retires a connection, and the exclusions are the substantive part. A\n   * transport failure, a bare 500 or an unparseable body means the vendor said NOTHING about the\n   * grant, and retiring a working connection because we could not reach a vendor for thirty seconds\n   * would be a self-inflicted outage. `invalid_client` is excluded for a different reason: it is the\n   * APPLICATION's own registration being rejected, one operator's misconfiguration affecting every\n   * connection at once — marking each person's account invalid would blame all of them for something\n   * none of them can fix.\n   *\n   * The mark is best-effort and the ORIGINAL error is always re-thrown: the caller needs the real\n   * cause, and a bookkeeping write that failed must not replace it with a different story.\n   */\n  private async renewOrRetire(\n    credentialId: string,\n    query: OrganizationProviderCredentialQuery,\n    request: Parameters<ProviderOAuth2RefresherPort['refreshGrant']>[0],\n  ): Promise<ProviderOAuth2Grant> {\n    try {\n      return await this.refresher!.refreshGrant(request);\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (providerOAuth2GrantWasPermanentlyRejected(error)) {\n        try {\n          await this.systemAccess.updateAsSystem(\n            CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n            credentialId,\n            {\n              validationState: ProviderCredentialValidationState.INVALID,\n              lastValidatedAt: new Date(),\n              // The vendor's own code, and nothing derived from the credential. This field is\n              // CLIENT-READABLE, so anything token-shaped reaching it would publish a secret onto\n              // the screen that displays it.\n              validationError: 'The provider rejected the stored authorization (invalid_grant). Reconnect the account.',\n            },\n            {\n              scopeContext: { organizationId: query.organizationId },\n              // Both of these are `.excludeFromUpdate()`; without the allow-list the row would go\n              // INVALID carrying no reason and no timestamp — see `recordCredentialUse`.\n              preserveServerInjectedFields: ['lastValidatedAt', 'validationError'],\n            },\n          );\n        } catch (markError) {\n          this.logger.warn?.(\n            '[organization-provider-credential] a grant was permanently rejected and the row could not be marked',\n            { providerRef: query.providerRef, secretSlug: query.secretSlug, credentialId, error: describeCaughtError(markError) },\n          );\n        }\n      }\n      throw error;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Record that a delegated authorization was GRANTED, distinct from the row's own `_SET` event.\n   *\n   * Emitted HERE and nowhere else, because this is the only place that holds the three facts an\n   * auditor wants and the row does not: the scopes the vendor actually issued, which account they\n   * were issued for, and whether this replaced a connection that already existed. By the time the\n   * resource's own write hook sees the row, the value is sealed and none of it is recoverable.\n   *\n   * Best-effort, like every other emission on this path. The grant is already stored and the person\n   * has already authorized it; failing their connection because a trail write did not land would\n   * turn a completed authorization into an error and invite them to grant it a second time.\n   */\n  private async emitConnectionGranted(\n    query: OrganizationProviderCredentialQuery,\n    grant: ProviderOAuth2Grant,\n    credentialId: string,\n    replacedExistingConnection: boolean,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    if (!this.auditLogs) {\n      return;\n    }\n    try {\n      await this.auditLogs.logOrganizationProviderConnectionGranted({\n        organizationId: query.organizationId,\n        providerRef: query.providerRef,\n        secretSlug: query.secretSlug,\n        credentialId,\n        grantedScopes: grant.grantedScopes,\n        accountRef: grant.accountRef,\n        replacedExistingConnection,\n      });\n    } catch (error) {\n      this.logger.warn?.(\n        '[organization-provider-credential] a connection was granted and the audit event could not be emitted',\n        { providerRef: query.providerRef, secretSlug: query.secretSlug, credentialId, error: describeCaughtError(error) },\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Persist a renewed grant through the resource's own WRITE door.\n   *\n   * The plaintext goes in and the CUSTOM IMPLEMENTATION seals it — the same hook that seals a\n   * credential a person types. Sealing here instead would be a second sealing site for one\n   * invariant, and it does not merely duplicate: `updateAsSystem` reaches the service tier, so a\n   * pre-sealed value arrives at that hook and the envelope REFUSES it (\"double-sealing would hand\n   * the envelope itself to the provider\"). Every refresh would have thrown at the write-back.\n   *\n   * `secretSetAt` therefore moves, and that is correct rather than tolerated: the field is defined\n   * as \"when the stored VALUE last changed\", and a renewal changes it. An earlier version of this\n   * method held it still on the theory that it should mean \"when a HUMAN last supplied a value\" —\n   * that is a different field, and inventing the behaviour without the field was the error.\n   *\n   * NOT best-effort. A refresh that is not persisted happens again on every call, and against a\n   * vendor that rotates the refresh token each one invalidates the last — so the connection breaks\n   * while every individual exchange succeeds.\n   */\n  private async persistRenewedGrant(\n    query: OrganizationProviderCredentialQuery,\n    credentialId: string,\n    renewed: ProviderOAuth2Grant,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    await this.systemAccess.updateAsSystem(\n      CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n      credentialId,\n      { secretValue: serializeProviderOAuth2Grant(renewed) },\n      { scopeContext: { organizationId: query.organizationId } },\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Turn an envelope failure into the operator-facing statement.\n   *\n   * Exposed so the registry can distinguish \"this tenant has no credential\" (fall through to the\n   * environment) from \"this tenant HAS one and it is broken\" (refuse, loudly) without importing the\n   * envelope's error type and re-deriving the distinction. One definition, one meaning.\n   */\n  public static isUnopenableCredential(error: unknown): error is ProviderCredentialEnvelopeError {\n    return error instanceof ProviderCredentialEnvelopeError;\n  }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/connected-accounts/services/organization-provider-credentials.custom-impl.backend.service.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/**
+ * The WRITE path for an organization's provider credential: seal on the way in, audit on the way
+ * out.
+ *
+ * ## Without this file the resource stores plaintext
+ *
+ * The schema declares `secretValue` as `.isWriteOnlySecret()`, which governs how the value is
+ * PRESENTED (redacted at the client boundary, and a round-tripped mask means "keep the stored
+ * secret"). It says nothing about how the value is STORED — a write-only-secret field lands in the
+ * database exactly as the client typed it. Sealing it is this hook's job, and it is the only place
+ * that job is done, so a credential reaching persistence unsealed means this registration did not
+ * resolve.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ A custom implementation resolves by an EXACT operation-path key embedding the resource, the
+ * operation, the variant TYPE and the default/variant-key slot. A registration naming a combination
+ * the resource configuration does not declare resolves nothing and silently never runs, while the
+ * route still answers 200 — here that would mean every credential persisted in plaintext behind a
+ * green suite. The pins in `__tests__/organization-provider-credentials-write-path.backend.test.ts`
+ * assert these registrations against the REAL resource configuration for that reason.
+ *
+ * ## The DELETE doors — enumerated, because only one of them reaches this file
+ *
+ * | Door | Path | This hook |
+ * |---|---|---|
+ * | A tenant administrator revoking a credential | service tier, `DELETE` default variant | RUNS |
+ * | The ORGANIZATIONS purge cascade (both the batch's route-less default door and the super-admin's `admin` door reach the same cascade) | `deleteChildrenImmediate` → the RAW repository | does NOT run |
+ *
+ * Door 2 is not an oversight and not a hole in the ERASURE: the cascade removes the rows, which is
+ * what matters, and `services-registry-handler.backend.service.ts` documents the raw-repository
+ * route explicitly ("VARIANT-AGNOSTIC CASCADE: the onParentDelete teardown deletes children directly
+ * through the RAW repository"). What door 2 has no way to produce is a per-credential AUDIT event,
+ * because the service tier — where custom implementations live — is bypassed entirely. Emitting one
+ * would need a cascade-tier audit hook in the framework, which is outside this resource. The tenant
+ * purge is itself audited as `ORGANIZATION_DELETED`, so the destruction is on the record; what is
+ * missing is the enumeration of WHICH third parties the tenant held credentials for at that moment.
+ * Recorded as its own issue rather than left for a reader to discover from an absence.
+ */
+import { type ResourceCustomServiceImplementationFactory } from '../../../base-classes/services/services/resource-operation-custom-implementation.factory.backend';
+/** Every write door of the organization-provider-credential resource. */
+export declare function createOrganizationProviderCredentialFactories(): ResourceCustomServiceImplementationFactory[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=organization-provider-credentials.custom-impl.backend.service.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/security/connected-accounts/services/organization-provider-credentials.custom-impl.backend.service.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"organization-provider-credentials.custom-impl.backend.service.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/security/connected-accounts/services/organization-provider-credentials.custom-impl.backend.service.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAoCG;AAkBH,OAAO,EAEL,KAAK,0CAA0C,EAChD,MAAM,4GAA4G,CAAC;AAqZpH,yEAAyE;AACzE,wBAAgB,6CAA6C,IAAI,0CAA0C,EAAE,CAM5G"}

package/dist/esm/security/connected-accounts/services/organization-provider-credentials.custom-impl.backend.service.js

@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+/**
+ * The WRITE path for an organization's provider credential: seal on the way in, audit on the way
+ * out.
+ *
+ * ## Without this file the resource stores plaintext
+ *
+ * The schema declares `secretValue` as `.isWriteOnlySecret()`, which governs how the value is
+ * PRESENTED (redacted at the client boundary, and a round-tripped mask means "keep the stored
+ * secret"). It says nothing about how the value is STORED — a write-only-secret field lands in the
+ * database exactly as the client typed it. Sealing it is this hook's job, and it is the only place
+ * that job is done, so a credential reaching persistence unsealed means this registration did not
+ * resolve.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ A custom implementation resolves by an EXACT operation-path key embedding the resource, the
+ * operation, the variant TYPE and the default/variant-key slot. A registration naming a combination
+ * the resource configuration does not declare resolves nothing and silently never runs, while the
+ * route still answers 200 — here that would mean every credential persisted in plaintext behind a
+ * green suite. The pins in `__tests__/organization-provider-credentials-write-path.backend.test.ts`
+ * assert these registrations against the REAL resource configuration for that reason.
+ *
+ * ## The DELETE doors — enumerated, because only one of them reaches this file
+ *
+ * | Door | Path | This hook |
+ * |---|---|---|
+ * | A tenant administrator revoking a credential | service tier, `DELETE` default variant | RUNS |
+ * | The ORGANIZATIONS purge cascade (both the batch's route-less default door and the super-admin's `admin` door reach the same cascade) | `deleteChildrenImmediate` → the RAW repository | does NOT run |
+ *
+ * Door 2 is not an oversight and not a hole in the ERASURE: the cascade removes the rows, which is
+ * what matters, and `services-registry-handler.backend.service.ts` documents the raw-repository
+ * route explicitly ("VARIANT-AGNOSTIC CASCADE: the onParentDelete teardown deletes children directly
+ * through the RAW repository"). What door 2 has no way to produce is a per-credential AUDIT event,
+ * because the service tier — where custom implementations live — is bypassed entirely. Emitting one
+ * would need a cascade-tier audit hook in the framework, which is outside this resource. The tenant
+ * purge is itself audited as `ORGANIZATION_DELETED`, so the destruction is on the record; what is
+ * missing is the enumeration of WHICH third parties the tenant held credentials for at that moment.
+ * Recorded as its own issue rather than left for a reader to discover from an absence.
+ */
+import { CoreAuditableEventType, CoreResourceOperation, CoreResourceType, ErrorType, ErrorCustomMessageReference, ProviderCredentialDeletionReason, ResourceOperationVariantType, WRITE_ONLY_SECRET_MASK, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier, } from '@wildo-ai/saas-models';
+import { ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope } from '@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models';
+import { createResourceCustomServiceImplementation, } from '../../../base-classes/services/services/resource-operation-custom-implementation.factory.backend.js';
+import { SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES } from '../../../inject/models/service-types.js';
+import { resolveAuditActorId } from '../../../compliance/audit-trails/utils/audit-actor.backend.utils.js';
+import { projectCaughtErrorLogFields } from '../../../errors/utils/error-log-level-classification.backend.utils.js';
+import { sealProviderCredential } from '../utils/provider-credential-envelope.backend.utils.js';
+/**
+ * Resolve the row identity for a write.
+ *
+ * The three parts come from three DIFFERENT places, and that is the reason this is a function rather
+ * than three property reads:
+ *
+ * - `organizationId` is injected by the context machinery from the request SCOPE, so on CREATE it is
+ *   not in the input payload at all. The execution context's context-resource map is the
+ *   authoritative channel — the same one `buildContextualFilter` and `enrichDataWithContext` read —
+ *   which is what makes the seal bind to the tenant the framework will actually store the row under,
+ *   rather than to one a caller could name in a body field.
+ * - `providerRef` / `secretSlug` are client-supplied on CREATE and `.excludeFromUpdate()` afterwards,
+ *   so on UPDATE they must come from the pre-fetched current row.
+ */
+function resolveWriteIdentity(input, executionContext, utils) {
+    const current = utils.currentObject;
+    // Two sources, and the request BODY is deliberately not one of them.
+    //
+    // On UPDATE the stored row is authoritative — it is what the framework already persisted. On
+    // CREATE the execution context's context-resource map is, because that is the same channel
+    // `enrichDataWithContext` reads when it injects the scope FK, so the seal binds to the tenant the
+    // row will actually be stored under.
+    //
+    // A `payload.organizationId` fallback was here and was REMOVED: it fails safe (a seal bound to a
+    // body-supplied tenant is simply unopenable later, so the outcome is a denial rather than a
+    // disclosure) but it is still the request choosing what the seal binds to, which is exactly the
+    // authorship this hook exists to keep out of a caller's hands. With no fallback, a context that
+    // cannot name the tenant is a REFUSAL — see below.
+    const organizationId = (typeof current?.organizationId === 'string' && current.organizationId)
+        || executionContext.getContextResourceId?.(coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]);
+    const providerRef = (typeof input?.providerRef === 'string' && input.providerRef)
+        || (typeof current?.providerRef === 'string' ? current.providerRef : undefined);
+    const secretSlug = (typeof input?.secretSlug === 'string' && input.secretSlug)
+        || (typeof current?.secretSlug === 'string' ? current.secretSlug : undefined);
+    if (typeof organizationId !== 'string' || !organizationId || !providerRef || !secretSlug) {
+        // Fail CLOSED. Sealing under a partial identity would produce a credential bound to the wrong
+        // row — unopenable at resolution time, and indistinguishable then from a tampered one.
+        throw utils.errorBuilder.buildError(ErrorType.CONFIGURATION, executionContext, {
+            customMessageReference: ErrorCustomMessageReference.CONFIGURATION,
+            context: {
+                message: 'Cannot seal an organization provider credential: the row identity is incomplete. All three of '
+                    + 'organizationId, providerRef and secretSlug must be resolvable, because the seal is bound to them. '
+                    + 'The organization is read from the execution scope or the stored row, never from the request body.',
+                hasOrganizationId: Boolean(organizationId),
+                hasProviderRef: Boolean(providerRef),
+                hasSecretSlug: Boolean(secretSlug),
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    return { organizationId, providerRef, secretSlug };
+}
+/**
+ * Seal `secretValue` if the write carries one.
+ *
+ * An ABSENT `secretValue` is normal on UPDATE and must pass through untouched: the framework strips
+ * the field when a client echoes back the redaction mask, which is how "edit the description without
+ * retyping the secret" works. Re-sealing nothing would be harmless; treating absence as an error
+ * would break the ordinary edit.
+ */
+function sealIncomingSecret(input, executionContext, utils, container) {
+    const payload = input ?? undefined;
+    const incoming = payload?.secretValue;
+    // ABSENT means "no change", and only absent. `null` is deliberately NOT treated as absent and
+    // falls through to the refusal below.
+    //
+    // That distinction became load-bearing the moment `secretValue` was declared authoritative: an
+    // authoritative field's post-prefix value is always carried past the repository's strict re-parse,
+    // so passing a `null` through here would push it INTO persistence rather than letting the schema
+    // reject it. The row would then hold a null where `z.string().min(1)` is required, and every
+    // later read would throw in `transformOutput` — a write that answers success and leaves the row
+    // permanently unreadable.
+    if (incoming === undefined) {
+        return payload;
+    }
+    // Defence in depth. The framework strips the mask sentinel before this hook runs, so reaching here
+    // with the mask means that strip did not happen — and sealing the mask would store the literal
+    // bullet characters as the tenant's credential, then hand them to a vendor.
+    if (incoming === WRITE_ONLY_SECRET_MASK) {
+        const { secretValue: _discarded, ...rest } = payload;
+        return rest;
+    }
+    if (typeof incoming !== 'string' || incoming.length === 0) {
+        throw utils.errorBuilder.buildError(ErrorType.VALIDATION, executionContext, {
+            customMessageReference: ErrorCustomMessageReference.VALIDATION,
+            context: { message: 'An organization provider credential value must be a non-empty string.' },
+        });
+    }
+    const identity = resolveWriteIdentity(payload, executionContext, utils);
+    const appConfig = container.get(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.AppConfigService);
+    const actingUserId = executionContext?.initiatorIds?.userId;
+    return {
+        ...payload,
+        secretValue: sealProviderCredential(incoming, appConfig.secrets.security.session.encryptionKey, {
+            ownerScope: ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope.ORGANIZATION,
+            ownerId: identity.organizationId,
+            providerRef: identity.providerRef,
+            secretSlug: identity.secretSlug,
+        }),
+        // Server-owned provenance. Both are `.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`, so returning them
+        // here is what carries them past the strict re-parse — the same mechanism api-key minting uses
+        // for its hashed material, and declared explicitly in `authoritativeFields` below.
+        secretSetAt: new Date(),
+        // Only when there IS an acting user. Writing the key with an `undefined` value would preserve an
+        // explicit `undefined` past the re-parse rather than leaving the field absent, and "absent"
+        // is the honest representation of a write with no human behind it.
+        ...(actingUserId ? { setByUserId: actingUserId } : {}),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Emit the lifecycle event for a completed write.
+ *
+ * Best-effort in the same posture as every other audit emission in the engine: the credential has
+ * already been written, and turning a logging failure into a 500 would tell the tenant their write
+ * failed when it did not.
+ */
+async function emitCredentialWriteAudit(container, 
+/**
+ * WHICH grant event this write is. Typed as the audit vocabulary's own two members rather than a
+ * bespoke `'set' | 'rotated'` pair: the distinction already has a named runtime source, and a
+ * second spelling of it would be a closed vocabulary with no home and one more thing to keep in
+ * step with the event names.
+ */
+eventType, row, previousSecretSetAt, executionContext, utils) {
+    if (!row || typeof row._id !== 'string' || typeof row.organizationId !== 'string') {
+        utils.logger.error?.('An organization provider credential was written but the row could not be identified — audit event not emitted', { eventType });
+        return;
+    }
+    try {
+        const auditLogs = container.get(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.AuditLogsService);
+        const common = {
+            organizationId: row.organizationId,
+            providerRef: row.providerRef,
+            secretSlug: row.secretSlug,
+            credentialId: row._id,
+        };
+        if (eventType === CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_SET) {
+            await auditLogs.logOrganizationProviderCredentialSet({ ...common, setBy: resolveAuditActorId(executionContext) }, executionContext);
+        }
+        else {
+            await auditLogs.logOrganizationProviderCredentialRotated({
+                ...common,
+                rotatedBy: resolveAuditActorId(executionContext),
+                previousSecretSetAt: previousSecretSetAt?.toISOString(),
+            }, executionContext);
+        }
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        utils.logger.error?.('Failed to emit the organization provider credential audit event', {
+            eventType,
+            credentialId: row._id,
+            ...projectCaughtErrorLogFields(error),
+        });
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * CREATE — the tenant grants this application authority toward a third party for the first time.
+ */
+function createCredentialCreateFactory() {
+    const factory = (_registry, container) => createResourceCustomServiceImplementation({
+        operationPath: {
+            resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,
+            operationIdentifier: CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,
+            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+            isOperationDefault: true,
+        },
+        debugLabel: 'organizationProviderCredentials.create.seal-and-audit',
+        /**
+         * The three fields this hook OWNS, declared rather than inferred.
+         *
+         * `preserveServerInjectedFields` is normally derived by diffing the prefix output against a
+         * snapshot of the payload keys taken BEFORE the prefix ran, so only keys the hook INTRODUCED
+         * survive the repository's strict re-parse. That inference has a documented hole: a caller
+         * reaching the service tier with the key already present — MCP `callTool` forwards its
+         * arguments with no strict parse — puts it into the snapshot, the hook's value is then not
+         * classified as introduced, and the repository strips it while the operation answers success.
+         *
+         * For `secretSetAt` / `setByUserId` that would silently lose the provenance of a credential,
+         * which is the first thing an incident asks for. For `secretValue` the declaration says the
+         * thing that matters most in this file: whatever a caller sent, what reaches persistence is
+         * the POST-prefix value — the sealed envelope — and never the plaintext they supplied.
+         */
+        authoritativeFields: ['secretValue', 'secretSetAt', 'setByUserId'],
+        handlers: {
+            prefixCoreOperations: async (_id, input, executionContext, _operationPath, utils) => sealIncomingSecret(input, executionContext, utils, container),
+            postfixCoreOperations: async (_id, created, executionContext, _operationPath, utils) => {
+                await emitCredentialWriteAudit(container, CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_SET, created, undefined, executionContext, utils);
+                return created;
+            },
+        },
+    });
+    return factory;
+}
+/**
+ * UPDATE — a rotation, or an ordinary metadata edit.
+ *
+ * The two are distinguished by whether the write actually carried a NEW secret. An edit that only
+ * changes the description emits nothing: a rotation event on a description change would make the
+ * one signal a compromise investigation depends on unusable.
+ */
+function createCredentialUpdateFactory() {
+    const factory = (_registry, container) => createResourceCustomServiceImplementation({
+        operationPath: {
+            resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,
+            operationIdentifier: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+            isOperationDefault: true,
+        },
+        debugLabel: 'organizationProviderCredentials.update.seal-and-audit',
+        /**
+         * The three fields this hook OWNS, declared rather than inferred.
+         *
+         * `preserveServerInjectedFields` is normally derived by diffing the prefix output against a
+         * snapshot of the payload keys taken BEFORE the prefix ran, so only keys the hook INTRODUCED
+         * survive the repository's strict re-parse. That inference has a documented hole: a caller
+         * reaching the service tier with the key already present — MCP `callTool` forwards its
+         * arguments with no strict parse — puts it into the snapshot, the hook's value is then not
+         * classified as introduced, and the repository strips it while the operation answers success.
+         *
+         * For `secretSetAt` / `setByUserId` that would silently lose the provenance of a credential,
+         * which is the first thing an incident asks for. For `secretValue` the declaration says the
+         * thing that matters most in this file: whatever a caller sent, what reaches persistence is
+         * the POST-prefix value — the sealed envelope — and never the plaintext they supplied.
+         */
+        authoritativeFields: ['secretValue', 'secretSetAt', 'setByUserId'],
+        handlers: {
+            prefixCoreOperations: async (_id, input, executionContext, _operationPath, utils) => {
+                const sealed = sealIncomingSecret(input, executionContext, utils, container);
+                // Bridge to the postfix, keyed by this operation's execution context. Carries only WHETHER
+                // the value moved and WHEN the previous one was set — never a secret, in either direction.
+                ROTATION_BRIDGE_BY_EC.set(executionContext, {
+                    rotated: sealed?.secretValue !== undefined,
+                    previousSecretSetAt: utils.currentObject?.secretSetAt,
+                });
+                return sealed;
+            },
+            postfixCoreOperations: async (_id, updated, executionContext, _operationPath, utils) => {
+                const bridge = ROTATION_BRIDGE_BY_EC.get(executionContext);
+                ROTATION_BRIDGE_BY_EC.delete(executionContext);
+                if (bridge?.rotated) {
+                    await emitCredentialWriteAudit(container, CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_ROTATED, updated, bridge.previousSecretSetAt, executionContext, utils);
+                }
+                return updated;
+            },
+        },
+    });
+    return factory;
+}
+/**
+ * DELETE — a tenant administrator revoking the grant.
+ *
+ * `ADMINISTRATOR_REVOKED` unconditionally, and that is CORRECT rather than an assumption: the
+ * cascade door never reaches this hook (see the module header), so every delete that arrives here is
+ * a deliberate service-tier revocation. If a future change routed a cascade through the service
+ * tier, this constant would become a lie — which is why the door table above is pinned by a test
+ * rather than left as prose.
+ */
+function createCredentialDeleteFactory() {
+    const factory = (_registry, container) => createResourceCustomServiceImplementation({
+        operationPath: {
+            resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,
+            operationIdentifier: CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,
+            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+            isOperationDefault: true,
+        },
+        debugLabel: 'organizationProviderCredentials.delete.audit',
+        handlers: {
+            postfixCoreOperations: async (id, result, executionContext, _operationPath, utils) => {
+                // The pre-deletion snapshot: after the row is gone, the provider and slug are unrecoverable,
+                // so an event naming only the id would identify nothing.
+                const snapshot = utils.currentObject;
+                const credentialId = snapshot?._id ?? (typeof id === 'string' ? id : undefined);
+                if (!snapshot?.organizationId || !credentialId) {
+                    utils.logger.error?.('An organization provider credential was deleted but the subject could not be resolved — audit event not emitted', { addressedIdType: Array.isArray(id) ? 'array' : typeof id });
+                    return result;
+                }
+                try {
+                    const auditLogs = container.get(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.AuditLogsService);
+                    await auditLogs.logOrganizationProviderCredentialDeleted({
+                        organizationId: snapshot.organizationId,
+                        providerRef: snapshot.providerRef,
+                        secretSlug: snapshot.secretSlug,
+                        credentialId,
+                        reason: ProviderCredentialDeletionReason.ADMINISTRATOR_REVOKED,
+                        deletedBy: resolveAuditActorId(executionContext),
+                    }, executionContext);
+                }
+                catch (error) {
+                    utils.logger.error?.('Failed to emit the organization provider credential deletion audit event', {
+                        credentialId,
+                        ...projectCaughtErrorLogFields(error),
+                    });
+                }
+                return result;
+            },
+        },
+    });
+    return factory;
+}
+/**
+ * Prefix→postfix bridge for the UPDATE hook, keyed by the per-operation execution-context instance.
+ *
+ * A `WeakMap` so an abandoned operation cannot retain the entry, mirroring the api-key mint bridge.
+ * It deliberately carries no secret: only a boolean and a timestamp cross it.
+ */
+const ROTATION_BRIDGE_BY_EC = new WeakMap();
+/** Every write door of the organization-provider-credential resource. */
+export function createOrganizationProviderCredentialFactories() {
+    return [
+        createCredentialCreateFactory(),
+        createCredentialUpdateFactory(),
+        createCredentialDeleteFactory(),
+    ];
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=organization-provider-credentials.custom-impl.backend.service.js.map

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* The WRITE path for an organization's provider credential: seal on the way in, audit on the way\n * out.\n *\n * ## Without this file the resource stores plaintext\n *\n * The schema declares `secretValue` as `.isWriteOnlySecret()`, which governs how the value is\n * PRESENTED (redacted at the client boundary, and a round-tripped mask means \"keep the stored\n * secret\"). It says nothing about how the value is STORED — a write-only-secret field lands in the\n * database exactly as the client typed it. Sealing it is this hook's job, and it is the only place\n * that job is done, so a credential reaching persistence unsealed means this registration did not\n * resolve.\n *\n * ⚠️ A custom implementation resolves by an EXACT operation-path key embedding the resource, the\n * operation, the variant TYPE and the default/variant-key slot. A registration naming a combination\n * the resource configuration does not declare resolves nothing and silently never runs, while the\n * route still answers 200 — here that would mean every credential persisted in plaintext behind a\n * green suite. The pins in `__tests__/organization-provider-credentials-write-path.backend.test.ts`\n * assert these registrations against the REAL resource configuration for that reason.\n *\n * ## The DELETE doors — enumerated, because only one of them reaches this file\n *\n * | Door | Path | This hook |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | A tenant administrator revoking a credential | service tier, `DELETE` default variant | RUNS |\n * | The ORGANIZATIONS purge cascade (both the batch's route-less default door and the super-admin's `admin` door reach the same cascade) | `deleteChildrenImmediate` → the RAW repository | does NOT run |\n *\n * Door 2 is not an oversight and not a hole in the ERASURE: the cascade removes the rows, which is\n * what matters, and `services-registry-handler.backend.service.ts` documents the raw-repository\n * route explicitly (\"VARIANT-AGNOSTIC CASCADE: the onParentDelete teardown deletes children directly\n * through the RAW repository\"). What door 2 has no way to produce is a per-credential AUDIT event,\n * because the service tier — where custom implementations live — is bypassed entirely. Emitting one\n * would need a cascade-tier audit hook in the framework, which is outside this resource. The tenant\n * purge is itself audited as `ORGANIZATION_DELETED`, so the destruction is on the record; what is\n * missing is the enumeration of WHICH third parties the tenant held credentials for at that moment.\n * Recorded as its own issue rather than left for a reader to discover from an absence.\n */\n\nimport type { Container } from 'inversify';\nimport {\n  CoreAuditableEventType,\n  CoreResourceOperation,\n  CoreResourceType,\n  ErrorType,\n  ErrorCustomMessageReference,\n  ProviderCredentialDeletionReason,\n  ResourceOperationVariantType,\n  WRITE_ONLY_SECRET_MASK,\n  coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier,\n  type OrganizationProviderCredential,\n} from '@wildo-ai/saas-models';\n\nimport { ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope } from '@wildo-ai/external-connectors-models';\n\nimport {\n  createResourceCustomServiceImplementation,\n  type ResourceCustomServiceImplementationFactory,\n} from '~wildo-backend-lib/base-classes/services/services/resource-operation-custom-implementation.factory.backend';\nimport type { ResourceOperation_CustomImplementation_Utils } from '~wildo-backend-lib/base-classes/services/services/resource-operation-custom-implementation-base.backend.service';\nimport type { ResourcesRegistryBackendService } from '~wildo-backend-lib/resources/services/resources-registry.backend.service';\nimport type { ExecutionContext } from '~wildo-backend-lib/runtime/models/execution-context.backend.schemas';\nimport { SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES } from '~wildo-backend-lib/inject/models/service-types';\nimport type { AppConfigurationService } from '~wildo-backend-lib/config/services/app-configuration.backend.service';\nimport type { AuditLogsBackendService } from '~wildo-backend-lib/compliance/audit-trails/services/audit-logs.backend.service';\nimport { resolveAuditActorId } from '~wildo-backend-lib/compliance/audit-trails/utils/audit-actor.backend.utils';\nimport { projectCaughtErrorLogFields } from '~wildo-backend-lib/errors/utils/error-log-level-classification.backend.utils';\n\nimport { sealProviderCredential } from '../utils/provider-credential-envelope.backend.utils';\n\n/** The row identity the seal binds to, resolved from whichever channel actually carries each part. */\ninterface CredentialWriteIdentity {\n  organizationId: string;\n  providerRef: string;\n  secretSlug: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the row identity for a write.\n *\n * The three parts come from three DIFFERENT places, and that is the reason this is a function rather\n * than three property reads:\n *\n * - `organizationId` is injected by the context machinery from the request SCOPE, so on CREATE it is\n *   not in the input payload at all. The execution context's context-resource map is the\n *   authoritative channel — the same one `buildContextualFilter` and `enrichDataWithContext` read —\n *   which is what makes the seal bind to the tenant the framework will actually store the row under,\n *   rather than to one a caller could name in a body field.\n * - `providerRef` / `secretSlug` are client-supplied on CREATE and `.excludeFromUpdate()` afterwards,\n *   so on UPDATE they must come from the pre-fetched current row.\n */\nfunction resolveWriteIdentity(\n  input: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n  executionContext: ExecutionContext<any>,\n  utils: ResourceOperation_CustomImplementation_Utils,\n): CredentialWriteIdentity {\n  const current = utils.currentObject as OrganizationProviderCredential | undefined;\n\n  // Two sources, and the request BODY is deliberately not one of them.\n  //\n  // On UPDATE the stored row is authoritative — it is what the framework already persisted. On\n  // CREATE the execution context's context-resource map is, because that is the same channel\n  // `enrichDataWithContext` reads when it injects the scope FK, so the seal binds to the tenant the\n  // row will actually be stored under.\n  //\n  // A `payload.organizationId` fallback was here and was REMOVED: it fails safe (a seal bound to a\n  // body-supplied tenant is simply unopenable later, so the outcome is a denial rather than a\n  // disclosure) but it is still the request choosing what the seal binds to, which is exactly the\n  // authorship this hook exists to keep out of a caller's hands. With no fallback, a context that\n  // cannot name the tenant is a REFUSAL — see below.\n  const organizationId =\n    (typeof current?.organizationId === 'string' && current.organizationId)\n    || executionContext.getContextResourceId?.(coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS] as never);\n\n  const providerRef =\n    (typeof input?.providerRef === 'string' && input.providerRef)\n    || (typeof current?.providerRef === 'string' ? current.providerRef : undefined);\n\n  const secretSlug =\n    (typeof input?.secretSlug === 'string' && input.secretSlug)\n    || (typeof current?.secretSlug === 'string' ? current.secretSlug : undefined);\n\n  if (typeof organizationId !== 'string' || !organizationId || !providerRef || !secretSlug) {\n    // Fail CLOSED. Sealing under a partial identity would produce a credential bound to the wrong\n    // row — unopenable at resolution time, and indistinguishable then from a tampered one.\n    throw utils.errorBuilder.buildError(ErrorType.CONFIGURATION, executionContext, {\n      customMessageReference: ErrorCustomMessageReference.CONFIGURATION,\n      context: {\n        message:\n          'Cannot seal an organization provider credential: the row identity is incomplete. All three of '\n          + 'organizationId, providerRef and secretSlug must be resolvable, because the seal is bound to them. '\n          + 'The organization is read from the execution scope or the stored row, never from the request body.',\n        hasOrganizationId: Boolean(organizationId),\n        hasProviderRef: Boolean(providerRef),\n        hasSecretSlug: Boolean(secretSlug),\n      },\n    });\n  }\n\n  return { organizationId, providerRef, secretSlug };\n}\n\n/**\n * Seal `secretValue` if the write carries one.\n *\n * An ABSENT `secretValue` is normal on UPDATE and must pass through untouched: the framework strips\n * the field when a client echoes back the redaction mask, which is how \"edit the description without\n * retyping the secret\" works. Re-sealing nothing would be harmless; treating absence as an error\n * would break the ordinary edit.\n */\nfunction sealIncomingSecret(\n  input: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n  executionContext: ExecutionContext<any>,\n  utils: ResourceOperation_CustomImplementation_Utils,\n  container: Container,\n): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  const payload = input ?? undefined;\n  const incoming = payload?.secretValue;\n\n  // ABSENT means \"no change\", and only absent. `null` is deliberately NOT treated as absent and\n  // falls through to the refusal below.\n  //\n  // That distinction became load-bearing the moment `secretValue` was declared authoritative: an\n  // authoritative field's post-prefix value is always carried past the repository's strict re-parse,\n  // so passing a `null` through here would push it INTO persistence rather than letting the schema\n  // reject it. The row would then hold a null where `z.string().min(1)` is required, and every\n  // later read would throw in `transformOutput` — a write that answers success and leaves the row\n  // permanently unreadable.\n  if (incoming === undefined) {\n    return payload;\n  }\n\n  // Defence in depth. The framework strips the mask sentinel before this hook runs, so reaching here\n  // with the mask means that strip did not happen — and sealing the mask would store the literal\n  // bullet characters as the tenant's credential, then hand them to a vendor.\n  if (incoming === WRITE_ONLY_SECRET_MASK) {\n    const { secretValue: _discarded, ...rest } = payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n    return rest;\n  }\n\n  if (typeof incoming !== 'string' || incoming.length === 0) {\n    throw utils.errorBuilder.buildError(ErrorType.VALIDATION, executionContext, {\n      customMessageReference: ErrorCustomMessageReference.VALIDATION,\n      context: { message: 'An organization provider credential value must be a non-empty string.' },\n    });\n  }\n\n  const identity = resolveWriteIdentity(payload, executionContext, utils);\n  const appConfig = container.get<AppConfigurationService>(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.AppConfigService);\n\n  const actingUserId = executionContext?.initiatorIds?.userId;\n\n  return {\n    ...payload,\n    secretValue: sealProviderCredential(\n      incoming,\n      appConfig.secrets.security.session.encryptionKey,\n      {\n        ownerScope: ExternalProvider_Connection_OwnerScope.ORGANIZATION,\n        ownerId: identity.organizationId,\n        providerRef: identity.providerRef,\n        secretSlug: identity.secretSlug,\n      },\n    ),\n    // Server-owned provenance. Both are `.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`, so returning them\n    // here is what carries them past the strict re-parse — the same mechanism api-key minting uses\n    // for its hashed material, and declared explicitly in `authoritativeFields` below.\n    secretSetAt: new Date(),\n    // Only when there IS an acting user. Writing the key with an `undefined` value would preserve an\n    // explicit `undefined` past the re-parse rather than leaving the field absent, and \"absent\"\n    // is the honest representation of a write with no human behind it.\n    ...(actingUserId ? { setByUserId: actingUserId } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Emit the lifecycle event for a completed write.\n *\n * Best-effort in the same posture as every other audit emission in the engine: the credential has\n * already been written, and turning a logging failure into a 500 would tell the tenant their write\n * failed when it did not.\n */\nasync function emitCredentialWriteAudit(\n  container: Container,\n  /**\n   * WHICH grant event this write is. Typed as the audit vocabulary's own two members rather than a\n   * bespoke `'set' | 'rotated'` pair: the distinction already has a named runtime source, and a\n   * second spelling of it would be a closed vocabulary with no home and one more thing to keep in\n   * step with the event names.\n   */\n  eventType:\n    | typeof CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_SET\n    | typeof CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_ROTATED,\n  row: OrganizationProviderCredential | undefined,\n  previousSecretSetAt: Date | undefined,\n  executionContext: ExecutionContext<any>,\n  utils: ResourceOperation_CustomImplementation_Utils,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!row || typeof row._id !== 'string' || typeof row.organizationId !== 'string') {\n    utils.logger.error?.(\n      'An organization provider credential was written but the row could not be identified — audit event not emitted',\n      { eventType },\n    );\n    return;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const auditLogs = container.get<AuditLogsBackendService>(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.AuditLogsService);\n    const common = {\n      organizationId: row.organizationId,\n      providerRef: row.providerRef,\n      secretSlug: row.secretSlug,\n      credentialId: row._id,\n    };\n    if (eventType === CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_SET) {\n      await auditLogs.logOrganizationProviderCredentialSet(\n        { ...common, setBy: resolveAuditActorId(executionContext) },\n        executionContext,\n      );\n    } else {\n      await auditLogs.logOrganizationProviderCredentialRotated(\n        {\n          ...common,\n          rotatedBy: resolveAuditActorId(executionContext),\n          previousSecretSetAt: previousSecretSetAt?.toISOString(),\n        },\n        executionContext,\n      );\n    }\n  } catch (error) {\n    utils.logger.error?.('Failed to emit the organization provider credential audit event', {\n      eventType,\n      credentialId: row._id,\n      ...projectCaughtErrorLogFields(error),\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * CREATE — the tenant grants this application authority toward a third party for the first time.\n */\nfunction createCredentialCreateFactory(): ResourceCustomServiceImplementationFactory {\n  const factory = (_registry: ResourcesRegistryBackendService, container: Container) =>\n    createResourceCustomServiceImplementation({\n      operationPath: {\n        resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n        operationIdentifier: CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n        isOperationDefault: true,\n      },\n      debugLabel: 'organizationProviderCredentials.create.seal-and-audit',\n      /**\n       * The three fields this hook OWNS, declared rather than inferred.\n       *\n       * `preserveServerInjectedFields` is normally derived by diffing the prefix output against a\n       * snapshot of the payload keys taken BEFORE the prefix ran, so only keys the hook INTRODUCED\n       * survive the repository's strict re-parse. That inference has a documented hole: a caller\n       * reaching the service tier with the key already present — MCP `callTool` forwards its\n       * arguments with no strict parse — puts it into the snapshot, the hook's value is then not\n       * classified as introduced, and the repository strips it while the operation answers success.\n       *\n       * For `secretSetAt` / `setByUserId` that would silently lose the provenance of a credential,\n       * which is the first thing an incident asks for. For `secretValue` the declaration says the\n       * thing that matters most in this file: whatever a caller sent, what reaches persistence is\n       * the POST-prefix value — the sealed envelope — and never the plaintext they supplied.\n       */\n      authoritativeFields: ['secretValue', 'secretSetAt', 'setByUserId'],\n      handlers: {\n        prefixCoreOperations: async (_id, input, executionContext, _operationPath, utils) =>\n          sealIncomingSecret(input as Record<string, unknown> | undefined, executionContext, utils, container),\n        postfixCoreOperations: async (_id, created, executionContext, _operationPath, utils) => {\n          await emitCredentialWriteAudit(\n            container,\n            CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_SET,\n            created as OrganizationProviderCredential | undefined,\n            undefined,\n            executionContext,\n            utils,\n          );\n          return created;\n        },\n      },\n    });\n  return factory as unknown as ResourceCustomServiceImplementationFactory;\n}\n\n/**\n * UPDATE — a rotation, or an ordinary metadata edit.\n *\n * The two are distinguished by whether the write actually carried a NEW secret. An edit that only\n * changes the description emits nothing: a rotation event on a description change would make the\n * one signal a compromise investigation depends on unusable.\n */\nfunction createCredentialUpdateFactory(): ResourceCustomServiceImplementationFactory {\n  const factory = (_registry: ResourcesRegistryBackendService, container: Container) =>\n    createResourceCustomServiceImplementation({\n      operationPath: {\n        resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n        operationIdentifier: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n        isOperationDefault: true,\n      },\n      debugLabel: 'organizationProviderCredentials.update.seal-and-audit',\n      /**\n       * The three fields this hook OWNS, declared rather than inferred.\n       *\n       * `preserveServerInjectedFields` is normally derived by diffing the prefix output against a\n       * snapshot of the payload keys taken BEFORE the prefix ran, so only keys the hook INTRODUCED\n       * survive the repository's strict re-parse. That inference has a documented hole: a caller\n       * reaching the service tier with the key already present — MCP `callTool` forwards its\n       * arguments with no strict parse — puts it into the snapshot, the hook's value is then not\n       * classified as introduced, and the repository strips it while the operation answers success.\n       *\n       * For `secretSetAt` / `setByUserId` that would silently lose the provenance of a credential,\n       * which is the first thing an incident asks for. For `secretValue` the declaration says the\n       * thing that matters most in this file: whatever a caller sent, what reaches persistence is\n       * the POST-prefix value — the sealed envelope — and never the plaintext they supplied.\n       */\n      authoritativeFields: ['secretValue', 'secretSetAt', 'setByUserId'],\n      handlers: {\n        prefixCoreOperations: async (_id, input, executionContext, _operationPath, utils) => {\n          const sealed = sealIncomingSecret(\n            input as Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n            executionContext,\n            utils,\n            container,\n          );\n          // Bridge to the postfix, keyed by this operation's execution context. Carries only WHETHER\n          // the value moved and WHEN the previous one was set — never a secret, in either direction.\n          ROTATION_BRIDGE_BY_EC.set(executionContext, {\n            rotated: sealed?.secretValue !== undefined,\n            previousSecretSetAt: (utils.currentObject as OrganizationProviderCredential | undefined)?.secretSetAt,\n          });\n          return sealed;\n        },\n        postfixCoreOperations: async (_id, updated, executionContext, _operationPath, utils) => {\n          const bridge = ROTATION_BRIDGE_BY_EC.get(executionContext);\n          ROTATION_BRIDGE_BY_EC.delete(executionContext);\n          if (bridge?.rotated) {\n            await emitCredentialWriteAudit(\n              container,\n              CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_ROTATED,\n              updated as OrganizationProviderCredential | undefined,\n              bridge.previousSecretSetAt,\n              executionContext,\n              utils,\n            );\n          }\n          return updated;\n        },\n      },\n    });\n  return factory as unknown as ResourceCustomServiceImplementationFactory;\n}\n\n/**\n * DELETE — a tenant administrator revoking the grant.\n *\n * `ADMINISTRATOR_REVOKED` unconditionally, and that is CORRECT rather than an assumption: the\n * cascade door never reaches this hook (see the module header), so every delete that arrives here is\n * a deliberate service-tier revocation. If a future change routed a cascade through the service\n * tier, this constant would become a lie — which is why the door table above is pinned by a test\n * rather than left as prose.\n */\nfunction createCredentialDeleteFactory(): ResourceCustomServiceImplementationFactory {\n  const factory = (_registry: ResourcesRegistryBackendService, container: Container) =>\n    createResourceCustomServiceImplementation({\n      operationPath: {\n        resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORG_PROVIDER_CREDENTIALS,\n        operationIdentifier: CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n        isOperationDefault: true,\n      },\n      debugLabel: 'organizationProviderCredentials.delete.audit',\n      handlers: {\n        postfixCoreOperations: async (id, result, executionContext, _operationPath, utils) => {\n          // The pre-deletion snapshot: after the row is gone, the provider and slug are unrecoverable,\n          // so an event naming only the id would identify nothing.\n          const snapshot = utils.currentObject as OrganizationProviderCredential | undefined;\n          const credentialId = snapshot?._id ?? (typeof id === 'string' ? id : undefined);\n\n          if (!snapshot?.organizationId || !credentialId) {\n            utils.logger.error?.(\n              'An organization provider credential was deleted but the subject could not be resolved — audit event not emitted',\n              { addressedIdType: Array.isArray(id) ? 'array' : typeof id },\n            );\n            return result;\n          }\n\n          try {\n            const auditLogs = container.get<AuditLogsBackendService>(SAAS_SERVICE_TYPES.AuditLogsService);\n            await auditLogs.logOrganizationProviderCredentialDeleted(\n              {\n                organizationId: snapshot.organizationId,\n                providerRef: snapshot.providerRef,\n                secretSlug: snapshot.secretSlug,\n                credentialId,\n                reason: ProviderCredentialDeletionReason.ADMINISTRATOR_REVOKED,\n                deletedBy: resolveAuditActorId(executionContext),\n              },\n              executionContext,\n            );\n          } catch (error) {\n            utils.logger.error?.('Failed to emit the organization provider credential deletion audit event', {\n              credentialId,\n              ...projectCaughtErrorLogFields(error),\n            });\n          }\n          return result;\n        },\n      },\n    });\n  return factory as unknown as ResourceCustomServiceImplementationFactory;\n}\n\n/**\n * Prefix→postfix bridge for the UPDATE hook, keyed by the per-operation execution-context instance.\n *\n * A `WeakMap` so an abandoned operation cannot retain the entry, mirroring the api-key mint bridge.\n * It deliberately carries no secret: only a boolean and a timestamp cross it.\n */\nconst ROTATION_BRIDGE_BY_EC = new WeakMap<object, { rotated: boolean; previousSecretSetAt?: Date }>();\n\n/** Every write door of the organization-provider-credential resource. */\nexport function createOrganizationProviderCredentialFactories(): ResourceCustomServiceImplementationFactory[] {\n  return [\n    createCredentialCreateFactory(),\n    createCredentialUpdateFactory(),\n    createCredentialDeleteFactory(),\n  ];\n}\n"]}