@wildo-ai/platform-infra-providers 1.1.11 → 1.1.13

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  1. package/dist/esm/aws-s3/aws-s3.infra.module.d.ts +11 -10
  2. package/dist/esm/aws-s3/aws-s3.infra.module.d.ts.map +1 -1
  3. package/dist/esm/aws-s3/aws-s3.infra.module.js +14 -12
  4. package/dist/esm/aws-s3/aws-s3.infra.module.js.map +1 -1
  5. package/dist/esm/clamav-self/clamav-self.infra.module.d.ts +1 -2
  6. package/dist/esm/clamav-self/clamav-self.infra.module.d.ts.map +1 -1
  7. package/dist/esm/clamav-self/clamav-self.infra.module.js +1 -2
  8. package/dist/esm/clamav-self/clamav-self.infra.module.js.map +1 -1
  9. package/dist/esm/immudb-self/immudb-self.infra.module.d.ts.map +1 -1
  10. package/dist/esm/immudb-self/immudb-self.infra.module.js.map +1 -1
  11. package/dist/esm/index.d.ts +1 -1
  12. package/dist/esm/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/esm/index.js +2 -2
  14. package/dist/esm/index.js.map +1 -1
  15. package/dist/esm/minio-self/minio-self.infra.module.d.ts +1 -4
  16. package/dist/esm/minio-self/minio-self.infra.module.d.ts.map +1 -1
  17. package/dist/esm/minio-self/minio-self.infra.module.js +1 -4
  18. package/dist/esm/minio-self/minio-self.infra.module.js.map +1 -1
  19. package/dist/esm/mongodb-atlas/mongodb-atlas.infra.module.d.ts +1 -2
  20. package/dist/esm/mongodb-atlas/mongodb-atlas.infra.module.d.ts.map +1 -1
  21. package/dist/esm/mongodb-atlas/mongodb-atlas.infra.module.js +1 -2
  22. package/dist/esm/mongodb-atlas/mongodb-atlas.infra.module.js.map +1 -1
  23. package/dist/esm/mongodb-self/mongodb-self.infra.module.d.ts +1 -2
  24. package/dist/esm/mongodb-self/mongodb-self.infra.module.d.ts.map +1 -1
  25. package/dist/esm/mongodb-self/mongodb-self.infra.module.js +1 -2
  26. package/dist/esm/mongodb-self/mongodb-self.infra.module.js.map +1 -1
  27. package/dist/esm/postgres-self/postgres-self.infra.module.d.ts +1 -2
  28. package/dist/esm/postgres-self/postgres-self.infra.module.d.ts.map +1 -1
  29. package/dist/esm/postgres-self/postgres-self.infra.module.js +1 -2
  30. package/dist/esm/postgres-self/postgres-self.infra.module.js.map +1 -1
  31. package/dist/esm/rabbitmq-self/rabbitmq-self.infra.module.d.ts +1 -2
  32. package/dist/esm/rabbitmq-self/rabbitmq-self.infra.module.d.ts.map +1 -1
  33. package/dist/esm/rabbitmq-self/rabbitmq-self.infra.module.js +4 -7
  34. package/dist/esm/rabbitmq-self/rabbitmq-self.infra.module.js.map +1 -1
  35. package/dist/esm/redis-self/redis-self.infra.module.d.ts +1 -2
  36. package/dist/esm/redis-self/redis-self.infra.module.d.ts.map +1 -1
  37. package/dist/esm/redis-self/redis-self.infra.module.js +1 -2
  38. package/dist/esm/redis-self/redis-self.infra.module.js.map +1 -1
  39. package/dist/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +1 -1
  40. package/package.json +6 -6
  41. package/src/aws-s3/__tests__/aws-s3.infra.module.test.ts +1 -2
  42. package/src/aws-s3/aws-s3.infra.module.ts +14 -12
  43. package/src/clamav-self/__tests__/clamav-self.infra.module.test.ts +1 -2
  44. package/src/clamav-self/clamav-self.infra.module.ts +1 -2
  45. package/src/index.ts +2 -2
  46. package/src/minio-self/__tests__/minio-self.infra.module.test.ts +1 -2
  47. package/src/minio-self/minio-self.infra.module.ts +1 -4
  48. package/src/mongodb-atlas/__tests__/mongodb-atlas.infra.module.test.ts +3 -2
  49. package/src/mongodb-atlas/mongodb-atlas.infra.module.ts +1 -2
  50. package/src/mongodb-self/__tests__/mongodb-self.infra.module.test.ts +11 -7
  51. package/src/mongodb-self/mongodb-self.infra.module.ts +1 -2
  52. package/src/postgres-self/__tests__/postgres-self.infra.module.test.ts +3 -4
  53. package/src/postgres-self/postgres-self.infra.module.ts +1 -2
  54. package/src/rabbitmq-self/__tests__/rabbitmq-self.infra.module.test.ts +2 -3
  55. package/src/rabbitmq-self/rabbitmq-self.infra.module.ts +4 -7
  56. package/src/redis-self/__tests__/redis-self.infra.module.test.ts +1 -2
  57. package/src/redis-self/redis-self.infra.module.ts +1 -2
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
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* `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule` — fourth concrete `InfraProviderModule`\n * (Slice 4.B.3 of `infra-provider-planner.md`, generalizing the Slice\n * 2 / 4.B.1 / 4.B.2 pattern to MongoDB Atlas).\n *\n * Implements the `MONGODB_ATLAS` `InfraProvider` over the\n * `IMongoAtlasClient` transport (Atlas REST API + digest auth, exposed\n * by `MongoAtlasManagerService` after the Slice 4.B.3 5C policy/\n * transport split). Owns the Atlas naming and grant policy; the USERNAME\n * policy itself is shared with the self-hosted module through\n * `buildMongodbPrincipalUsername` (`<applicationNamespace>_user` for the\n * application backend, `<namespace>_<kind>_<name>_user` for a principal).\n *\n * **What this module reads from `AppCredentialMintingContext`**:\n * - `applicationNamespace` + `principal` — the username source (above).\n * - `secretInputs['database.mongodb.password']` — orchestrator-\n * supplied password (module is upsert-only, never generator).\n * - `applicationConfigInputs['databaseName']` — required, the\n * per-app database name.\n * - `applicationConfigInputs['clusterName']` — required, the Atlas\n * cluster name. apps-manager resolves it once (`resolveAtlasClusterName`)\n * for the application user and every principal user, and a later\n * reconcile reads back the cluster recorded at registration.\n * - `resourceGrants` — required for a named principal: its declared\n * access, to which the engine floor is added here.\n * - `adminClient` — narrowed to `IMongoAtlasClient`.\n *\n * **Two audiences this module serves:**\n *\n * 1. **Audience-1 (platform-admin)**: Atlas API public/private key\n * pair + project id + base URL. Consumers: `apps-manager` only\n * (companion uses self-managed locally; Atlas is remote-only).\n *\n * 2. **Audience-3 (app-scoped, via `mintAppCredentials`)**:\n * per-customer-app Atlas database user. Result threaded into\n * `Wildo_Application_Secrets.database.mongodb.{username,password}`\n * via `_merge_WildoApplicationSecrets`; the cluster's connection\n * string (its SRV address, or the `mongoURIWithOptions` seed list\n * when it has none, #1969) returned via `runtimeArtifacts.connectionString` for\n * transient app-init operations (NOT persisted — the persistence\n * shape is split between config (host/protocol/options/database)\n * and secrets (username/password)).\n *\n * **NOT served (D-4 of Slice 4.B locked decisions, 2026-05-10)**:\n * - **Audience-2 (platform-service-scoped)**: no platform service\n * uses Atlas for inter-service messaging today. Method omitted.\n *\n * **`revokeAppCredentials`**: for a runtime principal, apps-manager's\n * declaration reconcile calls it when a minion is removed. For the application\n * backend, apps-manager calls it when the application is withdrawn from the\n * platform (`deregisterApplication`, #1307): the database user is deleted and\n * the database is kept, so `restoreApplication` can re-mint it.\n *\n * **Runtime principals (minions), #1694**: each gets its OWN Atlas database\n * user holding ONE Atlas custom database role — the Atlas twin of the\n * self-hosted module's collection-scoped user:\n * - the username comes from `buildMongodbPrincipalUsername`, the SAME\n * derivation the self-hosted module uses, so it can never be the backend's\n * `<namespace>_user`, and the mint and the revoke cannot disagree about it;\n * - the role carries the principal's declared `resourceAccess` PLUS the engine\n * execution-history floor every enabled Node minion needs, derived through\n * `deriveMinionDatabaseGrants` → `buildMinionMongodbPrivileges`, the same\n * pair the self-hosted module uses, then translated into Atlas's action names;\n * - the user is scoped to the application's cluster alone;\n * - revoking deletes that user and that role, and nothing else.\n *\n * Before #1694 the module ignored `principal` and derived `<namespace>_user`\n * for every input, so a minion mint would have overwritten the backend's user\n * and a minion revoke would have deleted it; apps-manager refused the\n * combination at registration instead.\n */\n\nimport {\n ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind,\n AppCredentialMintingContext,\n AppCredentialMintingResult,\n IMongoAtlasClient,\n InfraCapability,\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer,\n InfraProvider,\n InfraProviderModule,\n InfraProviderPlanContribution,\n deriveMinionDatabaseGrants,\n resolveGrantStorageNames,\n type ApplicationRuntimePrincipal,\n} from '@wildo-ai/platform-config-lib';\nimport {\n buildMinionMongodbPrivileges,\n buildMongodbPrincipalUsername,\n type MongodbCollectionPrivilege,\n} from '../mongodb-self/mongodb-self.infra.module';\n\n/**\n * The `Wildo_Application_Secrets` JSON paths this module writes\n * through `mintAppCredentials.secretBlobValues`. Declared once and\n * reused as `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` in `plan()` AND as\n * the keys of the result, so a refactor that renames a path fails\n * loudly at one place.\n */\nconst MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH = 'database.mongodb.username';\nconst MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH = 'database.mongodb.password';\n/**\n * The paths this module mints PER RUNTIME PRINCIPAL — the single source for both consumers.\n *\n * Read by `InfraProviderModule.perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths` (statically, so apps-manager can strip\n * these from the application blob before delivering a principal's own material) AND spread into\n * `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` inside `plan()`. Declaring the list twice is how the delivery\n * path would silently stop covering a path this module still mints.\n */\nconst PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH, MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH];\n\n\n/**\n * Key the module looks for in `secretInputs` for the orchestrator-\n * supplied password.\n */\nconst MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY = 'database.mongodb.password';\n\n/**\n * Required keys in `applicationConfigInputs`. The orchestrator\n * derives both before calling `mintAppCredentials`.\n */\nconst DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY = 'databaseName';\nconst CLUSTER_NAME_INPUT_KEY = 'clusterName';\n\n/**\n * Key in `runtimeArtifacts` carrying the cluster's connection string — its SRV\n * address, or the `mongoURIWithOptions` seed list when it has none (#1969) — with\n * credentials embedded. Exposed for orchestrator transient use\n * (app-init seeding); deliberately NOT persisted.\n */\nconst CONNECTION_STRING_ARTIFACT_KEY = 'connectionString';\n\n/**\n * A named runtime principal (a minion) — anything but the application backend, which keeps the\n * application-level `<namespace>_user` and its database-wide role.\n */\nfunction isNamedPrincipal(principal: ApplicationRuntimePrincipal | undefined): principal is ApplicationRuntimePrincipal {\n return principal !== undefined && principal.kind !== ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND;\n}\n\n/**\n * The Atlas custom role a principal's user holds — derived from the principal's username exactly as the\n * self-hosted module derives its role (`<username>_role`), so the mint and the revoke name the same role.\n *\n * Custom roles are PROJECT-wide in Atlas, not per database or cluster, so the name must be unique across\n * every application the project hosts. It is: the username embeds the application namespace.\n */\nfunction buildAtlasPrincipalRoleName(username: string): string {\n return `${username}_role`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Atlas's rule for a custom role name, checked before any request so a name Atlas would refuse fails here,\n * naming the principal, rather than as a bare HTTP 400 from the Admin API.\n *\n * spec-cite: https://www.mongodb.com/docs/atlas/security-add-mongodb-roles/ — \"The specified role name can\n * only contain letters, numbers, underscores or hyphens.\" (fetched 2026-09-27). The OpenAPI schema for\n * `UserCustomDBRole.roleName` states no pattern, so the prose page is the authority.\n */\nconst ATLAS_CUSTOM_ROLE_NAME_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;\n\n/**\n * MongoDB's privilege action (the vocabulary `buildMinionMongodbPrivileges` speaks, shared with the\n * self-hosted module) → the Atlas Admin API's name for the same action.\n *\n * semantic-literal-boundary: both sides are EXTERNAL vocabularies — MongoDB's `createRole` action names and\n * the Atlas Admin API's `DatabasePrivilegeAction.action` enum — and this table is the one place they meet.\n * spec-cite: Atlas Administration API v1.0 OpenAPI (github.com/mongodb/openapi, `openapi/v1-deprecated/v1.json`),\n * schema `DatabasePrivilegeAction`, enum `action`: `FIND`, `INSERT`, `REMOVE`, `UPDATE` (fetched 2026-09-27).\n *\n * Closed on purpose: an action with no entry is REFUSED rather than dropped (a silently narrower role reads\n * as a working grant until the minion fails) or passed through (a spelling Atlas does not know is a 400 at\n * best). Grants only ever reach Atlas through this table, so nothing can widen them on the way.\n */\nconst ATLAS_PRIVILEGE_ACTION_BY_MONGODB_ACTION: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {\n find: 'FIND',\n insert: 'INSERT',\n update: 'UPDATE',\n remove: 'REMOVE',\n};\n\nfunction toAtlasPrivileges(privileges: readonly MongodbCollectionPrivilege[]): MongodbCollectionPrivilege[] {\n return privileges.map((privilege) => ({\n resource: privilege.resource,\n actions: privilege.actions.map((action) => {\n const atlasAction = ATLAS_PRIVILEGE_ACTION_BY_MONGODB_ACTION[action];\n if (!atlasAction) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule: MongoDB privilege action '${action}' has no Atlas Admin API equivalent `\n + `in ATLAS_PRIVILEGE_ACTION_BY_MONGODB_ACTION. Refusing to mint a role that would silently lack it.`,\n );\n }\n return atlasAction;\n }),\n }));\n}\n\n/** The principal's username and role, checked against Atlas's role-name rule. One derivation for mint and revoke. */\nfunction resolvePrincipalAtlasIdentity(\n applicationNamespace: string,\n principal: ApplicationRuntimePrincipal,\n): { username: string; roleName: string } {\n const username = buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(applicationNamespace, principal);\n // The whole point of this path. `buildMongodbPrincipalUsername` returns the backend's name only for the\n // backend, but this is the one assertion whose failure would hand a minion the backend's user, so it is\n // made here rather than inferred from the helper.\n if (username === buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(applicationNamespace, undefined)) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule: principal '${principal.kind}:${principal.name ?? ''}' resolved to the `\n + `application backend's Atlas user '${username}'. Refusing: minting would overwrite it and revoking would delete it.`,\n );\n }\n const roleName = buildAtlasPrincipalRoleName(username);\n if (!ATLAS_CUSTOM_ROLE_NAME_PATTERN.test(roleName)) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule: the custom role name '${roleName}' for principal `\n + `'${principal.kind}:${principal.name ?? ''}' is not one Atlas accepts (letters, numbers, underscores or hyphens only).`,\n );\n }\n return { username, roleName };\n}\n\nexport const MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule: InfraProviderModule = {\n provider: InfraProvider.MONGODB_ATLAS,\n supportedCapabilities: [InfraCapability.DOCUMENT_DATABASE],\n perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths: PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS,\n\n plan(): InfraProviderPlanContribution {\n return {\n // Atlas is remote-only — no compose service / no K8s manifest.\n // The plan's `externalEndpoints` (in the wider envelope) carry\n // the Atlas host topology; this module's `plan()` covers only\n // admin-API access + per-app secret paths.\n platformAdmin: {\n envVars: {\n // ATLAS_API_BASE_URL is non-secret because it identifies\n // the Atlas API surface (default https://cloud.mongodb.com/api/atlas/v1.0).\n // ATLAS_PROJECT_ID + ATLAS_CLUSTER_NAME are non-secret\n // identifiers — public information about the customer's\n // Atlas project.\n ATLAS_API_BASE_URL: 'https://cloud.mongodb.com/api/atlas/v1.0',\n // PROJECT_ID + CLUSTER_NAME default to authored values; the\n // CLI's env-vars-builder writes them per-env from the\n // operator's `wildo.infra.<env>.config.ts > backingServices.mongodb`.\n ATLAS_PROJECT_ID: '',\n ATLAS_CLUSTER_NAME: 'Cluster0',\n },\n secretEnvVars: ['ATLAS_PUBLIC_KEY', 'ATLAS_PRIVATE_KEY'],\n // Atlas is admin-API only for apps-manager. Companion runs\n // locally against self-managed Mongo, NOT Atlas (no\n // companion consumer for the Atlas variant).\n consumers: [InfraPlatformAdminConsumer.APPS_MANAGER],\n },\n appRuntime: {\n // Static topology for the app pod. The actual host /\n // protocol / options for Atlas connections are derived\n // server-side at runtime from cluster info; the persistence\n // shape mirrors the legacy `_merge_WildoApplicationConfig`\n // mongodb section.\n perAppSecretBlobPaths: [...PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS],\n },\n };\n },\n\n async mintAppCredentials(\n context: AppCredentialMintingContext,\n ): Promise<AppCredentialMintingResult> {\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IMongoAtlasClient;\n const password = context.secretInputs[MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!password) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `secretInputs is missing '${MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the Mongo password — modules are upsert-only.`,\n );\n }\n if (!context.applicationNamespace) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationNamespace is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty namespace.`,\n );\n }\n const databaseName = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!databaseName) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the per-app database name.`,\n );\n }\n const clusterName = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[CLUSTER_NAME_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!clusterName) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${CLUSTER_NAME_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the Atlas cluster name.`,\n );\n }\n\n let username: string;\n let connectionString: string;\n if (isNamedPrincipal(context.principal)) {\n // A named principal gets a COLLECTION-SCOPED user on ONE custom role (#1694) — never the\n // application's `<namespace>_user`, which holds `readWrite` on the whole database.\n //\n // `resourceGrants` is REQUIRED and its absence is an error rather than a default, exactly as in the\n // self-hosted module: falling back to the application-wide upsert would hand a minion `readWrite` on\n // the whole database AND overwrite the backend's password, through a path that looks narrow.\n const grants = context.resourceGrants;\n if (!grants) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: `\n + `principal '${context.principal.kind}:${context.principal.name}' has no resourceGrants. `\n + `Refusing to fall back to the database-wide application user. The orchestrator must pass `\n + `an explicit empty resource grant when only the mandatory runtime floor is required.`,\n );\n }\n const identity = resolvePrincipalAtlasIdentity(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal);\n username = identity.username;\n // Authored declaration + the engine floor, through the SAME derivation the self-hosted and PostgreSQL\n // adapters use, so the three cannot disagree about what every runtime principal needs.\n const databaseGrants = deriveMinionDatabaseGrants(grants);\n ({ connectionString } = await adminClient.upsertCollectionScopedDatabaseUser({\n clusterName,\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n roleName: identity.roleName,\n privileges: toAtlasPrivileges(buildMinionMongodbPrivileges({\n databaseName,\n readCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.read),\n writeCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.write),\n appendCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.append),\n maintainCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.maintain),\n })),\n }));\n } else {\n username = buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal);\n // POST /databaseUsers (with PATCH-fallback) — idempotent upsert.\n // Returns the cluster's connection string (SRV address, or the seed list when it has none) with credentials embedded.\n ({ connectionString } = await adminClient.upsertApplicationDatabase({\n clusterName,\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n }));\n }\n\n return {\n secretBlobValues: {\n [MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH]: username,\n // Echo of input password — proves upsert-only.\n [MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH]: password,\n },\n runtimeArtifacts: {\n // Transient only — orchestrator uses for app-init seeding,\n // does NOT persist.\n [CONNECTION_STRING_ARTIFACT_KEY]: connectionString,\n },\n };\n },\n\n /**\n * Tear down an Atlas database user. Idempotent.\n *\n * **Caller status**: for a runtime principal, apps-manager's declaration reconcile calls this when a\n * minion is removed. For the application backend (and every minion), apps-manager's withdrawal calls it\n * (`deregisterApplication`, #1307): the user is deleted, the database is kept, and `restoreApplication`\n * re-mints the user with the recorded password.\n */\n async revokeAppCredentials(context: AppCredentialMintingContext): Promise<void> {\n if (!context.applicationNamespace) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.revokeAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationNamespace is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty namespace.`,\n );\n }\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IMongoAtlasClient;\n if (isNamedPrincipal(context.principal)) {\n // The principal's user AND its role, derived through the SAME function the mint uses. Before #1694\n // this derived `<namespace>_user` for every input, so revoking a minion would have deleted the\n // application backend's user — `invariant-call-site-enumeration.md` #18, on the Atlas side.\n await adminClient.dropCollectionScopedDatabaseUser(\n resolvePrincipalAtlasIdentity(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal),\n );\n return;\n }\n await adminClient.deleteDatabaseUser(buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal));\n },\n\n // No `mintPlatformServiceCredentials` (D-4).\n};\n"]}
1
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* `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule` — fourth concrete `InfraProviderModule`\n * (generalizing the RabbitMQ / Redis / PostgreSQL module pattern to MongoDB Atlas).\n *\n * Implements the `MONGODB_ATLAS` `InfraProvider` over the\n * `IMongoAtlasClient` transport (Atlas REST API + digest auth, exposed\n * by `MongoAtlasManagerService` after the Slice 4.B.3 5C policy/\n * transport split). Owns the Atlas naming and grant policy; the USERNAME\n * policy itself is shared with the self-hosted module through\n * `buildMongodbPrincipalUsername` (`<applicationNamespace>_user` for the\n * application backend, `<namespace>_<kind>_<name>_user` for a principal).\n *\n * **What this module reads from `AppCredentialMintingContext`**:\n * - `applicationNamespace` + `principal` — the username source (above).\n * - `secretInputs['database.mongodb.password']` — orchestrator-\n * supplied password (module is upsert-only, never generator).\n * - `applicationConfigInputs['databaseName']` — required, the\n * per-app database name.\n * - `applicationConfigInputs['clusterName']` — required, the Atlas\n * cluster name. apps-manager resolves it once (`resolveAtlasClusterName`)\n * for the application user and every principal user, and a later\n * reconcile reads back the cluster recorded at registration.\n * - `resourceGrants` — required for a named principal: its declared\n * access, to which the engine floor is added here.\n * - `adminClient` — narrowed to `IMongoAtlasClient`.\n *\n * **Two audiences this module serves:**\n *\n * 1. **Audience-1 (platform-admin)**: Atlas API public/private key\n * pair + project id + base URL. Consumers: `apps-manager` only\n * (companion uses self-managed locally; Atlas is remote-only).\n *\n * 2. **Audience-3 (app-scoped, via `mintAppCredentials`)**:\n * per-customer-app Atlas database user. Result threaded into\n * `Wildo_Application_Secrets.database.mongodb.{username,password}`\n * via `_merge_WildoApplicationSecrets`; the cluster's connection\n * string (its SRV address, or the `mongoURIWithOptions` seed list\n * when it has none, #1969) returned via `runtimeArtifacts.connectionString` for\n * transient app-init operations (NOT persisted — the persistence\n * shape is split between config (host/protocol/options/database)\n * and secrets (username/password)).\n *\n * **NOT served (D-4 of Slice 4.B locked decisions, 2026-05-10)**:\n * - **Audience-2 (platform-service-scoped)**: no platform service\n * uses Atlas for inter-service messaging today. Method omitted.\n *\n * **`revokeAppCredentials`**: for a runtime principal, apps-manager's\n * declaration reconcile calls it when a minion is removed. For the application\n * backend, apps-manager calls it when the application is withdrawn from the\n * platform (`deregisterApplication`, #1307): the database user is deleted and\n * the database is kept, so `restoreApplication` can re-mint it.\n *\n * **Runtime principals (minions), #1694**: each gets its OWN Atlas database\n * user holding ONE Atlas custom database role — the Atlas twin of the\n * self-hosted module's collection-scoped user:\n * - the username comes from `buildMongodbPrincipalUsername`, the SAME\n * derivation the self-hosted module uses, so it can never be the backend's\n * `<namespace>_user`, and the mint and the revoke cannot disagree about it;\n * - the role carries the principal's declared `resourceAccess` PLUS the engine\n * execution-history floor every enabled Node minion needs, derived through\n * `deriveMinionDatabaseGrants` → `buildMinionMongodbPrivileges`, the same\n * pair the self-hosted module uses, then translated into Atlas's action names;\n * - the user is scoped to the application's cluster alone;\n * - revoking deletes that user and that role, and nothing else.\n *\n * Before #1694 the module ignored `principal` and derived `<namespace>_user`\n * for every input, so a minion mint would have overwritten the backend's user\n * and a minion revoke would have deleted it; apps-manager refused the\n * combination at registration instead.\n */\n\nimport {\n ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind,\n AppCredentialMintingContext,\n AppCredentialMintingResult,\n IMongoAtlasClient,\n InfraCapability,\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer,\n InfraProvider,\n InfraProviderModule,\n InfraProviderPlanContribution,\n deriveMinionDatabaseGrants,\n resolveGrantStorageNames,\n type ApplicationRuntimePrincipal,\n} from '@wildo-ai/platform-config-lib';\nimport {\n buildMinionMongodbPrivileges,\n buildMongodbPrincipalUsername,\n type MongodbCollectionPrivilege,\n} from '../mongodb-self/mongodb-self.infra.module';\n\n/**\n * The `Wildo_Application_Secrets` JSON paths this module writes\n * through `mintAppCredentials.secretBlobValues`. Declared once and\n * reused as `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` in `plan()` AND as\n * the keys of the result, so a refactor that renames a path fails\n * loudly at one place.\n */\nconst MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH = 'database.mongodb.username';\nconst MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH = 'database.mongodb.password';\n/**\n * The paths this module mints PER RUNTIME PRINCIPAL — the single source for both consumers.\n *\n * Read by `InfraProviderModule.perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths` (statically, so apps-manager can strip\n * these from the application blob before delivering a principal's own material) AND spread into\n * `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` inside `plan()`. Declaring the list twice is how the delivery\n * path would silently stop covering a path this module still mints.\n */\nconst PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH, MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH];\n\n\n/**\n * Key the module looks for in `secretInputs` for the orchestrator-\n * supplied password.\n */\nconst MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY = 'database.mongodb.password';\n\n/**\n * Required keys in `applicationConfigInputs`. The orchestrator\n * derives both before calling `mintAppCredentials`.\n */\nconst DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY = 'databaseName';\nconst CLUSTER_NAME_INPUT_KEY = 'clusterName';\n\n/**\n * Key in `runtimeArtifacts` carrying the cluster's connection string — its SRV\n * address, or the `mongoURIWithOptions` seed list when it has none (#1969) — with\n * credentials embedded. Exposed for orchestrator transient use\n * (app-init seeding); deliberately NOT persisted.\n */\nconst CONNECTION_STRING_ARTIFACT_KEY = 'connectionString';\n\n/**\n * A named runtime principal (a minion) — anything but the application backend, which keeps the\n * application-level `<namespace>_user` and its database-wide role.\n */\nfunction isNamedPrincipal(principal: ApplicationRuntimePrincipal | undefined): principal is ApplicationRuntimePrincipal {\n return principal !== undefined && principal.kind !== ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND;\n}\n\n/**\n * The Atlas custom role a principal's user holds — derived from the principal's username exactly as the\n * self-hosted module derives its role (`<username>_role`), so the mint and the revoke name the same role.\n *\n * Custom roles are PROJECT-wide in Atlas, not per database or cluster, so the name must be unique across\n * every application the project hosts. It is: the username embeds the application namespace.\n */\nfunction buildAtlasPrincipalRoleName(username: string): string {\n return `${username}_role`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Atlas's rule for a custom role name, checked before any request so a name Atlas would refuse fails here,\n * naming the principal, rather than as a bare HTTP 400 from the Admin API.\n *\n * spec-cite: https://www.mongodb.com/docs/atlas/security-add-mongodb-roles/ — \"The specified role name can\n * only contain letters, numbers, underscores or hyphens.\" (fetched 2026-09-27). The OpenAPI schema for\n * `UserCustomDBRole.roleName` states no pattern, so the prose page is the authority.\n */\nconst ATLAS_CUSTOM_ROLE_NAME_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;\n\n/**\n * MongoDB's privilege action (the vocabulary `buildMinionMongodbPrivileges` speaks, shared with the\n * self-hosted module) → the Atlas Admin API's name for the same action.\n *\n * semantic-literal-boundary: both sides are EXTERNAL vocabularies — MongoDB's `createRole` action names and\n * the Atlas Admin API's `DatabasePrivilegeAction.action` enum — and this table is the one place they meet.\n * spec-cite: Atlas Administration API v1.0 OpenAPI (github.com/mongodb/openapi, `openapi/v1-deprecated/v1.json`),\n * schema `DatabasePrivilegeAction`, enum `action`: `FIND`, `INSERT`, `REMOVE`, `UPDATE` (fetched 2026-09-27).\n *\n * Closed on purpose: an action with no entry is REFUSED rather than dropped (a silently narrower role reads\n * as a working grant until the minion fails) or passed through (a spelling Atlas does not know is a 400 at\n * best). Grants only ever reach Atlas through this table, so nothing can widen them on the way.\n */\nconst ATLAS_PRIVILEGE_ACTION_BY_MONGODB_ACTION: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {\n find: 'FIND',\n insert: 'INSERT',\n update: 'UPDATE',\n remove: 'REMOVE',\n};\n\nfunction toAtlasPrivileges(privileges: readonly MongodbCollectionPrivilege[]): MongodbCollectionPrivilege[] {\n return privileges.map((privilege) => ({\n resource: privilege.resource,\n actions: privilege.actions.map((action) => {\n const atlasAction = ATLAS_PRIVILEGE_ACTION_BY_MONGODB_ACTION[action];\n if (!atlasAction) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule: MongoDB privilege action '${action}' has no Atlas Admin API equivalent `\n + `in ATLAS_PRIVILEGE_ACTION_BY_MONGODB_ACTION. Refusing to mint a role that would silently lack it.`,\n );\n }\n return atlasAction;\n }),\n }));\n}\n\n/** The principal's username and role, checked against Atlas's role-name rule. One derivation for mint and revoke. */\nfunction resolvePrincipalAtlasIdentity(\n applicationNamespace: string,\n principal: ApplicationRuntimePrincipal,\n): { username: string; roleName: string } {\n const username = buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(applicationNamespace, principal);\n // The whole point of this path. `buildMongodbPrincipalUsername` returns the backend's name only for the\n // backend, but this is the one assertion whose failure would hand a minion the backend's user, so it is\n // made here rather than inferred from the helper.\n if (username === buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(applicationNamespace, undefined)) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule: principal '${principal.kind}:${principal.name ?? ''}' resolved to the `\n + `application backend's Atlas user '${username}'. Refusing: minting would overwrite it and revoking would delete it.`,\n );\n }\n const roleName = buildAtlasPrincipalRoleName(username);\n if (!ATLAS_CUSTOM_ROLE_NAME_PATTERN.test(roleName)) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule: the custom role name '${roleName}' for principal `\n + `'${principal.kind}:${principal.name ?? ''}' is not one Atlas accepts (letters, numbers, underscores or hyphens only).`,\n );\n }\n return { username, roleName };\n}\n\nexport const MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule: InfraProviderModule = {\n provider: InfraProvider.MONGODB_ATLAS,\n supportedCapabilities: [InfraCapability.DOCUMENT_DATABASE],\n perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths: PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS,\n\n plan(): InfraProviderPlanContribution {\n return {\n // Atlas is remote-only — no compose service / no K8s manifest.\n // The plan's `externalEndpoints` (in the wider envelope) carry\n // the Atlas host topology; this module's `plan()` covers only\n // admin-API access + per-app secret paths.\n platformAdmin: {\n envVars: {\n // ATLAS_API_BASE_URL is non-secret because it identifies\n // the Atlas API surface (default https://cloud.mongodb.com/api/atlas/v1.0).\n // ATLAS_PROJECT_ID + ATLAS_CLUSTER_NAME are non-secret\n // identifiers — public information about the customer's\n // Atlas project.\n ATLAS_API_BASE_URL: 'https://cloud.mongodb.com/api/atlas/v1.0',\n // PROJECT_ID + CLUSTER_NAME default to authored values; the\n // CLI's env-vars-builder writes them per-env from the\n // operator's `wildo.infra.<env>.config.ts > backingServices.mongodb`.\n ATLAS_PROJECT_ID: '',\n ATLAS_CLUSTER_NAME: 'Cluster0',\n },\n secretEnvVars: ['ATLAS_PUBLIC_KEY', 'ATLAS_PRIVATE_KEY'],\n // Atlas is admin-API only for apps-manager. Companion runs\n // locally against self-managed Mongo, NOT Atlas (no\n // companion consumer for the Atlas variant).\n consumers: [InfraPlatformAdminConsumer.APPS_MANAGER],\n },\n appRuntime: {\n // Static topology for the app pod. The actual host /\n // protocol / options for Atlas connections are derived\n // server-side at runtime from cluster info; the persistence\n // shape mirrors the legacy `_merge_WildoApplicationConfig`\n // mongodb section.\n perAppSecretBlobPaths: [...PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS],\n },\n };\n },\n\n async mintAppCredentials(\n context: AppCredentialMintingContext,\n ): Promise<AppCredentialMintingResult> {\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IMongoAtlasClient;\n const password = context.secretInputs[MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!password) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `secretInputs is missing '${MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the Mongo password — modules are upsert-only.`,\n );\n }\n if (!context.applicationNamespace) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationNamespace is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty namespace.`,\n );\n }\n const databaseName = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!databaseName) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the per-app database name.`,\n );\n }\n const clusterName = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[CLUSTER_NAME_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!clusterName) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${CLUSTER_NAME_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the Atlas cluster name.`,\n );\n }\n\n let username: string;\n let connectionString: string;\n if (isNamedPrincipal(context.principal)) {\n // A named principal gets a COLLECTION-SCOPED user on ONE custom role (#1694) — never the\n // application's `<namespace>_user`, which holds `readWrite` on the whole database.\n //\n // `resourceGrants` is REQUIRED and its absence is an error rather than a default, exactly as in the\n // self-hosted module: falling back to the application-wide upsert would hand a minion `readWrite` on\n // the whole database AND overwrite the backend's password, through a path that looks narrow.\n const grants = context.resourceGrants;\n if (!grants) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: `\n + `principal '${context.principal.kind}:${context.principal.name}' has no resourceGrants. `\n + `Refusing to fall back to the database-wide application user. The orchestrator must pass `\n + `an explicit empty resource grant when only the mandatory runtime floor is required.`,\n );\n }\n const identity = resolvePrincipalAtlasIdentity(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal);\n username = identity.username;\n // Authored declaration + the engine floor, through the SAME derivation the self-hosted and PostgreSQL\n // adapters use, so the three cannot disagree about what every runtime principal needs.\n const databaseGrants = deriveMinionDatabaseGrants(grants);\n ({ connectionString } = await adminClient.upsertCollectionScopedDatabaseUser({\n clusterName,\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n roleName: identity.roleName,\n privileges: toAtlasPrivileges(buildMinionMongodbPrivileges({\n databaseName,\n readCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.read),\n writeCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.write),\n appendCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.append),\n maintainCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.maintain),\n })),\n }));\n } else {\n username = buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal);\n // POST /databaseUsers (with PATCH-fallback) — idempotent upsert.\n // Returns the cluster's connection string (SRV address, or the seed list when it has none) with credentials embedded.\n ({ connectionString } = await adminClient.upsertApplicationDatabase({\n clusterName,\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n }));\n }\n\n return {\n secretBlobValues: {\n [MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH]: username,\n // Echo of input password — proves upsert-only.\n [MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH]: password,\n },\n runtimeArtifacts: {\n // Transient only — orchestrator uses for app-init seeding,\n // does NOT persist.\n [CONNECTION_STRING_ARTIFACT_KEY]: connectionString,\n },\n };\n },\n\n /**\n * Tear down an Atlas database user. Idempotent.\n *\n * **Caller status**: for a runtime principal, apps-manager's declaration reconcile calls this when a\n * minion is removed. For the application backend (and every minion), apps-manager's withdrawal calls it\n * (`deregisterApplication`, #1307): the user is deleted, the database is kept, and `restoreApplication`\n * re-mints the user with the recorded password.\n */\n async revokeAppCredentials(context: AppCredentialMintingContext): Promise<void> {\n if (!context.applicationNamespace) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.revokeAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationNamespace is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty namespace.`,\n );\n }\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IMongoAtlasClient;\n if (isNamedPrincipal(context.principal)) {\n // The principal's user AND its role, derived through the SAME function the mint uses. Before #1694\n // this derived `<namespace>_user` for every input, so revoking a minion would have deleted the\n // application backend's user — `invariant-call-site-enumeration.md` #18, on the Atlas side.\n await adminClient.dropCollectionScopedDatabaseUser(\n resolvePrincipalAtlasIdentity(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal),\n );\n return;\n }\n await adminClient.deleteDatabaseUser(buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal));\n },\n\n // No `mintPlatformServiceCredentials` (D-4).\n};\n"]}
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
1
1
  /**
2
2
  * `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule` — fifth concrete `InfraProviderModule`
3
- * (Slice 4.B.3 of `infra-provider-planner.md`, generalizing the
4
- * pattern to self-managed MongoDB).
3
+ * (generalizing the pattern to self-managed MongoDB).
5
4
  *
6
5
  * Implements the `MONGODB_SELF` `InfraProvider` over the
7
6
  * `IMongoSelfAdminClient` transport (admin-side mongoose connection,
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
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@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
1
1
  /**
2
2
  * `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule` — fifth concrete `InfraProviderModule`
3
- * (Slice 4.B.3 of `infra-provider-planner.md`, generalizing the
4
- * pattern to self-managed MongoDB).
3
+ * (generalizing the pattern to self-managed MongoDB).
5
4
  *
6
5
  * Implements the `MONGODB_SELF` `InfraProvider` over the
7
6
  * `IMongoSelfAdminClient` transport (admin-side mongoose connection,
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
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* `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule` — fifth concrete `InfraProviderModule`\n * (Slice 4.B.3 of `infra-provider-planner.md`, generalizing the\n * pattern to self-managed MongoDB).\n *\n * Implements the `MONGODB_SELF` `InfraProvider` over the\n * `IMongoSelfAdminClient` transport (admin-side mongoose connection,\n * exposed by `MongoSelfManagerService` after the Slice 4.B.3 5C\n * policy/transport split). Owns the MongoDB username policy\n * (`buildMongodbPrincipalUsername`, which the Atlas module also uses, so a\n * user has one name whichever provider holds the store) and\n * the per-app connection URL derivation (same scheme as the admin URL) by swapping admin credentials\n * with per-app credentials in the admin connect URL the orchestrator\n * reads from `MONGO_CONNECT_URL`.\n *\n * **What this module reads from `AppCredentialMintingContext`**:\n * - `applicationNamespace` + `principal` — the username source\n * (`buildMongodbPrincipalUsername`: `${ns}_user` for the application\n * backend, `${ns}_<kind>_<name>_user` for a runtime principal).\n * - `resourceGrants` — required for a named principal: its declared\n * access, to which `deriveMinionDatabaseGrants` adds the engine floor.\n * - `secretInputs['database.mongodb.password']` — orchestrator-\n * supplied password (module is upsert-only, never generator).\n * - `applicationConfigInputs['databaseName']` — required.\n * - `applicationConfigInputs['adminConnectUrl']` — required, the\n * admin-scoped MongoDB connect URL the orchestrator reads from\n * `MONGO_CONNECT_URL` env at app-init time.\n * - `adminClient` — narrowed to `IMongoSelfAdminClient`.\n *\n * **Two audiences this module serves:**\n *\n * 1. **Audience-1 (platform-admin)**: cluster-wide Mongo admin\n * connect URL (`MONGO_CONNECT_URL`). Consumers: `apps-manager`\n * (mints per-app users via `mintAppCredentials`), `companion`\n * (mirrors apps-manager admin role for local dev).\n *\n * 2. **Audience-3 (app-scoped, via `mintAppCredentials`)**:\n * per-customer-app Mongo database user. Result threaded into\n * `Wildo_Application_Secrets.database.mongodb.{username,password}`\n * via `_merge_WildoApplicationSecrets`; the per-app connect URL\n * returned via `runtimeArtifacts.connectionString` for\n * transient app-init operations.\n *\n * **NOT served (D-4)**: audience-2 not applicable.\n */\n\nimport {\n AppCredentialMintingContext,\n AppCredentialMintingResult,\n IMongoSelfAdminClient,\n InfraCapability,\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer,\n InfraProvider,\n InfraProviderModule,\n InfraProviderPlanContribution,\n ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind,\n deriveMinionDatabaseGrants,\n resolveGrantStorageNames,\n type ApplicationRuntimePrincipal,\n} from '@wildo-ai/platform-config-lib';\n\nconst MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH = 'database.mongodb.username';\nconst MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH = 'database.mongodb.password';\n/**\n * The paths this module mints PER RUNTIME PRINCIPAL — the single source for both consumers.\n *\n * Read by `InfraProviderModule.perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths` (statically, so apps-manager can strip\n * these from the application blob before delivering a principal's own material) AND spread into\n * `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` inside `plan()`. Declaring the list twice is how the delivery\n * path would silently stop covering a path this module still mints.\n */\nconst PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH, MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH];\n\n\nconst MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY = 'database.mongodb.password';\n\nconst DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY = 'databaseName';\nconst ADMIN_CONNECT_URL_INPUT_KEY = 'adminConnectUrl';\n\nconst CONNECTION_STRING_ARTIFACT_KEY = 'connectionString';\n\n/**\n * The application backend's username (`${ns}_user`). Reached only through\n * `buildMongodbPrincipalUsername`, which both MongoDB modules call, so the\n * persistence shape is identical regardless of provider.\n */\nfunction buildMongodbUsername(applicationNamespace: string): string {\n return `${applicationNamespace}_user`;\n}\n\n/**\n * MongoDB privilege ACTIONS, per grant axis.\n *\n * Named here rather than inlined because these ARE the security semantics: what\n * \"read\" and \"write\" mean once they reach the database. Mongo's action\n * vocabulary is an external one, so it lives at this adapter — the module that\n * speaks Mongo — and never leaks into the platform's grant model.\n *\n * `find` alone for read: no `listCollections`, no `collStats`, nothing that\n * enumerates. A minion granted read on one resource should not be able to\n * discover what else exists.\n *\n * `insert`/`update`/`remove` for write, and deliberately NOT `find`. The\n * platform-level derivation refuses to widen write into read, and re-adding it\n * here would defeat that decision at the last hop — see\n * `deriveMinionResourceGrants`.\n */\nconst MONGODB_READ_ACTIONS: readonly string[] = ['find'];\nconst MONGODB_WRITE_ACTIONS: readonly string[] = ['insert', 'update', 'remove'];\n/**\n * Append-only: `insert` and `find`, WITHOUT `update` or `remove`. Carries the engine's audit-log\n * floor, where a principal must be able to record what it did and must never be able to unrecord it.\n *\n * `find` is not a widening — see {@link MONGODB_MAINTAIN_ACTIONS}, whose note covers both floors.\n */\nconst MONGODB_APPEND_ACTIONS: readonly string[] = ['insert', 'find'];\n/**\n * Durable runtime state may be inserted, read back and updated, never removed.\n *\n * ## Why the two FLOORS carry `find` and the author-declared write axis above does not\n *\n * Without it this axis could not perform the update the engine actually issues. Measured 2026-09-16\n * against the running replica set, as a throwaway role holding exactly these actions:\n *\n * | actions | operation | outcome |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | `insert`, `update` | `updateOne({_id}, …)` | works |\n * | `insert`, `update` | **`findOneAndUpdate`** | **Unauthorized** |\n * | `insert`, `find`, `update` | `findOneAndUpdate` | works; `deleteOne` still Unauthorized |\n *\n * The third row is the one that matters: `RepositoryResourceBackendService` updates through\n * `findOneAndUpdate`, so a role without `find` could not update at all — only a filter-less write no\n * caller issues. Note MongoDB and PostgreSQL differ here, which is why each was measured rather than\n * inferred from the other: Mongo's `update` action covers its own filter, while PostgreSQL requires\n * `SELECT` for the columns a `WHERE` reads.\n *\n * `find` on the APPEND axis was NOT broken on MongoDB — `insertOne` succeeds without it. It is added\n * so an axis means the same thing on both adapters: `deriveMinionDatabaseGrants` exists precisely so\n * the two cannot drift, and an append grant that carried read-back on one adapter and not the other\n * would make the same declaration yield two different authorities.\n *\n * **What these floors withhold is untouched.** Append still holds no `update` and no `remove`;\n * maintain still holds no `remove`. Both were re-probed after adding `find`, and `deleteOne` stayed\n * Unauthorized. The author-declared write axis keeps write-without-read deliberately, because there\n * the author has a remedy — declare the read — which `deriveMinionResourceGrants` argues for at\n * length. These two axes are engine-imposed and refuse any declaration, so no author action could\n * ever have repaired them.\n */\nconst MONGODB_MAINTAIN_ACTIONS: readonly string[] = ['insert', 'find', 'update'];\n\n/** One `createRole`/`updateRole` privilege entry. */\nexport interface MongodbCollectionPrivilege {\n readonly resource: { readonly db: string; readonly collection: string };\n readonly actions: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Turn a minion's grants into collection-scoped MongoDB privileges (D14, R1).\n *\n * ## What this deliberately never produces\n *\n * No `dbAdmin` and no `readWrite` — the two roles the application backend\n * currently holds on the whole database. `dbAdmin` is banned outright by D14;\n * `readWrite` is database-WIDE, so granting it to a minion would make every\n * collection reachable regardless of what `resourceAccess` declared, which is\n * the containment this exists to create.\n *\n * No privilege on the database RESOURCE either (`{ db, collection: '' }`), which\n * is Mongo's way of saying \"every collection in this database\". Every entry\n * names one collection explicitly.\n *\n * ## Read and write are separate entries on purpose\n *\n * A collection granted both axes yields TWO privilege entries rather than one\n * merged action list. Mongo unions them identically, but the emitted role then\n * reads back as the declaration that produced it — which is what makes an\n * operator inspecting `db.getRole()` able to check the grant against the config\n * without re-deriving it.\n */\nexport function buildMinionMongodbPrivileges(input: {\n databaseName: string;\n readCollections: readonly string[];\n writeCollections: readonly string[];\n /** Insert-only — see {@link MONGODB_APPEND_ACTIONS}. Optional so existing pins read unchanged. */\n appendCollections?: readonly string[];\n maintainCollections?: readonly string[];\n}): MongodbCollectionPrivilege[] {\n const privileges: MongodbCollectionPrivilege[] = [];\n for (const collection of input.readCollections) {\n privileges.push({ resource: { db: input.databaseName, collection }, actions: [...MONGODB_READ_ACTIONS] });\n }\n for (const collection of input.writeCollections) {\n privileges.push({ resource: { db: input.databaseName, collection }, actions: [...MONGODB_WRITE_ACTIONS] });\n }\n for (const collection of input.appendCollections ?? []) {\n privileges.push({ resource: { db: input.databaseName, collection }, actions: [...MONGODB_APPEND_ACTIONS] });\n }\n for (const collection of input.maintainCollections ?? []) {\n privileges.push({ resource: { db: input.databaseName, collection }, actions: [...MONGODB_MAINTAIN_ACTIONS] });\n }\n return privileges;\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the per-app connect URL by swapping admin credentials and\n * the database path in the authored `adminConnectUrl`. Mirrors the\n * legacy logic at\n * `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts:469-479`:\n *\n * const parsed = new URL(adminConnectUrl);\n * parsed.username = perAppUsername;\n * parsed.password = perAppPassword;\n * parsed.pathname = '/' + databaseName;\n *\n * URL-encoding handled automatically by the WHATWG URL class.\n */\nfunction buildPerAppConnectUrl(\n adminConnectUrl: string,\n databaseName: string,\n username: string,\n password: string,\n): string {\n const parsed = new URL(adminConnectUrl);\n parsed.username = encodeURIComponent(username);\n parsed.password = encodeURIComponent(password);\n parsed.pathname = '/' + databaseName;\n return parsed.toString();\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-principal Mongo username — the SAME derivation the revoke path must use.\n *\n * The application backend keeps `<namespace>_user` VERBATIM so an existing\n * deployment's user is never orphaned. Third time this shape appears (Redis,\n * RabbitMQ, now Mongo): a revoke deriving it differently deletes the BACKEND's\n * database user while believing it is removing a minion's.\n *\n * Exported because BOTH MongoDB modules name principals through it — the Atlas\n * module too (#1694) — so a principal's user has one name whichever provider\n * holds the store, and neither module can drift into the backend's name.\n */\nexport function buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(\n applicationNamespace: string,\n principal: ApplicationRuntimePrincipal | undefined,\n): string {\n if (!principal || principal.kind === ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n return buildMongodbUsername(applicationNamespace);\n }\n const sanitizedName = (principal.name ?? '').replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]+/g, '_').replace(/^_+|_+$/g, '');\n return `${applicationNamespace}_${principal.kind}_${sanitizedName}_user`;\n}\n\nexport const MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule: InfraProviderModule = {\n provider: InfraProvider.MONGODB_SELF,\n supportedCapabilities: [InfraCapability.DOCUMENT_DATABASE],\n perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths: PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS,\n\n plan(): InfraProviderPlanContribution {\n return {\n dockerComposeServices: ['mongodb'],\n k8sResources: ['templates/infra/k8s/internal/mongodb/deployment.yaml.hbs'],\n platformAdmin: {\n envVars: {},\n // The single MONGO_CONNECT_URL secret carries the admin\n // credentials embedded; legacy field name preserved.\n secretEnvVars: ['MONGO_CONNECT_URL'],\n consumers: [\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer.APPS_MANAGER,\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer.COMPANION,\n ],\n },\n appRuntime: {\n // Same persistence shape as Atlas — per-app username +\n // password go into secrets. The stored host/protocol are read\n // by apps-manager from the connection string this module\n // RETURNS when the application declares its provider (#1876),\n // and from BASE_MONGO_SERVER_URL only when it declares none.\n perAppSecretBlobPaths: [...PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS],\n },\n };\n },\n\n async mintAppCredentials(\n context: AppCredentialMintingContext,\n ): Promise<AppCredentialMintingResult> {\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IMongoSelfAdminClient;\n const password = context.secretInputs[MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!password) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `secretInputs is missing '${MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the Mongo password — modules are upsert-only.`,\n );\n }\n if (!context.applicationNamespace) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationNamespace is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty namespace.`,\n );\n }\n const databaseName = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!databaseName) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the per-app database name.`,\n );\n }\n const adminConnectUrl = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[ADMIN_CONNECT_URL_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!adminConnectUrl) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${ADMIN_CONNECT_URL_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the admin Mongo connect URL.`,\n );\n }\n\n const username = buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal);\n\n if (context.principal && context.principal.kind !== ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n // A named principal gets a COLLECTION-SCOPED user (Step 3 / R1 / D14):\n // one custom role carrying authored business grants plus the mandatory\n // runtime floor, and no inherited database-wide privileges.\n //\n // `resourceGrants` is REQUIRED here and its absence is an error rather\n // than a default. Falling back to the app-wide upsert would hand a minion\n // `readWrite` + `dbAdmin` on the whole database — the exact over-grant\n // this path exists to replace, arriving silently through a code path that\n // looks like it is doing the narrow thing.\n const grants = context.resourceGrants;\n if (!grants) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: `\n + `principal '${context.principal.kind}:${context.principal.name}' has no resourceGrants. `\n + `Refusing to fall back to the database-wide application user. The orchestrator must pass `\n + `an explicit empty resource grant when only the mandatory runtime floor is required.`,\n );\n }\n const databaseGrants = deriveMinionDatabaseGrants(grants);\n\n await adminClient.upsertCollectionScopedDatabaseUser({\n adminConnectUrl,\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n roleName: `${username}_role`,\n // Resource types → collection names HERE, at the adapter that speaks\n // Mongo. The grant contract itself stays in the platform vocabulary.\n // Authored declaration + the engine floor, through the SAME derivation\n // the PostgreSQL adapter uses — so the two cannot disagree about what\n // the framework itself requires of every runtime principal.\n privileges: buildMinionMongodbPrivileges({\n databaseName,\n readCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.read),\n writeCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.write),\n appendCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.append),\n maintainCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.maintain),\n }),\n });\n } else {\n // createUser-or-updateUser over an admin-scoped mongoose\n // connection — idempotent upsert.\n await adminClient.upsertApplicationDatabaseUser({\n adminConnectUrl,\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n });\n }\n\n // Derive the per-app connection URL (the admin URL's own scheme) by swapping credentials + db path\n // in the authored admin URL. The orchestrator uses this for\n // transient app-init seeding; not persisted.\n const connectionString = buildPerAppConnectUrl(\n adminConnectUrl,\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n );\n\n return {\n secretBlobValues: {\n [MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH]: username,\n [MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH]: password,\n },\n runtimeArtifacts: {\n [CONNECTION_STRING_ARTIFACT_KEY]: connectionString,\n },\n };\n },\n\n /**\n * Revoke a principal's Mongo database user (and a minion's custom role); the database\n * and its documents are kept.\n *\n * **Caller status**: apps-manager runtime-principal declaration reconciliation\n * calls this for a removed minion when its application has a MongoDB store, and\n * application withdrawal (`deregisterApplication`, #1307) for the backend and every\n * minion; `restoreApplication` re-mints them.\n * The named principal and database scope identify the grant being revoked.\n */\n async revokeAppCredentials(context: AppCredentialMintingContext): Promise<void> {\n if (!context.applicationNamespace) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.revokeAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationNamespace is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty namespace.`,\n );\n }\n const adminConnectUrl = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[ADMIN_CONNECT_URL_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!adminConnectUrl) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.revokeAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${ADMIN_CONNECT_URL_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the admin Mongo connect URL.`,\n );\n }\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IMongoSelfAdminClient;\n // Derived through the SAME function the mint uses. Deriving it independently\n // here — which is what this line did before named principals existed — meant\n // revoking a minion left its credential live AND dropped the APPLICATION\n // BACKEND's database user, because the backend's name is what\n // `buildMongodbUsername` returns for every input.\n const username = buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal);\n\n if (context.principal && context.principal.kind !== ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n // A scoped principal owns a user AND a custom role. Routing it through the\n // user-only door would leave a privileged role behind that the next mint\n // adopts without anybody declaring it.\n const databaseName = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!databaseName) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.revokeAppCredentials: `\n + `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY}' for principal `\n + `'${context.principal.kind}:${context.principal.name}'. The role to drop lives IN that `\n + `database — revoking without it would drop the user and silently orphan its privileges.`,\n );\n }\n await adminClient.dropCollectionScopedDatabaseUser({\n adminConnectUrl,\n databaseName,\n username,\n roleName: `${username}_role`,\n });\n return;\n }\n\n await adminClient.deleteApplicationDatabaseUser({ adminConnectUrl, username });\n },\n\n // No `mintPlatformServiceCredentials` (D-4).\n};\n"]}
1
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* `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule` — fifth concrete `InfraProviderModule`\n * (generalizing the pattern to self-managed MongoDB).\n *\n * Implements the `MONGODB_SELF` `InfraProvider` over the\n * `IMongoSelfAdminClient` transport (admin-side mongoose connection,\n * exposed by `MongoSelfManagerService` after the Slice 4.B.3 5C\n * policy/transport split). Owns the MongoDB username policy\n * (`buildMongodbPrincipalUsername`, which the Atlas module also uses, so a\n * user has one name whichever provider holds the store) and\n * the per-app connection URL derivation (same scheme as the admin URL) by swapping admin credentials\n * with per-app credentials in the admin connect URL the orchestrator\n * reads from `MONGO_CONNECT_URL`.\n *\n * **What this module reads from `AppCredentialMintingContext`**:\n * - `applicationNamespace` + `principal` — the username source\n * (`buildMongodbPrincipalUsername`: `${ns}_user` for the application\n * backend, `${ns}_<kind>_<name>_user` for a runtime principal).\n * - `resourceGrants` — required for a named principal: its declared\n * access, to which `deriveMinionDatabaseGrants` adds the engine floor.\n * - `secretInputs['database.mongodb.password']` — orchestrator-\n * supplied password (module is upsert-only, never generator).\n * - `applicationConfigInputs['databaseName']` — required.\n * - `applicationConfigInputs['adminConnectUrl']` — required, the\n * admin-scoped MongoDB connect URL the orchestrator reads from\n * `MONGO_CONNECT_URL` env at app-init time.\n * - `adminClient` — narrowed to `IMongoSelfAdminClient`.\n *\n * **Two audiences this module serves:**\n *\n * 1. **Audience-1 (platform-admin)**: cluster-wide Mongo admin\n * connect URL (`MONGO_CONNECT_URL`). Consumers: `apps-manager`\n * (mints per-app users via `mintAppCredentials`), `companion`\n * (mirrors apps-manager admin role for local dev).\n *\n * 2. **Audience-3 (app-scoped, via `mintAppCredentials`)**:\n * per-customer-app Mongo database user. Result threaded into\n * `Wildo_Application_Secrets.database.mongodb.{username,password}`\n * via `_merge_WildoApplicationSecrets`; the per-app connect URL\n * returned via `runtimeArtifacts.connectionString` for\n * transient app-init operations.\n *\n * **NOT served (D-4)**: audience-2 not applicable.\n */\n\nimport {\n AppCredentialMintingContext,\n AppCredentialMintingResult,\n IMongoSelfAdminClient,\n InfraCapability,\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer,\n InfraProvider,\n InfraProviderModule,\n InfraProviderPlanContribution,\n ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind,\n deriveMinionDatabaseGrants,\n resolveGrantStorageNames,\n type ApplicationRuntimePrincipal,\n} from '@wildo-ai/platform-config-lib';\n\nconst MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH = 'database.mongodb.username';\nconst MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH = 'database.mongodb.password';\n/**\n * The paths this module mints PER RUNTIME PRINCIPAL — the single source for both consumers.\n *\n * Read by `InfraProviderModule.perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths` (statically, so apps-manager can strip\n * these from the application blob before delivering a principal's own material) AND spread into\n * `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` inside `plan()`. Declaring the list twice is how the delivery\n * path would silently stop covering a path this module still mints.\n */\nconst PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH, MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH];\n\n\nconst MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY = 'database.mongodb.password';\n\nconst DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY = 'databaseName';\nconst ADMIN_CONNECT_URL_INPUT_KEY = 'adminConnectUrl';\n\nconst CONNECTION_STRING_ARTIFACT_KEY = 'connectionString';\n\n/**\n * The application backend's username (`${ns}_user`). Reached only through\n * `buildMongodbPrincipalUsername`, which both MongoDB modules call, so the\n * persistence shape is identical regardless of provider.\n */\nfunction buildMongodbUsername(applicationNamespace: string): string {\n return `${applicationNamespace}_user`;\n}\n\n/**\n * MongoDB privilege ACTIONS, per grant axis.\n *\n * Named here rather than inlined because these ARE the security semantics: what\n * \"read\" and \"write\" mean once they reach the database. Mongo's action\n * vocabulary is an external one, so it lives at this adapter — the module that\n * speaks Mongo — and never leaks into the platform's grant model.\n *\n * `find` alone for read: no `listCollections`, no `collStats`, nothing that\n * enumerates. A minion granted read on one resource should not be able to\n * discover what else exists.\n *\n * `insert`/`update`/`remove` for write, and deliberately NOT `find`. The\n * platform-level derivation refuses to widen write into read, and re-adding it\n * here would defeat that decision at the last hop — see\n * `deriveMinionResourceGrants`.\n */\nconst MONGODB_READ_ACTIONS: readonly string[] = ['find'];\nconst MONGODB_WRITE_ACTIONS: readonly string[] = ['insert', 'update', 'remove'];\n/**\n * Append-only: `insert` and `find`, WITHOUT `update` or `remove`. Carries the engine's audit-log\n * floor, where a principal must be able to record what it did and must never be able to unrecord it.\n *\n * `find` is not a widening — see {@link MONGODB_MAINTAIN_ACTIONS}, whose note covers both floors.\n */\nconst MONGODB_APPEND_ACTIONS: readonly string[] = ['insert', 'find'];\n/**\n * Durable runtime state may be inserted, read back and updated, never removed.\n *\n * ## Why the two FLOORS carry `find` and the author-declared write axis above does not\n *\n * Without it this axis could not perform the update the engine actually issues. Measured 2026-09-16\n * against the running replica set, as a throwaway role holding exactly these actions:\n *\n * | actions | operation | outcome |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | `insert`, `update` | `updateOne({_id}, …)` | works |\n * | `insert`, `update` | **`findOneAndUpdate`** | **Unauthorized** |\n * | `insert`, `find`, `update` | `findOneAndUpdate` | works; `deleteOne` still Unauthorized |\n *\n * The third row is the one that matters: `RepositoryResourceBackendService` updates through\n * `findOneAndUpdate`, so a role without `find` could not update at all — only a filter-less write no\n * caller issues. Note MongoDB and PostgreSQL differ here, which is why each was measured rather than\n * inferred from the other: Mongo's `update` action covers its own filter, while PostgreSQL requires\n * `SELECT` for the columns a `WHERE` reads.\n *\n * `find` on the APPEND axis was NOT broken on MongoDB — `insertOne` succeeds without it. It is added\n * so an axis means the same thing on both adapters: `deriveMinionDatabaseGrants` exists precisely so\n * the two cannot drift, and an append grant that carried read-back on one adapter and not the other\n * would make the same declaration yield two different authorities.\n *\n * **What these floors withhold is untouched.** Append still holds no `update` and no `remove`;\n * maintain still holds no `remove`. Both were re-probed after adding `find`, and `deleteOne` stayed\n * Unauthorized. The author-declared write axis keeps write-without-read deliberately, because there\n * the author has a remedy — declare the read — which `deriveMinionResourceGrants` argues for at\n * length. These two axes are engine-imposed and refuse any declaration, so no author action could\n * ever have repaired them.\n */\nconst MONGODB_MAINTAIN_ACTIONS: readonly string[] = ['insert', 'find', 'update'];\n\n/** One `createRole`/`updateRole` privilege entry. */\nexport interface MongodbCollectionPrivilege {\n readonly resource: { readonly db: string; readonly collection: string };\n readonly actions: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Turn a minion's grants into collection-scoped MongoDB privileges (D14, R1).\n *\n * ## What this deliberately never produces\n *\n * No `dbAdmin` and no `readWrite` — the two roles the application backend\n * currently holds on the whole database. `dbAdmin` is banned outright by D14;\n * `readWrite` is database-WIDE, so granting it to a minion would make every\n * collection reachable regardless of what `resourceAccess` declared, which is\n * the containment this exists to create.\n *\n * No privilege on the database RESOURCE either (`{ db, collection: '' }`), which\n * is Mongo's way of saying \"every collection in this database\". Every entry\n * names one collection explicitly.\n *\n * ## Read and write are separate entries on purpose\n *\n * A collection granted both axes yields TWO privilege entries rather than one\n * merged action list. Mongo unions them identically, but the emitted role then\n * reads back as the declaration that produced it — which is what makes an\n * operator inspecting `db.getRole()` able to check the grant against the config\n * without re-deriving it.\n */\nexport function buildMinionMongodbPrivileges(input: {\n databaseName: string;\n readCollections: readonly string[];\n writeCollections: readonly string[];\n /** Insert-only — see {@link MONGODB_APPEND_ACTIONS}. Optional so existing pins read unchanged. */\n appendCollections?: readonly string[];\n maintainCollections?: readonly string[];\n}): MongodbCollectionPrivilege[] {\n const privileges: MongodbCollectionPrivilege[] = [];\n for (const collection of input.readCollections) {\n privileges.push({ resource: { db: input.databaseName, collection }, actions: [...MONGODB_READ_ACTIONS] });\n }\n for (const collection of input.writeCollections) {\n privileges.push({ resource: { db: input.databaseName, collection }, actions: [...MONGODB_WRITE_ACTIONS] });\n }\n for (const collection of input.appendCollections ?? []) {\n privileges.push({ resource: { db: input.databaseName, collection }, actions: [...MONGODB_APPEND_ACTIONS] });\n }\n for (const collection of input.maintainCollections ?? []) {\n privileges.push({ resource: { db: input.databaseName, collection }, actions: [...MONGODB_MAINTAIN_ACTIONS] });\n }\n return privileges;\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the per-app connect URL by swapping admin credentials and\n * the database path in the authored `adminConnectUrl`. Mirrors the\n * legacy logic at\n * `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts:469-479`:\n *\n * const parsed = new URL(adminConnectUrl);\n * parsed.username = perAppUsername;\n * parsed.password = perAppPassword;\n * parsed.pathname = '/' + databaseName;\n *\n * URL-encoding handled automatically by the WHATWG URL class.\n */\nfunction buildPerAppConnectUrl(\n adminConnectUrl: string,\n databaseName: string,\n username: string,\n password: string,\n): string {\n const parsed = new URL(adminConnectUrl);\n parsed.username = encodeURIComponent(username);\n parsed.password = encodeURIComponent(password);\n parsed.pathname = '/' + databaseName;\n return parsed.toString();\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-principal Mongo username — the SAME derivation the revoke path must use.\n *\n * The application backend keeps `<namespace>_user` VERBATIM so an existing\n * deployment's user is never orphaned. Third time this shape appears (Redis,\n * RabbitMQ, now Mongo): a revoke deriving it differently deletes the BACKEND's\n * database user while believing it is removing a minion's.\n *\n * Exported because BOTH MongoDB modules name principals through it — the Atlas\n * module too (#1694) — so a principal's user has one name whichever provider\n * holds the store, and neither module can drift into the backend's name.\n */\nexport function buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(\n applicationNamespace: string,\n principal: ApplicationRuntimePrincipal | undefined,\n): string {\n if (!principal || principal.kind === ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n return buildMongodbUsername(applicationNamespace);\n }\n const sanitizedName = (principal.name ?? '').replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]+/g, '_').replace(/^_+|_+$/g, '');\n return `${applicationNamespace}_${principal.kind}_${sanitizedName}_user`;\n}\n\nexport const MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule: InfraProviderModule = {\n provider: InfraProvider.MONGODB_SELF,\n supportedCapabilities: [InfraCapability.DOCUMENT_DATABASE],\n perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths: PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS,\n\n plan(): InfraProviderPlanContribution {\n return {\n dockerComposeServices: ['mongodb'],\n k8sResources: ['templates/infra/k8s/internal/mongodb/deployment.yaml.hbs'],\n platformAdmin: {\n envVars: {},\n // The single MONGO_CONNECT_URL secret carries the admin\n // credentials embedded; legacy field name preserved.\n secretEnvVars: ['MONGO_CONNECT_URL'],\n consumers: [\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer.APPS_MANAGER,\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer.COMPANION,\n ],\n },\n appRuntime: {\n // Same persistence shape as Atlas — per-app username +\n // password go into secrets. The stored host/protocol are read\n // by apps-manager from the connection string this module\n // RETURNS when the application declares its provider (#1876),\n // and from BASE_MONGO_SERVER_URL only when it declares none.\n perAppSecretBlobPaths: [...PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS],\n },\n };\n },\n\n async mintAppCredentials(\n context: AppCredentialMintingContext,\n ): Promise<AppCredentialMintingResult> {\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IMongoSelfAdminClient;\n const password = context.secretInputs[MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!password) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `secretInputs is missing '${MONGODB_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the Mongo password — modules are upsert-only.`,\n );\n }\n if (!context.applicationNamespace) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationNamespace is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty namespace.`,\n );\n }\n const databaseName = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!databaseName) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the per-app database name.`,\n );\n }\n const adminConnectUrl = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[ADMIN_CONNECT_URL_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!adminConnectUrl) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${ADMIN_CONNECT_URL_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the admin Mongo connect URL.`,\n );\n }\n\n const username = buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal);\n\n if (context.principal && context.principal.kind !== ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n // A named principal gets a COLLECTION-SCOPED user (Step 3 / R1 / D14):\n // one custom role carrying authored business grants plus the mandatory\n // runtime floor, and no inherited database-wide privileges.\n //\n // `resourceGrants` is REQUIRED here and its absence is an error rather\n // than a default. Falling back to the app-wide upsert would hand a minion\n // `readWrite` + `dbAdmin` on the whole database — the exact over-grant\n // this path exists to replace, arriving silently through a code path that\n // looks like it is doing the narrow thing.\n const grants = context.resourceGrants;\n if (!grants) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: `\n + `principal '${context.principal.kind}:${context.principal.name}' has no resourceGrants. `\n + `Refusing to fall back to the database-wide application user. The orchestrator must pass `\n + `an explicit empty resource grant when only the mandatory runtime floor is required.`,\n );\n }\n const databaseGrants = deriveMinionDatabaseGrants(grants);\n\n await adminClient.upsertCollectionScopedDatabaseUser({\n adminConnectUrl,\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n roleName: `${username}_role`,\n // Resource types → collection names HERE, at the adapter that speaks\n // Mongo. The grant contract itself stays in the platform vocabulary.\n // Authored declaration + the engine floor, through the SAME derivation\n // the PostgreSQL adapter uses — so the two cannot disagree about what\n // the framework itself requires of every runtime principal.\n privileges: buildMinionMongodbPrivileges({\n databaseName,\n readCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.read),\n writeCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.write),\n appendCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.append),\n maintainCollections: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.maintain),\n }),\n });\n } else {\n // createUser-or-updateUser over an admin-scoped mongoose\n // connection — idempotent upsert.\n await adminClient.upsertApplicationDatabaseUser({\n adminConnectUrl,\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n });\n }\n\n // Derive the per-app connection URL (the admin URL's own scheme) by swapping credentials + db path\n // in the authored admin URL. The orchestrator uses this for\n // transient app-init seeding; not persisted.\n const connectionString = buildPerAppConnectUrl(\n adminConnectUrl,\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n );\n\n return {\n secretBlobValues: {\n [MONGODB_USERNAME_PATH]: username,\n [MONGODB_PASSWORD_PATH]: password,\n },\n runtimeArtifacts: {\n [CONNECTION_STRING_ARTIFACT_KEY]: connectionString,\n },\n };\n },\n\n /**\n * Revoke a principal's Mongo database user (and a minion's custom role); the database\n * and its documents are kept.\n *\n * **Caller status**: apps-manager runtime-principal declaration reconciliation\n * calls this for a removed minion when its application has a MongoDB store, and\n * application withdrawal (`deregisterApplication`, #1307) for the backend and every\n * minion; `restoreApplication` re-mints them.\n * The named principal and database scope identify the grant being revoked.\n */\n async revokeAppCredentials(context: AppCredentialMintingContext): Promise<void> {\n if (!context.applicationNamespace) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.revokeAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationNamespace is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty namespace.`,\n );\n }\n const adminConnectUrl = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[ADMIN_CONNECT_URL_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!adminConnectUrl) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.revokeAppCredentials: ` +\n `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${ADMIN_CONNECT_URL_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the admin Mongo connect URL.`,\n );\n }\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IMongoSelfAdminClient;\n // Derived through the SAME function the mint uses. Deriving it independently\n // here — which is what this line did before named principals existed — meant\n // revoking a minion left its credential live AND dropped the APPLICATION\n // BACKEND's database user, because the backend's name is what\n // `buildMongodbUsername` returns for every input.\n const username = buildMongodbPrincipalUsername(context.applicationNamespace, context.principal);\n\n if (context.principal && context.principal.kind !== ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n // A scoped principal owns a user AND a custom role. Routing it through the\n // user-only door would leave a privileged role behind that the next mint\n // adopts without anybody declaring it.\n const databaseName = context.applicationConfigInputs?.[DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!databaseName) {\n throw new Error(\n `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.revokeAppCredentials: `\n + `applicationConfigInputs is missing '${DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY}' for principal `\n + `'${context.principal.kind}:${context.principal.name}'. The role to drop lives IN that `\n + `database — revoking without it would drop the user and silently orphan its privileges.`,\n );\n }\n await adminClient.dropCollectionScopedDatabaseUser({\n adminConnectUrl,\n databaseName,\n username,\n roleName: `${username}_role`,\n });\n return;\n }\n\n await adminClient.deleteApplicationDatabaseUser({ adminConnectUrl, username });\n },\n\n // No `mintPlatformServiceCredentials` (D-4).\n};\n"]}
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
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  /**
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  * `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule` — third concrete `InfraProviderModule`
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- * (Slice 4.B.2 of `infra-provider-planner.md`, generalizing the
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- * Slice 2 / 4.B.1 pattern).
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+ * (generalizing the RabbitMQ / Redis module pattern).
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  *
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  * Implements the `POSTGRES_SELF` `InfraProvider` over the
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  * `IPostgresAdminClient` transport (raw `pg` Pool against the
@@ -1 +1 @@
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- {"version":3,"file":"postgres-self.infra.module.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/postgres-self/postgres-self.infra.module.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAoEG;AAEH,OAAO,EAOL,mBAAmB,EAMpB,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AA6HvC,eAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B,EAAE,mBAgM7C,CAAC"}
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"postgres-self.infra.module.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/postgres-self/postgres-self.infra.module.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmEG;AAEH,OAAO,EAOL,mBAAmB,EAMpB,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AA6HvC,eAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B,EAAE,mBAgM7C,CAAC"}
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
1
1
  /**
2
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  * `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule` — third concrete `InfraProviderModule`
3
- * (Slice 4.B.2 of `infra-provider-planner.md`, generalizing the
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- * Slice 2 / 4.B.1 pattern).
3
+ * (generalizing the RabbitMQ / Redis module pattern).
5
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  *
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  * Implements the `POSTGRES_SELF` `InfraProvider` over the
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  * `IPostgresAdminClient` transport (raw `pg` Pool against the
@@ -1 +1 @@
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- 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* `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule` — third concrete `InfraProviderModule`\n * (Slice 4.B.2 of `infra-provider-planner.md`, generalizing the\n * Slice 2 / 4.B.1 pattern).\n *\n * Implements the `POSTGRES_SELF` `InfraProvider` over the\n * `IPostgresAdminClient` transport (raw `pg` Pool against the\n * Postgres admin connection, exposed by\n * `PostgreSQLConnectionManagerService` after the Slice 4.B.2 5C\n * policy/transport split). Owns ALL per-app naming policy — the\n * per-app database-name + role-name conventions (`wildo_<sanitized>_user`,\n * `wildo_<sanitized>` mirroring the legacy\n * `PlatformInfrastructureManagerService.provisionPostgreSQLDatabase`).\n *\n * **What this module reads from `AppCredentialMintingContext`**:\n * - `appSlug` — used as the source for the sanitized database +\n * user name. Mirrors the legacy convention at\n * `platform-infrastructure-manager.service.ts:300-302`\n * (`sanitizedName = sanitizeForPostgreSQL(applicationName)`,\n * `databaseName = wildo_${sanitizedName}`,\n * `username = wildo_${sanitizedName}_user`).\n * - `secretInputs['database.postgresql.password']` — orchestrator-\n * supplied password (module is upsert-only, never generator).\n * - `applicationConfigInputs?.['databaseName']` — optional override\n * for the derived database name. Mirrors the legacy\n * `provisionPostgreSQLDatabase(appSlug, { databaseName? })` arg.\n * - `adminClient` — narrowed to `IPostgresAdminClient`.\n *\n * **What this module IGNORES from the context** (Slice 4.A.2 / M4\n * forward-compat documentation):\n * - `applicationNamespace` — Postgres per-app DB names use the\n * slug-derived sanitized form (env-suffix isolation comes from\n * the surrounding env-scoped admin connection). Future modules\n * may switch to namespace-scoped naming if cross-env collision\n * risk surfaces.\n * - `wildoApplicationId` — Postgres role names embed the\n * sanitized slug, NOT the application id. This is the legacy\n * convention; preserved for back-compat with apps already\n * provisioned.\n *\n * **Two audiences this module serves:**\n *\n * 1. **Audience-1 (platform-admin, declared via `plan().platformAdmin`)**:\n * cluster-wide Postgres admin creds. Consumers: `apps-manager`\n * (mints per-app DB+role via `mintAppCredentials`), `companion`\n * (mirrors apps-manager admin role for local dev).\n *\n * 2. **Audience-3 (app-scoped, via `plan().appRuntime` +\n * `mintAppCredentials`)**: per-customer-app Postgres database +\n * role. Result threaded into\n * `Wildo_Application_Secrets.database.postgresql.{\n * databaseName, username, connectUrl}` via\n * `_merge_WildoApplicationSecrets`. Note: the password is\n * embedded in `connectUrl` — there is no separate\n * `database.postgresql.password` blob path today (matches the\n * legacy persistence shape at\n * `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts:2191-2200`).\n *\n * **NOT served (D-4 of Slice 4.B locked decisions, 2026-05-10)**:\n * - **Audience-2 (platform-service-scoped)**: no platform service\n * uses Postgres for inter-service messaging today. Method omitted.\n *\n * **`revokeAppCredentials`** is called by apps-manager runtime-principal\n * declaration reconciliation when a minion is removed, and for every principal\n * of an application withdrawn from the platform (#1307). A minion's role is\n * DROPPED (it owns nothing); the application backend's role OWNS the database,\n * so it is disabled (`NOLOGIN`, null password, sessions terminated) and the\n * database is kept. Neither path destroys data — that is #1562.\n */\n\nimport {\n AppCredentialMintingContext,\n AppCredentialMintingResult,\n IPostgresAdminClient,\n InfraCapability,\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer,\n InfraProvider,\n InfraProviderModule,\n InfraProviderPlanContribution,\n ApplicationRuntimePrincipal,\n ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind,\n deriveMinionDatabaseGrants,\n resolveGrantStorageNames,\n} from '@wildo-ai/platform-config-lib';\n\n/**\n * Default Postgres port (matches `INFRA_DEFAULT_PORTS.POSTGRES` in\n * the shared platform constants — duplicated as a literal because\n * the planner output is consumed by the CLI which materializes it\n * into `Wildo_Application_Config` blob paths).\n */\nconst DEFAULT_POSTGRES_PORT = 5432;\n\n/**\n * The `Wildo_Application_Secrets` JSON paths this module writes\n * through `mintAppCredentials`. Declared once and reused as\n * `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` in `plan()` AND as the keys of\n * `secretBlobValues` in the result, so a refactor that renames a\n * path fails loudly at one place.\n *\n * Note: the password is embedded in `connectUrl` (Postgres\n * convention); there is no separate `database.postgresql.password`\n * blob path today. The orchestrator persists `connectUrl`\n * verbatim into `Wildo_Application_Secrets`.\n */\nconst POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_PATH = 'database.postgresql.databaseName';\nconst POSTGRES_USERNAME_PATH = 'database.postgresql.username';\nconst POSTGRES_CONNECT_URL_PATH = 'database.postgresql.connectUrl';\n/**\n * The paths this module mints PER RUNTIME PRINCIPAL — the single source for both consumers.\n *\n * Read by `InfraProviderModule.perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths` (statically, so apps-manager can strip\n * these from the application blob before delivering a principal's own material) AND spread into\n * `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` inside `plan()`. Declaring the list twice is how the delivery\n * path would silently stop covering a path this module still mints.\n */\nconst PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [\n POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_PATH,\n POSTGRES_USERNAME_PATH,\n POSTGRES_CONNECT_URL_PATH,\n];\n\n\n/**\n * Key the module looks for in `secretInputs` to read the\n * orchestrator-supplied password.\n */\nconst POSTGRES_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY = 'database.postgresql.password';\n\n/**\n * Optional key the module looks for in `applicationConfigInputs`\n * for an authored database-name override. When omitted, the module\n * derives the database name from `appSlug` via `sanitizeForPostgreSQL`.\n */\nconst POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY = 'databaseName';\n\n/**\n * Sanitize an application slug for Postgres identifier rules.\n * Mirrors the legacy `sanitizeForPostgreSQL` at\n * `platform-infrastructure-manager.service.ts:371-378`:\n * - lowercase\n * - `[^a-z0-9_]` → `_`\n * - collapse multiple `_`\n * - strip leading/trailing `_`\n * - cap at 50 chars (Postgres identifier limit is 63; leaves room\n * for the `wildo_` prefix and `_user` suffix).\n *\n * Centralized here so the module owns the convention; if the cap\n * or escape rules change, one site changes.\n */\nfunction sanitizeForPostgres(value: string): string {\n return value\n .toLowerCase()\n .replace(/[^a-z0-9_]/g, '_')\n .replace(/_+/g, '_')\n .replace(/^_|_$/g, '')\n .substring(0, 50);\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute the per-app database name. Mirrors legacy convention at\n * `platform-infrastructure-manager.service.ts:301`:\n * `wildo_<sanitized>`\n */\nfunction buildDatabaseName(appSlug: string): string {\n return `wildo_${sanitizeForPostgres(appSlug)}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute the per-app database role. Mirrors legacy convention at\n * `platform-infrastructure-manager.service.ts:302`:\n * `wildo_<sanitized>_user`\n */\nfunction buildUsername(appSlug: string): string {\n return `wildo_${sanitizeForPostgres(appSlug)}_user`;\n}\n\n/**\n * The schema a per-app database's resource tables live in.\n *\n * `public` is what the schema planner targets today. Named as a constant rather\n * than inlined at the four sites that need it because a grant issued into one\n * schema and revoked from another is a revocation that silently succeeds while\n * narrowing nothing.\n */\nconst POSTGRES_APPLICATION_SCHEMA = 'public';\n\n/**\n * Per-principal Postgres role name — the SAME derivation the revoke path uses.\n *\n * Fourth time this shape appears (Redis, RabbitMQ, Mongo, now Postgres), and the\n * consequence is worse here than anywhere else: a revoke that derived the name\n * differently would miss the minion's role AND, on the pre-existing\n * `dropApplicationDatabase` path, take the application's entire database with\n * it. The application backend keeps `wildo_<slug>_user` VERBATIM so an existing\n * deployment's owner role is never orphaned.\n */\nfunction buildPostgresPrincipalUsername(\n appSlug: string,\n principal: ApplicationRuntimePrincipal | undefined,\n): string {\n if (!principal || principal.kind === ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n return buildUsername(appSlug);\n }\n return `wildo_${sanitizeForPostgres(appSlug)}_${sanitizeForPostgres(principal.kind)}_`\n + `${sanitizeForPostgres(principal.name ?? '')}_user`;\n}\n\nexport const PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule: InfraProviderModule = {\n provider: InfraProvider.POSTGRES_SELF,\n supportedCapabilities: [InfraCapability.RELATIONAL_DATABASE],\n perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths: PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS,\n\n plan(): InfraProviderPlanContribution {\n return {\n dockerComposeServices: ['postgres'],\n k8sResources: ['templates/infra/k8s/internal/postgres/deployment.yaml.hbs'],\n platformAdmin: {\n envVars: {\n PG_HOST: 'postgres',\n PG_PORT: String(DEFAULT_POSTGRES_PORT),\n },\n // Admin user + password to provision per-app DBs/roles. The\n // legacy admin-init code reads these from `PG_ADMIN_USER` /\n // `PG_ADMIN_PASSWORD`; the planner emits the keys, the\n // CLI's `env-vars-builder` writes the values at sync time.\n secretEnvVars: ['PG_ADMIN_USER', 'PG_ADMIN_PASSWORD'],\n // Audience-1 only (DB-admin access). No audience-2\n // platform-service-scoped Postgres use case today (D-4).\n consumers: [\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer.APPS_MANAGER,\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer.COMPANION,\n ],\n },\n appRuntime: {\n // Static topology — same for every app in this env. The\n // per-app values (databaseName, username, connectUrl) flow\n // through `perAppSecretBlobPaths`.\n perAppConfigBlobPaths: {\n 'database.postgresql.host': 'postgres',\n 'database.postgresql.port': DEFAULT_POSTGRES_PORT,\n },\n perAppSecretBlobPaths: [...PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS],\n },\n };\n },\n\n async mintAppCredentials(\n context: AppCredentialMintingContext,\n ): Promise<AppCredentialMintingResult> {\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IPostgresAdminClient;\n const password = context.secretInputs[POSTGRES_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!password) {\n throw new Error(\n `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `secretInputs is missing '${POSTGRES_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the Postgres password — modules are upsert-only.`,\n );\n }\n if (!context.appSlug) {\n throw new Error(\n `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `appSlug is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty slug.`,\n );\n }\n\n // Allow operator override of the derived database name. Without\n // an override, derive from `appSlug` via the legacy convention.\n const databaseName =\n context.applicationConfigInputs?.[POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY]\n || buildDatabaseName(context.appSlug);\n const username = buildPostgresPrincipalUsername(context.appSlug, context.principal);\n\n if (context.principal && context.principal.kind !== ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n // A named principal gets a TABLE-SCOPED role (Step 3 / R1 / D14): exactly\n // the authored business verbs plus the mandatory runtime floor, inside\n // a database it does not own.\n //\n // `resourceGrants` is REQUIRED and its absence is an error rather than a\n // default. Falling through to `upsertApplicationDatabase` would make the\n // minion the OWNER of the application's database with `ALL PRIVILEGES` —\n // the exact over-grant this path replaces, arriving silently through a\n // code path that reads as if it were doing the narrow thing.\n const grants = context.resourceGrants;\n if (!grants) {\n throw new Error(\n `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: `\n + `principal '${context.principal.kind}:${context.principal.name}' has no resourceGrants. `\n + `Refusing to fall back to the database-wide application role. The orchestrator must pass `\n + `an explicit empty resource grant when only the mandatory runtime floor is required.`,\n );\n }\n // The authored declaration plus the engine's own floor — the reads and\n // appends the framework performs for ANY principal, which no\n // `resourceAccess` can express and none should have to. Applied through\n // the shared derivation so this adapter and the Mongo one cannot disagree\n // about what that floor is.\n const databaseGrants = deriveMinionDatabaseGrants(grants);\n\n const { connectionUrl: principalConnectionUrl } = await adminClient.upsertTableScopedDatabaseRole({\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n schemaName: POSTGRES_APPLICATION_SCHEMA,\n // Resource types → table names HERE, at the adapter that speaks\n // Postgres. The grant contract itself stays in the platform vocabulary,\n // and passes through the SAME translation Mongo uses, so the two\n // adapters cannot disagree about which rows a resource type addresses.\n // SQL identifier casing is applied by the manager, which is the one site\n // that issues the DDL and runs the existence check those names must match.\n readTables: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.read),\n writeTables: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.write),\n appendTables: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.append),\n maintainTables: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.maintain),\n });\n\n return {\n secretBlobValues: {\n [POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_PATH]: databaseName,\n [POSTGRES_USERNAME_PATH]: username,\n [POSTGRES_CONNECT_URL_PATH]: principalConnectionUrl,\n },\n };\n }\n\n // CREATE/ALTER USER + CREATE DATABASE — idempotent upsert. The\n // admin-client reapplies privileges every time so the call is\n // safe to repeat.\n const { connectionUrl } = await adminClient.upsertApplicationDatabase({\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n });\n\n return {\n secretBlobValues: {\n [POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_PATH]: databaseName,\n [POSTGRES_USERNAME_PATH]: username,\n [POSTGRES_CONNECT_URL_PATH]: connectionUrl,\n },\n };\n },\n\n /**\n * Revoke a principal's PostgreSQL credential — and destroy no data (#1307). A minion's\n * table-scoped role is dropped (it owns nothing); the application backend's role OWNS the\n * database, so its login is disabled and the role, its ownership and every row are kept.\n * Idempotent: the admin client treats a missing role as a no-op.\n *\n * **Caller status**: apps-manager runtime-principal declaration reconciliation calls this for\n * removed minions, and application withdrawal (`deregisterApplication`) for the backend and every\n * minion; `restoreApplication` re-mints them. Destroying the database is #1562's separate door.\n *\n * **Defensive validation** (Slice 4.A.2 / L4 pattern): empty\n * `appSlug` would derive an empty database name; we fail-loud\n * instead so a bad caller surfaces immediately.\n */\n async revokeAppCredentials(context: AppCredentialMintingContext): Promise<void> {\n if (!context.appSlug) {\n throw new Error(\n `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule.revokeAppCredentials: ` +\n `appSlug is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty slug.`,\n );\n }\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IPostgresAdminClient;\n const username = buildPostgresPrincipalUsername(context.appSlug, context.principal);\n\n if (context.principal && context.principal.kind !== ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n const databaseName =\n context.applicationConfigInputs?.[POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY]\n || buildDatabaseName(context.appSlug);\n // A named principal owns NOTHING but its own role. Routing it through\n // `dropApplicationDatabase` — which is what this method did before named\n // principals existed — would DROP THE APPLICATION'S DATABASE while\n // believing it was retiring one minion's access.\n await adminClient.dropTableScopedDatabaseRole({\n databaseName,\n username,\n schemaName: POSTGRES_APPLICATION_SCHEMA,\n });\n return;\n }\n\n /*\n * The APPLICATION BACKEND's role OWNS the application database, so revoking it disables the LOGIN\n * and keeps the role, its ownership and every row (#1307).\n *\n * This branch used to call `dropApplicationDatabase` — the database AND the role. Nothing called it\n * for the backend until deregistration did, and deregistration is a REVERSIBLE withdrawal: `restore`\n * re-mints the recorded credential and the application boots on the data it left. A revocation that\n * dropped the database would have turned every withdrawal into the irreversible destruction #1562\n * parks behind its own door. Revocation removes authentication; it never removes data.\n */\n await adminClient.revokeApplicationDatabaseLogin({ username });\n },\n\n // No `mintPlatformServiceCredentials` (D-4 of Slice 4.B —\n // audience-2 not applicable to Postgres_Self today).\n};\n"]}
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* `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule` — third concrete `InfraProviderModule`\n * (generalizing the RabbitMQ / Redis module pattern).\n *\n * Implements the `POSTGRES_SELF` `InfraProvider` over the\n * `IPostgresAdminClient` transport (raw `pg` Pool against the\n * Postgres admin connection, exposed by\n * `PostgreSQLConnectionManagerService` after the Slice 4.B.2 5C\n * policy/transport split). Owns ALL per-app naming policy — the\n * per-app database-name + role-name conventions (`wildo_<sanitized>_user`,\n * `wildo_<sanitized>` mirroring the legacy\n * `PlatformInfrastructureManagerService.provisionPostgreSQLDatabase`).\n *\n * **What this module reads from `AppCredentialMintingContext`**:\n * - `appSlug` — used as the source for the sanitized database +\n * user name. Mirrors the legacy convention at\n * `platform-infrastructure-manager.service.ts:300-302`\n * (`sanitizedName = sanitizeForPostgreSQL(applicationName)`,\n * `databaseName = wildo_${sanitizedName}`,\n * `username = wildo_${sanitizedName}_user`).\n * - `secretInputs['database.postgresql.password']` — orchestrator-\n * supplied password (module is upsert-only, never generator).\n * - `applicationConfigInputs?.['databaseName']` — optional override\n * for the derived database name. Mirrors the legacy\n * `provisionPostgreSQLDatabase(appSlug, { databaseName? })` arg.\n * - `adminClient` — narrowed to `IPostgresAdminClient`.\n *\n * **What this module IGNORES from the context** (Slice 4.A.2 / M4\n * forward-compat documentation):\n * - `applicationNamespace` — Postgres per-app DB names use the\n * slug-derived sanitized form (env-suffix isolation comes from\n * the surrounding env-scoped admin connection). Future modules\n * may switch to namespace-scoped naming if cross-env collision\n * risk surfaces.\n * - `wildoApplicationId` — Postgres role names embed the\n * sanitized slug, NOT the application id. This is the legacy\n * convention; preserved for back-compat with apps already\n * provisioned.\n *\n * **Two audiences this module serves:**\n *\n * 1. **Audience-1 (platform-admin, declared via `plan().platformAdmin`)**:\n * cluster-wide Postgres admin creds. Consumers: `apps-manager`\n * (mints per-app DB+role via `mintAppCredentials`), `companion`\n * (mirrors apps-manager admin role for local dev).\n *\n * 2. **Audience-3 (app-scoped, via `plan().appRuntime` +\n * `mintAppCredentials`)**: per-customer-app Postgres database +\n * role. Result threaded into\n * `Wildo_Application_Secrets.database.postgresql.{\n * databaseName, username, connectUrl}` via\n * `_merge_WildoApplicationSecrets`. Note: the password is\n * embedded in `connectUrl` — there is no separate\n * `database.postgresql.password` blob path today (matches the\n * legacy persistence shape at\n * `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts:2191-2200`).\n *\n * **NOT served (D-4 of Slice 4.B locked decisions, 2026-05-10)**:\n * - **Audience-2 (platform-service-scoped)**: no platform service\n * uses Postgres for inter-service messaging today. Method omitted.\n *\n * **`revokeAppCredentials`** is called by apps-manager runtime-principal\n * declaration reconciliation when a minion is removed, and for every principal\n * of an application withdrawn from the platform (#1307). A minion's role is\n * DROPPED (it owns nothing); the application backend's role OWNS the database,\n * so it is disabled (`NOLOGIN`, null password, sessions terminated) and the\n * database is kept. Neither path destroys data — that is #1562.\n */\n\nimport {\n AppCredentialMintingContext,\n AppCredentialMintingResult,\n IPostgresAdminClient,\n InfraCapability,\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer,\n InfraProvider,\n InfraProviderModule,\n InfraProviderPlanContribution,\n ApplicationRuntimePrincipal,\n ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind,\n deriveMinionDatabaseGrants,\n resolveGrantStorageNames,\n} from '@wildo-ai/platform-config-lib';\n\n/**\n * Default Postgres port (matches `INFRA_DEFAULT_PORTS.POSTGRES` in\n * the shared platform constants — duplicated as a literal because\n * the planner output is consumed by the CLI which materializes it\n * into `Wildo_Application_Config` blob paths).\n */\nconst DEFAULT_POSTGRES_PORT = 5432;\n\n/**\n * The `Wildo_Application_Secrets` JSON paths this module writes\n * through `mintAppCredentials`. Declared once and reused as\n * `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` in `plan()` AND as the keys of\n * `secretBlobValues` in the result, so a refactor that renames a\n * path fails loudly at one place.\n *\n * Note: the password is embedded in `connectUrl` (Postgres\n * convention); there is no separate `database.postgresql.password`\n * blob path today. The orchestrator persists `connectUrl`\n * verbatim into `Wildo_Application_Secrets`.\n */\nconst POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_PATH = 'database.postgresql.databaseName';\nconst POSTGRES_USERNAME_PATH = 'database.postgresql.username';\nconst POSTGRES_CONNECT_URL_PATH = 'database.postgresql.connectUrl';\n/**\n * The paths this module mints PER RUNTIME PRINCIPAL — the single source for both consumers.\n *\n * Read by `InfraProviderModule.perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths` (statically, so apps-manager can strip\n * these from the application blob before delivering a principal's own material) AND spread into\n * `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` inside `plan()`. Declaring the list twice is how the delivery\n * path would silently stop covering a path this module still mints.\n */\nconst PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [\n POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_PATH,\n POSTGRES_USERNAME_PATH,\n POSTGRES_CONNECT_URL_PATH,\n];\n\n\n/**\n * Key the module looks for in `secretInputs` to read the\n * orchestrator-supplied password.\n */\nconst POSTGRES_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY = 'database.postgresql.password';\n\n/**\n * Optional key the module looks for in `applicationConfigInputs`\n * for an authored database-name override. When omitted, the module\n * derives the database name from `appSlug` via `sanitizeForPostgreSQL`.\n */\nconst POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY = 'databaseName';\n\n/**\n * Sanitize an application slug for Postgres identifier rules.\n * Mirrors the legacy `sanitizeForPostgreSQL` at\n * `platform-infrastructure-manager.service.ts:371-378`:\n * - lowercase\n * - `[^a-z0-9_]` → `_`\n * - collapse multiple `_`\n * - strip leading/trailing `_`\n * - cap at 50 chars (Postgres identifier limit is 63; leaves room\n * for the `wildo_` prefix and `_user` suffix).\n *\n * Centralized here so the module owns the convention; if the cap\n * or escape rules change, one site changes.\n */\nfunction sanitizeForPostgres(value: string): string {\n return value\n .toLowerCase()\n .replace(/[^a-z0-9_]/g, '_')\n .replace(/_+/g, '_')\n .replace(/^_|_$/g, '')\n .substring(0, 50);\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute the per-app database name. Mirrors legacy convention at\n * `platform-infrastructure-manager.service.ts:301`:\n * `wildo_<sanitized>`\n */\nfunction buildDatabaseName(appSlug: string): string {\n return `wildo_${sanitizeForPostgres(appSlug)}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute the per-app database role. Mirrors legacy convention at\n * `platform-infrastructure-manager.service.ts:302`:\n * `wildo_<sanitized>_user`\n */\nfunction buildUsername(appSlug: string): string {\n return `wildo_${sanitizeForPostgres(appSlug)}_user`;\n}\n\n/**\n * The schema a per-app database's resource tables live in.\n *\n * `public` is what the schema planner targets today. Named as a constant rather\n * than inlined at the four sites that need it because a grant issued into one\n * schema and revoked from another is a revocation that silently succeeds while\n * narrowing nothing.\n */\nconst POSTGRES_APPLICATION_SCHEMA = 'public';\n\n/**\n * Per-principal Postgres role name — the SAME derivation the revoke path uses.\n *\n * Fourth time this shape appears (Redis, RabbitMQ, Mongo, now Postgres), and the\n * consequence is worse here than anywhere else: a revoke that derived the name\n * differently would miss the minion's role AND, on the pre-existing\n * `dropApplicationDatabase` path, take the application's entire database with\n * it. The application backend keeps `wildo_<slug>_user` VERBATIM so an existing\n * deployment's owner role is never orphaned.\n */\nfunction buildPostgresPrincipalUsername(\n appSlug: string,\n principal: ApplicationRuntimePrincipal | undefined,\n): string {\n if (!principal || principal.kind === ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n return buildUsername(appSlug);\n }\n return `wildo_${sanitizeForPostgres(appSlug)}_${sanitizeForPostgres(principal.kind)}_`\n + `${sanitizeForPostgres(principal.name ?? '')}_user`;\n}\n\nexport const PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule: InfraProviderModule = {\n provider: InfraProvider.POSTGRES_SELF,\n supportedCapabilities: [InfraCapability.RELATIONAL_DATABASE],\n perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths: PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS,\n\n plan(): InfraProviderPlanContribution {\n return {\n dockerComposeServices: ['postgres'],\n k8sResources: ['templates/infra/k8s/internal/postgres/deployment.yaml.hbs'],\n platformAdmin: {\n envVars: {\n PG_HOST: 'postgres',\n PG_PORT: String(DEFAULT_POSTGRES_PORT),\n },\n // Admin user + password to provision per-app DBs/roles. The\n // legacy admin-init code reads these from `PG_ADMIN_USER` /\n // `PG_ADMIN_PASSWORD`; the planner emits the keys, the\n // CLI's `env-vars-builder` writes the values at sync time.\n secretEnvVars: ['PG_ADMIN_USER', 'PG_ADMIN_PASSWORD'],\n // Audience-1 only (DB-admin access). No audience-2\n // platform-service-scoped Postgres use case today (D-4).\n consumers: [\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer.APPS_MANAGER,\n InfraPlatformAdminConsumer.COMPANION,\n ],\n },\n appRuntime: {\n // Static topology — same for every app in this env. The\n // per-app values (databaseName, username, connectUrl) flow\n // through `perAppSecretBlobPaths`.\n perAppConfigBlobPaths: {\n 'database.postgresql.host': 'postgres',\n 'database.postgresql.port': DEFAULT_POSTGRES_PORT,\n },\n perAppSecretBlobPaths: [...PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS],\n },\n };\n },\n\n async mintAppCredentials(\n context: AppCredentialMintingContext,\n ): Promise<AppCredentialMintingResult> {\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IPostgresAdminClient;\n const password = context.secretInputs[POSTGRES_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY];\n if (!password) {\n throw new Error(\n `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `secretInputs is missing '${POSTGRES_PASSWORD_INPUT_KEY}'. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply the Postgres password — modules are upsert-only.`,\n );\n }\n if (!context.appSlug) {\n throw new Error(\n `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: ` +\n `appSlug is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty slug.`,\n );\n }\n\n // Allow operator override of the derived database name. Without\n // an override, derive from `appSlug` via the legacy convention.\n const databaseName =\n context.applicationConfigInputs?.[POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY]\n || buildDatabaseName(context.appSlug);\n const username = buildPostgresPrincipalUsername(context.appSlug, context.principal);\n\n if (context.principal && context.principal.kind !== ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n // A named principal gets a TABLE-SCOPED role (Step 3 / R1 / D14): exactly\n // the authored business verbs plus the mandatory runtime floor, inside\n // a database it does not own.\n //\n // `resourceGrants` is REQUIRED and its absence is an error rather than a\n // default. Falling through to `upsertApplicationDatabase` would make the\n // minion the OWNER of the application's database with `ALL PRIVILEGES` —\n // the exact over-grant this path replaces, arriving silently through a\n // code path that reads as if it were doing the narrow thing.\n const grants = context.resourceGrants;\n if (!grants) {\n throw new Error(\n `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials: `\n + `principal '${context.principal.kind}:${context.principal.name}' has no resourceGrants. `\n + `Refusing to fall back to the database-wide application role. The orchestrator must pass `\n + `an explicit empty resource grant when only the mandatory runtime floor is required.`,\n );\n }\n // The authored declaration plus the engine's own floor — the reads and\n // appends the framework performs for ANY principal, which no\n // `resourceAccess` can express and none should have to. Applied through\n // the shared derivation so this adapter and the Mongo one cannot disagree\n // about what that floor is.\n const databaseGrants = deriveMinionDatabaseGrants(grants);\n\n const { connectionUrl: principalConnectionUrl } = await adminClient.upsertTableScopedDatabaseRole({\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n schemaName: POSTGRES_APPLICATION_SCHEMA,\n // Resource types → table names HERE, at the adapter that speaks\n // Postgres. The grant contract itself stays in the platform vocabulary,\n // and passes through the SAME translation Mongo uses, so the two\n // adapters cannot disagree about which rows a resource type addresses.\n // SQL identifier casing is applied by the manager, which is the one site\n // that issues the DDL and runs the existence check those names must match.\n readTables: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.read),\n writeTables: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.write),\n appendTables: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.append),\n maintainTables: resolveGrantStorageNames(databaseGrants.maintain),\n });\n\n return {\n secretBlobValues: {\n [POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_PATH]: databaseName,\n [POSTGRES_USERNAME_PATH]: username,\n [POSTGRES_CONNECT_URL_PATH]: principalConnectionUrl,\n },\n };\n }\n\n // CREATE/ALTER USER + CREATE DATABASE — idempotent upsert. The\n // admin-client reapplies privileges every time so the call is\n // safe to repeat.\n const { connectionUrl } = await adminClient.upsertApplicationDatabase({\n databaseName,\n username,\n password,\n });\n\n return {\n secretBlobValues: {\n [POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_PATH]: databaseName,\n [POSTGRES_USERNAME_PATH]: username,\n [POSTGRES_CONNECT_URL_PATH]: connectionUrl,\n },\n };\n },\n\n /**\n * Revoke a principal's PostgreSQL credential — and destroy no data (#1307). A minion's\n * table-scoped role is dropped (it owns nothing); the application backend's role OWNS the\n * database, so its login is disabled and the role, its ownership and every row are kept.\n * Idempotent: the admin client treats a missing role as a no-op.\n *\n * **Caller status**: apps-manager runtime-principal declaration reconciliation calls this for\n * removed minions, and application withdrawal (`deregisterApplication`) for the backend and every\n * minion; `restoreApplication` re-mints them. Destroying the database is #1562's separate door.\n *\n * **Defensive validation** (Slice 4.A.2 / L4 pattern): empty\n * `appSlug` would derive an empty database name; we fail-loud\n * instead so a bad caller surfaces immediately.\n */\n async revokeAppCredentials(context: AppCredentialMintingContext): Promise<void> {\n if (!context.appSlug) {\n throw new Error(\n `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule.revokeAppCredentials: ` +\n `appSlug is empty. ` +\n `The orchestrator MUST supply a non-empty slug.`,\n );\n }\n const adminClient = context.adminClient as IPostgresAdminClient;\n const username = buildPostgresPrincipalUsername(context.appSlug, context.principal);\n\n if (context.principal && context.principal.kind !== ApplicationRuntimePrincipalKind.APPLICATION_BACKEND) {\n const databaseName =\n context.applicationConfigInputs?.[POSTGRES_DATABASE_NAME_INPUT_KEY]\n || buildDatabaseName(context.appSlug);\n // A named principal owns NOTHING but its own role. Routing it through\n // `dropApplicationDatabase` — which is what this method did before named\n // principals existed — would DROP THE APPLICATION'S DATABASE while\n // believing it was retiring one minion's access.\n await adminClient.dropTableScopedDatabaseRole({\n databaseName,\n username,\n schemaName: POSTGRES_APPLICATION_SCHEMA,\n });\n return;\n }\n\n /*\n * The APPLICATION BACKEND's role OWNS the application database, so revoking it disables the LOGIN\n * and keeps the role, its ownership and every row (#1307).\n *\n * This branch used to call `dropApplicationDatabase` — the database AND the role. Nothing called it\n * for the backend until deregistration did, and deregistration is a REVERSIBLE withdrawal: `restore`\n * re-mints the recorded credential and the application boots on the data it left. A revocation that\n * dropped the database would have turned every withdrawal into the irreversible destruction #1562\n * parks behind its own door. Revocation removes authentication; it never removes data.\n */\n await adminClient.revokeApplicationDatabaseLogin({ username });\n },\n\n // No `mintPlatformServiceCredentials` (D-4 of Slice 4.B —\n // audience-2 not applicable to Postgres_Self today).\n};\n"]}
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
1
1
  /**
2
- * `RabbitmqSelfInfraProviderModule` — first concrete `InfraProviderModule`
3
- * (Slices 1–2.5 of `infra-provider-planner.md`).
2
+ * `RabbitmqSelfInfraProviderModule` — first concrete `InfraProviderModule`.
4
3
  *
5
4
  * Implements the `RABBITMQ_SELF` `InfraProvider` over the
6
5
  * `IRabbitMQManagementClient` transport (raw HTTP `PUT /api/users` etc.,
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
- {"version":3,"file":"rabbitmq-self.infra.module.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/rabbitmq-self/rabbitmq-self.infra.module.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqFG;AAEH,OAAO,EAOL,mBAAmB,EAOpB,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAiIvC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmCG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;IAC3C,gCAAgC;;;;CAIxB,CAAC;AAEX,mEAAmE;AACnE,wBAAgB,8BAA8B,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAEjF;AAED,+FAA+F;AAC/F,wBAAgB,iCAAiC,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAGpF;AAyED,eAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B,EAAE,mBA0P7C,CAAC"}
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"rabbitmq-self.infra.module.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/rabbitmq-self/rabbitmq-self.infra.module.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAoFG;AAEH,OAAO,EAOL,mBAAmB,EAOpB,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AA+HvC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmCG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;IAC3C,gCAAgC;;;;CAIxB,CAAC;AAEX,mEAAmE;AACnE,wBAAgB,8BAA8B,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAEjF;AAED,+FAA+F;AAC/F,wBAAgB,iCAAiC,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAGpF;AAyED,eAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B,EAAE,mBA0P7C,CAAC"}
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
1
1
  /**
2
- * `RabbitmqSelfInfraProviderModule` — first concrete `InfraProviderModule`
3
- * (Slices 1–2.5 of `infra-provider-planner.md`).
2
+ * `RabbitmqSelfInfraProviderModule` — first concrete `InfraProviderModule`.
4
3
  *
5
4
  * Implements the `RABBITMQ_SELF` `InfraProvider` over the
6
5
  * `IRabbitMQManagementClient` transport (raw HTTP `PUT /api/users` etc.,
@@ -127,15 +126,13 @@ const PER_PRINCIPAL_SECRET_BLOB_PATHS = [RABBITMQ_USERNAME_PATH, RABBITMQ_PASSWO
127
126
  * `AppCredentialMintingContext.applicationConfigInputs` to read the
128
127
  * optional per-app virtual host. Documented here as the public
129
128
  * contract: the orchestrator supplies the vhost via this key, the
130
- * module reads it via this key. Slice 2.5c-3 of
131
- * `infra-provider-planner.md`.
129
+ * module reads it via this key.
132
130
  */
133
131
  const VHOST_INPUT_KEY = 'vhost';
134
132
  /**
135
133
  * Key the module looks for in
136
134
  * `PlatformServiceCredentialMintingContext.secretInputs` to read the
137
- * orchestrator-supplied platform-service password. Slice 4.A.2 / M5
138
- * of `infra-provider-planner.md` — extracted as a constant for
135
+ * orchestrator-supplied platform-service password. Extracted as a constant for
139
136
  * symmetry with `RABBITMQ_PASSWORD_PATH` (used by `mintAppCredentials`),
140
137
  * so a future rename touches one site instead of drifting silently.
141
138
  */
@@ -412,7 +409,7 @@ export const RabbitmqSelfInfraProviderModule = {
412
409
  write: permissionRegex,
413
410
  read: readRegex,
414
411
  });
415
- // Per-app-vhost cron delivery (`.claude/plans/crontab-publisher-vhost-gap.md`).
412
+ // Per-app-vhost cron delivery.
416
413
  //
417
414
  // A per-app vhost is a HARD broker isolation boundary: the platform
418
415
  // cron/minion publisher (`platform_crontabs_batches_manager`) — a single