@wildo-ai/platform-config-lib 1.1.5 → 1.1.6

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Files changed (138) hide show
  1. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/bootstrap.contracts.d.ts +3 -2
  2. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/bootstrap.contracts.d.ts.map +1 -1
  3. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/bootstrap.contracts.js +3 -2
  4. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/bootstrap.contracts.js.map +1 -1
  5. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/bootstrap.schemas.d.ts +47 -0
  6. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/bootstrap.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  7. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/bootstrap.schemas.js +8 -0
  8. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/bootstrap.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  9. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/platform-runtime-env.contracts.d.ts +12 -1
  10. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/platform-runtime-env.contracts.d.ts.map +1 -1
  11. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/platform-runtime-env.contracts.js +12 -0
  12. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/platform-runtime-env.contracts.js.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/platform-store-preconnect.d.ts +37 -0
  14. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/platform-store-preconnect.d.ts.map +1 -0
  15. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/platform-store-preconnect.js +43 -0
  16. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/platform-store-preconnect.js.map +1 -0
  17. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/runtime-backing-service-access.d.ts.map +1 -1
  18. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/runtime-backing-service-access.js +8 -4
  19. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/runtime-backing-service-access.js.map +1 -1
  20. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/runtime-topology.contracts.d.ts +36 -3
  21. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/runtime-topology.contracts.d.ts.map +1 -1
  22. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/runtime-topology.contracts.js +36 -13
  23. package/dist/esm/bootstrap/runtime-topology.contracts.js.map +1 -1
  24. package/dist/esm/index.d.ts +1 -0
  25. package/dist/esm/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  26. package/dist/esm/index.js +1 -0
  27. package/dist/esm/index.js.map +1 -1
  28. package/dist/esm/lockfile/lockfile-io.d.ts +7 -1
  29. package/dist/esm/lockfile/lockfile-io.d.ts.map +1 -1
  30. package/dist/esm/lockfile/lockfile-io.js +17 -3
  31. package/dist/esm/lockfile/lockfile-io.js.map +1 -1
  32. package/dist/esm/lockfile/materialize-infra-section.d.ts +27 -6
  33. package/dist/esm/lockfile/materialize-infra-section.d.ts.map +1 -1
  34. package/dist/esm/lockfile/materialize-infra-section.js +23 -10
  35. package/dist/esm/lockfile/materialize-infra-section.js.map +1 -1
  36. package/dist/esm/lockfile/wildo-saas-lock.shared.schemas.d.ts +455 -6
  37. package/dist/esm/lockfile/wildo-saas-lock.shared.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  38. package/dist/esm/lockfile/wildo-saas-lock.shared.schemas.js +27 -0
  39. package/dist/esm/lockfile/wildo-saas-lock.shared.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  40. package/dist/esm/project-config/application-public-pricing-catalog.loader.d.ts +13 -0
  41. package/dist/esm/project-config/application-public-pricing-catalog.loader.d.ts.map +1 -0
  42. package/dist/esm/project-config/application-public-pricing-catalog.loader.js +56 -0
  43. package/dist/esm/project-config/application-public-pricing-catalog.loader.js.map +1 -0
  44. package/dist/esm/project-config/define-infra-env-config.d.ts +0 -27
  45. package/dist/esm/project-config/define-infra-env-config.d.ts.map +1 -1
  46. package/dist/esm/project-config/define-infra-env-config.js +0 -2
  47. package/dist/esm/project-config/define-infra-env-config.js.map +1 -1
  48. package/dist/esm/project-config/define-saas-config.d.ts +52 -0
  49. package/dist/esm/project-config/define-saas-config.d.ts.map +1 -1
  50. package/dist/esm/project-config/define-saas-config.js +65 -15
  51. package/dist/esm/project-config/define-saas-config.js.map +1 -1
  52. package/dist/esm/project-config/index.d.ts +3 -0
  53. package/dist/esm/project-config/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  54. package/dist/esm/project-config/index.js +3 -0
  55. package/dist/esm/project-config/index.js.map +1 -1
  56. package/dist/esm/project-config/loader.d.ts +11 -0
  57. package/dist/esm/project-config/loader.d.ts.map +1 -1
  58. package/dist/esm/project-config/loader.js +34 -7
  59. package/dist/esm/project-config/loader.js.map +1 -1
  60. package/dist/esm/project-config/npm-version-range.d.ts +23 -0
  61. package/dist/esm/project-config/npm-version-range.d.ts.map +1 -0
  62. package/dist/esm/project-config/npm-version-range.js +175 -0
  63. package/dist/esm/project-config/npm-version-range.js.map +1 -0
  64. package/dist/esm/project-config/provider-companion-discovery.d.ts +256 -30
  65. package/dist/esm/project-config/provider-companion-discovery.d.ts.map +1 -1
  66. package/dist/esm/project-config/provider-companion-discovery.js +719 -40
  67. package/dist/esm/project-config/provider-companion-discovery.js.map +1 -1
  68. package/dist/esm/project-config/provider-runtime-artifacts.d.ts +125 -2
  69. package/dist/esm/project-config/provider-runtime-artifacts.d.ts.map +1 -1
  70. package/dist/esm/project-config/provider-runtime-artifacts.js +283 -66
  71. package/dist/esm/project-config/provider-runtime-artifacts.js.map +1 -1
  72. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/backing-service-servability.d.ts +157 -0
  73. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/backing-service-servability.d.ts.map +1 -0
  74. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/backing-service-servability.js +256 -0
  75. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/backing-service-servability.js.map +1 -0
  76. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/backing-services.schemas.d.ts +62 -67
  77. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/backing-services.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  78. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/backing-services.schemas.js +71 -68
  79. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/backing-services.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  80. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/csp-emit.d.ts.map +1 -1
  81. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/csp-emit.js +41 -2
  82. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/csp-emit.js.map +1 -1
  83. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/infra-providers.schemas.d.ts +180 -4
  84. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/infra-providers.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  85. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/infra-providers.schemas.js +40 -0
  86. package/dist/esm/project-config/shared/infra-providers.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  87. package/dist/esm/project-config/static-asset-import-noop.d.ts +26 -0
  88. package/dist/esm/project-config/static-asset-import-noop.d.ts.map +1 -0
  89. package/dist/esm/project-config/static-asset-import-noop.js +49 -0
  90. package/dist/esm/project-config/static-asset-import-noop.js.map +1 -0
  91. package/dist/esm/registry/companion-api.schemas.d.ts +0 -176
  92. package/dist/esm/registry/companion-api.schemas.d.ts.map +0 -1
  93. package/dist/esm/registry/companion-api.schemas.js.map +0 -1
  94. package/dist/esm/registry/index.d.ts +3 -1
  95. package/dist/esm/registry/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  96. package/dist/esm/registry/index.js +3 -1
  97. package/dist/esm/registry/index.js.map +1 -1
  98. package/dist/esm/registry/local-checkout-source.d.ts +31 -0
  99. package/dist/esm/registry/local-checkout-source.d.ts.map +1 -0
  100. package/dist/esm/registry/local-checkout-source.js +45 -0
  101. package/dist/esm/registry/local-checkout-source.js.map +1 -0
  102. package/dist/esm/registry/lockfile-modules-section.schemas.d.ts +174 -14
  103. package/dist/esm/registry/lockfile-modules-section.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  104. package/dist/esm/registry/lockfile-modules-section.schemas.js +120 -11
  105. package/dist/esm/registry/lockfile-modules-section.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  106. package/dist/esm/registry/module-artifact.schemas.d.ts +79 -0
  107. package/dist/esm/registry/module-artifact.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  108. package/dist/esm/registry/module-artifact.schemas.js +36 -0
  109. package/dist/esm/registry/module-artifact.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  110. package/dist/esm/registry/module-manifest.schemas.d.ts +393 -7
  111. package/dist/esm/registry/module-manifest.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  112. package/dist/esm/registry/module-manifest.schemas.js +488 -40
  113. package/dist/esm/registry/module-manifest.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  114. package/dist/esm/registry/module-search.schemas.d.ts +80 -0
  115. package/dist/esm/registry/module-search.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -0
  116. package/dist/esm/registry/module-search.schemas.js +112 -0
  117. package/dist/esm/registry/module-search.schemas.js.map +1 -0
  118. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-config.schemas.d.ts +16 -0
  119. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-config.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  120. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-config.schemas.js +8 -0
  121. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-config.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  122. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-errors.d.ts +126 -2
  123. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-errors.d.ts.map +1 -1
  124. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-errors.js +183 -14
  125. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-errors.js.map +1 -1
  126. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-keys.schemas.d.ts +80 -0
  127. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-keys.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -0
  128. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-keys.schemas.js +68 -0
  129. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-keys.schemas.js.map +1 -0
  130. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-section-schemas.constants.d.ts +25 -3
  131. package/dist/esm/registry/registry-section-schemas.constants.d.ts.map +1 -1
  132. package/dist/esm/workspace-scope/workspace-homes.schemas.d.ts +13 -11
  133. package/dist/esm/workspace-scope/workspace-homes.schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
  134. package/dist/esm/workspace-scope/workspace-homes.schemas.js +2 -2
  135. package/dist/esm/workspace-scope/workspace-homes.schemas.js.map +1 -1
  136. package/package.json +7 -7
  137. package/dist/esm/registry/companion-api.schemas.js +0 -165
  138. package/dist/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +0 -1
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
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GRANTED TO EVERY RUNTIME, never declared as a backing service — see\n * {@link RUNTIME_GRANTED_INFRA_CAPABILITIES}.\n */\n METRICS_TELEMETRY = 'METRICS_TELEMETRY',\n BACKUP_MANAGER = 'BACKUP_MANAGER',\n}\n\n/**\n * Capabilities NO `BackingServiceKind` projects to — granted to a runtime by the platform rather\n * than declared by an environment.\n *\n * `BackingServiceKindToInfraCapability` used to be described as bijective, and a test asserted the\n * reverse direction: every capability reachable from some kind. That held only while every\n * capability was something an environment points at. It is not a property of the model, and reading\n * it as one is what kept `metrics-telemetry` alive as an authoring surface with no consumer.\n *\n * Membership here is the ANSWER to \"why does this capability have no kind\", so a capability that\n * belongs in neither place is a real gap and stays visible as one.\n */\nexport const RUNTIME_GRANTED_INFRA_CAPABILITIES: Readonly<Partial<Record<InfraCapability, string>>> = {\n /*\n * Telemetry is configured in TWO places, and a backing service is neither of them: the endpoint is\n * authored at `observability.telemetry.endpoint` (projected to `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT`), and\n * the auth header is derived provider-agnostically from the selected `OBSERVABILITY_TELEMETRY`\n * engine provider. Nothing is left for an environment to declare, and nothing for an\n * infra-provider module to mint — those exist to issue PER-APPLICATION credentials, and a\n * telemetry token is one provider-level secret shared by every runtime.\n *\n * The capability itself is load-bearing and must NOT be withdrawn with the kind: it carries the\n * `DATA_TELEMETRY` network in `NETWORK_FOR_CAPABILITY` and sits in\n * `MINION_UNCONDITIONAL_CAPABILITIES`, so every runtime reaches the collector through it. Setting\n * it to `null` there was corrected on 2026-08-12 precisely because it \"would have cut tracing for\n * every runtime the moment segmentation was enforced, with NO readiness check covering it\".\n */\n [InfraCapability.METRICS_TELEMETRY]:\n 'Authored at observability.telemetry + the OBSERVABILITY_TELEMETRY provider; granted to every '\n + 'runtime for the DATA_TELEMETRY network, so no environment declares it and no module mints it.',\n};\n\n/**\n * Built-in environment-facing provider ids — the (kind × hosting-model\n * × brand) projection vocabulary. Apps SELECT these implicitly via\n * `wildo.infra.<env>.config.ts > backingServices.<kind>.{source,\n * provider?}`; the planner resolves the tuple to one of these\n * `InfraProvider` values via `resolveInfraProvider`.\n *\n * **Naming convention**: `<KIND>_<BRAND>` — `BRAND` is either a\n * vendor (Atlas / AWS_RDS / Supabase / …) for managed services, or\n * an open-source software name (MinIO / vanilla self-hosted) for\n * self-hosted. `<KIND>_MANAGED` exists as a generic fallback when\n * the operator hasn't named a brand (Postgres in particular —\n * acceptable while the brand catalog is incomplete; Mongo's\n * `MONGODB_ATLAS` is the only branded managed option today, so no\n * `MONGODB_MANAGED` generic is needed).\n *\n * Slice 4.B.0 (2026-05-07) added the Postgres brand expansion to\n * generalize the source/brand split that S3 already had.\n */\nexport enum InfraProvider {\n // === MongoDB ===\n /** Self-hosted vanilla MongoDB (in-cluster docker-compose / K8s\n * deployment). Selected via `source: SELF`. No `provider` brand\n * required (Mongo's `provider` axis is reserved for managed\n * variants like `'atlas'`). */\n MONGODB_SELF = 'mongodb-self',\n /** MongoDB Atlas (managed cloud). brand: `'atlas'`. */\n MONGODB_ATLAS = 'mongodb-atlas',\n\n // === PostgreSQL ===\n /** Self-hosted vanilla PostgreSQL (in-cluster docker-compose /\n * K8s deployment). Selected via `source: SELF`. */\n POSTGRES_SELF = 'postgres-self',\n /** Generic managed Postgres — fallback when the operator hasn't\n * named a brand. Concrete brand identifiers below are preferred. */\n POSTGRES_MANAGED = 'postgres-managed',\n /** AWS RDS for PostgreSQL. brand: `'aws-rds'`. */\n POSTGRES_AWS_RDS = 'postgres-aws-rds',\n /** Google Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL. brand: `'gcp-cloud-sql'`. */\n POSTGRES_GCP_CLOUD_SQL = 'postgres-gcp-cloud-sql',\n /** Azure Database for PostgreSQL. brand: `'azure-database'`. */\n POSTGRES_AZURE_DATABASE = 'postgres-azure-database',\n /** Supabase. brand: `'supabase'`. */\n POSTGRES_SUPABASE = 'postgres-supabase',\n /** Neon. brand: `'neon'`. */\n POSTGRES_NEON = 'postgres-neon',\n /** Render. brand: `'render'`. */\n POSTGRES_RENDER = 'postgres-render',\n\n // === Redis / Valkey ===\n /** Self-hosted Redis-compatible cache (today: Valkey under the\n * hood; the engine adapter is wire-protocol compatible with\n * Redis OSS). Selected via `source: SELF`. */\n REDIS_SELF = 'redis-self',\n\n // === RabbitMQ ===\n /** Self-hosted RabbitMQ broker (in-cluster docker-compose / K8s\n * deployment). Selected via `source: SELF`. */\n RABBITMQ_SELF = 'rabbitmq-self',\n\n // === Object storage ===\n /** MinIO (self-hosted S3-compatible). brand: `'minio'` (or unset on\n * source=self — MinIO is the canonical default). */\n MINIO_SELF = 'minio-self',\n /** AWS S3 (managed). brand: `'aws'`. */\n AWS_S3 = 'aws-s3',\n\n // === Stateless infra ===\n /** Self-hosted ClamAV antivirus scanning service. Stateless (no\n * auth, no per-tenant state); apps connect to a shared host:port.\n * Selected via `source: SELF`. */\n CLAMAV_SELF = 'clamav-self',\n /** Self-hosted immudb — immutable, cryptographically-verifiable DB used as a\n * tamper-evident audit-log store. Selected via `source: SELF`. */\n IMMUDB_SELF = 'immudb-self',\n}\n\n/**\n * Platform-side consumers of an `InfraProviderPlanContribution.platformAdmin`\n * block. Each provider declares which platform services receive its\n * admin credentials so the planner can route them to the right pod /\n * compose service / env file.\n *\n * Locked enum (2026-05-05). Extending requires adding the consumer\n * enum value here AND in every `InfraProviderModule.plan()` that\n * legitimately delivers admin credentials to the new consumer.\n *\n * Excluded by design (consume platform-service APIs, not direct infra-admin):\n * - `file-generator`\n * - `sourcecode-provider`\n *\n * Add as real consumers surface, not pre-emptively.\n */\nexport enum InfraPlatformAdminConsumer {\n APPS_MANAGER = 'apps-manager',\n COMPANION = 'companion',\n CRONTABS_BATCHES_MANAGER = 'crontabs-batches-manager',\n MODULE_REGISTRY = 'module-registry',\n}\n\n/**\n * Audience-less contributions: describe the infra resource itself.\n * Same payload regardless of who consumes it (compose definitions,\n * K8s manifests, CI checks).\n */\nconst InfraProviderResourceContributionShapeSchema = z.strictObject({\n dockerComposeServices: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n k8sResources: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n startupScripts: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n ciChecks: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n policyChecks: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Audience: platform services that need **management-API access** to\n * administer the infra resource (create per-app users / vhosts / ACLs\n * / DBs). This is audience-1 in the three-audience model:\n *\n * 1. **Platform-admin** (this contribution slice). Cluster-wide\n * management-API credentials. Consumed by apps-manager (mints\n * per-app users via `mintAppCredentials`), companion (mirrors\n * apps-manager admin role for local dev). `crontabs` /\n * `module-registry` are listed in the enum because they MAY\n * surface admin needs in future slices, but no provider should\n * declare them as consumers in this slice unless evidence\n * surfaces.\n * 2. **Platform-service-scoped** (NOT modeled in `plan()` yet —\n * see LD-8 / Slice 2.5). Per-platform-service publish/consume\n * creds for the platform-services that participate in\n * inter-service messaging (`PLATFORM_SERVICES` enum:\n * apps-manager, crontabs-batches-manager, file-generator).\n * Today provisioned inline by\n * `PlatformInfrastructureManagerService.provisionAllPlatformServices`.\n * 3. **App-scoped** (`appRuntime` slice below). Per-app\n * publish/consume creds, minted by `mintAppCredentials`.\n *\n * `consumers` is the explicit audience declaration: every provider\n * states which platform services receive this block. The planner\n * routes the credentials accordingly.\n */\nconst InfraProviderPlatformAdminContributionSchema = z.strictObject({\n envVars: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).optional(),\n secretEnvVars: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n consumers: z.array(z.enum(InfraPlatformAdminConsumer)).optional(),\n});\nexport type InfraProviderPlatformAdminContribution = z.infer<\n typeof InfraProviderPlatformAdminContributionSchema\n>;\n\n/**\n * Audience: customer-app + minion + Node-worker pods. Per-app\n * runtime delivery flows through the persisted\n * `Wildo_Application_Config` and `Wildo_Application_Secrets` blobs in\n * MongoDB (NOT through K8s deployment-Secret env vars; engine\n * consumers like `queue.backend.service.ts:144-149` read from\n * `appConfigService.{config,secrets}` after fetching them at startup\n * via app-config-fetch).\n *\n * - `perAppConfigBlobPaths`: JSON paths into `Wildo_Application_Config`\n * carrying static values (same for every app in this env) — e.g.\n * `'database.rabbitmq.host': 'rabbitmq'`. Merged into the persisted\n * config blob by the planner at sync time.\n * - `perAppSecretBlobPaths`: JSON paths into `Wildo_Application_Secrets`\n * that `mintAppCredentials` will populate at deploy time (e.g.\n * `'database.rabbitmq.username'`). The planner emits only the path\n * list; apps-manager invokes `mintAppCredentials` per app to produce\n * the values, then merges them into the persisted secrets blob via\n * the existing `_merge_WildoApplicationSecrets` machinery.\n *\n * No K8s-Secret-env-var output is intentional: the K8s\n * `{appSlug}-secret` carries only the four-env bootstrap-env-contract\n * (APPLICATION_ID / PLATFORM_APPLICATION_PRIMARY_SECRET /\n * PLATFORM_APPS_MANAGER_URL / APPLICATION_ENV); per-resource creds\n * land in MongoDB, not env. If a future provider genuinely needs\n * env-var injection it can extend this contribution shape via\n * `.passthrough()` — not pre-emptively designed for here.\n */\nconst InfraProviderAppRuntimeContributionSchema = z.strictObject({\n perAppConfigBlobPaths: z.record(z.string().min(1), z.unknown()).optional(),\n perAppSecretBlobPaths: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n});\nexport type InfraProviderAppRuntimeContribution = z.infer<\n typeof InfraProviderAppRuntimeContributionSchema\n>;\n\n/**\n * Two-slice contribution shape. The audience-less resource block\n * (compose / K8s / CI) merges with the audience-scoped credential\n * blocks (`platformAdmin`, `appRuntime`).\n *\n * `.passthrough()` is preserved on the merged shape so future\n * contribution kinds (dashboards, alerting rules, autoscaler hints)\n * can be added without breaking existing modules.\n */\nexport const InfraProviderPlanContributionSchema =\n InfraProviderResourceContributionShapeSchema.extend({\n platformAdmin: InfraProviderPlatformAdminContributionSchema.optional(),\n appRuntime: InfraProviderAppRuntimeContributionSchema.optional(),\n }).passthrough();\nexport type InfraProviderPlanContribution = z.infer<typeof InfraProviderPlanContributionSchema>;\n\nexport interface InfraProviderPlanningContext {\n environment: string;\n runtime: string;\n backingServiceKey: string;\n config: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-app credential minting context. Called by the orchestrator\n * (apps-manager `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts`) at app-init\n * time — not at K8s deploy time. The orchestrator is responsible for\n * **generation policy** (read existing creds from MongoDB; decide\n * rotate-vs-preserve based on `overrideCredentials` flag; generate\n * new password when needed); the module is responsible for the\n * **broker upsert** (install / replace the user on the broker with\n * the supplied password).\n *\n * Inputs:\n * - `appSlug` — the application slug (or its derived namespace\n * `ns`); used by the module to compute the rabbit username,\n * permission regex, etc.\n * - `adminClient` — pre-wired by the orchestrator from the resolved\n * `platformAdmin` env vars; concrete type narrowed per provider at\n * the module's implementation site (e.g., RabbitMQ modules narrow\n * to `RabbitMQManagementClient`).\n * - `secretInputs` — orchestrator-supplied scalars keyed by the JSON\n * path the module declared in `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths`.\n * For RabbitMQ: `{ 'database.rabbitmq.password': '<orchestrator-generated-password>' }`.\n * The module installs these on the broker; it does NOT generate\n * passwords itself.\n *\n * Note: `applicationEnv` was previously included in this context but\n * removed 2026-05-06 — the integration site (`wildo-application-lifecycle`)\n * does not carry an env field on its options shape.\n */\nexport interface AppCredentialMintingContext {\n /**\n * Raw application slug (e.g., `'wonder-todos'`). Used by modules\n * whose per-app resource names embed the slug directly without\n * env-scoping (e.g., MongoDB database name).\n */\n appSlug: string;\n /**\n * Application namespace = `<appSlug>-<environmentId>`, derived\n * server-side via `buildApplicationNamespace` in platform-config-lib.\n * Used by modules whose per-app resource names scope by namespace\n * (RabbitMQ username, Redis ACL keyPattern, …) — i.e., resources\n * that must remain isolated across env boundaries (`wonder-todos-local`\n * vs `wonder-todos-staging`).\n */\n applicationNamespace: string;\n /**\n * Stable opaque application identifier (Mongo ObjectId-shaped string,\n * matches the convention at\n * `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts:552` where the broker\n * permission regex disambiguates per-app queue/reply names by this\n * id, NOT by `appSlug` — the slug is human-readable and could\n * theoretically be reassigned, the id is forever-stable). Required\n * by modules whose per-app resource names embed the application id\n * (RabbitMQ permission regex, …).\n */\n wildoApplicationId: string;\n /**\n * WHICH runtime principal these credentials are for (Step 2 / D17).\n *\n * Optional, and absent means the APPLICATION BACKEND — which keeps every\n * existing module and call site meaning exactly what it meant before, since\n * per-application minting IS the backend principal's case.\n *\n * A module that ignores this field still mints correctly for the backend and\n * simply does not participate in per-principal narrowing; a module that reads\n * it must derive a DISTINCT resource name (ACL username, DB user, queue\n * permission) per principal, or two principals will share one credential and\n * the narrowing will exist only on paper.\n *\n * `buildRuntimePrincipalKey` renders the stable identity to embed in such a\n * name — the same string the stored section is keyed by, so a minted resource\n * and the row that records it cannot drift.\n */\n principal?: ApplicationRuntimePrincipal;\n /**\n * What this principal may touch, in RESOURCE TYPES (Step 3).\n *\n * Deliberately the platform vocabulary, not storage names: a module that\n * grants on tables and a module that grants on collections must receive the\n * same contract, and the translation belongs at each adapter via\n * `resolveGrantStorageNames`.\n *\n * Absent for the application backend, which is granted database-wide by a\n * different path. Absent for a NAMED principal means \"no grants derived\" —\n * which a module must treat as an ERROR rather than as a reason to fall back\n * to the wide grant (D11/R3: a minion with no declared access gets no\n * database user at all, and that is the orchestrator's decision to make).\n */\n resourceGrants?: MinionResourceGrants;\n adminClient: unknown;\n secretInputs: Record<string, string>;\n /**\n * Optional non-secret per-app config inputs supplied by the\n * orchestrator. Distinct from `secretInputs` (passwords) — these\n * are authored topology values that affect HOW the module\n * provisions the per-app resource. Each module documents the keys\n * it consumes in its own JSDoc.\n *\n * Slice 2.5c-3 introduced this field for `RabbitmqSelfInfraProviderModule`\n * to receive the optional per-app vhost (key `'vhost'`); future\n * modules may use it for per-app database suffixes, bucket prefixes,\n * or other authored topology overrides without further extending\n * the context shape.\n *\n * When `undefined` or missing a key the module relies on, the\n * module falls back to its default behavior (e.g., RabbitMQ\n * provisions on the default vhost `/`).\n */\n applicationConfigInputs?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Platform-service-scoped credential minting (audience-2 / LD-8)\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// `provisionAllPlatformServices` (in apps-manager\n// `PlatformInfrastructureManagerService`) hands each platform service\n// (`apps-manager`, `crontabs-batches-manager`, `file-generator`) a SCOPED\n// (non-admin) broker user for inter-service messaging. Today the policy\n// (per-service permission regex, the broader-permissions special case for\n// crontabs) is hand-rolled inline. Slice 2.5 of `infra-provider-planner.md`\n// moves it onto the `InfraProviderModule` interface so each provider owns\n// its own per-platform-service policy.\n//\n// Distinct from `mintAppCredentials` (audience-3): platform-service creds\n// land in MongoDB `platformApplicationsSecrets` (orchestrator-owned), NOT\n// in `Wildo_Application_Secrets`.\n\n/**\n * Context for `InfraProviderModule.mintPlatformServiceCredentials`.\n * Same orchestrator-pattern as `mintAppCredentials`: orchestrator\n * generates the password, passes it via `secretInputs`; module is\n * upsert-only on the broker.\n */\nexport interface PlatformServiceCredentialMintingContext {\n /**\n * Stable identifier of the platform service this credential is for.\n * Today: members of `PlatformApplicationType` (e.g.,\n * `'platform_apps_manager'`, `'platform_crontabs_batches_manager'`,\n * `'platform_file_generator'`). Module derives the per-service\n * permission regex from this string.\n */\n serviceName: string;\n adminClient: unknown;\n /**\n * Orchestrator-supplied scalars. For RabbitMQ the only required\n * key is `'password'` (no JSON-blob-path conventions because\n * platform-service creds don't go into a per-app blob — they're\n * persisted at the platform-services collection level).\n */\n secretInputs: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\nexport interface PlatformServiceCredentialMintingResult {\n /**\n * Username installed on the broker. Equals `serviceName` today\n * (the legacy convention preserved from the inline ceremony in\n * `PlatformInfrastructureManagerService.provisionServiceCredentials`).\n * Future modules may transform if needed; the orchestrator persists\n * this value alongside the password.\n */\n username: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-app credential minting result. Keys are JSON paths into\n * `Wildo_Application_Secrets` (those declared in\n * `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths`); values are the canonical\n * persisted form post-broker-upsert. Typically:\n * - **Module-derived** values (e.g., `'database.rabbitmq.username': 'app_<ns>'`).\n * The module computes these from `appSlug`.\n * - **Echoed** values from `secretInputs` (e.g.,\n * `'database.rabbitmq.password': '<the-password-you-passed-in>'`)\n * — the module confirms it installed them on the broker.\n *\n * The orchestrator (apps-manager) merges this map into the persisted\n * secrets blob via `_merge_WildoApplicationSecrets`. The customer\n * pod reads at startup via the standard app-config-fetch path — no\n * K8s Secret involvement for per-app data creds.\n */\nexport interface AppCredentialMintingResult {\n secretBlobValues: Record<string, string>;\n /**\n * Optional non-persisted return values the module produces in the\n * course of upsert. Distinct from `secretBlobValues` (which lands\n * in `Wildo_Application_Secrets`) — `runtimeArtifacts` is a back-\n * channel for values the orchestrator needs at app-init time but\n * deliberately does NOT persist.\n *\n * Slice 4.B.3 of `infra-provider-planner.md` introduced this\n * field for the MongoDB modules: `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule`\n * returns `runtimeArtifacts['connectionString']` (the per-app\n * SRV URL with credentials embedded) so the orchestrator can use\n * it for transient app-database seeding without persisting the\n * whole credentialed URL into secrets — the persistence shape is\n * `(username, password)` in secrets + `(host, protocol, options,\n * database)` in config, NOT a single URL string.\n *\n * When `undefined`, the module has no transient artifacts; the\n * orchestrator should rely on `secretBlobValues` only.\n */\n runtimeArtifacts?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Per-provider admin-client contracts\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Each `InfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` call narrows the\n// `AppCredentialMintingContext.adminClient` field to a per-provider\n// management-client interface. The interfaces live HERE (in\n// platform-config-lib, contracts-only per platform/CLAUDE.md) so the\n// module implementation (in platform-apps-manager) and the manager\n// implementation (also in platform-apps-manager) share one definition\n// — and any future caller (companion, CLI) can implement the same\n// interface without depending on the manager class.\n\n/**\n * Raw RabbitMQ management-API transport (HTTP `PUT/DELETE`). Surface\n * what `RabbitmqSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` /\n * `revokeAppCredentials` need; nothing more. The 5C policy/transport\n * split (LD-4) carves *policy* methods (`upsertTenantUserPermissions`\n * etc.) out of the manager into the module; this interface is the\n * pure-transport remainder.\n *\n * **Argument-order convention** (Slice 4.A.2 / L3): for permission\n * methods, the order is `(vhost, username, permissions)` — vhost\n * first. The legacy pre-Slice-2 convention was `(username, vhost, ...)`\n * (positional, username first). The new convention is cleaner but\n * silently swappable since both args are strings. **Do NOT reorder**;\n * stale call sites copying the legacy positional order will produce\n * wrong-vhost permissions without compile-time complaint.\n */\nexport interface IRabbitMQManagementClient {\n /** PUT /api/users/{name} — idempotent upsert. */\n putUser(username: string, password: string, tags: ReadonlyArray<string>): Promise<void>;\n /** PUT /api/permissions/{vhost}/{name} — vhost-first per the\n * argument-order convention noted on the interface JSDoc. */\n setPermissions(\n vhost: string,\n username: string,\n permissions: { configure: string; write: string; read: string },\n ): Promise<void>;\n /** PUT /api/topic-permissions/{vhost}/{name} — vhost-first. */\n setTopicPermissions(\n vhost: string,\n username: string,\n permissions: { exchange: string; write: string; read: string },\n ): Promise<void>;\n /** DELETE /api/users/{name} — idempotent (404 → no-op). */\n deleteUser(username: string): Promise<void>;\n /** PUT /api/vhosts/{name} — ensures vhost exists; idempotent. */\n ensureVhost(vhost: string): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Raw Redis (Valkey) ACL transport. Surface what\n * `RedisSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` /\n * `revokeAppCredentials` need; nothing more. Used over a `redis-cli`-\n * equivalent ACL connection (the apps-manager's\n * `RedisConnectionManagerService` opens it once at boot and reuses).\n *\n * **Channel pattern policy** (Slice 4.B.1, 2026-05-10): the legacy\n * `RedisConnectionManagerService.upsertTenantUserAcl` derived a\n * fixed family of pub/sub channel patterns from `username`\n * (`<u>#*`, `<u>#/#*`, `<u>-request#*`, `<u>-request#/#*`,\n * `<u>-response#*`, `<u>-response#/#*`). That fan-out is module-\n * internal policy, NOT transport. The contract therefore takes\n * only `username`/`password`/`keyPattern` — the channel patterns\n * live inside the manager implementation today (preserves Slice 2\n * behavior parity); when the legacy method is retired the policy\n * moves into `RedisSelfInfraProviderModule` proper. Until then,\n * `upsertUser` is a thin delegator and the contract is the\n * forward-looking shape.\n *\n * **Idempotent persistence** (`persistAcl`): Valkey/Redis ACL\n * changes are in-memory until `ACL SAVE` is called. The legacy\n * code paired every `upsertTenantUserAcl` with `aclSave`; the\n * module mirrors that pairing.\n */\nexport interface IRedisAclClient {\n /**\n * `ACL SETUSER <name> on >password resetkeys ~<keyPattern> ...`\n * — idempotent upsert. The implementation owns the full ACL\n * command shape (channel patterns, allow/deny categories,\n * dangerous-command denials) — the contract surfaces only the\n * orchestrator-supplied identity material. Slice 4.B.1's manager\n * impl preserves the legacy channel-pattern fan-out from\n * `RedisConnectionManagerService.upsertTenantUserAcl`.\n */\n upsertUser(input: {\n username: string;\n password: string;\n keyPattern: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * `ACL DELUSER <name>` — idempotent (no-op when the user is\n * already absent).\n */\n deleteUser(username: string): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * `ACL SAVE` — flushes the in-memory ACL list to disk. MUST be\n * called after every mutation set so Valkey restarts don't lose\n * tenant users.\n */\n persistAcl(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Raw Postgres admin transport. Surface what\n * `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` /\n * `revokeAppCredentials` need; nothing more. The legacy\n * `PostgreSQLConnectionManagerService` (apps-manager) implements\n * this contract via its existing `createApplicationDatabase` /\n * `deleteApplicationDatabase` methods (Slice 4.B.2 5C policy/\n * transport split).\n *\n * **Identifier-injection-safe**: implementations MUST validate\n * `databaseName` / `username` shapes (alphanumeric + underscore;\n * 63-char Postgres limit) and quote them safely — module callers\n * pass authored slugs verbatim. `PostgreSQLConnectionManagerService`\n * uses the legacy `validateIdentifier` + `quoteIdentifier` pair.\n *\n * **Idempotent upsert** (`upsertApplicationDatabase`): the legacy\n * `createApplicationDatabase` is upsert-style — `CREATE USER` falls\n * back to `ALTER USER` on conflict; `CREATE DATABASE` skips when the\n * DB exists; ownership + privileges always reapplied. The module\n * surface preserves that contract; \"create\" is renamed to \"upsert\"\n * in the contract to match the orchestrator-pattern vocabulary.\n */\nexport interface IPostgresAdminClient {\n /**\n * Upsert per-app database + role. Returns the resolved\n * `connectionUrl` so the orchestrator can persist it into\n * `Wildo_Application_Secrets.database.postgresql.connectUrl`.\n * Idempotent: safe to call repeatedly with the same input.\n */\n upsertApplicationDatabase(input: {\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n sslMode?: PostgreSQLSSLMode;\n }): Promise<{ connectionUrl: string }>;\n /**\n * Drop per-app database + user. Idempotent: missing DB / missing\n * user are non-throws (best-effort cleanup, see legacy\n * `deleteApplicationDatabase` semantics).\n */\n dropApplicationDatabase(input: {\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * Upsert a LOGIN role holding exactly the given per-table privileges inside an\n * existing application database (Step 3 / R1).\n *\n * A SEPARATE method from {@link IPostgresAdminClient.upsertApplicationDatabase},\n * for the same reason the Mongo port is split: that one CREATEs the database\n * and makes its caller the OWNER with `ALL PRIVILEGES`, this one grants named\n * verbs on named tables inside a database somebody else owns. One method with\n * an optional privileges argument would make OWNERSHIP the behaviour you get\n * by forgetting to pass something.\n *\n * The grants are AUTHORITATIVE: the implementation must revoke what the role\n * previously held before granting, or a table removed from `resourceAccess`\n * keeps its privilege and revocation becomes a no-op that reports success.\n *\n * An empty `readTables`/`writeTables` pair is legitimate — a role that can\n * connect and see nothing — and must NOT be read as \"unspecified, leave the\n * previous grants alone\".\n */\n /**\n * Remove a table-scoped LOGIN role and everything it holds — WITHOUT touching\n * the database it was scoped into.\n *\n * Separate from {@link IPostgresAdminClient.dropApplicationDatabase}, which\n * drops the DATABASE and its owner. Reusing that one to retire a minion would\n * destroy the entire application's data while believing it was removing one\n * principal's access. That asymmetry is why revocation gets its own method\n * rather than a flag.\n */\n dropTableScopedDatabaseRole(input: {\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n schemaName: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n upsertTableScopedDatabaseRole(input: {\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n schemaName: string;\n readTables: readonly string[];\n writeTables: readonly string[];\n /**\n * Insert-only tables — `GRANT INSERT`, never UPDATE and never DELETE.\n *\n * A third axis rather than a flag on `writeTables`, because the two say\n * different things about the same verb set and a boolean would make the\n * safer one the thing you get by remembering to pass it. Today this carries\n * the engine's mandatory append floor — the audit trail and retained job\n * output (see `deriveMinionDatabaseGrants`): a principal must be able to record\n * what it did, and must never be able to unrecord it.\n */\n appendTables: readonly string[];\n /** Insert/update durable runtime records without granting DELETE. Read is granted separately. */\n maintainTables?: readonly string[];\n sslMode?: PostgreSQLSSLMode;\n }): Promise<{ connectionUrl: string }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Raw MongoDB Atlas API transport. Surface what\n * `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` /\n * `revokeAppCredentials` need; nothing more. The legacy\n * `MongoAtlasManagerService` (apps-manager) implements this\n * contract via its existing `createApplicationDatabase` /\n * `deleteDatabaseUser` methods (Slice 4.B.3 5C policy/transport\n * split).\n *\n * **Idempotent upsert** (`upsertApplicationDatabase`): the legacy\n * `createApplicationDatabase` is upsert-style — `POST /databaseUsers`\n * falls back to `PATCH` on conflict (existing user); cluster scope +\n * roles are reapplied on every call. Returns the SRV connection\n * string with credentials embedded, ready for transient\n * app-database seeding by the orchestrator.\n */\nexport interface IMongoAtlasClient {\n /**\n * Upsert per-app Atlas database user. Returns the SRV connection\n * string (with credentials embedded, `mongodb+srv://user:pass@...`)\n * that the orchestrator uses for transient app-init operations.\n * The string is NOT persisted into `Wildo_Application_Secrets`\n * by today's orchestrator — it's exposed via\n * `AppCredentialMintingResult.runtimeArtifacts.connectionString`.\n */\n upsertApplicationDatabase(input: {\n clusterName: string;\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n }): Promise<{ connectionString: string }>;\n /**\n * Delete an Atlas database user. Idempotent: 404 → no-op.\n */\n deleteDatabaseUser(username: string): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Raw self-managed MongoDB admin transport. Surface what\n * `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` /\n * `revokeAppCredentials` need; nothing more. Implemented by a\n * lightweight admin-side mongoose connection — the legacy inline\n * `ensureSelfManagedMongoApplicationUser` at\n * `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts:2710-2745` is the source\n * of behavior.\n *\n * **Why this contract is asymmetric to `IMongoAtlasClient`** (Slice\n * 4.B.3 design note, 2026-05-10): Atlas exposes a stateless REST\n * API for user management; self-managed Mongo requires opening an\n * admin-DB connection and running `createUser` / `updateUser`\n * commands. The contract therefore takes the admin connect URL as\n * an input (not a constructor-time configuration) — implementations\n * open transient connections per call, mirroring the legacy\n * pattern.\n */\nexport interface IMongoSelfAdminClient {\n /**\n * Upsert per-app database user on a self-managed MongoDB\n * instance. Connects to `adminConnectUrl` (admin-scoped),\n * creates or updates the user with `readWrite` + `dbAdmin`\n * roles on `databaseName`, then closes the connection. Idempotent.\n */\n upsertApplicationDatabaseUser(input: {\n adminConnectUrl: string;\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * Delete a per-app database user. Idempotent: missing user is a\n * no-op (best-effort cleanup, mirrors `IPostgresAdminClient`\n * semantics).\n */\n deleteApplicationDatabaseUser(input: {\n adminConnectUrl: string;\n username: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * Upsert a database user holding ONE custom role carrying exactly the given\n * collection-scoped privileges (Step 3 / R1 / D14).\n *\n * Deliberately a SEPARATE method from\n * {@link IMongoSelfAdminClient.upsertApplicationDatabaseUser} rather than an\n * optional parameter on it. The two grant fundamentally different authority —\n * that one grants `readWrite` + `dbAdmin` on the WHOLE database, this one\n * grants named actions on named collections and nothing else — and a single\n * method with an optional \"privileges\" argument would make the wide grant the\n * behaviour you get by forgetting to pass something. Two methods make the\n * caller name which authority it intends.\n *\n * `privileges` is authoritative and REPLACES the role's previous contents, so\n * a resource removed from `resourceAccess` loses its grant on the next sync.\n * An empty list is legitimate — a principal with no data access — and MUST\n * yield a role granting nothing rather than being treated as \"unspecified\".\n *\n * Idempotent: safe to call when the role and user already exist.\n */\n /**\n * Retire a collection-scoped user AND the custom role it holds.\n *\n * Separate from {@link IMongoSelfAdminClient.deleteApplicationDatabaseUser}\n * because a scoped principal owns TWO objects in TWO databases — the user in\n * `admin`, the role in the application database — and dropping only the user\n * leaves a privileged role behind that the next mint silently adopts.\n *\n * Idempotent in both halves: a missing user or a missing role is a no-op.\n */\n dropCollectionScopedDatabaseUser(input: {\n adminConnectUrl: string;\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n roleName: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n upsertCollectionScopedDatabaseUser(input: {\n adminConnectUrl: string;\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n roleName: string;\n privileges: ReadonlyArray<{\n resource: { db: string; collection: string };\n actions: readonly string[];\n }>;\n }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nexport interface InfraProviderModule {\n provider: InfraProvider;\n supportedCapabilities: ReadonlyArray<InfraCapability>;\n\n /**\n * Every `Wildo_Application_Secrets` JSON path this module can mint PER RUNTIME PRINCIPAL.\n *\n * ## Why this is static, when `plan()` already reports the same paths\n *\n * `plan()` answers \"what does THIS application get\", so it needs an\n * {@link InfraProviderPlanningContext}. The secret-DELIVERY path in apps-manager asks a different\n * question — \"which paths are per-principal AT ALL\" — and must answer it with no application in\n * hand, because it decides what to STRIP from the application blob before overlaying a\n * principal's own material. A principal must receive a credential only where one was minted for\n * it; anything left un-stripped is delivered with the APPLICATION's value, which for a database\n * means `readWrite` + `dbAdmin` on the whole database.\n *\n * Empty for a provider with no per-app credentials — shared-bucket object storage\n * (`MINIO_SELF`, `AWS_S3`) and stateless infra (`CLAMAV_SELF`). Empty is a\n * real answer, not a missing one, which is why the field is required rather than optional: a\n * module that mints per-principal material must not be able to omit it and be silently read as\n * \"nothing to confine\".\n *\n * **Modules MUST derive `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` from this same constant** rather than\n * repeating the literal list. Two spellings of where a credential lives is the defect this exists\n * to prevent, one layer up.\n */\n perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n\n plan(context: InfraProviderPlanningContext): InfraProviderPlanContribution;\n\n /**\n * Optional. Called by apps-manager at app-init time (see\n * `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts:432-580` — the existing\n * per-resource ceremony this method abstracts). Upserts the per-app\n * user / role / DB on the broker using `secretInputs` for any\n * orchestrator-supplied passwords; returns the canonical form of\n * the persisted secrets blob slice.\n *\n * Returns `null` when the provider has no per-app credentials (e.g.,\n * shared S3 bucket with shared access key).\n *\n * **Idempotent broker upsert** — the module installs / replaces the\n * user with the password from `secretInputs`. It does NOT make\n * generation/rotation decisions; that is the orchestrator's\n * responsibility (driven by the existing `overrideCredentials`\n * flag on `WildoApplicationInitOptions`). The module MUST NOT\n * crash on \"user already exists\" (PUT semantics on the broker\n * management API are sufficient for RabbitMQ; equivalent\n * upsert-on-conflict semantics for other providers).\n */\n mintAppCredentials?(\n context: AppCredentialMintingContext,\n ): Promise<AppCredentialMintingResult | null>;\n\n /**\n * Optional. Symmetric to `mintAppCredentials`; called at app\n * tear-down time. Idempotent: safe to call when the per-app user /\n * DB / role does not exist (best-effort cleanup, no throw on\n * already-absent).\n */\n revokeAppCredentials?(context: AppCredentialMintingContext): Promise<void>;\n\n /**\n * Optional (LD-8 / Slice 2.5). Called by the orchestrator\n * (`PlatformInfrastructureManagerService.provisionServiceCredentials`\n * + `ensureAppsManagerCredentials`) at platform-service-init time.\n * Upserts a SCOPED (non-admin) per-platform-service user on the\n * broker for inter-service messaging — distinct from\n * `mintAppCredentials` (audience-3, customer-app per-app creds).\n *\n * Same orchestrator-pattern as `mintAppCredentials`: orchestrator\n * owns generation, module is upsert-only.\n *\n * Returns `null` when the provider has no per-platform-service\n * credentials concept (e.g., S3 modules — platform services use a\n * shared bucket).\n */\n mintPlatformServiceCredentials?(\n context: PlatformServiceCredentialMintingContext,\n ): Promise<PlatformServiceCredentialMintingResult | null>;\n}\n"]}
1
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GRANTED TO EVERY RUNTIME, never declared as a backing service — see\n * {@link RUNTIME_GRANTED_INFRA_CAPABILITIES}.\n */\n METRICS_TELEMETRY = 'METRICS_TELEMETRY',\n /**\n * Backup. RESERVED — no backing-service kind declares it and no module serves it; see\n * {@link RESERVED_INFRA_CAPABILITIES}.\n */\n BACKUP_MANAGER = 'BACKUP_MANAGER',\n}\n\n/**\n * Capabilities NO `BackingServiceKind` projects to — granted to a runtime by the platform rather\n * than declared by an environment.\n *\n * `BackingServiceKindToInfraCapability` used to be described as bijective, and a test asserted the\n * reverse direction: every capability reachable from some kind. That held only while every\n * capability was something an environment points at. It is not a property of the model, and reading\n * it as one is what kept `metrics-telemetry` alive as an authoring surface with no consumer.\n *\n * Membership here is the ANSWER to \"why does this capability have no kind\", so a capability that\n * belongs in neither place is a real gap and stays visible as one.\n */\nexport const RUNTIME_GRANTED_INFRA_CAPABILITIES: Readonly<Partial<Record<InfraCapability, string>>> = {\n /*\n * Telemetry is configured in TWO places, and a backing service is neither of them: the endpoint is\n * authored at `observability.telemetry.endpoint` (projected to `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT`), and\n * the auth header is derived provider-agnostically from the selected `OBSERVABILITY_TELEMETRY`\n * engine provider. Nothing is left for an environment to declare, and nothing for an\n * infra-provider module to mint — those exist to issue PER-APPLICATION credentials, and a\n * telemetry token is one provider-level secret shared by every runtime.\n *\n * The capability itself is load-bearing and must NOT be withdrawn with the kind: it carries the\n * `DATA_TELEMETRY` network in `NETWORK_FOR_CAPABILITY` and sits in\n * `MINION_UNCONDITIONAL_CAPABILITIES`, so every runtime reaches the collector through it. Setting\n * it to `null` there was corrected on 2026-08-12 precisely because it \"would have cut tracing for\n * every runtime the moment segmentation was enforced, with NO readiness check covering it\".\n */\n [InfraCapability.METRICS_TELEMETRY]:\n 'Authored at observability.telemetry + the OBSERVABILITY_TELEMETRY provider; granted to every '\n + 'runtime for the DATA_TELEMETRY network, so no environment declares it and no module mints it.',\n};\n\n/**\n * Capabilities kept as VOCABULARY with no way to be selected yet — neither declared by an\n * environment (no `BackingServiceKind` projects to them) nor granted to runtimes by the platform.\n *\n * This is the third answer to \"why does this capability have no kind\", beside\n * `BackingServiceKindToInfraCapability` and {@link RUNTIME_GRANTED_INFRA_CAPABILITIES}. It exists so\n * that answer is WRITTEN DOWN: a capability in none of the three is an unexplained gap, and the\n * reachability test still fails on it.\n *\n * Membership is a statement that nothing can reach the capability today. It is not a placeholder\n * an environment may fill in — withdrawing the declarable kind is what stopped it being one.\n */\nexport const RESERVED_INFRA_CAPABILITIES: Readonly<Partial<Record<InfraCapability, string>>> = {\n /*\n * The `backup` backing-service kind was WITHDRAWN 2026-09-26 (#1693): it resolved to no provider,\n * rendered no workload, and nothing read it. The capability stays because whether backup is modelled\n * as a capability at all is the design question #8 owns. Its network is `null` in\n * `NETWORK_FOR_CAPABILITY` for the same reason — no runtime dials a backup target.\n */\n [InfraCapability.BACKUP_MANAGER]:\n 'Reserved for the backup design (#8): no environment can declare it and no module serves it.',\n};\n\n/**\n * Built-in environment-facing provider ids — the (kind × hosting-model\n * × brand) projection vocabulary. Apps SELECT these implicitly via\n * `wildo.infra.<env>.config.ts > backingServices.<kind>.{source,\n * provider?}`; the planner resolves the tuple to one of these\n * `InfraProvider` values via `resolveInfraProvider`.\n *\n * **Naming convention**: `<KIND>_<BRAND>` — `BRAND` is either a\n * vendor (Atlas / AWS_RDS / Supabase / …) for managed services, or\n * an open-source software name (MinIO / vanilla self-hosted) for\n * self-hosted. `<KIND>_MANAGED` exists as a generic fallback when\n * the operator hasn't named a brand (Postgres in particular —\n * acceptable while the brand catalog is incomplete; Mongo's\n * `MONGODB_ATLAS` is the only branded managed option today, so no\n * `MONGODB_MANAGED` generic is needed).\n *\n * Slice 4.B.0 (2026-05-07) added the Postgres brand expansion to\n * generalize the source/brand split that S3 already had.\n */\nexport enum InfraProvider {\n // === MongoDB ===\n /** Self-hosted vanilla MongoDB (in-cluster docker-compose / K8s\n * deployment). Selected via `source: SELF`. No `provider` brand\n * required (Mongo's `provider` axis is reserved for managed\n * variants like `'atlas'`). */\n MONGODB_SELF = 'mongodb-self',\n /** MongoDB Atlas (managed cloud). brand: `'atlas'`. */\n MONGODB_ATLAS = 'mongodb-atlas',\n\n // === PostgreSQL ===\n /** Self-hosted vanilla PostgreSQL (in-cluster docker-compose /\n * K8s deployment). Selected via `source: SELF`. */\n POSTGRES_SELF = 'postgres-self',\n /** Generic managed Postgres — fallback when the operator hasn't\n * named a brand. Concrete brand identifiers below are preferred. */\n POSTGRES_MANAGED = 'postgres-managed',\n /** AWS RDS for PostgreSQL. brand: `'aws-rds'`. */\n POSTGRES_AWS_RDS = 'postgres-aws-rds',\n /** Google Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL. brand: `'gcp-cloud-sql'`. */\n POSTGRES_GCP_CLOUD_SQL = 'postgres-gcp-cloud-sql',\n /** Azure Database for PostgreSQL. brand: `'azure-database'`. */\n POSTGRES_AZURE_DATABASE = 'postgres-azure-database',\n /** Supabase. brand: `'supabase'`. */\n POSTGRES_SUPABASE = 'postgres-supabase',\n /** Neon. brand: `'neon'`. */\n POSTGRES_NEON = 'postgres-neon',\n /** Render. brand: `'render'`. */\n POSTGRES_RENDER = 'postgres-render',\n\n // === Redis / Valkey ===\n /** Self-hosted Redis-compatible cache (today: Valkey under the\n * hood; the engine adapter is wire-protocol compatible with\n * Redis OSS). Selected via `source: SELF`. */\n REDIS_SELF = 'redis-self',\n\n // === RabbitMQ ===\n /** Self-hosted RabbitMQ broker (in-cluster docker-compose / K8s\n * deployment). Selected via `source: SELF`. */\n RABBITMQ_SELF = 'rabbitmq-self',\n\n // === Object storage ===\n /** MinIO (self-hosted S3-compatible). brand: `'minio'` (or unset on\n * source=self — MinIO is the canonical default). */\n MINIO_SELF = 'minio-self',\n /** AWS S3 (managed). brand: `'aws'`. */\n AWS_S3 = 'aws-s3',\n\n // === Stateless infra ===\n /** Self-hosted ClamAV antivirus scanning service. Stateless (no\n * auth, no per-tenant state); apps connect to a shared host:port.\n * Selected via `source: SELF`. */\n CLAMAV_SELF = 'clamav-self',\n /** Self-hosted immudb — immutable, cryptographically-verifiable DB used as a\n * tamper-evident audit-log store. Selected via `source: SELF`. */\n IMMUDB_SELF = 'immudb-self',\n}\n\n/**\n * Platform-side consumers of an `InfraProviderPlanContribution.platformAdmin`\n * block. Each provider declares which platform services receive its\n * admin credentials so the planner can route them to the right pod /\n * compose service / env file.\n *\n * Locked enum (2026-05-05). Extending requires adding the consumer\n * enum value here AND in every `InfraProviderModule.plan()` that\n * legitimately delivers admin credentials to the new consumer.\n *\n * Excluded by design (consume platform-service APIs, not direct infra-admin):\n * - `file-generator`\n * - `sourcecode-provider`\n *\n * Add as real consumers surface, not pre-emptively.\n */\nexport enum InfraPlatformAdminConsumer {\n APPS_MANAGER = 'apps-manager',\n COMPANION = 'companion',\n CRONTABS_BATCHES_MANAGER = 'crontabs-batches-manager',\n MODULE_REGISTRY = 'module-registry',\n}\n\n/**\n * Audience-less contributions: describe the infra resource itself.\n * Same payload regardless of who consumes it (compose definitions,\n * K8s manifests, CI checks).\n */\nconst InfraProviderResourceContributionShapeSchema = z.strictObject({\n dockerComposeServices: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n k8sResources: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n startupScripts: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n ciChecks: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n policyChecks: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Audience: platform services that need **management-API access** to\n * administer the infra resource (create per-app users / vhosts / ACLs\n * / DBs). This is audience-1 in the three-audience model:\n *\n * 1. **Platform-admin** (this contribution slice). Cluster-wide\n * management-API credentials. Consumed by apps-manager (mints\n * per-app users via `mintAppCredentials`), companion (mirrors\n * apps-manager admin role for local dev). `crontabs` /\n * `module-registry` are listed in the enum because they MAY\n * surface admin needs in future slices, but no provider should\n * declare them as consumers in this slice unless evidence\n * surfaces.\n * 2. **Platform-service-scoped** (NOT modeled in `plan()` yet —\n * see LD-8 / Slice 2.5). Per-platform-service publish/consume\n * creds for the platform-services that participate in\n * inter-service messaging (`PLATFORM_SERVICES` enum:\n * apps-manager, crontabs-batches-manager, file-generator).\n * Today provisioned inline by\n * `PlatformInfrastructureManagerService.provisionAllPlatformServices`.\n * 3. **App-scoped** (`appRuntime` slice below). Per-app\n * publish/consume creds, minted by `mintAppCredentials`.\n *\n * `consumers` is the explicit audience declaration: every provider\n * states which platform services receive this block. The planner\n * routes the credentials accordingly.\n */\nconst InfraProviderPlatformAdminContributionSchema = z.strictObject({\n envVars: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).optional(),\n secretEnvVars: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n consumers: z.array(z.enum(InfraPlatformAdminConsumer)).optional(),\n});\nexport type InfraProviderPlatformAdminContribution = z.infer<\n typeof InfraProviderPlatformAdminContributionSchema\n>;\n\n/**\n * Audience: customer-app + minion + Node-worker pods. Per-app\n * runtime delivery flows through the persisted\n * `Wildo_Application_Config` and `Wildo_Application_Secrets` blobs in\n * MongoDB (NOT through K8s deployment-Secret env vars; engine\n * consumers like `queue.backend.service.ts:144-149` read from\n * `appConfigService.{config,secrets}` after fetching them at startup\n * via app-config-fetch).\n *\n * - `perAppConfigBlobPaths`: JSON paths into `Wildo_Application_Config`\n * carrying static values (same for every app in this env) — e.g.\n * `'database.rabbitmq.host': 'rabbitmq'`. Merged into the persisted\n * config blob by the planner at sync time.\n * - `perAppSecretBlobPaths`: JSON paths into `Wildo_Application_Secrets`\n * that `mintAppCredentials` will populate at deploy time (e.g.\n * `'database.rabbitmq.username'`). The planner emits only the path\n * list; apps-manager invokes `mintAppCredentials` per app to produce\n * the values, then merges them into the persisted secrets blob via\n * the existing `_merge_WildoApplicationSecrets` machinery.\n *\n * No K8s-Secret-env-var output is intentional: the K8s\n * `{appSlug}-secret` carries only the four-env bootstrap-env-contract\n * (APPLICATION_ID / PLATFORM_APPLICATION_PRIMARY_SECRET /\n * PLATFORM_APPS_MANAGER_URL / APPLICATION_ENV); per-resource creds\n * land in MongoDB, not env. If a future provider genuinely needs\n * env-var injection it can extend this contribution shape via\n * `.passthrough()` — not pre-emptively designed for here.\n */\nconst InfraProviderAppRuntimeContributionSchema = z.strictObject({\n perAppConfigBlobPaths: z.record(z.string().min(1), z.unknown()).optional(),\n perAppSecretBlobPaths: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n});\nexport type InfraProviderAppRuntimeContribution = z.infer<\n typeof InfraProviderAppRuntimeContributionSchema\n>;\n\n/**\n * Two-slice contribution shape. The audience-less resource block\n * (compose / K8s / CI) merges with the audience-scoped credential\n * blocks (`platformAdmin`, `appRuntime`).\n *\n * `.passthrough()` is preserved on the merged shape so future\n * contribution kinds (dashboards, alerting rules, autoscaler hints)\n * can be added without breaking existing modules.\n */\nexport const InfraProviderPlanContributionSchema =\n InfraProviderResourceContributionShapeSchema.extend({\n platformAdmin: InfraProviderPlatformAdminContributionSchema.optional(),\n appRuntime: InfraProviderAppRuntimeContributionSchema.optional(),\n }).passthrough();\nexport type InfraProviderPlanContribution = z.infer<typeof InfraProviderPlanContributionSchema>;\n\nexport interface InfraProviderPlanningContext {\n environment: string;\n runtime: string;\n backingServiceKey: string;\n config: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-app credential minting context. Called by the orchestrator\n * (apps-manager `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts`) at app-init\n * time — not at K8s deploy time. The orchestrator is responsible for\n * **generation policy** (read existing creds from MongoDB; decide\n * rotate-vs-preserve based on `overrideCredentials` flag; generate\n * new password when needed); the module is responsible for the\n * **broker upsert** (install / replace the user on the broker with\n * the supplied password).\n *\n * Inputs:\n * - `appSlug` — the application slug (or its derived namespace\n * `ns`); used by the module to compute the rabbit username,\n * permission regex, etc.\n * - `adminClient` — pre-wired by the orchestrator from the resolved\n * `platformAdmin` env vars; concrete type narrowed per provider at\n * the module's implementation site (e.g., RabbitMQ modules narrow\n * to `RabbitMQManagementClient`).\n * - `secretInputs` — orchestrator-supplied scalars keyed by the JSON\n * path the module declared in `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths`.\n * For RabbitMQ: `{ 'database.rabbitmq.password': '<orchestrator-generated-password>' }`.\n * The module installs these on the broker; it does NOT generate\n * passwords itself.\n *\n * Note: `applicationEnv` was previously included in this context but\n * removed 2026-05-06 — the integration site (`wildo-application-lifecycle`)\n * does not carry an env field on its options shape.\n */\nexport interface AppCredentialMintingContext {\n /**\n * Raw application slug (e.g., `'wonder-todos'`). Used by modules\n * whose per-app resource names embed the slug directly without\n * env-scoping (e.g., MongoDB database name).\n */\n appSlug: string;\n /**\n * Application namespace = `<appSlug>-<environmentId>`, derived\n * server-side via `buildApplicationNamespace` in platform-config-lib.\n * Used by modules whose per-app resource names scope by namespace\n * (RabbitMQ username, Redis ACL keyPattern, …) — i.e., resources\n * that must remain isolated across env boundaries (`wonder-todos-local`\n * vs `wonder-todos-staging`).\n */\n applicationNamespace: string;\n /**\n * Stable opaque application identifier (Mongo ObjectId-shaped string,\n * matches the convention at\n * `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts:552` where the broker\n * permission regex disambiguates per-app queue/reply names by this\n * id, NOT by `appSlug` — the slug is human-readable and could\n * theoretically be reassigned, the id is forever-stable). Required\n * by modules whose per-app resource names embed the application id\n * (RabbitMQ permission regex, …).\n */\n wildoApplicationId: string;\n /**\n * WHICH runtime principal these credentials are for (Step 2 / D17).\n *\n * Optional, and absent means the APPLICATION BACKEND — which keeps every\n * existing module and call site meaning exactly what it meant before, since\n * per-application minting IS the backend principal's case.\n *\n * A module that ignores this field still mints correctly for the backend and\n * simply does not participate in per-principal narrowing; a module that reads\n * it must derive a DISTINCT resource name (ACL username, DB user, queue\n * permission) per principal, or two principals will share one credential and\n * the narrowing will exist only on paper.\n *\n * `buildRuntimePrincipalKey` renders the stable identity to embed in such a\n * name — the same string the stored section is keyed by, so a minted resource\n * and the row that records it cannot drift.\n */\n principal?: ApplicationRuntimePrincipal;\n /**\n * What this principal may touch, in RESOURCE TYPES (Step 3).\n *\n * Deliberately the platform vocabulary, not storage names: a module that\n * grants on tables and a module that grants on collections must receive the\n * same contract, and the translation belongs at each adapter via\n * `resolveGrantStorageNames`.\n *\n * Absent for the application backend, which is granted database-wide by a\n * different path. Absent for a NAMED principal means \"no grants derived\" —\n * which a module must treat as an ERROR rather than as a reason to fall back\n * to the wide grant (D11/R3: a minion with no declared access gets no\n * database user at all, and that is the orchestrator's decision to make).\n */\n resourceGrants?: MinionResourceGrants;\n adminClient: unknown;\n secretInputs: Record<string, string>;\n /**\n * Optional non-secret per-app config inputs supplied by the\n * orchestrator. Distinct from `secretInputs` (passwords) — these\n * are authored topology values that affect HOW the module\n * provisions the per-app resource. Each module documents the keys\n * it consumes in its own JSDoc.\n *\n * Slice 2.5c-3 introduced this field for `RabbitmqSelfInfraProviderModule`\n * to receive the optional per-app vhost (key `'vhost'`); future\n * modules may use it for per-app database suffixes, bucket prefixes,\n * or other authored topology overrides without further extending\n * the context shape.\n *\n * When `undefined` or missing a key the module relies on, the\n * module falls back to its default behavior (e.g., RabbitMQ\n * provisions on the default vhost `/`).\n */\n applicationConfigInputs?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Platform-service-scoped credential minting (audience-2 / LD-8)\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// `provisionAllPlatformServices` (in apps-manager\n// `PlatformInfrastructureManagerService`) hands each platform service\n// (`apps-manager`, `crontabs-batches-manager`, `file-generator`) a SCOPED\n// (non-admin) broker user for inter-service messaging. Today the policy\n// (per-service permission regex, the broader-permissions special case for\n// crontabs) is hand-rolled inline. Slice 2.5 of `infra-provider-planner.md`\n// moves it onto the `InfraProviderModule` interface so each provider owns\n// its own per-platform-service policy.\n//\n// Distinct from `mintAppCredentials` (audience-3): platform-service creds\n// land in MongoDB `platformApplicationsSecrets` (orchestrator-owned), NOT\n// in `Wildo_Application_Secrets`.\n\n/**\n * Context for `InfraProviderModule.mintPlatformServiceCredentials`.\n * Same orchestrator-pattern as `mintAppCredentials`: orchestrator\n * generates the password, passes it via `secretInputs`; module is\n * upsert-only on the broker.\n */\nexport interface PlatformServiceCredentialMintingContext {\n /**\n * Stable identifier of the platform service this credential is for.\n * Today: members of `PlatformApplicationType` (e.g.,\n * `'platform_apps_manager'`, `'platform_crontabs_batches_manager'`,\n * `'platform_file_generator'`). Module derives the per-service\n * permission regex from this string.\n */\n serviceName: string;\n adminClient: unknown;\n /**\n * Orchestrator-supplied scalars. For RabbitMQ the only required\n * key is `'password'` (no JSON-blob-path conventions because\n * platform-service creds don't go into a per-app blob — they're\n * persisted at the platform-services collection level).\n */\n secretInputs: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\nexport interface PlatformServiceCredentialMintingResult {\n /**\n * Username installed on the broker. Equals `serviceName` today\n * (the legacy convention preserved from the inline ceremony in\n * `PlatformInfrastructureManagerService.provisionServiceCredentials`).\n * Future modules may transform if needed; the orchestrator persists\n * this value alongside the password.\n */\n username: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-app credential minting result. Keys are JSON paths into\n * `Wildo_Application_Secrets` (those declared in\n * `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths`); values are the canonical\n * persisted form post-broker-upsert. Typically:\n * - **Module-derived** values (e.g., `'database.rabbitmq.username': 'app_<ns>'`).\n * The module computes these from `appSlug`.\n * - **Echoed** values from `secretInputs` (e.g.,\n * `'database.rabbitmq.password': '<the-password-you-passed-in>'`)\n * — the module confirms it installed them on the broker.\n *\n * The orchestrator (apps-manager) merges this map into the persisted\n * secrets blob via `_merge_WildoApplicationSecrets`. The customer\n * pod reads at startup via the standard app-config-fetch path — no\n * K8s Secret involvement for per-app data creds.\n */\nexport interface AppCredentialMintingResult {\n secretBlobValues: Record<string, string>;\n /**\n * Optional non-persisted return values the module produces in the\n * course of upsert. Distinct from `secretBlobValues` (which lands\n * in `Wildo_Application_Secrets`) — `runtimeArtifacts` is a back-\n * channel for values the orchestrator needs at app-init time but\n * deliberately does NOT persist.\n *\n * Slice 4.B.3 of `infra-provider-planner.md` introduced this\n * field for the MongoDB modules: `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule`\n * returns `runtimeArtifacts['connectionString']` (the per-app\n * SRV URL with credentials embedded) so the orchestrator can use\n * it for transient app-database seeding without persisting the\n * whole credentialed URL into secrets — the persistence shape is\n * `(username, password)` in secrets + `(host, protocol, options,\n * database)` in config, NOT a single URL string.\n *\n * When `undefined`, the module has no transient artifacts; the\n * orchestrator should rely on `secretBlobValues` only.\n */\n runtimeArtifacts?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Per-provider admin-client contracts\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Each `InfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` call narrows the\n// `AppCredentialMintingContext.adminClient` field to a per-provider\n// management-client interface. The interfaces live HERE (in\n// platform-config-lib, contracts-only per platform/CLAUDE.md) so the\n// module implementation (in platform-apps-manager) and the manager\n// implementation (also in platform-apps-manager) share one definition\n// — and any future caller (companion, CLI) can implement the same\n// interface without depending on the manager class.\n\n/**\n * Raw RabbitMQ management-API transport (HTTP `PUT/DELETE`). Surface\n * what `RabbitmqSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` /\n * `revokeAppCredentials` need; nothing more. The 5C policy/transport\n * split (LD-4) carves *policy* methods (`upsertTenantUserPermissions`\n * etc.) out of the manager into the module; this interface is the\n * pure-transport remainder.\n *\n * **Argument-order convention** (Slice 4.A.2 / L3): for permission\n * methods, the order is `(vhost, username, permissions)` — vhost\n * first. The legacy pre-Slice-2 convention was `(username, vhost, ...)`\n * (positional, username first). The new convention is cleaner but\n * silently swappable since both args are strings. **Do NOT reorder**;\n * stale call sites copying the legacy positional order will produce\n * wrong-vhost permissions without compile-time complaint.\n */\nexport interface IRabbitMQManagementClient {\n /** PUT /api/users/{name} — idempotent upsert. */\n putUser(username: string, password: string, tags: ReadonlyArray<string>): Promise<void>;\n /** PUT /api/permissions/{vhost}/{name} — vhost-first per the\n * argument-order convention noted on the interface JSDoc. */\n setPermissions(\n vhost: string,\n username: string,\n permissions: { configure: string; write: string; read: string },\n ): Promise<void>;\n /** PUT /api/topic-permissions/{vhost}/{name} — vhost-first. */\n setTopicPermissions(\n vhost: string,\n username: string,\n permissions: { exchange: string; write: string; read: string },\n ): Promise<void>;\n /** DELETE /api/users/{name} — idempotent (404 → no-op). */\n deleteUser(username: string): Promise<void>;\n /** PUT /api/vhosts/{name} — ensures vhost exists; idempotent. */\n ensureVhost(vhost: string): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Raw Redis (Valkey) ACL transport. Surface what\n * `RedisSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` /\n * `revokeAppCredentials` need; nothing more. Used over a `redis-cli`-\n * equivalent ACL connection (the apps-manager's\n * `RedisConnectionManagerService` opens it once at boot and reuses).\n *\n * **Channel pattern policy** (Slice 4.B.1, 2026-05-10): the legacy\n * `RedisConnectionManagerService.upsertTenantUserAcl` derived a\n * fixed family of pub/sub channel patterns from `username`\n * (`<u>#*`, `<u>#/#*`, `<u>-request#*`, `<u>-request#/#*`,\n * `<u>-response#*`, `<u>-response#/#*`). That fan-out is module-\n * internal policy, NOT transport. The contract therefore takes\n * only `username`/`password`/`keyPattern` — the channel patterns\n * live inside the manager implementation today (preserves Slice 2\n * behavior parity); when the legacy method is retired the policy\n * moves into `RedisSelfInfraProviderModule` proper. Until then,\n * `upsertUser` is a thin delegator and the contract is the\n * forward-looking shape.\n *\n * **Idempotent persistence** (`persistAcl`): Valkey/Redis ACL\n * changes are in-memory until `ACL SAVE` is called. The legacy\n * code paired every `upsertTenantUserAcl` with `aclSave`; the\n * module mirrors that pairing.\n */\nexport interface IRedisAclClient {\n /**\n * `ACL SETUSER <name> on >password resetkeys ~<keyPattern> ...`\n * — idempotent upsert. The implementation owns the full ACL\n * command shape (channel patterns, allow/deny categories,\n * dangerous-command denials) — the contract surfaces only the\n * orchestrator-supplied identity material. Slice 4.B.1's manager\n * impl preserves the legacy channel-pattern fan-out from\n * `RedisConnectionManagerService.upsertTenantUserAcl`.\n */\n upsertUser(input: {\n username: string;\n password: string;\n keyPattern: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * `ACL DELUSER <name>` — idempotent (no-op when the user is\n * already absent).\n */\n deleteUser(username: string): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * `ACL SAVE` — flushes the in-memory ACL list to disk. MUST be\n * called after every mutation set so Valkey restarts don't lose\n * tenant users.\n */\n persistAcl(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Raw Postgres admin transport. Surface what\n * `PostgresSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` /\n * `revokeAppCredentials` need; nothing more. The legacy\n * `PostgreSQLConnectionManagerService` (apps-manager) implements\n * this contract via its existing `createApplicationDatabase` /\n * `deleteApplicationDatabase` methods (Slice 4.B.2 5C policy/\n * transport split).\n *\n * **Identifier-injection-safe**: implementations MUST validate\n * `databaseName` / `username` shapes (alphanumeric + underscore;\n * 63-char Postgres limit) and quote them safely — module callers\n * pass authored slugs verbatim. `PostgreSQLConnectionManagerService`\n * uses the legacy `validateIdentifier` + `quoteIdentifier` pair.\n *\n * **Idempotent upsert** (`upsertApplicationDatabase`): the legacy\n * `createApplicationDatabase` is upsert-style — `CREATE USER` falls\n * back to `ALTER USER` on conflict; `CREATE DATABASE` skips when the\n * DB exists; ownership + privileges always reapplied. The module\n * surface preserves that contract; \"create\" is renamed to \"upsert\"\n * in the contract to match the orchestrator-pattern vocabulary.\n */\nexport interface IPostgresAdminClient {\n /**\n * Upsert per-app database + role. Returns the resolved\n * `connectionUrl` so the orchestrator can persist it into\n * `Wildo_Application_Secrets.database.postgresql.connectUrl`.\n * Idempotent: safe to call repeatedly with the same input.\n */\n upsertApplicationDatabase(input: {\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n sslMode?: PostgreSQLSSLMode;\n }): Promise<{ connectionUrl: string }>;\n /**\n * Drop per-app database + user. Idempotent: missing DB / missing\n * user are non-throws (best-effort cleanup, see legacy\n * `deleteApplicationDatabase` semantics).\n */\n dropApplicationDatabase(input: {\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * Stop the application's OWNER role from authenticating — and destroy nothing (#1307).\n *\n * The application backend's role OWNS its database, so it cannot be dropped without first handing\n * ownership of every object to somebody else (PostgreSQL refuses `DROP ROLE` while objects depend\n * on it). Revocation therefore keeps the role and removes its ability to open a session:\n * `NOLOGIN` (a role without it cannot be \"the initial session authorization name during client\n * connection\") plus `PASSWORD NULL` (\"password authentication will always fail for that user\"),\n * then terminates the sessions it already holds, because a login attribute is checked only when a\n * session starts.\n *\n * spec-cite: PostgreSQL 17 `CREATE ROLE` — `LOGIN`/`NOLOGIN` and `PASSWORD` parameter descriptions\n * (https://www.postgresql.org/docs/17/sql-createrole.html); `pg_terminate_backend`, System\n * Administration Functions (https://www.postgresql.org/docs/17/functions-admin.html).\n *\n * Separate from {@link IPostgresAdminClient.dropApplicationDatabase}, which DROPS the database: a\n * withdrawn application's data is kept (#1562 owns destruction), and a revocation that routed\n * through the drop would erase it while believing it was only retiring a login.\n *\n * Reversible by {@link IPostgresAdminClient.upsertApplicationDatabase}, which re-applies\n * `LOGIN PASSWORD` to an existing role. Idempotent: a role that does not exist is a no-op.\n */\n revokeApplicationDatabaseLogin(input: {\n username: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * Upsert a LOGIN role holding exactly the given per-table privileges inside an\n * existing application database (Step 3 / R1).\n *\n * A SEPARATE method from {@link IPostgresAdminClient.upsertApplicationDatabase},\n * for the same reason the Mongo port is split: that one CREATEs the database\n * and makes its caller the OWNER with `ALL PRIVILEGES`, this one grants named\n * verbs on named tables inside a database somebody else owns. One method with\n * an optional privileges argument would make OWNERSHIP the behaviour you get\n * by forgetting to pass something.\n *\n * The grants are AUTHORITATIVE: the implementation must revoke what the role\n * previously held before granting, or a table removed from `resourceAccess`\n * keeps its privilege and revocation becomes a no-op that reports success.\n *\n * An empty `readTables`/`writeTables` pair is legitimate — a role that can\n * connect and see nothing — and must NOT be read as \"unspecified, leave the\n * previous grants alone\".\n */\n /**\n * Remove a table-scoped LOGIN role and everything it holds — WITHOUT touching\n * the database it was scoped into.\n *\n * Separate from {@link IPostgresAdminClient.dropApplicationDatabase}, which\n * drops the DATABASE and its owner. Reusing that one to retire a minion would\n * destroy the entire application's data while believing it was removing one\n * principal's access. That asymmetry is why revocation gets its own method\n * rather than a flag.\n */\n dropTableScopedDatabaseRole(input: {\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n schemaName: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n upsertTableScopedDatabaseRole(input: {\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n schemaName: string;\n readTables: readonly string[];\n writeTables: readonly string[];\n /**\n * Insert-only tables — `GRANT INSERT`, never UPDATE and never DELETE.\n *\n * A third axis rather than a flag on `writeTables`, because the two say\n * different things about the same verb set and a boolean would make the\n * safer one the thing you get by remembering to pass it. Today this carries\n * the engine's mandatory append floor — the audit trail and retained job\n * output (see `deriveMinionDatabaseGrants`): a principal must be able to record\n * what it did, and must never be able to unrecord it.\n */\n appendTables: readonly string[];\n /** Insert/update durable runtime records without granting DELETE. Read is granted separately. */\n maintainTables?: readonly string[];\n sslMode?: PostgreSQLSSLMode;\n }): Promise<{ connectionUrl: string }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Raw MongoDB Atlas API transport. Surface what\n * `MongodbAtlasInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` /\n * `revokeAppCredentials` need; nothing more. The legacy\n * `MongoAtlasManagerService` (apps-manager) implements this\n * contract via its existing `createApplicationDatabase` /\n * `deleteDatabaseUser` methods (Slice 4.B.3 5C policy/transport\n * split).\n *\n * **Idempotent upsert** (`upsertApplicationDatabase`): the legacy\n * `createApplicationDatabase` is upsert-style — `POST /databaseUsers`\n * falls back to `PATCH` on conflict (existing user); cluster scope +\n * roles are reapplied on every call. Returns the SRV connection\n * string with credentials embedded, ready for transient\n * app-database seeding by the orchestrator.\n */\nexport interface IMongoAtlasClient {\n /**\n * Upsert per-app Atlas database user. Returns the SRV connection\n * string (with credentials embedded, `mongodb+srv://user:pass@...`)\n * that the orchestrator uses for transient app-init operations.\n * The string is NOT persisted into `Wildo_Application_Secrets`\n * by today's orchestrator — it's exposed via\n * `AppCredentialMintingResult.runtimeArtifacts.connectionString`.\n */\n upsertApplicationDatabase(input: {\n clusterName: string;\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n }): Promise<{ connectionString: string }>;\n /**\n * Delete an Atlas database user. Idempotent: 404 → no-op.\n */\n deleteDatabaseUser(username: string): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * Upsert a database user holding exactly ONE Atlas custom database role, which carries exactly the\n * given collection-scoped privileges and inherits nothing (#1694). The Atlas twin of\n * {@link IMongoSelfAdminClient.upsertCollectionScopedDatabaseUser}, for a runtime principal (a minion).\n *\n * A SEPARATE method from {@link IMongoAtlasClient.upsertApplicationDatabase} for the reason the\n * self-hosted contract gives: that one grants `readWrite` on the whole database, this one grants named\n * actions on named collections, and an optional \"privileges\" argument would make the wide grant the\n * behaviour you get by forgetting to pass something.\n *\n * - `privileges[].actions` are Atlas Admin API privilege-action names (`FIND`, `INSERT`, `UPDATE`,\n * `REMOVE`, …). The caller translates from MongoDB's own vocabulary; this transport never widens it.\n * - `privileges` is AUTHORITATIVE: an existing role's actions are REPLACED, so a resource removed from\n * `resourceAccess` loses its grant on the next sync.\n * - The user is scoped to `clusterName` alone (Atlas grants every cluster in the project when `scopes`\n * is omitted), and holds the custom role and nothing else.\n * - Idempotent: safe when the role and user already exist; the password is re-applied, which is how a\n * rotation lands.\n *\n * Returns the SRV connection string carrying THIS user's credentials, for the same transient use as\n * {@link IMongoAtlasClient.upsertApplicationDatabase}'s.\n */\n upsertCollectionScopedDatabaseUser(input: {\n clusterName: string;\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n roleName: string;\n privileges: ReadonlyArray<{\n resource: { db: string; collection: string };\n actions: readonly string[];\n }>;\n }): Promise<{ connectionString: string }>;\n /**\n * Retire a collection-scoped user AND the custom role it holds — and nothing else.\n *\n * Two objects, deleted user FIRST: Atlas refuses to delete a custom role that would leave a database\n * user with no roles, so the reverse order fails while the user exists. Dropping only the user would\n * leave a privileged role behind that the next mint silently adopts. Idempotent in both halves: a\n * missing user or a missing role is a no-op.\n */\n dropCollectionScopedDatabaseUser(input: {\n username: string;\n roleName: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * The immudb permission an application's audit user holds on its OWN database (#1696).\n *\n * The values are immudb's own permission bytes, because the admin transport sends them verbatim.\n * spec-cite: immudb v1.11.1 `pkg/auth/permissions.go` — `PermissionNone = iota`, `PermissionR`, `PermissionRW`\n * (0, 1, 2), `PermissionAdmin = 254`, `PermissionSysAdmin = 255`\n * (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/codenotary/immudb/v1.11.1/pkg/auth/permissions.go, fetched 2026-09-29).\n *\n * Only READ_WRITE is named: an audit sink appends and verifies, and nothing in the framework grants an\n * application more. `ADMIN` and `SYSADMIN` are deliberately absent — holding either is the defect #1696 removes.\n */\nexport enum ImmudbDatabasePermission {\n READ_WRITE = 2,\n}\n\n/**\n * Raw immudb admin transport (#1696). Surfaces exactly what `ImmudbSelfInfraProviderModule` needs to give each\n * application ONE database and ONE user confined to it, and to revoke that user — nothing more.\n *\n * Implemented in apps-manager over the gRPC admin API with the PLATFORM's own admin credential (a\n * framework-managed secret no application receives). Every method is idempotent, because registration,\n * withdrawal and restore all retry by re-running.\n *\n * **No method deletes anything.** immudb keeps every database and every user it has created: an append-only\n * store's audit history must outlive the application's credential, and a withdrawn application is restored by\n * RE-ACTIVATING its user onto the same database (#1307).\n */\nexport interface IImmudbAdminClient {\n /** Create the database when it does not exist; a no-op when it does. */\n ensureDatabase(input: { databaseName: string }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * Create the user, or bring an existing one back to exactly this state: ACTIVE, this password, and `permission`\n * on `databaseName`. Re-applying the password and re-activating are what make a restore after withdrawal work.\n */\n upsertDatabaseUser(input: {\n username: string;\n password: string;\n databaseName: string;\n permission: ImmudbDatabasePermission;\n }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * Refuse the user's credential from now on: revoke its permission on `databaseName` and DEACTIVATE it.\n * immudb has no user deletion; a deactivated user cannot log in. A user that does not exist is a no-op.\n */\n deactivateDatabaseUser(input: { username: string; databaseName: string }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Raw self-managed MongoDB admin transport. Surface what\n * `MongodbSelfInfraProviderModule.mintAppCredentials` /\n * `revokeAppCredentials` need; nothing more. Implemented by a\n * lightweight admin-side mongoose connection — the legacy inline\n * `ensureSelfManagedMongoApplicationUser` at\n * `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts:2710-2745` is the source\n * of behavior.\n *\n * **Why this contract is asymmetric to `IMongoAtlasClient`** (Slice\n * 4.B.3 design note, 2026-05-10): Atlas exposes a stateless REST\n * API for user management; self-managed Mongo requires opening an\n * admin-DB connection and running `createUser` / `updateUser`\n * commands. The contract therefore takes the admin connect URL as\n * an input (not a constructor-time configuration) — implementations\n * open transient connections per call, mirroring the legacy\n * pattern.\n */\nexport interface IMongoSelfAdminClient {\n /**\n * Upsert per-app database user on a self-managed MongoDB\n * instance. Connects to `adminConnectUrl` (admin-scoped),\n * creates or updates the user with `readWrite` + `dbAdmin`\n * roles on `databaseName`, then closes the connection. Idempotent.\n */\n upsertApplicationDatabaseUser(input: {\n adminConnectUrl: string;\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * Delete a per-app database user. Idempotent: missing user is a\n * no-op (best-effort cleanup, mirrors `IPostgresAdminClient`\n * semantics).\n */\n deleteApplicationDatabaseUser(input: {\n adminConnectUrl: string;\n username: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n /**\n * Upsert a database user holding ONE custom role carrying exactly the given\n * collection-scoped privileges (Step 3 / R1 / D14).\n *\n * Deliberately a SEPARATE method from\n * {@link IMongoSelfAdminClient.upsertApplicationDatabaseUser} rather than an\n * optional parameter on it. The two grant fundamentally different authority —\n * that one grants `readWrite` + `dbAdmin` on the WHOLE database, this one\n * grants named actions on named collections and nothing else — and a single\n * method with an optional \"privileges\" argument would make the wide grant the\n * behaviour you get by forgetting to pass something. Two methods make the\n * caller name which authority it intends.\n *\n * `privileges` is authoritative and REPLACES the role's previous contents, so\n * a resource removed from `resourceAccess` loses its grant on the next sync.\n * An empty list is legitimate — a principal with no data access — and MUST\n * yield a role granting nothing rather than being treated as \"unspecified\".\n *\n * Idempotent: safe to call when the role and user already exist.\n */\n /**\n * Retire a collection-scoped user AND the custom role it holds.\n *\n * Separate from {@link IMongoSelfAdminClient.deleteApplicationDatabaseUser}\n * because a scoped principal owns TWO objects in TWO databases — the user in\n * `admin`, the role in the application database — and dropping only the user\n * leaves a privileged role behind that the next mint silently adopts.\n *\n * Idempotent in both halves: a missing user or a missing role is a no-op.\n */\n dropCollectionScopedDatabaseUser(input: {\n adminConnectUrl: string;\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n roleName: string;\n }): Promise<void>;\n upsertCollectionScopedDatabaseUser(input: {\n adminConnectUrl: string;\n databaseName: string;\n username: string;\n password: string;\n roleName: string;\n privileges: ReadonlyArray<{\n resource: { db: string; collection: string };\n actions: readonly string[];\n }>;\n }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nexport interface InfraProviderModule {\n provider: InfraProvider;\n supportedCapabilities: ReadonlyArray<InfraCapability>;\n\n /**\n * Present when this module EXISTS but the platform cannot yet deliver a working connection for the\n * provider — the module can plan, and an application selecting it would still receive no usable\n * credential. The value says why, and what would change it.\n *\n * ## Why the module stays in the catalogue instead of being removed\n *\n * The module's `plan()` is correct and useful: it formalizes the env contract an operator will set\n * and gives the lockfile a stable digest. What is missing is elsewhere (for `AWS_S3`, the credential\n * broker that speaks only MinIO's AssumeRole, #14). Removing the module would lose the correct half\n * to express the missing one.\n *\n * ## What it does\n *\n * A declaration resolving to a provider whose module carries this is REFUSED at authoring time\n * (`wildo config validate` / `config sync` / `lock check`), exactly like a declaration resolving to\n * a provider with no module. Delete the field in the same change that makes the provider servable.\n */\n unservableReason?: string;\n\n /**\n * Every `Wildo_Application_Secrets` JSON path this module can mint PER RUNTIME PRINCIPAL.\n *\n * ## Why this is static, when `plan()` already reports the same paths\n *\n * `plan()` answers \"what does THIS application get\", so it needs an\n * {@link InfraProviderPlanningContext}. The secret-DELIVERY path in apps-manager asks a different\n * question — \"which paths are per-principal AT ALL\" — and must answer it with no application in\n * hand, because it decides what to STRIP from the application blob before overlaying a\n * principal's own material. A principal must receive a credential only where one was minted for\n * it; anything left un-stripped is delivered with the APPLICATION's value, which for a database\n * means `readWrite` + `dbAdmin` on the whole database.\n *\n * Empty for a provider with no per-app credentials — shared-bucket object storage\n * (`MINIO_SELF`, `AWS_S3`) and stateless infra (`CLAMAV_SELF`). Empty is a\n * real answer, not a missing one, which is why the field is required rather than optional: a\n * module that mints per-principal material must not be able to omit it and be silently read as\n * \"nothing to confine\".\n *\n * **Modules MUST derive `appRuntime.perAppSecretBlobPaths` from this same constant** rather than\n * repeating the literal list. Two spellings of where a credential lives is the defect this exists\n * to prevent, one layer up.\n *\n * **A module declaring paths here MUST derive a distinct resource name per principal**, in its mint\n * AND its revoke, through one function. apps-manager dispatches every minion mint and revocation\n * through the catalogue (#1692), so a module that ignored `principal` and derived the application\n * backend's own name would OVERWRITE the backend's user on a minion mint and DELETE it on a minion\n * revocation — the defect `invariant-call-site-enumeration.md` #18 records. MongoDB Atlas shipped in\n * exactly that shape and was refused at registration until its per-principal path landed (#1694).\n */\n perPrincipalSecretBlobPaths: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n\n plan(context: InfraProviderPlanningContext): InfraProviderPlanContribution;\n\n /**\n * Optional. Called by apps-manager at app-init time (see\n * `wildo-application-lifecycle.service.ts:432-580` — the existing\n * per-resource ceremony this method abstracts). Upserts the per-app\n * user / role / DB on the broker using `secretInputs` for any\n * orchestrator-supplied passwords; returns the canonical form of\n * the persisted secrets blob slice.\n *\n * Returns `null` when the provider has no per-app credentials (e.g.,\n * shared S3 bucket with shared access key).\n *\n * **Idempotent broker upsert** — the module installs / replaces the\n * user with the password from `secretInputs`. It does NOT make\n * generation/rotation decisions; that is the orchestrator's\n * responsibility (driven by the existing `overrideCredentials`\n * flag on `WildoApplicationInitOptions`). The module MUST NOT\n * crash on \"user already exists\" (PUT semantics on the broker\n * management API are sufficient for RabbitMQ; equivalent\n * upsert-on-conflict semantics for other providers).\n */\n mintAppCredentials?(\n context: AppCredentialMintingContext,\n ): Promise<AppCredentialMintingResult | null>;\n\n /**\n * Optional. Symmetric to `mintAppCredentials`: afterwards the principal's credential is REFUSED by the\n * server. Called by apps-manager when a minion leaves the declaration, and for EVERY principal of an\n * application withdrawn from the platform (`deregisterApplication`, #1307).\n *\n * **It revokes and never destroys.** It removes the ability to authenticate — an ACL user, a broker\n * user, a database user, or a login — and leaves the application's DATA where it is: its database,\n * keys, queues and blobs. A withdrawn application is restored by re-minting (`mintAppCredentials` with\n * the recorded material), which only works if nothing it owns was dropped. Destroying data is a\n * different verb with its own protection (#1562); a module must never reach it through this one.\n *\n * Idempotent: safe to call when the per-principal user / role does not exist (no throw on\n * already-absent), because a retry after a partial revocation must converge.\n */\n revokeAppCredentials?(context: AppCredentialMintingContext): Promise<void>;\n\n /**\n * Optional (LD-8 / Slice 2.5). Called by the orchestrator\n * (`PlatformInfrastructureManagerService.provisionServiceCredentials`\n * + `ensureAppsManagerCredentials`) at platform-service-init time.\n * Upserts a SCOPED (non-admin) per-platform-service user on the\n * broker for inter-service messaging — distinct from\n * `mintAppCredentials` (audience-3, customer-app per-app creds).\n *\n * Same orchestrator-pattern as `mintAppCredentials`: orchestrator\n * owns generation, module is upsert-only.\n *\n * Returns `null` when the provider has no per-platform-service\n * credentials concept (e.g., S3 modules — platform services use a\n * shared bucket).\n */\n mintPlatformServiceCredentials?(\n context: PlatformServiceCredentialMintingContext,\n ): Promise<PlatformServiceCredentialMintingResult | null>;\n}\n"]}
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1
+ /** The static-asset extensions a TypeScript module graph may import and Node cannot execute. */
2
+ export declare const STATIC_ASSET_IMPORT_PATTERN_SOURCE = "\\.(css|scss|less|sass|svg|png|jpe?g|gif|webp|ico|avif|woff2?|eot|ttf|otf)(\\?.*)?$";
3
+ /**
4
+ * Make static-asset imports (`.css`, images, fonts) resolve to empty modules for the rest of the
5
+ * process, so a Node-side loader can evaluate an application-authored TypeScript graph that
6
+ * reaches browser code.
7
+ *
8
+ * Why this is needed at all: an application's specifications and website sources import enums
9
+ * from `@wildo-ai/saas-specifications`, whose root transitively reaches frontend component
10
+ * modules that import their stylesheets. Node's ESM loader cannot execute a `.css`, so without
11
+ * this hook an otherwise valid module fails to load solely because a library imports a stylesheet.
12
+ * Static assets carry no meaning for a Node-side reader, so they load as `export default ""`.
13
+ *
14
+ * Process-wide, idempotent, and inert for any graph that imports no static asset. It never touches
15
+ * JavaScript or TypeScript resolution.
16
+ *
17
+ * This is the one copy for in-process callers. Four hand-copied versions existed until 2026-09-25
18
+ * — two in the dev companion and two in the CLI — each with its own regex; the next asset type
19
+ * added to one would have loaded in one tool and failed in another. One copy remains by necessity:
20
+ * the dev companion's introspection subprocess registers a hooks MODULE by path
21
+ * (`asset-noop-hooks.ts`), and loader hooks run on their own thread before anything else loads, so
22
+ * that module must stay dependency-free. `static-asset-pattern-parity.test.ts` in the companion
23
+ * holds its pattern equal to this one.
24
+ */
25
+ export declare function registerStaticAssetImportNoop(): void;
26
+ //# sourceMappingURL=static-asset-import-noop.d.ts.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"static-asset-import-noop.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/project-config/static-asset-import-noop.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,gGAAgG;AAChG,eAAO,MAAM,kCAAkC,wFAAwF,CAAC;AAIxI;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,wBAAgB,6BAA6B,IAAI,IAAI,CAqBpD"}
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
1
+ import { register } from 'node:module';
2
+ /** The static-asset extensions a TypeScript module graph may import and Node cannot execute. */
3
+ export const STATIC_ASSET_IMPORT_PATTERN_SOURCE = '\\.(css|scss|less|sass|svg|png|jpe?g|gif|webp|ico|avif|woff2?|eot|ttf|otf)(\\?.*)?$';
4
+ let staticAssetImportNoopRegistered = false;
5
+ /**
6
+ * Make static-asset imports (`.css`, images, fonts) resolve to empty modules for the rest of the
7
+ * process, so a Node-side loader can evaluate an application-authored TypeScript graph that
8
+ * reaches browser code.
9
+ *
10
+ * Why this is needed at all: an application's specifications and website sources import enums
11
+ * from `@wildo-ai/saas-specifications`, whose root transitively reaches frontend component
12
+ * modules that import their stylesheets. Node's ESM loader cannot execute a `.css`, so without
13
+ * this hook an otherwise valid module fails to load solely because a library imports a stylesheet.
14
+ * Static assets carry no meaning for a Node-side reader, so they load as `export default ""`.
15
+ *
16
+ * Process-wide, idempotent, and inert for any graph that imports no static asset. It never touches
17
+ * JavaScript or TypeScript resolution.
18
+ *
19
+ * This is the one copy for in-process callers. Four hand-copied versions existed until 2026-09-25
20
+ * — two in the dev companion and two in the CLI — each with its own regex; the next asset type
21
+ * added to one would have loaded in one tool and failed in another. One copy remains by necessity:
22
+ * the dev companion's introspection subprocess registers a hooks MODULE by path
23
+ * (`asset-noop-hooks.ts`), and loader hooks run on their own thread before anything else loads, so
24
+ * that module must stay dependency-free. `static-asset-pattern-parity.test.ts` in the companion
25
+ * holds its pattern equal to this one.
26
+ */
27
+ export function registerStaticAssetImportNoop() {
28
+ if (staticAssetImportNoopRegistered) {
29
+ return;
30
+ }
31
+ const hookSource = `
32
+ const ASSET_RE = /${STATIC_ASSET_IMPORT_PATTERN_SOURCE}/;
33
+ export function resolve(specifier, context, nextResolve) {
34
+ if (ASSET_RE.test(specifier)) {
35
+ return { shortCircuit: true, url: new URL(specifier, context.parentURL ?? 'file:///').href };
36
+ }
37
+ return nextResolve(specifier, context);
38
+ }
39
+ export function load(url, context, nextLoad) {
40
+ if (ASSET_RE.test(url)) {
41
+ return { shortCircuit: true, format: 'module', source: 'export default "";\\n' };
42
+ }
43
+ return nextLoad(url, context);
44
+ }
45
+ `;
46
+ register(`data:text/javascript,${encodeURIComponent(hookSource)}`);
47
+ staticAssetImportNoopRegistered = true;
48
+ }
49
+ //# sourceMappingURL=static-asset-import-noop.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"static-asset-import-noop.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/project-config/static-asset-import-noop.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAEvC,gGAAgG;AAChG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAG,qFAAqF,CAAC;AAExI,IAAI,+BAA+B,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;AAE5C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,6BAA6B;IAC3C,IAAI,+BAA+B,EAAE,CAAC;QACpC,OAAO;IACT,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG;wBACG,kCAAkC;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAavD,CAAC;IACF,QAAQ,CAAC,wBAAwB,kBAAkB,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACnE,+BAA+B,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;AACzC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { register } from 'node:module';\n\n/** The static-asset extensions a TypeScript module graph may import and Node cannot execute. */\nexport const STATIC_ASSET_IMPORT_PATTERN_SOURCE = '\\\\.(css|scss|less|sass|svg|png|jpe?g|gif|webp|ico|avif|woff2?|eot|ttf|otf)(\\\\?.*)?$';\n\nlet staticAssetImportNoopRegistered = false;\n\n/**\n * Make static-asset imports (`.css`, images, fonts) resolve to empty modules for the rest of the\n * process, so a Node-side loader can evaluate an application-authored TypeScript graph that\n * reaches browser code.\n *\n * Why this is needed at all: an application's specifications and website sources import enums\n * from `@wildo-ai/saas-specifications`, whose root transitively reaches frontend component\n * modules that import their stylesheets. Node's ESM loader cannot execute a `.css`, so without\n * this hook an otherwise valid module fails to load solely because a library imports a stylesheet.\n * Static assets carry no meaning for a Node-side reader, so they load as `export default \"\"`.\n *\n * Process-wide, idempotent, and inert for any graph that imports no static asset. It never touches\n * JavaScript or TypeScript resolution.\n *\n * This is the one copy for in-process callers. Four hand-copied versions existed until 2026-09-25\n * — two in the dev companion and two in the CLI — each with its own regex; the next asset type\n * added to one would have loaded in one tool and failed in another. One copy remains by necessity:\n * the dev companion's introspection subprocess registers a hooks MODULE by path\n * (`asset-noop-hooks.ts`), and loader hooks run on their own thread before anything else loads, so\n * that module must stay dependency-free. `static-asset-pattern-parity.test.ts` in the companion\n * holds its pattern equal to this one.\n */\nexport function registerStaticAssetImportNoop(): void {\n if (staticAssetImportNoopRegistered) {\n return;\n }\n const hookSource = `\n const ASSET_RE = /${STATIC_ASSET_IMPORT_PATTERN_SOURCE}/;\n export function resolve(specifier, context, nextResolve) {\n if (ASSET_RE.test(specifier)) {\n return { shortCircuit: true, url: new URL(specifier, context.parentURL ?? 'file:///').href };\n }\n return nextResolve(specifier, context);\n }\n export function load(url, context, nextLoad) {\n if (ASSET_RE.test(url)) {\n return { shortCircuit: true, format: 'module', source: 'export default \"\";\\\\n' };\n }\n return nextLoad(url, context);\n }\n `;\n register(`data:text/javascript,${encodeURIComponent(hookSource)}`);\n staticAssetImportNoopRegistered = true;\n}\n"]}
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
1
- /**
2
- * Wire schemas for the companion's `/api/companion/registry/*`
3
- * routes.
4
- *
5
- * Phase 2 lands the request/response contracts as Zod schemas so
6
- * both sides (CLI client + companion controller) share the same
7
- * shape. The CLI calls these via `RegistryCompanionClient`; the
8
- * companion implements the routes via `RegistryController`.
9
- *
10
- * KD-6 (companion owns SaaS-app source mutations) maps to these
11
- * routes:
12
- * - `POST /api/companion/registry/install` — copy module source
13
- * into app, mutate `wildo.saas.config.ts > moduleRegistries`,
14
- * mutate `modules-registry.{shared,frontend,backend}.ts`,
15
- * update `sections.modules`, run provider sync.
16
- * - `POST /api/companion/registry/update` — update an installed
17
- * module to a new version (delta apply + lockfile refresh).
18
- * - `POST /api/companion/registry/remove` — remove an installed
19
- * module (delete files, drop sentinel-managed entries, drop
20
- * `sections.modules.installed[<id>]`).
21
- * - `POST /api/companion/registry/publish` — stage + zip + upload
22
- * a local module to its registry (delegates to
23
- * `ModulePackagerService` + `RegistryServerClient`).
24
- *
25
- * Every route returns a `RegistryRouteResultSchema` envelope so
26
- * the CLI client can handle success / failure / repairable
27
- * post-mutation provider-sync errors uniformly.
28
- */
29
- import { z } from 'zod';
30
- /**
31
- * Reason flag forwarded to the provider-sync runner so its
32
- * diagnostic copy mirrors the calling verb.
33
- */
34
- export declare const RegistryMutationReasonSchema: z.ZodEnum<{
35
- install: "install";
36
- update: "update";
37
- adopt: "adopt";
38
- remove: "remove";
39
- }>;
40
- export type RegistryMutationReason = z.infer<typeof RegistryMutationReasonSchema>;
41
- export declare const RegistryInstallRequestSchema: z.ZodObject<{
42
- /** Module id (`<domain>/<name>`). */
43
- moduleId: z.ZodString;
44
- /**
45
- * Resolved exact version. The CLI resolves the range upstream.
46
- * Must be exact semver — accepting a range here (e.g. `^1.2.3`)
47
- * would let the lockfile carry a non-resolvable version.
48
- */
49
- version: z.ZodString;
50
- /** Range the user originally typed (preserved on the lockfile entry). */
51
- requestedRange: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
52
- /** Registry id from `wildo.saas.config.ts > moduleRegistries[].id`. */
53
- registryId: z.ZodString;
54
- /** Resolved registry URL at install time. */
55
- registryUrl: z.ZodURL;
56
- /** Domain segment under the registry. */
57
- domain: z.ZodString;
58
- /** Artifact integrity digest (`sha256:<64-hex>`). */
59
- artifactDigest: z.ZodString;
60
- }, z.core.$strict>;
61
- export type RegistryInstallRequest = z.infer<typeof RegistryInstallRequestSchema>;
62
- export declare const RegistryUpdateRequestSchema: z.ZodObject<{
63
- moduleId: z.ZodString;
64
- /** Target exact version. CLI resolves the range upstream. */
65
- toVersion: z.ZodString;
66
- toArtifactDigest: z.ZodString;
67
- registryId: z.ZodString;
68
- }, z.core.$strict>;
69
- export type RegistryUpdateRequest = z.infer<typeof RegistryUpdateRequestSchema>;
70
- export declare const RegistryRemoveRequestSchema: z.ZodObject<{
71
- moduleId: z.ZodString;
72
- }, z.core.$strict>;
73
- export type RegistryRemoveRequest = z.infer<typeof RegistryRemoveRequestSchema>;
74
- /**
75
- * `GET /v1/auth/whoami` response — what the registry server hands
76
- * back when a CLI calls `wildo registry login`/`whoami --verify`.
77
- * The CLI Zod-parses every required field so a misconfigured registry
78
- * that omits `organizationId` cannot persist a credential with `org=?`.
79
- *
80
- * `roles` is optional because not every registry deployment models
81
- * roles today; when supplied it lands on the per-machine credential
82
- * blob for staleness UX.
83
- *
84
- * 4th-pass review M5: the schema is `.object({...})` (NOT `.strictObject`)
85
- * so the registry server can add new optional response fields
86
- * (`tokenIssuedAt`, `lastUsedAt`, etc.) WITHOUT every existing CLI
87
- * version refusing to authenticate. The CLI still fails-closed on
88
- * missing required fields; only unknown additional fields are
89
- * silently dropped on the client side. Forward-compat is the priority
90
- * here since CLI versions cannot be flushed in lockstep with server
91
- * deployments.
92
- */
93
- export declare const RegistryWhoamiResponseSchema: z.ZodObject<{
94
- organizationId: z.ZodString;
95
- apiKeyId: z.ZodString;
96
- apiKeyName: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
97
- roles: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
98
- }, z.core.$strip>;
99
- export type RegistryWhoamiResponse = z.infer<typeof RegistryWhoamiResponseSchema>;
100
- export declare const RegistryPublishRequestSchema: z.ZodObject<{
101
- /** Module id from the staged manifest. */
102
- moduleId: z.ZodString;
103
- /** Exact version from the staged manifest — semver-validated. */
104
- version: z.ZodString;
105
- /** Registry id to publish to. */
106
- registryId: z.ZodString;
107
- /** Domain to publish under. */
108
- domain: z.ZodString;
109
- /** Pre-computed staging digest (matches `Sha256DigestSchema`). */
110
- artifactDigest: z.ZodString;
111
- }, z.core.$strict>;
112
- export type RegistryPublishRequest = z.infer<typeof RegistryPublishRequestSchema>;
113
- /**
114
- * Provider-sync outcome inside a mutation route's response. Mirrors
115
- * `runProviderSync` return shape (without the always-on path
116
- * constants — the CLI knows them via `platform-config-lib`).
117
- */
118
- export declare const RegistryProviderSyncOutcomeSchema: z.ZodDiscriminatedUnion<[z.ZodObject<{
119
- status: z.ZodLiteral<"ok">;
120
- mode: z.ZodEnum<{
121
- "shell-out": "shell-out";
122
- "dry-run": "dry-run";
123
- }>;
124
- durationMs: z.ZodNumber;
125
- }, z.core.$strict>, z.ZodObject<{
126
- status: z.ZodLiteral<"failed">;
127
- failureKind: z.ZodEnum<{
128
- unknown: "unknown";
129
- "companion-discovery": "companion-discovery";
130
- "runtime-import-reachability": "runtime-import-reachability";
131
- "invalid-scope": "invalid-scope";
132
- timeout: "timeout";
133
- }>;
134
- message: z.ZodString;
135
- stderrTail: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
136
- }, z.core.$strict>], "status">;
137
- export type RegistryProviderSyncOutcome = z.infer<typeof RegistryProviderSyncOutcomeSchema>;
138
- export declare const RegistryRouteResultSchema: z.ZodObject<{
139
- ok: z.ZodBoolean;
140
- /** Files written into app source (relative to saas root). */
141
- filesTouched: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
142
- /** Provider-sync outcome (omitted when not applicable, e.g. publish). */
143
- providerSync: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDiscriminatedUnion<[z.ZodObject<{
144
- status: z.ZodLiteral<"ok">;
145
- mode: z.ZodEnum<{
146
- "shell-out": "shell-out";
147
- "dry-run": "dry-run";
148
- }>;
149
- durationMs: z.ZodNumber;
150
- }, z.core.$strict>, z.ZodObject<{
151
- status: z.ZodLiteral<"failed">;
152
- failureKind: z.ZodEnum<{
153
- unknown: "unknown";
154
- "companion-discovery": "companion-discovery";
155
- "runtime-import-reachability": "runtime-import-reachability";
156
- "invalid-scope": "invalid-scope";
157
- timeout: "timeout";
158
- }>;
159
- message: z.ZodString;
160
- stderrTail: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
161
- }, z.core.$strict>], "status">>;
162
- /** Free-form diagnostic copy. */
163
- message: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
164
- }, z.core.$strict>;
165
- export type RegistryRouteResult = z.infer<typeof RegistryRouteResultSchema>;
166
- /**
167
- * Companion route paths — single source of truth shared by the
168
- * CLI client and the companion controller.
169
- */
170
- export declare const REGISTRY_COMPANION_ROUTES: {
171
- readonly install: "/api/companion/registry/install";
172
- readonly update: "/api/companion/registry/update";
173
- readonly remove: "/api/companion/registry/remove";
174
- readonly publish: "/api/companion/registry/publish";
175
- };
176
- //# sourceMappingURL=companion-api.schemas.d.ts.map
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The CLI calls these via `RegistryCompanionClient`; the\n * companion implements the routes via `RegistryController`.\n *\n * KD-6 (companion owns SaaS-app source mutations) maps to these\n * routes:\n * - `POST /api/companion/registry/install` — copy module source\n * into app, mutate `wildo.saas.config.ts > moduleRegistries`,\n * mutate `modules-registry.{shared,frontend,backend}.ts`,\n * update `sections.modules`, run provider sync.\n * - `POST /api/companion/registry/update` — update an installed\n * module to a new version (delta apply + lockfile refresh).\n * - `POST /api/companion/registry/remove` — remove an installed\n * module (delete files, drop sentinel-managed entries, drop\n * `sections.modules.installed[<id>]`).\n * - `POST /api/companion/registry/publish` — stage + zip + upload\n * a local module to its registry (delegates to\n * `ModulePackagerService` + `RegistryServerClient`).\n *\n * Every route returns a `RegistryRouteResultSchema` envelope so\n * the CLI client can handle success / failure / repairable\n * post-mutation provider-sync errors uniformly.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { SemverExactSchema } from './module-manifest.schemas';\n\n/**\n * Reason flag forwarded to the provider-sync runner so its\n * diagnostic copy mirrors the calling verb.\n */\nexport const RegistryMutationReasonSchema = z.enum([\n 'install',\n 'update',\n 'remove',\n 'adopt',\n]);\nexport type RegistryMutationReason = z.infer<typeof RegistryMutationReasonSchema>;\n\n// ---------- Install -------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport const RegistryInstallRequestSchema = z.strictObject({\n /** Module id (`<domain>/<name>`). */\n moduleId: z.string().min(1),\n /**\n * Resolved exact version. The CLI resolves the range upstream.\n * Must be exact semver — accepting a range here (e.g. `^1.2.3`)\n * would let the lockfile carry a non-resolvable version.\n */\n version: SemverExactSchema,\n /** Range the user originally typed (preserved on the lockfile entry). */\n requestedRange: z.string().min(1).optional(),\n /** Registry id from `wildo.saas.config.ts > moduleRegistries[].id`. */\n registryId: z.string().min(1),\n /** Resolved registry URL at install time. */\n registryUrl: z.url(),\n /** Domain segment under the registry. */\n domain: z.string().min(1),\n /** Artifact integrity digest (`sha256:<64-hex>`). */\n artifactDigest: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type RegistryInstallRequest = z.infer<typeof RegistryInstallRequestSchema>;\n\n// ---------- Update --------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport const RegistryUpdateRequestSchema = z.strictObject({\n moduleId: z.string().min(1),\n /** Target exact version. CLI resolves the range upstream. */\n toVersion: SemverExactSchema,\n toArtifactDigest: z.string().min(1),\n registryId: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type RegistryUpdateRequest = z.infer<typeof RegistryUpdateRequestSchema>;\n\n// ---------- Remove --------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport const RegistryRemoveRequestSchema = z.strictObject({\n moduleId: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type RegistryRemoveRequest = z.infer<typeof RegistryRemoveRequestSchema>;\n\n// ---------- Publish -------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * `GET /v1/auth/whoami` response — what the registry server hands\n * back when a CLI calls `wildo registry login`/`whoami --verify`.\n * The CLI Zod-parses every required field so a misconfigured registry\n * that omits `organizationId` cannot persist a credential with `org=?`.\n *\n * `roles` is optional because not every registry deployment models\n * roles today; when supplied it lands on the per-machine credential\n * blob for staleness UX.\n *\n * 4th-pass review M5: the schema is `.object({...})` (NOT `.strictObject`)\n * so the registry server can add new optional response fields\n * (`tokenIssuedAt`, `lastUsedAt`, etc.) WITHOUT every existing CLI\n * version refusing to authenticate. The CLI still fails-closed on\n * missing required fields; only unknown additional fields are\n * silently dropped on the client side. Forward-compat is the priority\n * here since CLI versions cannot be flushed in lockstep with server\n * deployments.\n */\nexport const RegistryWhoamiResponseSchema = z.object({\n organizationId: z.string().min(1),\n apiKeyId: z.string().min(1),\n apiKeyName: z.string().min(1).optional(),\n roles: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),\n});\nexport type RegistryWhoamiResponse = z.infer<typeof RegistryWhoamiResponseSchema>;\n\nexport const RegistryPublishRequestSchema = z.strictObject({\n /** Module id from the staged manifest. */\n moduleId: z.string().min(1),\n /** Exact version from the staged manifest — semver-validated. */\n version: SemverExactSchema,\n /** Registry id to publish to. */\n registryId: z.string().min(1),\n /** Domain to publish under. */\n domain: z.string().min(1),\n /** Pre-computed staging digest (matches `Sha256DigestSchema`). */\n artifactDigest: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type RegistryPublishRequest = z.infer<typeof RegistryPublishRequestSchema>;\n\n// ---------- Common result envelope ----------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Provider-sync outcome inside a mutation route's response. Mirrors\n * `runProviderSync` return shape (without the always-on path\n * constants — the CLI knows them via `platform-config-lib`).\n */\nexport const RegistryProviderSyncOutcomeSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('status', [\n z.strictObject({\n status: z.literal('ok'),\n mode: z.enum(['shell-out', 'dry-run']),\n durationMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n }),\n z.strictObject({\n status: z.literal('failed'),\n // 4th-pass review H4: keep this enum in lock-step with\n // `RegistryProviderSyncFailedError.failureKind` in\n // `registry-errors.ts`. The two are wire-and-error twins — when\n // the companion serializes a typed error into this envelope, the\n // strict-object enum here MUST cover every value the error class\n // can carry. `'timeout'` was added in the third-pass H5 fix on the\n // error-class side without being mirrored here, so a real timeout\n // failed strict validation client-side and surfaced as a generic\n // malformed-payload error.\n failureKind: z.enum([\n 'companion-discovery',\n 'runtime-import-reachability',\n 'invalid-scope',\n 'timeout',\n 'unknown',\n ]),\n message: z.string(),\n stderrTail: z.string().optional(),\n }),\n]);\nexport type RegistryProviderSyncOutcome = z.infer<typeof RegistryProviderSyncOutcomeSchema>;\n\nexport const RegistryRouteResultSchema = z.strictObject({\n ok: z.boolean(),\n /** Files written into app source (relative to saas root). */\n filesTouched: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n /** Provider-sync outcome (omitted when not applicable, e.g. publish). */\n providerSync: RegistryProviderSyncOutcomeSchema.optional(),\n /** Free-form diagnostic copy. */\n message: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type RegistryRouteResult = z.infer<typeof RegistryRouteResultSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Companion route paths — single source of truth shared by the\n * CLI client and the companion controller.\n */\nexport const REGISTRY_COMPANION_ROUTES = {\n install: '/api/companion/registry/install',\n update: '/api/companion/registry/update',\n remove: '/api/companion/registry/remove',\n publish: '/api/companion/registry/publish',\n} as const;\n"]}
@@ -23,11 +23,13 @@
23
23
  export * from './digest.schemas';
24
24
  export * from './lockfile-modules-section.schemas';
25
25
  export * from './module-manifest.schemas';
26
+ export * from './module-search.schemas';
26
27
  export * from './module-artifact.schemas';
27
28
  export * from './artifact-domain.schemas';
28
- export * from './companion-api.schemas';
29
29
  export * from './registry-config.schemas';
30
30
  export * from './registry-defaults.constants';
31
31
  export * from './registry-errors';
32
32
  export * from './registry-section-schemas.constants';
33
+ export * from './registry-keys.schemas';
34
+ export * from './local-checkout-source';
33
35
  //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
- {"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/registry/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,cAAc,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACjC,cAAc,oCAAoC,CAAC;AACnD,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACxC,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAC9C,cAAc,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAClC,cAAc,sCAAsC,CAAC"}
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/registry/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,cAAc,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACjC,cAAc,oCAAoC,CAAC;AACnD,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACxC,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAC9C,cAAc,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAClC,cAAc,sCAAsC,CAAC;AACrD,cAAc,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACxC,cAAc,yBAAyB,CAAC"}
@@ -23,11 +23,13 @@
23
23
  export * from './digest.schemas.js';
24
24
  export * from './lockfile-modules-section.schemas.js';
25
25
  export * from './module-manifest.schemas.js';
26
+ export * from './module-search.schemas.js';
26
27
  export * from './module-artifact.schemas.js';
27
28
  export * from './artifact-domain.schemas.js';
28
- export * from './companion-api.schemas.js';
29
29
  export * from './registry-config.schemas.js';
30
30
  export * from './registry-defaults.constants.js';
31
31
  export * from './registry-errors.js';
32
32
  export * from './registry-section-schemas.constants.js';
33
+ export * from './registry-keys.schemas.js';
34
+ export * from './local-checkout-source.js';
33
35
  //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
- {"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/registry/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,cAAc,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACjC,cAAc,oCAAoC,CAAC;AACnD,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACxC,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAC9C,cAAc,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAClC,cAAc,sCAAsC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Module-registry subpackage barrel\n * (per `.claude/plans/module-registry-analysis.md`).\n *\n * Surface:\n * - `RegistryModulesLockSectionSchema` — `sections.modules` payload.\n * - `DEFAULT_REGISTRY_SECTION_SCHEMAS` — CLI default lockfile-section map.\n * - `DEFAULT_LOCAL_REGISTRY_URL` / `DEFAULT_PUBLIC_REGISTRY_URL` /\n * `DEFAULT_LOCAL_REGISTRY_PORT` / `DEFAULT_REGISTRY_ID`.\n * - `ModuleManifestSchema` — `wildo.module.json` contract\n * (engine compat, boundaries, dependsOn buckets per KD-12 + KD-13).\n * - `ModuleVersionRecordSchema` — registry-server published-version row.\n * - `Sha256DigestSchema` — single-source digest field used by\n * both lockfile entries and registry-server records.\n * - `RegistryConfigSchema` — `wildo.saas.config.ts > moduleRegistries`.\n * - `RegistryArtifactVisibility` / `RegistryApiKeyScope` /\n * `RegistryDomainAccessPolicy` — access-control vocabulary.\n * - `RegistryError` family — typed-error vocabulary with\n * stable `code` strings.\n *\n * Phase 2+ adds artifact-staging + companion-mutation contracts.\n */\n\nexport * from './digest.schemas';\nexport * from './lockfile-modules-section.schemas';\nexport * from './module-manifest.schemas';\nexport * from './module-artifact.schemas';\nexport * from './artifact-domain.schemas';\nexport * from './companion-api.schemas';\nexport * from './registry-config.schemas';\nexport * from './registry-defaults.constants';\nexport * from './registry-errors';\nexport * from './registry-section-schemas.constants';\n"]}
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/registry/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,cAAc,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACjC,cAAc,oCAAoC,CAAC;AACnD,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACxC,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1C,cAAc,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAC9C,cAAc,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAClC,cAAc,sCAAsC,CAAC;AACrD,cAAc,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACxC,cAAc,yBAAyB,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Module-registry subpackage barrel\n * (per `.claude/plans/module-registry-analysis.md`).\n *\n * Surface:\n * - `RegistryModulesLockSectionSchema` — `sections.modules` payload.\n * - `DEFAULT_REGISTRY_SECTION_SCHEMAS` — CLI default lockfile-section map.\n * - `DEFAULT_LOCAL_REGISTRY_URL` / `DEFAULT_PUBLIC_REGISTRY_URL` /\n * `DEFAULT_LOCAL_REGISTRY_PORT` / `DEFAULT_REGISTRY_ID`.\n * - `ModuleManifestSchema` — `wildo.module.json` contract\n * (engine compat, boundaries, dependsOn buckets per KD-12 + KD-13).\n * - `ModuleVersionRecordSchema` — registry-server published-version row.\n * - `Sha256DigestSchema` — single-source digest field used by\n * both lockfile entries and registry-server records.\n * - `RegistryConfigSchema` — `wildo.saas.config.ts > moduleRegistries`.\n * - `RegistryArtifactVisibility` / `RegistryApiKeyScope` /\n * `RegistryDomainAccessPolicy` — access-control vocabulary.\n * - `RegistryError` family — typed-error vocabulary with\n * stable `code` strings.\n *\n * Phase 2+ adds artifact-staging + companion-mutation contracts.\n */\n\nexport * from './digest.schemas';\nexport * from './lockfile-modules-section.schemas';\nexport * from './module-manifest.schemas';\nexport * from './module-search.schemas';\nexport * from './module-artifact.schemas';\nexport * from './artifact-domain.schemas';\nexport * from './registry-config.schemas';\nexport * from './registry-defaults.constants';\nexport * from './registry-errors';\nexport * from './registry-section-schemas.constants';\nexport * from './registry-keys.schemas';\nexport * from './local-checkout-source';\n"]}