@wildo-ai/framework-knowledge 1.1.8 → 1.1.10

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (480) hide show
  1. package/dist/claude-marketplace/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json +1 -1
  2. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  3. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/references/acceptance.md +11 -0
  4. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/references/composites-and-the-loop.md +9 -2
  5. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/references/creation-state.md +21 -0
  6. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/references/derived-artifacts.md +121 -0
  7. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/references/expert-personas-and-deliberations.md +26 -7
  8. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/references/runs-judges-and-questions.md +31 -5
  9. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/skills/accept/SKILL.md +4 -2
  10. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/skills/answer/SKILL.md +29 -2
  11. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/skills/build/SKILL.md +69 -24
  12. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/skills/doctor/SKILL.md +10 -0
  13. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/skills/run/SKILL.md +21 -5
  14. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/skills/start/SKILL.md +31 -5
  15. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/skills/status/SKILL.md +2 -0
  16. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/skills/why/SKILL.md +20 -4
  17. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts +1 -1
  18. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  19. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js +95 -5
  20. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  21. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.loader.d.ts.map +1 -1
  22. package/dist/esm/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  23. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.d.ts +2 -2
  24. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  25. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.js +2 -2
  26. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  27. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build/playbook.definition.d.ts +11 -11
  28. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  29. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build/playbook.definition.js +29 -22
  30. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  31. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/playbook.definition.d.ts +41 -3
  32. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  33. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/playbook.definition.js +175 -14
  34. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  35. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
  36. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  37. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/playbook.definition.js +3 -3
  38. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  39. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-scale/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
  40. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-scale/playbook.definition.js +1 -1
  41. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.build-scale/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  42. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.conception/playbook.definition.d.ts +8 -4
  43. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.conception/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  44. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.conception/playbook.definition.js +13 -6
  45. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.conception/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  46. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.domain-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts +4 -2
  47. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.domain-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  48. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.domain-plan/playbook.definition.js +90 -13
  49. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.domain-plan/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  50. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.experience-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts +4 -3
  51. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.experience-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  52. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.experience-plan/playbook.definition.js +4 -3
  53. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.experience-plan/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  54. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.definition.d.ts +8 -0
  55. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  56. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.definition.js +12 -4
  57. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  58. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.placement-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts +12 -3
  59. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.placement-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  60. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.placement-plan/playbook.definition.js +8 -4
  61. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.placement-plan/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  62. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.website-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts +4 -1
  63. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.website-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  64. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.website-plan/playbook.definition.js +2 -1
  65. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.website-plan/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  66. package/dist/esm/playbooks/cross_cutting.application-creation/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  67. package/dist/esm/playbooks/cross_cutting.compliance/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  68. package/dist/esm/playbooks/cross_cutting.feature-development/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  69. package/dist/esm/playbooks/cross_cutting.refinement/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  70. package/dist/esm/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  71. package/dist/esm/playbooks/refinement.document-facts/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
  72. package/dist/esm/playbooks/refinement.document-facts/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  73. package/dist/esm/playbooks/refinement.document-facts/playbook.definition.js +13 -1
  74. package/dist/esm/playbooks/refinement.document-facts/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  75. package/dist/esm/playbooks/refinement.feature-contribution/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  76. package/dist/esm/playbooks/refinement.governance-document-candidate/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  77. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-identity/playbook.definition.d.ts +25 -27
  78. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-identity/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  79. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-identity/playbook.definition.js +91 -43
  80. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-identity/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  81. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-research/playbook.definition.d.ts +41 -0
  82. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-research/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -0
  83. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-research/playbook.definition.js +43 -0
  84. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-research/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -0
  85. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-screening-produce/playbook.definition.d.ts +200 -0
  86. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-screening-produce/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -0
  87. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-screening-produce/playbook.definition.js +203 -0
  88. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-screening-produce/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -0
  89. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-naming/playbook.definition.d.ts +81 -0
  90. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-naming/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -0
  91. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-naming/playbook.definition.js +93 -0
  92. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.brand-naming/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -0
  93. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.business-model/playbook.definition.d.ts +3 -1
  94. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.business-model/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  95. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.business-model/playbook.definition.js +27 -18
  96. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.business-model/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  97. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.capability-map/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  98. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-analysis/playbook.definition.d.ts +11 -1
  99. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-analysis/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  100. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-analysis/playbook.definition.js +11 -11
  101. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-analysis/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  102. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-conception/playbook.definition.d.ts +2 -0
  103. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-conception/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  104. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-conception/playbook.definition.js +3 -1
  105. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-conception/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  106. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-evidence-adequacy/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  107. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-posture/playbook.definition.d.ts +2 -0
  108. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-posture/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  109. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-posture/playbook.definition.js +3 -1
  110. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-posture/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  111. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.compliance-research/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  112. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.definition/playbook.definition.d.ts +5 -2
  113. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.definition/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  114. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.definition/playbook.definition.js +16 -4
  115. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.definition/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  116. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.expert-personas/playbook.definition.d.ts +27 -6
  117. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.expert-personas/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  118. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.expert-personas/playbook.definition.js +32 -12
  119. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.expert-personas/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  120. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.feature-drafts/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  121. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.market-analysis/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  122. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.market-evidence-adequacy/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  123. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.market-research/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  124. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.market-snapshot-produce/playbook.definition.d.ts +2 -1
  125. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.market-snapshot-produce/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  126. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.market-snapshot-produce/playbook.definition.js +13 -5
  127. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.market-snapshot-produce/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  128. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.phase-gate/playbook.definition.d.ts +7 -3
  129. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.phase-gate/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  130. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.phase-gate/playbook.definition.js +71 -2
  131. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.phase-gate/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  132. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.requirements-definition/playbook.definition.d.ts +2 -1
  133. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.requirements-definition/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  134. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.requirements-definition/playbook.definition.js +23 -8
  135. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.requirements-definition/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  136. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.risk-register/playbook.definition.d.ts +7 -1
  137. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.risk-register/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  138. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.risk-register/playbook.definition.js +4 -2
  139. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.risk-register/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  140. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.scope-roadmap/playbook.definition.d.ts +9 -3
  141. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.scope-roadmap/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  142. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.scope-roadmap/playbook.definition.js +3 -3
  143. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.scope-roadmap/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  144. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.value-proposition/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  145. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.vision-elicitation/playbook.definition.d.ts +35 -2
  146. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.vision-elicitation/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
  147. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.vision-elicitation/playbook.definition.js +41 -17
  148. package/dist/esm/playbooks/top_down.vision-elicitation/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  149. package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/authority-basis.json +1 -1
  150. package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/external-framework-mapping.json +1 -1
  151. package/dist/knowledge/manifest.json +8 -8
  152. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/method.md +22 -7
  153. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.json +3 -3
  154. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build/method.md +17 -15
  155. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build/playbook.json +4 -3
  156. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/evaluation-protocol.json +1 -1
  157. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/evaluation-treatment.json +1 -1
  158. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/method.md +261 -34
  159. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/playbook.json +42 -4
  160. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/method.md +188 -59
  161. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/playbook.json +2 -2
  162. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-scale/method.md +169 -276
  163. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-scale/playbook.json +2 -2
  164. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.capability-composition/method.md +8 -1
  165. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.capability-composition/playbook.json +1 -1
  166. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.conception/method.md +3 -2
  167. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.conception/playbook.json +11 -3
  168. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.domain-plan/evaluation-protocol.json +1 -1
  169. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.domain-plan/evaluation-treatment.json +1 -1
  170. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.domain-plan/method.md +129 -17
  171. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.domain-plan/playbook.json +7 -4
  172. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.experience-plan/method.md +28 -6
  173. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.experience-plan/playbook.json +5 -4
  174. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.json +13 -5
  175. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.placement-plan/method.md +50 -0
  176. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.placement-plan/playbook.json +16 -4
  177. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.website-plan/method.md +19 -0
  178. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.website-plan/playbook.json +5 -2
  179. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/method.md +7 -3
  180. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/playbook.json +1 -1
  181. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.document-facts/method.md +8 -0
  182. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.document-facts/playbook.json +3 -2
  183. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.feature-contribution/method.md +5 -2
  184. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.feature-contribution/playbook.json +1 -1
  185. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-identity/evaluation-protocol.json +1 -1
  186. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-identity/evaluation-treatment.json +1 -1
  187. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-identity/method.md +75 -37
  188. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-identity/playbook.json +35 -38
  189. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-research/method.md +145 -0
  190. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-research/playbook.json +57 -0
  191. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-screening-produce/evaluation-protocol.json +1 -0
  192. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-screening-produce/evaluation-treatment.json +1 -0
  193. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-screening-produce/method.md +99 -0
  194. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-name-screening-produce/playbook.json +65 -0
  195. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-naming/method.md +56 -0
  196. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.brand-naming/playbook.json +76 -0
  197. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.business-model/evaluation-protocol.json +1 -1
  198. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.business-model/evaluation-treatment.json +1 -1
  199. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.business-model/method.md +60 -6
  200. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.business-model/playbook.json +15 -10
  201. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.capability-map/method.md +10 -9
  202. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.capability-map/playbook.json +1 -1
  203. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.compliance-analysis/playbook.json +30 -10
  204. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.compliance-conception/playbook.json +3 -1
  205. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.compliance-posture/playbook.json +4 -1
  206. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.definition/method.md +8 -3
  207. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.definition/playbook.json +6 -4
  208. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.expert-personas/playbook.json +16 -2
  209. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.feature-drafts/method.md +5 -2
  210. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.feature-drafts/playbook.json +1 -1
  211. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.market-snapshot-produce/evaluation-protocol.json +1 -1
  212. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.market-snapshot-produce/evaluation-treatment.json +1 -1
  213. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.market-snapshot-produce/method.md +26 -0
  214. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.market-snapshot-produce/playbook.json +4 -2
  215. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.phase-gate/evaluation-protocol.json +1 -1
  216. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.phase-gate/evaluation-treatment.json +1 -1
  217. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.phase-gate/playbook.json +11 -1
  218. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.requirements-definition/evaluation-protocol.json +1 -1
  219. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.requirements-definition/evaluation-treatment.json +1 -1
  220. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.requirements-definition/method.md +84 -9
  221. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.requirements-definition/playbook.json +6 -3
  222. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.risk-register/method.md +21 -0
  223. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.risk-register/playbook.json +8 -2
  224. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.scope-roadmap/playbook.json +4 -2
  225. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.vision-elicitation/method.md +29 -0
  226. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.vision-elicitation/playbook.json +58 -17
  227. package/dist/knowledge/references/brand.name-choice.config.md +144 -0
  228. package/dist/knowledge/references/brand.name-screening.config.md +308 -0
  229. package/dist/knowledge/references/build-plan.task-graph.config.md +119 -11
  230. package/dist/knowledge/references/business-model.pricing-plan.config.md +16 -0
  231. package/dist/knowledge/references/business-model.snapshot.config.md +64 -0
  232. package/dist/knowledge/references/business-model.snapshot.validation.md +68 -4
  233. package/dist/knowledge/references/capability-composition.config.md +67 -4
  234. package/dist/knowledge/references/companion.market.prompt-renderer.md +11 -6
  235. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.authorization.application-roles.office-and-field.md +44 -0
  236. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.backend.custom-operation.audit-event.md +81 -0
  237. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.backend.custom-operation.child-line-total.md +258 -0
  238. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.backend.custom-operation.computed-total.md +153 -0
  239. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.backend.custom-operation.create-related-resource.md +107 -0
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That ordering is invisible in any record — a reconciled row and a row awaiting reconciliation look identical — so it is evidenced by tearing a tenant down and attempting to use a credential it granted.","obligation":"The credentials asserting those rights are revoked at the moment the granting scope is torn down, not merely marked.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each restoration names who restored the tenant and on what authority, in the same terms as the withdrawal it reverses"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The clause the objective's title is built on, and the one an implementer drops: the destructive direction gets an event and the recuperative one does not. Then a tenant marked and restored a year ago still reads as pending destruction, and an access review asking why it has live members again has no answer on record. Four members, two pairs, deliberately not merged — a teardown request and a suspension have the same blast radius and entirely different remedies.","obligation":"And RESTORING access is as attributable as removing it.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["organization_deletion_requested","organization_restored","organization_suspended","organization_activated"]}],"limits":"C3's credential reconciliation is a NO-OP for an application that maps no organization membership onto user types — it returns early — so a clean result there can mean the control ran and found nothing to do, or that the application has no such mapping at all. Establish which before reading it as evidence.\n\nC1, C2 and C4 attest the window; C3 attests the build driven. None of it evidences that a withdrawal was APPROPRIATE — only that it happened, was attributed, and took effect. And the credential reconciliation covers credentials the ENGINE knows it granted; anything an application minted outside that path is outside this evidence.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C4: the five tenant-lifecycle members over the window, PAIRED — each withdrawal read beside its restoration. C2: the committed non-conferring status set and the consumer that reads it. C3: a driven teardown followed by an attempted use of a credential the torn-down scope granted.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A withdrawal with no row is a MAJOR. A RESTORATION with no row is equally a MAJOR and is the one most likely to be argued down as harmless: it destroys nothing, and that is exactly why the record is the only trace it leaves. A live credential against a torn-down scope is a MAJOR. A scope in a non-conferring status still granting authority is a MAJOR and is a tenancy defect as well.","verificationSteps":["Query the withdrawal and restoration members over the window and pair them by scope — an unpaired restoration is the finding this demand exists for.","Assert the non-conferring status set is a named closed vocabulary, and that its consumer treats an unresolvable scope as non-conferring.","Suspend a scope and assert its members lose authority immediately, before any data is destroyed.","Tear a tenant down and attempt to use a credential it granted; assert refusal rather than a marked-but-live credential.","Do NOT expect a membership-removal row from a user deletion — no relationship exists, so its absence is correct rather than a gap."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:administrative-continuity-breach-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:administrative-continuity-breach-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application, at BOTH scopes — the application itself and each tenant. The two are separate floors with separate acknowledgements on purpose: an erasure that may lawfully strand one tenant is not thereby licensed to leave the whole application unadministrable.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The refusal is the artifact and it only exists when the last administrator is the subject. A healthy application evidences nothing: every scope having an administrator is equally consistent with a floor that holds and with one nobody has tested. The enumeration matters as much as the drive — EVERY door onto that status must enforce the same floor, and a door added later will not announce itself.\n\n**The user-deactivation door REPORTS and proceeds, deliberately, and this clause said \"every door… REFUSED\" until 2026-09-10.** The site states the asymmetry as the decision rather than an oversight: suspending a user account is overwhelmingly incident response, and refusing it would mean an operator cannot lock out a hostile owner without first performing an ownership transfer using the tenant the attacker controls. A stranded tenant is recoverable through the repair door; a live compromised owner is not. So driving that door and getting a 200 plus a CRITICAL breach row is the control WORKING, and reporting it as a MAJOR — which this body did — inverts a deliberate safety trade.","obligation":"A removal or demotion that would strand a scope is REFUSED, at every door onto the status that decides administrative usability — except USER DEACTIVATION, which reports and proceeds.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Textbook write skew: each transaction measures a count, then writes, and under snapshot isolation each sees the other still present. No amount of re-checking closes it and no row shows it — the outcome is a scope with zero administrators and two perfectly ordinary success responses. The evidence is that the two transactions COLLIDE, which requires giving them something to collide on and then driving them concurrently.\n\n**Only the TENANT floor does that.** It bumps a serialization token on the tenant's own row BEFORE measuring, precisely to create the collision. The application floor is a bare count-then-act with no token and no mention of concurrency anywhere in its source. This clause asserted both scopes until 2026-09-10, so a judge driving two concurrent super-admin reductions would see both succeed — the exact write skew described — with no way to tell whether that is a nonconformity or an unstated scope narrowing. It is a FRAMEWORK gap: report it there, not against the application.","obligation":"Concurrent reductions are SERIALIZED at TENANT scope, so two of them cannot pass each other. No such serialization exists at APPLICATION scope.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the rows came from an ACKNOWLEDGED erasure rather than from the deactivation or startup reports that write the same two classes, or that no erasure stranded a scope without an acknowledgement"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Here the record IS the control, not decoration: the acknowledgement's entire justification is that the consequence becomes VISIBLE rather than prevented. Two members, one per scope, deliberately not merged. And the acknowledgement must not silence the evaluation — an acknowledged erasure that strands nobody must stay quiet, or the alert stops meaning anything.\n\n**These two members have THREE producers, not one, and this clause read them as the erasure acknowledgement's record alone.** They are also written by the user-deactivation report (C1's exception) and by the BOOT report (C4) — the latter stamping a detected-by discriminator specifically so a reader can tell them apart. A collector querying the member over a window and reading every row as an acknowledged erasure misattributes containment actions and startup findings to a data-protection request. Filter on the discriminator.","obligation":"A data-protection erasure proceeds only on an explicit per-request acknowledgement, and the breach it causes is recorded.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["application_super_admin_floor_breached","organization_owner_floor_breached"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the rows were written by the startup report rather than by an erasure or a deactivation, or that every scope already stranded at boot was reported"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The boot report observes states no write guard ever saw — a direct datastore edit, a restore from a mid-erasure backup, a seed that authored no administrator, a role-table reconfiguration. It is non-fatal always, and that is deliberate: a fresh deployment legitimately has none of the population, and a diagnostic must never be why startup fails.\n\nIt is EMITTED rather than a log: the report writes the same two breach members at both scopes, carrying a detected-by discriminator that separates them from C3's rows. This clause called it a driven observation until 2026-09-10 and told a collector to read \"the startup report\", which denied it a queryable row class it actually has.\n\nThe single-administrator WARNING is a different matter and exists at TENANT scope only — see the steps.","obligation":"Any scope that has ALREADY been stranded is reported at startup, durably.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["application_super_admin_floor_breached","organization_owner_floor_breached"]},{"clauseRef":"C5","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the rows are repair-door grants rather than the ordinary membership edits that write the same class, or that each grant was additive and carried its justification"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The industry pattern has two halves and shipping only the refusal turns every mistake into a permanent lockout. The tenant half exists — an operator-tier grant that PROMOTES an existing member, writes one field additively, and requires a justification, recorded on the membership role-change row the grant emits once it commits. The generic operation row carries no request payload, so the justification is evidenced ONLY on the role-change row. Until issue #593 was fixed it was validated and then discarded, so rows written before that fix legitimately carry none. The application half does NOT and cannot: there is no scope above the application, which is why its acknowledgement names an out-of-band restore as the only remedy.\n\nThe member and its discriminator are declared because the minimum evidence already named the rows exactly — the membership role-change rows whose operation is the ownership grant — and until 2026-09-16 the clause named no member at all, so a collector had nothing to count and the judge recorded it NOT RUN against a door that works. The discriminator is what keeps the reading honest: every `create` and `update` also writes this row, and counting those would report a repair door being used every time anyone edited a membership.","obligation":"And a stranded TENANT has a higher-tier repair door, additive and audited.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventDataMatch":{"field":"operation","values":["grantOwnership"]},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["organization_member_role_changed"]}],"limits":"C1 and C2 attest the build driven; C2 in particular needs a datastore that really serializes, and an environment that mocks transactions can evidence the collision POINT but not the abort. C4's report is a snapshot at boot and says nothing about the interval since. And none of it evidences that a remaining administrator is REACHABLE — an account that exists, is active, and belongs to someone who has left satisfies every clause here.","minimumEvidence":"C1: an enumeration of every door onto the deciding status, plus a driven last-administrator removal at each scope, refused with a conflict rather than a forbidden. C2: two concurrent reductions driven against one scope, one aborting. C3: the two breach members over the window, each carrying the scope stranded and the action that caused it. C4: boot-detected breach rows at both scopes, plus the single-administrator count where the scope reports one — tenant only. C5: repair-door rows — the membership role-change rows whose operation is the ownership grant, each carrying the operator's justification beside the before and after role sets. A grant against a member who already owned the scope changes no authority and leaves no role-change row, only the generic operation row.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A door onto the deciding status that does not consult the floor is a MAJOR whether or not it has been used. A scope at zero administrators is a MAJOR and is simultaneously an access-control failure and an availability failure for that scope. A refusal answered as FORBIDDEN rather than CONFLICT is an OBSERVATION with real cost: the caller was authorized, and a wrong code sends an integrator to fix permissions. Scopes at exactly ONE administrator are an OBSERVATION, never a nonconformity — nothing is broken yet, and they are precisely the population the floor will REFUSE to help. A repair-door role-change row with NO justification, written after the framework recorded it (#593), is a MAJOR: the request requires one, so its absence means a caller reached the door without the request contract, and the justification is the whole control on an action no downstream check can second-guess. The same absence on a row written before that fix is an OBSERVATION against the framework version, not against the operator.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every door that writes the status deciding administrative usability, and assert each consults the floor.","Remove the last administrator at tenant scope and assert refusal with a CONFLICT — the caller IS authorized and the payload IS valid; it is the STATE that forbids the write.","Repeat at application scope and assert the distinct, scope-specific code.","Drive two concurrent reductions and assert one aborts rather than both succeeding.","Drive an acknowledged erasure that strands a scope and assert the breach row exists; drive one that strands nobody and assert SILENCE.","Query the two breach members filtered to the BOOT detected-by discriminator, at both scopes, and record the scopes at zero administrators.","Record the count of scopes at exactly ONE administrator where it is available — TENANT scope only. The application floor measures its population but logs nothing unless the floor is already breached, so an absent single-administrator count there is a framework gap rather than a clean result.","Assert the repair door promotes an EXISTING member, writes only the role, and refuses a member the floor would not count."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:administrative-continuity-breach-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:auditable-event-actor-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:auditable-event-actor-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The sentinel vocabulary and every marked emitter are engine-owned; the read-through and agent clauses have an empty population where no external binding or agent exists.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The clause is about a VOCABULARY, and that is what makes it declarative. Three sentinels are semantically distinct: the system acting with no human principal by design, a machine principal acting legitimately, and a principal that was EXPECTED and could not be resolved. Only the third is an anomaly. Collapsing them onto one value is what hid a batch-purged tenant recorded as deleted by an unknown actor — the one case worth investigating, buried inside the two that are not.","obligation":"A security-relevant action records who performed it, and never disguises an UNATTRIBUTABLE action as an ordinary automated one.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"An enumeration: the mapping from execution type to sentinel belongs in one place, so the evidence is that every emitter reaches the shared resolver. A hand-chosen sentinel that happens to be right today is indistinguishable in the row from a resolved one, and drifts silently.","obligation":"The sentinel a row carries is RESOLVED from the execution context, not chosen by hand at each emitter.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the REAL initiating user rather than the shared service principal that made the call"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class, and the clause exists because a service-principal binding authenticates every remote call as one account — so without this field attribution dies at the boundary.\n\n**The three members do NOT share an emission unit, and this rationale asserted one for all of them until 2026-09-10.** Only the read-through member is one row per read-family OPERATION execution, so that a paginated list and the count totalling its envelope are ONE access. The provider-call member is one row per outbound call, on success and failure; the agent-tool member is one row per tool call, and its declaration insists it is a sibling of the provider member rather than a case of it. Asserting the operation unit across all three reports a MAJOR against two working emitters.","obligation":"Read-through access to an external system carries the REAL initiating user through the shared service principal.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["http_api_read_through_access","provider_operation_call","mcp_tool_call"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each deletion names the subject it served and the system it reached, or that a non-erasure was acknowledged per resource per request rather than once as a posture"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Two members, and the second is the one that would be dropped. A hole in erasure that is acknowledged ONCE as a configuration becomes invisible; recorded per resource per request, it stays countable, and a reviewer can see how often the application chose to accept it.","obligation":"An outbound DELETION on that plane names the subject it served and the system it reached, and an acknowledged non-erasure is recorded per resource per request rather than as a standing posture.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["http_api_external_erasure","http_api_non_erasure_acknowledged"]}],"limits":"C2's enumeration attests the emitter set as enumerated. C3 and C4 attest the window, and they evidence attribution of the calls that were MADE — a call made outside the read-through plane leaves no row here. And a resolved actor is not a verified one: the row records who the execution context said was acting, which is a different claim from who was at the keyboard.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the sentinel vocabulary as a named closed set. C2: an enumeration of the emitters, each resolving the sentinel through the shared resolver. C3 and C4: the five outbound members over the window, with the initiating-user field present wherever the execution had a human principal. Absence of that field means a runtime acted, which is a value rather than a gap.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A row carrying the anomaly sentinel is a MAJOR and is exactly what the vocabulary exists to surface: a privileged action happened and the trail cannot say who. A read-through row missing the real initiating user where the execution had one is a MAJOR — attribution died at the service principal, which is the failure the field exists for. An outbound deletion with no row is a MAJOR. An acknowledged non-erasure recorded as a standing posture rather than per request is a MAJOR: it is the same fact made uncountable.","verificationSteps":["Assert the sentinel set is a named closed vocabulary and that the anomaly value is distinct from the two ordinary ones.","Query the window for rows carrying the anomaly sentinel — this is the alerting query, and a nonzero count is the finding.","Enumerate the emitters that TAKE AN ACTOR — a small minority of the service's log methods — and assert each resolves it through the shared resolver rather than choosing a literal. Enumerating all emitters is the wrong population: most carry no actor field and cannot satisfy the step, so the count would be a statement about the service's size rather than about the invariant.","Sample read-through rows and assert the real initiating user is present for executions that had one, and absent for machine and internal ones.","Assert the emission unit PER MEMBER: one row per read-family operation execution for read-through access (a list and its count are one access), one row per outbound call for provider calls, one per tool call for agent calls. A single unit asserted across all three is a MAJOR against two working emitters.","Query the acknowledged-non-erasure member GROUPED BY resource, and read the count as the size of the accepted hole."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:auditable-event-actor-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:authentication-eligibility-change-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:authentication-eligibility-change-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The status field, its exclusion from ordinary updates and the system door are all engine-owned, so no application authors the mechanism and none can opt out of it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second writer, so the enumeration is the artifact. A changed status looks identical whichever path changed it, and — this is the sharp part — a status write from the WRONG path does not fail either: the field is excluded from ordinary updates, so a handler writing it directly is stripped by the repository's strict re-parse and the operation reports success having persisted nothing. That failure mode has already cost this repository four sibling activations.","obligation":"A change to whether a principal may authenticate runs through ONE guarded authority.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A decorator on the committed schema, and the whole of the clause. Nothing observable distinguishes a system in which the exclusion holds from one in which no unrelated write has yet been attempted.","obligation":"The field carrying it is excluded from ordinary updates, so the change cannot arrive as a side effect of an unrelated write.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the state the eligibility moved FROM and the state it moved TO"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"TWO row classes, and the second is the one that carries the answer. The governed lifecycle verbs emit a purpose-built transition row carrying subject, from-status, to-status, an optional reason and an optional reactivation deadline — exactly what \"the state it moved from and to\" asks for. It is ONE member rather than five near-identical ones because the five verbs share a data shape and the resource plus operation identifier discriminate which ran.\n\nThe generic resource-operation row is demanded ALONGSIDE it and is strictly weaker here, because it is gated on an automatic risk floor of HIGH-or-CRITICAL: the USERS update is MEDIUM and declares no below-floor opt-in, so the four system-door writers this clause is about emit no generic row at all. Demanding only the generic row — which this clause did until 2026-09-10 — points a collector at an empty result and, under this body's own severity line, raises a MAJOR against the exact population C1 exists to protect.","obligation":"And each such change is evidenced, with the state it moved from and to.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_status_transition_performed","resource_operation_performed"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"UNPRODUCED","homeRationale":"Carried in the tree as an explicit unimplemented-control marker rather than as an omission. Note the mechanism precisely, because an earlier revision of this rationale said the merge verb is \"routed and unimplemented\" and it is neither: the operations enum contains no merge member and the transposition policy that would have carried it was REMOVED, so the comment is a re-declaration CHECKLIST for whoever reinstates it. A judge sent looking for a routed verb answering 501 finds no route at all. Seven conditions are enumerated at the declaration — among them an event naming the TWO identities being consolidated, which no generic before-and-after row can express, and the erasure interaction, where a merged-away identity subject to retention must not resurrect scrubbed personal data through the surviving row. Recording it UNPRODUCED keeps a known framework gap from being raised as an application nonconformity.","obligation":"Consolidating two identities is authorized, attributable, and non-destructive to the audit trail.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"C1 attests the writer set as ENUMERATED; one added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated, and the added writer will not fail loudly. C3 evidences the window it covers. And none of it evidences that a given change was APPROPRIATE — only that it was made through the one authority and left a record.","minimumEvidence":"C1: an enumeration of every writer of the authentication-eligibility status, each resolving to the guarded system door. C2: the committed field declaration. C3: generic resource-operation rows over the window carrying that field's before and after values. C4: nothing.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A second writer that reaches the field through the system door without the guard is a MAJOR. A writer that reaches it through an ordinary update is a MAJOR of a different kind and the more dangerous one: the account never changes state, with no error and no signal, so the symptom surfaces hops away as something else entirely. An eligibility change with no corresponding row is a MAJOR. C4 carries no severity.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every writer of the status field and assert each reaches the system door rather than an ordinary update.","Assert the field is excluded from ordinary updates in the committed schema, and marked as audit evidence.","Drive an eligibility change through the guarded verb and assert the row changed AND a resource-operation row carries the before and after values.","Drive one through an ordinary update and assert nothing changed — a success response with an unchanged row is the signature this clause exists to make visible.","Query the window for resource-operation rows on that field and assert every eligibility change in the window has one."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:authentication-eligibility-change-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:authentication-posture-change-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:authentication-posture-change-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application for the application-wide posture, and to every tenant that configures single sign-on for the per-tenant half. A tenant with no single-sign-on configuration has an empty population there.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The authored per-user-type configuration IS the posture. Nothing observed at runtime distinguishes a deliberate permissive posture from an unconsidered default, which is why the clause asks for the declaration rather than for behaviour.","obligation":"How principals may authenticate is EXPLICITLY configured — the multi-factor, password, lockout, methods, step-up and session posture.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Four separate declarations that a reader is tempted to treat as one: the live switch, the default provider, the endpoints, and the signature and replay validation posture. The last is the one that matters most and is easiest to leave permissive — a trusted provider whose assertions are not verified is not an identity provider, it is an open door with a name on it. A verified DOMAIN is upstream of all four: it decides which provider authenticates every principal at that domain.","obligation":"Which identity provider is trusted, whether single sign-on is ENFORCED, and whether that provider's assertions are actually VERIFIED are declared per tenant.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"a genuine change was evidenced ONCE rather than on every startup, which is a claim about duplicate rows that counting cannot separate from real ones"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class, and the detector's shape is the clause: the trail is its OWN change-detection state, so a first boot emits a baseline row, a moved digest emits a before-and-after naming the changed user types, and an identical digest emits NOTHING. One row per genuine change rather than one per boot is what keeps the trail readable — and it is why an empty result in a window means the posture did not move, rather than that nothing watched it.","obligation":"Every GENUINE change to that posture is detected at startup and evidenced once, from the runtime that puts it into effect.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["application_auth_policy_changed"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The clause an implementer drops, because a bypass is granted to keep an administrator from locking themselves out — a helpful act, and therefore one nobody thinks to record. Its whole point is that it defeats the enforcement the tenant declared, so a posture reviewed without it is a posture read as stricter than it is.\n\nThe member records a USE, not a GRANT, and the distinction decides what to look for: granting is a configuration write that adds an address to the break-glass set — evidenced by the generic row, since that block carries the audit-evidence marker — while USE is this row. A step demanding evidence of each GRANTED bypass, which this body had until 2026-09-10, reports a finding for every break-glass account correctly kept standing and never used, which is the recommended posture.","obligation":"An authenticated BYPASS of a tenant's own authentication requirement is evidenced each time it is USED.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["emergency_access_used"]},{"clauseRef":"C5","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each mint was authorized, bounded in time and names both the acting human and the identity acted as"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Three durable rows: the mint, the exchange, and the cancellation of an un-exchanged token. Each of the intent's three demands is a field on them — AUTHORIZED by the super-admin role gate, TIME-BOXED by a duration capped against the framework-wide one-off ceiling, and ATTRIBUTABLE because the mint row carries the caller AND the target rather than only the identity being acted as.\n\n**This clause said UNPRODUCED until 2026-09-10, and that was the most expensive shape a body can take.** It read a `TODO(assurance-control)` marker on one routed-and-unimplemented `users` verb and generalised it to \"no impersonation mechanism exists\" — while `createOneOffToken` was live, gated, capped and emitting all three rows. UNPRODUCED carries no severity, so the body excused every application from evidencing the single most sensitive access in the system. The catalog's own words are the correction: those markers are open gaps **at some of their sites**, never a statement about the objective.","obligation":"And privileged access under ANOTHER identity is authorized, time-boxed, and attributable to the human actor.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["one_off_token_created","one_off_token_exchanged","one_off_token_revoked"]},{"clauseRef":"C6","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The affordance is opt-in and off by default: the mint refuses unless the target user type declares it, and the requested duration is bounded by both a declared per-type maximum and a framework ceiling. An application that declares neither has no impersonation — which is a complete answer to C5 rather than an empty one, and the reason C5's population can legitimately be zero.","obligation":"And whether impersonation is available at all, and for how long, is a declared decision per user type.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"C3 detects change in the AUTHORED per-APPLICATION snapshot, and its own declaration says it does not enumerate per-tenant overrides — so C2's subject matter is evidenced by a different member entirely, which the steps now name. A posture altered by a mechanism outside both is invisible to each. The detector is fire-and-forget by design — a backend must boot whether or not it could record this — so a boot whose emission failed leaves a gap that looks exactly like an unchanged posture, and only the backend's own error log distinguishes them. And C1 and C2 evidence what was declared, never that the declared posture is adequate for the risk.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the authored per-user-type authentication configuration. C2: per tenant, the enforcement switch, the trusted provider, the endpoints, the signature and replay validation posture, and the domain verification behind them. C3: the policy-change rows over the window, read as one per change. C4: rows evidencing each granted bypass. C5: the three one-off-token rows over the window, read as a chain — a mint with no exchange and no revocation is an authorization that was granted and never used, which is a different fact from one that was exercised. C6: the per-user-type impersonation declaration and its duration bound.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An impersonation mint that names only the target and not the calling administrator is a MAJOR — the row then records an action as though the impersonated user performed it, which is worse than no row. An unbounded or ceiling-exceeding duration is a MAJOR. A mint with no exchange is NOT a finding: an authorization granted and not used is a normal outcome, and reporting it would train a reviewer to skim the chain that matters. A trusted identity provider whose assertion verification is off is a MAJOR and the most consequential finding this demand can produce. A posture change with no row is a MAJOR — the pre-incident weakening of an authentication requirement is precisely what the detector exists to catch. An unverified domain routing principals to a provider is a MAJOR. Several rows for one change is an OBSERVATION about noise, not a control failure. C5 carries no severity.","verificationSteps":["Read the authored authentication configuration per user type and record the posture rather than judging it — a permissive declared posture is a decision, and severity follows what it exposes.","Per tenant, assert the four single-sign-on declarations, and specifically that assertion verification is ON where a provider is trusted.","For a per-tenant posture CHANGE, query the GENERIC resource-operation row rather than the policy-change member. That member covers the per-application authored baseline and its own declaration says it does NOT enumerate per-tenant overrides — while the tenant's enforcement, emergency-access and provider-restriction fields all carry the audit-evidence marker, so their before-and-after values ride the generic row. A tenant turning single sign-on off and a collector querying only the policy member is an empty result over a change that WAS recorded.","Assert each configured domain was VERIFIED, since the domain is what routes principals to that provider.","Query the policy-change member over the window and reconcile the number of rows against the number of genuine changes — one per change, and none for an unchanged boot.","Assert the first-ever row is a baseline with no prior value, rather than treating its absence as a gap.","Enumerate the declared break-glass set from configuration, then query the emergency-access member for USES over the window. An account in the set with no use is NOT a finding — a standing, unused break-glass account is the recommended posture — while a use with no row is.","Read the per-user-type impersonation declaration. Absent, C5's population is legitimately empty and no finding follows from it.","Where it is declared, chain the one-off rows: assert each mint names BOTH the calling super-admin and the target, and resolve each mint to an exchange or a revocation.","Assert each mint's duration is within the declared per-type maximum AND the framework ceiling — a duration honouring only the first is the bound that silently widens."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:authentication-posture-change-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:authorization-decision-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the authorization funnel is engine-owned and every operation passes through it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each refusal names the principal it refused and the operation it refused them"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A per-occurrence row in the engine's audit trail. REFUSALS are the half that matters — a demand satisfied only by grants would evidence the opposite of the control.","obligation":"Access-control decisions, refusals included, are attributable and reviewable.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"recording every refusal stays bounded; a HIGH count is the availability risk this clause names, so the number cannot be read as the clause being met"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Same rows, read as a RATE rather than as instances. The clause carries its own tension — a control that records every refusal can be driven to exhaust storage — so evidence must show both that repetition is visible and that recording is bounded.","obligation":"Repeated refusals stay detectable without the record itself becoming an availability risk.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"Host-retained telemetry: a structured error log naming the lost action, plus two counters. NO audit member exists and that is a DECISION rather than a gap — recording \"the audit store was unreachable\" IN the audit store is circular, and the seam that emits these argues exactly that.\n\n**This clause said UNPRODUCED until 2026-09-10, which retired an implemented control from examination.** The marked site for this objective states the obligation in the implementer's own words — audit-pipeline failures are detectable AND attributable to the specific action they lost — and the log line carries the resource type, the resource id, the operation identifier, the variant key, the actor and the ambient correlation id. The body reasoned correctly that no member exists and then drew the wrong conclusion from it. UNPRODUCED carries no severity, so an application that had lost the control entirely — no error-level logger binding, no metrics service — would never have been asked.","obligation":"A failure of the recording pipeline is detectable and attributable to the specific action it lost.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences DECISIONS, never their correctness — a wrongly granted access is recorded exactly like a right one. And C1's rows come from the funnel: an authorization decision taken outside it is invisible here, which is why the funnel being the sole denial chokepoint is a separate and load-bearing property.","minimumEvidence":"C1: denial rows for the window, each attributable to a principal and an operation. C2: the same rows aggregated by principal and by operation, plus evidence that recording is bounded rather than unbounded. C3: the host's log and metric archive for the window — the rate-limited error line \"A security audit observation was DROPPED before it reached the audit pipeline\" (slug `audit_observation_dropped`), whose context carries the lost action's identity, and the two counters `audit_observation_dropped_total` (the observer never reached the pipeline) and `audit_store_failure_total` (the pipeline reached the store and the store refused). Both counters are needed because they cover DIFFERENT loss shapes and neither sees the other's. The boot diagnostic for an absent delivery path and the dead-letter drain may also be gathered, but they evidence the PIPELINE's health rather than the attribution this clause demands, and must not be substituted for it.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Denials absent while grants are present is a MAJOR — it is the exact shape of a funnel recording only successes, and establishing it requires gathering the GRANT side too, which is why the minimum evidence names both rather than denials alone. Without the comparison this rule cannot fire. Unbounded recording is a MAJOR against availability, which the intent names explicitly. For C3, a drop line naming lost authorization decisions is a MAJOR — access decisions were taken and are not in the trail, and the period's denial evidence is incomplete by an unknown amount. A metric channel that is inert because the OTLP preload is not wired is an OBSERVATION against the evidence rather than a finding against the application: the log channel still carries the signal, which is why the control has two.","verificationSteps":["Gather denial rows for the window and assert each carries a principal and an operation.","Read the DEDUPLICATION ladder as the bounding mechanism C2 asks about — it is what keeps the record from becoming an availability risk — and note it FAILS OPEN: when the counter store is unreachable, emission becomes unbounded exactly when availability is most at risk. That is the clause's own tension and the evidence must state which mode was in effect.","Aggregate by principal and by operation using the row's OWN occurrence count and its exactness flag — never by counting rows. Refusals are deduplicated on a logarithmic ladder inside a five-minute window, so a burst of ten thousand identical denials costs about five rows; counting rows reads five and concludes repetition was not occurring, which inverts the clause.","Confirm recording is bounded — the clause names availability as a risk of the control itself.","For C3, read the host's log archive for the drop line and its context, and the metric archive for both counters. A window with NO drop line and NO counter increment is the control working, not an absent control — so establish first that the loss seam could have fired: the line is rate-limited to one per (observation, reason) per interval, and the metric channel is silently inert when the OTLP preload is not wired, which is a finding about the evidence rather than about the application."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:billing-reconciliation-run-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.PROVIDER_RECONCILIATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:billing-reconciliation-run-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to an application with billing enabled on its backend, which is what registers the scheduled sweep. An application without billing holds no provider state to reconcile.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The run output is the only record: a repair is a billing update below the automatic audit floor and files no audit row, and the per-row finding lines go to the application log. The output is total over the divergence vocabulary, so a kind with zero occurrences is recorded as zero rather than absent.\n\nRun output lives in job-execution history for 30 days and output payloads for 24 hours, so those operational records alone cannot cover a longer claimed period; the accountable host must retain each run's outcome in its evidence archive for that period, and the clause is evidenced for exactly as long as it does.","obligation":"Each run records, for every divergence kind, how many were detected, repaired and failed to repair.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"Same record, the second vocabulary. A run over unlinked rows, or rows a subscription mutation held, looks identical to a run that compared them unless the uncompared counts are read beside the divergence counts. It carries C1's retention limit for the same reason: the archive the host keeps is the only place the output outlives a day.","obligation":"Each run records every population it met and did not compare, so skipped rows are not read as agreement.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The refusals are what stop a scheduled write corrupting a subscription, and a healthy production window may contain no divergence to observe them against. They have to be driven.","obligation":"A repair writes only the fields the provider is authoritative for, may record an invoice that exists at the provider and nowhere locally, and never cancels or deletes.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"The sweep never compares terminal subscriptions, subscriptions that exist only at the provider, subscription items, invoice totals, or invoices older than the per-customer lookback. Divergence in any of those is invisible to every clause here by design. And the runtime gate is the backend's billing switch, not the engine capability, so an application declaring billing without enabling it runs no sweep and produces no record.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C2: the recorded output of the runs in the window. C3: a driven drift, an unreadable provider subscription, a subscription a mutation wrote between the sweep's provider read and its repair, and an invoice the provider holds that is missing locally, with the resulting writes.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A repair that writes a non-authoritative field, or cancels a subscription on an unreadable provider answer, is a MAJOR. A persistent non-zero repaired count is not a finding against this objective — the control is working — but it is evidence that webhook delivery is failing, which is a MAJOR against that path. A repair-failed count with no follow-up is an OBSERVATION.","verificationSteps":["Read the recorded output of each reconciliation run in the window and assert every divergence kind and every uncompared population is present.","For each divergence kind, compare repaired plus repair-failed against detected; the remainder is reported-without-repair and must be zero for every repairable kind.","Drive a status drift and assert the written payload contains only provider-authoritative fields.","Make the provider unable to read a subscription and assert nothing is written, cancelled or deleted.","Remove locally an invoice the provider still holds and assert the sweep records it again from provider fields and counts it as repaired."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:billing-reconciliation-run-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"The identifier half applies to every application and the answer for most is that it is OFF, which is a full answer rather than an empty one — the control is opt-in with no default. The egress and observability halves apply wherever an external processor or a trace sink is reached.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The scope is a committed application decision and the default is off. The framework WARNS rather than refuses when it is on, deliberately: opting in is a legitimate choice, and refusing to boot over an application-authored privacy posture would be the framework overriding the controller's own decision.","obligation":"A device-stored pseudonymous identifier is collected only under an explicit application opt-in — absent that policy, not at all.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The refusal happens in ONE place — frame construction, before the value can reach a log line or the audit store — and the evidence is that a supplied identifier does not appear anywhere downstream. An absent identifier in a clean deployment is not evidence: nobody sent one. The value has to be sent.","obligation":"Absent policy means the identifier is refused at ingestion, for every transport at once.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A property of the client under a policy CHANGE, which no server-side artifact can observe. It is the practical form of the erasure obligation on this one field: a persistent identifier that outlives the decision that created it is exactly what withdrawal is supposed to end. Narrowing counts as withdrawal for the scope being left behind.","obligation":"Withdrawing or NARROWING the policy erases the identifier from the device, rather than merely ceasing to send it.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"STRUCTURAL at the DOCUMENT-EXTRACTION seam since 2026-09-09: its provider request input carries the bytes, the media type and the resolved model and nothing else, so no provider can include an identifier it was never given. That is a shape a reader settles from the type, which is what makes that half DECLARED, and it is a stronger guarantee than a driven one because it holds for providers not yet written.\n\n**It does NOT generalise to \"an external processor\", and this rationale did until 2026-09-10.** The other marked egress seam — embeddings — has no such type: the engine composes the outbound call itself, which is exactly the \"property of a body some service composes\" this rationale contrasts itself against. So the higher-volume TEXT egress is verified by reading the composed body, not by reading a type, and a step naming \"the provider request input type\" in the singular discharges C4 while never looking at it.\n\nThe observability half is a driven observation rather than a declaration, and is gathered as such — see the steps.","obligation":"Only what the declared purpose requires leaves the boundary: an external processor receives the payload and nothing identifying the requester or its row, and observability surfaces receive summaries rather than raw content.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"C2 and C3 attest the build driven and, for C3, the client build driven — a different client version may store differently. C4's structural guarantee covers the provider seam only: any other outbound path, an application's own call among them, is outside this demand and is not made minimal by it. And none of it evidences that the declared PURPOSE was itself proportionate, which is a judgement no artifact carries.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the committed identifier scope, and the startup warning where it is on. C2: a driven request supplying an identifier under no policy, with the logs, traces and audit rows it produced. C3: a driven policy withdrawal and a narrowing, each followed by an inspection of device storage. C4: the provider request input type, and trace and log records from the egress paths.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An identifier persisted with no declared policy is a MAJOR. An identifier surviving on the device after withdrawal is a MAJOR and is the erasure-shaped half of this objective. An identifier or row context reaching an external processor is a MAJOR. Raw content in a trace is a MAJOR — a summary surface holding raw text is a disclosure with a different retention regime and a different audience. A declared opt-in with the startup warning present is NOT a finding: it is the control working and the decision being surfaced.","verificationSteps":["Read the committed identifier scope and record it — a declared DISABLED is a complete answer to C1.","Send a request carrying an identifier with no policy declared, then search logs, traces and audit rows for it at every verbosity.","Turn the policy off after it was on, and assert the stored identifier is gone from the device rather than merely unsent.","Narrow the policy from persistent to session and assert the persistent value is erased, not left behind.","Read the DOCUMENT-EXTRACTION provider request input type and assert it cannot carry a filename, a row identifier, an organization or a user.","For the EMBEDDINGS seam, read the composed outbound body instead — there is no constraining type there, so the guarantee is a property of that code and must be re-read whenever it changes.","Sample egress traces and assert they carry summaries — token counts, page counts, outcomes — and never raw text or raw vectors."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:client-registration-provenance-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:client-registration-provenance-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies wherever the application exposes an authorization server AND has opted into the relevant door. Both are OFF by default and this field named neither until 2026-09-10: client-identity-metadata resolution defaults to disabled, and dynamic client registration answers 404 until it is authored. So an empty population has three causes, not one — no registered clients, or either opt-in absent — and C1's driven resolution simply fails on the default posture, which is not_applicable_as_configured rather than a finding.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Demonstrable control is a property of a resolution that happened, not of a stored row: a bound identity looks the same whether the binding was demonstrated or asserted. The resolver deliberately decides IDENTITY only — a client that resolves is one whose NAME the consent screen may show, and consent, scope and audience remain separate gates — so evidence gathered here must not be read as an authorization outcome.","obligation":"A client identity is bound to a domain the client demonstrably controls.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class, and the reason it exists is not that one such registration is dangerous — the client is confined to identity scopes, holds no roles, and always faces consent. It is that this is the only unauthenticated WRITE in the application, so an operator must be able to see the population it produces. The same member also covers a self-registered client CHANGING its own registration, which is the one way its redirect set moves after creation.","obligation":"A client identity created by a party that authenticated to NOTHING is recorded.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["oauth_dynamic_client_registered"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the reason that distinguishes a misconfiguration from an attack"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The row is the artifact and the REASON is why it is high risk: the vocabulary spans a misconfiguration and an active outbound-request attack, both arriving at the same endpoint from the same kind of unauthenticated caller. Only the reason tells them apart, and an operator watching this event is watching for the second — so it must be queryable rather than buried in a log line.","obligation":"And EVERY refused client assertion is recorded, with the reason that distinguishes a misconfiguration from an attack.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["oauth_cimd_client_refused"]}],"limits":"C1 attests the build driven. C2 and C3 evidence that registrations and refusals were RECORDED, never that the registered population is legitimate — the control is observability of an unauthenticated write, not prevention of it. And an update to a self-registered client shares the registration member, so the two cannot be separated by event type alone; separate them by the row payload or not at all.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven client-identity resolution against a domain under test control, and a driven resolution against one that is not, refused. C2 and C3: the two audit members over the window, with C3 grouped BY REASON rather than counted.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A registration with no row is a MAJOR: the unauthenticated write population becomes unobservable, which is the whole reason the event exists. A refusal with no row is a MAJOR. A refusal row with no reason is also a MAJOR rather than an observation — a refusal you cannot classify is operationally the same as one you did not record. An audit failure that CHANGED the outcome of the request it observed is a MAJOR against the emission design, not against the control.","verificationSteps":["Drive a client-identity resolution for a domain the test controls and assert the identity binds.","Drive one for a host outside the allowed set and assert refusal.","Query the registration member over the window and reconcile it against the client rows created in that window.","Query the refusal member over the window and GROUP BY reason — an undifferentiated count answers neither of the two questions the event exists for.","Assert both emissions are fire-and-forget: auditing must never change or fail the request it observes."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:client-registration-provenance-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:collection-export-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:collection-export-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application with an exportable collection; one with none has no bulk export to record.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the resource exported, the operation it was taken from and the format it was rendered in"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A per-occurrence row, and the three named fields are the clause: a bulk export is the largest disclosure an application performs routinely, and 'which resource, from which operation, in which format' is what makes it reviewable rather than merely counted. The FORMAT matters because a rendering can carry more than the operation's own projection.","obligation":"A bulk export of a resource collection is a recorded event naming the resource exported, the operation it was taken from, and the format it was rendered in.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["collection_data_export"]}],"limits":"It evidences that a collection left, HOW MUCH of it, and under what narrowing — the row carries a mandatory non-negative record count, a row scope and the filter field NAMES. This section claimed the opposite until 2026-09-10 (\"names no record count\"), which is the field the member was designed around: without reading it a judge cannot tell a twenty-row page download from a whole-table dump, and the schema says an export event with no count answers nothing.\n\nWhat it genuinely does NOT hold is filter VALUES — only the field names — so it can say a narrowing was applied and never which subjects it selected.","minimumEvidence":"C1: export rows for the window, each naming the resource, the source operation and the render format.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A bulk export with no record is a MAJOR: the single largest routine disclosure, unevidenced. A row missing the format is not a finding: the field is mandatory and always supplied, so its absence would be a schema violation rather than an evidence gap. A row whose record count is absent is likewise impossible; a row whose count is implausible against the collection's size is a MAJOR and is what this member exists to surface.","verificationSteps":["Gather collection-export rows and assert each carries resource, operation and format.","Reconcile against the operations that can produce a bulk export: an export path with no rows is the finding, not an empty window.","Note the row records the EVENT, not the extent — a row does not say how many records left."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:collection-export-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:conferring-grant-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:conferring-grant-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Narrowing is engine-owned and runs on every scoped read and write; the unit-subtree clause has an empty population where no organization unit exists.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The implementation REFUSES a contradicting scope with a named error code rather than silently overriding it, and the site records that silent override was considered and rejected precisely so the REST and agent surfaces answer identically. So the strongest evidence is the refusal, not an empty result: an empty result set is satisfied for many wrong reasons — no matching rows, a broken query, a filter dropped — while the code cannot be faked. This clause said the evidence is that a supplied scope \"has no effect\" until 2026-09-10, which is the design that was rejected. Note an EQUAL value, and a single-member membership test equal to it, are no-ops by design and must not be driven as attacks.\n\nNarrowing is also visible against data the caller should NOT see, so it has to be driven with rows outside the grant present. The write side needs its own drive and is the half that is missed: a row filter cannot constrain a CREATE — there is no row yet — and does not constrain the VALUES an update writes, so read-side evidence says nothing about it.","obligation":"Reads and writes are narrowed to the tenant, unit subtree or parent row the caller's own grant reaches.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The stamp exists to answer a specific question an access review asks — why does this principal reach this record — without reconstructing it from role tables afterwards, which answers the different question of what the principal could reach NOW.\n\n**But it reaches no store.** The stamp is a private in-memory Map on the execution context, read by exactly two consumers, both of them ENFORCEMENT: it tightens the query and is discarded when the request ends. Nothing under the audit trail reads it and no event payload carries it. So `EMITTED` at the PRODUCTION plane — which this clause claimed until 2026-09-10, telling a collector to sample decisions over a window — pointed at a window that does not exist. What IS evidenceable is that the stamp is computed and NARROWS the query, which is a driven observation.\n\nThe durable half the objective's wording implies is a genuine framework gap: an access review still cannot ask why a principal reached a record last March. Recorded in `limits` rather than as an application nonconformity.","obligation":"The conferring GRANT is recorded alongside the decision.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Exactness is two-sided and a single drive only ever shows one side. The expansion follows the unit's declared inheritance, so the evidence must show a sibling excluded AND a declared descendant included — an over-narrow grant is a defect too, and it presents as a support ticket rather than as a breach, so it survives longer.","obligation":"A unit grant expands to exactly its declared subtree and no further.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The direction that matters: every other clause makes a result smaller, and this one refuses an attempt to make it larger. Evidenced by driving a tenant-authored write against a platform-imposed restriction and asserting refusal — no artifact records a restriction that was NOT lifted.","obligation":"And a tenant cannot LIFT a narrowing the platform imposed on it.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"Every clause attests the build driven, on the scope kinds driven. C2 evidences that the stamp is PRESENT; whether it names the grant that truly conferred access is a question about the resolver, not about the row. And none of it evidences that the grant itself was appropriate — this demand is about confinement to a grant, never about whether the grant should exist.","minimumEvidence":"C1: driven reads and WRITES per scope kind — tenant, unit, parent row — each with out-of-scope rows present. C2: a driven read by a unit-scoped principal, with the stamp observed on the execution context and the query shown to have narrowed. Do NOT look for a store. C3: a driven read from a unit grant showing an included declared descendant and an excluded sibling. C4: a driven tenant attempt to relax a platform restriction, refused.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A read returning an out-of-scope row is a MAJOR and a disclosure. An unconstrained CREATE or UPDATE is a MAJOR of the same order and is more likely to be missed, because nothing looks wrong in a response. A unit grant reaching beyond its declared subtree is a MAJOR; one falling short is an OBSERVATION with a real cost, since it is reported as a product fault and worked around. A decision with no conferring-grant stamp is an OBSERVATION unless the review cannot proceed without it, at which point it is the demand's whole subject.","verificationSteps":["Drive a scoped read with out-of-scope rows present and assert none is returned.","Drive a CREATE and an UPDATE under the same grant and assert the values are constrained — a read-side filter does not constrain either.","Drive a read as a unit-scoped principal and assert the stamp is present on the execution context AND that the issued query was narrowed by it — the stamp existing while the query is unnarrowed is the finding.","Do NOT sample decisions over a window for the stamp: it is per-request and in-memory, so an empty result means only that the request ended.","From a unit grant, assert a declared descendant IS reached and a sibling is NOT — both directions, in one drive.","Attempt, as the tenant, to widen a platform-imposed restriction on itself, and assert refusal.","Assert the audit trail's own tenant segregation holds on the AUTHENTICATED scope while a subject tenant still sees events concerning it."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:conferring-grant-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:consent-decision-transition-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:consent-decision-transition-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: privacy preferences are engine-owned and every application's subjects have them.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the decision was recorded EXACTLY ONCE under a race, and that each row names the previous and the resulting value"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Processing-consent preference changes use the generic resource-operation row. OAuth authorization consent uses OAUTH_CONSENT_* events, while release-bound governed-document decisions use GOVERNED_DOCUMENT_INTERACTION_RECORDED. Those distinct records do not substitute for evidence that a preference value changed.\n\nSelf-service and administrator preference UPDATEs explicitly opt into auditing below the automatic HIGH-or-CRITICAL floor; RESET already reaches that floor. The privacy decision leaves are marked as audit evidence, so ordinary updates can retain previous and resulting values without copying the whole preferences block. Gather actual rows and compare them with completed changes; declarations alone do not prove durable delivery.","obligation":"A consent decision — given, changed or withdrawn — is recorded exactly once and never lost to a race, naming the previous and the resulting value.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_performed"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A structural property of the operation surface: every verb able to write the consent field reaches the same emission point. Rows cannot evidence it — a verb that bypassed the point would emit nothing, and its silence is indistinguishable from no consent change at all, which is why this is DECLARED rather than gathered.\n\nEnumerate the verbs from the resource configurations, including internal lifecycle paths. The historical update_privacy operation name was incorrect and has been removed from the control marker (#592).","obligation":"Every verb able to change consent routes through ONE emission point.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"any of the rows records a preferences RESET rather than another operation, or that each carries the previous and the resulting consent"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Called out because it is the one an implementer drops: a reset returns consentedPurposes to the EMPTY set, which is a consent decision — a withdrawal of every purpose — with a previous and a resulting value even though nobody chose the new one.","obligation":"And resetting a subject's privacy preferences is itself such a decision.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_performed"]}],"limits":"It evidences that a decision was RECORDED, never that it was honoured — whether processing actually stopped is the third-party-processing and minimisation demands' question. And it evidences decisions made through the application: consent captured out of band and imported is invisible here.\n\nScope boundary: the same objective also marks the OIDC authorization code path, whose marker reads \"the user's consent is recorded exactly once, never lost to a race\", C1's exact words. It is deliberately outside these clauses because it is OAuth authorization consent, and the emitted members there (OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTED / DENIED / GRANT_PERSISTED, all live) belong to the delegated-authorization demand. The exclusion is a judgement about SCOPE, not about emission — an earlier revision of this body argued it from a false claim that those rows are unwritten.","minimumEvidence":"C1: audit-floor rows for consent-changing operations in the window, each naming the previous and the resulting value — a row naming only the new value does not satisfy the clause. C2: the enumeration of every verb that can write consent, all resolving to the single emission point. C3: reset operations present in the same row class as explicit changes.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A consent change with no record is a MAJOR — a subject's decision unevidenced — but attribute it correctly: when the missing record comes from framework emission rather than application configuration, attribute the defect to the FRAMEWORK and record the application impact separately. A row naming only the resulting value is a MAJOR on an UPDATE, because 'changed' is unprovable without the prior, and NOT a finding on a CREATE or a bulk write, where no pre-image exists by design. Two rows for one decision is a MAJOR, since 'never lost to a race' cuts both ways. A verb that bypasses the emission point is a MAJOR even with no consent change observed through it.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every verb able to write a consent field FROM THE RESOURCE CONFIGURATION, and assert each reaches the one emission point (C2). Do not substitute the marker for the actual operation inventory.","Read each such verb's declared risk level and its below-floor audit opt-in BEFORE gathering. A verb below the automatic floor with no opt-in emits nothing, and its empty result is an engine gap rather than an application's.","Gather audit-floor rows for those operations and assert each carries previous AND resulting values. Expect NO prior value on a CREATE or a bulk write: no pre-image is fetched, so its absence there is the documented behaviour and not a finding.","Assert exactly-once: a consent change that produced two rows is a race the clause names explicitly, not a duplicate to deduplicate.","Check resets appear in the same class as explicit changes; a body that queries only explicit verbs will miss them."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:consent-decision-transition-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:constraint-conflict-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:constraint-conflict-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares a uniqueness constraint, which is every application with a business key. The head noun is misleading and the mismatch matters: nothing is RECORDED. What the intent demands is the SHAPE of a refusal handed back to a caller, so a judge looking for rows will find none and must not read that as an absence.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The identity a conflict is reported BY does not exist unless the committed schema names it — isUnique with a conflictMessageReference for a single-field key, businessKeySet for a compound one. Nothing at runtime can invent one, and resolveDeclaredUniqueConflictReference returns undefined by design when nothing was declared, so the declaration is the whole of this half.","obligation":"A resource names the conflict identity beside the constraint that produces it, rather than leaving every duplicate to collapse into one generic code.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The report is a response shape, not a stored artifact — OBSERVED, which is exactly that: a driven result, reproducible on demand and stored nowhere. This clause carried EMITTED until 2026-09-10 because no accurate member existed and EMITTED was the nearest; adding OBSERVED is what let it say what it means. The adapter split is the load-bearing part: the Mongo and PostgreSQL resource repositories are separate classes and each translates its own driver error, so evidence at one says nothing about the other.","obligation":"A driven duplicate is answered with that declared identity rather than as an opaque datastore failure — at BOTH persistence adapters.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It attests the adapters DRIVEN, never every conflict in production. Resolution is by the FIELD-NAME SET the datastore reports, deliberately rather than by reconstructing index shapes — so a driver that reports a violated index without its covered fields resolves to nothing and is indistinguishable here from a resource that declared no identity.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the committed declarations, read off the schema rather than transcribed. C2: a driven duplicate insert per adapter in use, and the refusal it produced carrying the declared ErrorCustomMessageReference.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A declared reference not returned on a driven conflict is a MAJOR at that adapter — the declaration is then a promise nothing keeps. A WRONG-but-specific reference is also MAJOR and is worse than a generic one, in the resolver's own words: an integrator branching on it takes the wrong recovery path. A constraint that declared no identity is an OBSERVATION and not a nonconformity; the fail-safe path is honouring a choice the resource made.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every declared uniqueness constraint that carries a conflict message reference.","Drive a duplicate against one such constraint on the Mongo adapter and assert the declared reference is returned.","Drive the same against the PostgreSQL adapter — a translation present in one repository class is absent in the other until shown.","Assert an UNDECLARED constraint still yields the generic conflict code rather than a guessed one."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:constraint-conflict-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:credential-state-transition-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Credentials are engine-owned across every authentication method an application enables.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each transition names the credential and the party it is attributed to — or, for an expiry, that nothing performed it"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Per-occurrence rows in the audit trail, one class per transition kind. EXPIRY is the one to watch: it is a transition nothing actively performs, so a demand assuming an actor for every member would fail on it.","obligation":"Issuance, refresh, rotation, revocation and expiry of a credential are explicit attributable transitions.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_password_changed","one_off_token_revoked","oauth_token_revoked","oauth_token_refreshed","user_password_reset_forced"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each detection was answered by invalidating the token family, which only the row's own revocation flag states"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"ONE row, not two. The detection member carries a boolean recording whether the token family was revoked, so the detection and the response it triggered are the same artifact and need no correlation.\n\n**This clause asserted the opposite until 2026-09-10 — \"a detection followed by a revocation is TWO rows that must be correlatable\" — and named no member at all.** Both halves misdirect: a collector pairing detections with revocations turns every ordinary user- or client-initiated token revocation into a reported unpaired invalidation, while the real theft response produces no separate revocation row to pair with.","obligation":"Credential theft is detected and answered by invalidation.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_refresh_token_reuse_detected"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"'Actually terminates' is a claim about EFFECT, and a revocation row evidences the intent rather than the outcome. Only a driven scenario — revoke, then present the credential and be refused — separates a real termination from a mark.","obligation":"A revocation actually terminates the sessions and tokens it names, rather than merely marking them.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"C1 and C2 attest the window; C3 attests the BUILD it was driven against, not that every production revocation took effect. Nothing here evidences that a credential was not ALSO copied before revocation.","minimumEvidence":"C1: transition rows across the window covering each kind an application's enabled methods can produce. C2: paired detection and invalidation rows, correlatable. C3: a driven scenario in which a revoked credential is presented and refused, for sessions and for tokens separately.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A revocation that leaves a credential usable is a MAJOR — it is C3's whole subject and the difference between marking and terminating. An uncorrelatable detection/invalidation pair is an OBSERVATION unless the invalidation is missing entirely, which is a MAJOR.","verificationSteps":["Gather transition rows and group by kind; report kinds with no activity as observations, not gaps.","For each invalidation, resolve the detection that preceded it; an unpaired invalidation is reported, not assumed benign.","Drive a revocation and then present the credential, asserting refusal for a session and for a token.","Treat expiry separately: it has no HUMAN actor, so an attribution check demanding one will misreport it. It is not actorless — a marked daily sweep drives the expire verbs — and its scheduled invocation leaves bounded job-execution history and successful output. Preserve those outcomes in the host's archive for claims longer than their operational retention, while the expire verbs it dispatches leave ordinary resource-operation rows where their risk level puts them above the audit floor. Gather both run continuity and the effects; neither alone proves the other."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:credit-grant-reachability-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:credit-grant-reachability-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies wherever the credit-pool RESOURCES are registered — a CONFIGURATION fact, not a data one. This field said \"wherever a credit balance exists\" until 2026-09-10, which invites the cheap reading: an application with zero credit rows declines the demand while its top-up door is fully declared and reachable. The doors are declared regardless of whether any balance was ever written, so the escape must be read off the registration and never off a row count.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"REACHABILITY is a property of the declared operation surface: which variants can increase a balance, and what gates each. The committed configuration answers it, and a runtime row could not — a balance nobody increased emits nothing.","obligation":"An increase in a credit balance is reachable only through a system or payment-gated door.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The self-grant is the failure mode, and its absence is a non-event. Only a driven attempt — an ordinary principal trying to increase its own balance and being refused — separates a closed door from an untested one.","obligation":"So no ordinary principal can grant itself economic value.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences the DOOR, never the amounts: a payment-gated increase for the wrong quantity is correct here and wrong elsewhere. And the enumeration attests the build — a variant added later is invisible until re-enumerated.","minimumEvidence":"C1: every operation variant that can increase a credit balance, with its gate, from committed configuration — the enumeration must be exhaustive, because one ungated variant defeats the rest. C2: a driven attempt by an ordinary principal, refused.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An ungated increase variant is a MAJOR and the objective's entire subject — economic value granted to self. A successful driven self-grant is a MAJOR. An empty set of illegitimate increases evidences nothing either way.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every variant that writes an increase and assert each is system- or payment-gated.","Drive an increase as an ordinary principal and assert refusal.","Do NOT read balance rows as evidence: a balance nobody wrongly increased looks exactly like a control that never ran."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:credit-grant-reachability-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application, and most sharply to those with no platform-tier administration: the demand's strongest evidence is an empty crossing set beside a live enforcement path.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The enumeration is a committed declaration: a variant either declares cross-tenant admission or it does not. Reach acquired by position in the request path is exactly what the intent forbids, and a declaration is what makes admission auditable rather than emergent.","obligation":"A crossing is admitted only by an explicitly enumerated operation variant — never ambient.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each elevation was requested before it was used, and approved by the tenant where that tenant demands approval"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The grant's life is a per-occurrence class. 'Requested rather than assumed' is a property of the record's existence: an elevation with no request row is the ambient standing privilege the objective exists to remove.","obligation":"It requires an elevation that was REQUESTED rather than assumed, and where the tenant demands it, approved by that tenant.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["platform_access_grant_lifecycle"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the TENANT REACHED, which is what makes the crossing reconstructable"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A separate row from the grant, and it must be: a grant evidences permission to cross, never that a crossing occurred. The record distinguishes a sanctioned crossing from an attempted undeclared one.","obligation":"And the crossing itself is recorded, as a distinct event NAMING THE TENANT REACHED.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["cross_tenant_administrative_access"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The intent's fourth demand, and this body had no clause for it until 2026-09-10 — which mattered more than an ordinary omission, because the body's own PASS rule then rested on it: an empty crossing set was read as \"no platform administration occurred\" while nothing gathered evidence that the enforcement path was live. An empty set is equally what a broken refusal produces when nobody happened to try.\n\nIt cannot be a row. The refusal throws a not-found at the authorization tier, and the crossing row is emitted BEFORE the admission decision and carries no outcome field — deliberately, so a reviewer sees the attempt either way. So a succeeded crossing and a refused one are indistinguishable in the trail BY DESIGN, and only driving the refusal separates them. The driven probe already exists over two provisioned tenants.","obligation":"And an UNDECLARED crossing fails closed.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"There is a SECOND blind spot INSIDE the application, and it is by design: an UNDECLARED application-scoped door that returns foreign rows leaves nothing in the trail, because emitting a declared-crossing flag of false for a door that declared nothing would put a false sentence in the trail. The population is enumerable — only a handful of application-scoped resources declare a top-level tenant field — so a judge can bound it, but this demand's evidence cannot see it.\n\nOtherwise it evidences crossings the engine mediates. A platform operator reaching a tenant's data outside the application — a database console — is invisible here and is not made safe by it.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the set of operation variants declaring cross-tenant admission, from committed configuration. C4: a driven undeclared crossing, refused, on both the per-instance and the collection path — the two are enforced in different phases from different inputs, so one is silence about the other. C2: grant lifecycle rows showing request, and where required approval, before use. C3: crossing rows for the window, each distinguishing a declared admission from an attempted undeclared one.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A crossing with no grant is a MAJOR — it is the ambient reach the objective removes. An undeclared crossing that is NOT REFUSED when driven is a MAJOR (C4); do not look for a succeeded-crossing row instead, because the row cannot say — its flag records whether the crossing was DECLARED, not whether it was admitted. A recorded undeclared attempt is the control WORKING. A grant used before approval, where the tenant demands approval, is a MAJOR.","verificationSteps":["Read the declared cross-tenant variants and assert the set is explicit rather than derived from a role alone.","For each crossing in the window, resolve the grant that permitted it and assert the grant was requested before use.","Assert every crossing produced a record, including attempted undeclared ones — those are the rows a reviewer most needs.","Drive an UNDECLARED crossing and assert it is refused. This is what makes the next step safe, and it is the step this body lacked until 2026-09-10: an empty crossing set is also what a broken refusal path produces when nobody happened to try.","An empty crossing set is a PASS only once that refusal has been driven — then it means no platform administration occurred, rather than that none was noticed.","Assert each crossing row names the TENANT REACHED, which is the row's organization and never the caller's own. Do NOT try to distinguish a crossing that SUCCEEDED from one that was refused: the row is emitted BEFORE the admission decision and carries no outcome, deliberately, so that a reviewer sees the attempt either way."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:delegated-authorization-decision-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:delegated-authorization-decision-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application exposing an authorization server or connecting to a third party. The largest marked surface in the catalog, and the demand covers BOTH directions: a third party acting for a user of this application, and this application acting toward a third party for one of its own principals.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"no third party acted for a user without that user's recorded authorization — a claim about accesses that left no consent row at all"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Four members, and they are four because the four facts are not recoverable from each other. A REFUSAL leaves no token and no grant, so nothing but its own row records that the user was asked and said no. A PERSISTED grant is a standing authorization that outlives the ceremony that created it, and it is separately audited even when it is created in the same request. A FAILED exchange is the monitoring surface — the code never decoded — and is the only one of the four that an attacker produces on purpose.","obligation":"A third party acts for a user only on that user's recorded authorization, and approval, refusal, persistence and failure of the exchange are each audited.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["oauth_consent_granted","oauth_consent_denied","oauth_consent_grant_persisted","oauth_code_exchange_failed"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the subject, client, audience, granted scopes and lifetime of the token it records"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Its own clause rather than part of C1, because consent and issuance are separable in both directions: a persisted grant issues tokens later with no new ceremony, and a client declaring itself consent-free inside its own trust boundary may skip the prompt entirely. The token row is then the only per-occurrence record that the delegation was exercised.","obligation":"Issuing a delegated token — the ability to act AS the user — is recorded with its subject, its client, its audience, its granted scopes and its lifetime.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["oauth_delegated_token_issued"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A property of what the endpoint REFUSES, which no successful exchange records. It has to be driven: present a code without its proof, and with a weakened proof, and assert both are refused. A row saying a token was issued cannot say whether the challenge would have been skippable.","obligation":"Proof of possession is enforced on the exchange.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Confinement is evidenced by asking for MORE than was granted and being refused, not by reading a correct token. The same holds for renewal, which happens with no new act of consent and is therefore bounded only by what the original grant carried — the point at which scope creep would be invisible.","obligation":"The issued token carries no more than the grant declared.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C5","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the authorization was spent ONLY for its principal, which is a claim about rows that do not exist"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The mirrored direction, with its own member set at both user and organization scope. FOUR facts per credential and each is separately load-bearing: the authorization, every USE of it — delegated authority exercised is what an access review counts — the ROTATION, and the withdrawal, without which a revoked credential is indistinguishable in the trail from one that was never granted. Read each member's own marker before demanding it: the enum assigns members to this objective and states which question each answers.","obligation":"In the outbound direction, a principal's authorization for this application to act toward a named third party is recorded, is spent only for that principal, and its withdrawal is recorded too.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_provider_connection_granted","organization_provider_connection_granted","user_provider_credential_set","organization_provider_credential_set","user_provider_credential_used","organization_provider_credential_used","user_provider_credential_rotated","organization_provider_credential_rotated","user_provider_credential_deleted","organization_provider_credential_deleted"]}],"limits":"C3 and C4 attest the build driven. The audited-emission design means an emission failure is swallowed rather than failing the request, so a gap in the trail and a period of no delegation look the same. Consent is evidenced as RECORDED, never as informed — what the user was shown is outside every artifact named here. And a consent-free client inside its own trust boundary legitimately produces no ceremony, so its absence must be resolved against the client declaration rather than reported.","minimumEvidence":"C1, C2 and C5: the eleven members over the window, with the refusal and failure members read as first-class results rather than as the absence of success. C3: driven exchanges without the possession proof and with a weakened one, both refused. C4: a driven exchange requesting more scope than the grant declared, and a driven renewal, both confined to the original grant.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A delegated token issued with no recorded authorization behind it is a MAJOR and is the most severe finding this demand produces: a third party holds the ability to act as a user who never agreed. A missing refusal row is a MAJOR — the trail then records only the outcomes the user accepted, which reads as unanimous consent. A skippable possession proof is a MAJOR. A token carrying more than the grant declared is a MAJOR. A credential USE with no row is a MAJOR, since delegated authority exercised is the only thing an access review can count. A failed-exchange row is not itself a finding — it is the monitoring surface, and a spike in it is.","verificationSteps":["Query the consent members over the window and read GRANTED, DENIED and PERSISTED as three separate populations — a persisted grant created inside a granting request produces two rows, and that is correct rather than duplication.","Reconcile issued delegated tokens against grants: a token with no consent ceremony behind it must resolve to a persisted grant or to a client declaring itself consent-free inside its own trust boundary.","Present an authorization code with no possession proof and assert refusal; repeat with a weakened proof.","Request a scope beyond the grant and assert the issued token does not carry it.","Renew a token and assert the renewal is bounded by the ORIGINAL grant, since no new consent occurred.","For the outbound direction, assert each credential USE names the principal whose authority it spent, and that a withdrawal leaves its own row.","Assert every emission on this path is fire-and-forget — auditing must never change the authorization outcome it observes."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:delegated-authorization-decision-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:destruction-decision-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:destruction-decision-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The identity and tenant destruction verbs are engine-owned; the retained-record clauses have an empty population where no resource declares a retention treatment, which is an absence of subject matter rather than a declined control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each destruction names who decided it"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Durable rows, and the unit is the DECISION rather than the destruction. The moment worth catching is when the tenant loses its access, which is also the moment a mistaken or malicious teardown can still be reversed; the purge that follows is the mechanical consequence. So the scheduling row must exist even where the decision was later reversed — an evidence trail that only records completed destructions cannot show an attempt.","obligation":"Destruction of an identity, a tenant or its data is a deliberate, attributable, evidenced DECISION.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["organization_deletion_requested","organization_deleted","user_deleted"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each restoration happened within the declared window and was performed by a party other than the one that scheduled the destruction"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The restoration row is the artifact, and the separately-privileged half is what makes the window a control rather than a delay: a party that can both schedule and reverse has a window with itself. Reversal destroys nothing, which is exactly why the record is the only trace it leaves.","obligation":"It is REVERSIBLE until its declared window elapses, and the reversal is itself audited and performed by a separately-privileged party.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["organization_restored"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each destruction happened when its declared window elapsed, rather than early or late"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Per scope rather than per run, and the per-scope half IS a durable row class: destroying a tenant emits its own member, which C1 already demands. That is what makes this clause EMITTED where the sibling sweep clauses are not.\n\nThe CONTINUITY half needs retained run outcomes. Scheduled application receipts now create operational history (30 days) and retain successful outputs separately (24 hours); longer claimed periods require the host to preserve evidence beyond those lifetimes. Gather destructions from the audit trail and continuity from retained run outcomes. An absence of destructions does not prove that none were due.\n\nThe members are the two DESTRUCTION classes C1 already demands — the tenant and the identity — and deliberately NOT the deletion REQUEST: this clause is about the destruction being CARRIED OUT, and counting requests would let a scheduled sweep that never ran read as evidence that it had. Until 2026-09-16 the clause named none, so the per-scope half its own rationale calls a durable row class could not be gathered at all. The CONTINUITY half still cannot be: retained run outcomes are a different store.","obligation":"Then it is carried out ON SCHEDULE, with evidence per scope destroyed.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["organization_deleted","user_deleted"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A negative property of every ordinary path, which no row can show: a retained row absent from a result is indistinguishable from a row that never existed. It has to be driven from both sides — ordinary reads and writes refused, and the one declared door succeeding and leaving its own audited trace. Both halves matter: a door that is not audited is not a door, it is a bypass.","obligation":"An erased-but-RETAINED record is hidden from, and immutable to, every ORDINARY access path — the only door is an audited see-through read.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C5","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The clause an implementer most reliably drops, because the primary row is correct and the derived copy is somewhere else — a retrieval chunk, an index entry. Sweep-based exclusion has a window during which erased content is still served, and the length of that window is an operational accident rather than a declared property. Evidenced by erasing a parent and immediately querying the derived surface.","obligation":"And its DERIVED copies are excluded by a live check against the parent row, rather than by waiting for a sweep.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"C1 to C3 attest the window; C4 and C5 attest the build driven, on the derived surfaces driven — a derived copy in a surface nobody queried is invisible here. It evidences that destruction was DECIDED and CARRIED OUT, never that every copy in every backup and export is gone, which no runtime artifact can show. And a reversal by a separately-privileged party evidences separation of the two roles, not that either was exercised well.","minimumEvidence":"C1, C2 and C3: the destruction and restoration members over the window, plus the scheduled sweep's per-scope evidence and the continuity of its runs. C4: driven ordinary reads and writes against a retained record, refused, and a driven see-through read that succeeds and is itself recorded. C5: a parent erased and its derived copies queried immediately.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A destruction with no decision row is a MAJOR. A retained record reachable on an ordinary path is a MAJOR and a disclosure of data the subject asked to have erased. A see-through read that leaves no row is a MAJOR: the carve-out's justification is that the access is accountable. A derived copy still served after its parent was erased is a MAJOR, and its severity does not fall because a sweep would eventually remove it — the window is the defect. A scheduled destruction past its window is a MAJOR against the sweep, not against the decision.","verificationSteps":["Query the destruction members over the window and PAIR each decision with either a completed destruction or a restoration — a decision with neither is a window still open, and its deadline is the finding.","Assert the reversal ran at the SEPARATELY-PRIVILEGED tier the verb declares. Do NOT assert the two acts were performed by different PEOPLE: both the marking and the restoring verb are platform-tier and cross-tenant, so one operator legitimately does both, and a person-distinctness check reports a MAJOR against the designed flow.","Read the sweep's per-scope evidence and assert continuity of runs across the period.","Attempt an ordinary read of a retained record and assert it is not returned; attempt an ordinary write and assert refusal.","Perform the declared see-through read and assert BOTH that it succeeds and that it left its own audited row.","Erase a parent row and query its derived copies IMMEDIATELY — not after a sweep interval, which is the assumption this clause exists to refuse."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:destruction-decision-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:directory-authority-switch-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:directory-authority-switch-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies ONLY where an application opts in — the intent says so in its first clause. An application with no directory connection has an empty population and has declined nothing; an application WITH a connection and no declared switches is the case this demand is actually about.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The provisioning configuration IS the evidence, and the clause is precisely that a connection alone must not be read as consent to it. Unit reconciliation is the sharpest case: it runs only when the organization declared BOTH a unit mapping and a default unit role, and that gate is load-bearing because reconciliation REPLACES a member's assignments with what the directory pushed.","obligation":"The switches conferring directory authority are DECLARED explicitly, rather than implied by the presence of a connection.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The bindings are committed values. The reason they must be explicit is structural: a directory pushes a flat string, units live in a TREE where a code is unique only among siblings and a name is freeform, so a search-based match is genuinely ambiguous and resolving to the wrong node grants the wrong DATA. Nothing guesses — an unbound value is ignored and no unit is ever created — which is a property of the declaration set, readable without driving anything.","obligation":"Unit membership is treated as an authorization grant, not a label — so the binding is unit-id-addressed and never guessed.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each account change names the account it changed and the directory it came from"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class in the engine's own event store. All three were verified to have production callers in the directory controller — several each rather than one apiece, which matters only in that a collector should not expect a single emission site per member when tracing one.","obligation":"Accounts created, updated and deprovisioned by the directory are each attributable.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["scim_user_provisioned","scim_user_updated","scim_user_deactivated"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A driven result and NOT a declaration: what stops such a member today is the effective-policy block, not the absence of a local first factor. The sweep that destroys local credentials can leave some standing and says so at error level — so the clause is evidenced by driving a deprovisioned member against the login path, never by reading that the sweep ran.","obligation":"A directory-managed member cannot authenticate around deprovisioning at the credential layer.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"The two provisioning-CONFIGURATION events are deliberately NOT demanded here. Both have a typed emit method with ZERO production callers, so demanding either would raise a MAJOR against a working control the first time its activity occurs — and neither carries an unemitted acknowledgement, so no gate refuses the demand either. Recorded as issue #591. The practical consequence for C1: a CHANGE to a declared switch is evidenced today only by the generic resource-operation row over the fields marked as audit evidence — which covers the create and deprovision switches, the default role, the default UNIT role, AND the unit mapping itself. An earlier revision of this sentence excluded the mapping, which is the switch C1's own rationale calls the sharpest case: a judge told it was unevidenced would accept an absence instead of querying the row that exists.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C2: the committed provisioning configuration — the create, verify and deprovision switches, the unit mapping and the default unit role — read as declarations rather than inferred from the connection. C3: the three directory audit members over the window. C4: a driven authentication attempt by a deprovisioned directory-managed member, refused, plus the sweep's error-level report of members still carrying local credentials.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A directory treated as authoritative for unit membership with no declared mapping is a MAJOR — the assignments are an authorization axis and would be replaced by whatever the directory pushed. A member still authenticating after deprovisioning is a MAJOR. Members named in the sweep's still-carrying report are an OBSERVATION where the effective-policy block holds and a MAJOR where it does not: the physical destruction is OWED, and the report line exists to say so rather than to assert a breach.","verificationSteps":["Read the provisioning configuration and assert each authority-conferring switch is explicitly declared.","Assert unit reconciliation is enabled only where BOTH a unit mapping and a default unit role are declared.","Assert every declared binding addresses a unit by id, and that a directory value with no binding is ignored rather than matched by name.","Query the three directory audit members over the window against the provisioning activity they should account for.","Deprovision a directory-managed member and assert authentication is refused, then read the sweep report for members still carrying local credentials."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:directory-authority-switch-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The gate is engine-owned and the objective is about REACHABILITY, so an application that has granted no entitlement still has the control and still has to satisfy it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The role gate IS a committed declaration — ScopeFeatures writes are APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN-only, and the marker notes the fields cannot be field-protected because the super-admin path must write them. So the gate is the whole boundary, and it is readable from the resource configuration.","obligation":"Feature and entitlement writes declare an operator-gated door.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second reachable path, which produces no rows and no occurrence: an entitlement nobody widened emits nothing. A driven reachability enumeration is the only artifact, and it is engine-owned and uniform. THIS IS WHY THE OBJECTIVE IS MARKED IN A TEST — for a reachability invariant the test IS the control's evidence, not a stand-in for it.","obligation":"No other door reaches those writes — a principal cannot widen what it is entitled to.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"The enumeration attests the BUILD it ran against; a variant added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated. It evidences that no door is REACHABLE, never that no entitlement was wrongly granted through the legitimate door — that is the credit-grant demand's question, not this one.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared role gate on every feature and entitlement write, from committed configuration. C2: a driven enumeration over the operation variants asserting each stays non-client-reachable — progression and lifecycle state writes in particular, whose state fields carry no field-level exclusion, so a variant flip would let a client self-forge currentStage, milestonesAchieved or totalPoints.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A client-reachable entitlement write is a MAJOR and the objective's whole subject. A gate weakened from APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN is a MAJOR: the marker records that this one role gate is the ENTIRE self-grant boundary for paid entitlements. An empty occurrence set is NOT a finding in either direction.","verificationSteps":["Read the declared gate for every feature and entitlement write (C1).","Drive the reachability enumeration over every SECURITY-SENSITIVE operation variant and assert none is client-reachable (C2). The population is not every variant: the pinned enumeration carves out state writes that are client-reachable BY DESIGN, so asserting over all of them flags every legitimate API variant.","Check the progression and lifecycle writes specifically: their fields have no field-level exclusion, so the variant gate is the only guard.","Do NOT look for occurrence rows. An entitlement nobody widened produces none, and their absence evidences nothing either way."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:erasure-propagation-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.ERASURE_PROPAGATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:erasure-propagation-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"C1, C3 and C4 apply where the application actually invokes subject erasure. The engine exposes erasure as a system call with no route, so an application that never erases a subject has produced no accounting, no record and has failed nothing — a judge records not_applicable_as_configured for those three clauses. C2 applies to every application: it is the framework's own behaviour and is driven, not gathered. C5 applies where the application declares an externalDataPipeline — a resource copied in from a system of record — and is not applicable to one that declares none, however many erasures it runs.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"APPLICATION_RECORDED","homeRationale":"The accounting is the erasure's RETURN VALUE — per direct edge its disposition and `executed`, the descendant edges walked below it, `subjectImpersonalized`, the session-revocation outcome, and one external-effect outcome per system — and the engine persists none of it. Only the application that called the erasure can retain it, so the store is that application's own row and its shape is that application's. A direct edge's `executed` already folds in every descendant below it, so an application that keeps only an AGGREGATE (how many dependent edges executed, plus each external effect's ref, status and steps), as the dogfood application does, still shows that a subtree was declined, but not which relationship in it. That is a legitimate modelling choice with a real cost, stated in the limits, and must not be asserted as framework contract.","obligation":"Each of the subject's dependent relationships — its direct dependents and every relationship the erasure walks below a dependent it deletes — is accounted for with the disposition its configuration declared and whether its teardown ran, and each registered external erasure effect with its own outcome.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A healthy window of receipts cannot show this: an accounting that always says `executed` and one that is right read identically until a teardown is declined. The property is established by driving the declined, blocking and incomplete cases and reading what comes back, which is a driven result and stored nowhere. It reaches descendants because the erasure classifies every relationship below a dependent it deletes before its transaction opens, and the cascade returns each descendant's outcome to the receipt rather than discarding it. It stops below a relationship whose rows are retained — scrubbed and kept, kept by declaration, or not the subject's — because those rows still anchor their own dependents.","obligation":"The accounting cannot overstate the erasure: a dependent edge at any depth whose disposition executes but whose teardown did not run is reported as not executed, and so is the direct edge above it; an edge at any depth that nobody classified, or one that would defer its teardown, refuses the erasure before any write; and every external outcome that may leave data live at a third party — including a deliberately acknowledged one — is classified incomplete.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the subject, the resource and the external system it reached"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Both rows are emitted by the per-resource external effect the erasure runs post-commit, which is reached from this control and from no other. The deletion row carries the remote row count; the acknowledgement row is written once per resource per request at HIGH risk, and its security-envelope classification is CRITICAL, so an accepted hole stays countable and reaches a SIEM as the loudest class. An effect that FAILED cleanly, deleting nothing, writes no row by design — its outcome is carried by C1's receipt instead, which is why C1 and C3 are read together. A billing-provider erasure writes no row at all and is evidenced by C1 alone.","obligation":"Where erasure deletes rows in an external system, or leaves them there on the controller's per-request acknowledgement, it leaves a durable record naming the subject, the resource and the external system.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["http_api_external_erasure","http_api_non_erasure_acknowledged"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the third-party credential it destroyed and what telling its vendor achieved"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The users-to-credentials composition removes those rows through the raw child repository, bypassing the credential resource's service tier, so the row is written by the credential resource's cascade removal observer: one credential-deletion row per destroyed credential, naming the subject, the provider and the credential slot, with the reason that distinguishes erasure from revocation. The erasure reason is written only when the cascade declares itself an erasure — an administrator's hard delete of the user row runs the same teardown and writes the account-deletion reason instead, naming who deleted it, so it is not erasure evidence and a C4 reading counts only the erasure reason — and it is written after commit, so a rolled-back erasure leaves no row. Delivery cannot fail the erasure: an audit write that fails is logged rather than retried, which is why C4 is read with C1, whose credential edge still reports that the teardown ran. Each row also records what telling the credential's VENDOR achieved, in `vendorRevocation`: the same observer hands the token it read from the destroyed row to the vendor's revocation endpoint, so the row says whether the grant was revoked there, could not be (the vendor declares no revocation endpoint, the credential was a pasted key, or the application's client registration is unset), or failed (unreachable, refused). The collector reports how the erasure rows divide over it; the same outcomes reach C1's receipt as one external effect.","obligation":"Where erasure destroys the subject's own third-party credentials, it leaves a record naming each one.","plane":"PRODUCTION","reportedAuditEventDataDistribution":{"field":"vendorRevocation"},"requiredAuditEventDataMatch":{"field":"reason","values":["user_erased"]},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_provider_credential_deleted"]},{"clauseRef":"C5","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each run row says how many rows it declined to load, never which erasure each skip honoured, nor that every erased pipeline row was suppressed"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The source still holds a record the application erased locally, so without this the next scheduled pass writes the person back while the erasure receipt says complete. The erasure writes a suppression at the two places every erasure of a local row passes through — the scrub that retains a row, and the erasure cascade's delete — keyed by a keyed hash of the system, the remote entity and the remote key, never the key itself. Both pipeline tracks skip a suppressed key, and each run's read-through audit row carries `suppressedRows`, which the collector SUMS over the window's pipeline runs. The row count says the runs happened; the sum says suppression held on them. A suppression is released only by a completed full pass over the whole remote entity that no longer sees the record, and a run that finds suppressions hashed under a key the application no longer derives refuses to load.","obligation":"Where an erased row had been copied in from a system of record by an external-data pipeline, the erasure suppresses that remote record, and no later pass — full or incremental — copies it back in; each pipeline run counts the rows it declined to load on its own audit row.","plane":"PRODUCTION","reportedAuditEventDataSum":{"field":"suppressedRows"},"requiredAuditEventDataMatch":{"field":"operationIdentifier","values":["externalDataPipelineRun"]},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["http_api_read_through_access"]},{"clauseRef":"C6","emittedCountLimit":{"absenceUnreadable":"emission is best-effort after the erasure commits, so a lost row and an erasure with no declared recipient both leave none; C1's receipt carries the same outcomes","unreached":"each row names the recipient, whose account reached it, who owes the communication and the outcome, never what the vendor still holds"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"GDPR Art. 19 asks the controller to communicate an erasure to each recipient the data was disclosed to, and to name them to the subject on request. The recipients are the application's DERIVED declaration (`compliance.subjectDataRecipients`, generated from the recipient population, the processor register and the declared flows), so the erasure knows which vendors to account for without a per-subject log of calls. After the external effects run, the erasure gives each recipient an outcome and writes one row per recipient naming it, whose account reached it, who owes the communication (the operator as controller, the operator assisting a controller tenant, or the tenant for its own vendor) and the status. The collector reports how the rows divide over `status`: an UNMEASURED or NOT_REGISTERED share is a vendor erasure does not reach, stated rather than hidden. An application that declares no recipients leaves no row and marks every receipt with one unmeasured outcome, which C1 reads.","obligation":"Each erasure accounts for every provider the application declares as holding the subject's data: one an effect reached reports that effect's outcome, and one no effect reached reports the status its declared erasure stance decides — unmeasured when it declares none — so no recipient passes in silence. Systems of record are C3's.","plane":"PRODUCTION","reportedAuditEventDataDistribution":{"field":"status"},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["subject_erasure_recipient_outcome"]}],"limits":"It evidences that the erasure ACCOUNTED for the stores it reached, never that the stores are now empty of the subject. The erasure walks every relationship below a dependent it deletes, at any depth and whatever depth the relationship declares for an ordinary delete; it does not walk below a relationship whose rows it retains — a retain-and-scrub edge, one kept by declaration, one not the subject's — because those rows keep their own dependents, so nothing below them is reported. An edge the walk never dispatched because no rows of the subject reached it reads as run: a teardown with nothing to do. Derived copies a teardown schedules after commit — search chunks, stored file content — are removed by their own seams, whose failures are logged rather than recorded, and are not evidenced here. An application that retains an aggregate rather than per-edge receipts can show THAT a subtree was declined but not WHICH relationship in it, and a reviewer must then drive or re-read the erasure to name it. A credential destroyed by an administrator's hard delete of the user rather than by erasure leaves a credential-deletion row with the account-deletion reason, which is not C4 evidence; a query counting the event type without reading the reason overstates C4. External outcomes are what the external system answered at the time; a third party that later restores or re-syncs the data is outside this evidence. A recorded vendor-revocation outcome is what the vendor's endpoint ANSWERED: under RFC 7009 a vendor answers success for a token it did not recognise, and whether a real vendor ended the grant is established only by observing that vendor, not by this row. And a window with no erasures evidences nothing about propagation. C5's suppression follows a remote KEY, not a person: a record the source merges into another key arrives under that key as a different record. A pipeline with a sourceFilter never releases a suppression, because it cannot tell a record gone at the source from one outside its filter. An erasure committing while a pass is loading can see that pass write the row back as a live copy that later passes skip and never remove; it is not self-healing, only DETECTED — each run counts `liveSuppressedRows`, and a non-zero count is an erasure that did not hold. Two pipelines keying one entity differently do not share a suppression. C6's recipient list is only as complete as the generated declaration: a vendor added since it was generated is not accounted for until it is regenerated. Systems of record are not in this list: their erasure is C3's, per bound resource, under the binding's declared stance.","minimumEvidence":"C1: for each erasure the application ran in the window, its retained receipt — at least whether the subject was impersonalized, whether every executing direct edge ran (a direct edge's flag already folds in its descendants), and each external effect's ref and status. C2: a driven erasure showing a declined executing edge reported as not executed, at the direct level and one level below a deleted dependent, the latter also turning its direct edge not executed; an unclassified or deferred edge, at the direct level and below a deleted dependent, refusing before any write; and each incomplete external status classified incomplete. C3: the external-erasure and acknowledged-non-erasure rows for the window. C4: the credential-deletion rows carrying the erasure reason for the window, one per credential each erasure destroyed, with how they divide over the vendor-revocation outcome. C5: the pipeline-run read-through rows for the window with the sum of `suppressedRows` over them, and — once, where the application runs a pipeline — a driven erasure of a pipeline-copied row followed by a full and an incremental pass that load nothing under its record. Any run row carrying a non-zero `liveSuppressedRows` is listed. C6: the recipient-outcome rows for the window, with how they divide over status, and the application's generated recipient declaration they were selected from.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A receipt reporting an executing edge as run when its teardown was declined — or a direct edge as run when a descendant below it was declined — is a MAJOR against the framework, and it is the finding this demand exists for: the accounting would then be the thing that hides live personal data. An unclassified or deferred edge at any depth that proceeds instead of refusing is a MAJOR: the erasure then guessed. An incomplete external status read as complete is a MAJOR for the same reason. An erasure the application ran and kept no receipt for is a MAJOR against the application — the only per-store account was discarded. A C3 or C4 row missing where the receipt shows the teardown ran is an OBSERVATION when the receipt itself is intact: the erasure operated and its queryable trail lagged. A C4 row carrying the erasure reason for a user whose row was deleted rather than erased is a MAJOR: it forges erasure evidence. A C4 row whose vendor was not told is an OBSERVATION, not a nonconformity: the local credential is destroyed and the outcome is recorded, and what is owed is a sentence to the person telling them to remove the application in the vendor's own settings. A receipt reporting that vendor effect as complete while a row says a grant was left live is a MAJOR, for the same reason an incomplete external status read as complete is. An erased pipeline-copied row that a later pass loaded again as a live row is a MAJOR against the framework: the erasure was silently undone; a run row reporting `liveSuppressedRows` above zero is exactly that finding, surfaced. A pipeline run refused because its suppressions were hashed under a rotated key is an OBSERVATION against the application's key handling, not a nonconformity: the refusal is the control holding. A C6 recipient reported UNMEASURED is an OBSERVATION owed a declaration (the vendor's stance on its compliance profile, or the operator's acknowledgement): the erasure said so rather than passing. A receipt that reads complete while a declared operator-account recipient carries no outcome is a MAJOR — the silent pass C6 exists to prevent.","verificationSteps":["Resolve applicability for C1, C3 and C4: does the application invoke subject erasure? If not, record those three clauses not_applicable_as_configured.","For C1, gather the application's retained receipts and assert each records, per erasure, the subject's impersonalization, the executed state of every executing direct edge, and every external effect's status. Do NOT assert a per-edge list or a descendant list: whether the application keeps edges individually or as a count is its own modelling choice.","Cross-check C1 against C3: for every receipt naming an external-system effect that deleted rows or was acknowledged, find the matching row for that subject and resource. A receipt with no row is reported; a row with no receipt is reported.","For C2, drive an erasure over a direct dependent edge whose teardown the cascade declines and assert the receipt says not executed; drive one whose direct edge runs but whose descendant is declined and assert both the descendant and its direct edge say not executed; drive one over an unclassified edge, directly and below a deleted dependent, and assert each refuses with nothing written; and assert every incomplete external status, including an acknowledged non-erasure, is classified incomplete.","For C4, cross-check each erasure whose credential edge executed against the credential-deletion rows carrying the erasure reason for that subject. A subject who held no credentials owes no row; a destroyed credential with no row is reported.","For C4, read the vendor-revocation distribution of those rows, and cross-check each erasure's receipt: its connected-account vendor-grant effect must name the same credentials with the same outcomes. A row carrying no vendor-revocation outcome predates the revocation and is reported as unrevoked, never as revoked.","For C5, resolve applicability: does the application declare an externalDataPipeline? Then read the window's pipeline-run rows and the sum of their suppressedRows. A sum of zero is not a finding on its own — no erased record may have been read in the window — but after an erasure of a pipeline-copied row, drive or observe the next full and incremental pass and assert that the erased record's row did not come back as a live row and that the run's suppressedRows counted it.","For C6, read the generated recipient declaration and confirm it is current (`wildo config subject-data-recipients --check`), then read the window's recipient-outcome rows and their status distribution. Cross-check C1: every receipt's `recipient:<ref>` external effects must match the rows for that erasure. A declared operator-account recipient with no row for an erasure is reported; an UNMEASURED share names vendors whose erasure stance nobody declared."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:erasure-propagation-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:field-authority-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:field-authority-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: server-owned fields are engine-declared and the boot proof runs unconditionally.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The authority is NAMED in the declaration, and 'exactly one' is a property of that declaration rather than of any write. A second writer is a declaration defect, visible without running anything.","obligation":"A server-owned field has exactly one named authority that writes it.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The intent's own contrast — proven, not assumed — makes the boot outcome the evidence rather than the declaration. The outcome is a LOG line: no audit member exists for startup configuration validation and the validator emits no row, so a collector reads the host's archive on the host's retention, not an engine store. This clause said EMITTED until 2026-09-10.\n\n**And a clean boot does not prove C1.** The check is a SPELLING check: every name in the authority declaration must resolve to a persisted field. It collects the declarations from the operation variant and from every custom-implementation registration into one list and validates each INDEPENDENTLY — it never compares them for overlap, so it cannot detect the two-authorities-for-one-field case that is C1's obligation and this body's only MAJOR. A collector told a clean boot is the proof records C2 satisfied and C1 unchecked.","obligation":"And that authority is PROVEN at boot rather than assumed.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"C2 attests the CONFIGURATION that booted and goes stale the moment it changes. Neither clause evidences that the authority wrote correct values — only that exactly one of them can.","minimumEvidence":"C1: every server-owned field with its single named authority, from committed configuration — and, because no boot check compares declarations for overlap, an explicit cross-read for a field claimed by more than one authority. C2: the boot validation outcome from the accountable runtime's log — not from an API, since probing HTTP for a boot-time fact is a category error whose silence establishes nothing.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Two named authorities for one field is a MAJOR — the intent's stated harm is that a reader must work out which value is current. A boot that did not run the proof is insufficient_evidence for C2, not a pass.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate server-owned fields and assert each names exactly one authority.","Read the boot outcome for the running revision; a clean boot is the proof C2 asks for.","Assert no reader has to disambiguate: two authorities for one field is the defect even if only one ever writes."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:field-authority-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:first-exposure-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:first-exposure-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Both halves are engine-owned: every resource schema passes through the disclosure boundary, and the first-exposure row lands in the application's own audit store. From 2026-09-10 to 2026-09-14 the binding's one capability was gated on the Layer-2 audit fan-out, which made the WHOLE demand NOT_APPLICABLE without a provider — including C1, the non-disclosure boundary, which has nothing to do with audit events (#302).","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A non-disclosure produces no record: a field that never crossed emits nothing. The artifact is a driven assertion over the disclosure predicate, which now covers BOTH decorators — isBackendOnly and its sibling isWriteOnlySecret, held to the same boundary.","obligation":"Material a schema declares backend-only does not cross the client boundary.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each exposure was the FIRST for its resource, field and row — a second exposure of the same one is the defect, and only the rows' identities show it"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The one clause with a real occurrence: a first exposure is a per-occurrence row in the engine's audit trail. The intent's word 'single' is the control — an exposure that happens twice is the defect the audit row makes visible.","obligation":"Except at a single first exposure, which is itself audited.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["field_access"]}],"limits":"C1 attests the predicate and the DTO, not every surface that can render a value: a header assembled from an application's own declarations is outside the DTO and reaches the same material. C2 evidences exposures that were AUDITED, so it cannot see one that crossed by a path emitting nothing — which is what C1 exists to close.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven assertion that the response DTO refuses to emit any field the disclosure predicate marks non-disclosable, across both decorators. C2: FIELD_ACCESS rows for each first exposure in the window, keyed on the row identity the member actually carries.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A non-disclosable field crossing the boundary is a MAJOR. A second exposure of the same field is a MAJOR: 'single' is the control. A first exposure with no FIELD_ACCESS row is an OBSERVATION where the exposure was legitimate and only its evidence is missing — effectiveness and evidence-availability stay apart.","verificationSteps":["Drive the disclosure predicate across both decorators and assert the response DTO masks every non-disclosable field (C1).","Gather FIELD_ACCESS rows for the window and resolve each to a first exposure (C2). The identity is resource type PLUS field PLUS resource id — so N rows of one type produce N rows for the same field, correctly. Do NOT assert that a field appears once: the resource id is optional, and a field first-exposed once per row is expected to repeat across rows.","Assert no field has more than one first exposure PER ROW. Across rows a repeat is expected and correct — the member's identity includes the resource id — so asserting global uniqueness reports a MAJOR the moment two rows of one type exist.","Check any surface that renders a field OUTSIDE the response DTO. The retrieval-header path — a header assembled from application declarations — WAS such a surface and is closed: summary-field resolution now routes through the disclosure predicate, whose own docstring names that case as the defect it closes. Verify the routing rather than assuming either state; a second such surface would look exactly like the closed one until traced."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:first-exposure-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:ingested-content-inspection","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:ingested-content-inspection"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that accepts uploads. An application with no file field has nothing to inspect; note that is a genuinely empty population and not a declined control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Both halves are committed: the per-field scan policy on the file field, and the application-wide answer, which is DERIVED from the scanner topology an operator provisions and is refused a default. Neither is implicit in either direction, which is the property the clause asks for.","obligation":"Whether ingested content is inspected is a DECLARED decision — per field, and then per application.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The clause is about the JOIN — the downloadable set reads the same status the verdict writes, so inspected and servable are one decision rather than two that could disagree. A row carrying a clean status looks identical whether the join holds or not, so only driving an infected upload and asserting it is unservable evidences it.","obligation":"The inspection reaches a member of the file's own status vocabulary rather than an opaque success, and that same vocabulary decides servability.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the file it concluded was infected or could not scan"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class in the engine's own event store, so one collector query serves every application. The two are separate members deliberately: an infection is a conclusion about a real threat, an unrunnable scan is an operational fault, and merging them would make the alert that matters unreadable.","obligation":"A concluded infection and a scan that could not run are each attributable in the audit trail.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["file_malware_detected","file_malware_scan_failed"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The fail-closed half, and the one that cannot be read off a healthy deployment: with a scanner present, a refusing and a degrading implementation behave identically. The condition has to be created.","obligation":"A requested scan with no scanner available REFUSES rather than passing.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"The application-wide half of C1 was NOT true before 2026-09-09 — the resolution step read a configuration path no schema declared and answered negative in every application ever built, leaving the per-field policy the only reachable declaration. Evidence gathered against an earlier build is not evidence about this clause. C2 and C4 attest the build driven. And none of it evidences detection QUALITY: that a scanner concluded clean is not evidence that the content was.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the per-field scan policies and the provisioned scanner topology the application-wide answer derives from. C2: a driven infected upload, its terminal status, and a download attempt refused on that status. C3: the two audit members over the window. C4: a driven upload requesting a scan with no scanner reachable.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A servable file that was never inspected IS a MAJOR where its declared policy required inspection — and is not a finding at all where the application declared not to inspect, which C1 records as a legitimate decision and the downloadable set honours. Scoping matters here or the severity line contradicts C1: uploaded and linked files are downloadable and unscanned by design in an application that provisioned no scanner. Within the population that owes inspection, this is the objective's stated harm — the intent asks precisely that never-inspected and passed be distinguishable. A scan that could not run and passed anyway is a MAJOR. An infection concluded with no audit row is an OBSERVATION where the file was correctly quarantined and a MAJOR where it was not: the control operated in the first case and only the evidence export is missing.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate file fields and read each per-field scan policy, then the application-wide answer and the topology it derives from.","Upload a benign test pattern that a scanner concludes infected, and assert the terminal status is a member of the file status vocabulary.","Attempt to download that file and assert refusal — asserting the status alone leaves the join unproven.","Query the two audit members over the window and assert each row follows its terminal transition rather than preceding it.","Create C4's condition deliberately, because it is not reachable on a conformant deployment: an application with a scan-REQUIRED field will not boot without a scanner, and one without such a field initiates no scan to refuse. Drive it by requesting a scan against an unreachable scanner — the branch the service itself calls unreachable in a well-formed deployment — and assert refusal rather than a pass."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:ingested-content-inspection"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:key-retirement-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:key-retirement-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies wherever token signing keys rotate; an application that has never rotated has no retirement to evidence, which is not_applicable_as_configured rather than a gap.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The declared instant IS the control — the intent's contrast is with a key that stays trusted until someone edits configuration — and its presence is readable without running anything.\n\n**But it is NOT authored by the application, and this rationale said it was until 2026-09-10.** JWT rotation metadata is platform-managed bootstrap material fetched from the apps manager, and authoring it in backend config is a declared ERROR path. So a collector searching the application's committed configuration finds nothing and a judge raises a C1 gap against a control whose data lives in a platform-persisted document no operator surface writes. Gather it from the resolved application configuration, not from the repository.","obligation":"A rotated signing key can be given an explicit retirement instant.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"TWO effects, and a body must name both: advertisement is what a client discovers, verification is what a token relies on. A key removed from the advertised set while still verifying is the failure the clause exists to catch, and only driving both separates them.","obligation":"After which it stops being advertised and stops verifying tokens.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences the retirement MECHANISM at the instant driven, never that no token signed by a retired key was accepted earlier in the window. Retroactive assurance would need a per-verification record this control does not produce.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the retirement instant on each rotated key, read from the RESOLVED application configuration — platform-owned, not repository-committed. C2: a driven check past that instant asserting the key is absent from the advertised set AND that a token signed by it is refused.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A retired key that still verifies is a MAJOR: an aged or compromised key staying trusted is the harm the objective names. A retired key still advertised is a MAJOR of a different kind — clients will keep selecting it. A rotated key with no retirement instant is an OBSERVATION unless the application's policy requires one.","verificationSteps":["Read the retirement instant for each rotated key from the resolved configuration. A key with none is an OBSERVATION rather than C1's finding: no product surface authors one today, so an empty set says nothing about the application.","Past the instant, assert the key is not advertised.","Past the instant, present a token signed by it and assert refusal — separately from the advertisement check, because a key can pass one and fail the other."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:key-retirement-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:lawful-basis-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that processes personal data, which is every application with a user. The basis is the operator's declaration, so there is nothing to opt into — an application that has declared none is covered by this demand and reported by it as not having answered.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The basis is committed configuration (`operatorComplianceIdentity.lawfulBases`), and no runtime row records why a purpose is lawful — the declaration IS the record. The declaring schema makes a purpose without a basis unrepresentable, so this clause is met by reading the declaration rather than by searching it for omissions.","obligation":"Every declared processing purpose names the one lawful basis it rests on, from the closed set of six.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The clause that makes this demand worth stating, because it is the one member of the vocabulary that changes what must exist: legitimate interests is lawful only where a balancing test was actually done, so a declaration without one asserts a conclusion nobody reached. The declaring schema already refuses that combination, which is what makes the clause checkable at the declaration rather than at a notice written from it.","obligation":"A purpose relying on legitimate interests carries the balancing assessment behind it, stated rather than implied.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The declaration is optional in configuration, so its absence is representable and must be read. Absence means nobody has answered, which is an honest state; reading it as 'nothing to declare' converts an unanswered question into a claim about the product that no application with a user can truthfully make.","obligation":"The declaration is present. An application that declares no lawful basis is reported as UNANSWERED, never as having no processing to justify.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences what the operator DECLARED — never that the declared basis is legally sound for the processing it names. Whether a purpose really is necessary for a contract, or whether an interest really survives the balancing test, is a judgement for a qualified reviewer, and no clause here should be read as one.\n\nPurposes are the operator's own prose, deliberately: nothing structured exists to key them to, so this demand cannot show that the declared purposes are the COMPLETE set of processing the product performs. It reaches only the purposes somebody wrote down.\n\nAnd it attests the repository at a commit. The declaration is committed configuration, so the answer is about that revision and goes stale the moment the configuration changes, with nothing in the artifact to announce it.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C2: the committed `operatorComplianceIdentity.lawfulBases` declaration at the revision under review, parsed through its declaring schema so the legitimate-interests refusal runs rather than being re-implemented. C3: the same configuration, with the absence of the declaration recorded as an explicit finding.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A legitimate-interests basis with no assessment cannot occur through the declaring schema; one found anywhere else — a notice, a document drafted by hand — is a MAJOR, because it is exactly the statement a regulator reads first. An absent declaration is a MINOR on its own and a MAJOR when a privacy notice is published that states bases the configuration does not carry. An assessment that is generic rather than about this product is a MINOR with a specific remedy: state the interest, the necessity and the balance.","verificationSteps":["Parse the declaration through its own schema and record the result. A re-implemented check beside the schema is a second authority that can drift from the one the application actually boots against.","For every entry whose basis is legitimate interests, confirm an assessment is present and read it for content. An assessment that would be true of any application — 'our interests do not override the user's' — satisfies the field and discharges nothing.","Where the declaration is absent, assert the answer says UNANSWERED rather than reporting zero purposes.","Compare the declared purposes with what the application's privacy notice states. A purpose the notice names that the declaration lacks is a gap in the declaration, not in the notice."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:lifecycle-stage-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:lifecycle-stage-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The control is that a self-reported stage confers nothing, so an application whose users report stages freely is exactly the case it exists for.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Evidence of a NON-grant. Nothing is emitted when a capability is not conferred, so there is no occurrence to collect — the artifact is a driven scenario in which activation succeeds with no feature repository present at all, so a grant would have to reach a repository that is not there.","obligation":"A self-reported lifecycle stage confers no capability.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Scoping of the evaluator, driven with an explicit principal. The HTTP-tier half — that one user cannot make a request the backend attributes to another — is a different mechanism proven at the e2e tier, and this clause must not claim it.","obligation":"And it cannot cross a scope boundary — authority comes only from a decision an authorized party made.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences the EVALUATOR, never the transport. That user A cannot make a request attributed to user B is the context-addressed-singleton mechanism, proven elsewhere, and reading this evidence as covering it would claim a tier this demand never touched.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven activation with no feature repository bound, succeeding — the absence of the repository is what makes the non-grant provable rather than merely unobserved. C2: the evaluator driven with an explicit principal, asserting the OTHER subject's stage is untouched. Not the guidance write: the evaluator READS guidance and WRITES lifecycle, and the guidance write is a client API write scoped by the transport — which this body's own limits put out of scope.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A capability conferred from a self-reported stage is a MAJOR — it is the objective's entire subject. A scope crossing is a MAJOR. Absence of activity evidences nothing: a stage nobody reported produces no signal either way.","verificationSteps":["Drive activation with no feature repository bound and assert it succeeds (C1).","Drive the evaluator with an explicit principal and assert the write is scoped to it (C2).","Record explicitly that the transport tier is out of scope here: this evidences the evaluator's scoping, not the request attribution."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:lifecycle-stage-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that mints a credential — an API key or a client secret — which is every application with a machine caller. The mechanism is engine-owned and the marked declarations are on engine resources, so an application declines nothing by not participating.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row is the FIRST disclosure of that secret and names who received it — the same class also marks the stored artifact at first exposure, which only the row tells apart"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"One durable row class naming a principal and a FIELD. It fires on two disjoint markers, and a judge must read the row to tell them apart: the stored artifact at first exposure, and the secret actually handed to the caller — the same operation can produce one, the other, or both.","obligation":"The FIRST disclosure of server-minted secret material is an attributable, audited event.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["field_access"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A property of the emitter's payload contract, settled by reading it. The reason it is load-bearing rather than hygienic: rows reach the per-tenant export and, where the application enables the Layer-2 fan-out, an immutable ledger — copies an erasure of the application's own store cannot scrub — so recording the secret would turn the record OF a disclosure into a second, permanent copy of it. The row and the secret must never be the same artifact.","obligation":"The row names the FIELD and never carries its contents.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Coverage is a property of the committed declarations — which operations carry the below-risk-floor audit opt-in, and which fields carry the two disclosure markers. Note WHY the opt-in exists rather than a raised risk level: buying the row by mis-declaring a verb's danger would corrupt the risk vocabulary every other control reads.","obligation":"Every operation that discloses minted material is reachable by that audit, on both the operation and the field axis.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"The mechanism inspects the TOP-LEVEL response-DTO shape only: it does not descend into nested objects or collection elements, and the test that pins its coverage runs over the ENGINE registry alone. So C3's \"every operation is reachable by that audit\" holds for the engine's own minting surfaces and not for an application-authored marker in a nested shape.\n\nIt evidences FIRST disclosure. A later re-read of stored material, or a copy made outside the operation path, is a different question this row class does not answer — which is why the marker is on first exposure rather than on the field generally. And a row proves a disclosure was RECORDED, never that the recipient was entitled to it.","minimumEvidence":"C1: field-access rows over the window, each naming a principal, a field and whether it was the create-time exposure. C2: the emitter's payload contract, plus a scan of sampled rows for material matching a live credential. C3: the committed disclosure declarations across the minting resources, at both application and tenant scope.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A minting operation with no field-access row is a MAJOR: the credential exists and nothing says who received it. A row carrying the secret VALUE is a MAJOR and an incident — the ledger cannot be scrubbed, so the disclosure is permanent and the erasure obligation is broken with it. A verb whose risk level was RAISED to buy the row is an OBSERVATION about the declaration and a real one: it makes that verb read as more dangerous than it is to every other consumer of the risk vocabulary.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate the operations that mint or reissue credential material at both scopes, and assert each carries the audit opt-in.","Enumerate the fields carrying the two disclosure markers and assert each is one of those operations' outputs.","Drive a mint and a reissue, and assert a field-access row exists for each, attributable to the calling principal.","Assert the rows name the field and carry no value — scan the sampled rows for the minted material itself.","Distinguish the two markers on a row rather than counting rows: the stored artifact and the handed-out secret are different disclosures of different things."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:multi-factor-enrolment","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR","objectiveVersion":2},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:multi-factor-enrolment-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the verification authority is engine-owned and unconditional. Note the demand is about the AUTHORITY, not about enrolment coverage — an application whose users enrolled no second factor still has the control, and still has to satisfy it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second verifier, which no committed specification can attest — a spec can say none was declared, never that none was built. A driven enumeration is engine-owned and uniform, so one query serves every application.","obligation":"Verification of an enrolled second factor goes through ONE authority — no caller builds a second door.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A driven scenario result. Production evidence would need a per-occurrence record this control deliberately does not produce.","obligation":"That authority is replay-resistant: a code or backup code used once cannot be used again.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"UNPRODUCED","homeRationale":"Timing-safety is a property of an execution that leaves no trace of having held. A scenario can assert the authority CALLS a constant-time primitive — which is C1's structural question wearing C3's clothes — and no artifact evidences that a particular verification was timing-safe.","obligation":"And timing-safe, so a match position cannot leak through timing.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It does not prove any user enrolled a second factor, and despite the slug it is not asked to. C1's enumeration attests the BUILD it was taken against — a door added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated, and nothing detects that. C2 proves the authority refuses a replay when DRIVEN, never that every production verification was replay-resistant.","minimumEvidence":"C1: an enumeration of every path verifying an enrolled second factor, each resolving to the single authority, plus the assertion that no other code compares a TOTP secret or consumes a backup code. C2: a driven scenario replaying a successful code and a consumed backup code, both refused. C3: nothing produces it; the constant-time primitive is confirmed by inspection, which evidences the CODE and not an execution. Deliberately NO audit members: the authority emits nothing by design and the MFA event members belong to the CALLERS — demanding them here would attribute a caller's evidence to a control that produces none.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A second verification path is a MAJOR — the intent names that failure mode explicitly, a second and weaker door onto the same credential. A replayable code or backup code is a MAJOR. C3 carries no severity: it is a framework-side absence, not an application's failure. MFA audit rows presented as evidence are a JUDGE defect rather than a finding, and they will look like thorough evidence.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every verification path and resolve each to the single authority; a path that compares a secret itself is the finding, not a variant.","Drive a successful verification, replay the same code, and assert refusal.","Consume a backup code, replay it, and assert refusal.","Confirm the comparison primitive is constant-time by inspection and record C3 as UNPRODUCED with that as its only support.","Do NOT gather MFA audit rows as evidence: they evidence the callers' flows and would read here as coverage the authority does not provide."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:multi-factor-enrolment-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:operation-role-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record","evidence-requirement:operation-role-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the authorization funnel is engine-owned and every operation passes through it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each refusal names the principal it refused and the operation it refused them"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A per-occurrence row in the engine's audit trail. REFUSALS are the half that matters — a demand satisfied only by grants would evidence the opposite of the control.","obligation":"Access-control decisions, refusals included, are attributable and reviewable.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"recording every refusal stays bounded; a HIGH count is the availability risk this clause names, so the number cannot be read as the clause being met"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Same rows, read as a RATE rather than as instances. The clause carries its own tension — a control that records every refusal can be driven to exhaust storage — so evidence must show both that repetition is visible and that recording is bounded.","obligation":"Repeated refusals stay detectable without the record itself becoming an availability risk.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"Host-retained telemetry: a structured error log naming the lost action, plus two counters. NO audit member exists and that is a DECISION rather than a gap — recording \"the audit store was unreachable\" IN the audit store is circular, and the seam that emits these argues exactly that.\n\n**This clause said UNPRODUCED until 2026-09-10, which retired an implemented control from examination.** The marked site for this objective states the obligation in the implementer's own words — audit-pipeline failures are detectable AND attributable to the specific action they lost — and the log line carries the resource type, the resource id, the operation identifier, the variant key, the actor and the ambient correlation id. The body reasoned correctly that no member exists and then drew the wrong conclusion from it. UNPRODUCED carries no severity, so an application that had lost the control entirely — no error-level logger binding, no metrics service — would never have been asked.","obligation":"A failure of the recording pipeline is detectable and attributable to the specific action it lost.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences DECISIONS, never their correctness — a wrongly granted access is recorded exactly like a right one. And C1's rows come from the funnel: an authorization decision taken outside it is invisible here, which is why the funnel being the sole denial chokepoint is a separate and load-bearing property.","minimumEvidence":"C1: denial rows for the window, each attributable to a principal and an operation. C2: the same rows aggregated by principal and by operation, plus evidence that recording is bounded rather than unbounded. C3: the host's log and metric archive for the window — the rate-limited error line \"A security audit observation was DROPPED before it reached the audit pipeline\" (slug `audit_observation_dropped`), whose context carries the lost action's identity, and the two counters `audit_observation_dropped_total` (the observer never reached the pipeline) and `audit_store_failure_total` (the pipeline reached the store and the store refused). Both counters are needed because they cover DIFFERENT loss shapes and neither sees the other's. The boot diagnostic for an absent delivery path and the dead-letter drain may also be gathered, but they evidence the PIPELINE's health rather than the attribution this clause demands, and must not be substituted for it.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Denials absent while grants are present is a MAJOR — it is the exact shape of a funnel recording only successes, and establishing it requires gathering the GRANT side too, which is why the minimum evidence names both rather than denials alone. Without the comparison this rule cannot fire. Unbounded recording is a MAJOR against availability, which the intent names explicitly. For C3, a drop line naming lost authorization decisions is a MAJOR — access decisions were taken and are not in the trail, and the period's denial evidence is incomplete by an unknown amount. A metric channel that is inert because the OTLP preload is not wired is an OBSERVATION against the evidence rather than a finding against the application: the log channel still carries the signal, which is why the control has two.","verificationSteps":["Gather denial rows for the window and assert each carries a principal and an operation.","Read the DEDUPLICATION ladder as the bounding mechanism C2 asks about — it is what keeps the record from becoming an availability risk — and note it FAILS OPEN: when the counter store is unreachable, emission becomes unbounded exactly when availability is most at risk. That is the clause's own tension and the evidence must state which mode was in effect.","Aggregate by principal and by operation using the row's OWN occurrence count and its exactness flag — never by counting rows. Refusals are deduplicated on a logarithmic ladder inside a five-minute window, so a burst of ten thousand identical denials costs about five rows; counting rows reads five and concludes repetition was not occurring, which inverts the clause.","Confirm recording is bounded — the clause names availability as a risk of the control itself.","For C3, read the host's log archive for the drop line and its context, and the metric archive for both counters. A window with NO drop line and NO counter increment is the control working, not an absent control — so establish first that the loss seam could have fired: the line is rate-limited to one per (observation, reason) per interval, and the metric channel is silently inert when the OTLP preload is not wired, which is a finding about the evidence rather than about the application."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record"},{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Every clause is engine-owned; the non-controller-surface clause has an empty population where the application exposes no agent, retrieval or self-service surface, which is an absence of subject matter rather than a declined control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The declaration IS the control's subject and the input every other clause reads. An operation that declares nothing does not fail visibly — it is simply gated on nothing, and no runtime observation distinguishes that from an operation legitimately open.","obligation":"Every operation declares the authority it requires.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Evidenced by an attempted upward grant being refused, which no successful grant records. The population is larger than role assignment alone and each site is separate code: application roles, membership roles, unit assignments, and the roles requested when minting an API key or an OAuth client. Two of those are credential MINTS, where a successful escalation hands out a durable credential rather than merely changing a row.","obligation":"A principal can never grant authority it does not itself hold — role assignment and machine-credential minting are bounded by the caller's own ceiling.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"This is the clause the objective was widened for, and it is an enumeration plus a drive. Through the SAME predicate is the operative phrase: a second gate that agrees today is a bypass tomorrow, and the retrieval case shows why the ordering matters — the gate runs per resource type BEFORE anything is searched, so a caller whose roles would be refused a read never reaches the corpus at all.","obligation":"A non-controller surface facing an external caller applies the SAME declared operation-role gate, through the SAME predicate, before a self-service verb, a retrieval corpus or an agent-facing tool is reached.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"any refusal came from an agent surface rather than the HTTP tier — both write this one class by design, and only the row says which"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class. Sharing the funnel is what makes the refusals comparable: a denial from an agent surface and one from the HTTP tier are the same fact about the same declared authority, and splitting them by surface would make a repeated-refusal pattern invisible in exactly the case where it matters most.","obligation":"And a refusal is RECORDED, by the same funnel that records a controller-tier refusal.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C5","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A property of the operation vocabulary rather than of a runtime check: a self-service verb must not be a privilege-assignment or lifecycle-override surface, which is enforced by what its request contract can even EXPRESS. Least privilege applies to a request contract as much as to a role — a contract that cannot carry a role cannot be used to grant one, whatever the caller holds.","obligation":"An administrative action on another principal is authorized by the caller's ROLE, never by caller and subject being the same person.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"C1 and C5 attest declarations. C2 and C3 attest the build driven, at the sites driven — and C3's enumeration is the part that goes stale, since a surface added later will simply not be in it and will not fail. None of it evidences that the DECLARED authority is the right authority for the operation, which is a judgement no artifact carries.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared authority per operation, from the committed configuration. C2: driven upward-grant attempts at each site — membership roles, unit assignment, both credential mints, and application-role administration — each refused. C3: an enumeration of the non-controller surfaces with each resolving to the shared predicate, plus a driven refusal at each. C4: refusal rows over the window carrying the surface they came from. C5: the request contracts of the self-service verbs.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A successful upward grant is a MAJOR and, on a credential mint, an incident: the escalated authority left the system as a durable credential. A non-controller surface with no gate is a MAJOR — the controller tier's coverage is irrelevant to a caller that does not go through it. A second gate that duplicates the predicate rather than sharing it is a MAJOR even while it agrees, because agreement is not the guarantee. A refusal that leaves no row is an OBSERVATION alone and a MAJOR where a repeated-refusal pattern is part of the application's detection story. An operation declaring no authority is an OBSERVATION until its exposure is assessed, then whatever that assessment warrants.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate operations and assert each declares its required authority; list any that declare none and treat that list as the finding rather than as the baseline.","Attempt, as a caller holding a bounded role, to grant a higher one at all FIVE sites: a membership, a unit assignment, each of the two credential mints, and APPLICATION-ROLE administration. Assert refusal at every one. The application-role site was omitted from this step until 2026-09-10 and it is the highest-privilege of the five — an escalation there confers the super-administrator role itself.","Enumerate the non-controller surfaces and assert each reaches the SAME authorizer predicate, not an equivalent one.","Drive a refusal at an agent surface and at the retrieval surface, and assert the retrieval gate ran BEFORE the search rather than filtering its results.","Query refusal rows over the window and assert refusals from every surface land in one funnel.","Read the self-service request contracts and assert none can express a role or a lifecycle status."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:operation-role-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:operation-serviceability-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:operation-serviceability-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the declared operation surface is engine-mediated for every resource.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Declaration cannot evidence it — that a verb is declared is precisely what is not in question. Only driving the declared surface distinguishes reachable-and-implemented from declared-and-absent.","obligation":"A declared, API-reachable operation stays reachable and is actually implemented.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A false success emits a SUCCESS, so no row distinguishes it — the record of a lie looks exactly like the record of a truth, which is why this cannot be a PRODUCTION clause.\n\nBut do NOT drive the whole catalogue, which \"only driving the action and observing its effect separates them\" invited until 2026-09-10. The engine REFUSES TO START when a declared operation would answer success having performed nothing, and the same resolver refuses the request at dispatch — one engine-owned verdict, uniform across applications, readable in one query. Read the boot verdict first and drive only what it cannot decide.","obligation":"An interface must not report success for an action it did not perform.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Readable from configuration without driving anything — but NOT as a mismatch between what a verb writes and what the resource exposes, which is what this clause said until 2026-09-10 and is a check that cannot fail.\n\nThe engine's finding is an OVERBROAD INHERITED CONTRACT, and a verb in that state has inherited the resource's WHOLE contract — so the two sets are equal by construction, the comparison finds no widening, and every flagged operation passes. The engine's actual predicate is one bit: did this verb AUTHOR its own request contract? A verb that did not has whatever the resource exposes, which for a named verb is the mass assignment the intent names. Read the authored-contract bit, not a set difference.","obligation":"A named verb must not silently widen into an unconstrained write over fields its resource never exposed for update.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"C1 and C2 attest the BUILD they were driven against. An operation that regresses after the run is invisible until re-driven, and nothing currently detects that.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven call per declared API-reachable operation, reaching an implementation. C2: for each action with an observable effect, the effect confirmed after a reported success. C3: per named verb, whether it AUTHORED a request contract — and for those that did not, the inherited field set, which is the breadth they actually carry.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A success reported for an action not performed is a MAJOR and the intent's central harm. A declared operation with no implementation is a MAJOR. A named verb carrying an unauthored, INHERITED contract is a MAJOR — it is mass assignment wearing a named verb, and its field set will look correct against the resource because it IS the resource's. Note the generic core path persists only declared schema fields, so the harm is the verb's BREADTH rather than a write to a column the resource never had.","verificationSteps":["Drive each declared operation and assert it reaches an implementation rather than an acknowledgement.","For each success, confirm the effect independently — the report is the thing under test and cannot be its own evidence.","For each NAMED verb, assert it authored its own request contract. Do NOT compare its written fields against the resource's updatable set: a verb that authored none inherits exactly that set, so the comparison is equal by construction and passes precisely the operations the engine flags."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:operation-serviceability-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:outbound-call-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:outbound-call-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that enables any provider-backed capability; an application with none makes no provider calls and the egress half is not applicable as configured.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A structural property of the configuration, and a committed declaration is what a reviewer enumerates.\n\n**\"A SINGLE named egress\" is wrong, and this clause said it until 2026-09-10.** Resolution mode is a first-class declared property of each capability, and one capability declares FAN_OUT: the audit trail writes every event to EVERY configured destination, because its nature is additive rather than substitutable. So a correctly configured application with two audit sinks was reported by the old step as more than one egress, and by the old severity line as a MAJOR — against the configuration the entire assurance programme rests on. Read the mode first, then count against what it admits.\n\nNote also what this clause CANNOT reach: a second egress would be a CODE path, and no declaration enumerates code. What is enumerable is the per-capability provider selection, which names providers rather than paths. C2's store is what can show a call to a provider the selection does not name.","obligation":"Outbound traffic for a capability leaves through the providers that capability's DECLARED resolution mode admits, and no others.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"An ENGINE-owned store, `providerCallRecords`: one metadata-only row per provider call, written by the engine's recorder on every call and read for a window through `GET /assurance/provider-call-evidence`, which returns counts and no row. It is not an audit event and names no audit member, which is right: the audit trail records decisions about people, and a per-call record in it would drown them.\n\n**Until 2026-09-24 this clause was UNPRODUCED**, and why is the part worth keeping. The engine already emitted a per-call trace, and every destination of it was telemetry: a logger, an analytics vendor, an observability forwarder, the dev companion's files. None was a store a collector could query, and the trace was emitted only when an observability provider raised the traceability level above its default `NONE`. So the evidence depended on an observability choice. The record has its own seam, called before that gate, so it is written whatever the level.\n\n**Granularity, stated so it is not overread.** A row is one engine call to a provider: one agent invocation, one embedding batch, one document extraction. An agent invocation that loops through tools makes several HTTP requests to the provider under that one row, with usage summed. And a coding agent run over the Agent Client Protocol is an external process whose own provider calls the engine never sees, so it produces no row.","obligation":"Every physical provider call is recorded — provider, model, usage and outcome.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each probe row names the actor that initiated it"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A different call kind with a different question: a probe has no provider or model, and what a reviewer needs is WHO initiated it. Separate store, separate member, and a body merging C2 and C3 would demand provider fields of a call that has none. Unlike C2 this half IS an audit row, which is why the two cannot share a home.\n\nThe member was `PLATFORM_DIRECTORY_ACCESS` until 2026-09-10, and that was a demand borrowed from another objective: its own declaration is marked `WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT` and it records an unconfined administrative READ of application-wide data — not an outbound call at all. The member marked for THIS objective is the outbound administrative probe, which is emitted directly rather than through the audit service. Read the member's own marker before demanding it; the enum says which objective each member answers.","obligation":"And an administrative probe records its initiating actor.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["webhook_endpoint_test_dispatched"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"absenceUnreadable":"The recorder is fire-and-forget, so a capability call whose row was dropped is exactly as silent as a window with no calls. Zero rows for an enabled capability with evidenced activity is read with audit_observation_dropped_total{observation=\"provider_capability_call\"}, never as a quiet period.","unreached":"that EVERY call left a row: a count shows the calls that were recorded and never the ones that were not, and a lost row is counted on audit_observation_dropped_total rather than in the trail"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The capability egresses are not model calls, so C2's store does not see them, and until #1712 nothing recorded them per call: the objective read as covered for the email, SMS, billing and storage traffic of every application. They now leave the record catalogue operations already leave — an audit row, the sibling `PROVIDER_CAPABILITY_CALL` — written by one recorder every egress calls: at the email and SMS services' single physical call, around every vendor-reaching method of the billing adapter (a table total over the adapter interface), and at each call a storage sends (Drive's round trips, the object store's calls; a Drive delete sends nothing and records nothing).\n\n**Subject-free by its schema, deliberately.** #412 declined any persisted record of a sent email, even metadata-only, because it would be a new personal-data store. So no field names a recipient, a number, a file, a customer or a payload; the row describes the egress. It is counted per capability.","obligation":"And every call a capability egress makes to a vendor — an email or SMS submission, a billing call, a storage call — is recorded with its provider, capability and outcome.","plane":"PRODUCTION","reportedAuditEventDataDistribution":{"field":"capability"},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["provider_capability_call"]}],"limits":"C1 evidences the declared PROVIDER SET and nothing about traffic, and it cannot evidence its own harder half, because a second egress would be a code path and no declaration enumerates code. C2 closes that half only for calls that pass through the engine's recording sites: `invokeAgent`, embeddings and document extraction. A provider SDK called directly from application code, or a coding agent's own calls, would leave no row, so an absent provider in C2 is evidence about the engine's call paths and not a proof that no other path exists. Recording is best-effort: a failed write never fails the call, so a store that stopped receiving rows shows as a quiet window, which is why an empty window is not read as conformance.\n\nC4 counts the calls that pass through the engine's capability egresses. Its row is one ACT of the application: a billing adapter call that pages through a list may make several HTTP requests under one row. A storage's readiness probe is not recorded — it carries no file and acts for no one, and a probe every few seconds would bury the calls the trail exists for. A storage a provider package contributes records only if its code calls the same recorder. Calls to a SYSTEM OF RECORD are not C4's, and their records are coarser than one per physical call — stated so they are not read as covering it: a read-through binding leaves one `HTTP_API_READ_THROUGH_ACCESS` row per OPERATION (a paginated list and its count are one access), a write one `HTTP_API_WRITE_THROUGH` row per attempt, a declared action one `SYSTEM_OF_RECORD_ACTION_EXECUTED` row per attempt, and a pipeline one row per RUN however many pages it read. A per-physical-call record for those lanes is not built. BROWSER-side egress — error monitoring, analytics, a frontend provider's own calls — never reaches a backend recorder, so it is OUT of scope here and is never implied covered; its consent is a separate requirement.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared egress per capability, and the enumeration showing no second path. C2: the provider-call counts for the window, grouped by provider, model, kind and outcome, with the records that lack a provider, a model or reported usage counted apart. C3: outbound-probe rows naming the initiating actor. C4: the capability-call rows for the window, counted per capability, with the outcomes nobody observed (`outcome_unknown`) named.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A provider configured for a capability whose declared mode does not admit it is a MAJOR. Several providers on a FAN_OUT capability are NOT a finding — that is the declared design. A probe with no actor is a MAJOR: attribution is the entire point of C3. For C2, a call to a provider no capability selects is a MAJOR (an undeclared egress); records missing their provider or model are a MINOR, because the call was recorded and only its attribution is incomplete; an empty window is an OBSERVATION, since an application that made no calls and a recorder that stopped writing read the same. For C4, a capability with evidenced activity and no row is a MAJOR (unrecorded egress); a provider C4 counted that C1 does not declare is a MAJOR; `outcome_unknown` rows are an OBSERVATION, the calls a reviewer reconciles with the vendor first.","verificationSteps":["Read each enabled capability's declared RESOLUTION MODE first. A select-one capability admits one active provider; a fan-out capability admits all configured ones, and counting more than one there is the control working. Assert the configured providers against what the mode admits — never against a flat expectation of one.","Read C2 from the provider-call evidence door for the window. Do NOT substitute a log search: a log is not an evidence store, and its retention is an operational setting rather than a retention decision.","Compare the providers C2 counted with the providers C1 found declared: a call to a provider no capability selects is the undeclared egress C1 cannot see on its own.","Report incomplete records (no provider, no model, no reported usage) as incomplete, never subtracted from the total and never read as calls that did not happen.","Gather administrative outbound-probe rows separately and assert each names its initiating actor, its scope and its destination HOST — never the full URL, since customer endpoint paths routinely embed per-tenant tokens and these rows replicate to the tenant SIEM and the immutable store.","Read C4 per capability. A capability the application enables (email, SMS, billing, a vendor storage) with activity in the window and no capability-call row is the gap C4 exists to show; compare its providers with C1's, and read `audit_observation_dropped_total` for `provider_capability_call` before reading an empty capability as silence."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:outbound-call-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:outbound-target-admission-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.NETWORK.OUTBOUND_TARGET_CONTROL","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:outbound-target-admission-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: webhook delivery, SIEM export, federated sign-in, A2A push, MCP and client-metadata resolution are engine-owned request paths. What varies is which of them an application exercises, never whether the admission governs them.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The resolution is a pure, total function of the class and the environment, and the environment is the value the operator declares for the deployment — a backend refuses to start with `APPLICATION_ENV` unset, and an environment a hydrating runtime did not declare resolves here as production. Reading the declared environment and the class table reproduces the admission for every class.","obligation":"Every such request names its target class, and its admission is resolved from the class and the operator-declared runtime environment.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A shape check and a connection-time check look identical against a well-behaved destination. Only a name that answers a private address when connected to, and a server answering with a redirect, separate them.","obligation":"A name that resolves to a refused address is refused at connection time, and a redirect is not followed.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The relaxation's safety rests on its NARROWNESS, which no production observation can show: a deployment that never met a metadata-address destination looks the same whether loopback-only admits it or not.","obligation":"Loopback is admitted only in a development or test runtime, and link-local and private-network space never under that admission.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"Destinations an application's own backend configuration declares — a provider API endpoint, an external-data binding — are trusted as authored and are outside this objective; only their redirect refusal is shared. Platform topology is operator configuration and private by design. And the environment is only as honest as the operator's declaration: a production deployment declared as development admits loopback. An operator may also admit private-network SIEM collectors by declaration; a private collector reached under that declaration is the escape working, not a finding.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared runtime environment and the resolved admission per class. C2: a driven request to a public-looking name resolving to a private address, and one to a server answering 302. C3: the same metadata-address and private-network targets under a development runtime.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A request from a tenant-, client- or stranger-chosen destination reaching a link-local or private-network address in production is a MAJOR — it is a request-forgery primitive. A development runtime admitting more than loopback is a MAJOR. A refusal recorded only in the application log is an OBSERVATION for the classes that write no audit row, never a nonconformity: those classes report the refusal to their caller by design.","verificationSteps":["Read the deployment's declared runtime environment and resolve the admission for every target class.","Start the backend with `APPLICATION_ENV` unset and assert it refuses to start, naming the variable.","Drive a request whose destination name resolves to a private address and assert it is refused before any byte is sent.","Drive a request to a server that answers with a redirect to a metadata address and assert exactly one request was made.","Under a development runtime, assert a loopback destination is reached and a link-local or private-network destination is still refused."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:outbound-target-admission-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:over-limit-refusal-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:over-limit-refusal-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application, unconditionally: the bound is engine-mounted and no application opts out. Note the asymmetry a judge must carry — the intent speaks of an unauthenticated request generally, and the single marked site bounds ONE unauthenticated surface.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The bound is a committed constant applied at a named mount, so reading the mount answers the clause. No occurrence evidences a bound — a window with no oversize request looks identical whether the cap exists or not.","obligation":"An unauthenticated request consumes a bounded amount of resource.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A status code is a driven result. It is also the half that silently regresses: a body-parser rejection that reaches no translator surfaces as a 500, and a 500 on an unauthenticated surface is an availability signal an attacker reads rather than a refusal.","obligation":"An over-limit request is answered as a CLIENT error rather than surfacing as a server failure.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"The marked mount is one unauthenticated surface, and the framework-wide BODY-SIZE bound is elsewhere and unmarked: a configurable request-body limit with an application-overridable default, applied to every other route. An earlier revision of this section named the body-parser CLASSIFIER and the perimeter RATE limiter instead — the first is a C2 property and the second bounds request rate rather than size, so neither is the other bound a judge weighing \"an absent bound is a MAJOR\" needs to know about. That the application can CHANGE its own default is the part worth carrying: a collector following markers under-reports coverage, which is the safe direction, but it also never sees the value that actually governs every unmarked route.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the mounted limit and the routes it covers. C2: a driven oversize POST answered 413 with the status preserved, and a malformed body answered as a client error. Do NOT expect a 415 for an unacceptable content type: the parsers are TYPE-MATCHED, so a foreign content type is SKIPPED rather than rejected and no 415 is produced — the mount's own test asserts 413, 400 and 200 and never 415. The translator handles any body-parser rejection, not two named ones.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An over-limit request answered 500 is a MAJOR: the intent names exactly that outcome. An absent bound on an unauthenticated surface is a MAJOR. Evidence gathered at only the marked mount is an OBSERVATION about COVERAGE, never a nonconformity — see the limits, where the under-report runs in the safe direction.","verificationSteps":["Read the committed body limit and the mount path it is applied at.","POST a body exceeding it to an unauthenticated token route and assert 413, not 500.","POST a malformed body of an accepted type and assert a client error rather than a 500. Do NOT assert 415 on a foreign content type — the parsers skip it and a downstream 200 or 400 is correct, so asserting 415 raises a MAJOR against a working mount.","Assert the same routes under GET are unaffected — they carry no body and the translator is a no-op for them."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:over-limit-refusal-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:persistence-isolation-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:persistence-isolation-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application whose resources do not all sit on the default adapter. An application on one adapter has an empty population; the refusal below still runs and still protects it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The declaration is a committed member of a named vocabulary on the resource config. Nothing observable at runtime distinguishes a resource that declared from one that was never asked, because the refusal happens at registry build and a booted application has already passed it.\n\n\"Non-default\" is narrower than it sounds and a judge must resolve it before counting: the obligation reaches only adapters that OWN a transaction. A resource on a read-through or introspection adapter is skipped before the door — it takes part in no atomic boundary, so it owes no declaration — and treating those as an undeclared population is the derive-before-you-ask defect exactly: a ratio whose denominator the reviewer chose.","obligation":"A resource declares its persistence isolation before it may sit on a non-default adapter.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is the refusal, which only exists when the bad configuration is presented. A booting application evidences that ITS configuration passed, never that a failing one would be refused.","obligation":"A configuration whose cross-resource writes could not be atomic is REFUSED when the registry is built, rather than discovered under load.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Without this clause a judge reading C1 alone would take the declaration for a waiver, which is the one reading that makes the control dangerous. The compatibility assessment still classifies such a boundary as mixed and the unit of work still throws — evidenced by driving that boundary, not by reading the declaration.","obligation":"And the declaration buys the right to BOOT, never a silent degradation: a declared resource actually reached by a cross-adapter atomic boundary still fails there.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It attests the registry BUILD. An adapter assignment made outside the registry, or changed after it, is invisible here. And it evidences that atomicity cannot be silently LOST — never that any particular write was atomic, which is a different question with a different answer per boundary.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared isolation member per resource on a non-default adapter, and the resource-to-adapter map. C2: a driven registry build over an undeclared mixed set, refused. C3: a driven cross-adapter atomic boundary over a DECLARED resource, throwing.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A mixed set that booted with neither a declaration nor the sanctioned platform option is a MAJOR — the guarantee was lost silently, which is exactly what building the check at registry time exists to prevent. A resource on a non-transactional adapter with no declaration is NOT a finding in any degree: it was never in the population. A declared resource that then throws at a boundary is the control WORKING: an OBSERVATION about that configuration, never a nonconformity. The tolerance option set with no recorded reason is an OBSERVATION.","verificationSteps":["Map each resource to its adapter, then scope the population to TRANSACTION-OWNING adapters before asserting anything. The registry skips a resource on a read-through or introspection adapter BEFORE the isolation door, deliberately — such a resource owns no transaction, so it cannot break atomicity and is never asked to declare. Asserting over every non-default adapter raises a MAJOR on correct configuration; real resources rely on that skip.","Within that population, assert every resource carries an isolation declaration.","Build a registry over a mixed set with no declaration and no platform tolerance option, and assert refusal.","Drive a cross-adapter atomic write over a resource that DID declare, and assert it throws at the boundary rather than committing partially.","Do NOT look for the platform dual-store tolerance option in an application: it is forced on only inside the platform's own validation path, and this objective's governance scope is the application. It is named in the severity guidance for completeness and is unreachable here."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:persistence-isolation-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:personal-data-field-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:personal-data-field-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that stores personal data. The DECLARATION mechanism is engine-owned; what is declared is the application's own, which is what makes C3 below unevidenceable rather than merely unevidenced.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The decorator on the field IS the inventory. There is no second store to query and no occurrence to observe: a field holding personal data emits nothing by holding it.","obligation":"Categories of personal data are declared ON THE FIELD, in the committed schema.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a name-reading producer, so the ENUMERATION is the artifact — the same shape as the one-authority clause of multi-factor-enrolment-record. A declared inventory looks identical whether it was authored or pattern-matched, so nothing but enumerating the producers separates them. Exactly ONE derivation is expected and must be found: the credentials category.\n\n**Its inputs are FIVE paths, not three, and this rationale said three until an independent judge counted them.** The password and one-time-code predicates each check a structural marker FIRST and then fall back to a string-UI edit mode; the write-only-secret predicate is the third marker. The clause's obligation still holds — an edit mode is authored by a developer, not read off a field's name — but a UI RENDERING choice is a different kind of declaration from a privacy marker, and a body that enumerates a derivation's inputs owes the reader the real set. A collector asserting \"three marker inputs\" and finding five would report a drift that is not one.","obligation":"No category is INFERRED from a field's identifier.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The PROVABLE half of completeness, and it is produced today: a derived per-resource set of fields the application declared personal by another door — an impersonalization treatment, a portability provenance — that carry no category. Its own words: the omission is provably an omission rather than a judgement that the field is not personal, BECAUSE the application said it was personal by another door.\n\nThat is a denominator the FRAMEWORK defines rather than one a reviewer chose, which is what makes it reportable at all. It is derived on demand and stored nowhere, so OBSERVED.\n\n**This was folded into a single UNPRODUCED completeness clause until 2026-09-10** — the permissive-direction error, since UNPRODUCED carries no severity and the body then told a judge that a field with no declaration is not a finding. It said that of a live gap report.","obligation":"A field the application ALREADY declared personal by another door, and which carries no category, is reported.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"UNPRODUCED","homeRationale":"The UNKNOWABLE remainder, and nothing can produce it. The objective's own reasoning is why: an inventory assembled by pattern-matching identifiers is a guess whose misses are silently undisclosed — an argument that disqualifies a completeness CHECKER as thoroughly as it disqualifies a name-inferring producer. A field called `notes` holding a case history is invisible to both, and to C3, because nothing else marks it either.\n\nRecording THIS much as UNPRODUCED is honest; recording C3 as part of it was not.","obligation":"And the inventory is COMPLETE — every field holding personal data is declared, including fields nothing else marks.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences what was DECLARED, how the declarations were produced, and the subset of omissions the application itself proves. It cannot evidence what nothing marks — the half a data-protection reviewer most wants — so say so rather than letting a clean C1 and an empty C3 read as a complete inventory. C2 attests the producer set as enumerated; one added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared category set per field, read off the committed schema, and for every resource bound or piped to a system of record, which of those categories reach it (`systemOfRecordFlowsOfResource`, #1709 — the same derivation the recipients fact and the selected-processor evidence read, so the three cannot disagree). C2: an enumeration of every producer of a field's category set, with the single marker-derived category identified and its inputs shown to be markers. C3: the derived uncategorized-personal-field set, per resource. C4: nothing.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A producer that derives a category from an identifier is a MAJOR and is the objective's stated failure, whatever its hit rate. A field whose declared categories are wrong is a MAJOR. A field in the C3 set — declared personal by another door and left uncategorized — is a MAJOR against the APPLICATION: it is a disclosure gap the application can close and the framework has already proved — and it is reported with the system of record it reaches, when it reaches one, because that recipient's categories are then reported NOT DERIVABLE in the notice. A field nothing marks at all is NOT a finding on this evidence: that is C4, which carries no severity, because reporting it would mean asserting a population nobody can enumerate — a count about the search rather than about the world.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate fields carrying a declared data-category set and the categories each names.","For each resource bound (`httpApiBinding`) or piped (`externalDataPipeline`) to a system of record, derive which declared categories reach that instance: every field for a read-through binding, the mapped fields for a pipeline. A C3 field among them is named WITH the instance, because it makes that recipient's disclosed categories incomplete.","Enumerate every producer that writes into that set and assert none reads the field identifier.","Assert the one derived category derives from AUTHORED inputs and not from names — and enumerate them rather than counting: there are five paths, two of which are a string-UI edit mode reached as a fallback behind a structural marker.","Gather the derived uncategorized-personal-field set per resource (C3) and report every entry. Each is a field the application itself declared personal by another door and left uncategorized, so the omission is provable rather than inferred.","Record C4 as UNPRODUCED. Do NOT approximate it with a name-based sweep — that reproduces the exact defect the objective refuses, and C3 is the only part of completeness that can be reported without one."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:personal-data-field-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:privileged-access-review-occurrences","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"APPLICABLE to every application: both required capabilities are ALWAYS_AVAILABLE — capability:audit-events is the application's own audit store and capability:privileged-access-review the enumeration. That status is DERIVED, not judged: deriveExpectationCapabilityApplicability returns APPLICABLE when every required capability is available, NOT_APPLICABLE when all are unavailable, and UNDETERMINED when only some are. A collector reads the status first rather than deciding. Availability says nothing about the HUMAN act this demand records, which is supplied as a host artifact. Until 2026-09-14 the audit capability was gated on the Layer-2 fan-out, and this read UNDETERMINED.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A live DERIVED READ, not a record: the enumeration is computed from the current role graph when asked, and the boot report that surfaces it writes a debug line rather than a row. So it is reproducible on demand and stored nowhere — which is what OBSERVED means, and it is why a review must attach the enumeration it read rather than cite a query that will answer differently tomorrow.\n\nIt said EMITTED — \"in the engine's own store\" — until 2026-09-10, restating the home rather than supporting it. There is no store, and a collector was pointed at one.","obligation":"The enumeration a review reads — who currently holds privileged access.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The second half of the intent's first demand, and a genuinely different artifact from the enumeration: rows in the engine's own store, queryable for the period a review covers. The body demanded them in PROSE and named no member until 2026-09-10, so a collector reading its query off the structured field asked for nothing.","obligation":"The ACCESS EVENTS behind the enumeration — the grants and removals it summarises.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_app_roles_changed","organization_member_role_changed","organization_unit_member_role_changed","organization_unit_member_removed"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"No engine mechanism produces it, none can, and none should: a review is a human act, and a framework that synthesised one would manufacture the evidence it is meant to collect. The framework's obligation is to make C1 and C2 available and to accept and retain C3. PRODUCTION because the review is performed against the live deployment — that the engine cannot OBSERVE it is carried by the home, not by the plane.","obligation":"The review OCCURRENCE — that authorized people examined that enumeration and decided.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"C3 is self-attested by construction. The framework can retain it and check that it cites the enumeration and falls within the declared cadence; it cannot evidence that the examination was competent or independent.\n\nAnd a review record evidences that access was EXAMINED, never that anything was remediated. The marked site says so and the caveat survives into the host artifact: a completed review with findings left open is a conformant review. Do not read C3 as closure.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the current privileged-access enumeration, ATTACHED as returned rather than cited as a query. C2: the four privilege-change members over the review period. C3: the operator-supplied review record, as a host artifact — who reviewed, what enumeration they read, what they decided — plus the declared review cadence it is checked against.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A missing C3 with a healthy C1 and C2 is a MAJOR against the OPERATOR, not the framework — the record was never supplied. A missing C1 or C2 is a MAJOR against the framework: the review had nothing to read. A review outside its declared cadence is a MAJOR against the operator. A capability-keyed classifier that reports this demand satisfied on C1 alone has silently dropped the half the objective is named for.","verificationSteps":["Resolve applicability first; if the two capabilities resolve differently, record UNDETERMINED and stop.","Drive the enumeration and ATTACH what it returned (C1). It is a live derived read, so a citation of the query rather than its result evidences nothing — the same query answers differently tomorrow.","Query the four privilege-change members for the period the review covers (C2). Formerly demanded in prose only, so a collector reading the structured field asked for nothing.","Accept the host-supplied review record and check it cites the enumeration it read, not a re-derived one (C3).","Never synthesise C3 from C1 or C2: an enumeration is what a review READS, never evidence that a review happened.","Assert the review fell within a declared CADENCE, and record the cadence. The intent says PERIODICALLY, and without this one five-year-old record satisfies C3 — this is a judgement the framework cannot make, so the cadence must be stated by the operator and checked against, not inferred."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: roles and memberships are engine-owned, and the demand covers whichever privilege kinds an application uses.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the assignment and the direction of its change, which is what lets a life be reconstructed rather than a current state inferred"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The intent's contrast is the control: a current-state read (who holds what NOW) satisfies nothing here. Only an append-only per-occurrence class evidences a life, which is why the audit trail rather than the role table is the store.","obligation":"Every grant, widening, narrowing and revocation of privilege leaves durable evidence of the assignment's FULL LIFE, not merely its current state.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_app_roles_changed","organization_member_role_changed","organization_unit_member_role_changed","organization_unit_member_removed","platform_access_grant_lifecycle"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"all four privilege kinds are covered — the discretionary and subscription-derived kinds are evidenced only by before-and-after values inside generic operation rows"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The intent ENUMERATES four kinds, so coverage is per-kind and a body naming only role changes would report a satisfied demand while two kinds go unevidenced. A subscription-derived privilege is the easiest to miss: nobody grants it, a billing state change does.\n\nThe last two kinds have no purpose-built member and do not need one: the discretionary entitlement and the subscription-derived kind are evidenced by BEFORE-AND-AFTER values riding the generic resource-operation row, because the scope-feature and subscription-status fields carry the audit-evidence marker and are marked for this objective. That is the mechanism, and this clause named neither it nor a member until 2026-09-10 — leaving a collector with a per-kind coverage obligation and no query for half of it.","obligation":"Across all four privilege kinds — a role, a unit-scoped membership, a discretionary entitlement, a subscription-derived one.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_performed"]}],"limits":"It evidences that a privilege CHANGED, never that the change was authorized — a grant made by someone entitled to make it and one made wrongly are recorded identically. Authorization is the decision demand's question.","minimumEvidence":"C1: lifecycle rows for the window, each naming the assignment, the direction of change and the actor. C2: coverage per privilege kind. For the discretionary and subscription-derived kinds that means generic resource-operation rows carrying before-and-after values on the scope-feature and subscription-status fields — not lifecycle rows, which those transitions never produce because they originate in billing rather than in an administrative act.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Evidence that only reports current state is a MAJOR — it is precisely what the intent excludes. A missing privilege kind is a MAJOR for that kind, not for the demand as a whole. A row without an actor is an OBSERVATION where the transition was legitimate and only its attribution is thin.","verificationSteps":["Gather lifecycle rows and assert each names the assignment, the change direction and an actor.","Partition by privilege kind and report per-kind coverage; a kind with no rows in a window that had activity is the finding.","Reconstruct one assignment's full life from the rows alone, without reading current state — that reconstruction IS the demand.","Check the subscription-derived kind specifically: its transitions are not administrative acts and a role-shaped query misses them."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:reconstructable-authorization-effect","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:reconstructable-authorization-effect"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The generic resource-operation row is engine-owned, so no application builds the lane and none opts out — but it is emitted for a BOUNDED population, not for \"every privileged action\" as this field claimed until 2026-09-10: an automatic risk floor of HIGH-or-CRITICAL, plus operations that declare a below-floor opt-in, and never for a read. Sampling MEDIUM-risk privileged actions and reporting the missing rows raises nonconformities against the designed floor.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the actor who performed the privileged action and the operation it performed"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"One durable row class in the engine's own store, carrying the operation identity triple, the actor, and the correlation id that groups a cascade. One collector query serves every application.","obligation":"A privileged action on a resource is attributable.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_performed"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the authorization EFFECT is reconstructable from the row itself, which is the whole difference between this clause and C1 and is a question about payload"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The clause is about what the row CARRIES: the actor's roles as they stood, and before-and-after values for every field marked as audit evidence. Re-deriving from today's role tables answers a different question — what the actor could do NOW — and a role change that does not record its old and new values proves nothing at all.","obligation":"The authorization EFFECT the action had is reconstructable from the record itself, rather than re-derived from role tables afterwards.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_performed"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"TWO audit configurations exist and they are evidenced differently — name which one a finding is about. The single-sign-on scoped block carries the audit-evidence marker, so a change to it IS a resource-operation row; the application-level trail configuration is a committed config block that produces no row, and only the committed history evidences a change to it. The severity line below is true of the first.\n\nThe block is committed, and the reason it is in scope is the pre-incident tampering move: disabling event logging or shortening the retention window must not be the one change the trail cannot evidence. A row cannot evidence its own absence, so the declaration is the only artifact that can.","obligation":"The configuration deciding what the trail captures is itself governed as part of the trail.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Which fields are marked as audit evidence is a committed decision per field, and it is a two-sided one. Marking a personal-data field would manufacture an unerasable duplicate in a ledger that cannot be scrubbed — in direct conflict with the erasure obligation and with the impersonalization capability built to satisfy it. Not marking an authority-bearing one empties C2.","obligation":"And the field set the row carries is bounded by the erasure obligation: authority-bearing values are recorded, personal data is not.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences that the effect is RECONSTRUCTABLE from what the row carries, never that any reconstruction performed was correct. It attests the window. And it says nothing about actions taken outside the resource-operation path — a direct datastore write leaves no row and is invisible here, which is the one gap no row class can close.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C2: resource-operation rows over the window carrying the operation triple, the actor and its roles as they stood, the correlation id, and before-and-after values for the audit-evidence fields. C3: the committed audit configuration and its own change history. C4: the audit-evidence field set, cross-read against the declared personal-data categories.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A privileged action with no row is a MAJOR. A row from which the authorization effect cannot be reconstructed — a role change with no prior value — is a MAJOR, and it is the clause the objective is named for. A personal-data field marked as audit evidence is a MAJOR in the OTHER direction: the trail is working and the erasure obligation is broken, permanently, because the ledger cannot be scrubbed. An audit configuration change with no record is a MAJOR.","verificationSteps":["Sample privileged actions from the window and assert each has a row naming actor, operation triple and correlation id.","For a role-bearing change, assert the row carries the OLD and NEW values rather than only the new one.","Assert the reconstruction uses the roles the row recorded, not the role table as it stands today — those answer different questions.","Read the audit configuration and assert a change to it is itself evidenced.","Cross-read the audit-evidence field set against the declared personal-data categories and assert no field appears in both."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:reconstructable-authorization-effect"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:record-context-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:record-context-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the trusted-system write path is engine-owned and every audit row passes through it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"SURVIVAL is a property of a transformation, and no row evidences it: a record whose actor was replaced looks exactly like one that always named that actor. Only driving a write with a known actor and tenant and reading the persisted row back separates them.","obligation":"The actor and tenant an audit row names survive the trusted-system write that persists it.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"A field-presence property of live records, checkable in the window — but the records are LOG lines and the framework owns no log store. The logger writes to stdout or an exporter, so the archive a collector reads is the HOST's, on the host's retention.\n\nThis clause said EMITTED until 2026-09-10, which told a collector to query an engine-owned record class that does not exist. Note C1 above IS correctly EMITTED — the audit repository is a real store — so the two halves of this demand are gathered from two different places, which is the thing a judge most needs to be told.\n\nIt is the clause that makes a record attributable across deployments: without it two environments' rows are indistinguishable once pooled.","obligation":"And a log record names which application and which environment produced it.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"C1 attests the write path DRIVEN, not every production write; a second path that persists rows without passing through it is invisible here. C2 evidences presence of the identifiers, never that they are correct.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven trusted-system write with a known actor and tenant, and the persisted row read back carrying both unchanged. C2: log records from the window carrying application and environment identifiers.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A row naming the trusted system instead of the principal is a MAJOR — it is the intent's stated harm, a record silently losing the principal it belongs to. A tenant replaced is a MAJOR and also a tenancy defect. A log record without application or environment is an OBSERVATION alone and a MAJOR once records from two deployments are pooled, which is the case the clause exists for.","verificationSteps":["Drive a write as a trusted system on behalf of a known principal in a known tenant.","Read the persisted row and assert the actor and tenant are the ones supplied, not the trusted system's own.","Sample log records from the window and assert application and environment are present."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:record-context-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:redirect-target-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:redirect-target-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to any application that registers OAuth clients. An application registering none has nothing to evidence and has not failed the control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The registered target set is committed configuration and the dangerous schemes are a closed vocabulary with one named runtime source — exported for exactly this reason, so this demand reads the set the guard branches on instead of transcribing it into a second list free to drift.\n\n**It is a DENYLIST, and this clause demanded membership in a permitted set until 2026-09-10 — an inversion.** The source states the reason an allowlist is impossible: the set of legitimate app schemes is OPEN, and every entry would be a new client the framework has to be taught about. A collector asserting membership would refuse every conformant private-use scheme a native or CLI client registers, which is the exact regression the guard's own history records a real client hitting. The danger is a scheme's CAPABILITY — executing, or reading local state — not its unfamiliarity.","obligation":"Every registered redirect target is a safe absolute URL whose scheme is NOT a member of the named dangerous set, and which carries no fragment and no embedded credentials.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A clean registered set proves nothing on its own — it is equally consistent with a guard that refuses and with an application nobody has yet attacked. Only a driven refusal separates them.","obligation":"A target outside that set is REFUSED at registration.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences REGISTRATION under a DENYLIST, so it can never evidence that a permitted scheme is safe — only that it is not one of the shapes known to execute or read local state. A capability the denylist has not been taught is admitted, by design. It says nothing about whether the authorization endpoint matches a presented redirect target against the registered set — a distinct control, and the one an open-redirect actually travels through. A custom scheme registered by a legitimate native client is admissible here and is not thereby proven to be controlled by that client.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the registered clients and their targets — for BOTH registered families, since post-logout targets pass the same gate — checked against the exported dangerous-scheme vocabulary by reference. C2: driven registration attempts carrying a script-executing scheme, an inline-data scheme, a relative target, a fragment, and embedded credentials, each refused.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A stored script-executing or inline-data target is a MAJOR and is the delegation primitive the intent names by consequence, not by category. A registration accepted for a scheme IN the dangerous set is a MAJOR whatever the target turned out to be. An unfamiliar private-use scheme is NOT a finding — it is the case the denylist exists to permit — and neither is a loopback http target: the rule is deliberately not https-only, because that would refuse the conformant native and CLI flow.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate registered OAuth clients and BOTH registered target families — redirect and post-logout redirect.","Assert each target parses as an absolute URL and its scheme is NOT in the exported dangerous set. Do NOT assert membership in a permitted set: there is no allowlist, and asserting one refuses conformant native clients.","Assert no target carries a fragment or embedded credentials — two refusals the guard makes that a scheme check alone misses.","Attempt to register a script-executing scheme and assert refusal.","Attempt to register a relative target and assert refusal."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:redirect-target-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:refusal-classification-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:refusal-classification-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Both marked controls are engine-owned; the second is reachable only where enterprise single sign-on is configured, which narrows its POPULATION and not its obligation.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A sanitized value produces a successful response, so there is no record of the refusal that did not happen. Only driving a filter that carries an operator and asserting the WHOLE value was refused separates rejection from stripping — and the site names why the distinction matters: a partially-stripped operator object is a filter the caller did not ask for, which is its own kind of wrong answer.","obligation":"Untrusted input is rejected WHOLE rather than partly sanitized.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The condition has to be created to be observed. A production window in which the dependency was present evidences nothing about the window in which it is not.","obligation":"A validator whose dependency is unavailable fails CLOSED on what it guards.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"This is the clause the requirement is really named after, and it is a property of the ERROR the refusal carries: a configuration problem with an actionable remedy, never an assertion-invalid verdict. Both outcomes refuse; only the classification tells an operator whether to look at the identity provider or at their own toolchain.","obligation":"And that degradation is CLASSIFIED distinctly from a rejected signature.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"Two marked sites for a principle the intent states generally — every other control that must refuse when it cannot evaluate is outside this evidence, and a clean result here is not an application-wide fail-closed claim. C2 and C3 attest the BUILD driven; note in particular that the validator dependency is a COMPILED artifact whose absence is per-workspace, so a probe in one workspace says nothing about another.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven query filter carrying an operator object, and the whole-value refusal it produced. C2 and C3: the validator driven with its dependency removed, and the error TYPE and code it produced.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A partially sanitized filter is a MAJOR. A validator that degrades OPEN is a MAJOR and is the objective's whole subject. A degraded validator reporting an invalid signature is also a MAJOR, and the reason is diagnostic rather than cryptographic: it sends the operator at the identity provider while the fault is in the local toolchain, so the outage outlives the diagnosis.","verificationSteps":["Send a filter value carrying a structured operator and assert THE VALUE DID NOT REACH THE QUERY. That is the evidence, not a request-level refusal: the guard DROPS the offending key and the request proceeds on the remaining filter, so on the agent surface the caller sees a 200. Where a refusal does occur it comes from the request contract, which is a different mechanism — asserting one on a surface that normalizes rather than parses reports a MAJOR against the marked control.","Assert the permitted scalar set is a named predicate and that a new structured shape would require a deliberate edit to it.","Remove the validator dependency, drive an assertion, and assert the refusal is a configuration error carrying a remedy.","Assert that refusal is NOT reported as an invalid signature — the two must be separable by an operator reading only the error."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:refusal-classification-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:reserved-claim-set-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:reserved-claim-set-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to any application issuing ID tokens. The set and the strip are engine-owned, so no application authors either and none can opt out.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A closed vocabulary with one named runtime source. The clause is satisfied or broken by the source tree alone, and the failure it guards against is a second copy drifting from the builder's own claim set — invisible to any runtime observation, because both copies produce well-formed tokens.","obligation":"The protocol and security claim names the ID-token builder owns are one named set, not a list restated where it is used.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Ordering is the whole control and no artifact records it: a token carrying a correct issuer looks identical whether the server authored it or the caller happened to supply the right value. Only issuing a token from extras that deliberately carry reserved names separates the two.","obligation":"A member of that set supplied through extra claims is stripped BEFORE the extras are spread, so it can never ride into an issued token.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It attests the ID-token builder and nothing else. Access tokens, the userinfo response and any second token minter have their own claim rules and are invisible here. It evidences that reserved names cannot be supplied, never that the server-authored values are correct.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the named reserved-claim set, referenced not retyped. C2: an issued ID token whose resolver supplied a not-before, a nonce, an authentication-context reference and an issuer among its extras, with every one of those claims in the result server-authored.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A smuggled not-before is a MAJOR and the intent names its consequence: a token that later fails verification, which presents as an outage rather than as an attack. A forged nonce, authentication-context or access-token hash is a MAJOR — those are the claims a relying party trusts about the ceremony it did not witness. A strip that happens AFTER the spread and is rescued only by a later re-set is still a MAJOR: the defence then rests on statement order.","verificationSteps":["Read the named reserved-claim set and assert the builder strips from that source rather than from a local list.","Drive an issuance whose extra claims carry a not-before and assert the issued token does not carry the supplied value.","Repeat with a nonce and an authentication-context reference — the claims a relying party reads to decide HOW the user authenticated.","For issuer, audience and subject, assert by SOURCE READ that the strip precedes the spread — a driven issuance cannot decide it, because the server re-sets those three after the spread and removing the strip produces an identical token. Say so in the finding rather than presenting a driven result for a claim driving cannot reach."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:reserved-claim-set-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:restriction-release-schedule","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:restriction-release-schedule"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the suspension verbs, the scheduled instant and the sweep are all engine-owned. An application that has suspended nobody has an empty population, not a failed control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the instant at which the restriction ends"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The scheduled instant lives on the engine-owned membership and user rows, so a query over the window answers the clause for every application through one schema. It is not DECLARED: the window is chosen per act by an administrator, not configured once.\n\nThe row that carries it is the purpose-built lifecycle-transition member, which records the subject, the from-to pair, an optional reason AND the automatic-reactivation deadline. This clause named no member until 2026-09-10, leaving a collector to find the instant by reading resource rows — which shows the deadline that stands NOW rather than the one the imposing act declared.","obligation":"A restriction imposed as time-boxed records the instant at which it ends.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_status_transition_performed"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A released row looks identical whichever path released it, so no record evidences this. The sweep dispatches the lifecycle verbs precisely so the state-machine check, the authoritative-field declaration that lets the patch survive the strict re-parse, and the administrative-continuity floors all run — a sweep wired around them would be a latent bypass nobody adding the next floor would think to check.","obligation":"The release runs through the SAME guarded authority that imposed the restriction, not through a direct status write.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"A sweep that silently stopped running leaves rows that look exactly like rows whose window has not yet elapsed, so continuity of the runs is itself part of the evidence.\n\nScheduled application receipts now leave bounded job-execution history and successful result payloads. Those operational stores retain history for 30 days and outputs for 24 hours. This clause remains PERFORMED because continuity over a longer claimed period requires period-covering evidence retained by the host. Each actual release also dispatches a lifecycle verb; use its transition rows for WHAT was released, and retained run outcomes for WHETHER the sweep kept running.","obligation":"And the sweep ran over the period, on schedule.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The ABSENCE of the field is the evidence, and it is readable in the committed contract. The inactive population is not swept because no door exists — the only reactivation verb for that state is self-scoped and the self resource grants no system update — and the two workarounds were refused as worse than the gap: widening the suspension verb merges an imposed restriction with a chosen one, and minting a per-user context would hand a batch the ability to impersonate.\n\n**This clause was UNPRODUCED until 2026-09-10, on the grounds that the date was accepted and unhonoured. It is not: the field was REMOVED (#430) rather than left as a promise nothing keeps.** The error came from the sweep's own docstring, which still described the pre-#430 contract — so a closed gap became a standing framework exemption one layer up, and UNPRODUCED carries no severity. The comment is corrected at its source. The clause survives INVERTED, because the removal is exactly what the objective wanted and an application that re-adds an unhonourable window should be told.","obligation":"A voluntary self-deactivation accepts no reactivation date at all, rather than accepting one nothing honours.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"C2 attests the path DRIVEN, on the build it was driven against. C1 and C3 attest a period and say nothing about the next one. And none of it evidences that the window an administrator CHOSE was appropriate — only that the system honoured the one it was given.","minimumEvidence":"C1: rows in the window carrying a scheduled release instant. C2: an enumeration of every writer of the restricted status, plus a driven elapsed window showing the verb path ran. C3: the sweep's execution records over the period. C4: the voluntary-deactivation contract, showing it declares no reactivation window.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A row whose window elapsed and whose restriction persists is a MAJOR — the intent names it exactly: a measure taken as temporary that silently became permanent. A release performed by a direct status write is a MAJOR even where the outcome was correct, because the floors and the state machine did not run. A gap in the sweep's execution record is a MAJOR for the period it covers, since nothing else lifts a window. A voluntary-deactivation contract that accepts a reactivation window is a MAJOR: nothing can lift it, so it is a declared promise the system cannot keep — which is the objective's own failure mode, arrived at from the other direction.","verificationSteps":["Query suspended memberships and users in the window and assert a scheduled release instant is present where the imposing act declared one.","Advance a row past its window, run the sweep, and assert the status changed AND the schedule was cleared — a stale deadline on a released row means the verb did not run.","Enumerate writers of the restricted status and assert the sweep is not among the direct writers.","Read the sweep execution records for the period and assert continuity of runs.","Read the voluntary-deactivation contract and assert it accepts no reactivation window. The un-swept inactive population is CORRECT — the field was removed rather than left unhonoured — so an application that re-added one is the finding, not the absence of a sweep."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:restriction-release-schedule"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:retention-window-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:retention-window-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"APPLICABLE to every application: capability:declared-retention-window is ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, so it survives the composer's capability filter unconditionally.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C0","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The premise the objective operates on rather than what it demands evidence of — needed as the BASELINE C1 is judged against, since enforcement cannot be assessed without knowing what was declared.","obligation":"The row-retention windows themselves are declared.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The sweep emits NO auditable event by design — a database TTL deletes silently — so 'did retention run?' is answerable only from the sweep's own outcome.\n\nScheduled application runs now have job-execution history and separately retained successful outputs. History expires after 30 days and output after 24 hours, so these operational records alone cannot cover a longer claimed period. Preserve the run outcomes and per-resource counts in the accountable host's evidence archive for that period. A completed invocation is not proof that its backlog was drained: inspect reachedRunCeiling and removal counts to tell a drained sweep from normal deferred work. A repository failure is not in the counters. It FAILS the invocation, and the scheduler holds that run for review rather than retaining its results, so a period's evidence must also account for failed runs.","obligation":"Declared row-retention windows are ENFORCED.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The startup validator's outcome, read from the accountable runtime's boot log — host-retained, not an engine store, which is why this is PERFORMED rather than EMITTED. PRODUCTION despite being about boot: what evidences it is a runtime-emitted outcome, not a configuration file.\n\n**A clean boot cannot be read as a pass.** The validator logs NOTHING on success, and it returns an empty result early when the detection it depends on is unbound — so silence is produced by a pass, by a skip, and by a validator that never ran, and the boot log cannot separate them. Establish that the check EXECUTED before reading its silence as a verdict.","obligation":"A configuration whose derived copies could outlive the row they came from is REFUSED at startup.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"An ENGINE-owned store, `retentionEnforcementRecords` (#1636): the retention-class sweep writes one row per run and per resource bound to a class — the period it applied, the cutoff, how many rows it deleted and the window of their retention start, how many a legal hold kept, and COMPLETED, DEFERRED_BY_CEILING, FAILED or SKIPPED. A failed run writes its row too, before the run fails. Read for a window through `GET /assurance/retention-enforcement-evidence`, which returns the records and no deleted row: a record holds counts and instants only. The rows are bound to AUDIT_LOGS, so they outlive the data they describe and the job-execution history C1 depends on. The run also emits `RETENTION_ENFORCEMENT_RECORDED`; the clause names no audit member because the store, not the event, is the record.\n\nDistinct from C1, and the reason it is a clause of its own: C1 is the `.ttl()` sweep over framework plumbing, C3 is the class sweep over the application's data (#1613). Until #1613 no mechanism enforced a declared class, and until #1636 nothing durable recorded that one did. The same records are what the `retention-enforcement` document fact reads (RUNTIME_EVIDENCE), so a notice and this measurement cannot disagree.","obligation":"Declared retention-CLASS periods are ENFORCED: every resource bound to a declared class is swept past its period.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences that the sweep RAN and what it removed, never that every row past its window is gone. And the boot outcome attests the configuration that booted, so it goes stale the moment configuration changes.\n\nScope limits a judge must not read past. C1's sweep covers the engine resources that declare a time-to-live and says nothing about the declared CLASSES; C3 evidences those, through the class sweep's own records (#1636). C3 evidences that each bound resource was swept, never that every row past its period is gone, and it cannot see a resource holding data that binds no class — that gap is a binding question, reported at startup. C1 and C2 are host-retained and evidenceable only as long as the host keeps its logs; C3's records are kept for the AUDIT_LOGS period.","minimumEvidence":"C0: the declared retention configuration, named by data-retention-class members derived from the capability's implementationRefs — the app-level SCHEDULE, which is a separate axis from C1 and is never reconciled against it. C1: the sweep's outcomes over the claimed period from the host's log archive — that it ran, per-resource removal counts, and whether it stopped early. C2: the startup validator's outcome from the boot log, NOT from an API: probing HTTP for a boot-time fact is a category error whose silence establishes nothing. C3: the retention-enforcement records of the period, read through the evidence door — per declared class, whether every bound resource has a recent completed or deferred run, and every failed one.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"'Stopped early' is NORMAL operation — the sweep defers the remainder rather than taking a table-wide lock — and must never read as failure. The nonconformity is the ABSENCE of a run in a period where retention was due. A startup refusal is the control working, not a finding.","verificationSteps":["Record the window, the application revision and the runtime profile.","Read the declared windows (C0) as the baseline; without them C1 cannot be judged.","Gather the `.ttl()` sweep's outcomes (C1) across the period for the resources it actually covers. Do NOT reconcile them against the declared retention CLASSES: C1's sweep covers the engine resources declaring a time-to-live, and the classes are enforced by a different sweep, evidenced by C3.","Read the retention-enforcement records (C3) for the period. The population is the resources BOUND to each declared class, never every resource: a class nothing binds is declared and not enforced, which is a finding about the bindings, not about the sweep. A DEFERRED_BY_CEILING run is enforcement in progress; a FAILED run is the nonconformity.","Read the boot log for the validator outcome; a clean boot means no unsafe derived-copy configuration was present."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:retention-window-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:risk-treatment-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The signals are derived from what an application already declares, so there is nothing to opt into — an application that has declared no treatment is covered by this demand and reported by it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Both halves are committed configuration: the signals derive from the application's own declarations and code, and the treatment is a field of `wildo.saas.config.ts`. No row records a decision that was never made, which is exactly why the gap must be DERIVED — total over the signal vocabulary — rather than looked for in a store that would be equally silent for an application that decided everything and one that decided nothing.","obligation":"Every exposure the derivation reports carries a declared treatment, or its absence is reported as UNDECLARED — and undeclared is never read as accepted.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The clause that makes this demand worth stating. Three of the four treatments are consistent with any measurement — an exposure reduced, shared or accepted is still present — so only the one claiming ABSENCE can be contradicted by what was derived. Reporting rather than resolving is deliberate: whether the declaration or the product is wrong is a judgement, and a mechanism that picked one would be deciding it.","obligation":"A treatment claiming the exposure is NOT TAKEN is checked against the measurement, and a disagreement is reported rather than resolved.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The register is a committed FILE and its acceptance is the commit, so git carries the author and the instant and the artifact carries no approver field to forge. The ordering half is stated here because a partial sequence reads as an answer and is not one — a reader cannot tell an entry left out from one ranked last.","obligation":"The accepted register states each risk in the application's own terms with the grounding for its weighting, and any ordering it declares covers every entry.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences what was DECLARED and what was DERIVED from declarations — never that either is true of the running system. A treatment of REDUCED attests that somebody chose it and wrote down why; it attests nothing about a control existing, and no clause here should be read as saying one does.\n\nThe contradiction check in C2 reaches exactly one posture. AVOIDED can be disagreed with because it claims an absence a derivation can see; REDUCED, SHARED_BY_CONTRACT and ACCEPTED are consistent with any measurement, so silence about them is the mechanism working rather than coverage. A judge must not read three unchallenged treatments as three verified ones.\n\nAnd it attests the repository at a commit. Every input is committed configuration or committed code, which is what lets this demand be answered without a collection window — and equally means the answer is about that revision and goes stale the moment configuration changes, with nothing in the artifact to announce that it has.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the derived signal set and the application's declared treatments, from committed sources, with the undeclared set computed total over the signal vocabulary. C2: for each treatment claiming absence, the measurement for that same signal. C3: the committed register, and its ordering if it declares one.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A contradicted absence claim is a MAJOR: the application states in committed configuration that it does not take an exposure the derivation finds present, and that statement is the kind a reader relies on. An undeclared signal is a MINOR on its own — nobody has decided yet, which is an honest state — and becomes MAJOR when the register is presented externally as complete. A register whose ordering covers only some entries is a MINOR with a specific remedy: declare none, or declare all.","verificationSteps":["Derive the signals and read the declared treatments; assert the undeclared set is TOTAL over the vocabulary rather than a list somebody maintained, or a signal added later is silently omitted from every application's answer.","Assert UNDECLARED and ACCEPTED are reported distinctly. Collapsing them is the failure this demand exists to catch: silence is not acceptance, and an artifact that renders the two alike converts every unanswered question into a decision nobody made.","For each treatment claiming the exposure is not taken, read that signal's own measurement and record any disagreement. Do not resolve it.","Where the derivation could not run, assert the answer says NOT ASKED rather than reporting zero declarations — an absent measurement and an absent decision are different findings.","Read the register for statements that would be true of any application. A weighting grounded in 'breaches are serious' carries no information about THIS product and fails C3's grounding half."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:runtime-principal-audit-grant-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.TAMPER_RESISTANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:runtime-principal-audit-grant-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to an application that runs a named runtime principal (a minion) on a SELF-MANAGED database adapter, which is where a per-principal, axis-scoped credential is issued. An application with no minion, or whose adapter issues no per-principal credential, has no such grant to evidence — a genuinely empty population, not a declined control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The grants are a pure derivation of each principal's committed resource-access declaration plus the engine's append floor, so the committed configuration IS the evidence: deriving it reproduces exactly what the adapter is asked to grant.","obligation":"The audit trail sits on the APPEND axis of every named principal's derived grants, and on no WRITE axis.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A conforming configuration never contains the refused shape, so reading one proves nothing about the refusal. The condition has to be created — declare the audit trail on a principal's write axis and observe the configuration refused at parse and at derivation.","obligation":"A declaration that would put an append-only resource on a principal's write axis is refused, not honoured.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The derivation describes what was ASKED for; only the datastore's own privilege catalogue shows what was granted. Read it for the principal's role.","obligation":"The database role the adapter creates carries insert and no update or delete on the audit table.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences NAMED runtime principals on self-managed adapters only. The application backend owns its database on every adapter, so nothing here constrains what the backend's own credential can do to an audit row — for the backend, immutability is application-layer only. And an adapter that issues no per-principal credential grants a principal nothing to evidence either way.","minimumEvidence":"C1: each named principal's resource-access declaration and the derived grants. C2: a configuration placing the audit trail on a principal's write axis, refused. C3: the datastore's privilege listing for each principal's role on the audit table.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A principal holding update or delete on the audit table is a MAJOR — it can remove the evidence of its own actions. A refusal that fires at only one of the two gates is an OBSERVATION where the other still refuses. A grant listing that cannot be read for a deployment is an OBSERVATION about evidence availability, never a nonconformity by itself.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate the application's named runtime principals and derive each one's database grants from its committed declaration.","Assert the audit trail appears on the append axis and on no write axis for every principal.","Author a declaration placing the audit trail on a principal's write axis and assert the configuration is refused.","Read the datastore privilege catalogue for each principal's role and assert insert without update or delete on the audit table."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:runtime-principal-audit-grant-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:second-signature-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:second-signature-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that has a platform tier at all. The strongest evidence here is an EMPTY set of application-wide elevations beside a live refusal path — an application whose operators never needed one is in scope and passes on that basis, not by exemption.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"a second, DISTINCT administrator signed each elevation — the requester and the signer are two names on two rows, and only reading them compares them — or that the requester could still withdraw"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Two identities have to be COMPARED, and a comparison leaves nothing behind unless it is recorded per occurrence. A declaration could say the rule exists; only an emitted pair of rows — one naming the requester, one naming the signer — shows that two different people were actually involved in a given elevation.\n\nThe obligation's POSITIVE half is easy to drop and this clause dropped it until 2026-09-10: the requester may withdraw or refuse their own request, deliberately and by declaration. A body evidencing only the approval refusal would accept an implementation that blocks withdrawal too — a different and worse control, which traps a requester in an elevation they no longer want.","obligation":"An operator act that names no single customer is granted only after a SECOND, distinct administrator signs, and the requester CAN still withdraw or refuse their own request.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["platform_access_grant_lifecycle"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the justification a row carries is the one the SECOND administrator decided on, which is a relation between two records that counting either establishes"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A second signature with no stated reason is a countersignature on nothing. The signer of an application-wide elevation has no tenant and no support case in front of them — the justification IS the whole of what they weigh, so evidence that omits it cannot show the decision was a decision.","obligation":"The requester's stated justification is recorded, and it is what the second administrator decided on.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["platform_access_grant_lifecycle"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the end of the authority and which end it was, revoked or elapsed"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A second signature that grants standing authority has moved the problem rather than solved it. The end of the window is the half a reader most needs and the half most likely to be missing, because nothing happens at that moment unless something writes it down.\n\nThe member is C1's — one lifecycle class carries the whole timeline — narrowed by the discriminator to the two TERMINAL transitions, because counting the class undifferentiated would report a REQUEST or an APPROVAL as the end of a window. `EXPIRED` is the transition with no human actor: the sweep relabels an elapsed grant, and this clause demands it precisely because a grant that simply stops appearing as ACTIVE, with no row, is the version of the history that raises questions. Until 2026-09-16 the clause named no member at all, so nothing could count either transition and the judge recorded the half a reader most needs as NOT RUN.","obligation":"The resulting authority is TIME-BOUND, and its end leaves a record — whether it was revoked or simply elapsed.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventDataMatch":{"field":"transition","values":["revoked","expired"]},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["platform_access_grant_lifecycle"]}],"limits":"It evidences that TWO PEOPLE acted, never that either was entitled to, and never that the second one read what they signed. Collusion is outside its reach by construction: two administrators who agree in advance produce evidence indistinguishable from a well-run approval. What it does buy is that a single compromised or mistaken operator cannot reach application-wide data alone.","minimumEvidence":"C1: for each application-wide elevation in the window, the request row and the approval row, naming two DIFFERENT principals. C2: the justification carried on those rows. C3: for each elevation, a terminal row — revoked or expired — or a window that has not yet closed.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A usable elevation whose request and approval name the SAME principal is a MAJOR, and is the only finding here that invalidates the control rather than the evidence. A missing justification is a MAJOR for that grant: it makes the signature unauditable. A missing terminal row where the window has demonstrably closed is an OBSERVATION when the elevation itself is unusable — the authority ended, the bookkeeping lagged.","verificationSteps":["Gather the elevation lifecycle rows for the window and partition them by grant.","For each grant that became usable, assert the requester and the approver are different principals; a grant reaching the usable state with one principal on both rows is the finding this demand exists for.","Assert every request carries a justification, and that the approval refers to the same grant.","Assert every closed grant has a terminal row, and that no grant is still usable past its stated window.","Attempt a self-approval against the running system and confirm it is REFUSED — an empty set of self-approvals proves nothing on its own, because it is also what a broken refusal path produces when nobody happened to try."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:second-signature-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:secret-contract-shape-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:secret-contract-shape-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that selects a provider, which is every application with an external capability. The artifact is platform-owned and committed, so no application authors it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The artifact is a committed lock entry, so the committed specification IS the evidence. Note this digest NAMES content and is carried in git, which is the use one-source-of-truth permits — it is not a second ledger recording agreement between two parts of the repository.\n\n**What the lock holds is a DIGEST, never the shape**, and this clause said \"recorded as a SHAPE… settled by reading it\" until 2026-09-10. A sha256 is opaque: reading the lock settles that a digest is PRESENT and nothing about what went into it. The values-free property is therefore established from the SOURCE that computes the digested input, not from the artifact — which is a source read, and the honest statement of what this clause can and cannot be gathered from.","obligation":"A provider's secret contract is recorded as a DIGEST OF its shape, with no secret value — and no shape — persisted anywhere in the artifact.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Detection is a property of the digest under change, and a digest that never moves is indistinguishable from one that moves correctly until something changes. The evidence is a driven shape change and the resulting difference.","obligation":"Drift in that shape is DETECTABLE.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It detects a change in SHAPE, never in VALUES — a rotated or a leaked credential moves nothing, by design and correctly. It attests the lock as committed; a runtime that resolves a secret contract from somewhere other than the lock is outside this evidence entirely.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the per-provider secret-contract digest from the lock, PLUS a read of the resolver that computes its input, showing the input is key names and structure. The shape itself is in no committed artifact, so it cannot be gathered from one. C2: a driven change to a provider's secret contract shape and the digest before and after — the lock-check command is the mechanism that performs this comparison in the ordinary course, and naming it is what makes C2 mechanical rather than a bespoke probe.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A secret VALUE present in the artifact is a MAJOR and an incident rather than a documentation defect — the artifact is committed, so disclosure is permanent in history. A digest that does not move when the shape changes is a MAJOR: detection is the control's only function, and a digest that cannot detect is worse than none because it reads as coverage. A provider with no entry is an OBSERVATION unless it declares secrets.","verificationSteps":["Read the committed lock entry for each selected provider and assert a secret-contract digest is present.","Read the RESOLVER that computes the digested input and assert it is key names and structure. Do not expect to verify this from the lock: the digest is opaque and the shape is not stored.","Scan the whole artifact for material matching the provider's declared secret keys and assert absence.","Add, rename or remove one key in a provider's secret contract, recompute, and assert the digest moved."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:secret-contract-shape-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:security-event-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:security-event-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The rows this demand reads are in the application's OWN audit store, which the engine writes whatever audit providers are configured. From 2026-09-10 to 2026-09-14 this field said the demand applied only where the audit-trail engine capability was enabled, because the binding's capability was gated on it. That engine capability is the Layer-2 provider fan-out, and the gate made an application without a provider derive NOT_APPLICABLE beside rows that existed (#302).\n\nNo application has to build the lane first, because the trail is engine-owned — unlike a demand whose evidence is an application-authored record.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The demanded artifact is a per-occurrence row in the engine's own durable event store, so one collector query serves every application. Not read off the attesting capability: it is read off the artifact the clause names.","obligation":"Authentication, authorization, privilege, credential and security-configuration changes each emit a typed auditable event.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_login","user_login_failed","machine_auth_success","machine_auth_failed","user_logout","user_session_evicted","resource_operation_denied","user_app_roles_changed","organization_member_role_changed","cross_tenant_administrative_access","user_password_changed","one_off_token_revoked","application_auth_policy_changed"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"absenceUnreadable":"on a runtime whose emission is fire-and-forget, an access that was neither audited nor refused leaves no row, exactly like a window with no access","unreached":"the accesses that took the other branch were REFUSED; a disjunction cannot be decided by counting rows of one side"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Same store as C1 but NOT the same rows — the classes that record system-context access and machine principals, and the two that record their refusal. The evidence is a DISJUNCTION and must not be flattened, and an absent row means different things on different runtimes — so it is never read on its own.\n\n**The disjunction is not uniform across runtimes, and reading it as one hides the failing case.** Where the runtime profile requires accountable system access — a minion — the read is WITHHELD when it could not be recorded, so audited-or-refused genuinely holds. On the application backend the emission is fire-and-forget and the read PROCEEDS on failure, which is the third outcome — neither audited nor refused — that this clause exists to exclude. Resolve the runtime profile before judging an absent row.","obligation":"Non-human privileged access is audited OR refused.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["system_context_read","system_context_write","machine_access","machine_auth_failed","resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The subtle one. It is ABOUT boot, but what evidences it is a runtime-emitted diagnostic rather than a configuration file — so it does not fall to META_APPLICATION even though its subject is startup.\n\n**It said EMITTED until 2026-09-16, and that was the wrong half of the same sentence.** The rationale above argues correctly that a runtime-emitted diagnostic is not a configuration file, and then names the home for a store of audit ROWS. What actually carries this is `logger.warn(\"COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL is enabled but no audit-log provider resolves…\")` — a line in the accountable runtime's log, on the host's retention, with no audit member behind it. That is PERFORMED by the vocabulary's own definition, and the sibling clause of the same shape says so in terms: `retention-window-declaration` C2 is \"read from the accountable runtime's boot log — host-retained, not an engine store, which is why this is PERFORMED rather than EMITTED\". An EMITTED collector reads the audit door, finds no member for this, and reports the clause as having no store to read — which is how a control that is implemented and working came to be uncollectable.\n\n**And silence is the HEALTHY case, so it cannot be read as the verdict.** The warning fires only when the capability is enabled AND the runtime is the one expected to host the Layer-2 fan-out AND no provider resolves. A quiet boot is produced by a correctly-configured application, by a runtime that is legitimately Layer-1-only, and by a runtime that never booted in the window. Establish that the gate COULD have fired — the runtime booted, and a Layer-2 provider is demonstrably active — before reading its silence as the control working.","obligation":"The absence of the audit delivery path is surfaced at boot rather than tolerated silently.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"C3's other half, split out 2026-09-21 because one clause was asking for two things only different planes can give. A healthy production deployment never emits the diagnostic, so C3 can only ever read its SILENCE; that the diagnostic FIRES in the misconfigured case is a driven fact, and producing it in production would mean breaking the deployment being evidenced. The adversarial judge's first run named this (#297). The decision is a pure predicate the boot path feeds, so the test that drives it answers this clause without booting anything.","obligation":"The boot diagnostic's decision fires on a runtime expected to host the audit fan-out when the capability is enabled and no provider resolves, and stays silent on a runtime that legitimately hosts none.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C5","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"C2's missing half, and the only place its third outcome can be seen. On a runtime whose system-context audit is best-effort — the application backend for reads, every runtime for writes — an access whose audit failed leaves no audit row, so no count over C2's classes can tell it from a quiet window. The loss itself is what records it: before the store, the loss seam's rate-limited drop line (and `audit_observation_dropped_total`); at the store, the audit service's own failure line (and `audit_store_failure_total`). Both are lines in the accountable runtime's log rather than audit rows, which is why this is PERFORMED. Until 2026-09-21 the half before the store was silent — an unbound audit service or a rejected emission was swallowed — so this clause could not have been answered at all (#297).","obligation":"No non-human privileged access in the window was left neither audited nor refused: every system-context observation that failed to reach the audit store is itself recorded as lost.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences that events were EMITTED, never that the trail is complete: an event class nobody wired emits nothing and looks identical to a quiet period. It attests the window queried and says nothing about periods outside it. And it is production evidence for the deployment that produced it — a different deployment of the same build has its own window and its own answer.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a non-empty, queryable class of rows for each member named in the clause's requiredAuditEventMembers — the members are DERIVED from the enum there rather than restated here, so a collector reads the query off the demand and this prose cannot drift from it. For any class that is EMPTY, the result of the static emitter check for that member, because the severity below turns on it and a row count cannot supply it. C2: for each non-human privileged access in the window, either an audit row or evidence of refusal, together with the runtime profile the rows were emitted under (`eventData.performedByRuntime`), because an absent row is read by that profile and cannot be read without it. C3: the accountable runtime's boot log over the window, with the evidence that the gate COULD have fired there — each boot paired with its own positive record that the Layer-2 fan-out was ACTIVE, naming the providers that resolved — so that the diagnostic's silence is read against a recorded healthy state rather than inferred from itself. C4: the outcome of the driven tests of the diagnostic's decision, both the firing case and the legitimately silent one. C5: the accountable runtimes' logs over the window — every drop line naming a system-context observation and every store or identity failure line naming a system-context event type — together with the evidence that the audit pipeline ran in that window, because an empty loss list from a pipeline that never ran says nothing.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A represented change family with no typed class is a MAJOR: the control did not operate. A family with no activity in the window is an OBSERVATION, not a gap — absence of activity and absence of a control read identically in a row store, and only the emitter check separates them. An absent C2 row is judged by the runtime profile, never on its own: where the runtime withholds a read it could not record, an absent row is consistent with the refused branch — a withheld read need not leave a refusal row — and reading it as failure is a judge defect; on a runtime whose emission is fire-and-forget, an absent row cannot be told from the third outcome the clause exists to exclude, so it is INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE rather than a pass — C5 is where that outcome is observed. A counted C5 loss is a MAJOR however transient its cause: an access happened and its record did not, which is the failing shape itself rather than evidence about it. A control that operated with a missing evidence export is an OBSERVATION, never a nonconformity.","verificationSteps":["Establish the reporting window and the application's audit store, and record which store answered.","For C1, query each change family and assert a non-empty typed class per represented family; report families with no activity as observations rather than gaps.","Before classifying any empty C1 class, run the static emitter check — every demanded member traced to a production caller. It is the only thing that separates an unwired class from a quiet one, and the severity below depends on which it is.","For C2, enumerate non-human privileged accesses in the window and resolve each to an audit row OR a refusal; an ACCESS with neither is the only failing shape. A window with no rows is not that shape on its own — read it by the runtime profile, as the severity guidance says.","For C3, read the accountable runtime's boot log for the window and establish that the gate could have fired before reading its silence as the control working. Never produce the diagnostic by misconfiguring the deployment being evidenced.","For C4, run the driven tests of the diagnostic's decision and record each outcome; a test that did not run is not a pass.","For C5, read both loss channels for the two system-context classes over the window, and establish that audit rows were created in it before reading an empty result. A drop line is rate-limited, so report the running total it carries, never the line count.","Record any clause not run as insufficient_evidence for that clause; never let a NOT RUN clause pass on its siblings' evidence."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:security-event-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:selected-processor-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:selected-processor-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application unconditionally. The control is the ABSENCE of egress by default, so an application that selected no provider is not un-evidenced — it is the strongest possible evidence for this demand.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The committed configuration IS the evidence: what a reviewer must establish is which capabilities have a provider selected, which is a property of the commit rather than of any runtime event. There is no audit member for 'a provider was selected', and there should not be — a selection is not an occurrence.","obligation":"Nothing leaves unless the application selects a provider for that capability.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A committed configuration can prove no provider is SELECTED. It cannot prove no bytes LEFT — that is a claim about behaviour under no selection, evidenced by driving the seam. Flattening C2 into C1's plane would let a reviewer accept a declaration as proof of a runtime property.","obligation":"With no selection, the work is served locally with no egress at all.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences the PROVIDER seam. Any other outbound path — a webhook, an integration, an application's own fetch — is outside this demand and is not made safe by it. C2's evidence attests the BUILD it was driven against, and nothing currently detects a change to the selection ladder. And the register cross-check compares a computed population with a HUMAN statement: nothing derives a register entry from a provider's declared profile. The population's own limits: a provider called by a ref string rather than its typed client is not seen, a typed-client call is taken to spend every owner scope the application admits for that provider. A provider's profile states POSSIBILITIES and SUGGESTED legal facts read on a date; it is never the operator's arrangement, and the staleness report dates it but cannot tell whether the vendor changed since. Per-recipient categories come from DECLARED flows only: what an application's own code passes to a typed client is not read, so those recipients are reported not derivable rather than complete, and free text makes any list a floor. A pipeline is counted on the instance it copies FROM, because the instance holds those rows on the operator's account. The DPA status is the operator's statement; nothing here verifies the contract exists.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the committed provider selection per capability, the recipient population computed from the committed configuration and source, and for each operator sub-processor its compliance choice — the deployment model and the region. The deployment model is required even for a single-model provider, because reading it from a framework default rather than an operator's declaration is how a wrong one goes unnoticed. Per recipient (#1709): the categories of personal data its DECLARED flows carry (`deriveRecipientDisclosures` — an engine capability's own statement, and the categories of the fields a resource binds or pipes to a system of record), every reason some are not derivable, the purposes its compliance choice links through `purposeRefs`, and the operator's own record of the DPA that governs it and the vendor's retention (`processorAgreementStanding`). Per source of personal data obtained from a system of record rather than from the person (#1745): the resource bound to or piped from it, the instance and its vendor, the categories that come from it, the purposes its binding links through `purposeRefs`, and for a local copy whether its rows are kept until erased (`deriveSystemOfRecordSources` — the same derivation the privacy notice's `system-of-record-sources` fact states, GDPR Art. 14(2)(f)). C2: that the extraction seam REFUSES when no provider is resolved rather than degrading, and that its one functional caller serves the local library when the field did not opt in.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An operator sub-processor with no compliance choice is a MAJOR: the processor exists and the deployment model is unstated, so no transfer statement about it can be derived. An operator sub-processor absent from the processor register is a MAJOR — the routing happens and the notice does not name the recipient. A tenant recipient listed on the register as the operator's sub-processor is a MAJOR: the operator did not engage that vendor, and for an operator that is a processor the entry states an engagement GDPR Art. 28(2) forbids without the controller's authorisation. A region outside the declared list is an OBSERVATION, app-asserted by design; a deployment model the provider does not offer is a MINOR, a configuration that contradicts the vendor. An operator sub-processor whose profile is UNDETERMINED or absent is an OBSERVATION when the register establishes it, and a MAJOR when neither does — nobody has said who runs it. A register, or a vendor fact it relies on, older than its own re-verification interval is an OBSERVATION; an undated register is an OBSERVATION. A register entry the operator records as having NO DPA in place is a MAJOR — processing a processor carries out with no contract binding it (GDPR Art. 28(3)); an entry recording no DPA status is a MINOR, an open question rather than a stated gap; no vendor retention recorded is an OBSERVATION. An operator sub-processor linked to no purpose is a MINOR — a notice cannot say what its data is sent for — and a `purposeRef` naming no declared lawful basis is a MINOR, a broken link. A source of personal data obtained from a system of record that links no purpose is a MINOR — a notice cannot state why the data is obtained (GDPR Art. 14(1)(c)) — and a local copy of it kept until erased is an OBSERVATION: nobody decided how long the copy is kept. A recipient whose categories are not all derivable is an OBSERVATION: the declared part stands, and the rest is named as not established rather than guessed. A register entry no data path reaches is an OBSERVATION worth reading twice: a stale entry, or a processor reached by a path this demand does not see. A declared provider no data path reaches is an OBSERVATION: it receives nothing, so it is a declaration to remove or a path to build, and never a recipient to publish.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate the capabilities with a provider selected, from committed configuration.","Assert each selected provider carries a compliance choice with a deployment model and a region.","Assess each compliance choice against the provider's own compliance profile, read through discovery (#1708): within its declared possibilities, a region it does not list (APP-ASSERTED — report it, never fail it), a deployment model it does not offer, an UNDETERMINED profile (nobody has researched the vendor), or no profile at all. Name each operator sub-processor whose profile is UNDETERMINED or absent: its region and identity are research owed, never an empty answer.","Date the vendor facts: the register's own verification date and each established profile's oldest evidence date, against the re-verification interval the register declares (`complianceFactStaleness`). An undated register is reported as such.","Derive, per recipient, what its declared flows carry and for which purpose (`deriveRecipientDisclosures`, #1709). Report every `categoriesNotDerivable` reason (a typed client, a browser operation or unscanned code declares no field map; a system of record no resource binds; flows that could not be read; a flowing field personal by another door with no category) as NOT DERIVABLE, never as an empty list, and a list including free text as a FLOOR. Name each recipient linked to no purpose, and each `purposeRef` naming no declared lawful basis.","Derive, per resource bound to or piped from a system of record, the SOURCE the notice owes for data not collected from the person (`deriveSystemOfRecordSources`, #1745): the instance, its vendor, the categories, the linked purposes, and for a copy whether it is kept until erased. Name each source linked to no purpose and each `purposeRef` naming no declared lawful basis; report flows that could not be read as NOT DERIVED, never as no source.","Read the operator's contractual record per register entry (`processorAgreementStanding`, #1709): which a recorded DPA governs, which the operator states has NONE in place, which records none, and which records no vendor retention. The status is the operator's fact; a vendor OFFERING a DPA (its profile's `dataProcessingAgreementUrl`) never counts as one in place.","Drive the seam with no provider configured and assert the refusal, then assert the local path serves.","Compute the recipient population (`computeRecipientPopulation`, #1707): every runtime-scoped provider and every system-of-record instance, classed as operator-run, operator sub-processor (a data path spends the application's own account), tenant recipient (reached only through a customer's or a person's connected account) or declared with no reachable data path. The population is NOT the capability-selected providers: a catalogue vendor reached by a typed client or a browser operation receives data with no engine capability at all.","Cross-check the operator sub-processors against the application's processor register, in BOTH directions, and report a tenant recipient listed on the register as its own misstatement."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:selected-processor-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:session-eviction-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:session-eviction-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to EVERY application, unconditionally, and this said the opposite until 2026-09-10 — that it applied \"wherever a concurrency bound is configured\" and was otherwise not applicable as configured. There is no such configuration. An application that declares nothing is capped at the framework default, and the vocabulary says so in its own words: there is no value that disables the cap. So the escape let an application decline evidence for a control that was running the whole time, which is the most expensive shape an applicability clause can take — it reads as diligence and removes the demand.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The bound holding is a non-event — a principal who never exceeded it emits nothing. Only a driven scenario that exceeds the bound and observes the refusal-or-eviction evidences that it is enforced.","obligation":"A principal holds a bounded number of concurrent sessions.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the chain each eviction retired was the OLDEST one, which is a property of WHICH row was written rather than of how many were"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The ORDERING is the control, not the eviction. The record must name which chain was retired and when it was issued, because a record naming only the victim would prove a session ended without proving the RIGHT one did.","obligation":"The eviction retires the OLDEST refresh chain — the property that pushes a stolen chain out instead of a legitimate one.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_session_evicted"]}],"limits":"It evidences the eviction's ORDERING, never that the evicted chain was stolen. And an unreadable issue time yields ABSENCE, never a synthesised instant — a reconstructed ordering would be evidence of the reconstruction.\n\n**The enforcement itself FAILS OPEN, and an empty eviction set does not exclude that.** The tracking-and-enforce step is wrapped so a store failure logs a warning and lets token issuance proceed — no row, no metric. So a window with no evictions is equally consistent with nobody exceeding the cap and with the bound never having been applied, and only the backend's own warning distinguishes them. A judge reading an empty set on the PRODUCTION plane must not read it as the control holding.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the effective bound, declared or defaulted, and a driven scenario exceeding it. C2: eviction rows carrying the evicted chain's issue time, so the ordering claim is checkable from the row rather than inferred.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An eviction retiring a chain that was not the oldest is a MAJOR: it is the property the objective is named for, and it inverts the control by pushing out the legitimate session. A row with no issue time is an OBSERVATION — the eviction may have been correct and its evidence is insufficient to say.","verificationSteps":["Read the effective bound — the declared value, or the framework default where nothing is declared. There is no configuration under which this step yields \"no bound\", so an answer of none means the resolution is wrong, not that the demand is inapplicable.","Drive the bound past its limit and observe the eviction.","Assert ORDERING across a principal's successive eviction rows: each row carries the evicted chain's issue time but no issue time for the RETAINED chains, so first-in-first-out cannot be established from a single row. Monotonicity across rows is the strongest check the evidence supports, and claiming more than that overstates it.","Treat two chains minted in the same millisecond as equally old: either eviction is correct, and a flat rule that a newer chain was retired reports a MAJOR against a documented tie."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:session-eviction-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:step-up-challenge-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:step-up-challenge-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The flag, the challenge and the consumable proof are engine-owned, and the operations carrying the flag are engine resources — so no application builds the lane and none opts out.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Which actions are high-impact is a committed per-operation declaration, and the SET is the evidence a reviewer needs — the question is not whether the mechanism works but which verbs were judged to need it. Note one declaration that reads as coverage and is not: the flag is INERT on read-shaped operations, which are skipped, so a read carrying it is a declaration nothing enforces.","obligation":"A high-impact action requires a FRESH re-proof of identity.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A driven property, and the clause that keeps the control from becoming an availability failure: a ceremony that accepts only one factor locks out every principal who holds a different one, and the response to a lockout is to relax the control. Evidenced by re-proving with each factor kind a test principal holds.","obligation":"The re-proof is accepted over ANY factor the principal actually holds.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The clause the requirement is really named after, and the one no successful ceremony evidences: a valid proof and a repurposed one both authenticate the same person. The proof is consumable and bound to its purpose precisely so the two are separable, and the only evidence of that is presenting a credential minted for something else and being refused — plus replaying a spent one and being refused again.","obligation":"And that ceremony CANNOT be satisfied by a credential presented for a different purpose.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"EMITTED since 2026-09-22, and the history is kept because this clause was wrong in two different directions before it was right.\n\nIt first demanded the GENERIC access-control denial, which is a real, emitted, frequently-written row that no step-up refusal could ever produce: that member had ONE production emitter, in the authorizer funnel, and the step-up gate is a private check at the services-registry tier that throws without passing through it. The verification step returned nothing by construction. A live member is not evidence that YOUR control emits it. Corrected to UNPRODUCED on 2026-09-10, which was honest and named its own fix: route the gate's refusal through the denial funnel.\n\nThat is what landed. The gate now records through the same chokepoint the role-ceiling gate uses, so the refusal inherits the dedup window, the escalation ladder, the AUDIT_LOGS recursion guard and the observation-loss counters — a burst of attempts on a declared-dangerous action stays legible AS a burst, which N indistinguishable rows would not be. The two members below are the two triggers the gate already distinguished in its error context: the operation's own unconditional declaration, and the user type's freshness policy. They are separate because they send a reviewer to different places, and because only the second varies with how long somebody has been signed in.\n\nWhat this does NOT evidence: that the refusal was correct. The row says an action was stopped for want of a re-proof, never that the action deserved to be gated — C1 is where the declaration is read.","obligation":"A refused high-impact action is recorded.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventDataMatch":{"field":"denialReason","values":["step_up_required_by_operation","step_up_required_by_freshness"]},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]}],"limits":"C2 and C3 attest the build driven, over the factors the test principal held — a factor kind nobody drove is unevidenced in both directions. C1 evidences which actions were JUDGED high-impact, never that the judgement was complete: an action that should carry the requirement and does not is invisible to every step here, because there is no independent source that says which actions are high-impact.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the set of operations declaring the re-proof requirement, with read-shaped ones identified as inert. C2: driven re-proofs over each factor kind the principal holds. C3: a driven attempt using a credential minted for another purpose, refused, and a driven replay of a spent proof, refused. C4: the denial rows the gate emits over the collection window, counted per trigger — and an empty window is NOT a failure, since an application whose callers never attempt a gated action while freshly unauthenticated legitimately produces none.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A high-impact action reachable with no fresh proof is a MAJOR. A ceremony satisfiable by a credential minted for another purpose is a MAJOR and is the objective's stated failure — it makes the re-proof a formality that any live session already satisfies. A replayable proof is a MAJOR. A ceremony that accepts only ONE factor is a MAJOR as an availability failure, and it is the one most likely to be argued down: the pressure it creates is to weaken the control, not to fix the ceremony. A read-shaped operation carrying the inert flag is an OBSERVATION, and it is worth reporting because it reads as coverage. C4 carries no severity — a framework gap, not an application's.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate operations declaring the re-proof requirement and separate the read-shaped ones — the flag does not run there, so listing them as covered overstates the control.","Drive a declared action with no proof and assert refusal.","Drive it with a fresh proof over each factor the principal holds, and assert each is accepted.","Present a credential minted for a different purpose and assert refusal — this is the clause, not a variant of the previous step.","Replay a proof already spent and assert refusal.","Record C4 as UNPRODUCED. Do NOT query access-control denial rows for these refusals: the gate does not route through the funnel that writes them, so an empty result reads as no refusals rather than as no recording."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:step-up-challenge-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:subject-data-export-receipt","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: subject access and portability are engine-owned obligations, and a resource opts in rather than an application opting out.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Three properties of the declared export surface: which purposes exist, which resources opted in, and that the scope is the subject. All readable from committed configuration, and none evidenced by a row — an export that leaked another subject's data emits the same event shape as one that did not.","obligation":"Authorized subject access and portability exports are purpose-specific, resource-opted-in and subject-isolated.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the purpose, the subject, the resource types, the record count and BOTH withholding lists, none of which a count opens the row to read"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The intent ENUMERATES its fields, which makes this a completeness clause rather than an existence one: a row that exists but omits a withholding list fails it. A subject must be able to tell what was excluded and why.\n\nThere are TWO such lists and this clause named only the derived one until 2026-09-10. The second — fields withheld as NON-DISCLOSABLE — exists precisely so a thin bundle reads as a deliberate security floor rather than a missed resource, which is the distinction a subject most needs and the one an incomplete assertion silently passes.","obligation":"And auditable: the export event names the purpose, the subject, the resource types included, the record count, and BOTH withholding lists — fields excluded as derived, and fields withheld as non-disclosable.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["subject_data_export"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row says whether recipients were declared and names them, never the categories or identities the subject was shown"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The export selects the recipients from the application's derived declaration (`compliance.subjectDataRecipients`) for the resources it read, lists them in the bundle the subject receives, and records on its row whether a declaration existed (`recipientsStatus`) and which recipients it named. The collector reports how the rows divide over `recipientsStatus`: a NOT_DECLARED share is exports that could not answer Art. 15(1)(c).","obligation":"And each export names the recipients of the subject's data (GDPR Art. 15(1)(c)) — by the legal identity the operator adopted and the categories each declared flow carries — or states that the application declares none.","plane":"PRODUCTION","reportedAuditEventDataDistribution":{"field":"recipientsStatus"},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["subject_data_export"]}],"limits":"It evidences the RECEIPT, never the payload: that the row says five resource types were included does not prove those were the right five. And it cannot see data the resource never declared as the subject's.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared purposes, the resources that opted in, and the subject-isolation mechanism, from committed configuration. C2: export rows for the window, each carrying every enumerated field INCLUDING both withholding lists. C3: the same rows' recipient status distribution and named recipients, against the generated recipient declaration.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An export row missing any of the five fields is a MAJOR — the intent enumerates them and a partial receipt cannot answer a subject. A resource carrying subject data that never opted in is a MAJOR — but do NOT hunt for a silently incomplete export: for a resource ON the subject-export graph the engine REFUSES, deliberately, saying that an export missing one without saying so is an incomplete disclosure presented as a complete one, and a forbidden edge is RECORDED with its reason rather than dropped. The observable symptom is therefore a REFUSED export, not a thin one. An export not isolated to its subject is a MAJOR and a disclosure.","verificationSteps":["Read the declared purposes and the opted-in resource set; a resource carrying subject data and not opted in is C1's finding.","For each export row assert every enumerated field is present — purpose, subject, resource types, record count, AND both withholding lists. Asserting a fixed count of five passes a row that omits the non-disclosable list, which is the half that distinguishes a deliberate security floor from a missed resource.","Assert the withheld list is DERIVED rather than authored, or it will drift from what the export actually omitted.","Do not treat a window with no exports as a gap: no subject exercised the right, and C1 stands on its own.","For C3, confirm the generated recipient declaration is current (`wildo config subject-data-recipients --check`), then read how the export rows divide over recipientsStatus; a NOT_DECLARED row is an export that could not name recipients."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:subject-erasure-execution","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies only where the APPLICATION owns an erasure-request resource. Four of the five marked sites are in an application, not the engine. An application that never built an erasure lane has not failed a control — it declared none — and a judge records not_applicable_as_configured rather than a nonconformity.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"APPLICATION_RECORDED","homeRationale":"The application's own resource row is the durable record, and no CoreAuditableEventType member covers the request LIFECYCLE — intake, withdrawal, execution. The erasure-shaped members that do exist record what an erasure did to a particular STORE (an external system's rows, an acknowledged external hole, a person's provider credential), which is a different question and is demanded by `evidence-requirement:erasure-propagation-record`, not here. The row's schema and status vocabulary are the application's, so a collector queries it against that application's specification.","obligation":"The request is recorded on intake, whether the subject or the controller raised it.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"APPLICATION_RECORDED","homeRationale":"The withdrawal is a state transition on the application-authored row, so the row is where it is recorded. This clause was re-homed `EMITTED` earlier on 2026-09-16 and is restored, because the objection that moved it was answered rather than argued. That objection was that collecting the rows means granting a standing cross-subject read over precisely the people who asked to be erased — the opposite of Article 5(1)(c). It is a real cost of ONE COLLECTION METHOD, fetching the rows over the resource API, and not a cost of this home. The engine's `/assurance/subject-erasure-lane-evidence` door derives its whole query from the application's own lane declaration and answers in COUNTS: no row, no identifier and no free text leaves the application.\n\nThe audit trail could not answer this clause in any case, and the words it cannot reach are `by the subject`. A generic operation row evidences that a withdrawal RAN; it cannot evidence that withdrawal is REACHABLE to the subject whose request it is, which is what the obligation says. The door reports exactly that, beside the count.\n\nWhat a supervisory authority asks for is a LOG OF THE PROCESS — the stage each request is at, the date responded, who handled it and why any delay — grounded in Article 5(2) and Article 30(1). Counts over the lane's own decision fields are that log in aggregate, and they disclose nobody.\nspec-cite: ICO, Data protection audit framework — \"Validating and managing requests for access\" (https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/advice-and-services/audits/data-protection-audit-framework/toolkits/requests-for-access/validating-and-managing-requests-for-access/), fetched 2026-09-16.","obligation":"It may be withdrawn by the subject while it is pending.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"APPLICATION_RECORDED","homeRationale":"Both halves are read from the application. The schedule is the sweep operation's own `cronExpression`, read from configuration rather than repeated in a clause; the outcome is the lane's terminal instant and its declared outcome, counted by the same door C2 names.\n\nRe-homed `EMITTED` earlier on 2026-09-16 and restored for C2's reason, with one of its own that settles it: the sweep's operation row carries the lane's resulting stage and outcome ONLY IF the application marked those fields as audit evidence, and no clause can require that of every application. An application that marked nothing would have been unevidenced under the EMITTED home and is evidenced under this one, because the door reads the declared fields directly.\n\nThe limit that survives either home, stated rather than discovered: a count of terminal requests carrying an outcome does not prove that each one met the schedule. Timeliness is tested by sampling, which is what the framework asks of an auditor.","obligation":"It is executed on the declared schedule.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"UNPRODUCED","homeRationale":"The session-revocation service emits no event and writes no durable record — its own marker calls it a write to our own Redis. That is the right design for the CONTROL and leaves the DEMAND unevidenced. UNPRODUCED is the honest value, not an absence.","obligation":"It terminates the erased person's sessions.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences the erasure LANE — intake, state, schedule, outcome — and never that the data is gone; whether the erasure reached its dependents and external effects is `evidence-requirement:erasure-propagation-record`'s demand. It does not prove sessions ended, and nothing available does. A window with no erasures evidences nothing about the lane: absence of activity and absence of a control read identically in a row store.","minimumEvidence":"C1: rows created in the window, each recording WHETHER the subject or the controller raised the request — the intent asks only for that. An application may model it as a channel enum, as the dogfood application does, but the shape is the APPLICATION's and must not be asserted as framework contract. Where controller-raised, also the requesting user and justification. C2: the withdrawal operation reachable to the subject, plus any cancelled rows — an EMPTY withdrawal set is not a deficiency. C3: completed or failed rows with a completion timestamp and outcome, plus the declared schedule. C4: nothing produces it; what can be gathered is that the revoker is installed, which evidences the control's PRESENCE and not its OPERATION.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A row with no channel, or a completed row with no outcome, is an OBSERVATION: the control operated and its evidence is incomplete. A row that left the pending state by an unaccounted route is a MAJOR — the state machine IS the control. Failed rows with no follow-up are a MAJOR: an unmet obligation to a real person. C4 carries NO severity against the application; it is a framework gap and belongs in the finding as such, so it is fixed once rather than raised against every application forever.","verificationSteps":["Resolve applicability: does the application own an erasure-request resource? If not, record not_applicable_as_configured and stop.","Assert every row records whether the subject or the controller raised it, in whatever shape that application declared, and that controller-raised rows carry the requester. Do NOT assert a specific channel vocabulary: that is one application's modelling choice.","Confirm the withdrawal operation is reachable to a subject-scoped principal, and that no row left the pending state by an unaccounted route.","Gather failed rows and report them; a suppressed failure is the defect this clause exists to catch.","Record C4 as UNPRODUCED and state that the binding evidence attests presence, not operation."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:tenancy-derivation-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:tenancy-derivation-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Every clause is engine-owned; the retrieval clauses have an empty population where no resource declares a retrieval source, which is an absence of subject matter rather than a declined control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is that a caller-supplied scope has no effect, which no stored row shows: a correctly narrowed result looks the same whether the narrowing came from the context or from a parameter that happened to match. It has to be driven, with a scope the caller does not hold.","obligation":"Tenancy narrowing is DERIVED from the resolved execution context and never offered as a parameter.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"An enumeration, and the site says why it must be one: a predicate added to one filter builder is a bypass on the other, and this repository has been bitten by exactly that shape. Two persistence adapters mean two implementations unless a single authority is what both call, so the enumeration must name the call sites and resolve each to the same one.","obligation":"The derivation is ONE authority, applied at every call site rather than re-derived per site.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The tool schema an agent reads is generated, so the clause is about what the GENERATOR strips — at both nesting positions, top level and inside the filter object, because the builder places the scope in either depending on the operation. Evidence is the generated schema for a scoped operation, which is a driven artifact rather than an authored one.","obligation":"The scope is not offered as a knob to an agent or to any other non-client caller either.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The distinction is invisible in the result set: filtering after the traversal returns the same rows, minus the ones it drops, and differs only in what the traversal SAW. It is evidenced by the query the store issues and by the second, authorized read of the owning row — which is the half that turns a store-level predicate into an authorization decision.","obligation":"Where the read is a similarity search, the predicate is evaluated INSIDE the traversal rather than over its results, then re-checked by an authorized read of the owning row.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"Every clause attests the build driven, on the adapters driven. C2's enumeration goes stale the moment a call site is added, and an added one will not fail — it will simply be wrong for one adapter. And none of it evidences that the resolved execution context was itself correct: this demand is about a caller not WIDENING its scope, never about the scope it legitimately holds.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven read supplying a scope the caller does not hold, returning nothing from it. C2: an enumeration of the filter call sites, each resolving to the single authority. C3: the generated agent tool schema for a scoped operation, with the scope absent at both nesting positions. C4: the issued similarity query showing the predicate inside the traversal, plus evidence of the re-read.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A caller-supplied scope that widens a result is a MAJOR and is a disclosure, not a defect in degree. A second filter implementation not reaching the single authority is a MAJOR even where it currently agrees — agreement today is not the guarantee, and the two adapters drift independently. A scope offered as an agent parameter is a MAJOR. A similarity predicate applied over results rather than inside the traversal is a MAJOR: it caps how much a caller sees rather than what it may see, so the failure is silent and proportional to corpus size.","verificationSteps":["Call a scoped read supplying ANOTHER tenant's scope as a parameter and assert the named initiator-inconsistent REFUSAL, not merely an empty result. Then assert the caller's supplied value is NOT echoed in the error: reflecting it turns a refusal into a probe oracle.","Assert a redundant restatement of the caller's OWN scope is accepted — including as a single-member membership test. Both are no-ops by design, and driving them as attacks reports a MAJOR against a documented accommodation.","Enumerate the filter call sites and assert each reaches the one authoritative context-filter method — count them, and record the count.","Generate the agent tool schema for a scoped operation and assert the scope field is absent at top level AND inside the filter object.","Issue a similarity search and assert the tenancy predicate is part of the traversal, not applied to its output.","Assert each admitted chunk is re-checked by an authorized read of its owning row before its text is used."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:tenancy-derivation-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:third-party-ai-component-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application with an AI capability enabled in the contracted service. An application that enables none uses no third-party AI component, and that is the answer rather than a gap. A build-time AI capability — the coding agent — is outside it: it writes the application's source and never processes a user's data.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The use posture is a committed declaration (`aiUsePosture`), and a capability being enabled cannot establish it: the same model backs a summary that decides nothing and a screening that decides a great deal. The committed configuration is the evidence.","obligation":"Every AI capability enabled in the contracted service declares what it is used for and whether it decides anything about a person.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Which vendor serves an AI capability is the committed provider selection, and whether it is identified is the committed processor register. Both are declarations of the application, so the join between them is read from the commit rather than from traffic.","obligation":"Every runtime provider serving such a capability is run by the operator or is named on the processor register.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences what the application DECLARES about its AI, never what the model does: a posture of NO_DECISION is the operator's word, and a feature that in fact decides something is not caught here. It says nothing about the vendor's own training or retention terms, and nothing about an organisation's AI risk policies, which are the operator's acts rather than the product's.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the enabled capabilities intersected with the AI capabilities of the contracted service, and for each its declared posture — the consequence and the purpose, and the human-review arrangement where the AI decides or assists a decision. C2: for each runtime provider selected for such a capability, its compliance choice and, when vendor-hosted, its processor-register entry.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An enabled AI capability with no declared posture is a MAJOR: a notice describing it reads as \"nothing significant happens here\" and silently claims the automated-decision exemption. A vendor-hosted AI provider absent from the processor register is a MAJOR: a model vendor receives user content and nothing names it.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate the AI capabilities enabled in the contracted service, derived from the framework's own vocabulary rather than a list.","Assert each carries a declared use posture; name every one that does not.","Enumerate the runtime providers selected for those capabilities, excluding the build-time companion scope.","Assert each is SELF_HOSTED or appears on the processor register; name every one that does not."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:uniqueness-verification-outcome","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:uniqueness-verification-outcome"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares a uniqueness or integrity control, which is every application with a business key. The gates are engine-owned and run before traffic, so no application opts out.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The artifact is the boot gate's own outcome. It is not DECLARED — the declaration is the premise, and the whole point of the objective is that a declared constraint must not be ASSUMED to have been created. There are TWO gates, one per adapter, and they are separate code: a proof at one is silence about the other.","obligation":"Every declared uniqueness control is PROVEN to exist in the datastore before the application serves traffic.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The gate says this in its own words: a fail-closed gate that passes proves nothing on its own, because one that iterated an EMPTY set — an unpopulated registry, a generator that yielded nothing — exits exactly as one that checked every index. A count is what makes a green boot evidence rather than an absence of noise.\n\n**It holds on Mongo and NOT on PostgreSQL, which this clause asserted uniformly until 2026-09-10.** The Mongo gate logs its counts at info. The PostgreSQL pass is written to a DEBUG channel that the same file disables, so there is no artifact at all — and the count it would carry is of RESOURCES, not of uniqueness controls. So a collector on a PostgreSQL application finds nothing, and the severity line below would have made \"a pass with a count of zero\" a MAJOR against a correctly-operating gate. C1's own reasoning — a proof at one adapter is silence about the other — applies to this clause too, and it did not honour it.","obligation":"A PASS carries the number of controls checked, rather than being reported as silence — where the adapter reports one at all.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The distinction is only visible in the gate's behaviour under an interrupted probe, and it is the clause with a recorded cost: a connection lifecycle interrupted mid-boot once produced a report of dozens of declared indexes that did not exist, against two entirely healthy databases. A false nonconformity is not a lesser outcome than a missed one — it sends an operator to repair data that is correct.","obligation":"A probe that could not learn anything is treated as INDETERMINATE and skipped, never reported as a missing control.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It attests BOOT, and not always that: on PostgreSQL the gate warns ONCE and returns empty when the catalog is unavailable, so a boot can complete with the declared constraints never verified — its own text says so. That silent-skip path is the gap in C1's \"proven before serving traffic\", and a green boot does not exclude it. An index dropped after boot is invisible until the next one, and nothing continuously re-checks. It evidences PRESENCE, never enforcement: an index that exists with a partial filter can fail to cover the rows a business key means, and the gate reports it present.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C2: the boot verification outcome from EACH adapter in use, carrying the count checked and the declared set it was checked against. C3: a driven interrupted probe showing the gate skips rather than reports.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An application serving traffic with a declared unique control absent is a MAJOR: the constraint is what a business key MEANS, and without it duplicate rows are already possible. A gate reporting a pass with a count of zero against a non-empty declared set is a MAJOR against the GATE rather than the datastore — that is the shape the count exists to expose, and it applies only where the adapter reports a count. On PostgreSQL none is observable, which is an OBSERVATION against the FRAMEWORK and never a nonconformity against the application. An indeterminate probe reported as a missing control is a MAJOR for the same reason and in the same direction.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate the declared uniqueness and integrity controls from the committed schema.","Read the Mongo boot verification outcome and assert its checked count matches that declared set.","Read the PostgreSQL boot verification outcome separately — a guard present in one repository class is absent in the other until shown.","Drive the refusal PER ADAPTER, and pick the condition per adapter. On PostgreSQL, drop a declared constraint and boot. On Mongo, do NOT drop an index and expect a refusal: automatic index building rebuilds it and the gate correctly passes, so the observation \"did not refuse\" would report a MAJOR against a working control. Disable automatic building, or make the build fail, so the missing constraint is the condition rather than a transient.","Interrupt a probe mid-verification and assert the outcome is indeterminate rather than a missing-control report."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:uniqueness-verification-outcome"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:usage-flush-run-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.USAGE_REPORTING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:usage-flush-run-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to an application with billing enabled on its backend and at least one metered product. With no metered product nothing is recorded to flush.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The run output carries all three, and its schema is strict, so a counter the service computes cannot be silently dropped from it. No audit event exists for a flush; this output is the evidence.\n\nRun output lives in job-execution history for 30 days and output payloads for 24 hours, so those operational records alone cannot cover a longer claimed period; the accountable host must retain each run's outcome in its evidence archive for that period, and the clause is evidenced for exactly as long as it does.","obligation":"Each run records the quantity due, the quantity reported and the quantity determined permanently unreportable.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A reported row looks the same whether the provider accepted it or not, so the ordering has to be driven: fail the provider call and observe the row stays pending.","obligation":"A usage row is marked reported only after the provider accepted its quantity.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The usage rows are an engine-owned store and carry the terminal state, its reason from the unreportable-reason vocabulary and the instant it was decided, so a query over the rows answers it directly for as long as the rows are kept — unlike C1, which depends on a host archive. The engine reads them for an evidence reader through `GET /assurance/usage-flush-evidence`, which counts rows by flush state and reason and counts apart the contradictions this clause forbids (no reason, no decision instant, also marked reported), returning no row.","obligation":"A row that can never be reported is marked unreportable with a reason, never reported and never retried forever.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"The reconciliation is an in-run count check: nothing asks the provider what it actually received, so a provider that acknowledged and then dropped a meter event is invisible here. The runtime gate is the backend's billing switch, not the engine capability.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the recorded output of the runs in the window. C2: a driven provider failure and the row's resulting state. C3: the unreportable rows and their reasons.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A row marked reported that the provider did not accept is a MAJOR — revenue that will never be billed, reported as billed. A run whose quantities do not reconcile with no error line is a MAJOR. A provider accepting a quantity whose rows could not then be marked is an OBSERVATION the service itself reports, because a later run may count it again.","verificationSteps":["Read each run's recorded output and assert quantity recorded equals quantity reported plus quantity unreportable, or that an error line explains the difference.","Fail the provider call for one group and assert its rows remain pending rather than reported.","Query rows in the unreportable state and assert each carries a reason."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:usage-flush-run-record"}]}],"implementationExpectationAuthorities":[{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:administrative-continuity-floor","capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:admitted-outbound-target","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.NETWORK.OUTBOUND_TARGET_CONTROL","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:outbound-target-admission"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.TAMPER_RESISTANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:runtime-principal-grant-axes"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:audited-first-exposure","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:authorization-decision-audit","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:startup-configuration-validation"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:verifiable-key-retirement"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:refusal-classification"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:caller-derived-tenancy"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:collection-export-recording","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:access-withdrawal-on-conferring-status","capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:constrained-redirect-target","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:redirect-target-constraint"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:credential-state-transition-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:declared-uniqueness-verification"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:declared-ai-component-use"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The floor is engine-owned and covers both the application scope and each tenant, so no application opts out and none has to build the refusal first.","knownLimitations":"Does NOT establish that concurrent reductions are serialized. That property needs two transactions racing on a real replica set; a single-node development datastore mocks transactions and will report success whether or not the serialization token is written.","passCriteria":"All three administrative doors refuse; the unacknowledged erasure refuses; the acknowledged erasure proceeds AND emits one high-severity record naming the stranded scope; and the startup report names that scope. An erasure that proceeds silently on acknowledgement is a fail even though the write succeeded — the acknowledgement's entire justification is that the consequence becomes visible.","procedure":["Reduce a scope to exactly one usable administrator, then attempt to remove, demote and deactivate that administrator — three distinct doors, because a floor applied at one of them is the defect this objective exists to prevent.","Confirm each attempt is refused as a CONFLICT naming the scope, not as a permission error: the caller IS authorized and the payload IS valid, so a 403 would send an operator to fix the wrong thing.","Run a data-protection erasure against that same last administrator WITHOUT the acknowledgement, then WITH it, and read the audit store for the second run.","Restart the application with a scope already stranded — reduce it out of band — and read the startup report."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A door that permits the last administrator's removal is a nonconformity — the scope becomes unadministrable and the remedy is out-of-tenant. An acknowledged erasure that strands a scope without emitting the record is equally a nonconformity, for the opposite reason: the write is correct and the control that makes it accountable is absent. A refusal carrying the wrong status code is an observation."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:administrative-continuity-floor"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:admitted-outbound-target","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.NETWORK.OUTBOUND_TARGET_CONTROL","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:admitted-outbound-target"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application; the governed request paths are engine-owned.","knownLimitations":"Does not cover destinations an application's own backend configuration declares, which are trusted as authored, and cannot establish that an operator declared the runtime environment truthfully. A SIEM collector admitted by the operator's private-network declaration is outside this act's refusal set.","passCriteria":"Every private-resolving destination is refused before a byte is sent, an undeclared environment refuses to start (a SIEM collector is exempt only where the operator declared private-network collectors admissible); each redirecting server receives exactly one request; loopback is reached under development for the tenant- and client-chosen classes and the metadata address is still refused; and MCP and client-metadata resolution refuse loopback in every runtime.","procedure":["Under a production runtime, drive a webhook delivery, a SIEM export and a federated sign-in token exchange at a destination whose name resolves to a private address.","Start the backend with the runtime environment left undeclared, and confirm it refuses to start rather than assuming development.","Drive the same classes at a server answering with a redirect to the metadata address, and count the requests it receives.","Under a development runtime, drive the same classes at a loopback destination and at the metadata address.","Drive an MCP call and a client-metadata resolution at a loopback destination under a development runtime."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A refused-class destination reached in production is a nonconformity and a request-forgery primitive. A followed redirect is a nonconformity. A development runtime admitting beyond loopback is a nonconformity."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:admitted-outbound-target"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.TAMPER_RESISTANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to an application that runs a named runtime principal on a self-managed database adapter. Without one there is no per-principal grant to test.","knownLimitations":"Does NOT establish anything about the application backend's own credential, which owns its database, nor about an adapter that issues no per-principal credential.","passCriteria":"The audit trail is append-only in every derivation; both the parse and the derivation refuse the widening; and the datastore rejects the update and the delete while accepting an insert.","procedure":["Derive a principal's database grants from a declaration that reads business data and writes nothing, and confirm the audit trail is on the append axis only.","Declare the audit trail on the principal's write axis and confirm the configuration is refused.","Hand the derivation a grant object carrying the audit trail on its write axis directly, bypassing the configuration parse, and confirm it refuses too.","Against a provisioned self-managed database, attempt an update and a delete on the audit table as that principal's role."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A principal able to update or delete an audit row is a nonconformity. A widening refused at only one of the two gates is an observation where the other still refuses."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:auditable-event-actor-attribution"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Attribution is a property of the engine's audit emitter, so what varies per application is which actions it performs, never whether the attribution exists.","knownLimitations":"Establishes attribution for the actions exercised. It does NOT establish that every emitting call site attributes correctly; enumerating those sites is a separate act, and a green result here says nothing about the ones not run.","passCriteria":"Every row names its actor. An action with no resolvable principal is recorded as UNATTRIBUTABLE and is distinguishable from an ordinary automated one — a row that dresses an unattributable action as a routine system action is a fail, because it removes the reviewer's ability to notice.","procedure":["Perform a security-relevant action as a named user, and read the resulting row's actor fields.","Perform the same class of action through a path with no resolvable principal — a scheduled job, a system-initiated write — and read that row.","Perform a read-through against an external system on a user's behalf and confirm the row carries the INITIATING user rather than the shared service principal the call was made with.","Perform an outbound deletion in that external system and confirm the row names both the subject it served and the system it reached."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A missing or wrong actor is a nonconformity: the trail exists and cannot answer the question it is read for. An unattributable action disguised as a system action is a nonconformity of the same weight, and harder to detect later. A cosmetic field wrong on an otherwise attributed row is an observation."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:auditable-event-actor-attribution"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:audited-first-exposure","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:audited-first-exposure"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares backend-only material — every application, since the framework's own credential and secret fields carry the declaration.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the declared fields do not cross the boundary through the reads exercised. It does NOT establish that a field holding sensitive material carries the declaration in the first place — an undeclared secret is invisible to this act, and is the other half of the objective.","passCriteria":"No client-facing read returns a backend-only field. The single first-exposure door returns the value exactly once and emits a record naming the field and the principal that received it. A second exposure through the same door without a second record is a fail.","procedure":["Enumerate the fields the schema declares backend-only from the resource registry, not from a hand-kept list.","For each, request the owning resource through every client-facing read the application exposes — single read, list, export, and any custom projection — and confirm the field is absent from the response body.","Exercise the ONE declared first-exposure door for a field that has one, and read the audit store for that window."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A backend-only field returned to a client is a nonconformity and, depending on the field, a disclosure. A first exposure that is not recorded is a nonconformity: the exception exists only because it is audited. An exposure through an undocumented door is a nonconformity even when the value is harmless."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:audited-first-exposure"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:authentication-posture-change-detection"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The posture surface is engine-owned and always present; what varies is which settings an application chooses.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that a change is DETECTED and recorded. It does NOT establish that the posture is appropriate: whether a given MFA or lockout setting is adequate for the application's risk is a review judgement this act does not make.","passCriteria":"Every element is explicitly configured. A genuine change is evidenced exactly once, from the runtime that puts it into effect. A restart with no change emits nothing — a posture record on every boot is a fail, because a record that fires unconditionally cannot signal a change.","procedure":["Read the resolved authentication posture from the running application rather than from the authored configuration file — the two can differ, and the runtime's view is the one that governs.","Confirm each element the objective names is explicitly configured rather than defaulted-into: MFA, password policy, lockout, permitted methods, step-up, session posture, whether single sign-on is enforced, which identity provider is trusted, and whether its assertions are verified.","Change one element, restart, and read the audit store.","Restart again with no change and read the same window."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An undetected posture change is a nonconformity — the control's whole value is that a weakening cannot happen quietly. A record emitted on every restart is also a nonconformity: it destroys the signal while appearing to provide it. A record emitted from a runtime other than the one enforcing the posture is an observation unless it is the only record."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:authentication-posture-change-detection"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:authorization-decision-audit","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:authorization-decision-audit"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Authorization is engine-enforced, so the decision points exist before an application adds any of its own.","knownLimitations":"Does NOT establish that the volume of records is survivable under load. Whether the trail becomes an availability risk at production rates is a capacity question, and this act runs at test rates.","passCriteria":"Refusals are recorded as reliably as grants; repeated refusals remain detectable; and a recording failure is itself detectable and attributable to the specific action whose record was lost. A pipeline that drops silently is a fail even when every other row is perfect.","procedure":["Perform an authorized action and a refused one, and confirm BOTH produce a row — a trail recording only grants cannot answer the question a reviewer brings to it.","Confirm each row names the principal, the resource and the decision.","Repeat a refusal enough times to cross the application's own detection threshold and confirm the repetition stays visible.","Interrupt the recording pipeline — stop the sink, or point it at an unreachable destination — perform one further action, and confirm the loss is detectable and names the action it lost."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Unrecorded refusals are a nonconformity: the detection case the trail exists for is exactly the refusal case. A silent pipeline failure is a nonconformity of higher weight, because every downstream control that reads the trail is then wrong without saying so."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:authorization-decision-audit"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:boot-proven-field-authority"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The authority declaration is engine-owned and the boot proof runs unconditionally, so what varies is which fields an application declares.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the authority is proven at boot for the DECLARED fields. It does NOT establish that a field which ought to be server-owned carries the declaration — an undeclared field is outside what this act can see.","passCriteria":"Startup proves the authority for every server-owned field. A field with two writers, or with none, refuses to start rather than starting and letting a reader work out which value is current. A start that succeeds with an unproven authority is a fail even if the field happens to hold the right value.","procedure":["Read the startup validation result and confirm it names each server-owned field and the single authority that writes it.","Introduce a second writer for one such field — a custom implementation that sets it directly — and restart.","Remove the declared authority for a field that has one, and restart."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A boot that succeeds without proving an authority is a nonconformity: the property this objective asks for is the proof, not the arrangement. Two writers for one field is a nonconformity regardless of current values, because the defect is a race that has not yet been lost."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:boot-proven-field-authority"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:bounded-concurrent-sessions"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application, and the bound is a declared value rather than a framework constant — so an application that has not chosen one is verified against the framework default rather than exempt.","knownLimitations":"Establishes eviction order for sessions established in a known order within one test. It does NOT establish behaviour under concurrent sign-ins racing at the bound, where the ordering the eviction reads may itself be contended.","passCriteria":"The count is bounded AND the eviction retired the oldest chain. Evicting the newest is a fail even though the bound holds — it pushes the legitimate session out and leaves a stolen chain in place, which inverts the property the bound exists for.","procedure":["Sign one principal in enough times to exceed the declared bound, recording the order in which the refresh chains were established.","Confirm the session count settles at the bound rather than growing.","Identify WHICH chain was evicted and confirm it is the OLDEST, not the newest and not an arbitrary one.","Confirm the evicted chain can no longer refresh."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unbounded session count is a nonconformity. Evicting anything other than the oldest chain is a nonconformity of HIGHER practical weight than the missing bound, because it silently converts a defence into an attack aid."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:bounded-concurrent-sessions"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:bounded-retired-signing-key"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to an application that has rotated a signing key. An application that has never rotated has nothing to verify here and is out of scope rather than passing.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the retirement instant is honoured by this runtime. It does NOT establish that every verifier honours it: a cached key set held by a downstream consumer is outside this act, and its refresh interval is what actually bounds the exposure there.","passCriteria":"The retired key stops being advertised AND stops verifying, at the declared instant, with no configuration edit in between. A key that disappears from the advertisement but still verifies is a fail — the second half is the one that matters to an attacker holding the old key.","procedure":["Rotate a signing key and give the retired key an explicit retirement instant in the near future.","Before that instant, confirm the retired key is still advertised and still verifies a token it signed.","After that instant, confirm it is no longer advertised at the public key surface.","After that instant, present a token the retired key signed and confirm it is refused."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A retired key that still verifies after its instant is a nonconformity: the mechanism exists precisely so a compromised prior key need not stay trusted. Continued advertisement alone is an observation, provided verification has genuinely stopped."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:bounded-retired-signing-key"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:bounded-unauthenticated-request"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The perimeter is engine-owned and unauthenticated surfaces exist before an application adds any.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the bound at the rates this act can generate. It does NOT establish the behaviour of the deployed edge — a CDN or ingress ahead of the application may absorb or transform the traffic, and its limits are declared elsewhere.","passCriteria":"Each bound is enforced, and an over-limit request is answered as a CLIENT error. A 5xx is a fail even when the limit held: it reports the caller's excess as the server's failure, which sends an operator to the wrong place and pollutes the error budget the objective's siblings are read against.","procedure":["Issue unauthenticated requests exceeding each declared bound in turn — rate, body size, and any other limit the perimeter declares.","Record the status class of the over-limit response.","Confirm the application remains serviceable to a compliant caller during and after the over-limit traffic."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unbounded unauthenticated surface is a nonconformity. An enforced bound reported as a server error is a nonconformity of lower weight but real cost, because it makes a working control indistinguishable from a fault."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:bounded-unauthenticated-request"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:caller-derived-tenancy"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Tenancy narrowing is engine-derived, and the surfaces that could offer it as a parameter — client reads, agent tools, retrieval — all exist by default.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the offering surfaces present at the time of the act refuse widening. A surface added later inherits nothing from this result — that is what makes the enumeration, rather than the assertion, the load-bearing half.","passCriteria":"No surface accepts a caller-supplied tenancy. For similarity search, the predicate is evaluated inside the traversal AND the owning row is re-read. Post-filtering the results is a fail even when the returned set is correct: it leaks through the ranking and the count, and it degrades toward returning nothing rather than returning safely.","procedure":["Attempt to widen a query's tenancy from EVERY offering surface in turn: a client request parameter, an agent tool argument, and a retrieval or similarity-search filter.","Confirm each attempt is ignored or refused, and that the served rows are those of the caller's resolved execution context.","For a similarity search, confirm the tenancy predicate is evaluated INSIDE the traversal — compare the row count and identities against a search whose predicate is applied to the results — and that each returned row is re-checked by an authorized read of the owning row."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A caller-widenable scope is a nonconformity and a cross-tenant disclosure. Post-traversal filtering on a similarity search is a nonconformity even with no observed leak, because the leak is in the ranking rather than in the rows."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:caller-derived-tenancy"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:collection-export-recording","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:collection-export-recording"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that exposes a collection export — the engine ships one, so this is every application unless the operation is withdrawn.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the export path records. It does NOT establish the SIZE of what left — the record names what was exported, not how many rows, so a reviewer cannot size an incident from this record alone.","passCriteria":"Every export produced one row carrying all three facts. A row naming the resource but not the operation is a fail: the operation is what distinguishes a routine listing from a deliberate bulk extraction, which is the distinction the record exists to preserve.","procedure":["Export a resource collection through each rendered format the application offers.","Read the audit store for that window.","Confirm each row names the resource exported, the operation it was taken from, and the format rendered."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unrecorded bulk export is a nonconformity: it is the single act most likely to matter in a later investigation. A record missing the format is an observation; missing the operation or the resource is a nonconformity."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:collection-export-recording"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:conferring-relationship-withdrawal"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Membership and role relationships are engine-owned, so the conferring relationships exist before an application declares any of its own.","knownLimitations":"Establishes withdrawal for the relationship kinds exercised. It does NOT establish the LATENCY of withdrawal across every cache and downstream consumer; a token invalidated at the issuer may still be accepted briefly by a verifier holding stale state.","passCriteria":"Withdrawal removes the access AND invalidates credentials already asserting it — a token minted before the withdrawal must stop working, or the withdrawal is a record rather than an effect. Both the withdrawal and the restoration are recorded and attributed.","procedure":["Establish a principal whose access derives from a relationship — a membership, an assignment, an employment-like link.","End that relationship and confirm the access is withdrawn, including any credential asserting it: attempt the previously permitted action, and attempt it again with a token minted before the withdrawal.","Restore the relationship and read the audit store for BOTH transitions."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Access surviving the end of the relationship conferring it is a nonconformity. An unrecorded RESTORATION is a nonconformity too, and the one more often missed — a restoration that leaves no trail is how a withdrawn privilege quietly returns."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:conferring-relationship-withdrawal"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:constrained-redirect-target","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:constrained-redirect-target"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that registers an OAuth redirect target. An application with no such registration is out of scope rather than passing.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the constraint on the forms exercised. It does NOT establish that the permitted target is under the operator's control — a syntactically safe absolute URL pointing at a host someone else owns passes this act and is still an open redirect.","passCriteria":"Every unsafe form is refused at REGISTRATION. Refusing only at redirect time is a fail: the stored value is then an attack the application is carrying, and one that a later code path may use without re-checking.","procedure":["Attempt to register redirect targets that are each individually unsafe: a relative path, a scheme other than the permitted one, a target carrying a javascript or data scheme, a wildcard host, and a target with credentials embedded.","Confirm each is refused at registration rather than at redirect time.","Register a valid target and confirm the authorization flow redirects to it."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A permissive redirect target is a nonconformity: it is simultaneously an open-redirect and a stored-XSS delegation primitive. Refusal deferred to redirect time is a nonconformity of lower weight but the same class, because the unsafe value is persisted."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:constrained-redirect-target"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:credential-state-transition-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Credential lifecycle is engine-owned, so every transition exists before an application adds a credential kind of its own.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the transitions exercised. It does NOT establish detection coverage for theft patterns not simulated, and a detector that has never fired against a real authenticator remains unproven regardless of this result.","passCriteria":"Every transition is explicit, attributed and recorded, AND a revocation terminates what it names. A revocation that marks a record while the session keeps working is a fail: it is the case where the trail says the control operated and the control did not.","procedure":["Drive each transition the objective names — issuance, refresh, rotation, revocation, expiry — and read the audit store for each.","Confirm each row is attributed to the principal whose credential moved, not to the system performing the move.","After a REVOCATION, attempt to use the named session and the named token, and confirm both are refused.","Simulate credential theft as the application detects it — a reused refresh token, a regressed counter — and confirm the answer is invalidation rather than a logged observation."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A revocation that does not terminate is a nonconformity of the highest weight here — every downstream reviewer reads the record as an effect. A missing transition record is a nonconformity. A transition attributed to the system where a principal acted is a nonconformity, since it defeats the review the record exists for."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application deployed on a platform with a tier above the tenant. A single-tenant deployment with no platform operator has no crossing to declare and is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the admission rule for the variants enumerated. It does NOT establish that the set of declared variants is APPROPRIATE — whether a given operation should be crossable is a design judgement, and an irreversible verb declared crossable passes this act.","passCriteria":"An undeclared crossing fails closed; a declared one requires an elevation that was requested rather than held; and every crossing emits its own event naming the tenant. A crossing that succeeds on standing privilege is a fail even when it is declared and recorded.","procedure":["Enumerate the operation variants that declare cross-tenant admission — the declaration is the population, and a verifier who chooses it has not measured anything.","As a platform administrator holding no role in the target tenant, attempt an UNDECLARED cross-tenant operation and confirm it fails closed.","Attempt a DECLARED one without an elevation and confirm it is refused; request the elevation, obtain any tenant approval the tenant demands, and confirm it then succeeds.","Read the audit store and confirm the crossing is a distinct event naming the tenant reached — not an ordinary operation row."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Ambient cross-tenant reach is a nonconformity of the highest weight: it is a standing privilege over customer data. An undeclared crossing that succeeds is the same finding. A crossing recorded as an ordinary operation is a nonconformity, because it cannot be separated for review."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:datastore-proven-uniqueness"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application declaring a uniqueness or integrity constraint — every application, since the framework's own resources declare them.","knownLimitations":"Establishes existence, not enforcement history. A constraint created moments before the probe passes identically to one that has held since the data was written, so this act says nothing about whether violating rows already exist.","passCriteria":"Every declared constraint is proven present before traffic is served, and a missing one refuses the start. An interrupted probe reports indeterminacy — reporting 'does not exist' for a probe that was cut off is a fail, because it sends an operator to repair data that is intact.","procedure":["Read the startup verification result and confirm it enumerates the declared constraints and reports, per constraint, whether the datastore holds it.","Remove one constraint from the datastore out of band and restart.","Confirm the application refuses to serve traffic rather than starting and discovering the absence on a later write.","Distinguish an INDETERMINATE probe from a negative one: interrupt the verification mid-run and confirm the result says the constraint could not be established rather than that it does not exist."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Serving traffic without a declared constraint is a nonconformity: every write after that point may violate an invariant the application believes is enforced. Reporting an interrupted probe as a definitive absence is a nonconformity in its own right — it manufactures a data incident out of a restart."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:datastore-proven-uniqueness"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:declared-directory-authority","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:declared-directory-authority"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies only to an application that opts a directory in as a provisioning authority. An application with no directory connection is out of scope rather than passing — and an application that HAS a connection but has not declared the switches is IN scope, because that is the state this requirement exists to catch.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the application's behaviour given what the directory asserts. It does NOT establish the directory's own correctness: a stale or wrongly-scoped group at the source produces a faithful and wrong grant here, and that is the directory's control rather than this one.","passCriteria":"Authority is conferred only by an explicit declaration, and a declared unit membership changes what the principal may DO. A membership applied as a label — visible in the profile, inert in authorization — is a fail, because it is the reading that makes an operator believe access was revoked when it was not.","procedure":["Read the declared switches that confer provisioning authority, and confirm each is set explicitly rather than inferred from the existence of a connection.","With account authority declared, provision and deprovision an account at the directory and confirm the application follows.","With unit-membership authority declared, move a principal between units at the directory and confirm the resulting change is applied as an AUTHORIZATION GRANT — attempt an action the new unit confers and one the old unit conferred.","Turn the membership switch off, repeat the move, and confirm the application does NOT re-derive authorization from it."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Provisioning authority conferred by the mere presence of a connection is a nonconformity — it is authority nobody granted. A unit membership treated as a label while the objective calls it a grant is a nonconformity, and the more dangerous of the two because it reads as working."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:declared-directory-authority"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:declared-persistence-isolation","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:declared-persistence-isolation"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The registry build runs unconditionally; what varies is whether an application places any resource on a non-default adapter.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the declared topology is checked. It does NOT establish that a write the application performs is actually atomic at runtime: a single-node development datastore mocks transactions, so an isolation failure there is invisible to any act short of a real multi-node run.","passCriteria":"Both refusals happen when the registry is BUILT. A configuration accepted at build and failing under load is a fail even if the eventual failure is loud — the objective's whole content is moving the discovery to a moment when nobody is depending on the write.","procedure":["Move a resource to a non-default adapter WITHOUT declaring its persistence isolation and build the registry.","Confirm the build refuses, naming the resource and the missing declaration.","Declare the isolation and construct a cross-resource write spanning two adapters that could not be atomic; build again.","Confirm that configuration is refused at registry-build time rather than accepted and discovered on a later write."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A cross-adapter write accepted at build is a nonconformity: it is a partial write waiting for load, and the resulting inconsistency has no owner. An undeclared resource on a non-default adapter is a nonconformity for the same reason one step earlier."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:declared-persistence-isolation"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:declared-personal-data-categories"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","AUTOMATED_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares resources — which is every application. The declaration surface is engine-owned; what is application-specific is which fields carry which classification.","knownLimitations":"Establishes what is DECLARED, not what a field actually contains at runtime. A field correctly declared may still receive data of a different kind; that is a data-handling question this act does not reach.","passCriteria":"Every field that owes the declaration carries it. The population that owes it is derived from the resource registry, never chosen by the verifier — a ratio whose denominator the verifier picked is not a measurement.","procedure":["Enumerate the application's declared resources and their fields from the resource registry, not from a hand-kept list.","For each field, read the classification the objective demands directly off the declaration.","Identify fields that carry personal or otherwise classified data and lack the declaration, and fields that declare it without holding such data."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An undeclared field holding classified data is a nonconformity — downstream controls key off the declaration, so the omission silently disables them. An over-declaration is an observation: it costs handling, not correctness."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:declared-personal-data-categories"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:declared-retention-window","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:declared-retention-window"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares a retention window, and to every application that stores derived copies of subject text — which the framework's own search and retrieval surfaces produce, so the second half reaches applications that declared nothing.","knownLimitations":"Establishes enforcement for the windows declared and the copies the configuration describes. It does NOT establish that every material data category HAS a window — an undeclared category is outside the enforcement loop entirely, and is the gap the coverage question asks about rather than this one.","passCriteria":"Declared windows are enforced, AND a configuration whose derived copies could outlive their source row is refused at startup. Enforcement without the startup refusal is a fail: an erasure that cannot reach a derived copy leaves subject text behind while every record says the erasure completed.","procedure":["Read the declared windows and confirm each names a class rather than a single resource, so a class added to the vocabulary is reported rather than silently omitted.","Age a row past its window — by clock or by seeded timestamp — run the enforcement, and confirm the row is treated as the window declares.","Configure a derived copy of subject text whose lifetime is NOT reachable by the erasure seams, and start the application.","Confirm startup refuses that configuration rather than starting with a copy that can outlive its source."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A derived copy able to outlive its source is a nonconformity of the highest weight here: it defeats erasure while reporting success. An unenforced declared window is a nonconformity. A category with no declared window is an observation against THIS requirement and a coverage gap elsewhere."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:declared-retention-window"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:delegated-authorization-exchange"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","AUTOMATED_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies only to an application that exposes delegated authorization. An application issuing no delegated grants is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the exchange as this application implements it. It does NOT establish the third party's handling of the token afterwards, which is where a correctly-scoped grant is most often over-used.","passCriteria":"All four outcomes are audited; the exchange refuses without proof of possession; and the issued token carries NO MORE than the declared grant. A token carrying a scope the grant did not name is a fail even when the exchange itself was flawless — that is the privilege the user never authorized.","procedure":["Drive a full delegated exchange to APPROVAL, and read the audit store.","Drive one to REFUSAL, one that PERSISTS a grant, and one that FAILS mid-exchange, reading the store after each — four outcomes, because a lane that records only the happy path cannot answer what a reviewer asks it.","Repeat the exchange without the proof of possession and confirm it is refused.","Decode the issued token and compare its claims against the declared grant."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A token exceeding its grant is a nonconformity and a privilege escalation. An unaudited refusal or failure is a nonconformity: those are the outcomes an investigation reads first. A missing proof-of-possession check is a nonconformity, because it converts a stolen code into a usable grant."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:delegated-authorization-exchange"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:diagnosable-refusal","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:diagnosable-refusal"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies wherever the objective's control is expressed as a REFUSAL — a guard, a floor, a fail-closed gate. An application that has not enabled the surface the guard protects is out of scope and has not failed anything.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the guard refuses at the sites exercised. It does NOT establish that every path to the protected state passes through it — an unenumerated call site is invisible to this act.","passCriteria":"The refused act is refused, with an error the caller can branch on, AND the permitted act succeeds. Both halves are required: the negative alone does not distinguish a working guard from a broken surface.","procedure":["Construct the state the guard exists to refuse, using the ordinary interface a caller would use — not a direct store write, which bypasses the guard being verified.","Attempt the refused act and record the outcome, including the status and the error classification the caller receives.","Perform the POSITIVE control: the same act in a state the guard permits, confirming it succeeds. A refusal with no positive control is unattributable — it may be refusing for an unrelated reason.","Where the guard has several call sites, repeat at each; a guard applied at one of its sites is the defect shape this step exists to catch."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A guard that admits the state it exists to refuse is a nonconformity at the severity of what the state permits. A guard that refuses correctly but returns an unclassifiable error is an observation, unless a caller's own safety depends on branching on it."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:diagnosable-refusal"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:erasure-propagation-accounting","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.ERASURE_PROPAGATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:erasure-propagation-accounting"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The accounting is the return value of the engine's erasure call, so it can be driven whether or not the application has ever erased anyone; the external-system steps apply only where the application binds a resource to an external system or registers an external erasure effect, and are recorded not_applicable_as_configured otherwise.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the accounting for the build it ran against. It does NOT establish that the stores are empty of the subject: a teardown that ran can leave derived copies whose removal is scheduled after commit and logged rather than recorded, and an external system reports only what it answered at the time. It establishes nothing below a relationship whose rows the erasure retains, which it does not walk. A credential-deletion record is delivered after commit and a failed audit write is logged rather than retried, so a missing record beside a run credential edge is possible and is an evidence lag rather than a live credential.","passCriteria":"Every dependent edge the erasure walks — direct and descendant — and every registered external effect is accounted for exactly once, a declined teardown at any depth reads as not run and makes its direct edge read as not run, an unclassifiable or deferred edge at any depth the erasure walks refuses before writing, no outcome that may leave data at a third party reads as complete, and each credential the erasure destroys leaves its record. An accounting that reports a declined edge as run is a fail even if every other step passes — it is the one failure that turns this control into a way of hiding live personal data.","procedure":["Erase a subject with DIRECT dependents on a deleting edge, a retaining edge and an edge that is not the subject's to decide, and confirm the returned accounting names every direct edge once, with its declared disposition, and marks exactly the executing edges as run.","Give the deleting dependent its own dependents two and three levels down, each declaring the ordinary one-level delete depth, erase again, and confirm the rows at every level are gone and each descendant relationship appears under its direct edge as run.","Make one executing edge undischargeable — its child has no registered repository — first as a direct edge and then as a descendant, and confirm the declined edge is reported as NOT run each time, and that the direct edge above the declined descendant is reported as not run with it.","Add an edge that declares no parent-delete behaviour, or one that defers its teardown to a queue, first as a direct edge and then below a deleted dependent, and confirm the erasure refuses before any write lands, naming the edge. Confirm the same shape placed below a retaining edge does NOT refuse: the erasure does not walk below rows it keeps.","Where an external system is bound: drive an external deletion and an acknowledged non-erasure, and confirm each appears in the accounting with its own status and leaves its row naming the subject, resource and system. Confirm every status that may leave data live, the acknowledged one included, is classified incomplete.","Erase a subject holding person-owned third-party credentials and confirm each credential row is gone, the credential edge reports as run, and one credential-deletion row carrying the erasure reason exists per destroyed credential. Hard-delete a different user holding a credential and confirm no row carrying the erasure reason is written for it."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A declined edge reported as run, or a direct edge reported as run above a declined descendant, is a nonconformity of the highest weight, as is an incomplete external outcome classified complete. An unclassified or deferred edge at any depth the erasure walks that proceeds instead of refusing is a nonconformity: the erasure then guessed. A missing external or credential row where the accounting shows the teardown ran is a nonconformity of evidence rather than of control. A credential record carrying the erasure reason for a user who was deleted rather than erased is a nonconformity: it forges erasure evidence."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:erasure-propagation-accounting"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:granted-authority-ceiling"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Role assignment and machine-credential minting are engine-owned, and the non-controller surfaces the objective names — self-service verbs, retrieval corpora, agent-facing tools — exist by default.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the ceiling for the surfaces enumerated at the time of the act. A surface added later inherits nothing from this result, which is why the enumeration is the load-bearing step rather than the assertions.","passCriteria":"No principal can grant authority above its own ceiling, and every non-controller surface applies the same declared gate through the same predicate as the controller tier. A surface enforcing an equivalent rule by its own copy of the logic is a fail: two implementations of one gate is how the two come to disagree.","procedure":["As a principal holding a bounded set of roles, attempt to assign a role OUTSIDE that set, and to mint a machine credential carrying one.","Confirm both are refused, and that the refusal is on the caller's ceiling rather than on a static list — repeat as a higher-ceiling principal and confirm it succeeds.","Enumerate the non-controller surfaces facing an external caller: each self-service verb, each retrieval corpus, each agent-facing tool.","For each, attempt an action the declared operation-role gate should refuse, and confirm the refusal happens BEFORE the surface is reached."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Granting above one's ceiling is a nonconformity and a privilege escalation. A non-controller surface reaching data without the gate is the same finding by a different door — and historically the more common one, because the controller tier is where everybody looks."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:granted-authority-ceiling"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:guarded-authentication-eligibility"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The status carrying authentication eligibility is engine-owned and excluded from ordinary updates by construction.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the ordinary write path cannot carry the change. It does NOT establish that every guarded transition is correct — whether a given principal should have become ineligible is a decision this act does not review.","passCriteria":"The status cannot move through an ordinary update, and the guarded door both applies it and records it. A generic update that appears to succeed while silently stripping the field is the EXPECTED behaviour and passes; what fails is an update that actually writes it.","procedure":["Attempt to change the eligibility status through the ordinary update verb for the principal's resource, including as part of a larger unrelated write.","Confirm the field is not written — read the row back rather than trusting the response, because a stripped field returns a success the caller cannot distinguish from an applied one.","Change it through the guarded authority and confirm it takes effect.","Read the audit store and confirm the guarded change is evidenced and attributed."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Eligibility changed as a side effect of an unrelated write is a nonconformity: the change is the one an investigation most needs attributed, and it arrives with no author. A guarded change that is not evidenced is a nonconformity of the same weight."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:guarded-authentication-eligibility"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:high-impact-action-reproof"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","AUTOMATED_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares a high-impact action. The engine declares several of its own, so an application that has declared none is still in scope through those.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the demand for the actions declared. It does NOT establish that the right actions are declared: an action that ought to be high-impact and is not declared passes this act silently.","passCriteria":"Every declared high-impact action demands a fresh re-proof; the ceremony accepts any factor the principal holds; and a credential presented for another purpose does not satisfy it. Accepting a recent unrelated authentication is a fail — it converts step-up into a time window, which is the property the objective explicitly denies.","procedure":["Enumerate the actions declared high-impact — the declaration is the population.","Attempt each with a valid ordinary session and confirm a fresh re-proof is demanded.","Satisfy the re-proof over EACH factor kind the principal actually holds, confirming the ceremony is not bound to one factor a given principal may not have.","Attempt to satisfy the re-proof with a credential presented moments earlier for a DIFFERENT purpose, and confirm it is refused."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A high-impact action reachable without re-proof is a nonconformity. Satisfying step-up with a credential minted for another purpose is a nonconformity of equal weight and lower visibility, because every log shows a successful ceremony."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:high-impact-action-reproof"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:ingested-content-inspection","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:ingested-content-inspection"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","AUTOMATED_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to an application that declares at least one field with a scan policy, or enables scanning globally. An application that ingests no user content has declared no such field and is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the pipeline runs and that its outcome gates serving. It does NOT establish detection quality — that is the scanner vendor's signature coverage, not this framework's control — and it does not establish that a scanner outage is handled the way the application intends.","passCriteria":"The benign file becomes downloadable only after the scan concludes clean; the test file reaches an infected or quarantined status and is never served.","procedure":["Upload a benign file to a field declaring a required scan, and read the file's status immediately on the upload response.","Confirm the file is NOT in a downloadable status before the scan resolves — the window in which unscanned bytes are servable is the defect this control exists to close.","Upload the EICAR standard antivirus test file to the same field and read the resulting status once the pipeline settles.","Attempt to download both files and record which are served."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Serving a file that has not concluded a required scan is a nonconformity: the control is claimed and does not hold. A scan that concludes correctly but records no audit row is an observation against this requirement and a gap against the trail (see #506)."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:ingested-content-inspection"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:lawful-basis-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with a user. Nothing is opted into — an application that has declared no basis is in scope, and the act is what shows its answer says so.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the declaration is complete in form and that the one member-level obligation is enforced. It establishes nothing about whether the declared bases are the right ones in law, and nothing about whether the declared purposes cover all the processing the product performs.","passCriteria":"Every declared purpose carries a basis; a legitimate-interests entry without an assessment is refused and one with an assessment is admitted; and an absent declaration is reported as unanswered. The second and third steps together are the ones worth the act — a refusal shown without its admitted counterpart could be refusing the basis itself.","procedure":["Parse the application's committed lawful-basis declaration through its declaring schema and confirm every entry names a basis from the closed set.","Add an entry relying on legitimate interests with no assessment and confirm the declaration is refused, naming the purpose. Revert it afterwards: a planted refusal is how the mechanism is proved and is not something to leave in committed configuration.","Add the same entry WITH an assessment and confirm it is admitted, so the refusal is shown to key on the missing assessment rather than on the basis.","Remove the declaration entirely and confirm the answer reports it as unanswered rather than as zero purposes."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A legitimate-interests entry admitted without an assessment is a nonconformity: the mechanism would then let an application assert a balancing test nobody performed. An absent declaration reported as zero purposes is a nonconformity, because it states that an application with users processes nothing that needs a ground."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:metered-usage-reporting","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.USAGE_REPORTING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:metered-usage-reporting"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to an application with billing enabled on its backend and at least one metered product.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the flush reports and records; it does not ask the provider what it received, so a provider that acknowledged and dropped an event is not detected.","passCriteria":"Accepted usage is marked reported and counted in quantity reported; failed usage stays pending; the account-less usage is marked unreportable with a reason and counted in quantity unreportable; and the recorded output carries all three quantities.","procedure":["Record usage due for flushing, run the flush against a provider that accepts, and read the rows and the recorded output.","Repeat against a provider that fails the call and read the rows.","Record usage for an account that no longer exists and read the rows and the recorded output."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Usage marked reported without provider acceptance is a nonconformity. A recorded output missing a quantity is a nonconformity against the record."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:metered-usage-reporting"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-audit"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The framework mints secret material — API keys, machine credentials, recovery codes — before an application mints any of its own.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the first disclosure through the doors exercised. It does NOT establish that the material has no other route out — a second path that reads the stored value is invisible here and is what the confidentiality objective covers.","passCriteria":"Every first disclosure is recorded and attributed. A second retrieval either refuses or emits its own record; a silent re-disclosure is a fail. A record containing the secret VALUE is also a fail, and a worse one: the trail then becomes the disclosure it was meant to police.","procedure":["Mint each kind of server-minted secret the application offers.","Retrieve each exactly once through its declared first-disclosure door, and read the audit store.","Attempt to retrieve the same material a second time.","Confirm the recorded row names the principal that received the material and the material's identity — never its value."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unaudited first disclosure is a nonconformity: after it, nobody can say who holds the material. A record carrying the value is a nonconformity and a disclosure in its own right."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-audit"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:multi-factor-authentication","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR","objectiveVersion":2},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:multi-factor-authentication"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application enrolling a second factor. An application with no second factor enrolled anywhere is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Timing safety is established by INSPECTION, not by measurement: a timing side channel is not reliably observable across a network in a verification act, and a negative measurement here would be evidence about the network rather than the code.","passCriteria":"All verifying paths share one authority, and a consumed factor cannot be replayed. A path performing its own comparison is a fail even when that comparison happens to be correct today — the objective's content is that no caller builds a second, weaker door onto the same credential.","procedure":["Enumerate the paths that verify a second factor — the sign-in ceremony, any step-up, any recovery flow, any administrative bypass.","Confirm every one routes through the single verification authority rather than performing its own comparison.","Replay a factor already consumed and confirm it is refused.","Confirm the comparison is timing-safe by inspecting the authority's implementation, since no black-box act reliably distinguishes it."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A second verification path is a nonconformity regardless of its current correctness — it is a door that will drift. A replayable factor is a nonconformity and defeats the factor entirely. A non-constant-time comparison is a nonconformity where the factor is guessable within the leak."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:multi-factor-authentication"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:named-constraint-conflict","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:named-constraint-conflict"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The refusal classifier is engine-owned and every application declares constraints through the framework's own resources.","knownLimitations":"Establishes naming for the constraints exercised. It does NOT establish that every constraint is reachable for a conflict test — one enforced only under concurrency may never surface in a sequential act.","passCriteria":"Every conflict names the constraint it violated. An opaque datastore error is a fail: an operator cannot tell a benign duplicate submission from an unexpected collision, and the two lead to opposite responses.","procedure":["Provoke a conflict on each declared constraint kind in turn — a unique field, a business key, a composite key set.","Read the response and confirm it names the violated IDENTITY rather than reporting an opaque datastore failure.","Confirm the status distinguishes a conflict from a validation error and from a server fault.","Confirm the response does not leak the conflicting row's contents while naming the constraint."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unnamed conflict is a nonconformity against diagnosability, not against integrity: the write was correctly refused. It costs operator time rather than correctness, which is why it sits here rather than with the integrity objective. Leaking the conflicting row's contents while naming the constraint is a separate nonconformity."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:named-constraint-conflict"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:operation-serviceability","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:operation-serviceability"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Every declared operation is in scope, and the population is the operation registry rather than a chosen sample.","knownLimitations":"Establishes reachability and implementation for the declared set. It does NOT establish behavioural correctness of each operation — that an implementation exists and does not over-write says nothing about whether it does the right thing.","passCriteria":"Every declared operation is implemented; no named verb widens into an unconstrained write; and no interface reports success for work it did not perform. A verb that accepts an unexposed field and silently drops it PASSES; one that writes it fails.","procedure":["Enumerate the declared, API-reachable operations from the registry.","For each, confirm an implementation exists — a declaration reaching no implementation is the defect, and it is invisible to any test that only calls what it knows about.","For each write verb, submit fields the resource does NOT expose for update and confirm they are not written; read the row back rather than trusting the response.","For any interface that reports an outcome without performing the action itself, confirm the reported success corresponds to work actually done."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Reporting success for an action not performed is the highest-weight nonconformity here: every consumer downstream believes work happened. A verb widening into an unconstrained write is a nonconformity and a mass-assignment defect. A declared operation with no implementation is a nonconformity even before anyone calls it."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:operation-serviceability"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:operator-gated-entitlement-write"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with entitlements or feature flags — every application, since the framework's own plan and capability entitlements exist by default.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the gate for the doors enumerated. An entitlement changed by a background process reacting to an external event — a payment webhook, a provider callback — is outside this act, and that path's own authorization is a separate question.","passCriteria":"No principal can widen its own entitlement through any enumerated door. A door refused only by a role check is a fail against this requirement: the objective asks that the write be operator-GATED, which is a property of reachability, not of the caller's roles alone.","procedure":["Enumerate every write that can change an entitlement, including indirect ones: a plan change, a discretionary grant, a subscription-derived update, and any self-service verb touching the same fields.","As an ordinary principal, attempt each and confirm refusal.","Confirm the refusal comes from the reachability gate rather than from a role check alone — an operation reachable and then refused is a different posture from one that is not exposed.","As an operator, confirm each succeeds."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A self-grantable entitlement is a nonconformity and a direct revenue and access defect. A door reachable but role-refused is an observation where the role check is sound, and a nonconformity where the role set is application-authored and therefore self-assignable."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:operator-gated-entitlement-write"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:outbound-call-recording","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:outbound-call-recording"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application making outbound calls — every application, since transactional email and at least one provider integration exist by default.","knownLimitations":"Establishes recording for the calls exercised. It does NOT establish that the recorded usage figures are accurate — the numbers come from the provider's own response, and this act observes that they are carried, not that they are true. Browser-side egress (error monitoring, analytics) never reaches a backend recorder and is out of this act's scope.","passCriteria":"Every physical call is recorded, with the fields its kind demands, and failures are recorded as reliably as successes. A capability whose traffic leaves outside the named egress is a fail even if it records: the objective's first clause is the single egress, because that is what makes the enumeration possible at all.","procedure":["Enumerate the capabilities that make outbound calls, and for each confirm the traffic leaves through the single named egress rather than through an ad-hoc client.","Make one PROVIDER call and confirm the record names provider, model, usage and outcome.","Make one call through each enabled capability egress — send a transactional email, send an SMS, call the billing provider, upload a file to a vendor storage — and confirm each leaves one PROVIDER_CAPABILITY_CALL row naming the provider, the capability and the outcome, and naming no recipient, number, file or payload.","Make one ADMINISTRATIVE probe and confirm the record names the initiating actor.","Make a call that FAILS — point the egress at an unreachable destination — and confirm the failure is recorded rather than only the successes."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unrecorded outbound call is a nonconformity: it is data leaving with no trail. A second egress path is a nonconformity of higher weight, because it makes every completeness claim about the trail false without any individual record being wrong."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:outbound-call-recording"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:privileged-access-review","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:privileged-access-review"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW","DOCUMENT_REVIEW","INTERVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with privileged roles — every application. The review is an operating practice rather than a code path, so an application that has never run one is in scope and failing rather than out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the review occurred and was decided. It does NOT establish that the decisions were correct, nor that any remediation actually happened; the objective deliberately stops short of the second, and a verifier who reads completion into it has widened the claim.","passCriteria":"Reviews happened on the declared cadence, over a declared population, decided by authorized people, and retained as traceable evidence. Evidence that reads as though remediation completed — when only a decision was taken — is a fail, because it is the form in which a review becomes a false assurance.","procedure":["Obtain the scope statement for privileged access and confirm it enumerates the roles and principals considered privileged, rather than leaving the population to the reviewer.","Obtain the completed reviews for the period and confirm each falls within the declared periodicity.","Confirm each review records who decided, and that the decider held authority to decide.","Confirm the retained evidence records the DECISION and does not imply that any remediation it recommended was completed."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"No review in the declared period is a nonconformity. A review decided by someone without authority is a nonconformity. Evidence implying remediation completion is a nonconformity in its own right, and the one most likely to mislead a later auditor."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:privileged-access-review"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Role, membership and entitlement grants are engine-owned, so the lifecycle exists before an application defines a privilege of its own.","knownLimitations":"Establishes evidence for the transitions exercised. It does NOT establish retention of that evidence over the period an auditor will ask about — whether the records still exist a year later is the retention control's question, not this one.","passCriteria":"The full life of each assignment is reconstructable from durable evidence — not merely its current state. A store that answers 'what does this principal hold now' but cannot answer 'what did it hold in March, and who changed it' is a fail: the objective's whole content is the difference between the two.","procedure":["For each privilege kind the objective names — a role, a unit-scoped membership, a discretionary entitlement, a subscription-derived one — drive the full life: grant, widen, narrow, revoke.","After each transition, read the audit store and confirm a record exists naming the principal, the privilege and the direction of the change.","Reconstruct the assignment's history from the records alone and compare it to what was actually done.","Confirm the current-state view and the reconstructed history agree."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A narrowing or revocation with no record is a nonconformity of the highest weight here: it is the transition a later investigation most needs, and its absence is indistinguishable from the privilege never having been held. A missing widening record is a nonconformity. Current-state-only evidence is a nonconformity against the objective as written, even when every current value is right."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:provider-billing-reconciliation","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.PROVIDER_RECONCILIATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:provider-billing-reconciliation"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to an application with billing enabled on its backend.","knownLimitations":"Establishes nothing about populations the sweep never selects — terminal subscriptions, subscriptions known only to the provider, items, invoice totals and invoices beyond the lookback. Runs recorded before the sweep moved onto the subscription mutation slot carry a retired quiet-period population and lack the slot populations, so the check that every uncompared population is present applies only to runs recorded after that change.","passCriteria":"The drift is repaired with only provider-authoritative fields and counted as repaired; the missing invoice is recorded again from provider fields and counted as repaired; the unreadable subscription is counted and left untouched; the superseded and the PREPARED subscriptions are each counted as not compared and neither is written; the failed write is counted as repair-failed; and every divergence kind and uncompared population is present in the recorded output.","procedure":["Put a subscription out of step with the provider on a provider-authoritative field, run the sweep, and read the write and the recorded output.","Make the provider unable to read a subscription, run the sweep, and read the write and the recorded output.","Complete a mutation's write on a subscription between the sweep's provider read and its repair, and confirm nothing is written and the subscription is counted as superseded.","Hold a mutation admission PREPARED on a subscription, run the sweep, and confirm the subscription is neither read from the provider nor written and is counted.","Make a repair write fail and confirm the recorded output counts it as repair-failed.","Remove locally an invoice the provider still holds, run the sweep, and confirm it is recorded again from provider-authoritative fields and counted as repaired."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A repair writing a non-authoritative field, or acting on an unreadable answer, is a nonconformity. A divergence or uncompared population missing from the recorded output is a nonconformity against the record."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:provider-billing-reconciliation"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:provider-selection-opt-in"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The selection surface is engine-owned, and an application that has selected NO provider is squarely in scope — the no-egress case is the one this requirement most needs to confirm.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the routing for the capabilities exercised. It does NOT establish that a selected provider handles the data as declared — what the processor does after receipt is covered by the register and the contract, not by this act.","passCriteria":"Nothing leaves without an explicit selection, and an unselected capability produces ZERO egress rather than reduced egress. A capability that falls back to a default provider is a fail: it makes a processor of a service the application never named, which is the disclosure this objective exists to prevent.","procedure":["Enumerate the capabilities that can route to an external service, and read which have a provider selected.","For a capability with NO selection, exercise it and confirm the work is served locally — then confirm at the egress that no outbound call was made at all.","For a capability WITH a selection, exercise it and confirm the traffic goes only to the selected provider.","Confirm no capability routes externally on a default: remove a selection and re-run rather than reasoning from the configuration file."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Egress with no selection is a nonconformity and an undisclosed processor relationship — the application's own privacy notice is then false. A capability routing to a default is the same finding; the absence of an author does not make it smaller."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:provider-selection-opt-in"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:purpose-limited-egress","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:purpose-limited-egress"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The external-processor and observability paths are engine-owned; the client-install identifier is application-declared, and an application with NO such policy is in scope for the 'not at all' half.","knownLimitations":"Establishes what leaves through the paths exercised. It does NOT establish that a payload is minimal in the legal sense — whether a field the purpose 'requires' genuinely requires it is a data-protection judgement, and this act reads the declaration rather than testing it.","passCriteria":"Each boundary receives only what its declared purpose requires; with no declared policy the device identifier is not collected AT ALL — a shortened or hashed identifier is a fail, because absence of a policy is a decision not to collect rather than a licence to collect less; and withdrawal takes effect rather than applying only to new installs.","procedure":["Capture the payload sent to an external processor and confirm it carries what the purpose requires and nothing identifying the requester or its originating row.","Capture what reaches the observability surfaces and confirm it carries summaries rather than raw content.","With NO client-install identifier policy declared, exercise the client and confirm no such identifier is collected at all.","Declare a policy, confirm the identifier is collected under it, then withdraw and narrow the policy and confirm the collection stops and shrinks accordingly."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Identifying material reaching an external processor is a nonconformity and a disclosure. Raw content in observability is a nonconformity of the same class, and typically higher volume. Collecting a device identifier with no declared policy is a nonconformity that engages storage-on-terminal-equipment rules directly."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:purpose-limited-egress"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:record-context-preservation","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:record-context-preservation"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Both halves are engine-owned: the trusted-system write that persists an audit row, and the log record's application and environment fields.","knownLimitations":"Establishes preservation for the actions exercised. It does NOT establish that every emitting call site supplies the context in the first place; a row that never carried an actor cannot lose one, and that is the attribution objective's question.","passCriteria":"The actor and tenant survive the trusted-system write, and every log record names its application and environment. A row whose actor becomes the system on persistence is a fail even though the event was emitted correctly — the trail is read from the store, not from the emission.","procedure":["Perform an audited action as a named principal in a named tenant, and read the persisted row rather than the emitted event — the write is where the context can be lost.","Confirm the persisted actor and tenant match the acting context, not the system principal that performed the write.","Read a log record from each running service and confirm it names the application and the environment that produced it.","Repeat in a second environment and confirm the environment field differs."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An actor or tenant lost at the write is a nonconformity of the highest weight here: every review of that row afterwards is wrong, and nothing indicates it. A log record not naming its environment is an observation, unless records from two environments are aggregated into one store — where it becomes a nonconformity, because the trail then attributes production activity to nowhere in particular."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:record-context-preservation"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:risk-treatment-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Nothing is opted into — an application that has declared no treatment is in scope and the act is what shows its answer says so.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the MECHANISM reports honestly. It establishes nothing about whether the declared treatments are the right ones — that a REDUCED posture names a control that exists is a judgement no act here reaches, and the procedure deliberately exercises only the posture a measurement can contradict.","passCriteria":"Undeclared is distinguishable from accepted; a contradicted absence claim is reported with both sides; an unusable claim is named as unusable; an unavailable derivation says so instead of answering zero; and a partial ordering is refused. The third and fifth are the ones worth the act — the rest can pass by accident, while a mechanism that silently agrees with a false absence claim, or that reports a stale artifact as an empty declaration, is the exact failure this demand exists against.","procedure":["Run the derivation against the application and read its answer for every signal in the vocabulary. Assert the set is TOTAL rather than a list of what happened to be found.","Take a signal the application has NOT declared a treatment for and confirm it is reported as UNDECLARED, distinctly from any signal declared ACCEPTED. If the two render alike, stop — the rest of the act cannot distinguish a decision from a silence either.","Declare a treatment of AVOIDED on a signal the derivation reports as PRESENT, and confirm the disagreement is reported, naming both the claim and the measurement. Revert the declaration afterwards: a planted contradiction is how the mechanism is proved and is not something to leave in a committed configuration.","Declare AVOIDED on a signal whose presence the derivation cannot determine, and confirm it is reported as an UNUSABLE claim rather than as a contradiction or as accepted.","Make the derivation unavailable — an engine artifact that predates the vocabulary is enough — and confirm the answer says NOT ASKED rather than reporting zero declarations.","If the register declares an ordering, remove one entry from it and confirm the partial sequence is refused."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Undeclared rendering as accepted is a nonconformity and the most consequential one available: it converts every unanswered question into a decision nobody made. A contradicted absence claim passing unreported is a nonconformity. A stale derivation answering zero rather than NOT ASKED is a nonconformity, because it reports an application as having decided nothing when it may have decided everything."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Identity, tenant and record destruction are engine-owned, and the retained-record concealment applies wherever any resource declares retain-and-impersonalize.","knownLimitations":"Establishes concealment across the paths exercised. It does NOT establish that no path exists which was not enumerated — and a path added later inherits nothing from this result, which is why the enumeration rather than the assertion is the load-bearing step.","passCriteria":"Destruction is deliberate, reversible within its window and executed on schedule; a retained record is invisible and immutable to every ordinary path with exactly one audited door; and derived copies are excluded immediately. Exclusion that depends on a sweep having run is a fail — between erasure and sweep the subject's text is still being served.","procedure":["Request destruction of an identity and of a tenant; confirm each is recorded as an attributable decision with its declared window.","Reverse each within the window and confirm the reversal works and is itself recorded.","Let a window elapse and confirm the destruction is carried out on schedule rather than on next access.","For an erased-but-retained record, attempt to read and to write it through EVERY ordinary path — direct read, list, search, export, relationship traversal — and confirm each is refused; then exercise the audited see-through read and confirm it succeeds and is recorded.","Confirm derived copies of that record are excluded by a LIVE check against the parent row: query a derived surface immediately after erasure, before any sweep could have run."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A retained record readable through an ordinary path is a nonconformity and a disclosure of data the subject asked to have erased. A derived copy served after erasure is the same finding by a quieter route. Destruction not carried out on schedule is a nonconformity against storage limitation."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:scope-confined-query","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:scope-confined-query"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Tenant and unit scoping are engine-owned; an application declaring no organizational units is still in scope for the tenant and parent-row halves.","knownLimitations":"Establishes confinement for the shapes exercised. A grant topology more complex than the one tested — overlapping subtrees, a principal holding grants in several units — may confine differently, and this act says nothing about the composition rule.","passCriteria":"Every read and write is confined to what the caller's own grant reaches; the subtree expansion is exact in both directions; the conferring grant is recorded beside the decision; and a platform-imposed narrowing cannot be lifted by the tenant it constrains.","procedure":["As a principal whose grant reaches one unit subtree, read and write across the boundary of that subtree in both directions, and confirm each is confined.","Confirm the subtree expands to EXACTLY its declared extent: place a row one level below the deepest granted node and one level above the granted node, and confirm the first is reachable and the second is not.","Read the authorization record for one of those decisions and confirm it names the conferring grant, not merely the outcome.","As a tenant administrator, attempt to lift a narrowing the platform imposed, and confirm it cannot be lifted from inside the tenant."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Reading across a scope boundary is a nonconformity and a disclosure. A subtree expanding beyond its declared extent is the same finding with a larger blast radius. A decision recorded without its conferring grant is a nonconformity against reviewability: an auditor cannot tell WHY access was allowed, only that it was."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:scope-confined-query"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with a platform tier. An application whose operators have never requested an application-wide elevation is squarely in scope — the refusal path is what is verified, and it is verified by trying, not by reading an empty table. Inspect the configured audit-read policy as part of the objective coverage: role-based application audit access does not satisfy the universal second-signature claim of WILDO.ACCESS.SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES@1. A passing directory-elevation test alone must not be reported as proving that universal claim. Record the unmet claim when that objective is required and the application intentionally uses role-based audit access.","knownLimitations":"It establishes that two DISTINCT accounts are required, never that two distinct PEOPLE are behind them. An operator holding a second account, or two operators who agree in advance, defeat it and are indistinguishable in the evidence. Account-provenance and collusion belong to the identity and monitoring controls; this one bounds what a single credential can reach.","passCriteria":"A self-approval never yields authority, a second administrator's approval does, and the authority ends on its own. The refused self-approval is the load-bearing step: a system that grants on the second signature but would ALSO have granted on the first passes every other step here and satisfies nothing.","procedure":["As one platform administrator, request an application-wide elevation with a stated justification, and confirm it is NOT usable on creation.","As the SAME administrator, attempt to approve it. Confirm the attempt is refused and that no authority follows.","Attempt a read that requires the elevation — the tenant-spanning directory, or the application audit door configured with auditTrail.applicationReadAccess=independent-approval — and confirm it is refused while the request is unsigned. The default role-based audit door is not a test of independent approval; verify its administrator and scope gates separately.","As a SECOND administrator, approve it. Confirm the same read now succeeds, and that the evidence names which elevation admitted it.","Wait past the stated window, or revoke, and confirm the read is refused again — and that the end left a record."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An admitted self-approval is a nonconformity of the highest weight — it is the control absent, not thin. A read admitted while the elevation is unsigned is the same weight, because the signature is then decorative. An elevation that outlives its window is a nonconformity: standing authority is what the second signature was buying against. A missing terminal record where the authority has genuinely ended is a nonconformity of evidence rather than of control."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:security-event-emission","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:security-event-emission"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application unconditionally. The audit trail is engine-owned, so no application opts out of the obligation and none has to build the lane first.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the emission path works for the actions exercised. It does NOT establish that every code path emitting that event type is covered, nor that the trail is complete over any historical period — coverage of the emitting call sites is a separate question, and one this act cannot answer.","passCriteria":"Every action performed produced its typed event, attributed to the acting principal and the tenant it acted in. A missing row, or a row attributed to the system where a user acted, is a fail.","procedure":["Perform one security-relevant action of each family the objective names — an authentication, an authorization change, a credential lifecycle change — against a running application.","Read the audit store back for the window in which those actions ran, filtering by the typed event members the evidence requirement names rather than by free text.","Confirm each action produced exactly one row of the expected type, and that the row carries actor and tenant attribution rather than a system placeholder."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A missing event for an action a control depends on is a nonconformity: the control may be operating and cannot be shown to. A row present but mis-attributed is also a nonconformity, because it defeats the reason the trail is read. A row present with a cosmetic field wrong is an observation."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:security-event-emission"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:self-describing-audit-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:self-describing-audit-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The trail and its capture configuration are engine-owned.","knownLimitations":"Establishes self-description for the actions exercised. It does NOT establish that the record's description of the effect is CORRECT — only that it is present and stable; an incorrectly computed effect is stable and wrong, and is outside this act.","passCriteria":"The authorization effect is reconstructable from the record alone, and stays correct after the role tables move. A record naming only the action, requiring the current tables to interpret, is a fail — the tables are exactly what will have changed by the time anybody reads it.","procedure":["Perform a privileged action that changes an authorization effect — a role grant, a scope widening.","Read the record and reconstruct WHAT THE EFFECT WAS from the record alone, without consulting the role tables.","Change the role tables afterwards and repeat the reconstruction, confirming the record still describes the effect it had at the time.","Read the configuration deciding what the trail captures, change it, and confirm that change is itself governed and evidenced within the trail."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A record needing the current role tables to interpret is a nonconformity: it is evidence whose meaning changes after the fact, which is the one property evidence must not have. Capture configuration outside the trail's own governance is a nonconformity, because it permits a silent narrowing of what is recorded."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:self-describing-audit-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:server-authored-token-claims","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:server-authored-token-claims"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application issuing an ID token — every application, since the framework's own identity provider does.","knownLimitations":"Establishes authorship for the claims in the named set. A claim that OUGHT to be reserved and is absent from the set is smuggled successfully and passes this act — the set's completeness is a separate question.","passCriteria":"Every reserved claim is server-authored regardless of what the caller supplied, and non-reserved extras still work. A build that drops all extras passes the smuggling test for the wrong reason and is a fail against this requirement, because it hides whether the reserved set is being consulted at all.","procedure":["Enumerate the reserved claim set from its single named source rather than from a hand-kept list.","Request a token supplying each reserved claim as a caller-provided extra, one at a time.","Decode the issued token and confirm every reserved claim carries the server's value, not the supplied one.","Confirm a NON-reserved extra is carried through, so the test distinguishes claim-set enforcement from extras being dropped wholesale."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A smuggled reserved claim is a nonconformity and, depending on the claim, an authentication bypass or an identity spoof. Extras dropped wholesale is an observation against functionality and a nonconformity against this requirement's verifiability."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:server-authored-token-claims"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:single-consent-emission-point","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:single-consent-emission-point"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Consent lives on engine-owned user preferences, so every application has the verbs this requirement enumerates.","knownLimitations":"Establishes single-emission for the verbs enumerated. It does NOT establish that a change is LAWFUL — whether the resulting consent is validly obtained is a data-protection judgement outside this act.","passCriteria":"Every verb routes through one emission point, each change yields exactly one record carrying both values, and the reset is among them. A record naming only the new value is a fail: 'consent is now {analytics}' does not say which purposes were granted or withdrawn, which is the whole question a regulator asks.","procedure":["Enumerate every verb able to change consent — the dedicated update, the generic resource update, and the privacy-preferences RESET.","Exercise each and confirm exactly one record results, naming the PREVIOUS and the RESULTING value.","Confirm the reset is recorded as a consent decision in its own right rather than as an unrelated preferences write.","Drive two changes concurrently and confirm neither record is lost."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A consent change with no record is a nonconformity and defeats the demonstrate-consent obligation directly. A record naming only the resulting value is a nonconformity for the same reason one step smaller. A change routed outside the single emission point is a nonconformity even when it happens to record, because it will drift."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:single-consent-emission-point"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:stage-confers-no-capability"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application declaring a self-reported lifecycle stage. An application with no such stage is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the stage confers nothing for the actions exercised. A future consumer reading the stage as authority inherits nothing from this result — the stage remains a value anyone can set, and only the reading sites make it safe.","passCriteria":"No action changes its outcome because of the stage, and the stage does not cross a scope boundary. The final step is required: without it, a broken action would pass this requirement by being broken.","procedure":["Set a principal's self-reported stage to the most privileged value the vocabulary offers.","Attempt every action that stage might plausibly be read as conferring, and confirm each is decided by an actual grant rather than by the stage.","Attempt to carry the stage across a scope boundary — set it in one tenant and read it in another — and confirm it does not cross.","Grant the corresponding authority properly and confirm the action then succeeds, so the test distinguishes 'stage confers nothing' from 'the action is unreachable'."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Any capability conferred by a self-reported stage is a nonconformity and a privilege escalation with no attacker skill required — the principal sets the field themselves. A stage crossing a scope boundary is a nonconformity even where nothing currently reads it."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:stage-confers-no-capability"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:subject-data-export","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:subject-data-export"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The export surface is engine-owned; what varies is which resources opt in, and an application with NO opted-in resource is in scope for the isolation and audit halves.","knownLimitations":"Establishes isolation for the subjects exercised. It does NOT establish completeness — whether every resource holding the subject's data has opted in is a coverage question this act cannot answer, since the population it would measure against is the opt-in list itself.","passCriteria":"The bundle is subject-isolated and resource-opted-in; withheld derived fields are named; and the event carries all five facts. Silently omitting a derived field is a fail: the subject cannot tell an absent field from data the controller does not hold, which is precisely what an access request asks.","procedure":["Run an export for a subject and confirm the bundle contains rows only for that subject — inspect the rows rather than the count, since a correct count can accompany a wrong row.","Confirm resources that have NOT opted in are absent from the bundle.","Confirm derived fields are withheld, and that the export event NAMES them as withheld rather than silently omitting them.","Read the export event and confirm it names the purpose, the subject, the resource types included and the record count.","Run an export against a subject the requester is not authorized for and confirm it is refused."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Another subject's rows in a bundle is a nonconformity and a personal-data breach. A non-opted-in resource appearing is a nonconformity: the opt-in is what bounds the disclosure. An unnamed withheld field is an observation against completeness of the answer and a nonconformity where the omission would mislead."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:subject-data-export"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:subject-erasure","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:subject-erasure"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Erasure intake and execution are engine-owned and reachable regardless of what the application declares.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the request lifecycle. It does NOT establish that erasure reached every copy of the subject's data; what the erasure reached, accounted per dependent relationship and external effect, is the erasure-propagation objective's question, and the concealment of retained and derived copies the secure-lifecycle objective's.","passCriteria":"Both intake routes are recorded and distinguishable; a pending request can be withdrawn by the subject; execution follows the declared schedule; and sessions are terminated. Erasure that completes while a pre-existing session keeps working is a fail — the person is erased and still signed in.","procedure":["Raise an erasure request as the SUBJECT, and separately as the CONTROLLER, and confirm each is recorded on intake with its origin distinguished.","Withdraw a pending request as the subject and confirm the withdrawal is honoured and recorded.","Let a request reach its declared schedule and confirm execution happens on that schedule.","After execution, attempt to use a session established before it and confirm the erased person's sessions are terminated."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A request not recorded on intake is a nonconformity: the response clock starts at intake and cannot be evidenced without it. A withdrawal not honoured is a nonconformity against the subject's own control. Sessions surviving erasure is a nonconformity and a live access path for a person whose data is gone."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:subject-erasure"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:system-gated-credit-grant"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with a credit or balance concept. An application with no such balance is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the gate for the paths enumerated. It does NOT establish that the credited AMOUNT is correct; a correctly-gated grant of the wrong value passes this act and is a billing-integrity question elsewhere.","passCriteria":"No ordinary principal can increase a balance through any enumerated path, and a payment-derived increase requires a verified payment authority. An unsigned or replayed callback that credits an account is a fail — it is the door an attacker reaches without touching the application's own authorization at all.","procedure":["Enumerate every path that can INCREASE a credit balance, including indirect ones: a direct grant, a refund, a promotional application, a plan change, and any payment-provider callback.","As an ordinary principal, attempt each and confirm refusal at the reachability gate.","Confirm the payment-gated paths verify the payment authority rather than trusting a caller-supplied assertion of it — replay a callback body without its authenticating signature.","As a system or payment authority, confirm the legitimate paths succeed."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A self-grantable credit is a nonconformity and a direct financial defect. An unverified payment callback that credits is a nonconformity of higher weight, because it is exploitable without any account in the application."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:system-gated-credit-grant"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:third-party-ai-component-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","AUTOMATED_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with an AI capability enabled in the contracted service; one enabling none is in scope only to confirm that none is enabled.","knownLimitations":"Establishes what is declared and where the exercised feature sends data. It does not establish that the declared posture matches what the model's output is used for; that needs a review of the feature itself.","passCriteria":"Every enabled contracted-service AI capability has a posture, every decision-bearing posture names its review arrangement, and every vendor-hosted AI provider is on the register. Any AI capability or AI vendor the declarations do not name is a fail.","procedure":["Read the enabled engine capabilities and intersect them with the AI capabilities of the contracted service.","For each, read the declared use posture, and confirm a use that decides or assists a decision about a person states how a human reviews it.","For each runtime provider selected for those capabilities, confirm it is operator-run or named on the processor register.","Exercise one AI feature and confirm the traffic reaches only the providers the register names."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An undeclared AI capability or an unregistered AI vendor is a nonconformity: the application's notice then omits an AI use or a recipient. A posture that understates what the feature decides is the same finding and the harder one to see."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:time-boxed-restriction-release"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that imposes a time-boxed restriction — a lockout, a suspension, a temporary membership hold. The framework imposes several of its own, so an application declaring none is still in scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes release for the restriction kinds exercised, at the windows tested. It does NOT establish behaviour where the release job itself is not running — a paused scheduler holds every restriction indefinitely, and detecting that is the operations objective's question.","passCriteria":"Every time-boxed restriction lifts automatically at its window, through the guarded authority, with a record. A restriction that lifts only when an operator notices is a fail: a measure taken as temporary has then become permanent by default, which is the exact failure the objective names.","procedure":["Impose each kind of time-boxed restriction the application supports, recording its declared window.","Before the window elapses, confirm the restriction holds.","After it elapses, confirm the restriction is lifted WITHOUT any operator action.","Confirm the release ran through the same guarded authority that imposed it, and is evidenced — read the audit store for both the imposition and the release."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A time-boxed restriction that does not lift is a nonconformity: it is an access denial nobody decided. A release bypassing the guarded authority is a nonconformity even when correct, because it is a second writer to a field the authority objective says has exactly one."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:time-boxed-restriction-release"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:values-free-secret-contract","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:values-free-secret-contract"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with a provider requiring secrets — every application, since transactional email and at least one provider integration are configured by default.","knownLimitations":"Establishes shape tracking and value-freedom for the providers exercised. It does NOT establish that the secrets themselves are correct or current — a well-shaped contract of expired credentials passes this act, and fails at the provider.","passCriteria":"Drift in the contract's shape is detected, and no secret value is persisted anywhere in the mechanism. A tracker that notices a value rotation is a fail, and a disclosure: it can only know because it retained the value.","procedure":["Read the tracked contract for a provider's secrets and confirm it records the SHAPE — the key names and their requiredness — and no values.","Change the provider's required key set and confirm the drift is detected and reported.","Inspect the tracked artifact and any log or record it produces, and confirm no secret value appears in any of them.","Confirm a value CHANGE, with the shape unchanged, produces no drift — the contract tracks shape, and a shape tracker that reacts to a rotation is reading values it should not hold."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A persisted secret value is a nonconformity and a disclosure, wherever it sits. Undetected contract drift is a nonconformity of lower weight: it surfaces later as a runtime failure rather than as an exposure."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:values-free-secret-contract"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:verifiable-client-identity","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:verifiable-client-identity"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application accepting client registration. An application registering no clients is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the binding at registration. It does NOT establish that control persists: a domain can change hands after registration, and nothing here re-verifies it.","passCriteria":"A client identity is bound only to a domain demonstrably controlled; every refused assertion is recorded; and an unauthenticated registration is recorded as unauthenticated. An unauthenticated registration recorded as ordinary is a fail — it is indistinguishable afterwards from one somebody vouched for.","procedure":["Register a client asserting a domain it does control, completing whatever demonstration the application requires, and confirm the binding is accepted.","Register one asserting a domain it does NOT control and confirm the assertion is refused.","Read the audit store and confirm the REFUSAL is recorded — a refused assertion is the event a reviewer most wants and the one most often dropped.","Register a client as a party that authenticated to nothing, and confirm the resulting identity is recorded as such rather than as an ordinary registration."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A client identity bound to an unproven domain is a nonconformity and an impersonation primitive. An unrecorded refusal is a nonconformity against detection — repeated refused assertions are the signal of an attempt in progress. An unauthenticated registration indistinguishable from a vouched one is a nonconformity against provenance."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:verifiable-client-identity"}]}]}
1
+ 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Four members, two pairs, deliberately not merged — a teardown request and a suspension have the same blast radius and entirely different remedies.","obligation":"And RESTORING access is as attributable as removing it.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["organization_deletion_requested","organization_restored","organization_suspended","organization_activated"]}],"limits":"C3's credential reconciliation is a NO-OP for an application that maps no organization membership onto user types — it returns early — so a clean result there can mean the control ran and found nothing to do, or that the application has no such mapping at all. Establish which before reading it as evidence.\n\nC1, C2 and C4 attest the window; C3 attests the build driven. None of it evidences that a withdrawal was APPROPRIATE — only that it happened, was attributed, and took effect. And the credential reconciliation covers credentials the ENGINE knows it granted; anything an application minted outside that path is outside this evidence.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C4: the five tenant-lifecycle members over the window, PAIRED — each withdrawal read beside its restoration. C2: the committed non-conferring status set and the consumer that reads it. C3: a driven teardown followed by an attempted use of a credential the torn-down scope granted.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A withdrawal with no row is a MAJOR. A RESTORATION with no row is equally a MAJOR and is the one most likely to be argued down as harmless: it destroys nothing, and that is exactly why the record is the only trace it leaves. A live credential against a torn-down scope is a MAJOR. A scope in a non-conferring status still granting authority is a MAJOR and is a tenancy defect as well.","verificationSteps":["Query the withdrawal and restoration members over the window and pair them by scope — an unpaired restoration is the finding this demand exists for.","Assert the non-conferring status set is a named closed vocabulary, and that its consumer treats an unresolvable scope as non-conferring.","Suspend a scope and assert its members lose authority immediately, before any data is destroyed.","Tear a tenant down and attempt to use a credential it granted; assert refusal rather than a marked-but-live credential.","Do NOT expect a membership-removal row from a user deletion — no relationship exists, so its absence is correct rather than a gap."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:access-withdrawal-and-restoration-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:administrative-continuity-breach-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:administrative-continuity-breach-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application, at BOTH scopes — the application itself and each tenant. The two are separate floors with separate acknowledgements on purpose: an erasure that may lawfully strand one tenant is not thereby licensed to leave the whole application unadministrable.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The refusal is the artifact and it only exists when the last administrator is the subject. A healthy application evidences nothing: every scope having an administrator is equally consistent with a floor that holds and with one nobody has tested. The enumeration matters as much as the drive — EVERY door onto that status must enforce the same floor, and a door added later will not announce itself.\n\n**The user-deactivation door REPORTS and proceeds, deliberately, and this clause said \"every door… REFUSED\" until 2026-09-10.** The site states the asymmetry as the decision rather than an oversight: suspending a user account is overwhelmingly incident response, and refusing it would mean an operator cannot lock out a hostile owner without first performing an ownership transfer using the tenant the attacker controls. A stranded tenant is recoverable through the repair door; a live compromised owner is not. So driving that door and getting a 200 plus a CRITICAL breach row is the control WORKING, and reporting it as a MAJOR — which this body did — inverts a deliberate safety trade.","obligation":"A removal or demotion that would strand a scope is REFUSED, at every door onto the status that decides administrative usability — except USER DEACTIVATION, which reports and proceeds.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Textbook write skew: each transaction measures a count, then writes, and under snapshot isolation each sees the other still present. No amount of re-checking closes it and no row shows it — the outcome is a scope with zero administrators and two perfectly ordinary success responses. The evidence is that the two transactions COLLIDE, which requires giving them something to collide on and then driving them concurrently.\n\n**Only the TENANT floor does that.** It bumps a serialization token on the tenant's own row BEFORE measuring, precisely to create the collision. The application floor is a bare count-then-act with no token and no mention of concurrency anywhere in its source. This clause asserted both scopes until 2026-09-10, so a judge driving two concurrent super-admin reductions would see both succeed — the exact write skew described — with no way to tell whether that is a nonconformity or an unstated scope narrowing. It is a FRAMEWORK gap: report it there, not against the application.","obligation":"Concurrent reductions are SERIALIZED at TENANT scope, so two of them cannot pass each other. No such serialization exists at APPLICATION scope.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the rows came from an ACKNOWLEDGED erasure rather than from the deactivation or startup reports that write the same two classes, or that no erasure stranded a scope without an acknowledgement"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Here the record IS the control, not decoration: the acknowledgement's entire justification is that the consequence becomes VISIBLE rather than prevented. Two members, one per scope, deliberately not merged. And the acknowledgement must not silence the evaluation — an acknowledged erasure that strands nobody must stay quiet, or the alert stops meaning anything.\n\n**These two members have THREE producers, not one, and this clause read them as the erasure acknowledgement's record alone.** They are also written by the user-deactivation report (C1's exception) and by the BOOT report (C4) — the latter stamping a detected-by discriminator specifically so a reader can tell them apart. A collector querying the member over a window and reading every row as an acknowledged erasure misattributes containment actions and startup findings to a data-protection request. Filter on the discriminator.","obligation":"A data-protection erasure proceeds only on an explicit per-request acknowledgement, and the breach it causes is recorded.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["application_super_admin_floor_breached","organization_owner_floor_breached"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the rows were written by the startup report rather than by an erasure or a deactivation, or that every scope already stranded at boot was reported"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The boot report observes states no write guard ever saw — a direct datastore edit, a restore from a mid-erasure backup, a seed that authored no administrator, a role-table reconfiguration. It is non-fatal always, and that is deliberate: a fresh deployment legitimately has none of the population, and a diagnostic must never be why startup fails.\n\nIt is EMITTED rather than a log: the report writes the same two breach members at both scopes, carrying a detected-by discriminator that separates them from C3's rows. This clause called it a driven observation until 2026-09-10 and told a collector to read \"the startup report\", which denied it a queryable row class it actually has.\n\nThe single-administrator WARNING is a different matter and exists at TENANT scope only — see the steps.","obligation":"Any scope that has ALREADY been stranded is reported at startup, durably.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["application_super_admin_floor_breached","organization_owner_floor_breached"]},{"clauseRef":"C5","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the rows are repair-door grants rather than the ordinary membership edits that write the same class, or that each grant was additive and carried its justification"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The industry pattern has two halves and shipping only the refusal turns every mistake into a permanent lockout. The tenant half exists — an operator-tier grant that PROMOTES an existing member, writes one field additively, and requires a justification, recorded on the membership role-change row the grant emits once it commits. The generic operation row carries no request payload, so the justification is evidenced ONLY on the role-change row. Until issue #593 was fixed it was validated and then discarded, so rows written before that fix legitimately carry none. The application half does NOT and cannot: there is no scope above the application, which is why its acknowledgement names an out-of-band restore as the only remedy.\n\nThe member and its discriminator are declared because the minimum evidence already named the rows exactly — the membership role-change rows whose operation is the ownership grant — and until 2026-09-16 the clause named no member at all, so a collector had nothing to count and the judge recorded it NOT RUN against a door that works. The discriminator is what keeps the reading honest: every `create` and `update` also writes this row, and counting those would report a repair door being used every time anyone edited a membership.","obligation":"And a stranded TENANT has a higher-tier repair door, additive and audited.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventDataMatch":{"field":"operation","values":["grantOwnership"]},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["organization_member_role_changed"]}],"limits":"C1 and C2 attest the build driven; C2 in particular needs a datastore that really serializes, and an environment that mocks transactions can evidence the collision POINT but not the abort. C4's report is a snapshot at boot and says nothing about the interval since. And none of it evidences that a remaining administrator is REACHABLE — an account that exists, is active, and belongs to someone who has left satisfies every clause here.","minimumEvidence":"C1: an enumeration of every door onto the deciding status, plus a driven last-administrator removal at each scope, refused with a conflict rather than a forbidden. C2: two concurrent reductions driven against one scope, one aborting. C3: the two breach members over the window, each carrying the scope stranded and the action that caused it. C4: boot-detected breach rows at both scopes, plus the single-administrator count where the scope reports one — tenant only. C5: repair-door rows — the membership role-change rows whose operation is the ownership grant, each carrying the operator's justification beside the before and after role sets. A grant against a member who already owned the scope changes no authority and leaves no role-change row, only the generic operation row.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A door onto the deciding status that does not consult the floor is a MAJOR whether or not it has been used. A scope at zero administrators is a MAJOR and is simultaneously an access-control failure and an availability failure for that scope. A refusal answered as FORBIDDEN rather than CONFLICT is an OBSERVATION with real cost: the caller was authorized, and a wrong code sends an integrator to fix permissions. Scopes at exactly ONE administrator are an OBSERVATION, never a nonconformity — nothing is broken yet, and they are precisely the population the floor will REFUSE to help. A repair-door role-change row with NO justification, written after the framework recorded it (#593), is a MAJOR: the request requires one, so its absence means a caller reached the door without the request contract, and the justification is the whole control on an action no downstream check can second-guess. The same absence on a row written before that fix is an OBSERVATION against the framework version, not against the operator.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every door that writes the status deciding administrative usability, and assert each consults the floor.","Remove the last administrator at tenant scope and assert refusal with a CONFLICT — the caller IS authorized and the payload IS valid; it is the STATE that forbids the write.","Repeat at application scope and assert the distinct, scope-specific code.","Drive two concurrent reductions and assert one aborts rather than both succeeding.","Drive an acknowledged erasure that strands a scope and assert the breach row exists; drive one that strands nobody and assert SILENCE.","Query the two breach members filtered to the BOOT detected-by discriminator, at both scopes, and record the scopes at zero administrators.","Record the count of scopes at exactly ONE administrator where it is available — TENANT scope only. The application floor measures its population but logs nothing unless the floor is already breached, so an absent single-administrator count there is a framework gap rather than a clean result.","Assert the repair door promotes an EXISTING member, writes only the role, and refuses a member the floor would not count."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:administrative-continuity-breach-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:auditable-event-actor-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:auditable-event-actor-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The sentinel vocabulary and every marked emitter are engine-owned; the read-through and agent clauses have an empty population where no external binding or agent exists.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The clause is about a VOCABULARY, and that is what makes it declarative. Three sentinels are semantically distinct: the system acting with no human principal by design, a machine principal acting legitimately, and a principal that was EXPECTED and could not be resolved. Only the third is an anomaly. Collapsing them onto one value is what hid a batch-purged tenant recorded as deleted by an unknown actor — the one case worth investigating, buried inside the two that are not.","obligation":"A security-relevant action records who performed it, and never disguises an UNATTRIBUTABLE action as an ordinary automated one.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"An enumeration: the mapping from execution type to sentinel belongs in one place, so the evidence is that every emitter reaches the shared resolver. A hand-chosen sentinel that happens to be right today is indistinguishable in the row from a resolved one, and drifts silently.","obligation":"The sentinel a row carries is RESOLVED from the execution context, not chosen by hand at each emitter.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the REAL initiating user rather than the shared service principal that made the call"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class, and the clause exists because a service-principal binding authenticates every remote call as one account — so without this field attribution dies at the boundary.\n\n**The three members do NOT share an emission unit, and this rationale asserted one for all of them until 2026-09-10.** Only the read-through member is one row per read-family OPERATION execution, so that a paginated list and the count totalling its envelope are ONE access. The provider-call member is one row per outbound call, on success and failure; the agent-tool member is one row per tool call, and its declaration insists it is a sibling of the provider member rather than a case of it. Asserting the operation unit across all three reports a MAJOR against two working emitters.","obligation":"Read-through access to an external system carries the REAL initiating user through the shared service principal.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["http_api_read_through_access","provider_operation_call","mcp_tool_call"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each deletion names the subject it served and the system it reached, or that a non-erasure was acknowledged per resource per request rather than once as a posture"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Two members, and the second is the one that would be dropped. A hole in erasure that is acknowledged ONCE as a configuration becomes invisible; recorded per resource per request, it stays countable, and a reviewer can see how often the application chose to accept it.","obligation":"An outbound DELETION on that plane names the subject it served and the system it reached, and an acknowledged non-erasure is recorded per resource per request rather than as a standing posture.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["http_api_external_erasure","http_api_non_erasure_acknowledged"]}],"limits":"C2's enumeration attests the emitter set as enumerated. C3 and C4 attest the window, and they evidence attribution of the calls that were MADE — a call made outside the read-through plane leaves no row here. And a resolved actor is not a verified one: the row records who the execution context said was acting, which is a different claim from who was at the keyboard.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the sentinel vocabulary as a named closed set. C2: an enumeration of the emitters, each resolving the sentinel through the shared resolver. C3 and C4: the five outbound members over the window, with the initiating-user field present wherever the execution had a human principal. Absence of that field means a runtime acted, which is a value rather than a gap.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A row carrying the anomaly sentinel is a MAJOR and is exactly what the vocabulary exists to surface: a privileged action happened and the trail cannot say who. A read-through row missing the real initiating user where the execution had one is a MAJOR — attribution died at the service principal, which is the failure the field exists for. An outbound deletion with no row is a MAJOR. An acknowledged non-erasure recorded as a standing posture rather than per request is a MAJOR: it is the same fact made uncountable.","verificationSteps":["Assert the sentinel set is a named closed vocabulary and that the anomaly value is distinct from the two ordinary ones.","Query the window for rows carrying the anomaly sentinel — this is the alerting query, and a nonzero count is the finding.","Enumerate the emitters that TAKE AN ACTOR — a small minority of the service's log methods — and assert each resolves it through the shared resolver rather than choosing a literal. Enumerating all emitters is the wrong population: most carry no actor field and cannot satisfy the step, so the count would be a statement about the service's size rather than about the invariant.","Sample read-through rows and assert the real initiating user is present for executions that had one, and absent for machine and internal ones.","Assert the emission unit PER MEMBER: one row per read-family operation execution for read-through access (a list and its count are one access), one row per outbound call for provider calls, one per tool call for agent calls. A single unit asserted across all three is a MAJOR against two working emitters.","Query the acknowledged-non-erasure member GROUPED BY resource, and read the count as the size of the accepted hole."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:auditable-event-actor-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:authentication-eligibility-change-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:authentication-eligibility-change-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The status field, its exclusion from ordinary updates and the system door are all engine-owned, so no application authors the mechanism and none can opt out of it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second writer, so the enumeration is the artifact. A changed status looks identical whichever path changed it, and — this is the sharp part — a status write from the WRONG path does not fail either: the field is excluded from ordinary updates, so a handler writing it directly is stripped by the repository's strict re-parse and the operation reports success having persisted nothing. That failure mode has already cost this repository four sibling activations.","obligation":"A change to whether a principal may authenticate runs through ONE guarded authority.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A decorator on the committed schema, and the whole of the clause. Nothing observable distinguishes a system in which the exclusion holds from one in which no unrelated write has yet been attempted.","obligation":"The field carrying it is excluded from ordinary updates, so the change cannot arrive as a side effect of an unrelated write.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the state the eligibility moved FROM and the state it moved TO"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"TWO row classes, and the second is the one that carries the answer. The governed lifecycle verbs emit a purpose-built transition row carrying subject, from-status, to-status, an optional reason and an optional reactivation deadline — exactly what \"the state it moved from and to\" asks for. It is ONE member rather than five near-identical ones because the five verbs share a data shape and the resource plus operation identifier discriminate which ran.\n\nThe generic resource-operation row is demanded ALONGSIDE it and is strictly weaker here, because it is gated on an automatic risk floor of HIGH-or-CRITICAL: the USERS update is MEDIUM and declares no below-floor opt-in, so the four system-door writers this clause is about emit no generic row at all. Demanding only the generic row — which this clause did until 2026-09-10 — points a collector at an empty result and, under this body's own severity line, raises a MAJOR against the exact population C1 exists to protect.","obligation":"And each such change is evidenced, with the state it moved from and to.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_status_transition_performed","resource_operation_performed"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"UNPRODUCED","homeRationale":"Carried in the tree as an explicit unimplemented-control marker rather than as an omission. Note the mechanism precisely, because an earlier revision of this rationale said the merge verb is \"routed and unimplemented\" and it is neither: the operations enum contains no merge member and the transposition policy that would have carried it was REMOVED, so the comment is a re-declaration CHECKLIST for whoever reinstates it. A judge sent looking for a routed verb answering 501 finds no route at all. Seven conditions are enumerated at the declaration — among them an event naming the TWO identities being consolidated, which no generic before-and-after row can express, and the erasure interaction, where a merged-away identity subject to retention must not resurrect scrubbed personal data through the surviving row. Recording it UNPRODUCED keeps a known framework gap from being raised as an application nonconformity.","obligation":"Consolidating two identities is authorized, attributable, and non-destructive to the audit trail.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"C1 attests the writer set as ENUMERATED; one added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated, and the added writer will not fail loudly. C3 evidences the window it covers. And none of it evidences that a given change was APPROPRIATE — only that it was made through the one authority and left a record.","minimumEvidence":"C1: an enumeration of every writer of the authentication-eligibility status, each resolving to the guarded system door. C2: the committed field declaration. C3: generic resource-operation rows over the window carrying that field's before and after values. C4: nothing.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A second writer that reaches the field through the system door without the guard is a MAJOR. A writer that reaches it through an ordinary update is a MAJOR of a different kind and the more dangerous one: the account never changes state, with no error and no signal, so the symptom surfaces hops away as something else entirely. An eligibility change with no corresponding row is a MAJOR. C4 carries no severity.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every writer of the status field and assert each reaches the system door rather than an ordinary update.","Assert the field is excluded from ordinary updates in the committed schema, and marked as audit evidence.","Drive an eligibility change through the guarded verb and assert the row changed AND a resource-operation row carries the before and after values.","Drive one through an ordinary update and assert nothing changed — a success response with an unchanged row is the signature this clause exists to make visible.","Query the window for resource-operation rows on that field and assert every eligibility change in the window has one."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:authentication-eligibility-change-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:authentication-posture-change-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:authentication-posture-change-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application for the application-wide posture, and to every tenant that configures single sign-on for the per-tenant half. A tenant with no single-sign-on configuration has an empty population there.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The authored per-user-type configuration IS the posture. Nothing observed at runtime distinguishes a deliberate permissive posture from an unconsidered default, which is why the clause asks for the declaration rather than for behaviour.","obligation":"How principals may authenticate is EXPLICITLY configured — the multi-factor, password, lockout, methods, step-up and session posture.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Four separate declarations that a reader is tempted to treat as one: the live switch, the default provider, the endpoints, and the signature and replay validation posture. The last is the one that matters most and is easiest to leave permissive — a trusted provider whose assertions are not verified is not an identity provider, it is an open door with a name on it. A verified DOMAIN is upstream of all four: it decides which provider authenticates every principal at that domain.","obligation":"Which identity provider is trusted, whether single sign-on is ENFORCED, and whether that provider's assertions are actually VERIFIED are declared per tenant.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"a genuine change was evidenced ONCE rather than on every startup, which is a claim about duplicate rows that counting cannot separate from real ones"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class, and the detector's shape is the clause: the trail is its OWN change-detection state, so a first boot emits a baseline row, a moved digest emits a before-and-after naming the changed user types, and an identical digest emits NOTHING. One row per genuine change rather than one per boot is what keeps the trail readable — and it is why an empty result in a window means the posture did not move, rather than that nothing watched it.","obligation":"Every GENUINE change to that posture is detected at startup and evidenced once, from the runtime that puts it into effect.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["application_auth_policy_changed"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The clause an implementer drops, because a bypass is granted to keep an administrator from locking themselves out — a helpful act, and therefore one nobody thinks to record. Its whole point is that it defeats the enforcement the tenant declared, so a posture reviewed without it is a posture read as stricter than it is.\n\nThe member records a USE, not a GRANT, and the distinction decides what to look for: granting is a configuration write that adds an address to the break-glass set — evidenced by the generic row, since that block carries the audit-evidence marker — while USE is this row. A step demanding evidence of each GRANTED bypass, which this body had until 2026-09-10, reports a finding for every break-glass account correctly kept standing and never used, which is the recommended posture.","obligation":"An authenticated BYPASS of a tenant's own authentication requirement is evidenced each time it is USED.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["emergency_access_used"]},{"clauseRef":"C5","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each mint was authorized, bounded in time and names both the acting human and the identity acted as"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Three durable rows: the mint, the exchange, and the cancellation of an un-exchanged token. Each of the intent's three demands is a field on them — AUTHORIZED by the super-admin role gate, TIME-BOXED by a duration capped against the framework-wide one-off ceiling, and ATTRIBUTABLE because the mint row carries the caller AND the target rather than only the identity being acted as.\n\n**This clause said UNPRODUCED until 2026-09-10, and that was the most expensive shape a body can take.** It read a `TODO(assurance-control)` marker on one routed-and-unimplemented `users` verb and generalised it to \"no impersonation mechanism exists\" — while `createOneOffToken` was live, gated, capped and emitting all three rows. UNPRODUCED carries no severity, so the body excused every application from evidencing the single most sensitive access in the system. The catalog's own words are the correction: those markers are open gaps **at some of their sites**, never a statement about the objective.","obligation":"And privileged access under ANOTHER identity is authorized, time-boxed, and attributable to the human actor.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["one_off_token_created","one_off_token_exchanged","one_off_token_revoked"]},{"clauseRef":"C6","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The affordance is opt-in and off by default: the mint refuses unless the target user type declares it, and the requested duration is bounded by both a declared per-type maximum and a framework ceiling. An application that declares neither has no impersonation — which is a complete answer to C5 rather than an empty one, and the reason C5's population can legitimately be zero.","obligation":"And whether impersonation is available at all, and for how long, is a declared decision per user type.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"C3 detects change in the AUTHORED per-APPLICATION snapshot, and its own declaration says it does not enumerate per-tenant overrides — so C2's subject matter is evidenced by a different member entirely, which the steps now name. A posture altered by a mechanism outside both is invisible to each. The detector is fire-and-forget by design — a backend must boot whether or not it could record this — so a boot whose emission failed leaves a gap that looks exactly like an unchanged posture, and only the backend's own error log distinguishes them. And C1 and C2 evidence what was declared, never that the declared posture is adequate for the risk.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the authored per-user-type authentication configuration. C2: per tenant, the enforcement switch, the trusted provider, the endpoints, the signature and replay validation posture, and the domain verification behind them. C3: the policy-change rows over the window, read as one per change. C4: rows evidencing each granted bypass. C5: the three one-off-token rows over the window, read as a chain — a mint with no exchange and no revocation is an authorization that was granted and never used, which is a different fact from one that was exercised. C6: the per-user-type impersonation declaration and its duration bound.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An impersonation mint that names only the target and not the calling administrator is a MAJOR — the row then records an action as though the impersonated user performed it, which is worse than no row. An unbounded or ceiling-exceeding duration is a MAJOR. A mint with no exchange is NOT a finding: an authorization granted and not used is a normal outcome, and reporting it would train a reviewer to skim the chain that matters. A trusted identity provider whose assertion verification is off is a MAJOR and the most consequential finding this demand can produce. A posture change with no row is a MAJOR — the pre-incident weakening of an authentication requirement is precisely what the detector exists to catch. An unverified domain routing principals to a provider is a MAJOR. Several rows for one change is an OBSERVATION about noise, not a control failure. C5 carries no severity.","verificationSteps":["Read the authored authentication configuration per user type and record the posture rather than judging it — a permissive declared posture is a decision, and severity follows what it exposes.","Per tenant, assert the four single-sign-on declarations, and specifically that assertion verification is ON where a provider is trusted.","For a per-tenant posture CHANGE, query the GENERIC resource-operation row rather than the policy-change member. That member covers the per-application authored baseline and its own declaration says it does NOT enumerate per-tenant overrides — while the tenant's enforcement, emergency-access and provider-restriction fields all carry the audit-evidence marker, so their before-and-after values ride the generic row. A tenant turning single sign-on off and a collector querying only the policy member is an empty result over a change that WAS recorded.","Assert each configured domain was VERIFIED, since the domain is what routes principals to that provider.","Query the policy-change member over the window and reconcile the number of rows against the number of genuine changes — one per change, and none for an unchanged boot.","Assert the first-ever row is a baseline with no prior value, rather than treating its absence as a gap.","Enumerate the declared break-glass set from configuration, then query the emergency-access member for USES over the window. An account in the set with no use is NOT a finding — a standing, unused break-glass account is the recommended posture — while a use with no row is.","Read the per-user-type impersonation declaration. Absent, C5's population is legitimately empty and no finding follows from it.","Where it is declared, chain the one-off rows: assert each mint names BOTH the calling super-admin and the target, and resolve each mint to an exchange or a revocation.","Assert each mint's duration is within the declared per-type maximum AND the framework ceiling — a duration honouring only the first is the bound that silently widens."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:authentication-posture-change-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:authorization-decision-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the authorization funnel is engine-owned and every operation passes through it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each refusal names the principal it refused and the operation it refused them"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A per-occurrence row in the engine's audit trail. REFUSALS are the half that matters — a demand satisfied only by grants would evidence the opposite of the control.","obligation":"Access-control decisions, refusals included, are attributable and reviewable.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"recording every refusal stays bounded; a HIGH count is the availability risk this clause names, so the number cannot be read as the clause being met"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Same rows, read as a RATE rather than as instances. The clause carries its own tension — a control that records every refusal can be driven to exhaust storage — so evidence must show both that repetition is visible and that recording is bounded.","obligation":"Repeated refusals stay detectable without the record itself becoming an availability risk.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"Host-retained telemetry: a structured error log naming the lost action, plus two counters. NO audit member exists and that is a DECISION rather than a gap — recording \"the audit store was unreachable\" IN the audit store is circular, and the seam that emits these argues exactly that.\n\n**This clause said UNPRODUCED until 2026-09-10, which retired an implemented control from examination.** The marked site for this objective states the obligation in the implementer's own words — audit-pipeline failures are detectable AND attributable to the specific action they lost — and the log line carries the resource type, the resource id, the operation identifier, the variant key, the actor and the ambient correlation id. The body reasoned correctly that no member exists and then drew the wrong conclusion from it. UNPRODUCED carries no severity, so an application that had lost the control entirely — no error-level logger binding, no metrics service — would never have been asked.","obligation":"A failure of the recording pipeline is detectable and attributable to the specific action it lost.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences DECISIONS, never their correctness — a wrongly granted access is recorded exactly like a right one. And C1's rows come from the funnel: an authorization decision taken outside it is invisible here, which is why the funnel being the sole denial chokepoint is a separate and load-bearing property.","minimumEvidence":"C1: denial rows for the window, each attributable to a principal and an operation. C2: the same rows aggregated by principal and by operation, plus evidence that recording is bounded rather than unbounded. C3: the host's log and metric archive for the window — the rate-limited error line \"A security audit observation was DROPPED before it reached the audit pipeline\" (slug `audit_observation_dropped`), whose context carries the lost action's identity, and the two counters `audit_observation_dropped_total` (the observer never reached the pipeline) and `audit_store_failure_total` (the pipeline reached the store and the store refused). Both counters are needed because they cover DIFFERENT loss shapes and neither sees the other's. The boot diagnostic for an absent delivery path and the dead-letter drain may also be gathered, but they evidence the PIPELINE's health rather than the attribution this clause demands, and must not be substituted for it.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Denials absent while grants are present is a MAJOR — it is the exact shape of a funnel recording only successes, and establishing it requires gathering the GRANT side too, which is why the minimum evidence names both rather than denials alone. Without the comparison this rule cannot fire. Unbounded recording is a MAJOR against availability, which the intent names explicitly. For C3, a drop line naming lost authorization decisions is a MAJOR — access decisions were taken and are not in the trail, and the period's denial evidence is incomplete by an unknown amount. A metric channel that is inert because the OTLP preload is not wired is an OBSERVATION against the evidence rather than a finding against the application: the log channel still carries the signal, which is why the control has two.","verificationSteps":["Gather denial rows for the window and assert each carries a principal and an operation.","Read the DEDUPLICATION ladder as the bounding mechanism C2 asks about — it is what keeps the record from becoming an availability risk — and note it FAILS OPEN: when the counter store is unreachable, emission becomes unbounded exactly when availability is most at risk. That is the clause's own tension and the evidence must state which mode was in effect.","Aggregate by principal and by operation using the row's OWN occurrence count and its exactness flag — never by counting rows. Refusals are deduplicated on a logarithmic ladder inside a five-minute window, so a burst of ten thousand identical denials costs about five rows; counting rows reads five and concludes repetition was not occurring, which inverts the clause.","Confirm recording is bounded — the clause names availability as a risk of the control itself.","For C3, read the host's log archive for the drop line and its context, and the metric archive for both counters. A window with NO drop line and NO counter increment is the control working, not an absent control — so establish first that the loss seam could have fired: the line is rate-limited to one per (observation, reason) per interval, and the metric channel is silently inert when the OTLP preload is not wired, which is a finding about the evidence rather than about the application."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:billing-reconciliation-run-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.PROVIDER_RECONCILIATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:billing-reconciliation-run-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to an application with billing enabled on its backend, which is what registers the scheduled sweep. An application without billing holds no provider state to reconcile.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The run output is the only record: a repair is a billing update below the automatic audit floor and files no audit row, and the per-row finding lines go to the application log. The output is total over the divergence vocabulary, so a kind with zero occurrences is recorded as zero rather than absent.\n\nRun output lives in job-execution history for 30 days and output payloads for 24 hours, so those operational records alone cannot cover a longer claimed period; the accountable host must retain each run's outcome in its evidence archive for that period, and the clause is evidenced for exactly as long as it does.","obligation":"Each run records, for every divergence kind, how many were detected, repaired and failed to repair.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"Same record, the second vocabulary. A run over unlinked rows, or rows a subscription mutation held, looks identical to a run that compared them unless the uncompared counts are read beside the divergence counts. It carries C1's retention limit for the same reason: the archive the host keeps is the only place the output outlives a day.","obligation":"Each run records every population it met and did not compare, so skipped rows are not read as agreement.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The refusals are what stop a scheduled write corrupting a subscription, and a healthy production window may contain no divergence to observe them against. They have to be driven.","obligation":"A repair writes only the fields the provider is authoritative for, may record an invoice that exists at the provider and nowhere locally, and never cancels or deletes.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"The sweep never compares terminal subscriptions, subscriptions that exist only at the provider, subscription items, invoice totals, or invoices older than the per-customer lookback. Divergence in any of those is invisible to every clause here by design. And the runtime gate is the backend's billing switch, not the engine capability, so an application declaring billing without enabling it runs no sweep and produces no record.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C2: the recorded output of the runs in the window. C3: a driven drift, an unreadable provider subscription, a subscription a mutation wrote between the sweep's provider read and its repair, and an invoice the provider holds that is missing locally, with the resulting writes.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A repair that writes a non-authoritative field, or cancels a subscription on an unreadable provider answer, is a MAJOR. A persistent non-zero repaired count is not a finding against this objective — the control is working — but it is evidence that webhook delivery is failing, which is a MAJOR against that path. A repair-failed count with no follow-up is an OBSERVATION.","verificationSteps":["Read the recorded output of each reconciliation run in the window and assert every divergence kind and every uncompared population is present.","For each divergence kind, compare repaired plus repair-failed against detected; the remainder is reported-without-repair and must be zero for every repairable kind.","Drive a status drift and assert the written payload contains only provider-authoritative fields.","Make the provider unable to read a subscription and assert nothing is written, cancelled or deleted.","Remove locally an invoice the provider still holds and assert the sweep records it again from provider fields and counts it as repaired."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:billing-reconciliation-run-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"The identifier half applies to every application and the answer for most is that it is OFF, which is a full answer rather than an empty one — the control is opt-in with no default. The egress and observability halves apply wherever an external processor or a trace sink is reached.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The scope is a committed application decision and the default is off. The framework WARNS rather than refuses when it is on, deliberately: opting in is a legitimate choice, and refusing to boot over an application-authored privacy posture would be the framework overriding the controller's own decision.","obligation":"A device-stored pseudonymous identifier is collected only under an explicit application opt-in — absent that policy, not at all.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The refusal happens in ONE place — frame construction, before the value can reach a log line or the audit store — and the evidence is that a supplied identifier does not appear anywhere downstream. An absent identifier in a clean deployment is not evidence: nobody sent one. The value has to be sent.","obligation":"Absent policy means the identifier is refused at ingestion, for every transport at once.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A property of the client under a policy CHANGE, which no server-side artifact can observe. It is the practical form of the erasure obligation on this one field: a persistent identifier that outlives the decision that created it is exactly what withdrawal is supposed to end. Narrowing counts as withdrawal for the scope being left behind.","obligation":"Withdrawing or NARROWING the policy erases the identifier from the device, rather than merely ceasing to send it.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"STRUCTURAL at the DOCUMENT-EXTRACTION seam since 2026-09-09: its provider request input carries the bytes, the media type and the resolved model and nothing else, so no provider can include an identifier it was never given. That is a shape a reader settles from the type, which is what makes that half DECLARED, and it is a stronger guarantee than a driven one because it holds for providers not yet written.\n\n**It does NOT generalise to \"an external processor\", and this rationale did until 2026-09-10.** The other marked egress seam — embeddings — has no such type: the engine composes the outbound call itself, which is exactly the \"property of a body some service composes\" this rationale contrasts itself against. So the higher-volume TEXT egress is verified by reading the composed body, not by reading a type, and a step naming \"the provider request input type\" in the singular discharges C4 while never looking at it.\n\nThe observability half is a driven observation rather than a declaration, and is gathered as such — see the steps.","obligation":"Only what the declared purpose requires leaves the boundary: an external processor receives the payload and nothing identifying the requester or its row, and observability surfaces receive summaries rather than raw content.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"C2 and C3 attest the build driven and, for C3, the client build driven — a different client version may store differently. C4's structural guarantee covers the provider seam only: any other outbound path, an application's own call among them, is outside this demand and is not made minimal by it. And none of it evidences that the declared PURPOSE was itself proportionate, which is a judgement no artifact carries.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the committed identifier scope, and the startup warning where it is on. C2: a driven request supplying an identifier under no policy, with the logs, traces and audit rows it produced. C3: a driven policy withdrawal and a narrowing, each followed by an inspection of device storage. C4: the provider request input type, and trace and log records from the egress paths.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An identifier persisted with no declared policy is a MAJOR. An identifier surviving on the device after withdrawal is a MAJOR and is the erasure-shaped half of this objective. An identifier or row context reaching an external processor is a MAJOR. Raw content in a trace is a MAJOR — a summary surface holding raw text is a disclosure with a different retention regime and a different audience. A declared opt-in with the startup warning present is NOT a finding: it is the control working and the decision being surfaced.","verificationSteps":["Read the committed identifier scope and record it — a declared DISABLED is a complete answer to C1.","Send a request carrying an identifier with no policy declared, then search logs, traces and audit rows for it at every verbosity.","Turn the policy off after it was on, and assert the stored identifier is gone from the device rather than merely unsent.","Narrow the policy from persistent to session and assert the persistent value is erased, not left behind.","Read the DOCUMENT-EXTRACTION provider request input type and assert it cannot carry a filename, a row identifier, an organization or a user.","For the EMBEDDINGS seam, read the composed outbound body instead — there is no constraining type there, so the guarantee is a property of that code and must be re-read whenever it changes.","Sample egress traces and assert they carry summaries — token counts, page counts, outcomes — and never raw text or raw vectors."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:client-install-identifier-policy-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:client-registration-provenance-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:client-registration-provenance-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies wherever the application exposes an authorization server AND has opted into the relevant door. Both are OFF by default and this field named neither until 2026-09-10: client-identity-metadata resolution defaults to disabled, and dynamic client registration answers 404 until it is authored. So an empty population has three causes, not one — no registered clients, or either opt-in absent — and C1's driven resolution simply fails on the default posture, which is not_applicable_as_configured rather than a finding.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Demonstrable control is a property of a resolution that happened, not of a stored row: a bound identity looks the same whether the binding was demonstrated or asserted. The resolver deliberately decides IDENTITY only — a client that resolves is one whose NAME the consent screen may show, and consent, scope and audience remain separate gates — so evidence gathered here must not be read as an authorization outcome.","obligation":"A client identity is bound to a domain the client demonstrably controls.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class, and the reason it exists is not that one such registration is dangerous — the client is confined to identity scopes, holds no roles, and always faces consent. It is that this is the only unauthenticated WRITE in the application, so an operator must be able to see the population it produces. The same member also covers a self-registered client CHANGING its own registration, which is the one way its redirect set moves after creation.","obligation":"A client identity created by a party that authenticated to NOTHING is recorded.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["oauth_dynamic_client_registered"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the reason that distinguishes a misconfiguration from an attack"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The row is the artifact and the REASON is why it is high risk: the vocabulary spans a misconfiguration and an active outbound-request attack, both arriving at the same endpoint from the same kind of unauthenticated caller. Only the reason tells them apart, and an operator watching this event is watching for the second — so it must be queryable rather than buried in a log line.","obligation":"And EVERY refused client assertion is recorded, with the reason that distinguishes a misconfiguration from an attack.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["oauth_cimd_client_refused"]}],"limits":"C1 attests the build driven. C2 and C3 evidence that registrations and refusals were RECORDED, never that the registered population is legitimate — the control is observability of an unauthenticated write, not prevention of it. And an update to a self-registered client shares the registration member, so the two cannot be separated by event type alone; separate them by the row payload or not at all.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven client-identity resolution against a domain under test control, and a driven resolution against one that is not, refused. C2 and C3: the two audit members over the window, with C3 grouped BY REASON rather than counted.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A registration with no row is a MAJOR: the unauthenticated write population becomes unobservable, which is the whole reason the event exists. A refusal with no row is a MAJOR. A refusal row with no reason is also a MAJOR rather than an observation — a refusal you cannot classify is operationally the same as one you did not record. An audit failure that CHANGED the outcome of the request it observed is a MAJOR against the emission design, not against the control.","verificationSteps":["Drive a client-identity resolution for a domain the test controls and assert the identity binds.","Drive one for a host outside the allowed set and assert refusal.","Query the registration member over the window and reconcile it against the client rows created in that window.","Query the refusal member over the window and GROUP BY reason — an undifferentiated count answers neither of the two questions the event exists for.","Assert both emissions are fire-and-forget: auditing must never change or fail the request it observes."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:client-registration-provenance-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:collection-export-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:collection-export-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application with an exportable collection; one with none has no bulk export to record.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the resource exported, the operation it was taken from and the format it was rendered in"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A per-occurrence row, and the three named fields are the clause: a bulk export is the largest disclosure an application performs routinely, and 'which resource, from which operation, in which format' is what makes it reviewable rather than merely counted. The FORMAT matters because a rendering can carry more than the operation's own projection.","obligation":"A bulk export of a resource collection is a recorded event naming the resource exported, the operation it was taken from, and the format it was rendered in.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["collection_data_export"]}],"limits":"It evidences that a collection left, HOW MUCH of it, and under what narrowing — the row carries a mandatory non-negative record count, a row scope and the filter field NAMES. This section claimed the opposite until 2026-09-10 (\"names no record count\"), which is the field the member was designed around: without reading it a judge cannot tell a twenty-row page download from a whole-table dump, and the schema says an export event with no count answers nothing.\n\nWhat it genuinely does NOT hold is filter VALUES — only the field names — so it can say a narrowing was applied and never which subjects it selected.","minimumEvidence":"C1: export rows for the window, each naming the resource, the source operation and the render format.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A bulk export with no record is a MAJOR: the single largest routine disclosure, unevidenced. A row missing the format is not a finding: the field is mandatory and always supplied, so its absence would be a schema violation rather than an evidence gap. A row whose record count is absent is likewise impossible; a row whose count is implausible against the collection's size is a MAJOR and is what this member exists to surface.","verificationSteps":["Gather collection-export rows and assert each carries resource, operation and format.","Reconcile against the operations that can produce a bulk export: an export path with no rows is the finding, not an empty window.","Note the row records the EVENT, not the extent — a row does not say how many records left."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:collection-export-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:conferring-grant-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:conferring-grant-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Narrowing is engine-owned and runs on every scoped read and write; the unit-subtree clause has an empty population where no organization unit exists.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The implementation REFUSES a contradicting scope with a named error code rather than silently overriding it, and the site records that silent override was considered and rejected precisely so the REST and agent surfaces answer identically. So the strongest evidence is the refusal, not an empty result: an empty result set is satisfied for many wrong reasons — no matching rows, a broken query, a filter dropped — while the code cannot be faked. This clause said the evidence is that a supplied scope \"has no effect\" until 2026-09-10, which is the design that was rejected. Note an EQUAL value, and a single-member membership test equal to it, are no-ops by design and must not be driven as attacks.\n\nNarrowing is also visible against data the caller should NOT see, so it has to be driven with rows outside the grant present. The write side needs its own drive and is the half that is missed: a row filter cannot constrain a CREATE — there is no row yet — and does not constrain the VALUES an update writes, so read-side evidence says nothing about it.","obligation":"Reads and writes are narrowed to the tenant, unit subtree or parent row the caller's own grant reaches.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The stamp exists to answer a specific question an access review asks — why does this principal reach this record — without reconstructing it from role tables afterwards, which answers the different question of what the principal could reach NOW.\n\n**But it reaches no store.** The stamp is a private in-memory Map on the execution context, read by exactly two consumers, both of them ENFORCEMENT: it tightens the query and is discarded when the request ends. Nothing under the audit trail reads it and no event payload carries it. So `EMITTED` at the PRODUCTION plane — which this clause claimed until 2026-09-10, telling a collector to sample decisions over a window — pointed at a window that does not exist. What IS evidenceable is that the stamp is computed and NARROWS the query, which is a driven observation.\n\nThe durable half the objective's wording implies is a genuine framework gap: an access review still cannot ask why a principal reached a record last March. Recorded in `limits` rather than as an application nonconformity.","obligation":"The conferring GRANT is recorded alongside the decision.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Exactness is two-sided and a single drive only ever shows one side. The expansion follows the unit's declared inheritance, so the evidence must show a sibling excluded AND a declared descendant included — an over-narrow grant is a defect too, and it presents as a support ticket rather than as a breach, so it survives longer.","obligation":"A unit grant expands to exactly its declared subtree and no further.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The direction that matters: every other clause makes a result smaller, and this one refuses an attempt to make it larger. Evidenced by driving a tenant-authored write against a platform-imposed restriction and asserting refusal — no artifact records a restriction that was NOT lifted.","obligation":"And a tenant cannot LIFT a narrowing the platform imposed on it.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"Every clause attests the build driven, on the scope kinds driven. C2 evidences that the stamp is PRESENT; whether it names the grant that truly conferred access is a question about the resolver, not about the row. And none of it evidences that the grant itself was appropriate — this demand is about confinement to a grant, never about whether the grant should exist.","minimumEvidence":"C1: driven reads and WRITES per scope kind — tenant, unit, parent row — each with out-of-scope rows present. C2: a driven read by a unit-scoped principal, with the stamp observed on the execution context and the query shown to have narrowed. Do NOT look for a store. C3: a driven read from a unit grant showing an included declared descendant and an excluded sibling. C4: a driven tenant attempt to relax a platform restriction, refused.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A read returning an out-of-scope row is a MAJOR and a disclosure. An unconstrained CREATE or UPDATE is a MAJOR of the same order and is more likely to be missed, because nothing looks wrong in a response. A unit grant reaching beyond its declared subtree is a MAJOR; one falling short is an OBSERVATION with a real cost, since it is reported as a product fault and worked around. A decision with no conferring-grant stamp is an OBSERVATION unless the review cannot proceed without it, at which point it is the demand's whole subject.","verificationSteps":["Drive a scoped read with out-of-scope rows present and assert none is returned.","Drive a CREATE and an UPDATE under the same grant and assert the values are constrained — a read-side filter does not constrain either.","Drive a read as a unit-scoped principal and assert the stamp is present on the execution context AND that the issued query was narrowed by it — the stamp existing while the query is unnarrowed is the finding.","Do NOT sample decisions over a window for the stamp: it is per-request and in-memory, so an empty result means only that the request ended.","From a unit grant, assert a declared descendant IS reached and a sibling is NOT — both directions, in one drive.","Attempt, as the tenant, to widen a platform-imposed restriction on itself, and assert refusal.","Assert the audit trail's own tenant segregation holds on the AUTHENTICATED scope while a subject tenant still sees events concerning it."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:conferring-grant-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:consent-decision-transition-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:consent-decision-transition-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: privacy preferences are engine-owned and every application's subjects have them.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the decision was recorded EXACTLY ONCE under a race, and that each row names the previous and the resulting value"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Processing-consent preference changes use the generic resource-operation row. OAuth authorization consent uses OAUTH_CONSENT_* events, while release-bound governed-document decisions use GOVERNED_DOCUMENT_INTERACTION_RECORDED. Those distinct records do not substitute for evidence that a preference value changed.\n\nSelf-service and administrator preference UPDATEs explicitly opt into auditing below the automatic HIGH-or-CRITICAL floor; RESET already reaches that floor. The privacy decision leaves are marked as audit evidence, so ordinary updates can retain previous and resulting values without copying the whole preferences block. Gather actual rows and compare them with completed changes; declarations alone do not prove durable delivery.","obligation":"A consent decision — given, changed or withdrawn — is recorded exactly once and never lost to a race, naming the previous and the resulting value.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_performed"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A structural property of the operation surface: every verb able to write the consent field reaches the same emission point. Rows cannot evidence it — a verb that bypassed the point would emit nothing, and its silence is indistinguishable from no consent change at all, which is why this is DECLARED rather than gathered.\n\nEnumerate the verbs from the resource configurations, including internal lifecycle paths. The historical update_privacy operation name was incorrect and has been removed from the control marker (#592).","obligation":"Every verb able to change consent routes through ONE emission point.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"any of the rows records a preferences RESET rather than another operation, or that each carries the previous and the resulting consent"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Called out because it is the one an implementer drops: a reset returns consentedPurposes to the EMPTY set, which is a consent decision — a withdrawal of every purpose — with a previous and a resulting value even though nobody chose the new one.","obligation":"And resetting a subject's privacy preferences is itself such a decision.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_performed"]}],"limits":"It evidences that a decision was RECORDED, never that it was honoured — whether processing actually stopped is the third-party-processing and minimisation demands' question. And it evidences decisions made through the application: consent captured out of band and imported is invisible here.\n\nScope boundary: the same objective also marks the OIDC authorization code path, whose marker reads \"the user's consent is recorded exactly once, never lost to a race\", C1's exact words. It is deliberately outside these clauses because it is OAuth authorization consent, and the emitted members there (OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTED / DENIED / GRANT_PERSISTED, all live) belong to the delegated-authorization demand. The exclusion is a judgement about SCOPE, not about emission — an earlier revision of this body argued it from a false claim that those rows are unwritten.","minimumEvidence":"C1: audit-floor rows for consent-changing operations in the window, each naming the previous and the resulting value — a row naming only the new value does not satisfy the clause. C2: the enumeration of every verb that can write consent, all resolving to the single emission point. C3: reset operations present in the same row class as explicit changes.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A consent change with no record is a MAJOR — a subject's decision unevidenced — but attribute it correctly: when the missing record comes from framework emission rather than application configuration, attribute the defect to the FRAMEWORK and record the application impact separately. A row naming only the resulting value is a MAJOR on an UPDATE, because 'changed' is unprovable without the prior, and NOT a finding on a CREATE or a bulk write, where no pre-image exists by design. Two rows for one decision is a MAJOR, since 'never lost to a race' cuts both ways. A verb that bypasses the emission point is a MAJOR even with no consent change observed through it.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every verb able to write a consent field FROM THE RESOURCE CONFIGURATION, and assert each reaches the one emission point (C2). Do not substitute the marker for the actual operation inventory.","Read each such verb's declared risk level and its below-floor audit opt-in BEFORE gathering. A verb below the automatic floor with no opt-in emits nothing, and its empty result is an engine gap rather than an application's.","Gather audit-floor rows for those operations and assert each carries previous AND resulting values. Expect NO prior value on a CREATE or a bulk write: no pre-image is fetched, so its absence there is the documented behaviour and not a finding.","Assert exactly-once: a consent change that produced two rows is a race the clause names explicitly, not a duplicate to deduplicate.","Check resets appear in the same class as explicit changes; a body that queries only explicit verbs will miss them."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:consent-decision-transition-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:constraint-conflict-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:constraint-conflict-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares a uniqueness constraint, which is every application with a business key. The head noun is misleading and the mismatch matters: nothing is RECORDED. What the intent demands is the SHAPE of a refusal handed back to a caller, so a judge looking for rows will find none and must not read that as an absence.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The identity a conflict is reported BY does not exist unless the committed schema names it — isUnique with a conflictMessageReference for a single-field key, businessKeySet for a compound one. Nothing at runtime can invent one, and resolveDeclaredUniqueConflictReference returns undefined by design when nothing was declared, so the declaration is the whole of this half.","obligation":"A resource names the conflict identity beside the constraint that produces it, rather than leaving every duplicate to collapse into one generic code.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The report is a response shape, not a stored artifact — OBSERVED, which is exactly that: a driven result, reproducible on demand and stored nowhere. This clause carried EMITTED until 2026-09-10 because no accurate member existed and EMITTED was the nearest; adding OBSERVED is what let it say what it means. The adapter split is the load-bearing part: the Mongo and PostgreSQL resource repositories are separate classes and each translates its own driver error, so evidence at one says nothing about the other.","obligation":"A driven duplicate is answered with that declared identity rather than as an opaque datastore failure — at BOTH persistence adapters.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It attests the adapters DRIVEN, never every conflict in production. Resolution is by the FIELD-NAME SET the datastore reports, deliberately rather than by reconstructing index shapes — so a driver that reports a violated index without its covered fields resolves to nothing and is indistinguishable here from a resource that declared no identity.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the committed declarations, read off the schema rather than transcribed. C2: a driven duplicate insert per adapter in use, and the refusal it produced carrying the declared ErrorCustomMessageReference.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A declared reference not returned on a driven conflict is a MAJOR at that adapter — the declaration is then a promise nothing keeps. A WRONG-but-specific reference is also MAJOR and is worse than a generic one, in the resolver's own words: an integrator branching on it takes the wrong recovery path. A constraint that declared no identity is an OBSERVATION and not a nonconformity; the fail-safe path is honouring a choice the resource made.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every declared uniqueness constraint that carries a conflict message reference.","Drive a duplicate against one such constraint on the Mongo adapter and assert the declared reference is returned.","Drive the same against the PostgreSQL adapter — a translation present in one repository class is absent in the other until shown.","Assert an UNDECLARED constraint still yields the generic conflict code rather than a guessed one."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:constraint-conflict-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:credential-state-transition-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Credentials are engine-owned across every authentication method an application enables.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each transition names the credential and the party it is attributed to — or, for an expiry, that nothing performed it"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Per-occurrence rows in the audit trail, one class per transition kind. EXPIRY is the one to watch: it is a transition nothing actively performs, so a demand assuming an actor for every member would fail on it.","obligation":"Issuance, refresh, rotation, revocation and expiry of a credential are explicit attributable transitions.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_password_changed","one_off_token_revoked","oauth_token_revoked","oauth_token_refreshed","user_password_reset_forced"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each detection was answered by invalidating the token family, which only the row's own revocation flag states"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"ONE row, not two. The detection member carries a boolean recording whether the token family was revoked, so the detection and the response it triggered are the same artifact and need no correlation.\n\n**This clause asserted the opposite until 2026-09-10 — \"a detection followed by a revocation is TWO rows that must be correlatable\" — and named no member at all.** Both halves misdirect: a collector pairing detections with revocations turns every ordinary user- or client-initiated token revocation into a reported unpaired invalidation, while the real theft response produces no separate revocation row to pair with.","obligation":"Credential theft is detected and answered by invalidation.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_refresh_token_reuse_detected"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"'Actually terminates' is a claim about EFFECT, and a revocation row evidences the intent rather than the outcome. Only a driven scenario — revoke, then present the credential and be refused — separates a real termination from a mark.","obligation":"A revocation actually terminates the sessions and tokens it names, rather than merely marking them.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"C1 and C2 attest the window; C3 attests the BUILD it was driven against, not that every production revocation took effect. Nothing here evidences that a credential was not ALSO copied before revocation.","minimumEvidence":"C1: transition rows across the window covering each kind an application's enabled methods can produce. C2: paired detection and invalidation rows, correlatable. C3: a driven scenario in which a revoked credential is presented and refused, for sessions and for tokens separately.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A revocation that leaves a credential usable is a MAJOR — it is C3's whole subject and the difference between marking and terminating. An uncorrelatable detection/invalidation pair is an OBSERVATION unless the invalidation is missing entirely, which is a MAJOR.","verificationSteps":["Gather transition rows and group by kind; report kinds with no activity as observations, not gaps.","For each invalidation, resolve the detection that preceded it; an unpaired invalidation is reported, not assumed benign.","Drive a revocation and then present the credential, asserting refusal for a session and for a token.","Treat expiry separately: it has no HUMAN actor, so an attribution check demanding one will misreport it. It is not actorless — a marked daily sweep drives the expire verbs — and its scheduled invocation leaves bounded job-execution history and successful output. Preserve those outcomes in the host's archive for claims longer than their operational retention, while the expire verbs it dispatches leave ordinary resource-operation rows where their risk level puts them above the audit floor. Gather both run continuity and the effects; neither alone proves the other."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:credit-grant-reachability-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:credit-grant-reachability-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies wherever the credit-pool RESOURCES are registered — a CONFIGURATION fact, not a data one. This field said \"wherever a credit balance exists\" until 2026-09-10, which invites the cheap reading: an application with zero credit rows declines the demand while its top-up door is fully declared and reachable. The doors are declared regardless of whether any balance was ever written, so the escape must be read off the registration and never off a row count.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"REACHABILITY is a property of the declared operation surface: which variants can increase a balance, and what gates each. The committed configuration answers it, and a runtime row could not — a balance nobody increased emits nothing.","obligation":"An increase in a credit balance is reachable only through a system or payment-gated door.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The self-grant is the failure mode, and its absence is a non-event. Only a driven attempt — an ordinary principal trying to increase its own balance and being refused — separates a closed door from an untested one.","obligation":"So no ordinary principal can grant itself economic value.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences the DOOR, never the amounts: a payment-gated increase for the wrong quantity is correct here and wrong elsewhere. And the enumeration attests the build — a variant added later is invisible until re-enumerated.","minimumEvidence":"C1: every operation variant that can increase a credit balance, with its gate, from committed configuration — the enumeration must be exhaustive, because one ungated variant defeats the rest. C2: a driven attempt by an ordinary principal, refused.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An ungated increase variant is a MAJOR and the objective's entire subject — economic value granted to self. A successful driven self-grant is a MAJOR. An empty set of illegitimate increases evidences nothing either way.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every variant that writes an increase and assert each is system- or payment-gated.","Drive an increase as an ordinary principal and assert refusal.","Do NOT read balance rows as evidence: a balance nobody wrongly increased looks exactly like a control that never ran."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:credit-grant-reachability-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application, and most sharply to those with no platform-tier administration: the demand's strongest evidence is an empty crossing set beside a live enforcement path.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The enumeration is a committed declaration: a variant either declares cross-tenant admission or it does not. Reach acquired by position in the request path is exactly what the intent forbids, and a declaration is what makes admission auditable rather than emergent.","obligation":"A crossing is admitted only by an explicitly enumerated operation variant — never ambient.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each elevation was requested before it was used, and approved by the tenant where that tenant demands approval"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The grant's life is a per-occurrence class. 'Requested rather than assumed' is a property of the record's existence: an elevation with no request row is the ambient standing privilege the objective exists to remove.","obligation":"It requires an elevation that was REQUESTED rather than assumed, and where the tenant demands it, approved by that tenant.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["platform_access_grant_lifecycle"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the TENANT REACHED, which is what makes the crossing reconstructable"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A separate row from the grant, and it must be: a grant evidences permission to cross, never that a crossing occurred. The record distinguishes a sanctioned crossing from an attempted undeclared one.","obligation":"And the crossing itself is recorded, as a distinct event NAMING THE TENANT REACHED.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["cross_tenant_administrative_access"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The intent's fourth demand, and this body had no clause for it until 2026-09-10 — which mattered more than an ordinary omission, because the body's own PASS rule then rested on it: an empty crossing set was read as \"no platform administration occurred\" while nothing gathered evidence that the enforcement path was live. An empty set is equally what a broken refusal produces when nobody happened to try.\n\nIt cannot be a row. The refusal throws a not-found at the authorization tier, and the crossing row is emitted BEFORE the admission decision and carries no outcome field — deliberately, so a reviewer sees the attempt either way. So a succeeded crossing and a refused one are indistinguishable in the trail BY DESIGN, and only driving the refusal separates them. The driven probe already exists over two provisioned tenants.","obligation":"And an UNDECLARED crossing fails closed.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"There is a SECOND blind spot INSIDE the application, and it is by design: an UNDECLARED application-scoped door that returns foreign rows leaves nothing in the trail, because emitting a declared-crossing flag of false for a door that declared nothing would put a false sentence in the trail. The population is enumerable — only a handful of application-scoped resources declare a top-level tenant field — so a judge can bound it, but this demand's evidence cannot see it.\n\nOtherwise it evidences crossings the engine mediates. A platform operator reaching a tenant's data outside the application — a database console — is invisible here and is not made safe by it.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the set of operation variants declaring cross-tenant admission, from committed configuration. C4: a driven undeclared crossing, refused, on both the per-instance and the collection path — the two are enforced in different phases from different inputs, so one is silence about the other. C2: grant lifecycle rows showing request, and where required approval, before use. C3: crossing rows for the window, each distinguishing a declared admission from an attempted undeclared one.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A crossing with no grant is a MAJOR — it is the ambient reach the objective removes. An undeclared crossing that is NOT REFUSED when driven is a MAJOR (C4); do not look for a succeeded-crossing row instead, because the row cannot say — its flag records whether the crossing was DECLARED, not whether it was admitted. A recorded undeclared attempt is the control WORKING. A grant used before approval, where the tenant demands approval, is a MAJOR.","verificationSteps":["Read the declared cross-tenant variants and assert the set is explicit rather than derived from a role alone.","For each crossing in the window, resolve the grant that permitted it and assert the grant was requested before use.","Assert every crossing produced a record, including attempted undeclared ones — those are the rows a reviewer most needs.","Drive an UNDECLARED crossing and assert it is refused. This is what makes the next step safe, and it is the step this body lacked until 2026-09-10: an empty crossing set is also what a broken refusal path produces when nobody happened to try.","An empty crossing set is a PASS only once that refusal has been driven — then it means no platform administration occurred, rather than that none was noticed.","Assert each crossing row names the TENANT REACHED, which is the row's organization and never the caller's own. Do NOT try to distinguish a crossing that SUCCEEDED from one that was refused: the row is emitted BEFORE the admission decision and carries no outcome, deliberately, so that a reviewer sees the attempt either way."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:delegated-authorization-decision-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:delegated-authorization-decision-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application exposing an authorization server or connecting to a third party. The largest marked surface in the catalog, and the demand covers BOTH directions: a third party acting for a user of this application, and this application acting toward a third party for one of its own principals.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"no third party acted for a user without that user's recorded authorization — a claim about accesses that left no consent row at all"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Four members, and they are four because the four facts are not recoverable from each other. A REFUSAL leaves no token and no grant, so nothing but its own row records that the user was asked and said no. A PERSISTED grant is a standing authorization that outlives the ceremony that created it, and it is separately audited even when it is created in the same request. A FAILED exchange is the monitoring surface — the code never decoded — and is the only one of the four that an attacker produces on purpose.","obligation":"A third party acts for a user only on that user's recorded authorization, and approval, refusal, persistence and failure of the exchange are each audited.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["oauth_consent_granted","oauth_consent_denied","oauth_consent_grant_persisted","oauth_code_exchange_failed"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the subject, client, audience, granted scopes and lifetime of the token it records"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Its own clause rather than part of C1, because consent and issuance are separable in both directions: a persisted grant issues tokens later with no new ceremony, and a client declaring itself consent-free inside its own trust boundary may skip the prompt entirely. The token row is then the only per-occurrence record that the delegation was exercised.","obligation":"Issuing a delegated token — the ability to act AS the user — is recorded with its subject, its client, its audience, its granted scopes and its lifetime.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["oauth_delegated_token_issued"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A property of what the endpoint REFUSES, which no successful exchange records. It has to be driven: present a code without its proof, and with a weakened proof, and assert both are refused. A row saying a token was issued cannot say whether the challenge would have been skippable.","obligation":"Proof of possession is enforced on the exchange.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Confinement is evidenced by asking for MORE than was granted and being refused, not by reading a correct token. The same holds for renewal, which happens with no new act of consent and is therefore bounded only by what the original grant carried — the point at which scope creep would be invisible.","obligation":"The issued token carries no more than the grant declared.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C5","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the authorization was spent ONLY for its principal, which is a claim about rows that do not exist"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The mirrored direction, with its own member set at both user and organization scope. FOUR facts per credential and each is separately load-bearing: the authorization, every USE of it — delegated authority exercised is what an access review counts — the ROTATION, and the withdrawal, without which a revoked credential is indistinguishable in the trail from one that was never granted. Read each member's own marker before demanding it: the enum assigns members to this objective and states which question each answers.","obligation":"In the outbound direction, a principal's authorization for this application to act toward a named third party is recorded, is spent only for that principal, and its withdrawal is recorded too.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_provider_connection_granted","organization_provider_connection_granted","user_provider_credential_set","organization_provider_credential_set","user_provider_credential_used","organization_provider_credential_used","user_provider_credential_rotated","organization_provider_credential_rotated","user_provider_credential_deleted","organization_provider_credential_deleted"]}],"limits":"C3 and C4 attest the build driven. The audited-emission design means an emission failure is swallowed rather than failing the request, so a gap in the trail and a period of no delegation look the same. Consent is evidenced as RECORDED, never as informed — what the user was shown is outside every artifact named here. And a consent-free client inside its own trust boundary legitimately produces no ceremony, so its absence must be resolved against the client declaration rather than reported.","minimumEvidence":"C1, C2 and C5: the eleven members over the window, with the refusal and failure members read as first-class results rather than as the absence of success. C3: driven exchanges without the possession proof and with a weakened one, both refused. C4: a driven exchange requesting more scope than the grant declared, and a driven renewal, both confined to the original grant.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A delegated token issued with no recorded authorization behind it is a MAJOR and is the most severe finding this demand produces: a third party holds the ability to act as a user who never agreed. A missing refusal row is a MAJOR — the trail then records only the outcomes the user accepted, which reads as unanimous consent. A skippable possession proof is a MAJOR. A token carrying more than the grant declared is a MAJOR. A credential USE with no row is a MAJOR, since delegated authority exercised is the only thing an access review can count. A failed-exchange row is not itself a finding — it is the monitoring surface, and a spike in it is.","verificationSteps":["Query the consent members over the window and read GRANTED, DENIED and PERSISTED as three separate populations — a persisted grant created inside a granting request produces two rows, and that is correct rather than duplication.","Reconcile issued delegated tokens against grants: a token with no consent ceremony behind it must resolve to a persisted grant or to a client declaring itself consent-free inside its own trust boundary.","Present an authorization code with no possession proof and assert refusal; repeat with a weakened proof.","Request a scope beyond the grant and assert the issued token does not carry it.","Renew a token and assert the renewal is bounded by the ORIGINAL grant, since no new consent occurred.","For the outbound direction, assert each credential USE names the principal whose authority it spent, and that a withdrawal leaves its own row.","Assert every emission on this path is fire-and-forget — auditing must never change the authorization outcome it observes."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:delegated-authorization-decision-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:destruction-decision-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:destruction-decision-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The identity and tenant destruction verbs are engine-owned; the retained-record clauses have an empty population where no resource declares a retention treatment, which is an absence of subject matter rather than a declined control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each destruction names who decided it"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Durable rows, and the unit is the DECISION rather than the destruction. The moment worth catching is when the tenant loses its access, which is also the moment a mistaken or malicious teardown can still be reversed; the purge that follows is the mechanical consequence. So the scheduling row must exist even where the decision was later reversed — an evidence trail that only records completed destructions cannot show an attempt.","obligation":"Destruction of an identity, a tenant or its data is a deliberate, attributable, evidenced DECISION.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["organization_deletion_requested","organization_deleted","user_deleted"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each restoration happened within the declared window and was performed by a party other than the one that scheduled the destruction"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The restoration row is the artifact, and the separately-privileged half is what makes the window a control rather than a delay: a party that can both schedule and reverse has a window with itself. Reversal destroys nothing, which is exactly why the record is the only trace it leaves.","obligation":"It is REVERSIBLE until its declared window elapses, and the reversal is itself audited and performed by a separately-privileged party.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["organization_restored"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each destruction happened when its declared window elapsed, rather than early or late"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Per scope rather than per run, and the per-scope half IS a durable row class: destroying a tenant emits its own member, which C1 already demands. That is what makes this clause EMITTED where the sibling sweep clauses are not.\n\nThe CONTINUITY half needs retained run outcomes. Scheduled application receipts now create operational history (30 days) and retain successful outputs separately (24 hours); longer claimed periods require the host to preserve evidence beyond those lifetimes. Gather destructions from the audit trail and continuity from retained run outcomes. An absence of destructions does not prove that none were due.\n\nThe members are the two DESTRUCTION classes C1 already demands — the tenant and the identity — and deliberately NOT the deletion REQUEST: this clause is about the destruction being CARRIED OUT, and counting requests would let a scheduled sweep that never ran read as evidence that it had. Until 2026-09-16 the clause named none, so the per-scope half its own rationale calls a durable row class could not be gathered at all. The CONTINUITY half still cannot be: retained run outcomes are a different store.","obligation":"Then it is carried out ON SCHEDULE, with evidence per scope destroyed.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["organization_deleted","user_deleted"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A negative property of every ordinary path, which no row can show: a retained row absent from a result is indistinguishable from a row that never existed. It has to be driven from both sides — ordinary reads and writes refused, and the one declared door succeeding and leaving its own audited trace. Both halves matter: a door that is not audited is not a door, it is a bypass.","obligation":"An erased-but-RETAINED record is hidden from, and immutable to, every ORDINARY access path — the only door is an audited see-through read.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C5","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The clause an implementer most reliably drops, because the primary row is correct and the derived copy is somewhere else — a retrieval chunk, an index entry. Sweep-based exclusion has a window during which erased content is still served, and the length of that window is an operational accident rather than a declared property. Evidenced by erasing a parent and immediately querying the derived surface.","obligation":"And its DERIVED copies are excluded by a live check against the parent row, rather than by waiting for a sweep.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"C1 to C3 attest the window; C4 and C5 attest the build driven, on the derived surfaces driven — a derived copy in a surface nobody queried is invisible here. It evidences that destruction was DECIDED and CARRIED OUT, never that every copy in every backup and export is gone, which no runtime artifact can show. And a reversal by a separately-privileged party evidences separation of the two roles, not that either was exercised well.","minimumEvidence":"C1, C2 and C3: the destruction and restoration members over the window, plus the scheduled sweep's per-scope evidence and the continuity of its runs. C4: driven ordinary reads and writes against a retained record, refused, and a driven see-through read that succeeds and is itself recorded. C5: a parent erased and its derived copies queried immediately.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A destruction with no decision row is a MAJOR. A retained record reachable on an ordinary path is a MAJOR and a disclosure of data the subject asked to have erased. A see-through read that leaves no row is a MAJOR: the carve-out's justification is that the access is accountable. A derived copy still served after its parent was erased is a MAJOR, and its severity does not fall because a sweep would eventually remove it — the window is the defect. A scheduled destruction past its window is a MAJOR against the sweep, not against the decision.","verificationSteps":["Query the destruction members over the window and PAIR each decision with either a completed destruction or a restoration — a decision with neither is a window still open, and its deadline is the finding.","Assert the reversal ran at the SEPARATELY-PRIVILEGED tier the verb declares. Do NOT assert the two acts were performed by different PEOPLE: both the marking and the restoring verb are platform-tier and cross-tenant, so one operator legitimately does both, and a person-distinctness check reports a MAJOR against the designed flow.","Read the sweep's per-scope evidence and assert continuity of runs across the period.","Attempt an ordinary read of a retained record and assert it is not returned; attempt an ordinary write and assert refusal.","Perform the declared see-through read and assert BOTH that it succeeds and that it left its own audited row.","Erase a parent row and query its derived copies IMMEDIATELY — not after a sweep interval, which is the assumption this clause exists to refuse."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:destruction-decision-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:directory-authority-switch-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:directory-authority-switch-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies ONLY where an application opts in — the intent says so in its first clause. An application with no directory connection has an empty population and has declined nothing; an application WITH a connection and no declared switches is the case this demand is actually about.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The provisioning configuration IS the evidence, and the clause is precisely that a connection alone must not be read as consent to it. Unit reconciliation is the sharpest case: it runs only when the organization declared BOTH a unit mapping and a default unit role, and that gate is load-bearing because reconciliation REPLACES a member's assignments with what the directory pushed.","obligation":"The switches conferring directory authority are DECLARED explicitly, rather than implied by the presence of a connection.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The bindings are committed values. The reason they must be explicit is structural: a directory pushes a flat string, units live in a TREE where a code is unique only among siblings and a name is freeform, so a search-based match is genuinely ambiguous and resolving to the wrong node grants the wrong DATA. Nothing guesses — an unbound value is ignored and no unit is ever created — which is a property of the declaration set, readable without driving anything.","obligation":"Unit membership is treated as an authorization grant, not a label — so the binding is unit-id-addressed and never guessed.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each account change names the account it changed and the directory it came from"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class in the engine's own event store. All three were verified to have production callers in the directory controller — several each rather than one apiece, which matters only in that a collector should not expect a single emission site per member when tracing one.","obligation":"Accounts created, updated and deprovisioned by the directory are each attributable.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["scim_user_provisioned","scim_user_updated","scim_user_deactivated"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A driven result and NOT a declaration: what stops such a member today is the effective-policy block, not the absence of a local first factor. The sweep that destroys local credentials can leave some standing and says so at error level — so the clause is evidenced by driving a deprovisioned member against the login path, never by reading that the sweep ran.","obligation":"A directory-managed member cannot authenticate around deprovisioning at the credential layer.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"The two provisioning-CONFIGURATION events are deliberately NOT demanded here. Both have a typed emit method with ZERO production callers, so demanding either would raise a MAJOR against a working control the first time its activity occurs — and neither carries an unemitted acknowledgement, so no gate refuses the demand either. Recorded as issue #591. The practical consequence for C1: a CHANGE to a declared switch is evidenced today only by the generic resource-operation row over the fields marked as audit evidence — which covers the create and deprovision switches, the default role, the default UNIT role, AND the unit mapping itself. An earlier revision of this sentence excluded the mapping, which is the switch C1's own rationale calls the sharpest case: a judge told it was unevidenced would accept an absence instead of querying the row that exists.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C2: the committed provisioning configuration — the create, verify and deprovision switches, the unit mapping and the default unit role — read as declarations rather than inferred from the connection. C3: the three directory audit members over the window. C4: a driven authentication attempt by a deprovisioned directory-managed member, refused, plus the sweep's error-level report of members still carrying local credentials.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A directory treated as authoritative for unit membership with no declared mapping is a MAJOR — the assignments are an authorization axis and would be replaced by whatever the directory pushed. A member still authenticating after deprovisioning is a MAJOR. Members named in the sweep's still-carrying report are an OBSERVATION where the effective-policy block holds and a MAJOR where it does not: the physical destruction is OWED, and the report line exists to say so rather than to assert a breach.","verificationSteps":["Read the provisioning configuration and assert each authority-conferring switch is explicitly declared.","Assert unit reconciliation is enabled only where BOTH a unit mapping and a default unit role are declared.","Assert every declared binding addresses a unit by id, and that a directory value with no binding is ignored rather than matched by name.","Query the three directory audit members over the window against the provisioning activity they should account for.","Deprovision a directory-managed member and assert authentication is refused, then read the sweep report for members still carrying local credentials."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:directory-authority-switch-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The gate is engine-owned and the objective is about REACHABILITY, so an application that has granted no entitlement still has the control and still has to satisfy it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The role gate IS a committed declaration — ScopeFeatures writes are APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN-only, and the marker notes the fields cannot be field-protected because the super-admin path must write them. So the gate is the whole boundary, and it is readable from the resource configuration.","obligation":"Feature and entitlement writes declare an operator-gated door.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second reachable path, which produces no rows and no occurrence: an entitlement nobody widened emits nothing. A driven reachability enumeration is the only artifact, and it is engine-owned and uniform. THIS IS WHY THE OBJECTIVE IS MARKED IN A TEST — for a reachability invariant the test IS the control's evidence, not a stand-in for it.","obligation":"No other door reaches those writes — a principal cannot widen what it is entitled to.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"The enumeration attests the BUILD it ran against; a variant added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated. It evidences that no door is REACHABLE, never that no entitlement was wrongly granted through the legitimate door — that is the credit-grant demand's question, not this one.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared role gate on every feature and entitlement write, from committed configuration. C2: a driven enumeration over the operation variants asserting each stays non-client-reachable — progression and lifecycle state writes in particular, whose state fields carry no field-level exclusion, so a variant flip would let a client self-forge currentStage, milestonesAchieved or totalPoints.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A client-reachable entitlement write is a MAJOR and the objective's whole subject. A gate weakened from APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN is a MAJOR: the marker records that this one role gate is the ENTIRE self-grant boundary for paid entitlements. An empty occurrence set is NOT a finding in either direction.","verificationSteps":["Read the declared gate for every feature and entitlement write (C1).","Drive the reachability enumeration over every SECURITY-SENSITIVE operation variant and assert none is client-reachable (C2). The population is not every variant: the pinned enumeration carves out state writes that are client-reachable BY DESIGN, so asserting over all of them flags every legitimate API variant.","Check the progression and lifecycle writes specifically: their fields have no field-level exclusion, so the variant gate is the only guard.","Do NOT look for occurrence rows. An entitlement nobody widened produces none, and their absence evidences nothing either way."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:entitlement-write-reachability-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:erasure-propagation-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.ERASURE_PROPAGATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:erasure-propagation-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"C1, C3 and C4 apply where the application actually invokes subject erasure. The engine exposes erasure as a system call with no route, so an application that never erases a subject has produced no accounting, no record and has failed nothing — a judge records not_applicable_as_configured for those three clauses. C2 applies to every application: it is the framework's own behaviour and is driven, not gathered. C5 applies where the application declares an externalDataPipeline — a resource copied in from a system of record — and is not applicable to one that declares none, however many erasures it runs.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"APPLICATION_RECORDED","homeRationale":"The accounting is the erasure's RETURN VALUE — per direct edge its disposition and `executed`, the descendant edges walked below it, `subjectImpersonalized`, the session-revocation outcome, and one external-effect outcome per system — and the engine persists none of it. Only the application that called the erasure can retain it, so the store is that application's own row and its shape is that application's. A direct edge's `executed` already folds in every descendant below it, so an application that keeps only an AGGREGATE (how many dependent edges executed, plus each external effect's ref, status and steps), as the dogfood application does, still shows that a subtree was declined, but not which relationship in it. That is a legitimate modelling choice with a real cost, stated in the limits, and must not be asserted as framework contract.","obligation":"Each of the subject's dependent relationships — its direct dependents and every relationship the erasure walks below a dependent it deletes — is accounted for with the disposition its configuration declared and whether its teardown ran, and each registered external erasure effect with its own outcome.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A healthy window of receipts cannot show this: an accounting that always says `executed` and one that is right read identically until a teardown is declined. The property is established by driving the declined, blocking and incomplete cases and reading what comes back, which is a driven result and stored nowhere. It reaches descendants because the erasure classifies every relationship below a dependent it deletes before its transaction opens, and the cascade returns each descendant's outcome to the receipt rather than discarding it. It stops below a relationship whose rows are retained — scrubbed and kept, kept by declaration, or not the subject's — because those rows still anchor their own dependents.","obligation":"The accounting cannot overstate the erasure: a dependent edge at any depth whose disposition executes but whose teardown did not run is reported as not executed, and so is the direct edge above it; an edge at any depth that nobody classified, or one that would defer its teardown, refuses the erasure before any write; and every external outcome that may leave data live at a third party — including a deliberately acknowledged one — is classified incomplete.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the subject, the resource and the external system it reached"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Both rows are emitted by the per-resource external effect the erasure runs post-commit, which is reached from this control and from no other. The deletion row carries the remote row count; the acknowledgement row is written once per resource per request at HIGH risk, and its security-envelope classification is CRITICAL, so an accepted hole stays countable and reaches a SIEM as the loudest class. An effect that FAILED cleanly, deleting nothing, writes no row by design — its outcome is carried by C1's receipt instead, which is why C1 and C3 are read together. A billing-provider erasure writes no row at all and is evidenced by C1 alone.","obligation":"Where erasure deletes rows in an external system, or leaves them there on the controller's per-request acknowledgement, it leaves a durable record naming the subject, the resource and the external system.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["http_api_external_erasure","http_api_non_erasure_acknowledged"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the third-party credential it destroyed and what telling its vendor achieved"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The users-to-credentials composition removes those rows through the raw child repository, bypassing the credential resource's service tier, so the row is written by the credential resource's cascade removal observer: one credential-deletion row per destroyed credential, naming the subject, the provider and the credential slot, with the reason that distinguishes erasure from revocation. The erasure reason is written only when the cascade declares itself an erasure — an administrator's hard delete of the user row runs the same teardown and writes the account-deletion reason instead, naming who deleted it, so it is not erasure evidence and a C4 reading counts only the erasure reason — and it is written after commit, so a rolled-back erasure leaves no row. Delivery cannot fail the erasure: an audit write that fails is logged rather than retried, which is why C4 is read with C1, whose credential edge still reports that the teardown ran. Each row also records what telling the credential's VENDOR achieved, in `vendorRevocation`: the same observer hands the token it read from the destroyed row to the vendor's revocation endpoint, so the row says whether the grant was revoked there, could not be (the vendor declares no revocation endpoint, the credential was a pasted key, or the application's client registration is unset), or failed (unreachable, refused). The collector reports how the erasure rows divide over it; the same outcomes reach C1's receipt as one external effect.","obligation":"Where erasure destroys the subject's own third-party credentials, it leaves a record naming each one.","plane":"PRODUCTION","reportedAuditEventDataDistribution":{"field":"vendorRevocation"},"requiredAuditEventDataMatch":{"field":"reason","values":["user_erased"]},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_provider_credential_deleted"]},{"clauseRef":"C5","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each run row says how many rows it declined to load, never which erasure each skip honoured, nor that every erased pipeline row was suppressed"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The source still holds a record the application erased locally, so without this the next scheduled pass writes the person back while the erasure receipt says complete. The erasure writes a suppression at the two places every erasure of a local row passes through — the scrub that retains a row, and the erasure cascade's delete — keyed by a keyed hash of the system, the remote entity and the remote key, never the key itself. Both pipeline tracks skip a suppressed key, and each run's read-through audit row carries `suppressedRows`, which the collector SUMS over the window's pipeline runs. The row count says the runs happened; the sum says suppression held on them. A suppression is released only by a completed full pass over the whole remote entity that no longer sees the record, and a run that finds suppressions hashed under a key the application no longer derives refuses to load.","obligation":"Where an erased row had been copied in from a system of record by an external-data pipeline, the erasure suppresses that remote record, and no later pass — full or incremental — copies it back in; each pipeline run counts the rows it declined to load on its own audit row.","plane":"PRODUCTION","reportedAuditEventDataSum":{"field":"suppressedRows"},"requiredAuditEventDataMatch":{"field":"operationIdentifier","values":["externalDataPipelineRun"]},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["http_api_read_through_access"]},{"clauseRef":"C6","emittedCountLimit":{"absenceUnreadable":"emission is best-effort after the erasure commits, so a lost row and an erasure with no declared recipient both leave none; C1's receipt carries the same outcomes","unreached":"each row names the recipient, whose account reached it, who owes the communication and the outcome, never what the vendor still holds"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"GDPR Art. 19 asks the controller to communicate an erasure to each recipient the data was disclosed to, and to name them to the subject on request. The recipients are the application's DERIVED declaration (`compliance.subjectDataRecipients`, generated from the recipient population, the processor register and the declared flows), so the erasure knows which vendors to account for without a per-subject log of calls. After the external effects run, the erasure gives each recipient an outcome and writes one row per recipient naming it, whose account reached it, who owes the communication (the operator as controller, the operator assisting a controller tenant, or the tenant for its own vendor) and the status. The collector reports how the rows divide over `status`: an UNMEASURED or NOT_REGISTERED share is a vendor erasure does not reach, stated rather than hidden. An application that declares no recipients leaves no row and marks every receipt with one unmeasured outcome, which C1 reads.","obligation":"Each erasure accounts for every provider the application declares as holding the subject's data: one an effect reached reports that effect's outcome, and one no effect reached reports the status its declared erasure stance decides — unmeasured when it declares none — so no recipient passes in silence. Systems of record are C3's.","plane":"PRODUCTION","reportedAuditEventDataDistribution":{"field":"status"},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["subject_erasure_recipient_outcome"]}],"limits":"It evidences that the erasure ACCOUNTED for the stores it reached, never that the stores are now empty of the subject. The erasure walks every relationship below a dependent it deletes, at any depth and whatever depth the relationship declares for an ordinary delete; it does not walk below a relationship whose rows it retains — a retain-and-scrub edge, one kept by declaration, one not the subject's — because those rows keep their own dependents, so nothing below them is reported. An edge the walk never dispatched because no rows of the subject reached it reads as run: a teardown with nothing to do. Derived copies a teardown schedules after commit — search chunks, stored file content — are removed by their own seams, whose failures are logged rather than recorded, and are not evidenced here. An application that retains an aggregate rather than per-edge receipts can show THAT a subtree was declined but not WHICH relationship in it, and a reviewer must then drive or re-read the erasure to name it. A credential destroyed by an administrator's hard delete of the user rather than by erasure leaves a credential-deletion row with the account-deletion reason, which is not C4 evidence; a query counting the event type without reading the reason overstates C4. External outcomes are what the external system answered at the time; a third party that later restores or re-syncs the data is outside this evidence. A recorded vendor-revocation outcome is what the vendor's endpoint ANSWERED: under RFC 7009 a vendor answers success for a token it did not recognise, and whether a real vendor ended the grant is established only by observing that vendor, not by this row. And a window with no erasures evidences nothing about propagation. C5's suppression follows a remote KEY, not a person: a record the source merges into another key arrives under that key as a different record. A pipeline with a sourceFilter never releases a suppression, because it cannot tell a record gone at the source from one outside its filter. An erasure committing while a pass is loading can see that pass write the row back as a live copy that later passes skip and never remove; it is not self-healing, only DETECTED — each run counts `liveSuppressedRows`, and a non-zero count is an erasure that did not hold. Two pipelines keying one entity differently do not share a suppression. C6's recipient list is only as complete as the generated declaration: a vendor added since it was generated is not accounted for until it is regenerated. Systems of record are not in this list: their erasure is C3's, per bound resource, under the binding's declared stance.","minimumEvidence":"C1: for each erasure the application ran in the window, its retained receipt — at least whether the subject was impersonalized, whether every executing direct edge ran (a direct edge's flag already folds in its descendants), and each external effect's ref and status. C2: a driven erasure showing a declined executing edge reported as not executed, at the direct level and one level below a deleted dependent, the latter also turning its direct edge not executed; an unclassified or deferred edge, at the direct level and below a deleted dependent, refusing before any write; and each incomplete external status classified incomplete. C3: the external-erasure and acknowledged-non-erasure rows for the window. C4: the credential-deletion rows carrying the erasure reason for the window, one per credential each erasure destroyed, with how they divide over the vendor-revocation outcome. C5: the pipeline-run read-through rows for the window with the sum of `suppressedRows` over them, and — once, where the application runs a pipeline — a driven erasure of a pipeline-copied row followed by a full and an incremental pass that load nothing under its record. Any run row carrying a non-zero `liveSuppressedRows` is listed. C6: the recipient-outcome rows for the window, with how they divide over status, and the application's generated recipient declaration they were selected from.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A receipt reporting an executing edge as run when its teardown was declined — or a direct edge as run when a descendant below it was declined — is a MAJOR against the framework, and it is the finding this demand exists for: the accounting would then be the thing that hides live personal data. An unclassified or deferred edge at any depth that proceeds instead of refusing is a MAJOR: the erasure then guessed. An incomplete external status read as complete is a MAJOR for the same reason. An erasure the application ran and kept no receipt for is a MAJOR against the application — the only per-store account was discarded. A C3 or C4 row missing where the receipt shows the teardown ran is an OBSERVATION when the receipt itself is intact: the erasure operated and its queryable trail lagged. A C4 row carrying the erasure reason for a user whose row was deleted rather than erased is a MAJOR: it forges erasure evidence. A C4 row whose vendor was not told is an OBSERVATION, not a nonconformity: the local credential is destroyed and the outcome is recorded, and what is owed is a sentence to the person telling them to remove the application in the vendor's own settings. A receipt reporting that vendor effect as complete while a row says a grant was left live is a MAJOR, for the same reason an incomplete external status read as complete is. An erased pipeline-copied row that a later pass loaded again as a live row is a MAJOR against the framework: the erasure was silently undone; a run row reporting `liveSuppressedRows` above zero is exactly that finding, surfaced. A pipeline run refused because its suppressions were hashed under a rotated key is an OBSERVATION against the application's key handling, not a nonconformity: the refusal is the control holding. A C6 recipient reported UNMEASURED is an OBSERVATION owed a declaration (the vendor's stance on its compliance profile, or the operator's acknowledgement): the erasure said so rather than passing. A receipt that reads complete while a declared operator-account recipient carries no outcome is a MAJOR — the silent pass C6 exists to prevent.","verificationSteps":["Resolve applicability for C1, C3 and C4: does the application invoke subject erasure? If not, record those three clauses not_applicable_as_configured.","For C1, gather the application's retained receipts and assert each records, per erasure, the subject's impersonalization, the executed state of every executing direct edge, and every external effect's status. Do NOT assert a per-edge list or a descendant list: whether the application keeps edges individually or as a count is its own modelling choice.","Cross-check C1 against C3: for every receipt naming an external-system effect that deleted rows or was acknowledged, find the matching row for that subject and resource. A receipt with no row is reported; a row with no receipt is reported.","For C2, drive an erasure over a direct dependent edge whose teardown the cascade declines and assert the receipt says not executed; drive one whose direct edge runs but whose descendant is declined and assert both the descendant and its direct edge say not executed; drive one over an unclassified edge, directly and below a deleted dependent, and assert each refuses with nothing written; and assert every incomplete external status, including an acknowledged non-erasure, is classified incomplete.","For C4, cross-check each erasure whose credential edge executed against the credential-deletion rows carrying the erasure reason for that subject. A subject who held no credentials owes no row; a destroyed credential with no row is reported.","For C4, read the vendor-revocation distribution of those rows, and cross-check each erasure's receipt: its connected-account vendor-grant effect must name the same credentials with the same outcomes. A row carrying no vendor-revocation outcome predates the revocation and is reported as unrevoked, never as revoked.","For C5, resolve applicability: does the application declare an externalDataPipeline? Then read the window's pipeline-run rows and the sum of their suppressedRows. A sum of zero is not a finding on its own — no erased record may have been read in the window — but after an erasure of a pipeline-copied row, drive or observe the next full and incremental pass and assert that the erased record's row did not come back as a live row and that the run's suppressedRows counted it.","For C6, read the generated recipient declaration and confirm it is current (`wildo config subject-data-recipients --check`), then read the window's recipient-outcome rows and their status distribution. Cross-check C1: every receipt's `recipient:<ref>` external effects must match the rows for that erasure. A declared operator-account recipient with no row for an erasure is reported; an UNMEASURED share names vendors whose erasure stance nobody declared."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:erasure-propagation-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:field-authority-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:field-authority-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: server-owned fields are engine-declared and the boot proof runs unconditionally.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The authority is NAMED in the declaration, and 'exactly one' is a property of that declaration rather than of any write. A second writer is a declaration defect, visible without running anything.","obligation":"A server-owned field has exactly one named authority that writes it.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The intent's own contrast — proven, not assumed — makes the boot outcome the evidence rather than the declaration. The outcome is a LOG line: no audit member exists for startup configuration validation and the validator emits no row, so a collector reads the host's archive on the host's retention, not an engine store. This clause said EMITTED until 2026-09-10.\n\n**And a clean boot does not prove C1.** The check is a SPELLING check: every name in the authority declaration must resolve to a persisted field. It collects the declarations from the operation variant and from every custom-implementation registration into one list and validates each INDEPENDENTLY — it never compares them for overlap, so it cannot detect the two-authorities-for-one-field case that is C1's obligation and this body's only MAJOR. A collector told a clean boot is the proof records C2 satisfied and C1 unchecked.","obligation":"And that authority is PROVEN at boot rather than assumed.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"C2 attests the CONFIGURATION that booted and goes stale the moment it changes. Neither clause evidences that the authority wrote correct values — only that exactly one of them can.","minimumEvidence":"C1: every server-owned field with its single named authority, from committed configuration — and, because no boot check compares declarations for overlap, an explicit cross-read for a field claimed by more than one authority. C2: the boot validation outcome from the accountable runtime's log — not from an API, since probing HTTP for a boot-time fact is a category error whose silence establishes nothing.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Two named authorities for one field is a MAJOR — the intent's stated harm is that a reader must work out which value is current. A boot that did not run the proof is insufficient_evidence for C2, not a pass.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate server-owned fields and assert each names exactly one authority.","Read the boot outcome for the running revision; a clean boot is the proof C2 asks for.","Assert no reader has to disambiguate: two authorities for one field is the defect even if only one ever writes."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:field-authority-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:first-exposure-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:first-exposure-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Both halves are engine-owned: every resource schema passes through the disclosure boundary, and the first-exposure row lands in the application's own audit store. From 2026-09-10 to 2026-09-14 the binding's one capability was gated on the Layer-2 audit fan-out, which made the WHOLE demand NOT_APPLICABLE without a provider — including C1, the non-disclosure boundary, which has nothing to do with audit events (#302).","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A non-disclosure produces no record: a field that never crossed emits nothing. The artifact is a driven assertion over the disclosure predicate, which now covers BOTH decorators — isBackendOnly and its sibling isWriteOnlySecret, held to the same boundary.","obligation":"Material a schema declares backend-only does not cross the client boundary.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each exposure was the FIRST for its resource, field and row — a second exposure of the same one is the defect, and only the rows' identities show it"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The one clause with a real occurrence: a first exposure is a per-occurrence row in the engine's audit trail. The intent's word 'single' is the control — an exposure that happens twice is the defect the audit row makes visible.","obligation":"Except at a single first exposure, which is itself audited.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["field_access"]}],"limits":"C1 attests the predicate and the DTO, not every surface that can render a value: a header assembled from an application's own declarations is outside the DTO and reaches the same material. C2 evidences exposures that were AUDITED, so it cannot see one that crossed by a path emitting nothing — which is what C1 exists to close.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven assertion that the response DTO refuses to emit any field the disclosure predicate marks non-disclosable, across both decorators. C2: FIELD_ACCESS rows for each first exposure in the window, keyed on the row identity the member actually carries.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A non-disclosable field crossing the boundary is a MAJOR. A second exposure of the same field is a MAJOR: 'single' is the control. A first exposure with no FIELD_ACCESS row is an OBSERVATION where the exposure was legitimate and only its evidence is missing — effectiveness and evidence-availability stay apart.","verificationSteps":["Drive the disclosure predicate across both decorators and assert the response DTO masks every non-disclosable field (C1).","Gather FIELD_ACCESS rows for the window and resolve each to a first exposure (C2). The identity is resource type PLUS field PLUS resource id — so N rows of one type produce N rows for the same field, correctly. Do NOT assert that a field appears once: the resource id is optional, and a field first-exposed once per row is expected to repeat across rows.","Assert no field has more than one first exposure PER ROW. Across rows a repeat is expected and correct — the member's identity includes the resource id — so asserting global uniqueness reports a MAJOR the moment two rows of one type exist.","Check any surface that renders a field OUTSIDE the response DTO. The retrieval-header path — a header assembled from application declarations — WAS such a surface and is closed: summary-field resolution now routes through the disclosure predicate, whose own docstring names that case as the defect it closes. Verify the routing rather than assuming either state; a second such surface would look exactly like the closed one until traced."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:first-exposure-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:ingested-content-inspection","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:ingested-content-inspection"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that accepts uploads. An application with no file field has nothing to inspect; note that is a genuinely empty population and not a declined control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Both halves are committed: the per-field scan policy on the file field, and the application-wide answer, which is DERIVED from the scanner topology an operator provisions and is refused a default. Neither is implicit in either direction, which is the property the clause asks for.","obligation":"Whether ingested content is inspected is a DECLARED decision — per field, and then per application.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The clause is about the JOIN — the downloadable set reads the same status the verdict writes, so inspected and servable are one decision rather than two that could disagree. A row carrying a clean status looks identical whether the join holds or not, so only driving an infected upload and asserting it is unservable evidences it.","obligation":"The inspection reaches a member of the file's own status vocabulary rather than an opaque success, and that same vocabulary decides servability.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the file it concluded was infected or could not scan"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class in the engine's own event store, so one collector query serves every application. The two are separate members deliberately: an infection is a conclusion about a real threat, an unrunnable scan is an operational fault, and merging them would make the alert that matters unreadable.","obligation":"A concluded infection and a scan that could not run are each attributable in the audit trail.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["file_malware_detected","file_malware_scan_failed"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The fail-closed half, and the one that cannot be read off a healthy deployment: with a scanner present, a refusing and a degrading implementation behave identically. The condition has to be created.","obligation":"A requested scan with no scanner available REFUSES rather than passing.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"The application-wide half of C1 was NOT true before 2026-09-09 — the resolution step read a configuration path no schema declared and answered negative in every application ever built, leaving the per-field policy the only reachable declaration. Evidence gathered against an earlier build is not evidence about this clause. C2 and C4 attest the build driven. And none of it evidences detection QUALITY: that a scanner concluded clean is not evidence that the content was.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the per-field scan policies and the provisioned scanner topology the application-wide answer derives from. C2: a driven infected upload, its terminal status, and a download attempt refused on that status. C3: the two audit members over the window. C4: a driven upload requesting a scan with no scanner reachable.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A servable file that was never inspected IS a MAJOR where its declared policy required inspection — and is not a finding at all where the application declared not to inspect, which C1 records as a legitimate decision and the downloadable set honours. Scoping matters here or the severity line contradicts C1: uploaded and linked files are downloadable and unscanned by design in an application that provisioned no scanner. Within the population that owes inspection, this is the objective's stated harm — the intent asks precisely that never-inspected and passed be distinguishable. A scan that could not run and passed anyway is a MAJOR. An infection concluded with no audit row is an OBSERVATION where the file was correctly quarantined and a MAJOR where it was not: the control operated in the first case and only the evidence export is missing.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate file fields and read each per-field scan policy, then the application-wide answer and the topology it derives from.","Upload a benign test pattern that a scanner concludes infected, and assert the terminal status is a member of the file status vocabulary.","Attempt to download that file and assert refusal — asserting the status alone leaves the join unproven.","Query the two audit members over the window and assert each row follows its terminal transition rather than preceding it.","Create C4's condition deliberately, because it is not reachable on a conformant deployment: an application with a scan-REQUIRED field will not boot without a scanner, and one without such a field initiates no scan to refuse. Drive it by requesting a scan against an unreachable scanner — the branch the service itself calls unreachable in a well-formed deployment — and assert refusal rather than a pass."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:ingested-content-inspection"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:key-retirement-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:key-retirement-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies wherever token signing keys rotate; an application that has never rotated has no retirement to evidence, which is not_applicable_as_configured rather than a gap.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The declared instant IS the control — the intent's contrast is with a key that stays trusted until someone edits configuration — and its presence is readable without running anything.\n\n**But it is NOT authored by the application, and this rationale said it was until 2026-09-10.** JWT rotation metadata is platform-managed bootstrap material fetched from the apps manager, and authoring it in backend config is a declared ERROR path. So a collector searching the application's committed configuration finds nothing and a judge raises a C1 gap against a control whose data lives in a platform-persisted document no operator surface writes. Gather it from the resolved application configuration, not from the repository.","obligation":"A rotated signing key can be given an explicit retirement instant.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"TWO effects, and a body must name both: advertisement is what a client discovers, verification is what a token relies on. A key removed from the advertised set while still verifying is the failure the clause exists to catch, and only driving both separates them.","obligation":"After which it stops being advertised and stops verifying tokens.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences the retirement MECHANISM at the instant driven, never that no token signed by a retired key was accepted earlier in the window. Retroactive assurance would need a per-verification record this control does not produce.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the retirement instant on each rotated key, read from the RESOLVED application configuration — platform-owned, not repository-committed. C2: a driven check past that instant asserting the key is absent from the advertised set AND that a token signed by it is refused.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A retired key that still verifies is a MAJOR: an aged or compromised key staying trusted is the harm the objective names. A retired key still advertised is a MAJOR of a different kind — clients will keep selecting it. A rotated key with no retirement instant is an OBSERVATION unless the application's policy requires one.","verificationSteps":["Read the retirement instant for each rotated key from the resolved configuration. A key with none is an OBSERVATION rather than C1's finding: no product surface authors one today, so an empty set says nothing about the application.","Past the instant, assert the key is not advertised.","Past the instant, present a token signed by it and assert refusal — separately from the advertisement check, because a key can pass one and fail the other."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:key-retirement-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:lawful-basis-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that processes personal data, which is every application with a user. The basis is the operator's declaration, so there is nothing to opt into — an application that has declared none is covered by this demand and reported by it as not having answered.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The basis is committed configuration (`operatorComplianceIdentity.lawfulBases`), and no runtime row records why a purpose is lawful — the declaration IS the record. The declaring schema makes a purpose without a basis unrepresentable, so this clause is met by reading the declaration rather than by searching it for omissions.","obligation":"Every declared processing purpose names the one lawful basis it rests on, from the closed set of six.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The clause that makes this demand worth stating, because it is the one member of the vocabulary that changes what must exist: legitimate interests is lawful only where a balancing test was actually done, so a declaration without one asserts a conclusion nobody reached. The declaring schema already refuses that combination, which is what makes the clause checkable at the declaration rather than at a notice written from it.","obligation":"A purpose relying on legitimate interests carries the balancing assessment behind it, stated rather than implied.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The declaration is optional in configuration, so its absence is representable and must be read. Absence means nobody has answered, which is an honest state; reading it as 'nothing to declare' converts an unanswered question into a claim about the product that no application with a user can truthfully make.","obligation":"The declaration is present. An application that declares no lawful basis is reported as UNANSWERED, never as having no processing to justify.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences what the operator DECLARED — never that the declared basis is legally sound for the processing it names. Whether a purpose really is necessary for a contract, or whether an interest really survives the balancing test, is a judgement for a qualified reviewer, and no clause here should be read as one.\n\nPurposes are the operator's own prose, deliberately: nothing structured exists to key them to, so this demand cannot show that the declared purposes are the COMPLETE set of processing the product performs. It reaches only the purposes somebody wrote down.\n\nAnd it attests the repository at a commit. The declaration is committed configuration, so the answer is about that revision and goes stale the moment the configuration changes, with nothing in the artifact to announce it.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C2: the committed `operatorComplianceIdentity.lawfulBases` declaration at the revision under review, parsed through its declaring schema so the legitimate-interests refusal runs rather than being re-implemented. C3: the same configuration, with the absence of the declaration recorded as an explicit finding.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A legitimate-interests basis with no assessment cannot occur through the declaring schema; one found anywhere else — a notice, a document drafted by hand — is a MAJOR, because it is exactly the statement a regulator reads first. An absent declaration is a MINOR on its own and a MAJOR when a privacy notice is published that states bases the configuration does not carry. An assessment that is generic rather than about this product is a MINOR with a specific remedy: state the interest, the necessity and the balance.","verificationSteps":["Parse the declaration through its own schema and record the result. A re-implemented check beside the schema is a second authority that can drift from the one the application actually boots against.","For every entry whose basis is legitimate interests, confirm an assessment is present and read it for content. An assessment that would be true of any application — 'our interests do not override the user's' — satisfies the field and discharges nothing.","Where the declaration is absent, assert the answer says UNANSWERED rather than reporting zero purposes.","Compare the declared purposes with what the application's privacy notice states. A purpose the notice names that the declaration lacks is a gap in the declaration, not in the notice."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:lifecycle-stage-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:lifecycle-stage-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The control is that a self-reported stage confers nothing, so an application whose users report stages freely is exactly the case it exists for.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Evidence of a NON-grant. Nothing is emitted when a capability is not conferred, so there is no occurrence to collect — the artifact is a driven scenario in which activation succeeds with no feature repository present at all, so a grant would have to reach a repository that is not there.","obligation":"A self-reported lifecycle stage confers no capability.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Scoping of the evaluator, driven with an explicit principal. The HTTP-tier half — that one user cannot make a request the backend attributes to another — is a different mechanism proven at the e2e tier, and this clause must not claim it.","obligation":"And it cannot cross a scope boundary — authority comes only from a decision an authorized party made.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences the EVALUATOR, never the transport. That user A cannot make a request attributed to user B is the context-addressed-singleton mechanism, proven elsewhere, and reading this evidence as covering it would claim a tier this demand never touched.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven activation with no feature repository bound, succeeding — the absence of the repository is what makes the non-grant provable rather than merely unobserved. C2: the evaluator driven with an explicit principal, asserting the OTHER subject's stage is untouched. Not the guidance write: the evaluator READS guidance and WRITES lifecycle, and the guidance write is a client API write scoped by the transport — which this body's own limits put out of scope.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A capability conferred from a self-reported stage is a MAJOR — it is the objective's entire subject. A scope crossing is a MAJOR. Absence of activity evidences nothing: a stage nobody reported produces no signal either way.","verificationSteps":["Drive activation with no feature repository bound and assert it succeeds (C1).","Drive the evaluator with an explicit principal and assert the write is scoped to it (C2).","Record explicitly that the transport tier is out of scope here: this evidences the evaluator's scoping, not the request attribution."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:lifecycle-stage-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that mints a credential — an API key or a client secret — which is every application with a machine caller. The mechanism is engine-owned and the marked declarations are on engine resources, so an application declines nothing by not participating.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row is the FIRST disclosure of that secret and names who received it — the same class also marks the stored artifact at first exposure, which only the row tells apart"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"One durable row class naming a principal and a FIELD. It fires on two disjoint markers, and a judge must read the row to tell them apart: the stored artifact at first exposure, and the secret actually handed to the caller — the same operation can produce one, the other, or both.","obligation":"The FIRST disclosure of server-minted secret material is an attributable, audited event.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["field_access"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A property of the emitter's payload contract, settled by reading it. The reason it is load-bearing rather than hygienic: rows reach the per-tenant export and, where the application enables the Layer-2 fan-out, an immutable ledger — copies an erasure of the application's own store cannot scrub — so recording the secret would turn the record OF a disclosure into a second, permanent copy of it. The row and the secret must never be the same artifact.","obligation":"The row names the FIELD and never carries its contents.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Coverage is a property of the committed declarations — which operations carry the below-risk-floor audit opt-in, and which fields carry the two disclosure markers. Note WHY the opt-in exists rather than a raised risk level: buying the row by mis-declaring a verb's danger would corrupt the risk vocabulary every other control reads.","obligation":"Every operation that discloses minted material is reachable by that audit, on both the operation and the field axis.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"The mechanism inspects the TOP-LEVEL response-DTO shape only: it does not descend into nested objects or collection elements, and the test that pins its coverage runs over the ENGINE registry alone. So C3's \"every operation is reachable by that audit\" holds for the engine's own minting surfaces and not for an application-authored marker in a nested shape.\n\nIt evidences FIRST disclosure. A later re-read of stored material, or a copy made outside the operation path, is a different question this row class does not answer — which is why the marker is on first exposure rather than on the field generally. And a row proves a disclosure was RECORDED, never that the recipient was entitled to it.","minimumEvidence":"C1: field-access rows over the window, each naming a principal, a field and whether it was the create-time exposure. C2: the emitter's payload contract, plus a scan of sampled rows for material matching a live credential. C3: the committed disclosure declarations across the minting resources, at both application and tenant scope.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A minting operation with no field-access row is a MAJOR: the credential exists and nothing says who received it. A row carrying the secret VALUE is a MAJOR and an incident — the ledger cannot be scrubbed, so the disclosure is permanent and the erasure obligation is broken with it. A verb whose risk level was RAISED to buy the row is an OBSERVATION about the declaration and a real one: it makes that verb read as more dangerous than it is to every other consumer of the risk vocabulary.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate the operations that mint or reissue credential material at both scopes, and assert each carries the audit opt-in.","Enumerate the fields carrying the two disclosure markers and assert each is one of those operations' outputs.","Drive a mint and a reissue, and assert a field-access row exists for each, attributable to the calling principal.","Assert the rows name the field and carry no value — scan the sampled rows for the minted material itself.","Distinguish the two markers on a row rather than counting rows: the stored artifact and the handed-out secret are different disclosures of different things."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:multi-factor-enrolment","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR","objectiveVersion":2},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:multi-factor-enrolment-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the verification authority is engine-owned and unconditional. Note the demand is about the AUTHORITY, not about enrolment coverage — an application whose users enrolled no second factor still has the control, and still has to satisfy it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a second verifier, which no committed specification can attest — a spec can say none was declared, never that none was built. A driven enumeration is engine-owned and uniform, so one query serves every application.","obligation":"Verification of an enrolled second factor goes through ONE authority — no caller builds a second door.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A driven scenario result. Production evidence would need a per-occurrence record this control deliberately does not produce.","obligation":"That authority is replay-resistant: a code or backup code used once cannot be used again.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"UNPRODUCED","homeRationale":"Timing-safety is a property of an execution that leaves no trace of having held. A scenario can assert the authority CALLS a constant-time primitive — which is C1's structural question wearing C3's clothes — and no artifact evidences that a particular verification was timing-safe.","obligation":"And timing-safe, so a match position cannot leak through timing.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It does not prove any user enrolled a second factor, and despite the slug it is not asked to. C1's enumeration attests the BUILD it was taken against — a door added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated, and nothing detects that. C2 proves the authority refuses a replay when DRIVEN, never that every production verification was replay-resistant.","minimumEvidence":"C1: an enumeration of every path verifying an enrolled second factor, each resolving to the single authority, plus the assertion that no other code compares a TOTP secret or consumes a backup code. C2: a driven scenario replaying a successful code and a consumed backup code, both refused. C3: nothing produces it; the constant-time primitive is confirmed by inspection, which evidences the CODE and not an execution. Deliberately NO audit members: the authority emits nothing by design and the MFA event members belong to the CALLERS — demanding them here would attribute a caller's evidence to a control that produces none.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A second verification path is a MAJOR — the intent names that failure mode explicitly, a second and weaker door onto the same credential. A replayable code or backup code is a MAJOR. C3 carries no severity: it is a framework-side absence, not an application's failure. MFA audit rows presented as evidence are a JUDGE defect rather than a finding, and they will look like thorough evidence.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate every verification path and resolve each to the single authority; a path that compares a secret itself is the finding, not a variant.","Drive a successful verification, replay the same code, and assert refusal.","Consume a backup code, replay it, and assert refusal.","Confirm the comparison primitive is constant-time by inspection and record C3 as UNPRODUCED with that as its only support.","Do NOT gather MFA audit rows as evidence: they evidence the callers' flows and would read here as coverage the authority does not provide."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:multi-factor-enrolment-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:operation-role-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record","evidence-requirement:operation-role-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the authorization funnel is engine-owned and every operation passes through it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each refusal names the principal it refused and the operation it refused them"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A per-occurrence row in the engine's audit trail. REFUSALS are the half that matters — a demand satisfied only by grants would evidence the opposite of the control.","obligation":"Access-control decisions, refusals included, are attributable and reviewable.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"recording every refusal stays bounded; a HIGH count is the availability risk this clause names, so the number cannot be read as the clause being met"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Same rows, read as a RATE rather than as instances. The clause carries its own tension — a control that records every refusal can be driven to exhaust storage — so evidence must show both that repetition is visible and that recording is bounded.","obligation":"Repeated refusals stay detectable without the record itself becoming an availability risk.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"Host-retained telemetry: a structured error log naming the lost action, plus two counters. NO audit member exists and that is a DECISION rather than a gap — recording \"the audit store was unreachable\" IN the audit store is circular, and the seam that emits these argues exactly that.\n\n**This clause said UNPRODUCED until 2026-09-10, which retired an implemented control from examination.** The marked site for this objective states the obligation in the implementer's own words — audit-pipeline failures are detectable AND attributable to the specific action they lost — and the log line carries the resource type, the resource id, the operation identifier, the variant key, the actor and the ambient correlation id. The body reasoned correctly that no member exists and then drew the wrong conclusion from it. UNPRODUCED carries no severity, so an application that had lost the control entirely — no error-level logger binding, no metrics service — would never have been asked.","obligation":"A failure of the recording pipeline is detectable and attributable to the specific action it lost.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences DECISIONS, never their correctness — a wrongly granted access is recorded exactly like a right one. And C1's rows come from the funnel: an authorization decision taken outside it is invisible here, which is why the funnel being the sole denial chokepoint is a separate and load-bearing property.","minimumEvidence":"C1: denial rows for the window, each attributable to a principal and an operation. C2: the same rows aggregated by principal and by operation, plus evidence that recording is bounded rather than unbounded. C3: the host's log and metric archive for the window — the rate-limited error line \"A security audit observation was DROPPED before it reached the audit pipeline\" (slug `audit_observation_dropped`), whose context carries the lost action's identity, and the two counters `audit_observation_dropped_total` (the observer never reached the pipeline) and `audit_store_failure_total` (the pipeline reached the store and the store refused). Both counters are needed because they cover DIFFERENT loss shapes and neither sees the other's. The boot diagnostic for an absent delivery path and the dead-letter drain may also be gathered, but they evidence the PIPELINE's health rather than the attribution this clause demands, and must not be substituted for it.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Denials absent while grants are present is a MAJOR — it is the exact shape of a funnel recording only successes, and establishing it requires gathering the GRANT side too, which is why the minimum evidence names both rather than denials alone. Without the comparison this rule cannot fire. Unbounded recording is a MAJOR against availability, which the intent names explicitly. For C3, a drop line naming lost authorization decisions is a MAJOR — access decisions were taken and are not in the trail, and the period's denial evidence is incomplete by an unknown amount. A metric channel that is inert because the OTLP preload is not wired is an OBSERVATION against the evidence rather than a finding against the application: the log channel still carries the signal, which is why the control has two.","verificationSteps":["Gather denial rows for the window and assert each carries a principal and an operation.","Read the DEDUPLICATION ladder as the bounding mechanism C2 asks about — it is what keeps the record from becoming an availability risk — and note it FAILS OPEN: when the counter store is unreachable, emission becomes unbounded exactly when availability is most at risk. That is the clause's own tension and the evidence must state which mode was in effect.","Aggregate by principal and by operation using the row's OWN occurrence count and its exactness flag — never by counting rows. Refusals are deduplicated on a logarithmic ladder inside a five-minute window, so a burst of ten thousand identical denials costs about five rows; counting rows reads five and concludes repetition was not occurring, which inverts the clause.","Confirm recording is bounded — the clause names availability as a risk of the control itself.","For C3, read the host's log archive for the drop line and its context, and the metric archive for both counters. A window with NO drop line and NO counter increment is the control working, not an absent control — so establish first that the loss seam could have fired: the line is rate-limited to one per (observation, reason) per interval, and the metric channel is silently inert when the OTLP preload is not wired, which is a finding about the evidence rather than about the application."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:authorization-decision-record"},{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Every clause is engine-owned; the non-controller-surface clause has an empty population where the application exposes no agent, retrieval or self-service surface, which is an absence of subject matter rather than a declined control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The declaration IS the control's subject and the input every other clause reads. An operation that declares nothing does not fail visibly — it is simply gated on nothing, and no runtime observation distinguishes that from an operation legitimately open.","obligation":"Every operation declares the authority it requires.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Evidenced by an attempted upward grant being refused, which no successful grant records. The population is larger than role assignment alone and each site is separate code: application roles, membership roles, unit assignments, and the roles requested when minting an API key or an OAuth client. Two of those are credential MINTS, where a successful escalation hands out a durable credential rather than merely changing a row.","obligation":"A principal can never grant authority it does not itself hold — role assignment and machine-credential minting are bounded by the caller's own ceiling.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"This is the clause the objective was widened for, and it is an enumeration plus a drive. Through the SAME predicate is the operative phrase: a second gate that agrees today is a bypass tomorrow, and the retrieval case shows why the ordering matters — the gate runs per resource type BEFORE anything is searched, so a caller whose roles would be refused a read never reaches the corpus at all.","obligation":"A non-controller surface facing an external caller applies the SAME declared operation-role gate, through the SAME predicate, before a self-service verb, a retrieval corpus or an agent-facing tool is reached.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"any refusal came from an agent surface rather than the HTTP tier — both write this one class by design, and only the row says which"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A durable row class. Sharing the funnel is what makes the refusals comparable: a denial from an agent surface and one from the HTTP tier are the same fact about the same declared authority, and splitting them by surface would make a repeated-refusal pattern invisible in exactly the case where it matters most.","obligation":"And a refusal is RECORDED, by the same funnel that records a controller-tier refusal.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C5","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A property of the operation vocabulary rather than of a runtime check: a self-service verb must not be a privilege-assignment or lifecycle-override surface, which is enforced by what its request contract can even EXPRESS. Least privilege applies to a request contract as much as to a role — a contract that cannot carry a role cannot be used to grant one, whatever the caller holds.","obligation":"An administrative action on another principal is authorized by the caller's ROLE, never by caller and subject being the same person.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"C1 and C5 attest declarations. C2 and C3 attest the build driven, at the sites driven — and C3's enumeration is the part that goes stale, since a surface added later will simply not be in it and will not fail. None of it evidences that the DECLARED authority is the right authority for the operation, which is a judgement no artifact carries.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared authority per operation, from the committed configuration. C2: driven upward-grant attempts at each site — membership roles, unit assignment, both credential mints, and application-role administration — each refused. C3: an enumeration of the non-controller surfaces with each resolving to the shared predicate, plus a driven refusal at each. C4: refusal rows over the window carrying the surface they came from. C5: the request contracts of the self-service verbs.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A successful upward grant is a MAJOR and, on a credential mint, an incident: the escalated authority left the system as a durable credential. A non-controller surface with no gate is a MAJOR — the controller tier's coverage is irrelevant to a caller that does not go through it. A second gate that duplicates the predicate rather than sharing it is a MAJOR even while it agrees, because agreement is not the guarantee. A refusal that leaves no row is an OBSERVATION alone and a MAJOR where a repeated-refusal pattern is part of the application's detection story. An operation declaring no authority is an OBSERVATION until its exposure is assessed, then whatever that assessment warrants.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate operations and assert each declares its required authority; list any that declare none and treat that list as the finding rather than as the baseline.","Attempt, as a caller holding a bounded role, to grant a higher one at all FIVE sites: a membership, a unit assignment, each of the two credential mints, and APPLICATION-ROLE administration. Assert refusal at every one. The application-role site was omitted from this step until 2026-09-10 and it is the highest-privilege of the five — an escalation there confers the super-administrator role itself.","Enumerate the non-controller surfaces and assert each reaches the SAME authorizer predicate, not an equivalent one.","Drive a refusal at an agent surface and at the retrieval surface, and assert the retrieval gate ran BEFORE the search rather than filtering its results.","Query refusal rows over the window and assert refusals from every surface land in one funnel.","Read the self-service request contracts and assert none can express a role or a lifecycle status."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:operation-role-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:operation-serviceability-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:operation-serviceability-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the declared operation surface is engine-mediated for every resource.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Declaration cannot evidence it — that a verb is declared is precisely what is not in question. Only driving the declared surface distinguishes reachable-and-implemented from declared-and-absent.","obligation":"A declared, API-reachable operation stays reachable and is actually implemented.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A false success emits a SUCCESS, so no row distinguishes it — the record of a lie looks exactly like the record of a truth, which is why this cannot be a PRODUCTION clause.\n\nBut do NOT drive the whole catalogue, which \"only driving the action and observing its effect separates them\" invited until 2026-09-10. The engine REFUSES TO START when a declared operation would answer success having performed nothing, and the same resolver refuses the request at dispatch — one engine-owned verdict, uniform across applications, readable in one query. Read the boot verdict first and drive only what it cannot decide.","obligation":"An interface must not report success for an action it did not perform.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Readable from configuration without driving anything — but NOT as a mismatch between what a verb writes and what the resource exposes, which is what this clause said until 2026-09-10 and is a check that cannot fail.\n\nThe engine's finding is an OVERBROAD INHERITED CONTRACT, and a verb in that state has inherited the resource's WHOLE contract — so the two sets are equal by construction, the comparison finds no widening, and every flagged operation passes. The engine's actual predicate is one bit: did this verb AUTHOR its own request contract? A verb that did not has whatever the resource exposes, which for a named verb is the mass assignment the intent names. Read the authored-contract bit, not a set difference.","obligation":"A named verb must not silently widen into an unconstrained write over fields its resource never exposed for update.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"C1 and C2 attest the BUILD they were driven against. An operation that regresses after the run is invisible until re-driven, and nothing currently detects that.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven call per declared API-reachable operation, reaching an implementation. C2: for each action with an observable effect, the effect confirmed after a reported success. C3: per named verb, whether it AUTHORED a request contract — and for those that did not, the inherited field set, which is the breadth they actually carry.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A success reported for an action not performed is a MAJOR and the intent's central harm. A declared operation with no implementation is a MAJOR. A named verb carrying an unauthored, INHERITED contract is a MAJOR — it is mass assignment wearing a named verb, and its field set will look correct against the resource because it IS the resource's. Note the generic core path persists only declared schema fields, so the harm is the verb's BREADTH rather than a write to a column the resource never had.","verificationSteps":["Drive each declared operation and assert it reaches an implementation rather than an acknowledgement.","For each success, confirm the effect independently — the report is the thing under test and cannot be its own evidence.","For each NAMED verb, assert it authored its own request contract. Do NOT compare its written fields against the resource's updatable set: a verb that authored none inherits exactly that set, so the comparison is equal by construction and passes precisely the operations the engine flags."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:operation-serviceability-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:outbound-call-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:outbound-call-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that enables any provider-backed capability; an application with none makes no provider calls and the egress half is not applicable as configured.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A structural property of the configuration, and a committed declaration is what a reviewer enumerates.\n\n**\"A SINGLE named egress\" is wrong, and this clause said it until 2026-09-10.** Resolution mode is a first-class declared property of each capability, and one capability declares FAN_OUT: the audit trail writes every event to EVERY configured destination, because its nature is additive rather than substitutable. So a correctly configured application with two audit sinks was reported by the old step as more than one egress, and by the old severity line as a MAJOR — against the configuration the entire assurance programme rests on. Read the mode first, then count against what it admits.\n\nNote also what this clause CANNOT reach: a second egress would be a CODE path, and no declaration enumerates code. What is enumerable is the per-capability provider selection, which names providers rather than paths. C2's store is what can show a call to a provider the selection does not name.","obligation":"Outbound traffic for a capability leaves through the providers that capability's DECLARED resolution mode admits, and no others.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"An ENGINE-owned store, `providerCallRecords`: one metadata-only row per provider call, written by the engine's recorder on every call and read for a window through `GET /assurance/provider-call-evidence`, which returns counts and no row. It is not an audit event and names no audit member, which is right: the audit trail records decisions about people, and a per-call record in it would drown them.\n\n**Until 2026-09-24 this clause was UNPRODUCED**, and why is the part worth keeping. The engine already emitted a per-call trace, and every destination of it was telemetry: a logger, an analytics vendor, an observability forwarder, the dev companion's files. None was a store a collector could query, and the trace was emitted only when an observability provider raised the traceability level above its default `NONE`. So the evidence depended on an observability choice. The record has its own seam, called before that gate, so it is written whatever the level.\n\n**Granularity, stated so it is not overread.** A row is one engine call to a provider: one agent invocation, one embedding batch, one document extraction. An agent invocation that loops through tools makes several HTTP requests to the provider under that one row, with usage summed. And a coding agent run over the Agent Client Protocol is an external process whose own provider calls the engine never sees, so it produces no row.","obligation":"Every physical provider call is recorded — provider, model, usage and outcome.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each probe row names the actor that initiated it"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A different call kind with a different question: a probe has no provider or model, and what a reviewer needs is WHO initiated it. Separate store, separate member, and a body merging C2 and C3 would demand provider fields of a call that has none. Unlike C2 this half IS an audit row, which is why the two cannot share a home.\n\nThe member was `PLATFORM_DIRECTORY_ACCESS` until 2026-09-10, and that was a demand borrowed from another objective: its own declaration is marked `WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT` and it records an unconfined administrative READ of application-wide data — not an outbound call at all. The member marked for THIS objective is the outbound administrative probe, which is emitted directly rather than through the audit service. Read the member's own marker before demanding it; the enum says which objective each member answers.","obligation":"And an administrative probe records its initiating actor.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["webhook_endpoint_test_dispatched"]},{"clauseRef":"C4","emittedCountLimit":{"absenceUnreadable":"The recorder is fire-and-forget, so a capability call whose row was dropped is exactly as silent as a window with no calls. Zero rows for an enabled capability with evidenced activity is read with audit_observation_dropped_total{observation=\"provider_capability_call\"}, never as a quiet period.","unreached":"that EVERY call left a row: a count shows the calls that were recorded and never the ones that were not, and a lost row is counted on audit_observation_dropped_total rather than in the trail"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The capability egresses are not model calls, so C2's store does not see them, and until #1712 nothing recorded them per call: the objective read as covered for the email, SMS, billing and storage traffic of every application. They now leave the record catalogue operations already leave — an audit row, the sibling `PROVIDER_CAPABILITY_CALL` — written by one recorder every egress calls: at the email and SMS services' single physical call, around every vendor-reaching method of the billing adapter (a table total over the adapter interface), and at each call a storage sends (Drive's round trips, the object store's calls; a Drive delete sends nothing and records nothing).\n\n**Subject-free by its schema, deliberately.** #412 declined any persisted record of a sent email, even metadata-only, because it would be a new personal-data store. So no field names a recipient, a number, a file, a customer or a payload; the row describes the egress. It is counted per capability.","obligation":"And every call a capability egress makes to a vendor — an email or SMS submission, a billing call, a storage call — is recorded with its provider, capability and outcome.","plane":"PRODUCTION","reportedAuditEventDataDistribution":{"field":"capability"},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["provider_capability_call"]}],"limits":"C1 evidences the declared PROVIDER SET and nothing about traffic, and it cannot evidence its own harder half, because a second egress would be a code path and no declaration enumerates code. C2 closes that half only for calls that pass through the engine's recording sites: `invokeAgent`, embeddings and document extraction. A provider SDK called directly from application code, or a coding agent's own calls, would leave no row, so an absent provider in C2 is evidence about the engine's call paths and not a proof that no other path exists. Recording is best-effort: a failed write never fails the call, so a store that stopped receiving rows shows as a quiet window, which is why an empty window is not read as conformance.\n\nC4 counts the calls that pass through the engine's capability egresses. Its row is one ACT of the application: a billing adapter call that pages through a list may make several HTTP requests under one row. A storage's readiness probe is not recorded — it carries no file and acts for no one, and a probe every few seconds would bury the calls the trail exists for. A storage a provider package contributes records only if its code calls the same recorder. Calls to a SYSTEM OF RECORD are not C4's, and their records are coarser than one per physical call — stated so they are not read as covering it: a read-through binding leaves one `HTTP_API_READ_THROUGH_ACCESS` row per OPERATION (a paginated list and its count are one access), a write one `HTTP_API_WRITE_THROUGH` row per attempt, a declared action one `SYSTEM_OF_RECORD_ACTION_EXECUTED` row per attempt, and a pipeline one row per RUN however many pages it read. A per-physical-call record for those lanes is not built. BROWSER-side egress — error monitoring, analytics, a frontend provider's own calls — never reaches a backend recorder, so it is OUT of scope here and is never implied covered; its consent is a separate requirement.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared egress per capability, and the enumeration showing no second path. C2: the provider-call counts for the window, grouped by provider, model, kind and outcome, with the records that lack a provider, a model or reported usage counted apart. C3: outbound-probe rows naming the initiating actor. C4: the capability-call rows for the window, counted per capability, with the outcomes nobody observed (`outcome_unknown`) named.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A provider configured for a capability whose declared mode does not admit it is a MAJOR. Several providers on a FAN_OUT capability are NOT a finding — that is the declared design. A probe with no actor is a MAJOR: attribution is the entire point of C3. For C2, a call to a provider no capability selects is a MAJOR (an undeclared egress); records missing their provider or model are a MINOR, because the call was recorded and only its attribution is incomplete; an empty window is an OBSERVATION, since an application that made no calls and a recorder that stopped writing read the same. For C4, a capability with evidenced activity and no row is a MAJOR (unrecorded egress); a provider C4 counted that C1 does not declare is a MAJOR; `outcome_unknown` rows are an OBSERVATION, the calls a reviewer reconciles with the vendor first.","verificationSteps":["Read each enabled capability's declared RESOLUTION MODE first. A select-one capability admits one active provider; a fan-out capability admits all configured ones, and counting more than one there is the control working. Assert the configured providers against what the mode admits — never against a flat expectation of one.","Read C2 from the provider-call evidence door for the window. Do NOT substitute a log search: a log is not an evidence store, and its retention is an operational setting rather than a retention decision.","Compare the providers C2 counted with the providers C1 found declared: a call to a provider no capability selects is the undeclared egress C1 cannot see on its own.","Report incomplete records (no provider, no model, no reported usage) as incomplete, never subtracted from the total and never read as calls that did not happen.","Gather administrative outbound-probe rows separately and assert each names its initiating actor, its scope and its destination HOST — never the full URL, since customer endpoint paths routinely embed per-tenant tokens and these rows replicate to the tenant SIEM and the immutable store.","Read C4 per capability. A capability the application enables (email, SMS, billing, a vendor storage) with activity in the window and no capability-call row is the gap C4 exists to show; compare its providers with C1's, and read `audit_observation_dropped_total` for `provider_capability_call` before reading an empty capability as silence."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:outbound-call-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:outbound-target-admission-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.NETWORK.OUTBOUND_TARGET_CONTROL","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:outbound-target-admission-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: webhook delivery, SIEM export, federated sign-in, A2A push, MCP and client-metadata resolution are engine-owned request paths. What varies is which of them an application exercises, never whether the admission governs them.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The resolution is a pure, total function of the class and the environment, and the environment is the value the operator declares for the deployment — a backend refuses to start with `APPLICATION_ENV` unset, and an environment a hydrating runtime did not declare resolves here as production. Reading the declared environment and the class table reproduces the admission for every class.","obligation":"Every such request names its target class, and its admission is resolved from the class and the operator-declared runtime environment.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A shape check and a connection-time check look identical against a well-behaved destination. Only a name that answers a private address when connected to, and a server answering with a redirect, separate them.","obligation":"A name that resolves to a refused address is refused at connection time, and a redirect is not followed.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The relaxation's safety rests on its NARROWNESS, which no production observation can show: a deployment that never met a metadata-address destination looks the same whether loopback-only admits it or not.","obligation":"Loopback is admitted only in a development or test runtime, and link-local and private-network space never under that admission.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"Destinations an application's own backend configuration declares — a provider API endpoint, an external-data binding — are trusted as authored and are outside this objective; only their redirect refusal is shared. Platform topology is operator configuration and private by design. And the environment is only as honest as the operator's declaration: a production deployment declared as development admits loopback. An operator may also admit private-network SIEM collectors by declaration; a private collector reached under that declaration is the escape working, not a finding.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared runtime environment and the resolved admission per class. C2: a driven request to a public-looking name resolving to a private address, and one to a server answering 302. C3: the same metadata-address and private-network targets under a development runtime.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A request from a tenant-, client- or stranger-chosen destination reaching a link-local or private-network address in production is a MAJOR — it is a request-forgery primitive. A development runtime admitting more than loopback is a MAJOR. A refusal recorded only in the application log is an OBSERVATION for the classes that write no audit row, never a nonconformity: those classes report the refusal to their caller by design.","verificationSteps":["Read the deployment's declared runtime environment and resolve the admission for every target class.","Start the backend with `APPLICATION_ENV` unset and assert it refuses to start, naming the variable.","Drive a request whose destination name resolves to a private address and assert it is refused before any byte is sent.","Drive a request to a server that answers with a redirect to a metadata address and assert exactly one request was made.","Under a development runtime, assert a loopback destination is reached and a link-local or private-network destination is still refused."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:outbound-target-admission-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:over-limit-refusal-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:over-limit-refusal-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application, unconditionally: the bound is engine-mounted and no application opts out. Note the asymmetry a judge must carry — the intent speaks of an unauthenticated request generally, and the single marked site bounds ONE unauthenticated surface.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The bound is a committed constant applied at a named mount, so reading the mount answers the clause. No occurrence evidences a bound — a window with no oversize request looks identical whether the cap exists or not.","obligation":"An unauthenticated request consumes a bounded amount of resource.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A status code is a driven result. It is also the half that silently regresses: a body-parser rejection that reaches no translator surfaces as a 500, and a 500 on an unauthenticated surface is an availability signal an attacker reads rather than a refusal.","obligation":"An over-limit request is answered as a CLIENT error rather than surfacing as a server failure.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"The marked mount is one unauthenticated surface, and the framework-wide BODY-SIZE bound is elsewhere and unmarked: a configurable request-body limit with an application-overridable default, applied to every other route. An earlier revision of this section named the body-parser CLASSIFIER and the perimeter RATE limiter instead — the first is a C2 property and the second bounds request rate rather than size, so neither is the other bound a judge weighing \"an absent bound is a MAJOR\" needs to know about. That the application can CHANGE its own default is the part worth carrying: a collector following markers under-reports coverage, which is the safe direction, but it also never sees the value that actually governs every unmarked route.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the mounted limit and the routes it covers. C2: a driven oversize POST answered 413 with the status preserved, and a malformed body answered as a client error. Do NOT expect a 415 for an unacceptable content type: the parsers are TYPE-MATCHED, so a foreign content type is SKIPPED rather than rejected and no 415 is produced — the mount's own test asserts 413, 400 and 200 and never 415. The translator handles any body-parser rejection, not two named ones.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An over-limit request answered 500 is a MAJOR: the intent names exactly that outcome. An absent bound on an unauthenticated surface is a MAJOR. Evidence gathered at only the marked mount is an OBSERVATION about COVERAGE, never a nonconformity — see the limits, where the under-report runs in the safe direction.","verificationSteps":["Read the committed body limit and the mount path it is applied at.","POST a body exceeding it to an unauthenticated token route and assert 413, not 500.","POST a malformed body of an accepted type and assert a client error rather than a 500. Do NOT assert 415 on a foreign content type — the parsers skip it and a downstream 200 or 400 is correct, so asserting 415 raises a MAJOR against a working mount.","Assert the same routes under GET are unaffected — they carry no body and the translator is a no-op for them."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:over-limit-refusal-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:persistence-isolation-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:persistence-isolation-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application whose resources do not all sit on the default adapter. An application on one adapter has an empty population; the refusal below still runs and still protects it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The declaration is a committed member of a named vocabulary on the resource config. Nothing observable at runtime distinguishes a resource that declared from one that was never asked, because the refusal happens at registry build and a booted application has already passed it.\n\n\"Non-default\" is narrower than it sounds and a judge must resolve it before counting: the obligation reaches only adapters that OWN a transaction. A resource on a read-through or introspection adapter is skipped before the door — it takes part in no atomic boundary, so it owes no declaration — and treating those as an undeclared population is the derive-before-you-ask defect exactly: a ratio whose denominator the reviewer chose.","obligation":"A resource declares its persistence isolation before it may sit on a non-default adapter.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is the refusal, which only exists when the bad configuration is presented. A booting application evidences that ITS configuration passed, never that a failing one would be refused.","obligation":"A configuration whose cross-resource writes could not be atomic is REFUSED when the registry is built, rather than discovered under load.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Without this clause a judge reading C1 alone would take the declaration for a waiver, which is the one reading that makes the control dangerous. The compatibility assessment still classifies such a boundary as mixed and the unit of work still throws — evidenced by driving that boundary, not by reading the declaration.","obligation":"And the declaration buys the right to BOOT, never a silent degradation: a declared resource actually reached by a cross-adapter atomic boundary still fails there.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It attests the registry BUILD. An adapter assignment made outside the registry, or changed after it, is invisible here. And it evidences that atomicity cannot be silently LOST — never that any particular write was atomic, which is a different question with a different answer per boundary.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared isolation member per resource on a non-default adapter, and the resource-to-adapter map. C2: a driven registry build over an undeclared mixed set, refused. C3: a driven cross-adapter atomic boundary over a DECLARED resource, throwing.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A mixed set that booted with neither a declaration nor the sanctioned platform option is a MAJOR — the guarantee was lost silently, which is exactly what building the check at registry time exists to prevent. A resource on a non-transactional adapter with no declaration is NOT a finding in any degree: it was never in the population. A declared resource that then throws at a boundary is the control WORKING: an OBSERVATION about that configuration, never a nonconformity. The tolerance option set with no recorded reason is an OBSERVATION.","verificationSteps":["Map each resource to its adapter, then scope the population to TRANSACTION-OWNING adapters before asserting anything. The registry skips a resource on a read-through or introspection adapter BEFORE the isolation door, deliberately — such a resource owns no transaction, so it cannot break atomicity and is never asked to declare. Asserting over every non-default adapter raises a MAJOR on correct configuration; real resources rely on that skip.","Within that population, assert every resource carries an isolation declaration.","Build a registry over a mixed set with no declaration and no platform tolerance option, and assert refusal.","Drive a cross-adapter atomic write over a resource that DID declare, and assert it throws at the boundary rather than committing partially.","Do NOT look for the platform dual-store tolerance option in an application: it is forced on only inside the platform's own validation path, and this objective's governance scope is the application. It is named in the severity guidance for completeness and is unreachable here."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:persistence-isolation-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:personal-data-field-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:personal-data-field-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that stores personal data. The DECLARATION mechanism is engine-owned; what is declared is the application's own, which is what makes C3 below unevidenceable rather than merely unevidenced.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The decorator on the field IS the inventory. There is no second store to query and no occurrence to observe: a field holding personal data emits nothing by holding it.","obligation":"Categories of personal data are declared ON THE FIELD, in the committed schema.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is the ABSENCE of a name-reading producer, so the ENUMERATION is the artifact — the same shape as the one-authority clause of multi-factor-enrolment-record. A declared inventory looks identical whether it was authored or pattern-matched, so nothing but enumerating the producers separates them. Exactly ONE derivation is expected and must be found: the credentials category.\n\n**Its inputs are FIVE paths, not three, and this rationale said three until an independent judge counted them.** The password and one-time-code predicates each check a structural marker FIRST and then fall back to a string-UI edit mode; the write-only-secret predicate is the third marker. The clause's obligation still holds — an edit mode is authored by a developer, not read off a field's name — but a UI RENDERING choice is a different kind of declaration from a privacy marker, and a body that enumerates a derivation's inputs owes the reader the real set. A collector asserting \"three marker inputs\" and finding five would report a drift that is not one.","obligation":"No category is INFERRED from a field's identifier.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The PROVABLE half of completeness, and it is produced today: a derived per-resource set of fields the application declared personal by another door — an impersonalization treatment, a portability provenance — that carry no category. Its own words: the omission is provably an omission rather than a judgement that the field is not personal, BECAUSE the application said it was personal by another door.\n\nThat is a denominator the FRAMEWORK defines rather than one a reviewer chose, which is what makes it reportable at all. It is derived on demand and stored nowhere, so OBSERVED.\n\n**This was folded into a single UNPRODUCED completeness clause until 2026-09-10** — the permissive-direction error, since UNPRODUCED carries no severity and the body then told a judge that a field with no declaration is not a finding. It said that of a live gap report.","obligation":"A field the application ALREADY declared personal by another door, and which carries no category, is reported.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"UNPRODUCED","homeRationale":"The UNKNOWABLE remainder, and nothing can produce it. The objective's own reasoning is why: an inventory assembled by pattern-matching identifiers is a guess whose misses are silently undisclosed — an argument that disqualifies a completeness CHECKER as thoroughly as it disqualifies a name-inferring producer. A field called `notes` holding a case history is invisible to both, and to C3, because nothing else marks it either.\n\nRecording THIS much as UNPRODUCED is honest; recording C3 as part of it was not.","obligation":"And the inventory is COMPLETE — every field holding personal data is declared, including fields nothing else marks.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences what was DECLARED, how the declarations were produced, and the subset of omissions the application itself proves. It cannot evidence what nothing marks — the half a data-protection reviewer most wants — so say so rather than letting a clean C1 and an empty C3 read as a complete inventory. C2 attests the producer set as enumerated; one added afterwards is invisible until re-enumerated.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared category set per field, read off the committed schema, and for every resource bound or piped to a system of record, which of those categories reach it (`systemOfRecordFlowsOfResource`, #1709 — the same derivation the recipients fact and the selected-processor evidence read, so the three cannot disagree). C2: an enumeration of every producer of a field's category set, with the single marker-derived category identified and its inputs shown to be markers. C3: the derived uncategorized-personal-field set, per resource. C4: nothing.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A producer that derives a category from an identifier is a MAJOR and is the objective's stated failure, whatever its hit rate. A field whose declared categories are wrong is a MAJOR. A field in the C3 set — declared personal by another door and left uncategorized — is a MAJOR against the APPLICATION: it is a disclosure gap the application can close and the framework has already proved — and it is reported with the system of record it reaches, when it reaches one, because that recipient's categories are then reported NOT DERIVABLE in the notice. A field nothing marks at all is NOT a finding on this evidence: that is C4, which carries no severity, because reporting it would mean asserting a population nobody can enumerate — a count about the search rather than about the world.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate fields carrying a declared data-category set and the categories each names.","For each resource bound (`httpApiBinding`) or piped (`externalDataPipeline`) to a system of record, derive which declared categories reach that instance: every field for a read-through binding, the mapped fields for a pipeline. A C3 field among them is named WITH the instance, because it makes that recipient's disclosed categories incomplete.","Enumerate every producer that writes into that set and assert none reads the field identifier.","Assert the one derived category derives from AUTHORED inputs and not from names — and enumerate them rather than counting: there are five paths, two of which are a string-UI edit mode reached as a fallback behind a structural marker.","Gather the derived uncategorized-personal-field set per resource (C3) and report every entry. Each is a field the application itself declared personal by another door and left uncategorized, so the omission is provable rather than inferred.","Record C4 as UNPRODUCED. Do NOT approximate it with a name-based sweep — that reproduces the exact defect the objective refuses, and C3 is the only part of completeness that can be reported without one."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:personal-data-field-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:privileged-access-review-occurrences","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"APPLICABLE to every application: both required capabilities are ALWAYS_AVAILABLE — capability:audit-events is the application's own audit store and capability:privileged-access-review the enumeration. That status is DERIVED, not judged: deriveExpectationCapabilityApplicability returns APPLICABLE when every required capability is available, NOT_APPLICABLE when all are unavailable, and UNDETERMINED when only some are. A collector reads the status first rather than deciding. Availability says nothing about the HUMAN act this demand records, which is supplied as a host artifact. Until 2026-09-14 the audit capability was gated on the Layer-2 fan-out, and this read UNDETERMINED.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A live DERIVED READ, not a record: the enumeration is computed from the current role graph when asked, and the boot report that surfaces it writes a debug line rather than a row. So it is reproducible on demand and stored nowhere — which is what OBSERVED means, and it is why a review must attach the enumeration it read rather than cite a query that will answer differently tomorrow.\n\nIt said EMITTED — \"in the engine's own store\" — until 2026-09-10, restating the home rather than supporting it. There is no store, and a collector was pointed at one.","obligation":"The enumeration a review reads — who currently holds privileged access.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The second half of the intent's first demand, and a genuinely different artifact from the enumeration: rows in the engine's own store, queryable for the period a review covers. The body demanded them in PROSE and named no member until 2026-09-10, so a collector reading its query off the structured field asked for nothing.","obligation":"The ACCESS EVENTS behind the enumeration — the grants and removals it summarises.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_app_roles_changed","organization_member_role_changed","organization_unit_member_role_changed","organization_unit_member_removed"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"No engine mechanism produces it, none can, and none should: a review is a human act, and a framework that synthesised one would manufacture the evidence it is meant to collect. The framework's obligation is to make C1 and C2 available and to accept and retain C3. PRODUCTION because the review is performed against the live deployment — that the engine cannot OBSERVE it is carried by the home, not by the plane.","obligation":"The review OCCURRENCE — that authorized people examined that enumeration and decided.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"C3 is self-attested by construction. The framework can retain it and check that it cites the enumeration and falls within the declared cadence; it cannot evidence that the examination was competent or independent.\n\nAnd a review record evidences that access was EXAMINED, never that anything was remediated. The marked site says so and the caveat survives into the host artifact: a completed review with findings left open is a conformant review. Do not read C3 as closure.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the current privileged-access enumeration, ATTACHED as returned rather than cited as a query. C2: the four privilege-change members over the review period. C3: the operator-supplied review record, as a host artifact — who reviewed, what enumeration they read, what they decided — plus the declared review cadence it is checked against.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A missing C3 with a healthy C1 and C2 is a MAJOR against the OPERATOR, not the framework — the record was never supplied. A missing C1 or C2 is a MAJOR against the framework: the review had nothing to read. A review outside its declared cadence is a MAJOR against the operator. A capability-keyed classifier that reports this demand satisfied on C1 alone has silently dropped the half the objective is named for.","verificationSteps":["Resolve applicability first; if the two capabilities resolve differently, record UNDETERMINED and stop.","Drive the enumeration and ATTACH what it returned (C1). It is a live derived read, so a citation of the query rather than its result evidences nothing — the same query answers differently tomorrow.","Query the four privilege-change members for the period the review covers (C2). Formerly demanded in prose only, so a collector reading the structured field asked for nothing.","Accept the host-supplied review record and check it cites the enumeration it read, not a re-derived one (C3).","Never synthesise C3 from C1 or C2: an enumeration is what a review READS, never evidence that a review happened.","Assert the review fell within a declared CADENCE, and record the cadence. The intent says PERIODICALLY, and without this one five-year-old record satisfies C3 — this is a judgement the framework cannot make, so the cadence must be stated by the operator and checked against, not inferred."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:privileged-access-review-occurrence"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: roles and memberships are engine-owned, and the demand covers whichever privilege kinds an application uses.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the assignment and the direction of its change, which is what lets a life be reconstructed rather than a current state inferred"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The intent's contrast is the control: a current-state read (who holds what NOW) satisfies nothing here. Only an append-only per-occurrence class evidences a life, which is why the audit trail rather than the role table is the store.","obligation":"Every grant, widening, narrowing and revocation of privilege leaves durable evidence of the assignment's FULL LIFE, not merely its current state.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_app_roles_changed","organization_member_role_changed","organization_unit_member_role_changed","organization_unit_member_removed","platform_access_grant_lifecycle"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"all four privilege kinds are covered — the discretionary and subscription-derived kinds are evidenced only by before-and-after values inside generic operation rows"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The intent ENUMERATES four kinds, so coverage is per-kind and a body naming only role changes would report a satisfied demand while two kinds go unevidenced. A subscription-derived privilege is the easiest to miss: nobody grants it, a billing state change does.\n\nThe last two kinds have no purpose-built member and do not need one: the discretionary entitlement and the subscription-derived kind are evidenced by BEFORE-AND-AFTER values riding the generic resource-operation row, because the scope-feature and subscription-status fields carry the audit-evidence marker and are marked for this objective. That is the mechanism, and this clause named neither it nor a member until 2026-09-10 — leaving a collector with a per-kind coverage obligation and no query for half of it.","obligation":"Across all four privilege kinds — a role, a unit-scoped membership, a discretionary entitlement, a subscription-derived one.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_performed"]}],"limits":"It evidences that a privilege CHANGED, never that the change was authorized — a grant made by someone entitled to make it and one made wrongly are recorded identically. Authorization is the decision demand's question.","minimumEvidence":"C1: lifecycle rows for the window, each naming the assignment, the direction of change and the actor. C2: coverage per privilege kind. For the discretionary and subscription-derived kinds that means generic resource-operation rows carrying before-and-after values on the scope-feature and subscription-status fields — not lifecycle rows, which those transitions never produce because they originate in billing rather than in an administrative act.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Evidence that only reports current state is a MAJOR — it is precisely what the intent excludes. A missing privilege kind is a MAJOR for that kind, not for the demand as a whole. A row without an actor is an OBSERVATION where the transition was legitimate and only its attribution is thin.","verificationSteps":["Gather lifecycle rows and assert each names the assignment, the change direction and an actor.","Partition by privilege kind and report per-kind coverage; a kind with no rows in a window that had activity is the finding.","Reconstruct one assignment's full life from the rows alone, without reading current state — that reconstruction IS the demand.","Check the subscription-derived kind specifically: its transitions are not administrative acts and a role-shaped query misses them."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:reconstructable-authorization-effect","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:reconstructable-authorization-effect"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The generic resource-operation row is engine-owned, so no application builds the lane and none opts out — but it is emitted for a BOUNDED population, not for \"every privileged action\" as this field claimed until 2026-09-10: an automatic risk floor of HIGH-or-CRITICAL, plus operations that declare a below-floor opt-in, and never for a read. Sampling MEDIUM-risk privileged actions and reporting the missing rows raises nonconformities against the designed floor.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the actor who performed the privileged action and the operation it performed"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"One durable row class in the engine's own store, carrying the operation identity triple, the actor, and the correlation id that groups a cascade. One collector query serves every application.","obligation":"A privileged action on a resource is attributable.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_performed"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the authorization EFFECT is reconstructable from the row itself, which is the whole difference between this clause and C1 and is a question about payload"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The clause is about what the row CARRIES: the actor's roles as they stood, and before-and-after values for every field marked as audit evidence. Re-deriving from today's role tables answers a different question — what the actor could do NOW — and a role change that does not record its old and new values proves nothing at all.","obligation":"The authorization EFFECT the action had is reconstructable from the record itself, rather than re-derived from role tables afterwards.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_performed"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"TWO audit configurations exist and they are evidenced differently — name which one a finding is about. The single-sign-on scoped block carries the audit-evidence marker, so a change to it IS a resource-operation row; the application-level trail configuration is a committed config block that produces no row, and only the committed history evidences a change to it. The severity line below is true of the first.\n\nThe block is committed, and the reason it is in scope is the pre-incident tampering move: disabling event logging or shortening the retention window must not be the one change the trail cannot evidence. A row cannot evidence its own absence, so the declaration is the only artifact that can.","obligation":"The configuration deciding what the trail captures is itself governed as part of the trail.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Which fields are marked as audit evidence is a committed decision per field, and it is a two-sided one. Marking a personal-data field would manufacture an unerasable duplicate in a ledger that cannot be scrubbed — in direct conflict with the erasure obligation and with the impersonalization capability built to satisfy it. Not marking an authority-bearing one empties C2.","obligation":"And the field set the row carries is bounded by the erasure obligation: authority-bearing values are recorded, personal data is not.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences that the effect is RECONSTRUCTABLE from what the row carries, never that any reconstruction performed was correct. It attests the window. And it says nothing about actions taken outside the resource-operation path — a direct datastore write leaves no row and is invisible here, which is the one gap no row class can close.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C2: resource-operation rows over the window carrying the operation triple, the actor and its roles as they stood, the correlation id, and before-and-after values for the audit-evidence fields. C3: the committed audit configuration and its own change history. C4: the audit-evidence field set, cross-read against the declared personal-data categories.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A privileged action with no row is a MAJOR. A row from which the authorization effect cannot be reconstructed — a role change with no prior value — is a MAJOR, and it is the clause the objective is named for. A personal-data field marked as audit evidence is a MAJOR in the OTHER direction: the trail is working and the erasure obligation is broken, permanently, because the ledger cannot be scrubbed. An audit configuration change with no record is a MAJOR.","verificationSteps":["Sample privileged actions from the window and assert each has a row naming actor, operation triple and correlation id.","For a role-bearing change, assert the row carries the OLD and NEW values rather than only the new one.","Assert the reconstruction uses the roles the row recorded, not the role table as it stands today — those answer different questions.","Read the audit configuration and assert a change to it is itself evidenced.","Cross-read the audit-evidence field set against the declared personal-data categories and assert no field appears in both."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:reconstructable-authorization-effect"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:record-context-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:record-context-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the trusted-system write path is engine-owned and every audit row passes through it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"SURVIVAL is a property of a transformation, and no row evidences it: a record whose actor was replaced looks exactly like one that always named that actor. Only driving a write with a known actor and tenant and reading the persisted row back separates them.","obligation":"The actor and tenant an audit row names survive the trusted-system write that persists it.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"A field-presence property of live records, checkable in the window — but the records are LOG lines and the framework owns no log store. The logger writes to stdout or an exporter, so the archive a collector reads is the HOST's, on the host's retention.\n\nThis clause said EMITTED until 2026-09-10, which told a collector to query an engine-owned record class that does not exist. Note C1 above IS correctly EMITTED — the audit repository is a real store — so the two halves of this demand are gathered from two different places, which is the thing a judge most needs to be told.\n\nIt is the clause that makes a record attributable across deployments: without it two environments' rows are indistinguishable once pooled.","obligation":"And a log record names which application and which environment produced it.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"C1 attests the write path DRIVEN, not every production write; a second path that persists rows without passing through it is invisible here. C2 evidences presence of the identifiers, never that they are correct.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven trusted-system write with a known actor and tenant, and the persisted row read back carrying both unchanged. C2: log records from the window carrying application and environment identifiers.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A row naming the trusted system instead of the principal is a MAJOR — it is the intent's stated harm, a record silently losing the principal it belongs to. A tenant replaced is a MAJOR and also a tenancy defect. A log record without application or environment is an OBSERVATION alone and a MAJOR once records from two deployments are pooled, which is the case the clause exists for.","verificationSteps":["Drive a write as a trusted system on behalf of a known principal in a known tenant.","Read the persisted row and assert the actor and tenant are the ones supplied, not the trusted system's own.","Sample log records from the window and assert application and environment are present."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:record-context-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:redirect-target-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:redirect-target-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to any application that registers OAuth clients. An application registering none has nothing to evidence and has not failed the control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The registered target set is committed configuration and the dangerous schemes are a closed vocabulary with one named runtime source — exported for exactly this reason, so this demand reads the set the guard branches on instead of transcribing it into a second list free to drift.\n\n**It is a DENYLIST, and this clause demanded membership in a permitted set until 2026-09-10 — an inversion.** The source states the reason an allowlist is impossible: the set of legitimate app schemes is OPEN, and every entry would be a new client the framework has to be taught about. A collector asserting membership would refuse every conformant private-use scheme a native or CLI client registers, which is the exact regression the guard's own history records a real client hitting. The danger is a scheme's CAPABILITY — executing, or reading local state — not its unfamiliarity.","obligation":"Every registered redirect target is a safe absolute URL whose scheme is NOT a member of the named dangerous set, and which carries no fragment and no embedded credentials.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A clean registered set proves nothing on its own — it is equally consistent with a guard that refuses and with an application nobody has yet attacked. Only a driven refusal separates them.","obligation":"A target outside that set is REFUSED at registration.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences REGISTRATION under a DENYLIST, so it can never evidence that a permitted scheme is safe — only that it is not one of the shapes known to execute or read local state. A capability the denylist has not been taught is admitted, by design. It says nothing about whether the authorization endpoint matches a presented redirect target against the registered set — a distinct control, and the one an open-redirect actually travels through. A custom scheme registered by a legitimate native client is admissible here and is not thereby proven to be controlled by that client.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the registered clients and their targets — for BOTH registered families, since post-logout targets pass the same gate — checked against the exported dangerous-scheme vocabulary by reference. C2: driven registration attempts carrying a script-executing scheme, an inline-data scheme, a relative target, a fragment, and embedded credentials, each refused.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A stored script-executing or inline-data target is a MAJOR and is the delegation primitive the intent names by consequence, not by category. A registration accepted for a scheme IN the dangerous set is a MAJOR whatever the target turned out to be. An unfamiliar private-use scheme is NOT a finding — it is the case the denylist exists to permit — and neither is a loopback http target: the rule is deliberately not https-only, because that would refuse the conformant native and CLI flow.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate registered OAuth clients and BOTH registered target families — redirect and post-logout redirect.","Assert each target parses as an absolute URL and its scheme is NOT in the exported dangerous set. Do NOT assert membership in a permitted set: there is no allowlist, and asserting one refuses conformant native clients.","Assert no target carries a fragment or embedded credentials — two refusals the guard makes that a scheme check alone misses.","Attempt to register a script-executing scheme and assert refusal.","Attempt to register a relative target and assert refusal."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:redirect-target-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:refusal-classification-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:refusal-classification-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Both marked controls are engine-owned; the second is reachable only where enterprise single sign-on is configured, which narrows its POPULATION and not its obligation.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A sanitized value produces a successful response, so there is no record of the refusal that did not happen. Only driving a filter that carries an operator and asserting the WHOLE value was refused separates rejection from stripping — and the site names why the distinction matters: a partially-stripped operator object is a filter the caller did not ask for, which is its own kind of wrong answer.","obligation":"Untrusted input is rejected WHOLE rather than partly sanitized.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The condition has to be created to be observed. A production window in which the dependency was present evidences nothing about the window in which it is not.","obligation":"A validator whose dependency is unavailable fails CLOSED on what it guards.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"This is the clause the requirement is really named after, and it is a property of the ERROR the refusal carries: a configuration problem with an actionable remedy, never an assertion-invalid verdict. Both outcomes refuse; only the classification tells an operator whether to look at the identity provider or at their own toolchain.","obligation":"And that degradation is CLASSIFIED distinctly from a rejected signature.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"Two marked sites for a principle the intent states generally — every other control that must refuse when it cannot evaluate is outside this evidence, and a clean result here is not an application-wide fail-closed claim. C2 and C3 attest the BUILD driven; note in particular that the validator dependency is a COMPILED artifact whose absence is per-workspace, so a probe in one workspace says nothing about another.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven query filter carrying an operator object, and the whole-value refusal it produced. C2 and C3: the validator driven with its dependency removed, and the error TYPE and code it produced.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A partially sanitized filter is a MAJOR. A validator that degrades OPEN is a MAJOR and is the objective's whole subject. A degraded validator reporting an invalid signature is also a MAJOR, and the reason is diagnostic rather than cryptographic: it sends the operator at the identity provider while the fault is in the local toolchain, so the outage outlives the diagnosis.","verificationSteps":["Send a filter value carrying a structured operator and assert THE VALUE DID NOT REACH THE QUERY. That is the evidence, not a request-level refusal: the guard DROPS the offending key and the request proceeds on the remaining filter, so on the agent surface the caller sees a 200. Where a refusal does occur it comes from the request contract, which is a different mechanism — asserting one on a surface that normalizes rather than parses reports a MAJOR against the marked control.","Assert the permitted scalar set is a named predicate and that a new structured shape would require a deliberate edit to it.","Remove the validator dependency, drive an assertion, and assert the refusal is a configuration error carrying a remedy.","Assert that refusal is NOT reported as an invalid signature — the two must be separable by an operator reading only the error."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:refusal-classification-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:reserved-claim-set-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:reserved-claim-set-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to any application issuing ID tokens. The set and the strip are engine-owned, so no application authors either and none can opt out.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"A closed vocabulary with one named runtime source. The clause is satisfied or broken by the source tree alone, and the failure it guards against is a second copy drifting from the builder's own claim set — invisible to any runtime observation, because both copies produce well-formed tokens.","obligation":"The protocol and security claim names the ID-token builder owns are one named set, not a list restated where it is used.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Ordering is the whole control and no artifact records it: a token carrying a correct issuer looks identical whether the server authored it or the caller happened to supply the right value. Only issuing a token from extras that deliberately carry reserved names separates the two.","obligation":"A member of that set supplied through extra claims is stripped BEFORE the extras are spread, so it can never ride into an issued token.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It attests the ID-token builder and nothing else. Access tokens, the userinfo response and any second token minter have their own claim rules and are invisible here. It evidences that reserved names cannot be supplied, never that the server-authored values are correct.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the named reserved-claim set, referenced not retyped. C2: an issued ID token whose resolver supplied a not-before, a nonce, an authentication-context reference and an issuer among its extras, with every one of those claims in the result server-authored.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A smuggled not-before is a MAJOR and the intent names its consequence: a token that later fails verification, which presents as an outage rather than as an attack. A forged nonce, authentication-context or access-token hash is a MAJOR — those are the claims a relying party trusts about the ceremony it did not witness. A strip that happens AFTER the spread and is rescued only by a later re-set is still a MAJOR: the defence then rests on statement order.","verificationSteps":["Read the named reserved-claim set and assert the builder strips from that source rather than from a local list.","Drive an issuance whose extra claims carry a not-before and assert the issued token does not carry the supplied value.","Repeat with a nonce and an authentication-context reference — the claims a relying party reads to decide HOW the user authenticated.","For issuer, audience and subject, assert by SOURCE READ that the strip precedes the spread — a driven issuance cannot decide it, because the server re-sets those three after the spread and removing the strip produces an identical token. Say so in the finding rather than presenting a driven result for a claim driving cannot reach."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:reserved-claim-set-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:restriction-release-schedule","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:restriction-release-schedule"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: the suspension verbs, the scheduled instant and the sweep are all engine-owned. An application that has suspended nobody has an empty population, not a failed control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the instant at which the restriction ends"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The scheduled instant lives on the engine-owned membership and user rows, so a query over the window answers the clause for every application through one schema. It is not DECLARED: the window is chosen per act by an administrator, not configured once.\n\nThe row that carries it is the purpose-built lifecycle-transition member, which records the subject, the from-to pair, an optional reason AND the automatic-reactivation deadline. This clause named no member until 2026-09-10, leaving a collector to find the instant by reading resource rows — which shows the deadline that stands NOW rather than the one the imposing act declared.","obligation":"A restriction imposed as time-boxed records the instant at which it ends.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_status_transition_performed"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A released row looks identical whichever path released it, so no record evidences this. The sweep dispatches the lifecycle verbs precisely so the state-machine check, the authoritative-field declaration that lets the patch survive the strict re-parse, and the administrative-continuity floors all run — a sweep wired around them would be a latent bypass nobody adding the next floor would think to check.","obligation":"The release runs through the SAME guarded authority that imposed the restriction, not through a direct status write.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"A sweep that silently stopped running leaves rows that look exactly like rows whose window has not yet elapsed, so continuity of the runs is itself part of the evidence.\n\nScheduled application receipts now leave bounded job-execution history and successful result payloads. Those operational stores retain history for 30 days and outputs for 24 hours. This clause remains PERFORMED because continuity over a longer claimed period requires period-covering evidence retained by the host. Each actual release also dispatches a lifecycle verb; use its transition rows for WHAT was released, and retained run outcomes for WHETHER the sweep kept running.","obligation":"And the sweep ran over the period, on schedule.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The ABSENCE of the field is the evidence, and it is readable in the committed contract. The inactive population is not swept because no door exists — the only reactivation verb for that state is self-scoped and the self resource grants no system update — and the two workarounds were refused as worse than the gap: widening the suspension verb merges an imposed restriction with a chosen one, and minting a per-user context would hand a batch the ability to impersonate.\n\n**This clause was UNPRODUCED until 2026-09-10, on the grounds that the date was accepted and unhonoured. It is not: the field was REMOVED (#430) rather than left as a promise nothing keeps.** The error came from the sweep's own docstring, which still described the pre-#430 contract — so a closed gap became a standing framework exemption one layer up, and UNPRODUCED carries no severity. The comment is corrected at its source. The clause survives INVERTED, because the removal is exactly what the objective wanted and an application that re-adds an unhonourable window should be told.","obligation":"A voluntary self-deactivation accepts no reactivation date at all, rather than accepting one nothing honours.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"C2 attests the path DRIVEN, on the build it was driven against. C1 and C3 attest a period and say nothing about the next one. And none of it evidences that the window an administrator CHOSE was appropriate — only that the system honoured the one it was given.","minimumEvidence":"C1: rows in the window carrying a scheduled release instant. C2: an enumeration of every writer of the restricted status, plus a driven elapsed window showing the verb path ran. C3: the sweep's execution records over the period. C4: the voluntary-deactivation contract, showing it declares no reactivation window.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A row whose window elapsed and whose restriction persists is a MAJOR — the intent names it exactly: a measure taken as temporary that silently became permanent. A release performed by a direct status write is a MAJOR even where the outcome was correct, because the floors and the state machine did not run. A gap in the sweep's execution record is a MAJOR for the period it covers, since nothing else lifts a window. A voluntary-deactivation contract that accepts a reactivation window is a MAJOR: nothing can lift it, so it is a declared promise the system cannot keep — which is the objective's own failure mode, arrived at from the other direction.","verificationSteps":["Query suspended memberships and users in the window and assert a scheduled release instant is present where the imposing act declared one.","Advance a row past its window, run the sweep, and assert the status changed AND the schedule was cleared — a stale deadline on a released row means the verb did not run.","Enumerate writers of the restricted status and assert the sweep is not among the direct writers.","Read the sweep execution records for the period and assert continuity of runs.","Read the voluntary-deactivation contract and assert it accepts no reactivation window. The un-swept inactive population is CORRECT — the field was removed rather than left unhonoured — so an application that re-added one is the finding, not the absence of a sweep."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:restriction-release-schedule"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:retention-window-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:retention-window-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"APPLICABLE to every application: capability:declared-retention-window is ALWAYS_AVAILABLE, so it survives the composer's capability filter unconditionally.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C0","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The premise the objective operates on rather than what it demands evidence of — needed as the BASELINE C1 is judged against, since enforcement cannot be assessed without knowing what was declared.","obligation":"The row-retention windows themselves are declared.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The sweep emits NO auditable event by design — a database TTL deletes silently — so 'did retention run?' is answerable only from the sweep's own outcome.\n\nScheduled application runs now have job-execution history and separately retained successful outputs. History expires after 30 days and output after 24 hours, so these operational records alone cannot cover a longer claimed period. Preserve the run outcomes and per-resource counts in the accountable host's evidence archive for that period. A completed invocation is not proof that its backlog was drained: inspect reachedRunCeiling and removal counts to tell a drained sweep from normal deferred work. A repository failure is not in the counters. It FAILS the invocation, and the scheduler holds that run for review rather than retaining its results, so a period's evidence must also account for failed runs.","obligation":"Declared row-retention windows are ENFORCED.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The startup validator's outcome, read from the accountable runtime's boot log — host-retained, not an engine store, which is why this is PERFORMED rather than EMITTED. PRODUCTION despite being about boot: what evidences it is a runtime-emitted outcome, not a configuration file.\n\n**A clean boot cannot be read as a pass.** The validator logs NOTHING on success, and it returns an empty result early when the detection it depends on is unbound — so silence is produced by a pass, by a skip, and by a validator that never ran, and the boot log cannot separate them. Establish that the check EXECUTED before reading its silence as a verdict.","obligation":"A configuration whose derived copies could outlive the row they came from is REFUSED at startup.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"An ENGINE-owned store, `retentionEnforcementRecords` (#1636): the retention-class sweep writes one row per run and per resource bound to a class — the period it applied, the cutoff, how many rows it deleted and the window of their retention start, how many a legal hold kept, and COMPLETED, DEFERRED_BY_CEILING, FAILED or SKIPPED. A failed run writes its row too, before the run fails. Read for a window through `GET /assurance/retention-enforcement-evidence`, which returns the records and no deleted row: a record holds counts and instants only. The rows are bound to AUDIT_LOGS, so they outlive the data they describe and the job-execution history C1 depends on. The run also emits `RETENTION_ENFORCEMENT_RECORDED`; the clause names no audit member because the store, not the event, is the record.\n\nDistinct from C1, and the reason it is a clause of its own: C1 is the `.ttl()` sweep over framework plumbing, C3 is the class sweep over the application's data (#1613). Until #1613 no mechanism enforced a declared class, and until #1636 nothing durable recorded that one did. The same records are what the `retention-enforcement` document fact reads (RUNTIME_EVIDENCE), so a notice and this measurement cannot disagree.","obligation":"Declared retention-CLASS periods are ENFORCED: every resource bound to a declared class is swept past its period.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences that the sweep RAN and what it removed, never that every row past its window is gone. And the boot outcome attests the configuration that booted, so it goes stale the moment configuration changes.\n\nScope limits a judge must not read past. C1's sweep covers the engine resources that declare a time-to-live and says nothing about the declared CLASSES; C3 evidences those, through the class sweep's own records (#1636). C3 evidences that each bound resource was swept, never that every row past its period is gone, and it cannot see a resource holding data that binds no class — that gap is a binding question, reported at startup. C1 and C2 are host-retained and evidenceable only as long as the host keeps its logs; C3's records are kept for the AUDIT_LOGS period.","minimumEvidence":"C0: the declared retention configuration, named by data-retention-class members derived from the capability's implementationRefs — the app-level SCHEDULE, which is a separate axis from C1 and is never reconciled against it. C1: the sweep's outcomes over the claimed period from the host's log archive — that it ran, per-resource removal counts, and whether it stopped early. C2: the startup validator's outcome from the boot log, NOT from an API: probing HTTP for a boot-time fact is a category error whose silence establishes nothing. C3: the retention-enforcement records of the period, read through the evidence door — per declared class, whether every bound resource has a recent completed or deferred run, and every failed one.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"'Stopped early' is NORMAL operation — the sweep defers the remainder rather than taking a table-wide lock — and must never read as failure. The nonconformity is the ABSENCE of a run in a period where retention was due. A startup refusal is the control working, not a finding.","verificationSteps":["Record the window, the application revision and the runtime profile.","Read the declared windows (C0) as the baseline; without them C1 cannot be judged.","Gather the `.ttl()` sweep's outcomes (C1) across the period for the resources it actually covers. Do NOT reconcile them against the declared retention CLASSES: C1's sweep covers the engine resources declaring a time-to-live, and the classes are enforced by a different sweep, evidenced by C3.","Read the retention-enforcement records (C3) for the period. The population is the resources BOUND to each declared class, never every resource: a class nothing binds is declared and not enforced, which is a finding about the bindings, not about the sweep. A DEFERRED_BY_CEILING run is enforcement in progress; a FAILED run is the nonconformity.","Read the boot log for the validator outcome; a clean boot means no unsafe derived-copy configuration was present."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:retention-window-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:risk-treatment-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The signals are derived from what an application already declares, so there is nothing to opt into — an application that has declared no treatment is covered by this demand and reported by it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Both halves are committed configuration: the signals derive from the application's own declarations and code, and the treatment is a field of `wildo.saas.config.ts`. No row records a decision that was never made, which is exactly why the gap must be DERIVED — total over the signal vocabulary — rather than looked for in a store that would be equally silent for an application that decided everything and one that decided nothing.","obligation":"Every exposure the derivation reports carries a declared treatment, or its absence is reported as UNDECLARED — and undeclared is never read as accepted.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The clause that makes this demand worth stating. Three of the four treatments are consistent with any measurement — an exposure reduced, shared or accepted is still present — so only the one claiming ABSENCE can be contradicted by what was derived. Reporting rather than resolving is deliberate: whether the declaration or the product is wrong is a judgement, and a mechanism that picked one would be deciding it.","obligation":"A treatment claiming the exposure is NOT TAKEN is checked against the measurement, and a disagreement is reported rather than resolved.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The register is a committed FILE and its acceptance is the commit, so git carries the author and the instant and the artifact carries no approver field to forge. The ordering half is stated here because a partial sequence reads as an answer and is not one — a reader cannot tell an entry left out from one ranked last.","obligation":"The accepted register states each risk in the application's own terms with the grounding for its weighting, and any ordering it declares covers every entry.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences what was DECLARED and what was DERIVED from declarations — never that either is true of the running system. A treatment of REDUCED attests that somebody chose it and wrote down why; it attests nothing about a control existing, and no clause here should be read as saying one does.\n\nThe contradiction check in C2 reaches exactly one posture. AVOIDED can be disagreed with because it claims an absence a derivation can see; REDUCED, SHARED_BY_CONTRACT and ACCEPTED are consistent with any measurement, so silence about them is the mechanism working rather than coverage. A judge must not read three unchallenged treatments as three verified ones.\n\nAnd it attests the repository at a commit. Every input is committed configuration or committed code, which is what lets this demand be answered without a collection window — and equally means the answer is about that revision and goes stale the moment configuration changes, with nothing in the artifact to announce that it has.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the derived signal set and the application's declared treatments, from committed sources, with the undeclared set computed total over the signal vocabulary. C2: for each treatment claiming absence, the measurement for that same signal. C3: the committed register, and its ordering if it declares one.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A contradicted absence claim is a MAJOR: the application states in committed configuration that it does not take an exposure the derivation finds present, and that statement is the kind a reader relies on. An undeclared signal is a MINOR on its own — nobody has decided yet, which is an honest state — and becomes MAJOR when the register is presented externally as complete. A register whose ordering covers only some entries is a MINOR with a specific remedy: declare none, or declare all.","verificationSteps":["Derive the signals and read the declared treatments; assert the undeclared set is TOTAL over the vocabulary rather than a list somebody maintained, or a signal added later is silently omitted from every application's answer.","Assert UNDECLARED and ACCEPTED are reported distinctly. Collapsing them is the failure this demand exists to catch: silence is not acceptance, and an artifact that renders the two alike converts every unanswered question into a decision nobody made.","For each treatment claiming the exposure is not taken, read that signal's own measurement and record any disagreement. Do not resolve it.","Where the derivation could not run, assert the answer says NOT ASKED rather than reporting zero declarations — an absent measurement and an absent decision are different findings.","Read the register for statements that would be true of any application. A weighting grounded in 'breaches are serious' carries no information about THIS product and fails C3's grounding half."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:runtime-principal-audit-grant-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.TAMPER_RESISTANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:runtime-principal-audit-grant-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to an application that runs a named runtime principal (a minion) on a SELF-MANAGED database adapter, which is where a per-principal, axis-scoped credential is issued. An application with no minion, or whose adapter issues no per-principal credential, has no such grant to evidence — a genuinely empty population, not a declined control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The grants are a pure derivation of each principal's committed resource-access declaration plus the engine's append floor, so the committed configuration IS the evidence: deriving it reproduces exactly what the adapter is asked to grant.","obligation":"The audit trail sits on the APPEND axis of every named principal's derived grants, and on no WRITE axis.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A conforming configuration never contains the refused shape, so reading one proves nothing about the refusal. The condition has to be created — declare the audit trail on a principal's write axis and observe the configuration refused at parse and at derivation.","obligation":"A declaration that would put an append-only resource on a principal's write axis is refused, not honoured.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The derivation describes what was ASKED for; only the datastore's own privilege catalogue shows what was granted. Read it for the principal's role.","obligation":"The database role the adapter creates carries insert and no update or delete on the audit table.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences NAMED runtime principals on self-managed adapters only. The application backend owns its database on every adapter, so nothing here constrains what the backend's own credential can do to an audit row — for the backend, immutability is application-layer only. And an adapter that issues no per-principal credential grants a principal nothing to evidence either way.","minimumEvidence":"C1: each named principal's resource-access declaration and the derived grants. C2: a configuration placing the audit trail on a principal's write axis, refused. C3: the datastore's privilege listing for each principal's role on the audit table.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A principal holding update or delete on the audit table is a MAJOR — it can remove the evidence of its own actions. A refusal that fires at only one of the two gates is an OBSERVATION where the other still refuses. A grant listing that cannot be read for a deployment is an OBSERVATION about evidence availability, never a nonconformity by itself.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate the application's named runtime principals and derive each one's database grants from its committed declaration.","Assert the audit trail appears on the append axis and on no write axis for every principal.","Author a declaration placing the audit trail on a principal's write axis and assert the configuration is refused.","Read the datastore privilege catalogue for each principal's role and assert insert without update or delete on the audit table."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:runtime-principal-audit-grant-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:second-signature-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:second-signature-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that has a platform tier at all. The strongest evidence here is an EMPTY set of application-wide elevations beside a live refusal path — an application whose operators never needed one is in scope and passes on that basis, not by exemption.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"a second, DISTINCT administrator signed each elevation — the requester and the signer are two names on two rows, and only reading them compares them — or that the requester could still withdraw"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Two identities have to be COMPARED, and a comparison leaves nothing behind unless it is recorded per occurrence. A declaration could say the rule exists; only an emitted pair of rows — one naming the requester, one naming the signer — shows that two different people were actually involved in a given elevation.\n\nThe obligation's POSITIVE half is easy to drop and this clause dropped it until 2026-09-10: the requester may withdraw or refuse their own request, deliberately and by declaration. A body evidencing only the approval refusal would accept an implementation that blocks withdrawal too — a different and worse control, which traps a requester in an elevation they no longer want.","obligation":"An operator act that names no single customer is granted only after a SECOND, distinct administrator signs, and the requester CAN still withdraw or refuse their own request.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["platform_access_grant_lifecycle"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the justification a row carries is the one the SECOND administrator decided on, which is a relation between two records that counting either establishes"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A second signature with no stated reason is a countersignature on nothing. The signer of an application-wide elevation has no tenant and no support case in front of them — the justification IS the whole of what they weigh, so evidence that omits it cannot show the decision was a decision.","obligation":"The requester's stated justification is recorded, and it is what the second administrator decided on.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["platform_access_grant_lifecycle"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row carries the end of the authority and which end it was, revoked or elapsed"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"A second signature that grants standing authority has moved the problem rather than solved it. The end of the window is the half a reader most needs and the half most likely to be missing, because nothing happens at that moment unless something writes it down.\n\nThe member is C1's — one lifecycle class carries the whole timeline — narrowed by the discriminator to the two TERMINAL transitions, because counting the class undifferentiated would report a REQUEST or an APPROVAL as the end of a window. `EXPIRED` is the transition with no human actor: the sweep relabels an elapsed grant, and this clause demands it precisely because a grant that simply stops appearing as ACTIVE, with no row, is the version of the history that raises questions. Until 2026-09-16 the clause named no member at all, so nothing could count either transition and the judge recorded the half a reader most needs as NOT RUN.","obligation":"The resulting authority is TIME-BOUND, and its end leaves a record — whether it was revoked or simply elapsed.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventDataMatch":{"field":"transition","values":["revoked","expired"]},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["platform_access_grant_lifecycle"]}],"limits":"It evidences that TWO PEOPLE acted, never that either was entitled to, and never that the second one read what they signed. Collusion is outside its reach by construction: two administrators who agree in advance produce evidence indistinguishable from a well-run approval. What it does buy is that a single compromised or mistaken operator cannot reach application-wide data alone.","minimumEvidence":"C1: for each application-wide elevation in the window, the request row and the approval row, naming two DIFFERENT principals. C2: the justification carried on those rows. C3: for each elevation, a terminal row — revoked or expired — or a window that has not yet closed.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A usable elevation whose request and approval name the SAME principal is a MAJOR, and is the only finding here that invalidates the control rather than the evidence. A missing justification is a MAJOR for that grant: it makes the signature unauditable. A missing terminal row where the window has demonstrably closed is an OBSERVATION when the elevation itself is unusable — the authority ended, the bookkeeping lagged.","verificationSteps":["Gather the elevation lifecycle rows for the window and partition them by grant.","For each grant that became usable, assert the requester and the approver are different principals; a grant reaching the usable state with one principal on both rows is the finding this demand exists for.","Assert every request carries a justification, and that the approval refers to the same grant.","Assert every closed grant has a terminal row, and that no grant is still usable past its stated window.","Attempt a self-approval against the running system and confirm it is REFUSED — an empty set of self-approvals proves nothing on its own, because it is also what a broken refusal path produces when nobody happened to try."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:second-signature-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:secret-contract-shape-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:secret-contract-shape-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that selects a provider, which is every application with an external capability. The artifact is platform-owned and committed, so no application authors it.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The artifact is a committed lock entry, so the committed specification IS the evidence. Note this digest NAMES content and is carried in git, which is the use one-source-of-truth permits — it is not a second ledger recording agreement between two parts of the repository.\n\n**What the lock holds is a DIGEST, never the shape**, and this clause said \"recorded as a SHAPE… settled by reading it\" until 2026-09-10. A sha256 is opaque: reading the lock settles that a digest is PRESENT and nothing about what went into it. The values-free property is therefore established from the SOURCE that computes the digested input, not from the artifact — which is a source read, and the honest statement of what this clause can and cannot be gathered from.","obligation":"A provider's secret contract is recorded as a DIGEST OF its shape, with no secret value — and no shape — persisted anywhere in the artifact.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"Detection is a property of the digest under change, and a digest that never moves is indistinguishable from one that moves correctly until something changes. The evidence is a driven shape change and the resulting difference.","obligation":"Drift in that shape is DETECTABLE.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It detects a change in SHAPE, never in VALUES — a rotated or a leaked credential moves nothing, by design and correctly. It attests the lock as committed; a runtime that resolves a secret contract from somewhere other than the lock is outside this evidence entirely.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the per-provider secret-contract digest from the lock, PLUS a read of the resolver that computes its input, showing the input is key names and structure. The shape itself is in no committed artifact, so it cannot be gathered from one. C2: a driven change to a provider's secret contract shape and the digest before and after — the lock-check command is the mechanism that performs this comparison in the ordinary course, and naming it is what makes C2 mechanical rather than a bespoke probe.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A secret VALUE present in the artifact is a MAJOR and an incident rather than a documentation defect — the artifact is committed, so disclosure is permanent in history. A digest that does not move when the shape changes is a MAJOR: detection is the control's only function, and a digest that cannot detect is worse than none because it reads as coverage. A provider with no entry is an OBSERVATION unless it declares secrets.","verificationSteps":["Read the committed lock entry for each selected provider and assert a secret-contract digest is present.","Read the RESOLVER that computes the digested input and assert it is key names and structure. Do not expect to verify this from the lock: the digest is opaque and the shape is not stored.","Scan the whole artifact for material matching the provider's declared secret keys and assert absence.","Add, rename or remove one key in a provider's secret contract, recompute, and assert the digest moved."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:secret-contract-shape-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:security-event-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:security-event-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The rows this demand reads are in the application's OWN audit store, which the engine writes whatever audit providers are configured. From 2026-09-10 to 2026-09-14 this field said the demand applied only where the audit-trail engine capability was enabled, because the binding's capability was gated on it. That engine capability is the Layer-2 provider fan-out, and the gate made an application without a provider derive NOT_APPLICABLE beside rows that existed (#302).\n\nNo application has to build the lane first, because the trail is engine-owned — unlike a demand whose evidence is an application-authored record.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The demanded artifact is a per-occurrence row in the engine's own durable event store, so one collector query serves every application. Not read off the attesting capability: it is read off the artifact the clause names.","obligation":"Authentication, authorization, privilege, credential and security-configuration changes each emit a typed auditable event.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_login","user_login_failed","machine_auth_success","machine_auth_failed","user_logout","user_session_evicted","resource_operation_denied","user_app_roles_changed","organization_member_role_changed","cross_tenant_administrative_access","user_password_changed","one_off_token_revoked","application_auth_policy_changed"]},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"absenceUnreadable":"on a runtime whose emission is fire-and-forget, an access that was neither audited nor refused leaves no row, exactly like a window with no access","unreached":"the accesses that took the other branch were REFUSED; a disjunction cannot be decided by counting rows of one side"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"Same store as C1 but NOT the same rows — the classes that record system-context access and machine principals, and the two that record their refusal. The evidence is a DISJUNCTION and must not be flattened, and an absent row means different things on different runtimes — so it is never read on its own.\n\n**The disjunction is not uniform across runtimes, and reading it as one hides the failing case.** Where the runtime profile requires accountable system access — a minion — the read is WITHHELD when it could not be recorded, so audited-or-refused genuinely holds. On the application backend the emission is fire-and-forget and the read PROCEEDS on failure, which is the third outcome — neither audited nor refused — that this clause exists to exclude. Resolve the runtime profile before judging an absent row.","obligation":"Non-human privileged access is audited OR refused.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["system_context_read","system_context_write","machine_access","machine_auth_failed","resource_operation_denied"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The subtle one. It is ABOUT boot, but what evidences it is a runtime-emitted diagnostic rather than a configuration file — so it does not fall to META_APPLICATION even though its subject is startup.\n\n**It said EMITTED until 2026-09-16, and that was the wrong half of the same sentence.** The rationale above argues correctly that a runtime-emitted diagnostic is not a configuration file, and then names the home for a store of audit ROWS. What actually carries this is `logger.warn(\"COMPLIANCE_AUDIT_TRAIL is enabled but no audit-log provider resolves…\")` — a line in the accountable runtime's log, on the host's retention, with no audit member behind it. That is PERFORMED by the vocabulary's own definition, and the sibling clause of the same shape says so in terms: `retention-window-declaration` C2 is \"read from the accountable runtime's boot log — host-retained, not an engine store, which is why this is PERFORMED rather than EMITTED\". An EMITTED collector reads the audit door, finds no member for this, and reports the clause as having no store to read — which is how a control that is implemented and working came to be uncollectable.\n\n**And silence is the HEALTHY case, so it cannot be read as the verdict.** The warning fires only when the capability is enabled AND the runtime is the one expected to host the Layer-2 fan-out AND no provider resolves. A quiet boot is produced by a correctly-configured application, by a runtime that is legitimately Layer-1-only, and by a runtime that never booted in the window. Establish that the gate COULD have fired — the runtime booted, and a Layer-2 provider is demonstrably active — before reading its silence as the control working.","obligation":"The absence of the audit delivery path is surfaced at boot rather than tolerated silently.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"C3's other half, split out 2026-09-21 because one clause was asking for two things only different planes can give. A healthy production deployment never emits the diagnostic, so C3 can only ever read its SILENCE; that the diagnostic FIRES in the misconfigured case is a driven fact, and producing it in production would mean breaking the deployment being evidenced. The adversarial judge's first run named this (#297). The decision is a pure predicate the boot path feeds, so the test that drives it answers this clause without booting anything.","obligation":"The boot diagnostic's decision fires on a runtime expected to host the audit fan-out when the capability is enabled and no provider resolves, and stays silent on a runtime that legitimately hosts none.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C5","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"C2's missing half, and the only place its third outcome can be seen. On a runtime whose system-context audit is best-effort — the application backend for reads, every runtime for writes — an access whose audit failed leaves no audit row, so no count over C2's classes can tell it from a quiet window. The loss itself is what records it: before the store, the loss seam's rate-limited drop line (and `audit_observation_dropped_total`); at the store, the audit service's own failure line (and `audit_store_failure_total`). Both are lines in the accountable runtime's log rather than audit rows, which is why this is PERFORMED. Until 2026-09-21 the half before the store was silent — an unbound audit service or a rejected emission was swallowed — so this clause could not have been answered at all (#297).","obligation":"No non-human privileged access in the window was left neither audited nor refused: every system-context observation that failed to reach the audit store is itself recorded as lost.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences that events were EMITTED, never that the trail is complete: an event class nobody wired emits nothing and looks identical to a quiet period. It attests the window queried and says nothing about periods outside it. And it is production evidence for the deployment that produced it — a different deployment of the same build has its own window and its own answer.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a non-empty, queryable class of rows for each member named in the clause's requiredAuditEventMembers — the members are DERIVED from the enum there rather than restated here, so a collector reads the query off the demand and this prose cannot drift from it. For any class that is EMPTY, the result of the static emitter check for that member, because the severity below turns on it and a row count cannot supply it. C2: for each non-human privileged access in the window, either an audit row or evidence of refusal, together with the runtime profile the rows were emitted under (`eventData.performedByRuntime`), because an absent row is read by that profile and cannot be read without it. C3: the accountable runtime's boot log over the window, with the evidence that the gate COULD have fired there — each boot paired with its own positive record that the Layer-2 fan-out was ACTIVE, naming the providers that resolved — so that the diagnostic's silence is read against a recorded healthy state rather than inferred from itself. C4: the outcome of the driven tests of the diagnostic's decision, both the firing case and the legitimately silent one. C5: the accountable runtimes' logs over the window — every drop line naming a system-context observation and every store or identity failure line naming a system-context event type — together with the evidence that the audit pipeline ran in that window, because an empty loss list from a pipeline that never ran says nothing.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A represented change family with no typed class is a MAJOR: the control did not operate. A family with no activity in the window is an OBSERVATION, not a gap — absence of activity and absence of a control read identically in a row store, and only the emitter check separates them. An absent C2 row is judged by the runtime profile, never on its own: where the runtime withholds a read it could not record, an absent row is consistent with the refused branch — a withheld read need not leave a refusal row — and reading it as failure is a judge defect; on a runtime whose emission is fire-and-forget, an absent row cannot be told from the third outcome the clause exists to exclude, so it is INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE rather than a pass — C5 is where that outcome is observed. A counted C5 loss is a MAJOR however transient its cause: an access happened and its record did not, which is the failing shape itself rather than evidence about it. A control that operated with a missing evidence export is an OBSERVATION, never a nonconformity.","verificationSteps":["Establish the reporting window and the application's audit store, and record which store answered.","For C1, query each change family and assert a non-empty typed class per represented family; report families with no activity as observations rather than gaps.","Before classifying any empty C1 class, run the static emitter check — every demanded member traced to a production caller. It is the only thing that separates an unwired class from a quiet one, and the severity below depends on which it is.","For C2, enumerate non-human privileged accesses in the window and resolve each to an audit row OR a refusal; an ACCESS with neither is the only failing shape. A window with no rows is not that shape on its own — read it by the runtime profile, as the severity guidance says.","For C3, read the accountable runtime's boot log for the window and establish that the gate could have fired before reading its silence as the control working. Never produce the diagnostic by misconfiguring the deployment being evidenced.","For C4, run the driven tests of the diagnostic's decision and record each outcome; a test that did not run is not a pass.","For C5, read both loss channels for the two system-context classes over the window, and establish that audit rows were created in it before reading an empty result. A drop line is rate-limited, so report the running total it carries, never the line count.","Record any clause not run as insufficient_evidence for that clause; never let a NOT RUN clause pass on its siblings' evidence."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:security-event-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:selected-processor-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:selected-processor-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application unconditionally. The control is the ABSENCE of egress by default, so an application that selected no provider is not un-evidenced — it is the strongest possible evidence for this demand.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The committed configuration IS the evidence: what a reviewer must establish is which capabilities have a provider selected, which is a property of the commit rather than of any runtime event. There is no audit member for 'a provider was selected', and there should not be — a selection is not an occurrence.","obligation":"Nothing leaves unless the application selects a provider for that capability.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A committed configuration can prove no provider is SELECTED. It cannot prove no bytes LEFT — that is a claim about behaviour under no selection, evidenced by driving the seam. Flattening C2 into C1's plane would let a reviewer accept a declaration as proof of a runtime property.","obligation":"With no selection, the work is served locally with no egress at all.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences the PROVIDER seam. Any other outbound path — a webhook, an integration, an application's own fetch — is outside this demand and is not made safe by it. C2's evidence attests the BUILD it was driven against, and nothing currently detects a change to the selection ladder. And the register cross-check compares a computed population with a HUMAN statement: nothing derives a register entry from a provider's declared profile. The population's own limits: a provider called by a ref string rather than its typed client is not seen, a typed-client call is taken to spend every owner scope the application admits for that provider. A provider's profile states POSSIBILITIES and SUGGESTED legal facts read on a date; it is never the operator's arrangement, and the staleness report dates it but cannot tell whether the vendor changed since. Per-recipient categories come from DECLARED flows only: what an application's own code passes to a typed client is not read, so those recipients are reported not derivable rather than complete, and free text makes any list a floor. A pipeline is counted on the instance it copies FROM, because the instance holds those rows on the operator's account. The DPA status is the operator's statement; nothing here verifies the contract exists.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the committed provider selection per capability, the recipient population computed from the committed configuration and source, and for each operator sub-processor its compliance choice — the deployment model and the region. The deployment model is required even for a single-model provider, because reading it from a framework default rather than an operator's declaration is how a wrong one goes unnoticed. Per recipient (#1709): the categories of personal data its DECLARED flows carry (`deriveRecipientDisclosures` — an engine capability's own statement, and the categories of the fields a resource binds or pipes to a system of record), every reason some are not derivable, the purposes its compliance choice links through `purposeRefs`, and the operator's own record of the DPA that governs it and the vendor's retention (`processorAgreementStanding`). Per source of personal data obtained from a system of record rather than from the person (#1745): the resource bound to or piped from it, the instance and its vendor, the categories that come from it, the purposes its binding links through `purposeRefs`, and for a local copy whether its rows are kept until erased (`deriveSystemOfRecordSources` — the same derivation the privacy notice's `system-of-record-sources` fact states, GDPR Art. 14(2)(f)). C2: that the extraction seam REFUSES when no provider is resolved rather than degrading, and that its one functional caller serves the local library when the field did not opt in.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An operator sub-processor with no compliance choice is a MAJOR: the processor exists and the deployment model is unstated, so no transfer statement about it can be derived. An operator sub-processor absent from the processor register is a MAJOR — the routing happens and the notice does not name the recipient. A tenant recipient listed on the register as the operator's sub-processor is a MAJOR: the operator did not engage that vendor, and for an operator that is a processor the entry states an engagement GDPR Art. 28(2) forbids without the controller's authorisation. A region outside the declared list is an OBSERVATION, app-asserted by design; a deployment model the provider does not offer is a MINOR, a configuration that contradicts the vendor. An operator sub-processor whose profile is UNDETERMINED or absent is an OBSERVATION when the register establishes it, and a MAJOR when neither does — nobody has said who runs it. A register, or a vendor fact it relies on, older than its own re-verification interval is an OBSERVATION; an undated register is an OBSERVATION. A register entry the operator records as having NO DPA in place is a MAJOR — processing a processor carries out with no contract binding it (GDPR Art. 28(3)); an entry recording no DPA status is a MINOR, an open question rather than a stated gap; no vendor retention recorded is an OBSERVATION. An operator sub-processor linked to no purpose is a MINOR — a notice cannot say what its data is sent for — and a `purposeRef` naming no declared lawful basis is a MINOR, a broken link. A source of personal data obtained from a system of record that links no purpose is a MINOR — a notice cannot state why the data is obtained (GDPR Art. 14(1)(c)) — and a local copy of it kept until erased is an OBSERVATION: nobody decided how long the copy is kept. A recipient whose categories are not all derivable is an OBSERVATION: the declared part stands, and the rest is named as not established rather than guessed. A register entry no data path reaches is an OBSERVATION worth reading twice: a stale entry, or a processor reached by a path this demand does not see. A declared provider no data path reaches is an OBSERVATION: it receives nothing, so it is a declaration to remove or a path to build, and never a recipient to publish.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate the capabilities with a provider selected, from committed configuration.","Assert each selected provider carries a compliance choice with a deployment model and a region.","Assess each compliance choice against the provider's own compliance profile, read through discovery (#1708): within its declared possibilities, a region it does not list (APP-ASSERTED — report it, never fail it), a deployment model it does not offer, an UNDETERMINED profile (nobody has researched the vendor), or no profile at all. Name each operator sub-processor whose profile is UNDETERMINED or absent: its region and identity are research owed, never an empty answer.","Date the vendor facts: the register's own verification date and each established profile's oldest evidence date, against the re-verification interval the register declares (`complianceFactStaleness`). An undated register is reported as such.","Derive, per recipient, what its declared flows carry and for which purpose (`deriveRecipientDisclosures`, #1709). Report every `categoriesNotDerivable` reason (a typed client, a browser operation or unscanned code declares no field map; a system of record no resource binds; flows that could not be read; a flowing field personal by another door with no category) as NOT DERIVABLE, never as an empty list, and a list including free text as a FLOOR. Name each recipient linked to no purpose, and each `purposeRef` naming no declared lawful basis.","Derive, per resource bound to or piped from a system of record, the SOURCE the notice owes for data not collected from the person (`deriveSystemOfRecordSources`, #1745): the instance, its vendor, the categories, the linked purposes, and for a copy whether it is kept until erased. Name each source linked to no purpose and each `purposeRef` naming no declared lawful basis; report flows that could not be read as NOT DERIVED, never as no source.","Read the operator's contractual record per register entry (`processorAgreementStanding`, #1709): which a recorded DPA governs, which the operator states has NONE in place, which records none, and which records no vendor retention. The status is the operator's fact; a vendor OFFERING a DPA (its profile's `dataProcessingAgreementUrl`) never counts as one in place.","Drive the seam with no provider configured and assert the refusal, then assert the local path serves.","Compute the recipient population (`computeRecipientPopulation`, #1707): every runtime-scoped provider and every system-of-record instance, classed as operator-run, operator sub-processor (a data path spends the application's own account), tenant recipient (reached only through a customer's or a person's connected account) or declared with no reachable data path. The population is NOT the capability-selected providers: a catalogue vendor reached by a typed client or a browser operation receives data with no engine capability at all.","Cross-check the operator sub-processors against the application's processor register, in BOTH directions, and report a tenant recipient listed on the register as its own misstatement."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:selected-processor-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:session-eviction-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:session-eviction-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to EVERY application, unconditionally, and this said the opposite until 2026-09-10 — that it applied \"wherever a concurrency bound is configured\" and was otherwise not applicable as configured. There is no such configuration. An application that declares nothing is capped at the framework default, and the vocabulary says so in its own words: there is no value that disables the cap. So the escape let an application decline evidence for a control that was running the whole time, which is the most expensive shape an applicability clause can take — it reads as diligence and removes the demand.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The bound holding is a non-event — a principal who never exceeded it emits nothing. Only a driven scenario that exceeds the bound and observes the refusal-or-eviction evidences that it is enforced.","obligation":"A principal holds a bounded number of concurrent sessions.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"the chain each eviction retired was the OLDEST one, which is a property of WHICH row was written rather than of how many were"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The ORDERING is the control, not the eviction. The record must name which chain was retired and when it was issued, because a record naming only the victim would prove a session ended without proving the RIGHT one did.","obligation":"The eviction retires the OLDEST refresh chain — the property that pushes a stolen chain out instead of a legitimate one.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["user_session_evicted"]}],"limits":"It evidences the eviction's ORDERING, never that the evicted chain was stolen. And an unreadable issue time yields ABSENCE, never a synthesised instant — a reconstructed ordering would be evidence of the reconstruction.\n\n**The enforcement itself FAILS OPEN, and an empty eviction set does not exclude that.** The tracking-and-enforce step is wrapped so a store failure logs a warning and lets token issuance proceed — no row, no metric. So a window with no evictions is equally consistent with nobody exceeding the cap and with the bound never having been applied, and only the backend's own warning distinguishes them. A judge reading an empty set on the PRODUCTION plane must not read it as the control holding.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the effective bound, declared or defaulted, and a driven scenario exceeding it. C2: eviction rows carrying the evicted chain's issue time, so the ordering claim is checkable from the row rather than inferred.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An eviction retiring a chain that was not the oldest is a MAJOR: it is the property the objective is named for, and it inverts the control by pushing out the legitimate session. A row with no issue time is an OBSERVATION — the eviction may have been correct and its evidence is insufficient to say.","verificationSteps":["Read the effective bound — the declared value, or the framework default where nothing is declared. There is no configuration under which this step yields \"no bound\", so an answer of none means the resolution is wrong, not that the demand is inapplicable.","Drive the bound past its limit and observe the eviction.","Assert ORDERING across a principal's successive eviction rows: each row carries the evicted chain's issue time but no issue time for the RETAINED chains, so first-in-first-out cannot be established from a single row. Monotonicity across rows is the strongest check the evidence supports, and claiming more than that overstates it.","Treat two chains minted in the same millisecond as equally old: either eviction is correct, and a flat rule that a newer chain was retired reports a MAJOR against a documented tie."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:session-eviction-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:step-up-challenge-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:step-up-challenge-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. The flag, the challenge and the consumable proof are engine-owned, and the operations carrying the flag are engine resources — so no application builds the lane and none opts out.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Which actions are high-impact is a committed per-operation declaration, and the SET is the evidence a reviewer needs — the question is not whether the mechanism works but which verbs were judged to need it. Note one declaration that reads as coverage and is not: the flag is INERT on read-shaped operations, which are skipped, so a read carrying it is a declaration nothing enforces.","obligation":"A high-impact action requires a FRESH re-proof of identity.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A driven property, and the clause that keeps the control from becoming an availability failure: a ceremony that accepts only one factor locks out every principal who holds a different one, and the response to a lockout is to relax the control. Evidenced by re-proving with each factor kind a test principal holds.","obligation":"The re-proof is accepted over ANY factor the principal actually holds.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The clause the requirement is really named after, and the one no successful ceremony evidences: a valid proof and a repurposed one both authenticate the same person. The proof is consumable and bound to its purpose precisely so the two are separable, and the only evidence of that is presenting a credential minted for something else and being refused — plus replaying a spent one and being refused again.","obligation":"And that ceremony CANNOT be satisfied by a credential presented for a different purpose.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"EMITTED since 2026-09-22, and the history is kept because this clause was wrong in two different directions before it was right.\n\nIt first demanded the GENERIC access-control denial, which is a real, emitted, frequently-written row that no step-up refusal could ever produce: that member had ONE production emitter, in the authorizer funnel, and the step-up gate is a private check at the services-registry tier that throws without passing through it. The verification step returned nothing by construction. A live member is not evidence that YOUR control emits it. Corrected to UNPRODUCED on 2026-09-10, which was honest and named its own fix: route the gate's refusal through the denial funnel.\n\nThat is what landed. The gate now records through the same chokepoint the role-ceiling gate uses, so the refusal inherits the dedup window, the escalation ladder, the AUDIT_LOGS recursion guard and the observation-loss counters — a burst of attempts on a declared-dangerous action stays legible AS a burst, which N indistinguishable rows would not be. The two members below are the two triggers the gate already distinguished in its error context: the operation's own unconditional declaration, and the user type's freshness policy. They are separate because they send a reviewer to different places, and because only the second varies with how long somebody has been signed in.\n\nWhat this does NOT evidence: that the refusal was correct. The row says an action was stopped for want of a re-proof, never that the action deserved to be gated — C1 is where the declaration is read.","obligation":"A refused high-impact action is recorded.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventDataMatch":{"field":"denialReason","values":["step_up_required_by_operation","step_up_required_by_freshness"]},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["resource_operation_denied"]}],"limits":"C2 and C3 attest the build driven, over the factors the test principal held — a factor kind nobody drove is unevidenced in both directions. C1 evidences which actions were JUDGED high-impact, never that the judgement was complete: an action that should carry the requirement and does not is invisible to every step here, because there is no independent source that says which actions are high-impact.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the set of operations declaring the re-proof requirement, with read-shaped ones identified as inert. C2: driven re-proofs over each factor kind the principal holds. C3: a driven attempt using a credential minted for another purpose, refused, and a driven replay of a spent proof, refused. C4: the denial rows the gate emits over the collection window, counted per trigger — and an empty window is NOT a failure, since an application whose callers never attempt a gated action while freshly unauthenticated legitimately produces none.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A high-impact action reachable with no fresh proof is a MAJOR. A ceremony satisfiable by a credential minted for another purpose is a MAJOR and is the objective's stated failure — it makes the re-proof a formality that any live session already satisfies. A replayable proof is a MAJOR. A ceremony that accepts only ONE factor is a MAJOR as an availability failure, and it is the one most likely to be argued down: the pressure it creates is to weaken the control, not to fix the ceremony. A read-shaped operation carrying the inert flag is an OBSERVATION, and it is worth reporting because it reads as coverage. C4 carries no severity — a framework gap, not an application's.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate operations declaring the re-proof requirement and separate the read-shaped ones — the flag does not run there, so listing them as covered overstates the control.","Drive a declared action with no proof and assert refusal.","Drive it with a fresh proof over each factor the principal holds, and assert each is accepted.","Present a credential minted for a different purpose and assert refusal — this is the clause, not a variant of the previous step.","Replay a proof already spent and assert refusal.","Record C4 as UNPRODUCED. Do NOT query access-control denial rows for these refusals: the gate does not route through the funnel that writes them, so an empty result reads as no refusals rather than as no recording."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:step-up-challenge-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:subject-data-export-receipt","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application: subject access and portability are engine-owned obligations, and a resource opts in rather than an application opting out.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Three properties of the declared export surface: which purposes exist, which resources opted in, and that the scope is the subject. All readable from committed configuration, and none evidenced by a row — an export that leaked another subject's data emits the same event shape as one that did not.","obligation":"Authorized subject access and portability exports are purpose-specific, resource-opted-in and subject-isolated.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row names the purpose, the subject, the resource types, the record count and BOTH withholding lists, none of which a count opens the row to read"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The intent ENUMERATES its fields, which makes this a completeness clause rather than an existence one: a row that exists but omits a withholding list fails it. A subject must be able to tell what was excluded and why.\n\nThere are TWO such lists and this clause named only the derived one until 2026-09-10. The second — fields withheld as NON-DISCLOSABLE — exists precisely so a thin bundle reads as a deliberate security floor rather than a missed resource, which is the distinction a subject most needs and the one an incomplete assertion silently passes.","obligation":"And auditable: the export event names the purpose, the subject, the resource types included, the record count, and BOTH withholding lists — fields excluded as derived, and fields withheld as non-disclosable.","plane":"PRODUCTION","requiredAuditEventMembers":["subject_data_export"]},{"clauseRef":"C3","emittedCountLimit":{"unreached":"each row says whether recipients were declared and names them, never the categories or identities the subject was shown"},"home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The export selects the recipients from the application's derived declaration (`compliance.subjectDataRecipients`) for the resources it read, lists them in the bundle the subject receives, and records on its row whether a declaration existed (`recipientsStatus`) and which recipients it named. The collector reports how the rows divide over `recipientsStatus`: a NOT_DECLARED share is exports that could not answer Art. 15(1)(c).","obligation":"And each export names the recipients of the subject's data (GDPR Art. 15(1)(c)) — by the legal identity the operator adopted and the categories each declared flow carries — or states that the application declares none.","plane":"PRODUCTION","reportedAuditEventDataDistribution":{"field":"recipientsStatus"},"requiredAuditEventMembers":["subject_data_export"]}],"limits":"It evidences the RECEIPT, never the payload: that the row says five resource types were included does not prove those were the right five. And it cannot see data the resource never declared as the subject's.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the declared purposes, the resources that opted in, and the subject-isolation mechanism, from committed configuration. C2: export rows for the window, each carrying every enumerated field INCLUDING both withholding lists. C3: the same rows' recipient status distribution and named recipients, against the generated recipient declaration.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An export row missing any of the five fields is a MAJOR — the intent enumerates them and a partial receipt cannot answer a subject. A resource carrying subject data that never opted in is a MAJOR — but do NOT hunt for a silently incomplete export: for a resource ON the subject-export graph the engine REFUSES, deliberately, saying that an export missing one without saying so is an incomplete disclosure presented as a complete one, and a forbidden edge is RECORDED with its reason rather than dropped. The observable symptom is therefore a REFUSED export, not a thin one. An export not isolated to its subject is a MAJOR and a disclosure.","verificationSteps":["Read the declared purposes and the opted-in resource set; a resource carrying subject data and not opted in is C1's finding.","For each export row assert every enumerated field is present — purpose, subject, resource types, record count, AND both withholding lists. Asserting a fixed count of five passes a row that omits the non-disclosable list, which is the half that distinguishes a deliberate security floor from a missed resource.","Assert the withheld list is DERIVED rather than authored, or it will drift from what the export actually omitted.","Do not treat a window with no exports as a gap: no subject exercised the right, and C1 stands on its own.","For C3, confirm the generated recipient declaration is current (`wildo config subject-data-recipients --check`), then read how the export rows divide over recipientsStatus; a NOT_DECLARED row is an export that could not name recipients."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:subject-data-export-receipt"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:subject-erasure-execution","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies only where the APPLICATION owns an erasure-request resource. Four of the five marked sites are in an application, not the engine. An application that never built an erasure lane has not failed a control — it declared none — and a judge records not_applicable_as_configured rather than a nonconformity.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"APPLICATION_RECORDED","homeRationale":"The application's own resource row is the durable record, and no CoreAuditableEventType member covers the request LIFECYCLE — intake, withdrawal, execution. The erasure-shaped members that do exist record what an erasure did to a particular STORE (an external system's rows, an acknowledged external hole, a person's provider credential), which is a different question and is demanded by `evidence-requirement:erasure-propagation-record`, not here. The row's schema and status vocabulary are the application's, so a collector queries it against that application's specification.","obligation":"The request is recorded on intake, whether the subject or the controller raised it.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"APPLICATION_RECORDED","homeRationale":"The withdrawal is a state transition on the application-authored row, so the row is where it is recorded. This clause was re-homed `EMITTED` earlier on 2026-09-16 and is restored, because the objection that moved it was answered rather than argued. That objection was that collecting the rows means granting a standing cross-subject read over precisely the people who asked to be erased — the opposite of Article 5(1)(c). It is a real cost of ONE COLLECTION METHOD, fetching the rows over the resource API, and not a cost of this home. The engine's `/assurance/subject-erasure-lane-evidence` door derives its whole query from the application's own lane declaration and answers in COUNTS: no row, no identifier and no free text leaves the application.\n\nThe audit trail could not answer this clause in any case, and the words it cannot reach are `by the subject`. A generic operation row evidences that a withdrawal RAN; it cannot evidence that withdrawal is REACHABLE to the subject whose request it is, which is what the obligation says. The door reports exactly that, beside the count.\n\nWhat a supervisory authority asks for is a LOG OF THE PROCESS — the stage each request is at, the date responded, who handled it and why any delay — grounded in Article 5(2) and Article 30(1). Counts over the lane's own decision fields are that log in aggregate, and they disclose nobody.\nspec-cite: ICO, Data protection audit framework — \"Validating and managing requests for access\" (https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/advice-and-services/audits/data-protection-audit-framework/toolkits/requests-for-access/validating-and-managing-requests-for-access/), fetched 2026-09-16.","obligation":"It may be withdrawn by the subject while it is pending.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"APPLICATION_RECORDED","homeRationale":"Both halves are read from the application. The schedule is the sweep operation's own `cronExpression`, read from configuration rather than repeated in a clause; the outcome is the lane's terminal instant and its declared outcome, counted by the same door C2 names.\n\nRe-homed `EMITTED` earlier on 2026-09-16 and restored for C2's reason, with one of its own that settles it: the sweep's operation row carries the lane's resulting stage and outcome ONLY IF the application marked those fields as audit evidence, and no clause can require that of every application. An application that marked nothing would have been unevidenced under the EMITTED home and is evidenced under this one, because the door reads the declared fields directly.\n\nThe limit that survives either home, stated rather than discovered: a count of terminal requests carrying an outcome does not prove that each one met the schedule. Timeliness is tested by sampling, which is what the framework asks of an auditor.","obligation":"It is executed on the declared schedule.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"UNPRODUCED","homeRationale":"The session-revocation service emits no event and writes no durable record — its own marker calls it a write to our own Redis. That is the right design for the CONTROL and leaves the DEMAND unevidenced. UNPRODUCED is the honest value, not an absence.","obligation":"It terminates the erased person's sessions.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"It evidences the erasure LANE — intake, state, schedule, outcome — and never that the data is gone; whether the erasure reached its dependents and external effects is `evidence-requirement:erasure-propagation-record`'s demand. It does not prove sessions ended, and nothing available does. A window with no erasures evidences nothing about the lane: absence of activity and absence of a control read identically in a row store.","minimumEvidence":"C1: rows created in the window, each recording WHETHER the subject or the controller raised the request — the intent asks only for that. An application may model it as a channel enum, as the dogfood application does, but the shape is the APPLICATION's and must not be asserted as framework contract. Where controller-raised, also the requesting user and justification. C2: the withdrawal operation reachable to the subject, plus any cancelled rows — an EMPTY withdrawal set is not a deficiency. C3: completed or failed rows with a completion timestamp and outcome, plus the declared schedule. C4: nothing produces it; what can be gathered is that the revoker is installed, which evidences the control's PRESENCE and not its OPERATION.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A row with no channel, or a completed row with no outcome, is an OBSERVATION: the control operated and its evidence is incomplete. A row that left the pending state by an unaccounted route is a MAJOR — the state machine IS the control. Failed rows with no follow-up are a MAJOR: an unmet obligation to a real person. C4 carries NO severity against the application; it is a framework gap and belongs in the finding as such, so it is fixed once rather than raised against every application forever.","verificationSteps":["Resolve applicability: does the application own an erasure-request resource? If not, record not_applicable_as_configured and stop.","Assert every row records whether the subject or the controller raised it, in whatever shape that application declared, and that controller-raised rows carry the requester. Do NOT assert a specific channel vocabulary: that is one application's modelling choice.","Confirm the withdrawal operation is reachable to a subject-scoped principal, and that no row left the pending state by an unaccounted route.","Gather failed rows and report them; a suppressed failure is the defect this clause exists to catch.","Record C4 as UNPRODUCED and state that the binding evidence attests presence, not operation."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:subject-erasure-execution-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:tenancy-derivation-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:tenancy-derivation-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application. Every clause is engine-owned; the retrieval clauses have an empty population where no resource declares a retrieval source, which is an absence of subject matter rather than a declined control.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The evidence is that a caller-supplied scope has no effect, which no stored row shows: a correctly narrowed result looks the same whether the narrowing came from the context or from a parameter that happened to match. It has to be driven, with a scope the caller does not hold.","obligation":"Tenancy narrowing is DERIVED from the resolved execution context and never offered as a parameter.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"An enumeration, and the site says why it must be one: a predicate added to one filter builder is a bypass on the other, and this repository has been bitten by exactly that shape. Two persistence adapters mean two implementations unless a single authority is what both call, so the enumeration must name the call sites and resolve each to the same one.","obligation":"The derivation is ONE authority, applied at every call site rather than re-derived per site.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The tool schema an agent reads is generated, so the clause is about what the GENERATOR strips — at both nesting positions, top level and inside the filter object, because the builder places the scope in either depending on the operation. Evidence is the generated schema for a scoped operation, which is a driven artifact rather than an authored one.","obligation":"The scope is not offered as a knob to an agent or to any other non-client caller either.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C4","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The distinction is invisible in the result set: filtering after the traversal returns the same rows, minus the ones it drops, and differs only in what the traversal SAW. It is evidenced by the query the store issues and by the second, authorized read of the owning row — which is the half that turns a store-level predicate into an authorization decision.","obligation":"Where the read is a similarity search, the predicate is evaluated INSIDE the traversal rather than over its results, then re-checked by an authorized read of the owning row.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"Every clause attests the build driven, on the adapters driven. C2's enumeration goes stale the moment a call site is added, and an added one will not fail — it will simply be wrong for one adapter. And none of it evidences that the resolved execution context was itself correct: this demand is about a caller not WIDENING its scope, never about the scope it legitimately holds.","minimumEvidence":"C1: a driven read supplying a scope the caller does not hold, returning nothing from it. C2: an enumeration of the filter call sites, each resolving to the single authority. C3: the generated agent tool schema for a scoped operation, with the scope absent at both nesting positions. C4: the issued similarity query showing the predicate inside the traversal, plus evidence of the re-read.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A caller-supplied scope that widens a result is a MAJOR and is a disclosure, not a defect in degree. A second filter implementation not reaching the single authority is a MAJOR even where it currently agrees — agreement today is not the guarantee, and the two adapters drift independently. A scope offered as an agent parameter is a MAJOR. A similarity predicate applied over results rather than inside the traversal is a MAJOR: it caps how much a caller sees rather than what it may see, so the failure is silent and proportional to corpus size.","verificationSteps":["Call a scoped read supplying ANOTHER tenant's scope as a parameter and assert the named initiator-inconsistent REFUSAL, not merely an empty result. Then assert the caller's supplied value is NOT echoed in the error: reflecting it turns a refusal into a probe oracle.","Assert a redundant restatement of the caller's OWN scope is accepted — including as a single-member membership test. Both are no-ops by design, and driving them as attacks reports a MAJOR against a documented accommodation.","Enumerate the filter call sites and assert each reaches the one authoritative context-filter method — count them, and record the count.","Generate the agent tool schema for a scoped operation and assert the scope field is absent at top level AND inside the filter object.","Issue a similarity search and assert the tenancy predicate is part of the traversal, not applied to its output.","Assert each admitted chunk is re-checked by an authorized read of its owning row before its text is used."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:tenancy-derivation-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:third-party-ai-component-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application with an AI capability enabled in the contracted service. An application that enables none uses no third-party AI component, and that is the answer rather than a gap. A build-time AI capability — the coding agent — is outside it: it writes the application's source and never processes a user's data.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"The use posture is a committed declaration (`aiUsePosture`), and a capability being enabled cannot establish it: the same model backs a summary that decides nothing and a screening that decides a great deal. The committed configuration is the evidence.","obligation":"Every AI capability enabled in the contracted service declares what it is used for and whether it decides anything about a person.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"DECLARED","homeRationale":"Which vendor serves an AI capability is the committed provider selection, and whether it is identified is the committed processor register. Both are declarations of the application, so the join between them is read from the commit rather than from traffic.","obligation":"Every runtime provider serving such a capability is run by the operator or is named on the processor register.","plane":"META_APPLICATION"}],"limits":"It evidences what the application DECLARES about its AI, never what the model does: a posture of NO_DECISION is the operator's word, and a feature that in fact decides something is not caught here. It says nothing about the vendor's own training or retention terms, and nothing about an organisation's AI risk policies, which are the operator's acts rather than the product's.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the enabled capabilities intersected with the AI capabilities of the contracted service, and for each its declared posture — the consequence and the purpose, and the human-review arrangement where the AI decides or assists a decision. C2: for each runtime provider selected for such a capability, its compliance choice and, when vendor-hosted, its processor-register entry.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An enabled AI capability with no declared posture is a MAJOR: a notice describing it reads as \"nothing significant happens here\" and silently claims the automated-decision exemption. A vendor-hosted AI provider absent from the processor register is a MAJOR: a model vendor receives user content and nothing names it.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate the AI capabilities enabled in the contracted service, derived from the framework's own vocabulary rather than a list.","Assert each carries a declared use posture; name every one that does not.","Enumerate the runtime providers selected for those capabilities, excluding the build-time companion scope.","Assert each is SELF_HOSTED or appears on the processor register; name every one that does not."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:uniqueness-verification-outcome","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:uniqueness-verification-outcome"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares a uniqueness or integrity control, which is every application with a business key. The gates are engine-owned and run before traffic, so no application opts out.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The artifact is the boot gate's own outcome. It is not DECLARED — the declaration is the premise, and the whole point of the objective is that a declared constraint must not be ASSUMED to have been created. There are TWO gates, one per adapter, and they are separate code: a proof at one is silence about the other.","obligation":"Every declared uniqueness control is PROVEN to exist in the datastore before the application serves traffic.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The gate says this in its own words: a fail-closed gate that passes proves nothing on its own, because one that iterated an EMPTY set — an unpopulated registry, a generator that yielded nothing — exits exactly as one that checked every index. A count is what makes a green boot evidence rather than an absence of noise.\n\n**It holds on Mongo and NOT on PostgreSQL, which this clause asserted uniformly until 2026-09-10.** The Mongo gate logs its counts at info. The PostgreSQL pass is written to a DEBUG channel that the same file disables, so there is no artifact at all — and the count it would carry is of RESOURCES, not of uniqueness controls. So a collector on a PostgreSQL application finds nothing, and the severity line below would have made \"a pass with a count of zero\" a MAJOR against a correctly-operating gate. C1's own reasoning — a proof at one adapter is silence about the other — applies to this clause too, and it did not honour it.","obligation":"A PASS carries the number of controls checked, rather than being reported as silence — where the adapter reports one at all.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"The distinction is only visible in the gate's behaviour under an interrupted probe, and it is the clause with a recorded cost: a connection lifecycle interrupted mid-boot once produced a report of dozens of declared indexes that did not exist, against two entirely healthy databases. A false nonconformity is not a lesser outcome than a missed one — it sends an operator to repair data that is correct.","obligation":"A probe that could not learn anything is treated as INDETERMINATE and skipped, never reported as a missing control.","plane":"VERIFICATION"}],"limits":"It attests BOOT, and not always that: on PostgreSQL the gate warns ONCE and returns empty when the catalog is unavailable, so a boot can complete with the declared constraints never verified — its own text says so. That silent-skip path is the gap in C1's \"proven before serving traffic\", and a green boot does not exclude it. An index dropped after boot is invisible until the next one, and nothing continuously re-checks. It evidences PRESENCE, never enforcement: an index that exists with a partial filter can fail to cover the rows a business key means, and the gate reports it present.","minimumEvidence":"C1 and C2: the boot verification outcome from EACH adapter in use, carrying the count checked and the declared set it was checked against. C3: a driven interrupted probe showing the gate skips rather than reports.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An application serving traffic with a declared unique control absent is a MAJOR: the constraint is what a business key MEANS, and without it duplicate rows are already possible. A gate reporting a pass with a count of zero against a non-empty declared set is a MAJOR against the GATE rather than the datastore — that is the shape the count exists to expose, and it applies only where the adapter reports a count. On PostgreSQL none is observable, which is an OBSERVATION against the FRAMEWORK and never a nonconformity against the application. An indeterminate probe reported as a missing control is a MAJOR for the same reason and in the same direction.","verificationSteps":["Enumerate the declared uniqueness and integrity controls from the committed schema.","Read the Mongo boot verification outcome and assert its checked count matches that declared set.","Read the PostgreSQL boot verification outcome separately — a guard present in one repository class is absent in the other until shown.","Drive the refusal PER ADAPTER, and pick the condition per adapter. On PostgreSQL, drop a declared constraint and boot. On Mongo, do NOT drop an index and expect a refusal: automatic index building rebuilds it and the gate correctly passes, so the observation \"did not refuse\" would report a MAJOR against a working control. Disable automatic building, or make the build fail, so the missing constraint is the condition rather than a transient.","Interrupt a probe mid-verification and assert the outcome is indeterminate rather than a missing-control report."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:uniqueness-verification-outcome"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"evidence-expectation:usage-flush-run-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.USAGE_REPORTING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementEvidenceRefs":["evidence-requirement:usage-flush-run-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"applicability":"Applies to an application with billing enabled on its backend and at least one metered product. With no metered product nothing is recorded to flush.","clauses":[{"clauseRef":"C1","home":"PERFORMED","homeRationale":"The run output carries all three, and its schema is strict, so a counter the service computes cannot be silently dropped from it. No audit event exists for a flush; this output is the evidence.\n\nRun output lives in job-execution history for 30 days and output payloads for 24 hours, so those operational records alone cannot cover a longer claimed period; the accountable host must retain each run's outcome in its evidence archive for that period, and the clause is evidenced for exactly as long as it does.","obligation":"Each run records the quantity due, the quantity reported and the quantity determined permanently unreportable.","plane":"PRODUCTION"},{"clauseRef":"C2","home":"OBSERVED","homeRationale":"A reported row looks the same whether the provider accepted it or not, so the ordering has to be driven: fail the provider call and observe the row stays pending.","obligation":"A usage row is marked reported only after the provider accepted its quantity.","plane":"VERIFICATION"},{"clauseRef":"C3","home":"EMITTED","homeRationale":"The usage rows are an engine-owned store and carry the terminal state, its reason from the unreportable-reason vocabulary and the instant it was decided, so a query over the rows answers it directly for as long as the rows are kept — unlike C1, which depends on a host archive. The engine reads them for an evidence reader through `GET /assurance/usage-flush-evidence`, which counts rows by flush state and reason and counts apart the contradictions this clause forbids (no reason, no decision instant, also marked reported), returning no row.","obligation":"A row that can never be reported is marked unreportable with a reason, never reported and never retried forever.","plane":"PRODUCTION"}],"limits":"The reconciliation is an in-run count check: nothing asks the provider what it actually received, so a provider that acknowledged and then dropped a meter event is invisible here. The runtime gate is the backend's billing switch, not the engine capability.","minimumEvidence":"C1: the recorded output of the runs in the window. C2: a driven provider failure and the row's resulting state. C3: the unreportable rows and their reasons.","schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A row marked reported that the provider did not accept is a MAJOR — revenue that will never be billed, reported as billed. A run whose quantities do not reconcile with no error line is a MAJOR. A provider accepting a quantity whose rows could not then be marked is an OBSERVATION the service itself reports, because a later run may count it again.","verificationSteps":["Read each run's recorded output and assert quantity recorded equals quantity reported plus quantity unreportable, or that an error line explains the difference.","Fail the provider call for one group and assert its rows remain pending rather than reported.","Query rows in the unreportable state and assert each carries a reason."]},"requirementRef":"evidence-requirement:usage-flush-run-record"}]}],"implementationExpectationAuthorities":[{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:administrative-continuity-floor","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:administrative-continuity-floor","capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:admitted-outbound-target","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.NETWORK.OUTBOUND_TARGET_CONTROL","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:outbound-target-admission"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.TAMPER_RESISTANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:runtime-principal-grant-axes"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:audited-first-exposure","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:authorization-decision-audit","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:startup-configuration-validation"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:verifiable-key-retirement"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:refusal-classification"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:caller-derived-tenancy"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:collection-export-recording","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:access-withdrawal-on-conferring-status","capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:constrained-redirect-target","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:redirect-target-constraint"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:credential-state-transition-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:audit-events"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredCapabilityRefs":["capability:declared-uniqueness-verification"]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"implementation-expectation:declared-ai-component-use"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The floor is engine-owned and covers both the application scope and each tenant, so no application opts out and none has to build the refusal first.","knownLimitations":"Does NOT establish that concurrent reductions are serialized. That property needs two transactions racing on a real replica set; a single-node development datastore mocks transactions and will report success whether or not the serialization token is written.","passCriteria":"All three administrative doors refuse; the unacknowledged erasure refuses; the acknowledged erasure proceeds AND emits one high-severity record naming the stranded scope; and the startup report names that scope. An erasure that proceeds silently on acknowledgement is a fail even though the write succeeded — the acknowledgement's entire justification is that the consequence becomes visible.","procedure":["Reduce a scope to exactly one usable administrator, then attempt to remove, demote and deactivate that administrator — three distinct doors, because a floor applied at one of them is the defect this objective exists to prevent.","Confirm each attempt is refused as a CONFLICT naming the scope, not as a permission error: the caller IS authorized and the payload IS valid, so a 403 would send an operator to fix the wrong thing.","Run a data-protection erasure against that same last administrator WITHOUT the acknowledgement, then WITH it, and read the audit store for the second run.","Restart the application with a scope already stranded — reduce it out of band — and read the startup report."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A door that permits the last administrator's removal is a nonconformity — the scope becomes unadministrable and the remedy is out-of-tenant. An acknowledged erasure that strands a scope without emitting the record is equally a nonconformity, for the opposite reason: the write is correct and the control that makes it accountable is absent. A refusal carrying the wrong status code is an observation."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:administrative-continuity-floor"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:admitted-outbound-target","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.NETWORK.OUTBOUND_TARGET_CONTROL","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:admitted-outbound-target"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application; the governed request paths are engine-owned.","knownLimitations":"Does not cover destinations an application's own backend configuration declares, which are trusted as authored, and cannot establish that an operator declared the runtime environment truthfully. A SIEM collector admitted by the operator's private-network declaration is outside this act's refusal set.","passCriteria":"Every private-resolving destination is refused before a byte is sent, an undeclared environment refuses to start (a SIEM collector is exempt only where the operator declared private-network collectors admissible); each redirecting server receives exactly one request; loopback is reached under development for the tenant- and client-chosen classes and the metadata address is still refused; and MCP and client-metadata resolution refuse loopback in every runtime.","procedure":["Under a production runtime, drive a webhook delivery, a SIEM export and a federated sign-in token exchange at a destination whose name resolves to a private address.","Start the backend with the runtime environment left undeclared, and confirm it refuses to start rather than assuming development.","Drive the same classes at a server answering with a redirect to the metadata address, and count the requests it receives.","Under a development runtime, drive the same classes at a loopback destination and at the metadata address.","Drive an MCP call and a client-metadata resolution at a loopback destination under a development runtime."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A refused-class destination reached in production is a nonconformity and a request-forgery primitive. A followed redirect is a nonconformity. A development runtime admitting beyond loopback is a nonconformity."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:admitted-outbound-target"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.TAMPER_RESISTANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to an application that runs a named runtime principal on a self-managed database adapter. Without one there is no per-principal grant to test.","knownLimitations":"Does NOT establish anything about the application backend's own credential, which owns its database, nor about an adapter that issues no per-principal credential.","passCriteria":"The audit trail is append-only in every derivation; both the parse and the derivation refuse the widening; and the datastore rejects the update and the delete while accepting an insert.","procedure":["Derive a principal's database grants from a declaration that reads business data and writes nothing, and confirm the audit trail is on the append axis only.","Declare the audit trail on the principal's write axis and confirm the configuration is refused.","Hand the derivation a grant object carrying the audit trail on its write axis directly, bypassing the configuration parse, and confirm it refuses too.","Against a provisioned self-managed database, attempt an update and a delete on the audit table as that principal's role."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A principal able to update or delete an audit row is a nonconformity. A widening refused at only one of the two gates is an observation where the other still refuses."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:append-only-runtime-principal-audit-grant"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:auditable-event-actor-attribution","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.ATTRIBUTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:auditable-event-actor-attribution"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Attribution is a property of the engine's audit emitter, so what varies per application is which actions it performs, never whether the attribution exists.","knownLimitations":"Establishes attribution for the actions exercised. It does NOT establish that every emitting call site attributes correctly; enumerating those sites is a separate act, and a green result here says nothing about the ones not run.","passCriteria":"Every row names its actor. An action with no resolvable principal is recorded as UNATTRIBUTABLE and is distinguishable from an ordinary automated one — a row that dresses an unattributable action as a routine system action is a fail, because it removes the reviewer's ability to notice.","procedure":["Perform a security-relevant action as a named user, and read the resulting row's actor fields.","Perform the same class of action through a path with no resolvable principal — a scheduled job, a system-initiated write — and read that row.","Perform a read-through against an external system on a user's behalf and confirm the row carries the INITIATING user rather than the shared service principal the call was made with.","Perform an outbound deletion in that external system and confirm the row names both the subject it served and the system it reached."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A missing or wrong actor is a nonconformity: the trail exists and cannot answer the question it is read for. An unattributable action disguised as a system action is a nonconformity of the same weight, and harder to detect later. A cosmetic field wrong on an otherwise attributed row is an observation."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:auditable-event-actor-attribution"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:audited-first-exposure","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.CONFIDENTIALITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:audited-first-exposure"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares backend-only material — every application, since the framework's own credential and secret fields carry the declaration.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the declared fields do not cross the boundary through the reads exercised. It does NOT establish that a field holding sensitive material carries the declaration in the first place — an undeclared secret is invisible to this act, and is the other half of the objective.","passCriteria":"No client-facing read returns a backend-only field. The single first-exposure door returns the value exactly once and emits a record naming the field and the principal that received it. A second exposure through the same door without a second record is a fail.","procedure":["Enumerate the fields the schema declares backend-only from the resource registry, not from a hand-kept list.","For each, request the owning resource through every client-facing read the application exposes — single read, list, export, and any custom projection — and confirm the field is absent from the response body.","Exercise the ONE declared first-exposure door for a field that has one, and read the audit store for that window."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A backend-only field returned to a client is a nonconformity and, depending on the field, a disclosure. A first exposure that is not recorded is a nonconformity: the exception exists only because it is audited. An exposure through an undocumented door is a nonconformity even when the value is harmless."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:audited-first-exposure"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:authentication-posture-change-detection","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:authentication-posture-change-detection"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The posture surface is engine-owned and always present; what varies is which settings an application chooses.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that a change is DETECTED and recorded. It does NOT establish that the posture is appropriate: whether a given MFA or lockout setting is adequate for the application's risk is a review judgement this act does not make.","passCriteria":"Every element is explicitly configured. A genuine change is evidenced exactly once, from the runtime that puts it into effect. A restart with no change emits nothing — a posture record on every boot is a fail, because a record that fires unconditionally cannot signal a change.","procedure":["Read the resolved authentication posture from the running application rather than from the authored configuration file — the two can differ, and the runtime's view is the one that governs.","Confirm each element the objective names is explicitly configured rather than defaulted-into: MFA, password policy, lockout, permitted methods, step-up, session posture, whether single sign-on is enforced, which identity provider is trusted, and whether its assertions are verified.","Change one element, restart, and read the audit store.","Restart again with no change and read the same window."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An undetected posture change is a nonconformity — the control's whole value is that a weakening cannot happen quietly. A record emitted on every restart is also a nonconformity: it destroys the signal while appearing to provide it. A record emitted from a runtime other than the one enforcing the posture is an observation unless it is the only record."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:authentication-posture-change-detection"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:authorization-decision-audit","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:authorization-decision-audit"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Authorization is engine-enforced, so the decision points exist before an application adds any of its own.","knownLimitations":"Does NOT establish that the volume of records is survivable under load. Whether the trail becomes an availability risk at production rates is a capacity question, and this act runs at test rates.","passCriteria":"Refusals are recorded as reliably as grants; repeated refusals remain detectable; and a recording failure is itself detectable and attributable to the specific action whose record was lost. A pipeline that drops silently is a fail even when every other row is perfect.","procedure":["Perform an authorized action and a refused one, and confirm BOTH produce a row — a trail recording only grants cannot answer the question a reviewer brings to it.","Confirm each row names the principal, the resource and the decision.","Repeat a refusal enough times to cross the application's own detection threshold and confirm the repetition stays visible.","Interrupt the recording pipeline — stop the sink, or point it at an unreachable destination — perform one further action, and confirm the loss is detectable and names the action it lost."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Unrecorded refusals are a nonconformity: the detection case the trail exists for is exactly the refusal case. A silent pipeline failure is a nonconformity of higher weight, because every downstream control that reads the trail is then wrong without saying so."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:authorization-decision-audit"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:boot-proven-field-authority","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SOFTWARE.AUTHORITY_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:boot-proven-field-authority"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The authority declaration is engine-owned and the boot proof runs unconditionally, so what varies is which fields an application declares.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the authority is proven at boot for the DECLARED fields. It does NOT establish that a field which ought to be server-owned carries the declaration — an undeclared field is outside what this act can see.","passCriteria":"Startup proves the authority for every server-owned field. A field with two writers, or with none, refuses to start rather than starting and letting a reader work out which value is current. A start that succeeds with an unproven authority is a fail even if the field happens to hold the right value.","procedure":["Read the startup validation result and confirm it names each server-owned field and the single authority that writes it.","Introduce a second writer for one such field — a custom implementation that sets it directly — and restart.","Remove the declared authority for a field that has one, and restart."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A boot that succeeds without proving an authority is a nonconformity: the property this objective asks for is the proof, not the arrangement. Two writers for one field is a nonconformity regardless of current values, because the defect is a race that has not yet been lost."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:boot-proven-field-authority"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:bounded-concurrent-sessions","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:bounded-concurrent-sessions"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application, and the bound is a declared value rather than a framework constant — so an application that has not chosen one is verified against the framework default rather than exempt.","knownLimitations":"Establishes eviction order for sessions established in a known order within one test. It does NOT establish behaviour under concurrent sign-ins racing at the bound, where the ordering the eviction reads may itself be contended.","passCriteria":"The count is bounded AND the eviction retired the oldest chain. Evicting the newest is a fail even though the bound holds — it pushes the legitimate session out and leaves a stolen chain in place, which inverts the property the bound exists for.","procedure":["Sign one principal in enough times to exceed the declared bound, recording the order in which the refresh chains were established.","Confirm the session count settles at the bound rather than growing.","Identify WHICH chain was evicted and confirm it is the OLDEST, not the newest and not an arbitrary one.","Confirm the evicted chain can no longer refresh."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unbounded session count is a nonconformity. Evicting anything other than the oldest chain is a nonconformity of HIGHER practical weight than the missing bound, because it silently converts a defence into an attack aid."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:bounded-concurrent-sessions"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:bounded-retired-signing-key","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:bounded-retired-signing-key"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to an application that has rotated a signing key. An application that has never rotated has nothing to verify here and is out of scope rather than passing.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the retirement instant is honoured by this runtime. It does NOT establish that every verifier honours it: a cached key set held by a downstream consumer is outside this act, and its refresh interval is what actually bounds the exposure there.","passCriteria":"The retired key stops being advertised AND stops verifying, at the declared instant, with no configuration edit in between. A key that disappears from the advertisement but still verifies is a fail — the second half is the one that matters to an attacker holding the old key.","procedure":["Rotate a signing key and give the retired key an explicit retirement instant in the near future.","Before that instant, confirm the retired key is still advertised and still verifies a token it signed.","After that instant, confirm it is no longer advertised at the public key surface.","After that instant, present a token the retired key signed and confirm it is refused."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A retired key that still verifies after its instant is a nonconformity: the mechanism exists precisely so a compromised prior key need not stay trusted. Continued advertisement alone is an observation, provided verification has genuinely stopped."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:bounded-retired-signing-key"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:bounded-unauthenticated-request","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.RESOURCE_LIMIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:bounded-unauthenticated-request"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The perimeter is engine-owned and unauthenticated surfaces exist before an application adds any.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the bound at the rates this act can generate. It does NOT establish the behaviour of the deployed edge — a CDN or ingress ahead of the application may absorb or transform the traffic, and its limits are declared elsewhere.","passCriteria":"Each bound is enforced, and an over-limit request is answered as a CLIENT error. A 5xx is a fail even when the limit held: it reports the caller's excess as the server's failure, which sends an operator to the wrong place and pollutes the error budget the objective's siblings are read against.","procedure":["Issue unauthenticated requests exceeding each declared bound in turn — rate, body size, and any other limit the perimeter declares.","Record the status class of the over-limit response.","Confirm the application remains serviceable to a compliant caller during and after the over-limit traffic."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unbounded unauthenticated surface is a nonconformity. An enforced bound reported as a server error is a nonconformity of lower weight but real cost, because it makes a working control indistinguishable from a fault."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:bounded-unauthenticated-request"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:caller-derived-tenancy","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.TENANT_ISOLATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:caller-derived-tenancy"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Tenancy narrowing is engine-derived, and the surfaces that could offer it as a parameter — client reads, agent tools, retrieval — all exist by default.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the offering surfaces present at the time of the act refuse widening. A surface added later inherits nothing from this result — that is what makes the enumeration, rather than the assertion, the load-bearing half.","passCriteria":"No surface accepts a caller-supplied tenancy. For similarity search, the predicate is evaluated inside the traversal AND the owning row is re-read. Post-filtering the results is a fail even when the returned set is correct: it leaks through the ranking and the count, and it degrades toward returning nothing rather than returning safely.","procedure":["Attempt to widen a query's tenancy from EVERY offering surface in turn: a client request parameter, an agent tool argument, and a retrieval or similarity-search filter.","Confirm each attempt is ignored or refused, and that the served rows are those of the caller's resolved execution context.","For a similarity search, confirm the tenancy predicate is evaluated INSIDE the traversal — compare the row count and identities against a search whose predicate is applied to the results — and that each returned row is re-checked by an authorized read of the owning row."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A caller-widenable scope is a nonconformity and a cross-tenant disclosure. Post-traversal filtering on a similarity search is a nonconformity even with no observed leak, because the leak is in the ranking rather than in the rows."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:caller-derived-tenancy"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:collection-export-recording","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:collection-export-recording"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that exposes a collection export — the engine ships one, so this is every application unless the operation is withdrawn.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the export path records. It does NOT establish the SIZE of what left — the record names what was exported, not how many rows, so a reviewer cannot size an incident from this record alone.","passCriteria":"Every export produced one row carrying all three facts. A row naming the resource but not the operation is a fail: the operation is what distinguishes a routine listing from a deliberate bulk extraction, which is the distinction the record exists to preserve.","procedure":["Export a resource collection through each rendered format the application offers.","Read the audit store for that window.","Confirm each row names the resource exported, the operation it was taken from, and the format rendered."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unrecorded bulk export is a nonconformity: it is the single act most likely to matter in a later investigation. A record missing the format is an observation; missing the operation or the resource is a nonconformity."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:collection-export-recording"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:conferring-relationship-withdrawal","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:conferring-relationship-withdrawal"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Membership and role relationships are engine-owned, so the conferring relationships exist before an application declares any of its own.","knownLimitations":"Establishes withdrawal for the relationship kinds exercised. It does NOT establish the LATENCY of withdrawal across every cache and downstream consumer; a token invalidated at the issuer may still be accepted briefly by a verifier holding stale state.","passCriteria":"Withdrawal removes the access AND invalidates credentials already asserting it — a token minted before the withdrawal must stop working, or the withdrawal is a record rather than an effect. Both the withdrawal and the restoration are recorded and attributed.","procedure":["Establish a principal whose access derives from a relationship — a membership, an assignment, an employment-like link.","End that relationship and confirm the access is withdrawn, including any credential asserting it: attempt the previously permitted action, and attempt it again with a token minted before the withdrawal.","Restore the relationship and read the audit store for BOTH transitions."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Access surviving the end of the relationship conferring it is a nonconformity. An unrecorded RESTORATION is a nonconformity too, and the one more often missed — a restoration that leaves no trail is how a withdrawn privilege quietly returns."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:conferring-relationship-withdrawal"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:constrained-redirect-target","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:constrained-redirect-target"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that registers an OAuth redirect target. An application with no such registration is out of scope rather than passing.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the constraint on the forms exercised. It does NOT establish that the permitted target is under the operator's control — a syntactically safe absolute URL pointing at a host someone else owns passes this act and is still an open redirect.","passCriteria":"Every unsafe form is refused at REGISTRATION. Refusing only at redirect time is a fail: the stored value is then an attack the application is carrying, and one that a later code path may use without re-checking.","procedure":["Attempt to register redirect targets that are each individually unsafe: a relative path, a scheme other than the permitted one, a target carrying a javascript or data scheme, a wildcard host, and a target with credentials embedded.","Confirm each is refused at registration rather than at redirect time.","Register a valid target and confirm the authorization flow redirects to it."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A permissive redirect target is a nonconformity: it is simultaneously an open-redirect and a stored-XSS delegation primitive. Refusal deferred to redirect time is a nonconformity of lower weight but the same class, because the unsafe value is persisted."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:constrained-redirect-target"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:credential-state-transition-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.CREDENTIAL_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Credential lifecycle is engine-owned, so every transition exists before an application adds a credential kind of its own.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the transitions exercised. It does NOT establish detection coverage for theft patterns not simulated, and a detector that has never fired against a real authenticator remains unproven regardless of this result.","passCriteria":"Every transition is explicit, attributed and recorded, AND a revocation terminates what it names. A revocation that marks a record while the session keeps working is a fail: it is the case where the trail says the control operated and the control did not.","procedure":["Drive each transition the objective names — issuance, refresh, rotation, revocation, expiry — and read the audit store for each.","Confirm each row is attributed to the principal whose credential moved, not to the system performing the move.","After a REVOCATION, attempt to use the named session and the named token, and confirm both are refused.","Simulate credential theft as the application detects it — a reused refresh token, a regressed counter — and confirm the answer is invalidation rather than a logged observation."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A revocation that does not terminate is a nonconformity of the highest weight here — every downstream reviewer reads the record as an effect. A missing transition record is a nonconformity. A transition attributed to the system where a principal acted is a nonconformity, since it defeats the review the record exists for."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:credential-state-transition-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application deployed on a platform with a tier above the tenant. A single-tenant deployment with no platform operator has no crossing to declare and is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the admission rule for the variants enumerated. It does NOT establish that the set of declared variants is APPROPRIATE — whether a given operation should be crossable is a design judgement, and an irreversible verb declared crossable passes this act.","passCriteria":"An undeclared crossing fails closed; a declared one requires an elevation that was requested rather than held; and every crossing emits its own event naming the tenant. A crossing that succeeds on standing privilege is a fail even when it is declared and recorded.","procedure":["Enumerate the operation variants that declare cross-tenant admission — the declaration is the population, and a verifier who chooses it has not measured anything.","As a platform administrator holding no role in the target tenant, attempt an UNDECLARED cross-tenant operation and confirm it fails closed.","Attempt a DECLARED one without an elevation and confirm it is refused; request the elevation, obtain any tenant approval the tenant demands, and confirm it then succeeds.","Read the audit store and confirm the crossing is a distinct event naming the tenant reached — not an ordinary operation row."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Ambient cross-tenant reach is a nonconformity of the highest weight: it is a standing privilege over customer data. An undeclared crossing that succeeds is the same finding. A crossing recorded as an ordinary operation is a nonconformity, because it cannot be separated for review."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:cross-tenant-administrative-access-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:datastore-proven-uniqueness","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.INTEGRITY_CONSTRAINTS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:datastore-proven-uniqueness"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application declaring a uniqueness or integrity constraint — every application, since the framework's own resources declare them.","knownLimitations":"Establishes existence, not enforcement history. A constraint created moments before the probe passes identically to one that has held since the data was written, so this act says nothing about whether violating rows already exist.","passCriteria":"Every declared constraint is proven present before traffic is served, and a missing one refuses the start. An interrupted probe reports indeterminacy — reporting 'does not exist' for a probe that was cut off is a fail, because it sends an operator to repair data that is intact.","procedure":["Read the startup verification result and confirm it enumerates the declared constraints and reports, per constraint, whether the datastore holds it.","Remove one constraint from the datastore out of band and restart.","Confirm the application refuses to serve traffic rather than starting and discovering the absence on a later write.","Distinguish an INDETERMINATE probe from a negative one: interrupt the verification mid-run and confirm the result says the constraint could not be established rather than that it does not exist."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Serving traffic without a declared constraint is a nonconformity: every write after that point may violate an invariant the application believes is enforced. Reporting an interrupted probe as a definitive absence is a nonconformity in its own right — it manufactures a data incident out of a restart."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:datastore-proven-uniqueness"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:declared-directory-authority","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.DIRECTORY_PROVISIONING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:declared-directory-authority"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies only to an application that opts a directory in as a provisioning authority. An application with no directory connection is out of scope rather than passing — and an application that HAS a connection but has not declared the switches is IN scope, because that is the state this requirement exists to catch.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the application's behaviour given what the directory asserts. It does NOT establish the directory's own correctness: a stale or wrongly-scoped group at the source produces a faithful and wrong grant here, and that is the directory's control rather than this one.","passCriteria":"Authority is conferred only by an explicit declaration, and a declared unit membership changes what the principal may DO. A membership applied as a label — visible in the profile, inert in authorization — is a fail, because it is the reading that makes an operator believe access was revoked when it was not.","procedure":["Read the declared switches that confer provisioning authority, and confirm each is set explicitly rather than inferred from the existence of a connection.","With account authority declared, provision and deprovision an account at the directory and confirm the application follows.","With unit-membership authority declared, move a principal between units at the directory and confirm the resulting change is applied as an AUTHORIZATION GRANT — attempt an action the new unit confers and one the old unit conferred.","Turn the membership switch off, repeat the move, and confirm the application does NOT re-derive authorization from it."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Provisioning authority conferred by the mere presence of a connection is a nonconformity — it is authority nobody granted. A unit membership treated as a label while the objective calls it a grant is a nonconformity, and the more dangerous of the two because it reads as working."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:declared-directory-authority"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:declared-persistence-isolation","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.TRANSACTIONAL_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:declared-persistence-isolation"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The registry build runs unconditionally; what varies is whether an application places any resource on a non-default adapter.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the declared topology is checked. It does NOT establish that a write the application performs is actually atomic at runtime: a single-node development datastore mocks transactions, so an isolation failure there is invisible to any act short of a real multi-node run.","passCriteria":"Both refusals happen when the registry is BUILT. A configuration accepted at build and failing under load is a fail even if the eventual failure is loud — the objective's whole content is moving the discovery to a moment when nobody is depending on the write.","procedure":["Move a resource to a non-default adapter WITHOUT declaring its persistence isolation and build the registry.","Confirm the build refuses, naming the resource and the missing declaration.","Declare the isolation and construct a cross-resource write spanning two adapters that could not be atomic; build again.","Confirm that configuration is refused at registry-build time rather than accepted and discovered on a later write."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A cross-adapter write accepted at build is a nonconformity: it is a partial write waiting for load, and the resulting inconsistency has no owner. An undeclared resource on a non-default adapter is a nonconformity for the same reason one step earlier."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:declared-persistence-isolation"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:declared-personal-data-categories","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.PERSONAL_DATA_INVENTORY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:declared-personal-data-categories"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","AUTOMATED_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares resources — which is every application. The declaration surface is engine-owned; what is application-specific is which fields carry which classification.","knownLimitations":"Establishes what is DECLARED, not what a field actually contains at runtime. A field correctly declared may still receive data of a different kind; that is a data-handling question this act does not reach.","passCriteria":"Every field that owes the declaration carries it. The population that owes it is derived from the resource registry, never chosen by the verifier — a ratio whose denominator the verifier picked is not a measurement.","procedure":["Enumerate the application's declared resources and their fields from the resource registry, not from a hand-kept list.","For each field, read the classification the objective demands directly off the declaration.","Identify fields that carry personal or otherwise classified data and lack the declaration, and fields that declare it without holding such data."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An undeclared field holding classified data is a nonconformity — downstream controls key off the declaration, so the omission silently disables them. An over-declaration is an observation: it costs handling, not correctness."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:declared-personal-data-categories"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:declared-retention-window","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.STORAGE_LIMITATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:declared-retention-window"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares a retention window, and to every application that stores derived copies of subject text — which the framework's own search and retrieval surfaces produce, so the second half reaches applications that declared nothing.","knownLimitations":"Establishes enforcement for the windows declared and the copies the configuration describes. It does NOT establish that every material data category HAS a window — an undeclared category is outside the enforcement loop entirely, and is the gap the coverage question asks about rather than this one.","passCriteria":"Declared windows are enforced, AND a configuration whose derived copies could outlive their source row is refused at startup. Enforcement without the startup refusal is a fail: an erasure that cannot reach a derived copy leaves subject text behind while every record says the erasure completed.","procedure":["Read the declared windows and confirm each names a class rather than a single resource, so a class added to the vocabulary is reported rather than silently omitted.","Age a row past its window — by clock or by seeded timestamp — run the enforcement, and confirm the row is treated as the window declares.","Configure a derived copy of subject text whose lifetime is NOT reachable by the erasure seams, and start the application.","Confirm startup refuses that configuration rather than starting with a copy that can outlive its source."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A derived copy able to outlive its source is a nonconformity of the highest weight here: it defeats erasure while reporting success. An unenforced declared window is a nonconformity. A category with no declared window is an observation against THIS requirement and a coverage gap elsewhere."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:declared-retention-window"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:delegated-authorization-exchange","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.DELEGATED_AUTHORIZATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:delegated-authorization-exchange"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","AUTOMATED_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies only to an application that exposes delegated authorization. An application issuing no delegated grants is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the exchange as this application implements it. It does NOT establish the third party's handling of the token afterwards, which is where a correctly-scoped grant is most often over-used.","passCriteria":"All four outcomes are audited; the exchange refuses without proof of possession; and the issued token carries NO MORE than the declared grant. A token carrying a scope the grant did not name is a fail even when the exchange itself was flawless — that is the privilege the user never authorized.","procedure":["Drive a full delegated exchange to APPROVAL, and read the audit store.","Drive one to REFUSAL, one that PERSISTS a grant, and one that FAILS mid-exchange, reading the store after each — four outcomes, because a lane that records only the happy path cannot answer what a reviewer asks it.","Repeat the exchange without the proof of possession and confirm it is refused.","Decode the issued token and compare its claims against the declared grant."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A token exceeding its grant is a nonconformity and a privilege escalation. An unaudited refusal or failure is a nonconformity: those are the outcomes an investigation reads first. A missing proof-of-possession check is a nonconformity, because it converts a stolen code into a usable grant."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:delegated-authorization-exchange"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:diagnosable-refusal","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECURITY.FAIL_CLOSED","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:diagnosable-refusal"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies wherever the objective's control is expressed as a REFUSAL — a guard, a floor, a fail-closed gate. An application that has not enabled the surface the guard protects is out of scope and has not failed anything.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the guard refuses at the sites exercised. It does NOT establish that every path to the protected state passes through it — an unenumerated call site is invisible to this act.","passCriteria":"The refused act is refused, with an error the caller can branch on, AND the permitted act succeeds. Both halves are required: the negative alone does not distinguish a working guard from a broken surface.","procedure":["Construct the state the guard exists to refuse, using the ordinary interface a caller would use — not a direct store write, which bypasses the guard being verified.","Attempt the refused act and record the outcome, including the status and the error classification the caller receives.","Perform the POSITIVE control: the same act in a state the guard permits, confirming it succeeds. A refusal with no positive control is unattributable — it may be refusing for an unrelated reason.","Where the guard has several call sites, repeat at each; a guard applied at one of its sites is the defect shape this step exists to catch."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A guard that admits the state it exists to refuse is a nonconformity at the severity of what the state permits. A guard that refuses correctly but returns an unclassifiable error is an observation, unless a caller's own safety depends on branching on it."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:diagnosable-refusal"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:erasure-propagation-accounting","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.ERASURE_PROPAGATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:erasure-propagation-accounting"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The accounting is the return value of the engine's erasure call, so it can be driven whether or not the application has ever erased anyone; the external-system steps apply only where the application binds a resource to an external system or registers an external erasure effect, and are recorded not_applicable_as_configured otherwise.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the accounting for the build it ran against. It does NOT establish that the stores are empty of the subject: a teardown that ran can leave derived copies whose removal is scheduled after commit and logged rather than recorded, and an external system reports only what it answered at the time. It establishes nothing below a relationship whose rows the erasure retains, which it does not walk. A credential-deletion record is delivered after commit and a failed audit write is logged rather than retried, so a missing record beside a run credential edge is possible and is an evidence lag rather than a live credential.","passCriteria":"Every dependent edge the erasure walks — direct and descendant — and every registered external effect is accounted for exactly once, a declined teardown at any depth reads as not run and makes its direct edge read as not run, an unclassifiable or deferred edge at any depth the erasure walks refuses before writing, no outcome that may leave data at a third party reads as complete, and each credential the erasure destroys leaves its record. An accounting that reports a declined edge as run is a fail even if every other step passes — it is the one failure that turns this control into a way of hiding live personal data.","procedure":["Erase a subject with DIRECT dependents on a deleting edge, a retaining edge and an edge that is not the subject's to decide, and confirm the returned accounting names every direct edge once, with its declared disposition, and marks exactly the executing edges as run.","Give the deleting dependent its own dependents two and three levels down, each declaring the ordinary one-level delete depth, erase again, and confirm the rows at every level are gone and each descendant relationship appears under its direct edge as run.","Make one executing edge undischargeable — its child has no registered repository — first as a direct edge and then as a descendant, and confirm the declined edge is reported as NOT run each time, and that the direct edge above the declined descendant is reported as not run with it.","Add an edge that declares no parent-delete behaviour, or one that defers its teardown to a queue, first as a direct edge and then below a deleted dependent, and confirm the erasure refuses before any write lands, naming the edge. Confirm the same shape placed below a retaining edge does NOT refuse: the erasure does not walk below rows it keeps.","Where an external system is bound: drive an external deletion and an acknowledged non-erasure, and confirm each appears in the accounting with its own status and leaves its row naming the subject, resource and system. Confirm every status that may leave data live, the acknowledged one included, is classified incomplete.","Erase a subject holding person-owned third-party credentials and confirm each credential row is gone, the credential edge reports as run, and one credential-deletion row carrying the erasure reason exists per destroyed credential. Hard-delete a different user holding a credential and confirm no row carrying the erasure reason is written for it."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A declined edge reported as run, or a direct edge reported as run above a declined descendant, is a nonconformity of the highest weight, as is an incomplete external outcome classified complete. An unclassified or deferred edge at any depth the erasure walks that proceeds instead of refusing is a nonconformity: the erasure then guessed. A missing external or credential row where the accounting shows the teardown ran is a nonconformity of evidence rather than of control. A credential record carrying the erasure reason for a user who was deleted rather than erased is a nonconformity: it forges erasure evidence."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:erasure-propagation-accounting"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:granted-authority-ceiling","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:granted-authority-ceiling"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Role assignment and machine-credential minting are engine-owned, and the non-controller surfaces the objective names — self-service verbs, retrieval corpora, agent-facing tools — exist by default.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the ceiling for the surfaces enumerated at the time of the act. A surface added later inherits nothing from this result, which is why the enumeration is the load-bearing step rather than the assertions.","passCriteria":"No principal can grant authority above its own ceiling, and every non-controller surface applies the same declared gate through the same predicate as the controller tier. A surface enforcing an equivalent rule by its own copy of the logic is a fail: two implementations of one gate is how the two come to disagree.","procedure":["As a principal holding a bounded set of roles, attempt to assign a role OUTSIDE that set, and to mint a machine credential carrying one.","Confirm both are refused, and that the refusal is on the caller's ceiling rather than on a static list — repeat as a higher-ceiling principal and confirm it succeeds.","Enumerate the non-controller surfaces facing an external caller: each self-service verb, each retrieval corpus, each agent-facing tool.","For each, attempt an action the declared operation-role gate should refuse, and confirm the refusal happens BEFORE the surface is reached."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Granting above one's ceiling is a nonconformity and a privilege escalation. A non-controller surface reaching data without the gate is the same finding by a different door — and historically the more common one, because the controller tier is where everybody looks."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:granted-authority-ceiling"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:guarded-authentication-eligibility","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:guarded-authentication-eligibility"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The status carrying authentication eligibility is engine-owned and excluded from ordinary updates by construction.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the ordinary write path cannot carry the change. It does NOT establish that every guarded transition is correct — whether a given principal should have become ineligible is a decision this act does not review.","passCriteria":"The status cannot move through an ordinary update, and the guarded door both applies it and records it. A generic update that appears to succeed while silently stripping the field is the EXPECTED behaviour and passes; what fails is an update that actually writes it.","procedure":["Attempt to change the eligibility status through the ordinary update verb for the principal's resource, including as part of a larger unrelated write.","Confirm the field is not written — read the row back rather than trusting the response, because a stripped field returns a success the caller cannot distinguish from an applied one.","Change it through the guarded authority and confirm it takes effect.","Read the audit store and confirm the guarded change is evidenced and attributed."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Eligibility changed as a side effect of an unrelated write is a nonconformity: the change is the one an investigation most needs attributed, and it arrives with no author. A guarded change that is not evidenced is a nonconformity of the same weight."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:guarded-authentication-eligibility"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:high-impact-action-reproof","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:high-impact-action-reproof"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","AUTOMATED_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that declares a high-impact action. The engine declares several of its own, so an application that has declared none is still in scope through those.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the demand for the actions declared. It does NOT establish that the right actions are declared: an action that ought to be high-impact and is not declared passes this act silently.","passCriteria":"Every declared high-impact action demands a fresh re-proof; the ceremony accepts any factor the principal holds; and a credential presented for another purpose does not satisfy it. Accepting a recent unrelated authentication is a fail — it converts step-up into a time window, which is the property the objective explicitly denies.","procedure":["Enumerate the actions declared high-impact — the declaration is the population.","Attempt each with a valid ordinary session and confirm a fresh re-proof is demanded.","Satisfy the re-proof over EACH factor kind the principal actually holds, confirming the ceremony is not bound to one factor a given principal may not have.","Attempt to satisfy the re-proof with a credential presented moments earlier for a DIFFERENT purpose, and confirm it is refused."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A high-impact action reachable without re-proof is a nonconformity. Satisfying step-up with a credential minted for another purpose is a nonconformity of equal weight and lower visibility, because every log shows a successful ceremony."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:high-impact-action-reproof"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:ingested-content-inspection","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECURITY.INGESTED_CONTENT_INSPECTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:ingested-content-inspection"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","AUTOMATED_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to an application that declares at least one field with a scan policy, or enables scanning globally. An application that ingests no user content has declared no such field and is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the pipeline runs and that its outcome gates serving. It does NOT establish detection quality — that is the scanner vendor's signature coverage, not this framework's control — and it does not establish that a scanner outage is handled the way the application intends.","passCriteria":"The benign file becomes downloadable only after the scan concludes clean; the test file reaches an infected or quarantined status and is never served.","procedure":["Upload a benign file to a field declaring a required scan, and read the file's status immediately on the upload response.","Confirm the file is NOT in a downloadable status before the scan resolves — the window in which unscanned bytes are servable is the defect this control exists to close.","Upload the EICAR standard antivirus test file to the same field and read the resulting status once the pipeline settles.","Attempt to download both files and record which are served."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Serving a file that has not concluded a required scan is a nonconformity: the control is claimed and does not hold. A scan that concludes correctly but records no audit row is an observation against this requirement and a gap against the trail (see #506)."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:ingested-content-inspection"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:lawful-basis-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.LAWFUL_BASIS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with a user. Nothing is opted into — an application that has declared no basis is in scope, and the act is what shows its answer says so.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the declaration is complete in form and that the one member-level obligation is enforced. It establishes nothing about whether the declared bases are the right ones in law, and nothing about whether the declared purposes cover all the processing the product performs.","passCriteria":"Every declared purpose carries a basis; a legitimate-interests entry without an assessment is refused and one with an assessment is admitted; and an absent declaration is reported as unanswered. The second and third steps together are the ones worth the act — a refusal shown without its admitted counterpart could be refusing the basis itself.","procedure":["Parse the application's committed lawful-basis declaration through its declaring schema and confirm every entry names a basis from the closed set.","Add an entry relying on legitimate interests with no assessment and confirm the declaration is refused, naming the purpose. Revert it afterwards: a planted refusal is how the mechanism is proved and is not something to leave in committed configuration.","Add the same entry WITH an assessment and confirm it is admitted, so the refusal is shown to key on the missing assessment rather than on the basis.","Remove the declaration entirely and confirm the answer reports it as unanswered rather than as zero purposes."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A legitimate-interests entry admitted without an assessment is a nonconformity: the mechanism would then let an application assert a balancing test nobody performed. An absent declaration reported as zero purposes is a nonconformity, because it states that an application with users processes nothing that needs a ground."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:lawful-basis-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:metered-usage-reporting","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.USAGE_REPORTING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:metered-usage-reporting"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to an application with billing enabled on its backend and at least one metered product.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the flush reports and records; it does not ask the provider what it received, so a provider that acknowledged and dropped an event is not detected.","passCriteria":"Accepted usage is marked reported and counted in quantity reported; failed usage stays pending; the account-less usage is marked unreportable with a reason and counted in quantity unreportable; and the recorded output carries all three quantities.","procedure":["Record usage due for flushing, run the flush against a provider that accepts, and read the rows and the recorded output.","Repeat against a provider that fails the call and read the rows.","Record usage for an account that no longer exists and read the rows and the recorded output."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Usage marked reported without provider acceptance is a nonconformity. A recorded output missing a quantity is a nonconformity against the record."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:metered-usage-reporting"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:minted-secret-disclosure-audit","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-audit"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The framework mints secret material — API keys, machine credentials, recovery codes — before an application mints any of its own.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the first disclosure through the doors exercised. It does NOT establish that the material has no other route out — a second path that reads the stored value is invisible here and is what the confidentiality objective covers.","passCriteria":"Every first disclosure is recorded and attributed. A second retrieval either refuses or emits its own record; a silent re-disclosure is a fail. A record containing the secret VALUE is also a fail, and a worse one: the trail then becomes the disclosure it was meant to police.","procedure":["Mint each kind of server-minted secret the application offers.","Retrieve each exactly once through its declared first-disclosure door, and read the audit store.","Attempt to retrieve the same material a second time.","Confirm the recorded row names the principal that received the material and the material's identity — never its value."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unaudited first disclosure is a nonconformity: after it, nobody can say who holds the material. A record carrying the value is a nonconformity and a disclosure in its own right."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:minted-secret-disclosure-audit"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:multi-factor-authentication","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.MULTI_FACTOR","objectiveVersion":2},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:multi-factor-authentication"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application enrolling a second factor. An application with no second factor enrolled anywhere is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Timing safety is established by INSPECTION, not by measurement: a timing side channel is not reliably observable across a network in a verification act, and a negative measurement here would be evidence about the network rather than the code.","passCriteria":"All verifying paths share one authority, and a consumed factor cannot be replayed. A path performing its own comparison is a fail even when that comparison happens to be correct today — the objective's content is that no caller builds a second, weaker door onto the same credential.","procedure":["Enumerate the paths that verify a second factor — the sign-in ceremony, any step-up, any recovery flow, any administrative bypass.","Confirm every one routes through the single verification authority rather than performing its own comparison.","Replay a factor already consumed and confirm it is refused.","Confirm the comparison is timing-safe by inspecting the authority's implementation, since no black-box act reliably distinguishes it."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A second verification path is a nonconformity regardless of its current correctness — it is a door that will drift. A replayable factor is a nonconformity and defeats the factor entirely. A non-constant-time comparison is a nonconformity where the factor is guessable within the leak."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:multi-factor-authentication"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:named-constraint-conflict","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.CONFLICT_DIAGNOSTICS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:named-constraint-conflict"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The refusal classifier is engine-owned and every application declares constraints through the framework's own resources.","knownLimitations":"Establishes naming for the constraints exercised. It does NOT establish that every constraint is reachable for a conflict test — one enforced only under concurrency may never surface in a sequential act.","passCriteria":"Every conflict names the constraint it violated. An opaque datastore error is a fail: an operator cannot tell a benign duplicate submission from an unexpected collision, and the two lead to opposite responses.","procedure":["Provoke a conflict on each declared constraint kind in turn — a unique field, a business key, a composite key set.","Read the response and confirm it names the violated IDENTITY rather than reporting an opaque datastore failure.","Confirm the status distinguishes a conflict from a validation error and from a server fault.","Confirm the response does not leak the conflicting row's contents while naming the constraint."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unnamed conflict is a nonconformity against diagnosability, not against integrity: the write was correctly refused. It costs operator time rather than correctness, which is why it sits here rather than with the integrity objective. Leaking the conflicting row's contents while naming the constraint is a separate nonconformity."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:named-constraint-conflict"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:operation-serviceability","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.OPERATIONS.EXECUTION_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:operation-serviceability"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Every declared operation is in scope, and the population is the operation registry rather than a chosen sample.","knownLimitations":"Establishes reachability and implementation for the declared set. It does NOT establish behavioural correctness of each operation — that an implementation exists and does not over-write says nothing about whether it does the right thing.","passCriteria":"Every declared operation is implemented; no named verb widens into an unconstrained write; and no interface reports success for work it did not perform. A verb that accepts an unexposed field and silently drops it PASSES; one that writes it fails.","procedure":["Enumerate the declared, API-reachable operations from the registry.","For each, confirm an implementation exists — a declaration reaching no implementation is the defect, and it is invisible to any test that only calls what it knows about.","For each write verb, submit fields the resource does NOT expose for update and confirm they are not written; read the row back rather than trusting the response.","For any interface that reports an outcome without performing the action itself, confirm the reported success corresponds to work actually done."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Reporting success for an action not performed is the highest-weight nonconformity here: every consumer downstream believes work happened. A verb widening into an unconstrained write is a nonconformity and a mass-assignment defect. A declared operation with no implementation is a nonconformity even before anyone calls it."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:operation-serviceability"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:operator-gated-entitlement-write","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ENTITLEMENT.NO_SELF_GRANT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:operator-gated-entitlement-write"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with entitlements or feature flags — every application, since the framework's own plan and capability entitlements exist by default.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the gate for the doors enumerated. An entitlement changed by a background process reacting to an external event — a payment webhook, a provider callback — is outside this act, and that path's own authorization is a separate question.","passCriteria":"No principal can widen its own entitlement through any enumerated door. A door refused only by a role check is a fail against this requirement: the objective asks that the write be operator-GATED, which is a property of reachability, not of the caller's roles alone.","procedure":["Enumerate every write that can change an entitlement, including indirect ones: a plan change, a discretionary grant, a subscription-derived update, and any self-service verb touching the same fields.","As an ordinary principal, attempt each and confirm refusal.","Confirm the refusal comes from the reachability gate rather than from a role check alone — an operation reachable and then refused is a different posture from one that is not exposed.","As an operator, confirm each succeeds."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A self-grantable entitlement is a nonconformity and a direct revenue and access defect. A door reachable but role-refused is an observation where the role check is sound, and a nonconformity where the role set is application-authored and therefore self-assignable."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:operator-gated-entitlement-write"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:outbound-call-recording","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.INTEGRATION.OUTBOUND_ACTIVITY_AUDIT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:outbound-call-recording"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application making outbound calls — every application, since transactional email and at least one provider integration exist by default.","knownLimitations":"Establishes recording for the calls exercised. It does NOT establish that the recorded usage figures are accurate — the numbers come from the provider's own response, and this act observes that they are carried, not that they are true. Browser-side egress (error monitoring, analytics) never reaches a backend recorder and is out of this act's scope.","passCriteria":"Every physical call is recorded, with the fields its kind demands, and failures are recorded as reliably as successes. A capability whose traffic leaves outside the named egress is a fail even if it records: the objective's first clause is the single egress, because that is what makes the enumeration possible at all.","procedure":["Enumerate the capabilities that make outbound calls, and for each confirm the traffic leaves through the single named egress rather than through an ad-hoc client.","Make one PROVIDER call and confirm the record names provider, model, usage and outcome.","Make one call through each enabled capability egress — send a transactional email, send an SMS, call the billing provider, upload a file to a vendor storage — and confirm each leaves one PROVIDER_CAPABILITY_CALL row naming the provider, the capability and the outcome, and naming no recipient, number, file or payload.","Make one ADMINISTRATIVE probe and confirm the record names the initiating actor.","Make a call that FAILS — point the egress at an unreachable destination — and confirm the failure is recorded rather than only the successes."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An unrecorded outbound call is a nonconformity: it is data leaving with no trail. A second egress path is a nonconformity of higher weight, because it makes every completeness claim about the trail false without any individual record being wrong."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:outbound-call-recording"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:privileged-access-review","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGED_REVIEW","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:privileged-access-review"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW","DOCUMENT_REVIEW","INTERVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with privileged roles — every application. The review is an operating practice rather than a code path, so an application that has never run one is in scope and failing rather than out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the review occurred and was decided. It does NOT establish that the decisions were correct, nor that any remediation actually happened; the objective deliberately stops short of the second, and a verifier who reads completion into it has widened the claim.","passCriteria":"Reviews happened on the declared cadence, over a declared population, decided by authorized people, and retained as traceable evidence. Evidence that reads as though remediation completed — when only a decision was taken — is a fail, because it is the form in which a review becomes a false assurance.","procedure":["Obtain the scope statement for privileged access and confirm it enumerates the roles and principals considered privileged, rather than leaving the population to the reviewer.","Obtain the completed reviews for the period and confirm each falls within the declared periodicity.","Confirm each review records who decided, and that the decider held authority to decide.","Confirm the retained evidence records the DECISION and does not imply that any remediation it recommended was completed."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"No review in the declared period is a nonconformity. A review decided by someone without authority is a nonconformity. Evidence implying remediation completion is a nonconformity in its own right, and the one most likely to mislead a later auditor."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:privileged-access-review"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Role, membership and entitlement grants are engine-owned, so the lifecycle exists before an application defines a privilege of its own.","knownLimitations":"Establishes evidence for the transitions exercised. It does NOT establish retention of that evidence over the period an auditor will ask about — whether the records still exist a year later is the retention control's question, not this one.","passCriteria":"The full life of each assignment is reconstructable from durable evidence — not merely its current state. A store that answers 'what does this principal hold now' but cannot answer 'what did it hold in March, and who changed it' is a fail: the objective's whole content is the difference between the two.","procedure":["For each privilege kind the objective names — a role, a unit-scoped membership, a discretionary entitlement, a subscription-derived one — drive the full life: grant, widen, narrow, revoke.","After each transition, read the audit store and confirm a record exists naming the principal, the privilege and the direction of the change.","Reconstruct the assignment's history from the records alone and compare it to what was actually done.","Confirm the current-state view and the reconstructed history agree."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A narrowing or revocation with no record is a nonconformity of the highest weight here: it is the transition a later investigation most needs, and its absence is indistinguishable from the privilege never having been held. A missing widening record is a nonconformity. Current-state-only evidence is a nonconformity against the objective as written, even when every current value is right."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:privileged-grant-lifecycle-evidence"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:provider-billing-reconciliation","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.PROVIDER_RECONCILIATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:provider-billing-reconciliation"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to an application with billing enabled on its backend.","knownLimitations":"Establishes nothing about populations the sweep never selects — terminal subscriptions, subscriptions known only to the provider, items, invoice totals and invoices beyond the lookback. Runs recorded before the sweep moved onto the subscription mutation slot carry a retired quiet-period population and lack the slot populations, so the check that every uncompared population is present applies only to runs recorded after that change.","passCriteria":"The drift is repaired with only provider-authoritative fields and counted as repaired; the missing invoice is recorded again from provider fields and counted as repaired; the unreadable subscription is counted and left untouched; the superseded and the PREPARED subscriptions are each counted as not compared and neither is written; the failed write is counted as repair-failed; and every divergence kind and uncompared population is present in the recorded output.","procedure":["Put a subscription out of step with the provider on a provider-authoritative field, run the sweep, and read the write and the recorded output.","Make the provider unable to read a subscription, run the sweep, and read the write and the recorded output.","Complete a mutation's write on a subscription between the sweep's provider read and its repair, and confirm nothing is written and the subscription is counted as superseded.","Hold a mutation admission PREPARED on a subscription, run the sweep, and confirm the subscription is neither read from the provider nor written and is counted.","Make a repair write fail and confirm the recorded output counts it as repair-failed.","Remove locally an invoice the provider still holds, run the sweep, and confirm it is recorded again from provider-authoritative fields and counted as repaired."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A repair writing a non-authoritative field, or acting on an unreadable answer, is a nonconformity. A divergence or uncompared population missing from the recorded output is a nonconformity against the record."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:provider-billing-reconciliation"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:provider-selection-opt-in","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.THIRD_PARTY_PROCESSING","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:provider-selection-opt-in"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The selection surface is engine-owned, and an application that has selected NO provider is squarely in scope — the no-egress case is the one this requirement most needs to confirm.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the routing for the capabilities exercised. It does NOT establish that a selected provider handles the data as declared — what the processor does after receipt is covered by the register and the contract, not by this act.","passCriteria":"Nothing leaves without an explicit selection, and an unselected capability produces ZERO egress rather than reduced egress. A capability that falls back to a default provider is a fail: it makes a processor of a service the application never named, which is the disclosure this objective exists to prevent.","procedure":["Enumerate the capabilities that can route to an external service, and read which have a provider selected.","For a capability with NO selection, exercise it and confirm the work is served locally — then confirm at the egress that no outbound call was made at all.","For a capability WITH a selection, exercise it and confirm the traffic goes only to the selected provider.","Confirm no capability routes externally on a default: remove a selection and re-run rather than reasoning from the configuration file."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Egress with no selection is a nonconformity and an undisclosed processor relationship — the application's own privacy notice is then false. A capability routing to a default is the same finding; the absence of an author does not make it smaller."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:provider-selection-opt-in"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:purpose-limited-egress","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.DATA_MINIMIZATION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:purpose-limited-egress"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The external-processor and observability paths are engine-owned; the client-install identifier is application-declared, and an application with NO such policy is in scope for the 'not at all' half.","knownLimitations":"Establishes what leaves through the paths exercised. It does NOT establish that a payload is minimal in the legal sense — whether a field the purpose 'requires' genuinely requires it is a data-protection judgement, and this act reads the declaration rather than testing it.","passCriteria":"Each boundary receives only what its declared purpose requires; with no declared policy the device identifier is not collected AT ALL — a shortened or hashed identifier is a fail, because absence of a policy is a decision not to collect rather than a licence to collect less; and withdrawal takes effect rather than applying only to new installs.","procedure":["Capture the payload sent to an external processor and confirm it carries what the purpose requires and nothing identifying the requester or its originating row.","Capture what reaches the observability surfaces and confirm it carries summaries rather than raw content.","With NO client-install identifier policy declared, exercise the client and confirm no such identifier is collected at all.","Declare a policy, confirm the identifier is collected under it, then withdraw and narrow the policy and confirm the collection stops and shrinks accordingly."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Identifying material reaching an external processor is a nonconformity and a disclosure. Raw content in observability is a nonconformity of the same class, and typically higher volume. Collecting a device identifier with no declared policy is a nonconformity that engages storage-on-terminal-equipment rules directly."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:purpose-limited-egress"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:record-context-preservation","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:record-context-preservation"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Both halves are engine-owned: the trusted-system write that persists an audit row, and the log record's application and environment fields.","knownLimitations":"Establishes preservation for the actions exercised. It does NOT establish that every emitting call site supplies the context in the first place; a row that never carried an actor cannot lose one, and that is the attribution objective's question.","passCriteria":"The actor and tenant survive the trusted-system write, and every log record names its application and environment. A row whose actor becomes the system on persistence is a fail even though the event was emitted correctly — the trail is read from the store, not from the emission.","procedure":["Perform an audited action as a named principal in a named tenant, and read the persisted row rather than the emitted event — the write is where the context can be lost.","Confirm the persisted actor and tenant match the acting context, not the system principal that performed the write.","Read a log record from each running service and confirm it names the application and the environment that produced it.","Repeat in a second environment and confirm the environment field differs."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An actor or tenant lost at the write is a nonconformity of the highest weight here: every review of that row afterwards is wrong, and nothing indicates it. A log record not naming its environment is an observation, unless records from two environments are aggregated into one store — where it becomes a nonconformity, because the trail then attributes production activity to nowhere in particular."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:record-context-preservation"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:risk-treatment-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.RISK.TREATMENT_DECLARED","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Nothing is opted into — an application that has declared no treatment is in scope and the act is what shows its answer says so.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the MECHANISM reports honestly. It establishes nothing about whether the declared treatments are the right ones — that a REDUCED posture names a control that exists is a judgement no act here reaches, and the procedure deliberately exercises only the posture a measurement can contradict.","passCriteria":"Undeclared is distinguishable from accepted; a contradicted absence claim is reported with both sides; an unusable claim is named as unusable; an unavailable derivation says so instead of answering zero; and a partial ordering is refused. The third and fifth are the ones worth the act — the rest can pass by accident, while a mechanism that silently agrees with a false absence claim, or that reports a stale artifact as an empty declaration, is the exact failure this demand exists against.","procedure":["Run the derivation against the application and read its answer for every signal in the vocabulary. Assert the set is TOTAL rather than a list of what happened to be found.","Take a signal the application has NOT declared a treatment for and confirm it is reported as UNDECLARED, distinctly from any signal declared ACCEPTED. If the two render alike, stop — the rest of the act cannot distinguish a decision from a silence either.","Declare a treatment of AVOIDED on a signal the derivation reports as PRESENT, and confirm the disagreement is reported, naming both the claim and the measurement. Revert the declaration afterwards: a planted contradiction is how the mechanism is proved and is not something to leave in a committed configuration.","Declare AVOIDED on a signal whose presence the derivation cannot determine, and confirm it is reported as an UNUSABLE claim rather than as a contradiction or as accepted.","Make the derivation unavailable — an engine artifact that predates the vocabulary is enough — and confirm the answer says NOT ASKED rather than reporting zero declarations.","If the register declares an ordering, remove one entry from it and confirm the partial sequence is refused."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Undeclared rendering as accepted is a nonconformity and the most consequential one available: it converts every unanswered question into a decision nobody made. A contradicted absence claim passing unreported is a nonconformity. A stale derivation answering zero rather than NOT ASKED is a nonconformity, because it reports an application as having decided nothing when it may have decided everything."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:risk-treatment-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.DATA.SECURE_LIFECYCLE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Identity, tenant and record destruction are engine-owned, and the retained-record concealment applies wherever any resource declares retain-and-impersonalize.","knownLimitations":"Establishes concealment across the paths exercised. It does NOT establish that no path exists which was not enumerated — and a path added later inherits nothing from this result, which is why the enumeration rather than the assertion is the load-bearing step.","passCriteria":"Destruction is deliberate, reversible within its window and executed on schedule; a retained record is invisible and immutable to every ordinary path with exactly one audited door; and derived copies are excluded immediately. Exclusion that depends on a sweep having run is a fail — between erasure and sweep the subject's text is still being served.","procedure":["Request destruction of an identity and of a tenant; confirm each is recorded as an attributable decision with its declared window.","Reverse each within the window and confirm the reversal works and is itself recorded.","Let a window elapse and confirm the destruction is carried out on schedule rather than on next access.","For an erased-but-retained record, attempt to read and to write it through EVERY ordinary path — direct read, list, search, export, relationship traversal — and confirm each is refused; then exercise the audited see-through read and confirm it succeeds and is recorded.","Confirm derived copies of that record are excluded by a LIVE check against the parent row: query a derived surface immediately after erasure, before any sweep could have run."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A retained record readable through an ordinary path is a nonconformity and a disclosure of data the subject asked to have erased. A derived copy served after erasure is the same finding by a quieter route. Destruction not carried out on schedule is a nonconformity against storage limitation."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:scheduled-destruction-and-concealment"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:scope-confined-query","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:scope-confined-query"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Tenant and unit scoping are engine-owned; an application declaring no organizational units is still in scope for the tenant and parent-row halves.","knownLimitations":"Establishes confinement for the shapes exercised. A grant topology more complex than the one tested — overlapping subtrees, a principal holding grants in several units — may confine differently, and this act says nothing about the composition rule.","passCriteria":"Every read and write is confined to what the caller's own grant reaches; the subtree expansion is exact in both directions; the conferring grant is recorded beside the decision; and a platform-imposed narrowing cannot be lifted by the tenant it constrains.","procedure":["As a principal whose grant reaches one unit subtree, read and write across the boundary of that subtree in both directions, and confirm each is confined.","Confirm the subtree expands to EXACTLY its declared extent: place a row one level below the deepest granted node and one level above the granted node, and confirm the first is reachable and the second is not.","Read the authorization record for one of those decisions and confirm it names the conferring grant, not merely the outcome.","As a tenant administrator, attempt to lift a narrowing the platform imposed, and confirm it cannot be lifted from inside the tenant."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Reading across a scope boundary is a nonconformity and a disclosure. A subtree expanding beyond its declared extent is the same finding with a larger blast radius. A decision recorded without its conferring grant is a nonconformity against reviewability: an auditor cannot tell WHY access was allowed, only that it was."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:scope-confined-query"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with a platform tier. An application whose operators have never requested an application-wide elevation is squarely in scope — the refusal path is what is verified, and it is verified by trying, not by reading an empty table. Inspect the configured audit-read policy as part of the objective coverage: role-based application audit access does not satisfy the universal second-signature claim of WILDO.ACCESS.SEGREGATION_OF_DUTIES@1. A passing directory-elevation test alone must not be reported as proving that universal claim. Record the unmet claim when that objective is required and the application intentionally uses role-based audit access.","knownLimitations":"It establishes that two DISTINCT accounts are required, never that two distinct PEOPLE are behind them. An operator holding a second account, or two operators who agree in advance, defeat it and are indistinguishable in the evidence. Account-provenance and collusion belong to the identity and monitoring controls; this one bounds what a single credential can reach.","passCriteria":"A self-approval never yields authority, a second administrator's approval does, and the authority ends on its own. The refused self-approval is the load-bearing step: a system that grants on the second signature but would ALSO have granted on the first passes every other step here and satisfies nothing.","procedure":["As one platform administrator, request an application-wide elevation with a stated justification, and confirm it is NOT usable on creation.","As the SAME administrator, attempt to approve it. Confirm the attempt is refused and that no authority follows.","Attempt a read that requires the elevation — the tenant-spanning directory, or the application audit door configured with auditTrail.applicationReadAccess=independent-approval — and confirm it is refused while the request is unsigned. The default role-based audit door is not a test of independent approval; verify its administrator and scope gates separately.","As a SECOND administrator, approve it. Confirm the same read now succeeds, and that the evidence names which elevation admitted it.","Wait past the stated window, or revoke, and confirm the read is refused again — and that the end left a record."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An admitted self-approval is a nonconformity of the highest weight — it is the control absent, not thin. A read admitted while the elevation is unsigned is the same weight, because the signature is then decorative. An elevation that outlives its window is a nonconformity: standing authority is what the second signature was buying against. A missing terminal record where the authority has genuinely ended is a nonconformity of evidence rather than of control."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:second-signature-on-uncheckable-elevation"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:security-event-emission","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.SECURITY_EVENT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:security-event-emission"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application unconditionally. The audit trail is engine-owned, so no application opts out of the obligation and none has to build the lane first.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the emission path works for the actions exercised. It does NOT establish that every code path emitting that event type is covered, nor that the trail is complete over any historical period — coverage of the emitting call sites is a separate question, and one this act cannot answer.","passCriteria":"Every action performed produced its typed event, attributed to the acting principal and the tenant it acted in. A missing row, or a row attributed to the system where a user acted, is a fail.","procedure":["Perform one security-relevant action of each family the objective names — an authentication, an authorization change, a credential lifecycle change — against a running application.","Read the audit store back for the window in which those actions ran, filtering by the typed event members the evidence requirement names rather than by free text.","Confirm each action produced exactly one row of the expected type, and that the row carries actor and tenant attribution rather than a system placeholder."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A missing event for an action a control depends on is a nonconformity: the control may be operating and cannot be shown to. A row present but mis-attributed is also a nonconformity, because it defeats the reason the trail is read. A row present with a cosmetic field wrong is an observation."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:security-event-emission"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:self-describing-audit-record","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:self-describing-audit-record"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The trail and its capture configuration are engine-owned.","knownLimitations":"Establishes self-description for the actions exercised. It does NOT establish that the record's description of the effect is CORRECT — only that it is present and stable; an incorrectly computed effect is stable and wrong, and is outside this act.","passCriteria":"The authorization effect is reconstructable from the record alone, and stays correct after the role tables move. A record naming only the action, requiring the current tables to interpret, is a fail — the tables are exactly what will have changed by the time anybody reads it.","procedure":["Perform a privileged action that changes an authorization effect — a role grant, a scope widening.","Read the record and reconstruct WHAT THE EFFECT WAS from the record alone, without consulting the role tables.","Change the role tables afterwards and repeat the reconstruction, confirming the record still describes the effect it had at the time.","Read the configuration deciding what the trail captures, change it, and confirm that change is itself governed and evidenced within the trail."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A record needing the current role tables to interpret is a nonconformity: it is evidence whose meaning changes after the fact, which is the one property evidence must not have. Capture configuration outside the trail's own governance is a nonconformity, because it permits a silent narrowing of what is recorded."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:self-describing-audit-record"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:server-authored-token-claims","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:server-authored-token-claims"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application issuing an ID token — every application, since the framework's own identity provider does.","knownLimitations":"Establishes authorship for the claims in the named set. A claim that OUGHT to be reserved and is absent from the set is smuggled successfully and passes this act — the set's completeness is a separate question.","passCriteria":"Every reserved claim is server-authored regardless of what the caller supplied, and non-reserved extras still work. A build that drops all extras passes the smuggling test for the wrong reason and is a fail against this requirement, because it hides whether the reserved set is being consulted at all.","procedure":["Enumerate the reserved claim set from its single named source rather than from a hand-kept list.","Request a token supplying each reserved claim as a caller-provided extra, one at a time.","Decode the issued token and confirm every reserved claim carries the server's value, not the supplied one.","Confirm a NON-reserved extra is carried through, so the test distinguishes claim-set enforcement from extras being dropped wholesale."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A smuggled reserved claim is a nonconformity and, depending on the claim, an authentication bypass or an identity spoof. Extras dropped wholesale is an observation against functionality and a nonconformity against this requirement's verifiability."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:server-authored-token-claims"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:single-consent-emission-point","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.CONSENT_RECORD","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:single-consent-emission-point"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Consent lives on engine-owned user preferences, so every application has the verbs this requirement enumerates.","knownLimitations":"Establishes single-emission for the verbs enumerated. It does NOT establish that a change is LAWFUL — whether the resulting consent is validly obtained is a data-protection judgement outside this act.","passCriteria":"Every verb routes through one emission point, each change yields exactly one record carrying both values, and the reset is among them. A record naming only the new value is a fail: 'consent is now {analytics}' does not say which purposes were granted or withdrawn, which is the whole question a regulator asks.","procedure":["Enumerate every verb able to change consent — the dedicated update, the generic resource update, and the privacy-preferences RESET.","Exercise each and confirm exactly one record results, naming the PREVIOUS and the RESULTING value.","Confirm the reset is recorded as a consent decision in its own right rather than as an unrelated preferences write.","Drive two changes concurrently and confirm neither record is lost."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A consent change with no record is a nonconformity and defeats the demonstrate-consent obligation directly. A record naming only the resulting value is a nonconformity for the same reason one step smaller. A change routed outside the single emission point is a nonconformity even when it happens to record, because it will drift."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:single-consent-emission-point"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:stage-confers-no-capability","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.LIFECYCLE.STAGE_IS_NOT_AUTHORITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:stage-confers-no-capability"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application declaring a self-reported lifecycle stage. An application with no such stage is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes that the stage confers nothing for the actions exercised. A future consumer reading the stage as authority inherits nothing from this result — the stage remains a value anyone can set, and only the reading sites make it safe.","passCriteria":"No action changes its outcome because of the stage, and the stage does not cross a scope boundary. The final step is required: without it, a broken action would pass this requirement by being broken.","procedure":["Set a principal's self-reported stage to the most privileged value the vocabulary offers.","Attempt every action that stage might plausibly be read as conferring, and confirm each is decided by an actual grant rather than by the stage.","Attempt to carry the stage across a scope boundary — set it in one tenant and read it in another — and confirm it does not cross.","Grant the corresponding authority properly and confirm the action then succeeds, so the test distinguishes 'stage confers nothing' from 'the action is unreachable'."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Any capability conferred by a self-reported stage is a nonconformity and a privilege escalation with no attacker skill required — the principal sets the field themselves. A stage crossing a scope boundary is a nonconformity even where nothing currently reads it."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:stage-confers-no-capability"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:subject-data-export","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:subject-data-export"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. The export surface is engine-owned; what varies is which resources opt in, and an application with NO opted-in resource is in scope for the isolation and audit halves.","knownLimitations":"Establishes isolation for the subjects exercised. It does NOT establish completeness — whether every resource holding the subject's data has opted in is a coverage question this act cannot answer, since the population it would measure against is the opt-in list itself.","passCriteria":"The bundle is subject-isolated and resource-opted-in; withheld derived fields are named; and the event carries all five facts. Silently omitting a derived field is a fail: the subject cannot tell an absent field from data the controller does not hold, which is precisely what an access request asks.","procedure":["Run an export for a subject and confirm the bundle contains rows only for that subject — inspect the rows rather than the count, since a correct count can accompany a wrong row.","Confirm resources that have NOT opted in are absent from the bundle.","Confirm derived fields are withheld, and that the export event NAMES them as withheld rather than silently omitting them.","Read the export event and confirm it names the purpose, the subject, the resource types included and the record count.","Run an export against a subject the requester is not authorized for and confirm it is refused."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"Another subject's rows in a bundle is a nonconformity and a personal-data breach. A non-opted-in resource appearing is a nonconformity: the opt-in is what bounds the disclosure. An unnamed withheld field is an observation against completeness of the answer and a nonconformity where the omission would mislead."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:subject-data-export"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:subject-erasure","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.PRIVACY.SUBJECT_ERASURE","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:subject-erasure"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application. Erasure intake and execution are engine-owned and reachable regardless of what the application declares.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the request lifecycle. It does NOT establish that erasure reached every copy of the subject's data; what the erasure reached, accounted per dependent relationship and external effect, is the erasure-propagation objective's question, and the concealment of retained and derived copies the secure-lifecycle objective's.","passCriteria":"Both intake routes are recorded and distinguishable; a pending request can be withdrawn by the subject; execution follows the declared schedule; and sessions are terminated. Erasure that completes while a pre-existing session keeps working is a fail — the person is erased and still signed in.","procedure":["Raise an erasure request as the SUBJECT, and separately as the CONTROLLER, and confirm each is recorded on intake with its origin distinguished.","Withdraw a pending request as the subject and confirm the withdrawal is honoured and recorded.","Let a request reach its declared schedule and confirm execution happens on that schedule.","After execution, attempt to use a session established before it and confirm the erased person's sessions are terminated."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A request not recorded on intake is a nonconformity: the response clock starts at intake and cannot be evidenced without it. A withdrawal not honoured is a nonconformity against the subject's own control. Sessions surviving erasure is a nonconformity and a live access path for a person whose data is gone."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:subject-erasure"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:system-gated-credit-grant","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.BILLING.CREDIT_GRANT_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:system-gated-credit-grant"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with a credit or balance concept. An application with no such balance is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the gate for the paths enumerated. It does NOT establish that the credited AMOUNT is correct; a correctly-gated grant of the wrong value passes this act and is a billing-integrity question elsewhere.","passCriteria":"No ordinary principal can increase a balance through any enumerated path, and a payment-derived increase requires a verified payment authority. An unsigned or replayed callback that credits an account is a fail — it is the door an attacker reaches without touching the application's own authorization at all.","procedure":["Enumerate every path that can INCREASE a credit balance, including indirect ones: a direct grant, a refund, a promotional application, a plan change, and any payment-provider callback.","As an ordinary principal, attempt each and confirm refusal at the reachability gate.","Confirm the payment-gated paths verify the payment authority rather than trusting a caller-supplied assertion of it — replay a callback body without its authenticating signature.","As a system or payment authority, confirm the legitimate paths succeed."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A self-grantable credit is a nonconformity and a direct financial defect. An unverified payment callback that credits is a nonconformity of higher weight, because it is exploitable without any account in the application."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:system-gated-credit-grant"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:third-party-ai-component-declaration","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.AI.THIRD_PARTY_COMPONENTS","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION","AUTOMATED_TEST"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with an AI capability enabled in the contracted service; one enabling none is in scope only to confirm that none is enabled.","knownLimitations":"Establishes what is declared and where the exercised feature sends data. It does not establish that the declared posture matches what the model's output is used for; that needs a review of the feature itself.","passCriteria":"Every enabled contracted-service AI capability has a posture, every decision-bearing posture names its review arrangement, and every vendor-hosted AI provider is on the register. Any AI capability or AI vendor the declarations do not name is a fail.","procedure":["Read the enabled engine capabilities and intersect them with the AI capabilities of the contracted service.","For each, read the declared use posture, and confirm a use that decides or assists a decision about a person states how a human reviews it.","For each runtime provider selected for those capabilities, confirm it is operator-run or named on the processor register.","Exercise one AI feature and confirm the traffic reaches only the providers the register names."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"An undeclared AI capability or an unregistered AI vendor is a nonconformity: the application's notice then omits an AI use or a recipient. A posture that understates what the feature decides is the same finding and the harder one to see."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:third-party-ai-component-declaration"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:time-boxed-restriction-release","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.ACCESS.LIFECYCLE_TIME_BOUND","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:time-boxed-restriction-release"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application that imposes a time-boxed restriction — a lockout, a suspension, a temporary membership hold. The framework imposes several of its own, so an application declaring none is still in scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes release for the restriction kinds exercised, at the windows tested. It does NOT establish behaviour where the release job itself is not running — a paused scheduler holds every restriction indefinitely, and detecting that is the operations objective's question.","passCriteria":"Every time-boxed restriction lifts automatically at its window, through the guarded authority, with a record. A restriction that lifts only when an operator notices is a fail: a measure taken as temporary has then become permanent by default, which is the exact failure the objective names.","procedure":["Impose each kind of time-boxed restriction the application supports, recording its declared window.","Before the window elapses, confirm the restriction holds.","After it elapses, confirm the restriction is lifted WITHOUT any operator action.","Confirm the release ran through the same guarded authority that imposed it, and is evidenced — read the audit store for both the imposition and the release."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A time-boxed restriction that does not lift is a nonconformity: it is an access denial nobody decided. A release bypassing the guarded authority is a nonconformity even when correct, because it is a second writer to a field the authority objective says has exactly one."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:time-boxed-restriction-release"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:values-free-secret-contract","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.SECRETS.CONTRACT_INTEGRITY","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:values-free-secret-contract"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["AUTOMATED_TEST","CONFIGURATION_INSPECTION"],"applicability":"Applies to every application with a provider requiring secrets — every application, since transactional email and at least one provider integration are configured by default.","knownLimitations":"Establishes shape tracking and value-freedom for the providers exercised. It does NOT establish that the secrets themselves are correct or current — a well-shaped contract of expired credentials passes this act, and fails at the provider.","passCriteria":"Drift in the contract's shape is detected, and no secret value is persisted anywhere in the mechanism. A tracker that notices a value rotation is a fail, and a disclosure: it can only know because it retained the value.","procedure":["Read the tracked contract for a provider's secrets and confirm it records the SHAPE — the key names and their requiredness — and no values.","Change the provider's required key set and confirm the drift is detected and reported.","Inspect the tracked artifact and any log or record it produces, and confirm no secret value appears in any of them.","Confirm a value CHANGE, with the shape unchanged, produces no drift — the contract tracks shape, and a shape tracker that reacts to a rotation is reading values it should not hold."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A persisted secret value is a nonconformity and a disclosure, wherever it sits. Undetected contract drift is a nonconformity of lower weight: it surfaces later as a runtime failure rather than as an exposure."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:values-free-secret-contract"}]},{"identity":{"expectationRef":"verification-expectation:verifiable-client-identity","expectationVersion":1},"objective":{"objectiveRef":"WILDO.IDENTITY.CLIENT_IDENTITY_ASSERTION","objectiveVersion":1},"requiredStatementVerificationRefs":["verification-requirement:verifiable-client-identity"],"requirementBodies":[{"body":{"acceptableMethods":["MANUAL_TECHNICAL_TEST","OPERATING_EVIDENCE_REVIEW"],"applicability":"Applies to every application accepting client registration. An application registering no clients is out of scope.","knownLimitations":"Establishes the binding at registration. It does NOT establish that control persists: a domain can change hands after registration, and nothing here re-verifies it.","passCriteria":"A client identity is bound only to a domain demonstrably controlled; every refused assertion is recorded; and an unauthenticated registration is recorded as unauthenticated. An unauthenticated registration recorded as ordinary is a fail — it is indistinguishable afterwards from one somebody vouched for.","procedure":["Register a client asserting a domain it does control, completing whatever demonstration the application requires, and confirm the binding is accepted.","Register one asserting a domain it does NOT control and confirm the assertion is refused.","Read the audit store and confirm the REFUSAL is recorded — a refused assertion is the event a reviewer most wants and the one most often dropped.","Register a client as a party that authenticated to nothing, and confirm the resulting identity is recorded as such rather than as an ordinary registration."],"schemaVersion":1,"severityGuidance":"A client identity bound to an unproven domain is a nonconformity and an impersonation primitive. An unrecorded refusal is a nonconformity against detection — repeated refused assertions are the signal of an attempt in progress. An unauthenticated registration indistinguishable from a vouched one is a nonconformity against provenance."},"requirementRef":"verification-requirement:verifiable-client-identity"}]}]}