@wildo-ai/framework-knowledge 1.1.13 → 1.1.15
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/claude-marketplace/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json +1 -1
- package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/references/composites-and-the-loop.md +12 -4
- package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/skills/build/SKILL.md +4 -0
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js +9 -0
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/authority-basis.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/external-framework-mapping.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/manifest.json +7 -7
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/method.md +7 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.json +2 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/method.md +27 -10
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/playbook.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/method.md +13 -9
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/playbook.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/method.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/method.md +20 -5
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.json +2 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/method.md +15 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/playbook.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/build-plan.task-graph.config.md +12 -8
- package/dist/knowledge/references/engine.client-bundle.allow-list.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.backend.addon-wiring.module.md +5 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.backend.custom-operation.declared-refusal-code.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.config.navigation.full.md +14 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.flows-actors.autonomous-agent.reviewed-write.md +6 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.flows-actors.chat-assistant.md +13 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.inbound.email-to-todo.md +33 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.module.relationships.discriminator.md +7 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.resource.status-lifecycle.quote.md +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.resource.ui-behavior.operation-icon.md +8 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/external-connectors.frontend-provider-consent-classification.md +2 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/integration-plan.config.md +78 -8
- package/dist/knowledge/references/platform.config.environment.deployment.md +84 -5
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.custom-operation.hook-transaction-posture.md +12 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.domain-module.md +15 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.a2a-agent-card.md +43 -11
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.a2a-task-surface.md +17 -11
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.function-tool.md +11 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.system-access-service.md +30 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.frontend.app-shell.shell-motion-contract.md +30 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.frontend.electronic-signatures.embedded-signing-frame.md +46 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.agent-definition.md +24 -33
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.mcp-server-declaration.md +63 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.outbound-credential.md +61 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.remote-agent-declaration.md +56 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.frontend-provider-public-config-contract.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.http-api-binding.md +51 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.privacy.data-residency.md +188 -31
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.privacy.provider-capability-disclosure.md +7 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.provider-capabilities.md +11 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.providers.compliance-choice.md +9 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.resource-config.operation-condition-parameters.md +8 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.system-of-record-error-codes.md +30 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.rag.retrieval-scores.md +4 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.specifications.processor-register.md +10 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/assurance-authority-bases.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/framework-topics.json +45 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/playbooks.json +2 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/source-tags.json +1175 -1107
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/INDEX.md +2 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-addon-wiring/SKILL.md +9 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-addon-wiring/references/framework-backend-bootstrap-api.md +15 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-custom-operation/SKILL.md +3 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-custom-operation/references/declared-refusal-codes.md +28 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-custom-operation/references/framework-hook-transaction-posture-api.md +21 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/document-composition-privacy-notice.md +15 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/framework-processor-register-authoring.md +16 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/framework-provider-compliance-choice-api.md +197 -31
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/framework-recipient-disclosures.md +7 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-app-shell/references/framework-shell-layout-api.md +30 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-navigation/SKILL.md +14 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/compliance-declarations.md +19 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/framework-auditable-event-catalog.md +1 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/framework-key-management-api.md +15 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/framework-provider-capabilities-api.md +11 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/electronic-signature-deliverables/SKILL.md +12 -5
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/electronic-signature-deliverables/references/signing-inside-the-application.md +113 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-add-template/SKILL.md +3 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-add-template/references/email-artifact-paths.md +8 -4
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-definition-wiring/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-a2a-exposure/SKILL.md +29 -7
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-a2a-exposure/references/framework-flows-actors-a2a-contract.md +66 -26
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-autonomous-agents/SKILL.md +6 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/SKILL.md +34 -3
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/examples/todo-assistant.example.md +13 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-flows-actors-tool-api.md +11 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-flows-actors-view-api.md +15 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-mcp-server-declaration-api.md +139 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-remote-a2a-agent-declaration-api.md +169 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-llm-agent-invocation/references/framework-llm-agent-definition-api.md +24 -33
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/inbound-channels/references/receiving-email.md +33 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/SKILL.md +39 -13
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/references/framework-environment-deployment-api.md +84 -5
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/layout-2d-adoption/references/framework-shell-motion-api.md +30 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/local-environment-bootstrap/references/wildo-cli-bootstrap-commands.md +26 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/module-registration/references/framework-domain-modules-api.md +15 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/module-relationships/SKILL.md +20 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-backend-package/SKILL.md +13 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-file-picker/references/framework-frontend-provider-consent-api.md +2 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-file-picker/references/framework-frontend-public-config-api.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-module/SKILL.md +3 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-module/references/package-frontend-facets.md +4 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-add-module/SKILL.md +8 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-add-module/references/module-scaffold-layout.md +17 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-chat-commands/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-config-wiring/SKILL.md +6 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-config-wiring/references/framework-operation-audit-api.md +4 -3
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-config-wiring/references/framework-system-access-reads-api.md +30 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/framework-http-api-binding-api.md +51 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/incremental-extraction.md +14 -5
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/read-through-writes.md +30 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-mcp-tool-exposure/references/mcp-client-registration-postures.md +5 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-rag-source-fields/references/framework-rag-retrieval-api.md +4 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-status-lifecycle/SKILL.md +3 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-status-lifecycle/references/framework-operation-condition-parameters-api.md +8 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-status-lifecycle/references/quote-lifecycle-worked-example.md +3 -3
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-ui-behavior/SKILL.md +8 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/views-chart-authoring/SKILL.md +5 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/website-bundle-discipline/SKILL.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/website-bundle-discipline/references/website-bundle-rules.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/topic-index.json +326 -179
- package/dist/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +1 -1
- package/package.json +4 -4
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---
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name: flows-actors-chat-assistant
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description: Add a conversational AI assistant to your app that answers questions grounded in your users' own resource data. Use when the user says "add a chat assistant", "add an AI assistant grounded on <resource>", "let users chat with / ask questions about their <resource>", "wire a resourceReadTool", "add a flows-actors chat agent", "expose an actor system as a chat view", "show the records as cards in the chat", "set a deadline or reminders on an approval", or "cap what the assistant spends per organization / per person" — i.e. when the intent is a conversational, tool-grounded assistant surfaced as a standalone view, NOT a one-shot generation agent or a background flow.
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description: Add a conversational AI assistant to your app that answers questions grounded in your users' own resource data. Use when the user says "add a chat assistant", "add an AI assistant grounded on <resource>", "let users chat with / ask questions about their <resource>", "wire a resourceReadTool", "add a flows-actors chat agent", "expose an actor system as a chat view", "show the records as cards in the chat", "set a deadline or reminders on an approval", "let my agent delegate to another company's A2A agent", or "cap what the assistant spends per organization / per person" — i.e. when the intent is a conversational, tool-grounded assistant surfaced as a standalone view, NOT a one-shot generation agent or a background flow.
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user-invocable: false
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---
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@@ -187,6 +187,24 @@ A tool you **write by hand** declares how it reaches the application's data, as
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Nothing refuses a tool that declares nothing, but the application's assurance evidence reports it, because a
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tool is what an agent's authority confinement rests on.
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**Tools from another party's MCP server.** Declare the server on the backend domain module's
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`flowsActors.mcpServers` and list its `ref` in the agent's `mcpRefs` — the full contract is in
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`references/framework-mcp-server-declaration-api.md`. Mind two fields: `credential.secretSlug` is the provider's
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secrets-contract KEY (`accessToken`), never the env-var spelling, or a stored credential is silently missed; and write
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`timeouts` out (`discoveryMs: 5_000, callMs: 30_000`). Startup refuses an `mcpRefs` entry naming no declared server, a
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plaintext `http://` endpoint, a transport the runtime does not speak and a `ref` declared twice. The server's tools are
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offered at turn start, except on a turn an inbound delivery started and when no credential resolves for the server's
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`credential.subject`; a server that does not answer contributes none rather than failing the turn, and every call is
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on the audit trail. The server's answers are another party's text: declare `contentGuardrails.promptInjection` (Step 4).
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**Another party's A2A agent.** Declare it on the backend domain module's `flowsActors.remoteAgents` and list its `ref`
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in the agent's `remoteAgentRefs`; the agent is offered one tool, `a2a_<ref>`, that sends a message and returns the
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remote agent's answer, or the remote task still running with its ids. The contract is in
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`references/framework-remote-a2a-agent-declaration-api.md`. The tool's description is your `description`, never the
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card's; the credential goes only to the `endpointUrl` you named or, without one, to the card's own host; the model
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cannot continue or cancel a remote task, and one still running at `callMs` comes back with its state and ids. The same credential, inbound-delivery and audit rules as an MCP server
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apply, and so does `promptInjection`.
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### Step 4: Declare the use, the guardrails and the approval gates
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Every agent you author — a chat assistant, a one-shot call from your code, a background agent, the agent
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step of a flow — carries three declarations. They are not options for a sensitive agent: they are what an
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functionRefs: [
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TODOS_READ_TOOL_REF,
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TODO_LISTS_READ_TOOL_REF,
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// A recurring todo's occurrences, by the todo's id: they are listed under their todo, which the generic read
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// tool cannot address. See `./todo-occurrences-tool.ts`.
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TODO_OCCURRENCES_TOOL_REF,
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TODOS_CREATE_TOOL_REF,
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TODOS_UPDATE_TOOL_REF,
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// RETRIEVAL grounding — a different KIND of source from the three above. Those return ROWS
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agents: FlowsActors_Agent[];
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functionTools?: FunctionTool[];
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autonomousAgents?: FlowsActors_AutonomousAgentDeclaration[];
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chatAgents?: FlowsActors_ChatAgentDeclaration[];
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} = {
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flowActorSystemsFactoryMap: {
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[TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF]: () => todoAssistantActorSystem,
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},
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agents: [todoAssistantChatAgent, todoTriageAgent, todoDeadlineDrillAgent, todoAutoResolveAgent],
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autonomousAgents: [todosOverdueTriage, todosDeadlineDrill],
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// Who answers a person who writes to the Teams bot (#2665). The Teams messages handler already converses
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// (`../../inbound/teams-bot.inbound-handler.ts`), and with no chat agent declared every such message was refused.
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// The todo assistant answers, as the linked member who wrote and with that member's authority, in every
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// organization that chose no other agent for the connection (Settings > Chat agents).
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chatAgents: [{ ref: 'todos.assistant', systemRef: TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF, isDefault: true }],
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// Generic engine factories instantiated per resource — every tool runs AS THE
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// CALLER (the engine rebuilds a scoped ExecutionContext from the caller's verified
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// auth; identity is never LLM-supplied) and each op's own ACL is enforced by the
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// The engine's question tool (#2720): gated on the OWNER route by construction, so only the person whose turn it
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// is answers it, in the conversation or from their decision inbox.
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askPersonTool(),
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// The records the assistant may show as cards: the same
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// The records the assistant may show as cards: the same three it reads. An occurrence has no page, so its card opens
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// it in an overlay over the conversation (#2776).
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presentRecordsTool({ resourceTypes: [TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODO_LISTS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS_RECURRING_OCCURRENCES] }),
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todoOccurrencesTool,
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// The overdue-triage agent's one write, ROLE-gated to administrators (#1611). See `./reschedule-todo-tool.ts`.
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rescheduleTodoTool,
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// The deadline drill's four-minute reviewer-routed delete (#1866). See `./deadline-drill-agent.ts`.
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## References
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- `references/framework-remote-a2a-agent-declaration-api.md` — the `FlowsActors_RemoteAgent` declaration an agent's `remoteAgentRefs` names: the `a2a_<ref>` tool it becomes, where the credential may go, what each call does and records
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- `references/framework-mcp-server-declaration-api.md` — the `FlowsActors_McpServer` declaration (transport, credential, timeouts) an agent's `mcpRefs` names
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- `references/framework-model-spend-limits-api.md` — the organization budget and the per-person ceiling every in-app turn is refused against, fail-closed, and the three unit ceilings on embeddings, document extraction and content screening: how to grant them on plans, what the person is told, what each refused call does, the `MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT_REFUSED` audit row each refusal writes, and where each one's usage is shown
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- `references/framework-tool-dispatch-obligations-api.md` — grounding an agent on resource operations, and the two controller-tier gates a HAND-WRITTEN tool must call itself
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- `references/framework-present-records-tool-api.md` — `presentRecordsTool()`: the agent shows its person records as summary cards in the conversation, kept as a reference and fetched with the viewer's session
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package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/examples/todo-assistant.example.md
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// A recurring todo's occurrences, by the todo's id: they are listed under their todo, which the generic read
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TODO_OCCURRENCES_TOOL_REF,
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autonomousAgents?: FlowsActors_AutonomousAgentDeclaration[];
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chatAgents?: FlowsActors_ChatAgentDeclaration[];
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} = {
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flowActorSystemsFactoryMap: {
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[TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF]: () => todoAssistantActorSystem,
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agents: [todoAssistantChatAgent, todoTriageAgent, todoDeadlineDrillAgent, todoAutoResolveAgent],
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autonomousAgents: [todosOverdueTriage, todosDeadlineDrill],
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// Who answers a person who writes to the Teams bot (#2665). The Teams messages handler already converses
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// (`../../inbound/teams-bot.inbound-handler.ts`), and with no chat agent declared every such message was refused.
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// The todo assistant answers, as the linked member who wrote and with that member's authority, in every
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// organization that chose no other agent for the connection (Settings > Chat agents).
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chatAgents: [{ ref: 'todos.assistant', systemRef: TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF, isDefault: true }],
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// The engine's question tool (#2720): gated on the OWNER route by construction, so only the person whose turn it
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askPersonTool(),
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// The records the assistant may show as cards: the same
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// The records the assistant may show as cards: the same three it reads. An occurrence has no page, so its card opens
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// it in an overlay over the conversation (#2776).
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presentRecordsTool({ resourceTypes: [TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODO_LISTS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS_RECURRING_OCCURRENCES] }),
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todoOccurrencesTool,
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// The overdue-triage agent's one write, ROLE-gated to administrators (#1611). See `./reschedule-todo-tool.ts`.
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// The deadline drill's four-minute reviewer-routed delete (#1866). See `./deadline-drill-agent.ts`.
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* #2914), one sentence per problem with its remedy; empty when they are sound or absent. `declaredFieldsOf` answers the
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* fields the resource's main schema declares, or undefined when the resource is not registered (its fields are then not
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* checked here: a field the row does not hold is shown and sealed as absent).
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*
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* `systemReadAllowedOf` answers whether the resource grants the system READ (`systemAccessPolicy.read`), or undefined when
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* the resource is not registered. The card, the seal and the currency check all read the row through `readAsSystem`, which
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* refuses a resource that does not grant it, and that refusal is swallowed into "no record values": every approval then
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* seals no field and no currency check can compare anything. Measured on Wonder Ledger's live sign-off, where the declared
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* field set was sealed on none of the seals, so a declaration nothing can read stops the application here instead.
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*/
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export function functionToolRecordApprovalDeclarationProblems(
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tool: Pick<FunctionTool, 'functionRef' | 'sealedRecordFields' | 'approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow' | 'argumentsResource' | 'requiresHumanApproval' | 'humanApproval' | 'asksThePerson'>,
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declaredFieldsOf?: (resourceType: string) => readonly string[] | undefined,
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systemReadAllowedOf?: (resourceType: string) => boolean | undefined,
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): string[] {
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const unknown = declared ? fields.filter((field) => !declared.includes(field)) : [];
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if (unknown.length > 0) problems.push(`${named}, naming ${unknown.join(', ')}, which ${tool.argumentsResource!.resourceType} does not declare.`);
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if (tool.argumentsResource && systemReadAllowedOf?.(tool.argumentsResource.resourceType) === false) {
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problems.push(`${named}, but ${tool.argumentsResource.resourceType} does not grant the system read the approval card, the seal and the currency check `
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+ `read the row through: declare systemAccessPolicy.read = ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED on it.`);
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}
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@@ -93,6 +93,19 @@ export interface BackendDomainModule extends SharedDomainModule {
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* `capabilities.tools.functionRefs`.
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*/
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functionTools?: FunctionTool[];
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/**
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* Another party's MCP servers this module's agents may call (#3958): each one's endpoint and the stored provider
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* connection whose credential reaches it. Reference them from an agent's `capabilities.tools.mcpRefs`. Registration
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* refuses a plaintext `http://` endpoint, and every call goes through the outbound guard. See `FlowsActors_McpServer`.
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*/
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mcpServers?: FlowsActors_McpServer[];
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/**
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* Another party's A2A agents this module's agents may delegate a task to (#3930): each one's card URL and the stored
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* provider connection whose credential reaches it. Reference them from an agent's
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* `capabilities.tools.remoteAgentRefs`. Registration refuses a plaintext `http://` card or endpoint, and every call
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* goes through the outbound guard. See `FlowsActors_RemoteAgent`.
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*/
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remoteAgents?: FlowsActors_RemoteAgent[];
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/**
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* Agents that may run with nobody on a socket — on a schedule or on an inbound delivery (#1611).
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* Declaring one grants nothing: a turn runs in an organization only while one of its OAuth clients
|
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@@ -501,6 +514,8 @@ function mergeFlowsActors(
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) as FlowActorSystem_InitializationFactoryMap,
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agents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.agents ?? []),
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|
functionTools: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.functionTools ?? []),
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+
mcpServers: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.mcpServers ?? []),
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|
+
remoteAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.remoteAgents ?? []),
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|
autonomousAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.autonomousAgents ?? []),
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chatAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.chatAgents ?? []),
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|
actorExecutionContinuations: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.actorExecutionContinuations ?? []),
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|
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Another party's MCP server — the declaration contract
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
Read this when an agent should call tools from an MCP server someone else runs. It surfaces the
|
|
4
|
+
`FlowsActors_McpServer` you put on a backend domain module's `flowsActors.mcpServers`, and whose `ref`
|
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5
|
+
an agent lists in `capabilities.tools.mcpRefs`:
|
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6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
- `transport` — `HTTP_STREAM` (Streamable HTTP) is the one the runtime speaks.
|
|
8
|
+
- `url` — the server's `https://` endpoint; startup refuses `http://`.
|
|
9
|
+
- `credential` — a `FlowsActors_OutboundCredential`, the stored provider connection whose token reaches the server:
|
|
10
|
+
`providerRef`, `secretSlug` (the provider's secrets-contract KEY, e.g. `accessToken`, never the
|
|
11
|
+
env-var spelling such as `VENDOR_ACCESS_TOKEN`: a wrong spelling misses a stored credential
|
|
12
|
+
silently), and `subject` (`USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION`, `ORGANIZATION` or `USER`).
|
|
13
|
+
- `timeouts` — `discoveryMs` (opening a session and listing tools, default 5 000) and `callMs` (one
|
|
14
|
+
tool call, default 30 000). Write them out: the type an application authors against is the parsed
|
|
15
|
+
one, so the defaults do not make them optional there.
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
## Import Origins
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
- `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
|
|
20
|
+
|
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21
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+
## Source Excerpts
|
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|
+
|
|
23
|
+
### Origin Package: `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
```typescript
|
|
26
|
+
*
|
|
27
|
+
* How the runtime reaches the server.
|
|
28
|
+
*
|
|
29
|
+
* A closed vocabulary rather than a free string: the transport decides the whole connection
|
|
30
|
+
* lifecycle — how a session opens, whether the server can push, how a stream ends — so a value
|
|
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|
+
* nobody implemented must be unrepresentable rather than discovered at the first call.
|
|
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|
+
*
|
|
33
|
+
* STDIO is deliberately ABSENT. It launches a local subprocess, which is the coding-agent lane's
|
|
34
|
+
* shape and not an application's: a generated application runs in a container it does not control,
|
|
35
|
+
* and "the agent may spawn a process" is a different security decision from "the agent may call an
|
|
36
|
+
* endpoint". Adding it later is a decision, not an omission.
|
|
37
|
+
*/
|
|
38
|
+
export enum FlowsActors_McpTransport {
|
|
39
|
+
/** Streamable HTTP — the current MCP transport for remote servers. */
|
|
40
|
+
HTTP_STREAM = 'http_stream',
|
|
41
|
+
/**
|
|
42
|
+
* Server-sent events — the earlier remote transport, still widely deployed. The client speaks Streamable HTTP only,
|
|
43
|
+
* so startup REFUSES a server declared with it (#3958) rather than failing every turn as a protocol error.
|
|
44
|
+
*/
|
|
45
|
+
SSE = 'sse',
|
|
46
|
+
}
|
|
47
|
+
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
/**
|
|
50
|
+
* Bounds on a call that leaves the trust boundary.
|
|
51
|
+
*
|
|
52
|
+
* Present with defaults rather than optional-and-unbounded, because an MCP call is a REMOTE call and
|
|
53
|
+
* the mistake this whole issue warns against is modelling it as a second kind of local function. A
|
|
54
|
+
* local function cannot hang; this can, and an unbounded tool call holds a model turn open for as
|
|
55
|
+
* long as somebody else's server feels like it.
|
|
56
|
+
*/
|
|
57
|
+
export const FlowsActors_McpServerTimeoutsSchema = z.object({
|
|
58
|
+
/** How long tool DISCOVERY may take before the server contributes no tools to the turn. */
|
|
59
|
+
discoveryMs: z.number().int().positive().default(5_000),
|
|
60
|
+
/** How long one tool CALL may take before it returns a typed timeout to the agent. */
|
|
61
|
+
callMs: z.number().int().positive().default(30_000),
|
|
62
|
+
});
|
|
63
|
+
export type FlowsActors_McpServerTimeouts = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_McpServerTimeoutsSchema>;
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
export const FlowsActors_McpServerSchema = z.object({
|
|
66
|
+
/** The value an agent's `capabilities.tools.mcpRefs` names. Unique within an application. */
|
|
67
|
+
ref: z.string().min(1),
|
|
68
|
+
displayName: z.string().min(1),
|
|
69
|
+
transport: z.enum(FlowsActors_McpTransport),
|
|
70
|
+
/** The server's endpoint. `https` in every deployed environment; the runtime refuses plaintext. */
|
|
71
|
+
url: z.string().url(),
|
|
72
|
+
/** Which stored provider credential authorizes the calls (`FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema`). */
|
|
73
|
+
credential: FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema,
|
|
74
|
+
timeouts: FlowsActors_McpServerTimeoutsSchema.default({ discoveryMs: 5_000, callMs: 30_000 }),
|
|
75
|
+
});
|
|
76
|
+
export type FlowsActors_McpServer = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_McpServerSchema>;
|
|
77
|
+
```
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
79
|
+
The credential's own contract, shared with remote A2A agents:
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
81
|
+
## Import Origins
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
- `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
## Source Excerpts
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
### Origin Package: `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
```typescript
|
|
90
|
+
/**
|
|
91
|
+
* WHOSE credential the call carries.
|
|
92
|
+
*
|
|
93
|
+
* The distinction is not a preference. A tool call that reaches a third party on a user's behalf
|
|
94
|
+
* should be attributable to that user AT THE FAR END — that is what makes it revocable there and
|
|
95
|
+
* auditable by the party being called. An application-wide service identity loses that: every
|
|
96
|
+
* user's call looks identical to the server, and one leaked credential exposes every tenant.
|
|
97
|
+
*/
|
|
98
|
+
export enum FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject {
|
|
99
|
+
/**
|
|
100
|
+
* The acting user's own delegated credential, falling back to the organization's connection when
|
|
101
|
+
* the user has none. The default, and the reason a fallback exists at all: an agent acting for a
|
|
102
|
+
* user who has never connected the server would otherwise have no path, which would make every
|
|
103
|
+
* unattended and batch turn impossible.
|
|
104
|
+
*/
|
|
105
|
+
USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION = 'user_then_organization',
|
|
106
|
+
/** The organization's connection only — for a server the tenant connects once on everyone's behalf. */
|
|
107
|
+
ORGANIZATION = 'organization',
|
|
108
|
+
/** The acting user's own credential only. No fallback: a user who has not connected cannot call. */
|
|
109
|
+
USER = 'user',
|
|
110
|
+
}
|
|
111
|
+
|
|
112
|
+
/**
|
|
113
|
+
* Which stored credential authorizes the call.
|
|
114
|
+
*
|
|
115
|
+
* `providerRef` names a provider the application has already connected, so the credential comes from
|
|
116
|
+
* `organizationProviderCredentials` / `userProviderCredentials` rather than from a store invented
|
|
117
|
+
* for one kind of call. Those exist, carry per-tenant isolation by construction, and already have the connect and
|
|
118
|
+
* consent flow in front of them — a second credential store for this one call shape would be a
|
|
119
|
+
* second thing to rotate, audit and leak.
|
|
120
|
+
*/
|
|
121
|
+
export const FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema = z.object({
|
|
122
|
+
providerRef: z.string().min(1),
|
|
123
|
+
/**
|
|
124
|
+
* The provider's `secretsContract` KEY (`accessToken`) — the one both credential resolver ports
|
|
125
|
+
* require, and NOT the slot's env-var spelling (`VENDOR_ACCESS_TOKEN`) the env projection names.
|
|
126
|
+
* Stored credentials are keyed on the key (#624), and this value reaches the stores verbatim, so a
|
|
127
|
+
* spelling here misses a credential that exists.
|
|
128
|
+
*
|
|
129
|
+
* DECLARED rather than derived, because it is not derivable: a provider's contract may carry
|
|
130
|
+
* several secrets, and which of them authorizes the endpoint is a fact about that vendor's
|
|
131
|
+
* deployment rather than anything the framework can compute. Guessing a conventional name would
|
|
132
|
+
* resolve the wrong secret silently — the resolver would find a credential, spend it, and be
|
|
133
|
+
* refused by the far server for a reason no log here would explain.
|
|
134
|
+
*/
|
|
135
|
+
secretSlug: z.string().min(1),
|
|
136
|
+
subject: z.enum(FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject).default(FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject.USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION),
|
|
137
|
+
});
|
|
138
|
+
export type FlowsActors_OutboundCredential = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema>;
|
|
139
|
+
```
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Another party's A2A agent — the declaration contract
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
Read this when an agent should hand a task to an agent someone else runs, over A2A 1.0. It surfaces the
|
|
4
|
+
`FlowsActors_RemoteAgent` you put on a backend domain module's `flowsActors.remoteAgents`, and whose `ref` an
|
|
5
|
+
agent lists in `capabilities.tools.remoteAgentRefs`.
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
What the calling agent gets:
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
- One tool per remote agent, named `a2a_<ref>`, described by YOUR `description` (the remote card's own text never
|
|
10
|
+
reaches the model). It takes one argument, `message`, and returns `{ answer, taskState?, taskId?, contextId? }`, or
|
|
11
|
+
`{ error, detail, taskId?, contextId? }` naming how the call failed (`refused_target`, `unreachable`, `timed_out`,
|
|
12
|
+
`protocol_error`, `remote_task_failed`, `remote_request_refused`, `incompatible_agent`, `rate_budget_exhausted`), with
|
|
13
|
+
the remote task's ids when one was opened before the failure.
|
|
14
|
+
- Each call is a new request: the remote agent answers it directly or opens a new task. The model cannot pass a task or
|
|
15
|
+
context id, so it cannot continue, read or cancel a remote task. A task still running when `callMs` elapses comes back
|
|
16
|
+
as an answer carrying its last-read state and ids, and keeps running there; it is never cancelled.
|
|
17
|
+
- A blank or missing `message` is refused before anything is sent.
|
|
18
|
+
- The tool is offered only when a credential resolves for `credential.subject`, never on a turn an inbound delivery
|
|
19
|
+
started, and never under the name of a tool already offered that turn.
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
What the runtime does on each call:
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
- Fetches the card from `cardUrl` WITHOUT the credential and keeps it for as long as its `Cache-Control` allows (five
|
|
24
|
+
minutes by default, one hour at most, never with `no-store` or `no-cache`). It reads the card's JSON-RPC interfaces at
|
|
25
|
+
protocol version 1.0 (any 1.0 patch).
|
|
26
|
+
- Sends the credential, as a bearer token, to one of those interfaces only: with `endpointUrl` declared, the interface
|
|
27
|
+
at exactly that URL, which is also the URL the credential is resolved for; without it, the card's first such
|
|
28
|
+
interface, and only when it is on the card's own host. A card whose interface is on another host is refused unless
|
|
29
|
+
you declared that interface as `endpointUrl`.
|
|
30
|
+
- Sends `SendMessage`, then reads the task with `GetTask` until it ends, pauses for input or `callMs` elapses. Every
|
|
31
|
+
JSON-RPC request carries `A2A-Version: 1.0`. Each response body is read within the same deadline and refused past a
|
|
32
|
+
size ceiling.
|
|
33
|
+
- Goes through the outbound guard, so a private, loopback or metadata address is refused before anything leaves, and
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through the connection's rate budget when the credential has one.
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- Records every call as an `a2a_remote_agent_call` audit row: the remote agent, the host the credential went to, the
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outcome, the remote task id and state, and whose credential it spent. Never the message, never the answer.
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The fields:
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- `cardUrl` / `endpointUrl` — `https://` only; startup refuses `http://`. Declare `endpointUrl` when the agent's
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interface is on another host than its card, or to pin which of its interfaces is used.
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- `credential` — required. `secretSlug` is the provider's secrets-contract KEY (`accessToken`), never the env-var
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spelling: a wrong spelling silently misses the stored credential, and the tool is then never offered.
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- `timeouts` — `cardMs` (default 5 000) and `callMs` (default 60 000). Write them out: the type you author against is
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the parsed one.
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Startup refuses a declaration the schema refuses, a `ref` declared twice, a plaintext URL, and an agent whose
|
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`remoteAgentRefs` names no declaration (`agent_remote_agent_ref_names_no_declared_remote_agent`).
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The remote agent's answer is another party's text. Declare `contentGuardrails.promptInjection` on the calling agent,
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and under `contentGuardrails.personalData` the answer reaches the model withheld whole, because nothing says which of
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its words are personal data.
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## Import Origins
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- `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
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## Source Excerpts
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### Origin Package: `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
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```typescript
|
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/**
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* Bounds on a call that leaves the trust boundary. Present with defaults, because a remote agent can take as long as it
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* likes and an unbounded call would hold the calling agent's turn open for that long.
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*/
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export const FlowsActors_RemoteAgentTimeoutsSchema = z.object({
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/** How long fetching the remote agent's card may take. */
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cardMs: z.number().int().positive().default(5_000),
|
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/**
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* How long one delegation may take, end to end: the send, then reading the task until it ends or pauses. A task still
|
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* running at the deadline is returned to the calling agent as still running, with its ids; it is never cancelled.
|
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*/
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|
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callMs: z.number().int().positive().default(60_000),
|
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|
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});
|
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|
+
export type FlowsActors_RemoteAgentTimeouts = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_RemoteAgentTimeoutsSchema>;
|
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+
|
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/**
|
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* Another party's A2A agent the application's agents may delegate a task to (A2A 1.0, JSON-RPC binding).
|
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*
|
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|
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* The runtime fetches the agent card from `cardUrl` WITHOUT the credential and sends the credential to one of the card's
|
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|
+
* JSON-RPC interfaces at protocol version 1.0, and only to one the application named too: with `endpointUrl` declared,
|
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|
+
* the interface at exactly that URL; without it, the card's first such interface, and only when it is on the card's own
|
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|
+
* host. A card cannot redirect a credential to a host the application never named.
|
|
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|
+
*/
|
|
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|
+
export const FlowsActors_RemoteAgentSchema = z.object({
|
|
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|
+
/** The value an agent's `capabilities.tools.remoteAgentRefs` names. Unique within an application. */
|
|
88
|
+
ref: z.string().min(1),
|
|
89
|
+
displayName: z.string().min(1),
|
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90
|
+
/**
|
|
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|
+
* What the remote agent does, in the application's words. It is the description of the tool the calling model is
|
|
92
|
+
* offered — the card's own description never reaches the model.
|
|
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|
+
*/
|
|
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|
+
description: z.string().min(1),
|
|
95
|
+
/** Where the agent card is served, `https://` (e.g. `https://agent.example.com/.well-known/agent-card.json`). */
|
|
96
|
+
cardUrl: z.string().url(),
|
|
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|
+
/**
|
|
98
|
+
* The interface URL the credential is sent to, exactly. Declare it when the agent's interface is on another host than
|
|
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|
+
* its card, or to pin which of the card's interfaces is used. The credential is resolved for this URL.
|
|
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|
+
*/
|
|
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|
+
endpointUrl: z.string().url().optional(),
|
|
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|
+
/** Which stored provider credential authorizes the calls, and whose. Required: an anonymous remote agent is not admitted. */
|
|
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|
+
credential: FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema,
|
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|
+
timeouts: FlowsActors_RemoteAgentTimeoutsSchema.default({ cardMs: 5_000, callMs: 60_000 }),
|
|
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|
+
});
|
|
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|
+
export type FlowsActors_RemoteAgent = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_RemoteAgentSchema>;
|
|
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|
+
```
|
|
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|
+
|
|
109
|
+
The credential's own contract, shared with MCP servers:
|
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
## Import Origins
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
- `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
|
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
## Source Excerpts
|
|
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|
+
|
|
117
|
+
### Origin Package: `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
|
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
```typescript
|
|
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|
+
/**
|
|
121
|
+
* WHOSE credential the call carries.
|
|
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|
+
*
|
|
123
|
+
* The distinction is not a preference. A tool call that reaches a third party on a user's behalf
|
|
124
|
+
* should be attributable to that user AT THE FAR END — that is what makes it revocable there and
|
|
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|
+
* auditable by the party being called. An application-wide service identity loses that: every
|
|
126
|
+
* user's call looks identical to the server, and one leaked credential exposes every tenant.
|
|
127
|
+
*/
|
|
128
|
+
export enum FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject {
|
|
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|
+
/**
|
|
130
|
+
* The acting user's own delegated credential, falling back to the organization's connection when
|
|
131
|
+
* the user has none. The default, and the reason a fallback exists at all: an agent acting for a
|
|
132
|
+
* user who has never connected the server would otherwise have no path, which would make every
|
|
133
|
+
* unattended and batch turn impossible.
|
|
134
|
+
*/
|
|
135
|
+
USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION = 'user_then_organization',
|
|
136
|
+
/** The organization's connection only — for a server the tenant connects once on everyone's behalf. */
|
|
137
|
+
ORGANIZATION = 'organization',
|
|
138
|
+
/** The acting user's own credential only. No fallback: a user who has not connected cannot call. */
|
|
139
|
+
USER = 'user',
|
|
140
|
+
}
|
|
141
|
+
|
|
142
|
+
/**
|
|
143
|
+
* Which stored credential authorizes the call.
|
|
144
|
+
*
|
|
145
|
+
* `providerRef` names a provider the application has already connected, so the credential comes from
|
|
146
|
+
* `organizationProviderCredentials` / `userProviderCredentials` rather than from a store invented
|
|
147
|
+
* for one kind of call. Those exist, carry per-tenant isolation by construction, and already have the connect and
|
|
148
|
+
* consent flow in front of them — a second credential store for this one call shape would be a
|
|
149
|
+
* second thing to rotate, audit and leak.
|
|
150
|
+
*/
|
|
151
|
+
export const FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema = z.object({
|
|
152
|
+
providerRef: z.string().min(1),
|
|
153
|
+
/**
|
|
154
|
+
* The provider's `secretsContract` KEY (`accessToken`) — the one both credential resolver ports
|
|
155
|
+
* require, and NOT the slot's env-var spelling (`VENDOR_ACCESS_TOKEN`) the env projection names.
|
|
156
|
+
* Stored credentials are keyed on the key (#624), and this value reaches the stores verbatim, so a
|
|
157
|
+
* spelling here misses a credential that exists.
|
|
158
|
+
*
|
|
159
|
+
* DECLARED rather than derived, because it is not derivable: a provider's contract may carry
|
|
160
|
+
* several secrets, and which of them authorizes the endpoint is a fact about that vendor's
|
|
161
|
+
* deployment rather than anything the framework can compute. Guessing a conventional name would
|
|
162
|
+
* resolve the wrong secret silently — the resolver would find a credential, spend it, and be
|
|
163
|
+
* refused by the far server for a reason no log here would explain.
|
|
164
|
+
*/
|
|
165
|
+
secretSlug: z.string().min(1),
|
|
166
|
+
subject: z.enum(FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject).default(FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject.USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION),
|
|
167
|
+
});
|
|
168
|
+
export type FlowsActors_OutboundCredential = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema>;
|
|
169
|
+
```
|
|
@@ -131,45 +131,36 @@ export type FlowsActors_Agent = {
|
|
|
131
131
|
/**
|
|
132
132
|
* References to MCP servers the agent may reach.
|
|
133
133
|
*
|
|
134
|
-
* ##
|
|
134
|
+
* ## Checked at startup, called at turn start (#491, #3958)
|
|
135
135
|
*
|
|
136
|
-
* Each ref must name an MCP server the APPLICATION declared (`FlowsActors_McpServer
|
|
137
|
-
* `
|
|
138
|
-
*
|
|
139
|
-
* carried seven refs
|
|
140
|
-
* no server anywhere while the agent card rendered them as capabilities — a claim shown to a
|
|
141
|
-
* user about a reach the agent did not have. The catalog is gone and the card no longer
|
|
142
|
-
* renders these.
|
|
136
|
+
* Each ref must name an MCP server the APPLICATION declared (`FlowsActors_McpServer`, on a backend domain
|
|
137
|
+
* module's `flowsActors.mcpServers`), and startup REFUSES an agent whose refs name none. That closes the shape
|
|
138
|
+
* this field was in: it used to resolve against nothing, so a shipped
|
|
139
|
+
* catalog carried seven refs that named no server anywhere — a claim about a reach the agent did not have.
|
|
143
140
|
*
|
|
144
|
-
* The check is deliberately stricter than `functionRefs`, which skip an unknown ref with a
|
|
145
|
-
*
|
|
146
|
-
* as a capability, and a refusal makes the old state unreachable rather than fixed once.
|
|
141
|
+
* The check is deliberately stricter than `functionRefs`, which skip an unknown ref with a debug line: an unknown
|
|
142
|
+
* `functionRef` costs an agent one tool, whereas these name another party's server.
|
|
147
143
|
*
|
|
148
|
-
*
|
|
149
|
-
*
|
|
150
|
-
*
|
|
151
|
-
*
|
|
152
|
-
*
|
|
153
|
-
|
|
154
|
-
|
|
155
|
-
|
|
156
|
-
*
|
|
157
|
-
* 3. **Credential resolution at call time.** Decided 2026-09-09: the call carries the acting
|
|
158
|
-
* user's own delegated provider credential where present and the organization's connection
|
|
159
|
-
* otherwise, from `userProviderCredentials` / `organizationProviderCredentials` rather than
|
|
160
|
-
* a store invented for MCP. `FlowsActors_McpCredentialSubject` records that choice per
|
|
161
|
-
* server; nothing reads it yet.
|
|
144
|
+
* At turn start the agent opens a session with each named server, using the credential the server's declared
|
|
145
|
+
* `credential.subject` selects, and is offered the server's tools. They are withheld on a turn an inbound
|
|
146
|
+
* delivery started and when no credential resolves; a server that does not answer contributes no tools rather
|
|
147
|
+
* than failing the turn. Every tool call, and a target the outbound guard refuses, is recorded on the audit
|
|
148
|
+
* trail; an unreachable or slow server is logged.
|
|
149
|
+
*/
|
|
150
|
+
mcpRefs: string[],
|
|
151
|
+
/**
|
|
152
|
+
* References to remote A2A agents the agent may delegate a task to (#3930).
|
|
162
153
|
*
|
|
163
|
-
*
|
|
164
|
-
*
|
|
165
|
-
* returns a typed error the agent can reason about. Both emit an audit event, because a server
|
|
166
|
-
* quietly unreachable for a week must be visible as that rather than as an agent that became
|
|
167
|
-
* less capable for no stated reason.
|
|
154
|
+
* Each ref must name a remote agent the APPLICATION declared (`FlowsActors_RemoteAgent`, on a backend domain
|
|
155
|
+
* module's `flowsActors.remoteAgents`); startup REFUSES an agent whose refs name none, as for `mcpRefs`.
|
|
168
156
|
*
|
|
169
|
-
*
|
|
170
|
-
*
|
|
157
|
+
* At turn start the agent is offered one tool per named remote agent, described by the declaration (never by the
|
|
158
|
+
* remote card). A call sends the agent's message to the remote agent over A2A 1.0 with the credential the
|
|
159
|
+
* declaration's `credential.subject` selects, and returns the remote reply, or the remote task's state and ids
|
|
160
|
+
* when it is still running or waits for input. Withheld on a turn an inbound delivery started and when no
|
|
161
|
+
* credential resolves. Every call is recorded on the audit trail.
|
|
171
162
|
*/
|
|
172
|
-
|
|
163
|
+
remoteAgentRefs?: string[],
|
|
173
164
|
},
|
|
174
165
|
},
|
|
175
166
|
|
|
@@ -177,6 +177,12 @@ unconfirmed todo and never answers; a follow-up on a linked thread becomes a che
|
|
|
177
177
|
/** The template the answer is rendered from — `emails/resources/todos/email-intake.received/`. */
|
|
178
178
|
export const TODO_EMAIL_RECEIVED_TEMPLATE_REF = 'email.todos.email-intake.received';
|
|
179
179
|
|
|
180
|
+
/** The answer to "summary" on a linked thread — `emails/resources/todos/email-intake.summary/`. */
|
|
181
|
+
export const TODO_EMAIL_SUMMARY_TEMPLATE_REF = 'email.todos.email-intake.summary';
|
|
182
|
+
|
|
183
|
+
/** What a sender writes, alone, on a linked thread to receive the todo's summary PDF. */
|
|
184
|
+
export const TODO_EMAIL_SUMMARY_REQUEST = 'summary';
|
|
185
|
+
|
|
180
186
|
/** The route tag of the screened address, `acme+screened@…`. */
|
|
181
187
|
export const TODO_EMAIL_SCREENED_ROUTE_TAG = 'screened';
|
|
182
188
|
|
|
@@ -256,8 +262,32 @@ async function addFollowUpOnce(ctx: InboundChannelHandlerContextBase, todoId: st
|
|
|
256
262
|
await ctx.resources.update(TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, todoId, { checklist: [...checklist, { label: `${label} ${marker}`, done: false }] });
|
|
257
263
|
}
|
|
258
264
|
|
|
265
|
+
/** A follow-up whose whole text is the word {@link TODO_EMAIL_SUMMARY_REQUEST}, in any case. */
|
|
266
|
+
function asksForSummary(message: InboundMessage<InboundChannelKind.EMAIL>): boolean {
|
|
267
|
+
return (message.strippedReply ?? message.text).trim().toLowerCase() === TODO_EMAIL_SUMMARY_REQUEST;
|
|
268
|
+
}
|
|
269
|
+
|
|
270
|
+
/**
|
|
271
|
+
* Answers "summary" with the todo's generated summary PDF attached (#1856). The handler names the file; the engine
|
|
272
|
+
* checks it with the handler's own read (the file belongs to the organization, is servable, and the todo still holds
|
|
273
|
+
* it) before the reply is queued. A todo with no summary yet gets the same template, saying so.
|
|
274
|
+
*/
|
|
275
|
+
async function replyWithSummary(ctx: InboundChannelHandlerContext<InboundReplyMode.THREAD>, todoId: string): Promise<void> {
|
|
276
|
+
const todo = await ctx.resources.read<Todos>(TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, todoId);
|
|
277
|
+
if (!todo) throw Object.assign(new Error('The todo this thread is about no longer exists'), { name: 'TodoNotFound' });
|
|
278
|
+
// A `z_file` value is typed as either shape (one file, or `fileIds` for a multi-file field); this field holds one.
|
|
279
|
+
const summary = todo.generatedSummaryPdf;
|
|
280
|
+
const summaryFileId = summary && 'fileId' in summary ? summary.fileId : undefined;
|
|
281
|
+
await ctx.reply({
|
|
282
|
+
templateRef: TODO_EMAIL_SUMMARY_TEMPLATE_REF,
|
|
283
|
+
variables: { todoTitle: todo.title, hasSummary: Boolean(summaryFileId) },
|
|
284
|
+
...(summaryFileId ? { attachmentFileIds: [summaryFileId] } : {}),
|
|
285
|
+
});
|
|
286
|
+
}
|
|
287
|
+
|
|
259
288
|
/**
|
|
260
|
-
* What both answering handlers do: a message on a thread already linked to a todo is a follow-up
|
|
289
|
+
* What both answering handlers do: a message on a thread already linked to a todo is a follow-up (or, when it
|
|
290
|
+
* reads only "summary", a request for the todo's summary PDF); any other
|
|
261
291
|
* becomes a new todo, the thread is linked to it, and the sender is answered.
|
|
262
292
|
*/
|
|
263
293
|
async function intake(
|
|
@@ -266,7 +296,8 @@ async function intake(
|
|
|
266
296
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
267
297
|
const linked = message.thread.linkedResource;
|
|
268
298
|
if (linked?.resourceType === TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS) {
|
|
269
|
-
await
|
|
299
|
+
if (asksForSummary(message)) await replyWithSummary(ctx, linked.resourceId);
|
|
300
|
+
else await addFollowUpOnce(ctx, linked.resourceId, message);
|
|
270
301
|
return;
|
|
271
302
|
}
|
|
272
303
|
const list = await resolveTargetList(ctx, message.payload.routeTag);
|