@wildo-ai/framework-knowledge 1.1.12 → 1.1.14
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/claude-marketplace/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json +1 -1
- package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/references/composites-and-the-loop.md +12 -4
- package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/skills/build/SKILL.md +4 -0
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js +10 -0
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.definition.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.definition.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.definition.js +8 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/external-framework-mapping.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/manifest.json +7 -7
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/method.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.foundation/playbook.json +6 -3
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.maturity-reading/method.md +9 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.maturity-reading/playbook.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/method.md +11 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/playbook.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.requirements-definition/method.md +14 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/top_down.requirements-definition/playbook.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/application-maturity.config.md +43 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/engine.client-bundle.allow-list.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.backend.addon-wiring.module.md +5 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.backend.custom-operation.declared-refusal-code.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.config.navigation.full.md +14 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.infra.environment-config.local.md +2 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.resource.config-wiring.retention-policy-operations.md +21 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.resource.status-lifecycle.quote.md +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.resource.ui-behavior.operation-icon.md +8 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/platform.config.environment.deployment.md +60 -4
- package/dist/knowledge/references/platform.config.infrastructure-host.md +1 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/platform.config.platform-key-management.md +5 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/requirements.engine-substance.md +38 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/requirements.functional-requirement.config.md +11 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/requirements.non-functional-requirement.config.md +11 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.approval-seals.admin-endpoints.md +20 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.custom-operation.hook-transaction-posture.md +12 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.function-tool.md +72 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.system-access-service.md +30 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.frontend.app-shell.shell-motion-contract.md +30 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.frontend.chart-dashboard-view.md +3 -3
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.frontend.chart-dashboard.md +38 -35
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.chart-dashboard-tile-sizes.md +40 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.agent-content-guardrails-environment.md +52 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.frontend-provider-public-config-contract.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.organization-dashboard-layout.md +61 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.privacy.data-residency.md +188 -31
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.providers.compliance-choice.md +9 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.resource-config.operation-condition-parameters.md +8 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.specifications.processor-register.md +10 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/assurance-authority-bases.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/framework-topics.json +41 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/playbooks.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/source-tags.json +1147 -1077
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-addon-wiring/SKILL.md +5 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-custom-operation/references/declared-refusal-codes.md +28 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-custom-operation/references/framework-hook-transaction-posture-api.md +32 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/document-composition-privacy-notice.md +11 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/framework-processor-register-authoring.md +16 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/framework-provider-compliance-choice-api.md +197 -31
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-app-shell/references/framework-shell-layout-api.md +30 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-navigation/SKILL.md +14 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/compliance-declarations.md +19 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/framework-key-management-api.md +58 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/electronic-signature-deliverables/references/what-makes-a-request-signed.md +20 -3
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-autonomous-agents/SKILL.md +12 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/SKILL.md +16 -4
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-agent-content-guardrails-api.md +144 -6
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-flows-actors-tool-api.md +72 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-declared-flow/SKILL.md +12 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-llm-agent-invocation/SKILL.md +12 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/frontend-component-catalog/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/frontend-component-catalog/references/framework-component-catalog.md +3 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/frontend-component-catalog/references/framework-component-usage.md +13 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/SKILL.md +36 -8
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/references/framework-agent-content-guardrails-environment-api.md +67 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/references/framework-environment-deployment-api.md +60 -4
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/references/framework-infrastructure-host-api.md +1 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/references/framework-platform-key-management-api.md +5 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/layout-2d-adoption/references/framework-shell-motion-api.md +30 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-backend-package/SKILL.md +17 -3
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-file-picker/references/framework-frontend-public-config-api.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-module/references/package-frontend-facets.md +4 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-config-wiring/SKILL.md +6 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-config-wiring/references/framework-operation-audit-api.md +4 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-config-wiring/references/framework-retention-policy-operations.md +21 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-config-wiring/references/framework-system-access-reads-api.md +30 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-status-lifecycle/SKILL.md +3 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-status-lifecycle/references/framework-operation-condition-parameters-api.md +8 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-status-lifecycle/references/quote-lifecycle-worked-example.md +3 -3
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-ui-behavior/SKILL.md +8 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/views-chart-authoring/SKILL.md +5 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/views-composite-authoring/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/views-composite-authoring/references/framework-chart-dashboard-api.md +166 -39
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/website-bundle-discipline/SKILL.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/website-bundle-discipline/references/website-bundle-rules.md +6 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/topic-index.json +292 -153
- package/dist/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +1 -1
- package/package.json +4 -4
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@@ -217,8 +217,8 @@ export default defineInfraEnvConfig({
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* (#2991): its host slot `AZURE_CONTENT_SAFETY_HOST` holds `127.0.0.1:18309` and its key the double's own, both in
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* `secrets.json`, never here. The engine reaches a loopback host only in a development or test environment, so this
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* selection cannot carry the double's address anywhere else. The double is the content-safety simulator of
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* `@wildo-ai/provider-simulators`,
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* answer that their content could not be screened.
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* `@wildo-ai/provider-simulators`, which `wildo local dev` starts on that port with that key; without a service
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* answering there, the guarded agents answer that their content could not be screened or checked.
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*/
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[EngineCapability.AI_CONTENT_SAFETY]: {
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primary: 'azure-content-safety',
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package/dist/knowledge/references/example.resource.config-wiring.retention-policy-operations.md
CHANGED
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@@ -36,6 +36,27 @@ type OrganizationEscalationPolicies_CoreOperations =
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*/
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dataSubjectPolicy: { kind: ResourceDataSubjectKind.NO_PRINCIPAL },
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/**
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* On a person's Art. 15 export graph: a policy names the person it escalates to (`targetUserId`) and whoever created it
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* (`createdByUserId`), and both foreign keys put it there. Being named as an escalation target, or as a policy's author,
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* is information about that person, so the rows are disclosed, as the module's other member-naming resources are. Until
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* this was declared, the fail-closed export refused every access request of a person this resource can name (the
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* account-erasure-journey lane's download answered 500, #3743).
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*/
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systemAccessPolicy: { exportSubject: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED },
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/**
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* Withheld from every copy: the organization's endpoint, not the person's data, and a webhook URL often carries the
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* credential that authorizes posting to it.
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*/
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subjectExportOthersDataFields: ['webhookUrl'],
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/**
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* Each person's copy withholds the OTHER person the row names: the target's copy does not say who configured the
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* policy, and the author's copy does not say whom it escalates to. An actor's identity is that actor's data.
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*
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* spec-cite: GDPR Art. 15(4) (https://gdpr-info.eu/art-15-gdpr/), as `organizationRepresentativeAssignments` cites it
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*/
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subjectExportOthersDataFieldsByForeignKey: { targetUserId: ['createdByUserId'], createdByUserId: ['targetUserId'] },
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coreOperations: [
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CoreResourceOperation.READ,
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CoreResourceOperation.LIST,
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* read from the row. ACCEPT and DECLINE arriving at the same moment on one SENT quote both pass the
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* condition, but only the first write finds the quote still SENT. The second matches no row and is
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* refused with 409 `version_conflict` (re-read the quote and decide again). One after the other, the second is
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* refused by the condition itself (
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* refused by the condition itself (409 `service_resource_operation_disabled`: it read only the row). Nothing is declared for
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export enum Quote_Status {
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surface: ResourceOperationFrontendSurface.EMBEDDED,
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// Explicit ORDER in the bar. Status is the verb reached for most often on a todo, so it leads;
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// Explicit ORDER in the bar. Status is the verb reached for most often on a todo, so it leads; the move follows (MOVE_TO_LIST, 7).
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// of how the actions are used — and `actionDisclosure` caps the bar at three, so ordering decides WHICH three survive.
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// foreign key declared to `todoLists`), so "Move to ▾" lists the lists and picking one moves the todo.
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//
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// Priority 7, BELOW 10, for CHANGE_STATUS's reason: Edit defaults to 10 and every UPDATE-like custom verb (Make
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// recurring, Unassign…) inherits it, and the detail bar keeps three. At 30 the pick never held a slot: a todo's
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// header read Change status, Edit, Make recurring, and "Move to" sat in the `…` menu, where a DROPDOWN degrades to
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// the overlay form that marks no current list (#3861). Moving is what a todo in the Inbox is opened for, so it
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// takes the slot Make recurring held; it follows the status verbs (5, 6) and leads Edit.
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[Todos_Operations.MOVE_TO_LIST, {
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surface: ResourceOperationFrontendSurface.EMBEDDED,
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actionPresentation: ResourceOperationActionPresentation.DROPDOWN,
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displayPriority:
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displayPriority: 7,
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}],
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* Both lanes render a profile: the Docker Compose generator, and the Kubernetes manifests (workloads, the mongod
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* routing parameters, secrets, persistent volumes and readiness) since #2303's second slice.
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*
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* ## The queue
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*
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* `SMALL`'s background work runs on the application's own database (`QueueAdapterType.DATABASE`, selected by
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* `queueAdapterTypeOfEnvironmentServiceProfile`), and the platform scheduler delivers its occurrences to the backend over
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* HTTP rather than onto a broker. A minion is confined to its own queues there by a PostgreSQL row-level security policy;
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* MongoDB has none, so a MongoDB application's minions are refused under `SMALL` (`describeMinionsRefusedByEnvironmentServiceProfile`).
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*
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* ## What it does not change yet
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* The broker
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* application's
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* (`QueueAdapterType.MEMORY` is in-process only). Tracked by #2303.
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* The broker's provisioning: under every profile the environment still runs RabbitMQ and apps-manager still mints the
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* application's vhost and credentials, though a `SMALL` application's processes no longer use them. Tracked by #2303.
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*/
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export enum EnvironmentServiceProfile {
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/** Every service the environment's declarations ask for. The default when nothing is authored. */
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/**
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* ({@link servicesOmittedByEnvironmentServiceProfile}), one database family, and background work on the application's
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* own database instead of RabbitMQ (minions only on PostgreSQL). Vector search remains available on PostgreSQL
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* (pgvector is part of the PostgreSQL image, not a separate service).
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}
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}
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/**
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* The queue an environment's application processes share (#2303), as its profile decides it. Total over
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* {@link EnvironmentServiceProfile}: a member added tomorrow fails the build until somebody decides.
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*
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* the application's own database (`QueueAdapterType.DATABASE`). Read by the application's container when it binds its
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* queue adapter, so the backend and its minions (which receive the same profile) always choose the same queue.
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*
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* `FULL` with the database queue would run a broker nothing uses, and `SMALL` with RabbitMQ would defeat the profile's
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* purpose; neither has a use, and a second field would let them be declared.
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*/
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export function queueAdapterTypeOfEnvironmentServiceProfile(profile: EnvironmentServiceProfile): QueueAdapterType {
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}
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}
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*
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export function describeMinionsRefusedByEnvironmentServiceProfile(
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+ 'background work runs on the application\'s own database instead of RabbitMQ, and the application persists to '
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+ 'MongoDB, which cannot confine a minion to its own queues there (only PostgreSQL row-level security can). Remove the '
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+ `serviceProfile to '${EnvironmentServiceProfile.FULL}'.`;
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}
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}
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/** Whether `profile` omits `service`. Absent profile ⇒ {@link DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT_SERVICE_PROFILE}. */
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* a Premium vault offers in preview; a Standard vault cannot hold one and serves signing only).
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* Azure has no `keys/versions/read` data action: `keys/read` reads every version. Measured 2026-11-12 (#3697) with two
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@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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# requirements.engine-substance
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## Import Origins
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- `@wildo-ai/saas-specifications`
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## Source Excerpts
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### Origin Package: `@wildo-ai/saas-specifications`
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```typescript
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*
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* What a requirement CANNOT be met without, in the application's own configuration (#3702).
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*
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* Some requirements are met by code a build task writes; the maturity reading proves those by finding the task's
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* product. Others are met only when the application's configuration turns something on: "the product is usable in
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* German, French, Italian and Spanish" is met when those languages are served and the multi-language capability is
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* enabled, whatever page a build task wrote about it. A file existing proves nothing about a switch being off, so a
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* reading that only probes products called such a requirement verified while the application could not do it
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* (measured on the reference run, 2026-11-10: `nfr-languages-and-local-formats` VERIFIED with `MULTI_LANGUAGE`
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* disabled and English alone served).
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*
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* These two fields are the requirement's SUBSTANCE stated in the engine's own vocabularies, so the reading can measure
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* it against the configuration instead of trusting a product probe:
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*
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* - **`engineCapabilities`** — every {@link EngineCapability} the requirement needs enabled ("pay by card" needs
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* `BILLING`, "sign in with the company's identity provider" needs `SSO`). Empty when code alone meets it.
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* - **`languages`** — every {@link AvailableLanguage} the product must be usable in for this requirement. More than one
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* implies `MULTI_LANGUAGE` without restating it. Empty when the requirement names no language.
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*
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* Both are typed rather than prose for the reason `compliance-is-derived-from-the-product.md` gives: a claim about the
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* product is read from a declaration a function can compare, never re-stated in a sentence nobody can check.
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*/
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export const RequirementEngineCapabilitiesSchema = z.array(z.enum(EngineCapability).systemEnum('EngineCapability'));
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/** See {@link RequirementEngineCapabilitiesSchema}: the languages the requirement asks the product to be usable in. */
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export const RequirementLanguagesSchema = z.array(z.enum(AvailableLanguage).systemEnum('AvailableLanguage'));
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|
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```
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@@ -67,6 +67,17 @@ export const FunctionalRequirementConfigSchema = z.object({
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* for: 005's market weighed missed follow-ups heavily and no requirement said so.
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*/
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painRefs: z.array(NonEmptyStringSchema).optional(),
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/**
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* The engine capabilities this requirement cannot be met without (#3702): see `RequirementEngineCapabilitiesSchema`.
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* Read by the maturity reading against the application's configuration, so a requirement whose capability is off
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* never reads proven. Absent or empty when code alone meets it.
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*/
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engineCapabilities: RequirementEngineCapabilitiesSchema.optional(),
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/**
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* The languages the product must be usable in for this requirement (#3702): see `RequirementLanguagesSchema`. Read by
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* the maturity reading against the languages the application serves. Absent or empty when it names no language.
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*/
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languages: RequirementLanguagesSchema.optional(),
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/** Optional per-entity authoring provenance. */
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authored: RequirementsAuthoredMetadataSchema.optional(),
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/**
|
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@@ -95,6 +95,17 @@ export const NonFunctionalRequirementConfigSchema = z.object({
|
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jobRefs: z.array(NonEmptyStringSchema).optional(),
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/** Optional cross-references to the market pains this quality relieves (#2500), as on a functional requirement. */
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/**
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* The engine capabilities this requirement cannot be met without (#3702): see `RequirementEngineCapabilitiesSchema`.
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* Read by the maturity reading against the application's configuration, so a requirement whose capability is off
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* never reads proven. Absent or empty when code alone meets it.
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*/
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engineCapabilities: RequirementEngineCapabilitiesSchema.optional(),
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/**
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* The languages the product must be usable in for this requirement (#3702): see `RequirementLanguagesSchema`. Read by
|
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* the maturity reading against the languages the application serves. Absent or empty when it names no language.
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*/
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|
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languages: RequirementLanguagesSchema.optional(),
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|
/** Optional per-entity authoring provenance. */
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authored: RequirementsAuthoredMetadataSchema.optional(),
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});
|
|
@@ -62,6 +62,16 @@ export const ApprovalSealsAdminEndpointPath = {
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* which no copy can be made (`reason` names why, `detail` says more).
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*/
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|
MANIFESTED_COPY_REBUILD: '/manifested-copy/rebuild',
|
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/**
|
|
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|
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* POST — whether ONE seal's approval is still CURRENT over the record it is about (#2914): `{ "sealId": "…" }` →
|
|
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|
+
* {@link ApprovalSealCurrencyResult}. The seal's presentation carries the values of the fields its tool declared the
|
|
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|
+
* approval covers (`sealedRecordFields`); they are compared with the record as it is now. CURRENT right after the
|
|
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|
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* approval, NO_LONGER_CURRENT once one of them changed, SUBJECT_GONE when the record is gone, NO_SEALED_FIELD_SET when
|
|
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|
+
* the seal covers no record field. Names which fields moved, never a value, so it is not recorded on the trail. 404 for
|
|
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|
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* an unknown seal (a seal its approver's erasure retained is not read here); 409 for one whose presentation file is
|
|
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|
+
* unreadable or not the one its row recorded.
|
|
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|
+
*/
|
|
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|
+
CURRENCY: '/currency',
|
|
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|
} as const;
|
|
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|
|
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67
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|
/**
|
|
@@ -147,6 +157,16 @@ export interface ApprovalSealRetryResult {
|
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147
157
|
readonly sealed: boolean;
|
|
148
158
|
}
|
|
149
159
|
|
|
160
|
+
/** `POST /currency`'s answer (#2914). Names no person and no value. */
|
|
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|
+
export interface ApprovalSealCurrencyResult {
|
|
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|
+
readonly sealId: string;
|
|
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|
+
readonly standing: ApprovalSealSubjectCurrency;
|
|
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|
+
/** The record compared, as the seal names it; absent for NO_SEALED_FIELD_SET. */
|
|
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|
+
readonly subject?: { readonly resourceType: string; readonly resourceId: string };
|
|
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|
+
/** Each sealed field's currency (CURRENT / CHANGED / ABSENT); absent unless compared. */
|
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|
+
readonly fields?: readonly { readonly key: string; readonly currency: HumanDecision_PresentedFieldCurrency }[];
|
|
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|
+
}
|
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|
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|
|
150
170
|
/** `POST /manifested-copy/rebuild`'s answer. */
|
|
151
171
|
export interface ApprovalSealManifestedCopyRebuildResult {
|
|
152
172
|
readonly sealId: string;
|
|
@@ -33,11 +33,22 @@
|
|
|
33
33
|
* provider call, or on an audit row that has to exist before the operation answers), so the write stays best effort,
|
|
34
34
|
* reported under its own reason rather than as unreviewed. Say why at the declaration.
|
|
35
35
|
*
|
|
36
|
-
*
|
|
36
|
+
* DELEGATES_WRITES_TO_AUDITED_OPERATIONS records a third review (#2297): the hooks write nothing themselves. They select a
|
|
37
|
+
* population that nothing bounds (a purge of a whole scope, of every row past a cutoff) and remove it in pages of at most
|
|
38
|
+
* 100 rows, each through a declared operation of the resource (its hook-less internal `DELETE_MANY`), which the framework
|
|
39
|
+
* runs in its own transaction with its own audit row. So every row the operation removes is recorded through a crash, and
|
|
40
|
+
* the answer stays "everything was purged". The operation runs outside any framework transaction (inside one, the
|
|
41
|
+
* delegated writes would join it, unbounded), and its own row is a summary of those writes, written after them, best
|
|
42
|
+
* effort. Accepted only on a REPLACE handler without `transactionalCore`, and honoured only on a multi-row verb
|
|
43
|
+
* (`DELETE_MANY`, `UPDATE_MANY`, or a custom operation borrowing one); elsewhere the write is reported as unreviewed. The
|
|
44
|
+
* engine's purges walk their pages with an engine-internal helper that applications do not receive.
|
|
45
|
+
*
|
|
46
|
+
* A registration with `transactionalCore: true` already runs its hooks in a transaction and needs none of these. Refused beside an
|
|
37
47
|
* `overrideAll` handler, which replaces the pipeline whose transaction this is about.
|
|
38
48
|
*/
|
|
39
49
|
export enum ResourceCustomServiceImplementationHookTransactionPosture {
|
|
40
50
|
RUNS_INSIDE_TRANSACTION = 'runs_inside_transaction',
|
|
41
51
|
STAYS_OUTSIDE_TRANSACTION = 'stays_outside_transaction',
|
|
52
|
+
DELEGATES_WRITES_TO_AUDITED_OPERATIONS = 'delegates_writes_to_audited_operations',
|
|
42
53
|
}
|
|
43
54
|
```
|
|
@@ -249,6 +249,42 @@ export interface FunctionTool {
|
|
|
249
249
|
* has no top-level string argument of that name. A tool without it is unaffected.
|
|
250
250
|
*/
|
|
251
251
|
deliverableFileArgument?: string;
|
|
252
|
+
/**
|
|
253
|
+
* The fields of the row the call acts on that the approval COVERS (#2914): the record's SEALED FIELD SET. Declare it
|
|
254
|
+
* on an approval-gated tool whose approval is a statement about a record's values (a month's figures signed off, an
|
|
255
|
+
* invoice's amounts approved), so that whether the approval still holds can be answered later:
|
|
256
|
+
*
|
|
257
|
+
* - the decision's card shows these values of the row named by `argumentsResource.rowIdArgument`, read as the system
|
|
258
|
+
* when the card is built, so the person approves what they read; a card read before one of them changed is refused
|
|
259
|
+
* as stale;
|
|
260
|
+
* - the approval's seal commits to them inside its presentation, and the currency check
|
|
261
|
+
* (`approvalSealSubjectCurrencyOf`, the operator door `POST /internal/admin/approval-seals/currency`, and
|
|
262
|
+
* `wildo seal verify --subject-record`) compares them with the record as it is: CURRENT right after the approval,
|
|
263
|
+
* NO_LONGER_CURRENT once one of them changes.
|
|
264
|
+
*
|
|
265
|
+
* Name only what the approval is ABOUT. Never a lifecycle or approval field (a status, `updatedAt`, the column the
|
|
266
|
+
* approved call writes the seal's id or the signer into): the approved call's own write would otherwise make its own
|
|
267
|
+
* seal look stale. A row of another organization than the decision's, or one that cannot be read, is shown and sealed
|
|
268
|
+
* with no record values, and so is an answer given on a chat card: no notice card shows the row, so its SENT seal
|
|
269
|
+
* claims none of it (its currency reads NO_SEALED_FIELD_SET).
|
|
270
|
+
*
|
|
271
|
+
* Registration refuses it on a tool that is not approval-gated, on a question tool, without
|
|
272
|
+
* `argumentsResource.rowIdArgument`, and when it names no field, a field twice, or a field the resource's main schema
|
|
273
|
+
* does not declare (checked when the resource is registered).
|
|
274
|
+
*/
|
|
275
|
+
sealedRecordFields?: readonly string[];
|
|
276
|
+
/**
|
|
277
|
+
* An approval of this tool on a row REPLACES the latest earlier approval of this tool on the same row (#2914): its seal
|
|
278
|
+
* names that earlier seal as the one it supersedes, as a decision answered again supersedes its own earlier seal. For a
|
|
279
|
+
* decision that is taken again on the same record after the record was reopened (a month signed off, reopened and
|
|
280
|
+
* signed off again): the two are different decisions, and without this the second seal names no predecessor, so a
|
|
281
|
+
* verifier sees two approvals of one record and nothing saying which one stands.
|
|
282
|
+
*
|
|
283
|
+
* Only the latest seal of the same source, the same record (`argumentsResource.rowIdArgument`) and the same tool is
|
|
284
|
+
* superseded, never an approval made through another tool on that row; a decision answered again still supersedes its
|
|
285
|
+
* own earlier answer first. Requires an approval gate and `argumentsResource.rowIdArgument`.
|
|
286
|
+
*/
|
|
287
|
+
approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow?: boolean;
|
|
252
288
|
/**
|
|
253
289
|
* The electronic signature the file deliverable needs once the person approved it (#2293): after the approval's seal is
|
|
254
290
|
* SEALED, the engine sends the approved file (`deliverableFileArgument`, bound by its hash) to the vendor selected for
|
|
@@ -931,6 +967,42 @@ export function functionToolDeliverableDeclarationProblems(
|
|
|
931
967
|
return problems;
|
|
932
968
|
}
|
|
933
969
|
|
|
970
|
+
/**
|
|
971
|
+
* What is wrong with a tool's record-approval declarations (`sealedRecordFields`, `approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow`,
|
|
972
|
+
* #2914), one sentence per problem with its remedy; empty when they are sound or absent. `declaredFieldsOf` answers the
|
|
973
|
+
* fields the resource's main schema declares, or undefined when the resource is not registered (its fields are then not
|
|
974
|
+
* checked here: a field the row does not hold is shown and sealed as absent).
|
|
975
|
+
*/
|
|
976
|
+
export function functionToolRecordApprovalDeclarationProblems(
|
|
977
|
+
tool: Pick<FunctionTool, 'functionRef' | 'sealedRecordFields' | 'approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow' | 'argumentsResource' | 'requiresHumanApproval' | 'humanApproval' | 'asksThePerson'>,
|
|
978
|
+
declaredFieldsOf?: (resourceType: string) => readonly string[] | undefined,
|
|
979
|
+
): string[] {
|
|
980
|
+
const fields = tool.sealedRecordFields;
|
|
981
|
+
const replaces = tool.approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow === true;
|
|
982
|
+
if (fields === undefined && !replaces) return [];
|
|
983
|
+
const problems: string[] = [];
|
|
984
|
+
const named = `Function tool "${tool.functionRef}" declares ${fields !== undefined ? 'sealedRecordFields' : 'approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow'}`;
|
|
985
|
+
if (!tool.humanApproval && !tool.requiresHumanApproval) {
|
|
986
|
+
problems.push(`${named} and is not approval-gated: it describes what an approval covers, so gate it (humanApproval or requiresHumanApproval).`);
|
|
987
|
+
}
|
|
988
|
+
if (tool.asksThePerson) problems.push(`${named} and asks the person: a question approves no record.`);
|
|
989
|
+
if (!tool.argumentsResource?.rowIdArgument) {
|
|
990
|
+
problems.push(`${named} without argumentsResource.rowIdArgument: name the argument holding the id of the row the approval is about.`);
|
|
991
|
+
}
|
|
992
|
+
if (fields !== undefined) {
|
|
993
|
+
if (!Array.isArray(fields) || fields.length === 0 || fields.some((field) => typeof field !== 'string' || field.trim().length === 0)) {
|
|
994
|
+
problems.push(`${named}, which names no field: list the fields of the row the approval covers.`);
|
|
995
|
+
} else {
|
|
996
|
+
const duplicated = fields.filter((field, index) => fields.indexOf(field) !== index);
|
|
997
|
+
if (duplicated.length > 0) problems.push(`${named}, which names ${[...new Set(duplicated)].join(', ')} more than once.`);
|
|
998
|
+
const declared = tool.argumentsResource ? declaredFieldsOf?.(tool.argumentsResource.resourceType) : undefined;
|
|
999
|
+
const unknown = declared ? fields.filter((field) => !declared.includes(field)) : [];
|
|
1000
|
+
if (unknown.length > 0) problems.push(`${named}, naming ${unknown.join(', ')}, which ${tool.argumentsResource!.resourceType} does not declare.`);
|
|
1001
|
+
}
|
|
1002
|
+
}
|
|
1003
|
+
return problems;
|
|
1004
|
+
}
|
|
1005
|
+
|
|
934
1006
|
/** Whether an argument schema is a string once its optional, nullable and default wrappers are removed. */
|
|
935
1007
|
function isStringArgumentSchema(schema: z.ZodTypeAny): boolean {
|
|
936
1008
|
let current: z.ZodTypeAny = schema;
|
|
@@ -702,6 +702,21 @@
|
|
|
702
702
|
},
|
|
703
703
|
});
|
|
704
704
|
}
|
|
705
|
+
// #3786: a PERSON is erased through `eraseSubjectAsSystem` only. That door consults both administrative-continuity
|
|
706
|
+
// floors, takes down the organization only the person lived in, and tears down their dependents; this one scrubs the
|
|
707
|
+
// row alone and consulted no floor, so a direct scrub of the last owner or super-administrator stranded the tenant or
|
|
708
|
+
// the application with no refusal and no record. It has no production caller, so the sibling door is closed rather
|
|
709
|
+
// than given a second copy of the orchestration: an invariant held at one door of two is not held.
|
|
710
|
+
if (isOrganizationOwnerFloorGovernedSubjectResource(resourceType) || isSuperAdminFloorGovernedSubjectResource(resourceType)) {
|
|
711
|
+
throw this.errorBuilder.buildError(ErrorType.CONFIGURATION, undefined, {
|
|
712
|
+
context: {
|
|
713
|
+
reason: 'person_erased_through_subject_erasure',
|
|
714
|
+
resourceType,
|
|
715
|
+
message: `'${String(resourceType)}' rows are people: erase them through eraseSubjectAsSystem, which applies the `
|
|
716
|
+
+ 'administrative-continuity floors, takes down an organization only they belonged to, and tears down their dependents.',
|
|
717
|
+
},
|
|
718
|
+
});
|
|
719
|
+
}
|
|
705
720
|
await this.impersonalizeRowsAsSystem(resourceType, typeof id_or_ids === 'string' ? [id_or_ids] : id_or_ids, options, ExternalDataCopyScrubCause.ERASURE_REQUEST);
|
|
706
721
|
}
|
|
707
722
|
|
|
@@ -1160,13 +1175,26 @@
|
|
|
1160
1175
|
// either, so reporting that first gives the operator the outer problem to solve.
|
|
1161
1176
|
//
|
|
1162
1177
|
// Also BEFORE `eraseSubjectInPlace`, so a refusal from either guard leaves nothing written.
|
|
1163
|
-
await this.assertOrganizationOwnerFloorForSubjectErasure(
|
|
1178
|
+
const organizationsLeavingWithSubjects = await this.assertOrganizationOwnerFloorForSubjectErasure(
|
|
1164
1179
|
resourceType,
|
|
1165
1180
|
subjectIds,
|
|
1166
1181
|
systemContext,
|
|
1167
1182
|
options?.acknowledgeOrganizationOwnerFloorBreach,
|
|
1168
1183
|
);
|
|
1169
1184
|
|
|
1185
|
+
// ── The organizations only the subjects lived in go with them (#3786) ──
|
|
1186
|
+
//
|
|
1187
|
+
// The floor refuses stranding, and these strand nobody: the subjects are their last usable owners AND their only
|
|
1188
|
+
// living members, which is the ordinary state of a person who signed up alone. Marked here, after both floors and
|
|
1189
|
+
// before anything of the subjects is written, so a refusal above still leaves nothing written and a failed mark
|
|
1190
|
+
// leaves the subjects untouched. See `takeDownOrganizationsLeavingWithSubjects` for why the outcome is explicit
|
|
1191
|
+
// rather than one transaction.
|
|
1192
|
+
const organizationsTakenDownWithSubject = await this.takeDownOrganizationsLeavingWithSubjects(
|
|
1193
|
+
organizationsLeavingWithSubjects,
|
|
1194
|
+
resourceType,
|
|
1195
|
+
subjectIds,
|
|
1196
|
+
);
|
|
1197
|
+
|
|
1170
1198
|
// An erasure guard stood here (D6 stance 6c): rows in a system of record refused the erasure until a per-request
|
|
1171
1199
|
// acknowledgement no request schema could carry. Removed by #2559 (epic #2558): the system of record answers requests
|
|
1172
1200
|
// about its own records, and each such resource's effect reports HANDLED_AT_SOURCE, naming it, post-commit.
|
|
@@ -1187,6 +1215,7 @@
|
|
|
1187
1215
|
const report = await this.getServicesRegistryHandler()
|
|
1188
1216
|
.getService(resourceType)
|
|
1189
1217
|
.eraseSubjectInPlace(resourceType, subjectIds, systemContext, options);
|
|
1218
|
+
if (organizationsTakenDownWithSubject.length > 0) report.organizationsTakenDownWithSubject = organizationsTakenDownWithSubject;
|
|
1190
1219
|
|
|
1191
1220
|
// ── External, non-transactional effects — POST-COMMIT by construction ──
|
|
1192
1221
|
//
|
|
@@ -155,6 +155,36 @@ export const SHELL_GHOST_LAYER_ATTRIBUTE = 'data-shell-ghost-layer';
|
|
|
155
155
|
/** The attribute every ghost carries, with its kind (`ShellGhostKind`). */
|
|
156
156
|
export const SHELL_GHOST_ATTRIBUTE = 'data-shell-ghost';
|
|
157
157
|
|
|
158
|
+
/**
|
|
159
|
+
* The markers a still picture of an engine element must NOT carry: everything a query for the real element, or for a
|
|
160
|
+
* control inside it, finds it by. A picture (a discarded pane leaving, an image behind an expanded pane, a pressed row
|
|
161
|
+
* flying into its pane) is inert and takes no pointer, but it is still in the document while it fades, and a picture
|
|
162
|
+
* that kept these was found by those queries as though it were the thing it shows.
|
|
163
|
+
*
|
|
164
|
+
* Measured 2026-11-14 on Your Application (morph layout): a closed todo pane's picture kept `data-navigation-back` for the
|
|
165
|
+
* ~650ms it took to leave, so a lookup of the pane's back control found the picture's (#3764 had to wait it out in
|
|
166
|
+
* `browser-nav-zones`). It never took a click (inert, `pointer-events: none`: the point under it hit the list), but
|
|
167
|
+
* the zone's own back control is identified by that attribute, and a picture must not answer to it.
|
|
168
|
+
*
|
|
169
|
+
* Styling hooks (`data-slot`, `data-state`) are NOT here: a picture keeps the look of what it shows. A caller that
|
|
170
|
+
* needs a narrower picture strips more on its own.
|
|
171
|
+
*/
|
|
172
|
+
export const SHELL_PICTURE_STRIPPED_ATTRIBUTES: readonly string[] = [
|
|
173
|
+
'id',
|
|
174
|
+
// The engine's pane and region markers.
|
|
175
|
+
'data-content-area',
|
|
176
|
+
'data-panel-id',
|
|
177
|
+
'data-zone-hidden',
|
|
178
|
+
'data-zone-emphasized',
|
|
179
|
+
'data-component-area',
|
|
180
|
+
SHELL_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTE,
|
|
181
|
+
// The engine's control hooks: a zone's back control, an operation's trigger, a navigation item, a rail entry.
|
|
182
|
+
'data-navigation-back',
|
|
183
|
+
'data-operation-id',
|
|
184
|
+
'data-nav-item-id',
|
|
185
|
+
'data-ref',
|
|
186
|
+
];
|
|
187
|
+
|
|
158
188
|
/** The two kinds of ghost. */
|
|
159
189
|
export enum ShellGhostKind {
|
|
160
190
|
/** A dismissed side pane, flying away. */
|
|
@@ -28,13 +28,13 @@
|
|
|
28
28
|
* ```
|
|
29
29
|
*/
|
|
30
30
|
export function defineChartDashboardView(
|
|
31
|
-
config: { tiles: readonly ChartDashboardTile[] } & Omit<CompositeViewAuthoringConfig, 'viewComponent'>,
|
|
31
|
+
config: { tiles: readonly ChartDashboardTile[]; columns?: ChartDashboardColumns; layoutRef?: string } & Omit<CompositeViewAuthoringConfig, 'viewComponent'>,
|
|
32
32
|
): CompositeViewAuthoringConfig {
|
|
33
|
-
const { tiles, ...compositeConfig } = config;
|
|
33
|
+
const { tiles, columns, layoutRef, ...compositeConfig } = config;
|
|
34
34
|
function ChartDashboardView(): React.JSX.Element {
|
|
35
35
|
return (
|
|
36
36
|
<CompositeLayout>
|
|
37
|
-
<ChartDashboard tiles={tiles} />
|
|
37
|
+
<ChartDashboard tiles={tiles} columns={columns} layoutRef={layoutRef} />
|
|
38
38
|
</CompositeLayout>
|
|
39
39
|
);
|
|
40
40
|
}
|