@whooshbang/sdk 1.0.0-rc.14

package/LICENSE

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+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 FlowXO LLC
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

package/README.md

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+# `@whooshbang/sdk`
+
+Fetch-injected, ESM-only client for the release-candidate WhooshBang V1
+contract. The package has no automatic retry policy, persistence, telemetry,
+Node-only runtime import, or Cloudflare binding.
+
+Install the current release candidate from the public npm registry:
+
+```sh
+npm install @whooshbang/sdk@next
+```
+
+```ts
+import { WhooshBangClient, confirmInteraction } from "@whooshbang/sdk";
+
+const whooshBang = new WhooshBangClient({
+  baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8787",
+  credential: "synthetic-local-credential",
+  fetch,
+});
+
+const message = await whooshBang.createMessage(
+  {
+    to: { subscriber_id: "customer_123" },
+    content: { type: "text", text: "A deployment is waiting." },
+    interaction: confirmInteraction({
+      prompt: "Approve the synthetic deployment?",
+      confirmLabel: "Approve",
+      denyLabel: "Deny",
+      expiresInSeconds: 900,
+    }),
+  },
+  { idempotencyKey: "deploy-approval-987", timeoutMs: 10_000 },
+);
+```
+
+## Interaction builders
+
+`confirmInteraction`, `selectInteraction`, and `inputInteraction` produce
+exactly the C0 tagged interaction union and enforce every documented bound —
+prompt and label lengths, two to six unique select options, correlation-id
+shape — before any request is built. A violation raises
+`WhooshBangValidationError` listing the offending field paths and rule names.
+The offending values are deliberately absent: builder input carries prompts and
+option labels, which never belong in an error, a log, or a stack trace.
+
+Supply `expiresInSeconds` (30 through 86400) to compute the expiry locally, or
+`expiresAt` to set it exactly. The 30-second-to-24-hour window is measured from
+server acceptance, so only the value this package computes is bounded here.
+
+## Bounded response inspection
+
+`getMessage` and `getInteraction` accept `wait`, the server-held long poll in
+whole seconds from 0 through 30. Omitting it uses the documented server default
+of 30. A wait that expires is a successful current-state read, not an error, so
+a listener-less consumer simply reads again. Inspection never acknowledges,
+consumes, retries, or replays anything.
+
+`interactionAnswer` reads a terminal summary as the same tagged union the
+machine stream and signed customer events carry, and returns nothing once the
+typed answer has left its retention window — `answered` and `answered_at`
+survive that deletion, the answer does not.
+
+## Endpoint lifecycle and webhook verification
+
+`createCustomerEndpoint`, `verifyCustomerEndpoint`, `rotateCustomerEndpoint`,
+`pauseCustomerEndpoint`, `resumeCustomerEndpoint`, `disableCustomerEndpoint`,
+`listCustomerEndpoints`, `getCustomerEndpoint`, and
+`listCustomerEndpointAttempts` cover the endpoint lifecycle. The signing secret
+is revealed exactly once, by create and by rotate; an equivalent idempotent
+replay returns the same logical endpoint without it.
+
+`verifyWhooshBangEvent` verifies the Standard Webhooks envelope over the exact
+raw request bytes and returns the typed customer event. Read the body as bytes:
+framework JSON re-serialization changes the signed input. Verification enforces
+the replay window, fails closed on an unknown signature version, and accepts
+both the previous and the current secret so a rotation overlap has no gap. Use
+`verifyWhooshBangWebhook` (or `verifyWebhookSignature`) for signature-only
+verification of any signed body.
+
+## Machine clients
+
+`createMachineCredential` generates the C0-03 secret with Web Crypto and
+returns the readable bearer plus a digest-only `registration`. Only the
+registration may be sent; the service never receives, stores, or can return the
+secret. `registerMachineCredential`, `revokeMachineCredential`,
+`revokeMachineClient`, `pollMachineEvents`, and `acknowledgeMachineEvent`
+complete the stream lifecycle. Rotate by registering the replacement first and
+revoking the original second.
+
+The machine stream is proved against the deterministic C0-05 contract mock.
+The production machine-stream service is a separate story.
+
+## Errors
+
+| Class | Meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| `WhooshBangValidationError` | Caller input broke a documented bound. No request was made. Extends `TypeError`. |
+| `WhooshBangContractError` | A request or response did not match the pinned contract. |
+| `WhooshBangProblemError` | The API returned Problem Details, with `code`, `status`, `diagnosticId`, `retryable`, and `retryAt` preserved. |
+| `WhooshBangProtocolError` | The response was not a usable WhooshBang response. |
+| `WhooshBangTransportError` | The request could not be completed. |
+| `WhooshBangAbortError` | The caller's `AbortSignal` fired. |
+| `WhooshBangTimeoutError` | The caller's `timeoutMs` elapsed. |
+
+The last three carry `outcomeUnknown`: a cancelled or failed side effect may
+already have been applied, and the client never resolves that on your behalf.
+
+Use a verified human-session token with the same client to call `getAccount`,
+`listProjects`, `createProject`, `getProject`, `listApiCredentials`,
+`createApiCredential`, `rotateApiCredential`, and `revokeApiCredential`.
+Credential create and rotate calls intentionally have no response-replay key:
+their complete bearer is a one-time response and cannot be retrieved later.
+Treat a transport failure as outcome unknown, inspect safe metadata, and issue
+then revoke a replacement. Product delivery methods continue to use project-
+or machine-scoped credentials; the client does not persist either credential
+kind.
+
+Delivery, project creation, endpoint create/rotate, machine administration, and
+acknowledgement side-effects require an explicit idempotency key. Credential
+lifecycle create/rotate/revoke calls follow their one-time-reveal or intrinsic
+repeat-safe contract instead. The client sends each call exactly once. A
+transport failure on a side effect raises an error with
+`outcomeUnknown: true`; the caller decides whether a new logical operation is
+appropriate. With a caller key, an explicit retry returns the original result
+and creates no duplicate.
+
+## Cancellation and deadlines
+
+Every method accepts `signal` and `timeoutMs` (1 through 300000 milliseconds).
+When only one is supplied it reaches `fetch` unchanged. Neither adds a retry:
+they bound waiting, and neither claims a server outcome after cancellation.
+
+## Optional logging
+
+`logger` receives one record per attempted request containing the operation name,
+outcome, duration, HTTP status, public diagnostic identifier, problem code,
+retryability, and retry time. Credentials, URLs, request bodies, prompts,
+answers, and signing material are structurally absent rather than redacted. A
+hook that throws never changes the operation's outcome. Caller input is checked
+before the attempt begins, so a local refusal throws at your call site rather
+than arriving as a log record.
+
+## Examples
+
+Runnable scripts for the interactive send, bounded polling, raw-body webhook
+verification, endpoint lifecycle, and machine bootstrap flows live in the
+repository under `packages/sdk-js/examples/`. They are deliberately not part of
+the published tarball, which carries only `dist` and this README. From a
+repository checkout they run against any base URL and default to the local
+deterministic mock:
+
+```sh
+npx @whooshbang/contract-mock@next --port 8787 --scenario machine-event-replay
+node packages/sdk-js/examples/send-interactive-message.mjs
+```
+
+## Compatibility
+
+The exact runtime dependency is
+`@whooshbang/contracts@1.0.0-rc.13`. Successful payloads are
+validated with its packaged validators, while additive response fields remain
+available on the returned object.

package/dist/additive-compatibility.d.ts

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+import type { ContractValidationError } from "@whooshbang/contracts";
+export type ResponseValidator<T> = {
+    (value: unknown): value is T;
+    readonly errors?: readonly ContractValidationError[] | null;
+};
+/**
+ * Accepts only forward-compatible success payloads whose validator failures
+ * are exclusively unknown object properties. Validation runs against a clone;
+ * callers receive the original payload with additive fields preserved.
+ */
+export declare function validateAdditiveCompatible<T>(value: unknown, validator: ResponseValidator<T>): value is T;

package/dist/additive-compatibility.js

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+import { contractValidationErrors } from "@whooshbang/contracts";
+function decodeJsonPointerSegment(value) {
+    return value.replaceAll("~1", "/").replaceAll("~0", "~");
+}
+function removeAdditionalProperty(value, error) {
+    const additionalProperty = error.params.additionalProperty;
+    if (error.keyword !== "additionalProperties" ||
+        typeof additionalProperty !== "string") {
+        return false;
+    }
+    const path = error.instancePath === ""
+        ? []
+        : error.instancePath.slice(1).split("/").map(decodeJsonPointerSegment);
+    let target = value;
+    for (const segment of path) {
+        if (typeof target !== "object" ||
+            target === null ||
+            !Object.hasOwn(target, segment)) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        target = target[segment];
+    }
+    if (typeof target !== "object" ||
+        target === null ||
+        Array.isArray(target) ||
+        !Object.hasOwn(target, additionalProperty)) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    return Reflect.deleteProperty(target, additionalProperty);
+}
+/**
+ * Accepts only forward-compatible success payloads whose validator failures
+ * are exclusively unknown object properties. Validation runs against a clone;
+ * callers receive the original payload with additive fields preserved.
+ */
+export function validateAdditiveCompatible(value, validator) {
+    if (validator(value)) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    let projection;
+    try {
+        projection = structuredClone(value);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    for (let pass = 0; pass < 100; pass += 1) {
+        const errors = contractValidationErrors(validator);
+        let removed = false;
+        for (const error of errors) {
+            if (error.keyword === "additionalProperties" &&
+                removeAdditionalProperty(projection, error)) {
+                removed = true;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!removed) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if (validator(projection)) {
+            return true;
+        }
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=additive-compatibility.js.map

package/dist/additive-compatibility.js.map

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package/dist/client.d.ts

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+import type { AccountProjection, ApiCredential, ApiCredentialCollection, ApiCredentialRotation, ApiCredentialSecretReveal, CreateApiCredentialRequest, CreateCustomerEndpointRequest, CreateMachineClientRequest, CreateMessageRequest, CreateProjectRequest, CreateSubscriptionLinkRequest, CustomerEndpoint, CustomerEndpointAttemptCollection, CustomerEndpointCollection, CustomerEndpointMutationResult, InteractionSummary, MachineClient, MachineCredential, MachineEventAckRequest, MachineEventAckResponse, MachineEventPollResponse, Message, Problem, Project, ProjectCollection, ProviderCapabilitiesCollection, RegisterMachineCredentialRequest, RotateApiCredentialRequest, RotateCustomerEndpointRequest, SubscriptionLink } from "@whooshbang/contracts";
+export type WhooshBangFetch = (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;
+/**
+ * The outcome of one SDK invocation, as reported to an optional logging hook.
+ *
+ * Every field here is safe to persist: the operation name, how it ended, how
+ * long it took, and the public identifiers the service already publishes for
+ * support. Credentials, URLs, request bodies, prompts, answers, and signing
+ * material are structurally absent rather than redacted.
+ */
+export interface WhooshBangLogRecord {
+    readonly diagnosticId?: string;
+    readonly durationMs: number;
+    readonly operation: string;
+    readonly outcome: "abort" | "contract" | "problem" | "protocol" | "success" | "timeout" | "transport";
+    readonly problemCode?: Problem["code"];
+    readonly retryAt?: string;
+    readonly retryable?: boolean;
+    readonly status?: number;
+}
+export type WhooshBangLogger = (record: WhooshBangLogRecord) => void;
+export interface WhooshBangClientOptions {
+    readonly baseUrl: string | URL;
+    readonly credential: string;
+    readonly fetch?: WhooshBangFetch;
+    readonly logger?: WhooshBangLogger;
+}
+export interface RequestOptions {
+    readonly signal?: AbortSignal;
+    /**
+     * Local deadline in whole milliseconds, 1 through 300000.
+     *
+     * Expiry raises `WhooshBangTimeoutError` and never claims a server outcome.
+     * It bounds waiting; it is not a retry budget.
+     */
+    readonly timeoutMs?: number;
+}
+export interface SideEffectRequestOptions extends RequestOptions {
+    readonly idempotencyKey: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Options for the bounded response-inspection reads.
+ *
+ * `wait` is the server-held long poll in whole seconds, 0 through 30. Omitting
+ * it uses the documented server default of 30. A wait that expires is a
+ * successful current-state read, not an error.
+ */
+export interface ResponseInspectionOptions extends RequestOptions {
+    readonly wait?: number;
+}
+export interface PollMachineEventsOptions extends RequestOptions {
+    readonly after?: string;
+    readonly limit?: number;
+    readonly wait?: number;
+}
+export interface ListProjectsOptions extends RequestOptions {
+    readonly after?: string;
+    readonly limit?: number;
+}
+export interface ListApiCredentialsOptions extends RequestOptions {
+    readonly after?: string;
+    readonly limit?: number;
+}
+export declare class WhooshBangClient {
+    #private;
+    constructor(options: WhooshBangClientOptions);
+    getAccount(options?: RequestOptions): Promise<AccountProjection>;
+    listProjects(options?: ListProjectsOptions): Promise<ProjectCollection>;
+    createProject(request: CreateProjectRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<Project>;
+    getProject(projectId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<Project>;
+    listApiCredentials(projectId: string, environmentId: string, options?: ListApiCredentialsOptions): Promise<ApiCredentialCollection>;
+    createApiCredential(projectId: string, environmentId: string, request: CreateApiCredentialRequest, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<ApiCredentialSecretReveal>;
+    rotateApiCredential(projectId: string, environmentId: string, credentialId: string, request: RotateApiCredentialRequest, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<ApiCredentialRotation>;
+    revokeApiCredential(projectId: string, environmentId: string, credentialId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<ApiCredential>;
+    createSubscriptionLink(request: CreateSubscriptionLinkRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<SubscriptionLink>;
+    getSubscriptionLink(subscriptionLinkId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<SubscriptionLink>;
+    cancelSubscriptionLink(subscriptionLinkId: string, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<SubscriptionLink>;
+    createMessage(request: CreateMessageRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<Message>;
+    /**
+     * Reads the canonical message state, optionally holding for an open
+     * interaction's terminal state.
+     *
+     * A `wait` that expires still resolves with the current message. Inspection
+     * never acknowledges, consumes, retries, or replays anything.
+     */
+    getMessage(messageId: string, options?: ResponseInspectionOptions): Promise<Message>;
+    /**
+     * Reads the canonical interaction summary, optionally holding for its
+     * terminal state.
+     *
+     * Expiry without resolution returns the current `open` summary successfully
+     * and can be re-polled immediately.
+     */
+    getInteraction(interactionId: string, options?: ResponseInspectionOptions): Promise<InteractionSummary>;
+    cancelMessage(messageId: string, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<Message>;
+    getCapabilities(options?: RequestOptions): Promise<ProviderCapabilitiesCollection>;
+    listCustomerEndpoints(projectId: string, environmentId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<CustomerEndpointCollection>;
+    /**
+     * Creates one signing endpoint.
+     *
+     * The signing secret is revealed exactly once, in this result. An equivalent
+     * idempotent replay returns the same logical endpoint without it, so a caller
+     * that loses the value must rotate rather than re-read.
+     */
+    createCustomerEndpoint(projectId: string, environmentId: string, request: CreateCustomerEndpointRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<CustomerEndpointMutationResult>;
+    getCustomerEndpoint(projectId: string, environmentId: string, endpointId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<CustomerEndpoint>;
+    verifyCustomerEndpoint(projectId: string, environmentId: string, endpointId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<CustomerEndpoint>;
+    /**
+     * Starts a rotation with a bounded overlap window.
+     *
+     * Both secrets verify for `overlap_seconds`, so a receiver that accepts the
+     * previous and the new secret together has no verification gap.
+     */
+    rotateCustomerEndpoint(projectId: string, environmentId: string, endpointId: string, request: RotateCustomerEndpointRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<CustomerEndpointMutationResult>;
+    pauseCustomerEndpoint(projectId: string, environmentId: string, endpointId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<CustomerEndpoint>;
+    resumeCustomerEndpoint(projectId: string, environmentId: string, endpointId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<CustomerEndpoint>;
+    disableCustomerEndpoint(projectId: string, environmentId: string, endpointId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<CustomerEndpoint>;
+    listCustomerEndpointAttempts(projectId: string, environmentId: string, endpointId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<CustomerEndpointAttemptCollection>;
+    /**
+     * The environment-scoped forms of the product operations.
+     *
+     * They exist for a caller whose authority selects an account rather than a
+     * project — a person's OAuth grant — and name the project and environment in
+     * the path that the flat forms take from a credential. Request, response,
+     * and semantics are otherwise identical, so a caller that changes authority
+     * changes which method it calls and nothing else.
+     */
+    createSubscriptionLinkInEnvironment(projectId: string, environmentId: string, request: CreateSubscriptionLinkRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<SubscriptionLink>;
+    getSubscriptionLinkInEnvironment(projectId: string, environmentId: string, subscriptionLinkId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<SubscriptionLink>;
+    createMessageInEnvironment(projectId: string, environmentId: string, request: CreateMessageRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<Message>;
+    getMessageInEnvironment(projectId: string, environmentId: string, messageId: string, options?: ResponseInspectionOptions): Promise<Message>;
+    getInteractionInEnvironment(projectId: string, environmentId: string, interactionId: string, options?: ResponseInspectionOptions): Promise<InteractionSummary>;
+    createMachineClientInEnvironment(projectId: string, environmentId: string, request: CreateMachineClientRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<MachineClient>;
+    getCapabilitiesInEnvironment(projectId: string, environmentId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<ProviderCapabilitiesCollection>;
+    createMachineClient(request: CreateMachineClientRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<MachineClient>;
+    getMachineClient(machineClientId: string, options?: RequestOptions): Promise<MachineClient>;
+    /**
+     * Registers a locally generated credential by digest only.
+     *
+     * The readable secret never leaves the caller's process. See
+     * `createMachineCredential` for the generator that produces the pair.
+     */
+    registerMachineCredential(machineClientId: string, request: RegisterMachineCredentialRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<MachineCredential>;
+    revokeMachineCredential(machineClientId: string, credentialId: string, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<MachineCredential>;
+    revokeMachineClient(machineClientId: string, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<MachineClient>;
+    pollMachineEvents(options?: PollMachineEventsOptions): Promise<MachineEventPollResponse>;
+    acknowledgeMachineEvent(eventId: string, request: MachineEventAckRequest, options: SideEffectRequestOptions): Promise<MachineEventAckResponse>;
+}