@wenathlan/extension 1.1.61 → 1.1.62

package/dist/index.js

@@ -4837,6 +4837,169 @@ var sessionmemory = class {
     }
     return kept;
   }
+  /**
+   * Security part two persistence of the 1.1.62 family.
+   * The protections for secrets, messages and money live here: the secretvault metadata with labels and scopes only and never values, scoped per profile workspace; the connectallow entries with their senders shipping empty by default; the ratelimit bucket state per origin and per session; the confirm gates with their resolution events and their human action provenance; the redactshot regions per origin and page template; the phishguard verdicts with their distance scores expiring past their freshness window; the permdiff records of each installed version; the safedefaults applications with their first seen origins; and the deferred command events waiting for their bucket reset.
+   * The vault values never touch this seam: only metadata persists while the values stay behind the vault seam the background wires.
+   */
+  /** Replaces the secretvault metadata of the profile workspaces: labels, scopes, provenance and digests only, never values. */
+  async setsecretvault(entries) {
+    return this.adapter.set("secretvault", entries);
+  }
+  /** Returns the stored secretvault metadata, oldest record first; the values live behind the vault seam and never persist. */
+  async getsecretvault() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("secretvault") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Adds one secretvault metadata record scoped to a profile workspace; a duplicate vault id keeps its first record. */
+  async addsecret(entry) {
+    const entries = await this.getsecretvault();
+    if (entries.some((candidate) => candidate.vaultid === entry.vaultid)) return;
+    await this.setsecretvault([...entries, entry]);
+  }
+  /** Removes one secretvault metadata record by its vault id; the background drops the value behind the seam in the same action. */
+  async removesecret(vaultid) {
+    await this.setsecretvault((await this.getsecretvault()).filter((entry) => entry.vaultid !== vaultid));
+  }
+  /** Stamps the last use of one secretvault record: the metadata notes when the vault last released its value while the value itself stays unrecorded. */
+  async stampsecretuse(vaultid, at) {
+    await this.setsecretvault((await this.getsecretvault()).map((entry) => entry.vaultid === vaultid ? { ...entry, lastusedat: at } : entry));
+  }
+  /** Replaces the connectallow entries of external senders; the list ships empty by default with user managed entries only. */
+  async setconnectallow(entries) {
+    return this.adapter.set("connectallow", entries);
+  }
+  /** Returns the stored connectallow entries, oldest add first. */
+  async getconnectallow() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("connectallow") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Adds one connectallow entry for an external sender; a duplicate sender id keeps its first entry. */
+  async addconnectallow(entry) {
+    const entries = await this.getconnectallow();
+    if (entries.some((candidate) => candidate.senderid === entry.senderid)) return;
+    await this.setconnectallow([...entries, entry]);
+  }
+  /** Removes one connectallow entry by its sender id; the origincheck drops the sender again after the removal. */
+  async removeconnectallow(senderid) {
+    await this.setconnectallow((await this.getconnectallow()).filter((entry) => entry.senderid !== senderid));
+  }
+  /** Replaces the ratelimit bucket state per origin and per session: the user configured bounds and windows with their used counts. */
+  async setratelimitbuckets(buckets) {
+    return this.adapter.set("ratelimitbuckets", buckets);
+  }
+  /** Returns the stored ratelimit buckets per origin and per session. */
+  async getratelimitbuckets() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("ratelimitbuckets") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Upserts one ratelimit bucket: a bucket of the same origin and session replaces its state while a new pair joins the list. */
+  async saveratelimitbucket(bucket) {
+    const buckets = await this.getratelimitbuckets();
+    await this.setratelimitbuckets(buckets.some((candidate) => candidate.origin === bucket.origin && candidate.sessionid === bucket.sessionid) ? buckets.map((candidate) => candidate.origin === bucket.origin && candidate.sessionid === bucket.sessionid ? bucket : candidate) : [...buckets, bucket]);
+  }
+  /** Removes the ratelimit bucket of one origin and session; the origin runs without a bucket because the bounds stay user choices only. */
+  async removeratelimitbucket(origin, sessionid) {
+    await this.setratelimitbuckets((await this.getratelimitbuckets()).filter((bucket) => !(bucket.origin === origin && bucket.sessionid === sessionid)));
+  }
+  /** Replaces the confirm gates with their payloads and states; a resolved or refused gate stays terminal for the audit trail. */
+  async setgates(gates) {
+    return this.adapter.set("confirmgates", gates);
+  }
+  /** Returns the stored confirm gates, newest open first. */
+  async getgates() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("confirmgates") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Upserts one confirm gate: a gate of the same step keeps its latest record because one gated step carries one live gate. */
+  async savegate(gate) {
+    const gates = await this.getgates();
+    await this.setgates(gates.some((candidate) => candidate.stepid === gate.stepid && candidate.kind === gate.kind) ? gates.map((candidate) => candidate.stepid === gate.stepid && candidate.kind === gate.kind ? gate : candidate) : [gate, ...gates]);
+  }
+  /** Records one gate resolution event with its human action provenance; the resolution history stays visible for the audit trail. */
+  async addgateresolution(resolution) {
+    await this.adapter.set("gateresolutions", [resolution, ...await this.adapter.get("gateresolutions") ?? []].slice(0, 500));
+  }
+  /** Returns the recorded gate resolution events with their human action provenance, newest first. */
+  async getgateresolutions() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("gateresolutions") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Replaces the redactshot regions per origin and page template. */
+  async setredactregions(regions) {
+    return this.adapter.set("redactregions", regions);
+  }
+  /** Returns the stored redactshot regions per origin and page template, oldest rule first. */
+  async getredactregions() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("redactregions") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Adds one redactshot region, derived from a field shape or drawn by the user. */
+  async addredactregion(region) {
+    await this.setredactregions([...await this.getredactregions(), region]);
+  }
+  /** Removes one redactshot region by its id. */
+  async removeredactregion(id) {
+    await this.setredactregions((await this.getredactregions()).filter((region) => region.id !== id));
+  }
+  /** Records one phishguard verdict with its distance score; the records stay for the audit trail while the freshness window governs the live set. */
+  async addphishverdict(verdict) {
+    await this.adapter.set("phishverdicts", [verdict, ...(await this.adapter.get("phishverdicts") ?? []).filter((candidate) => candidate.origin !== verdict.origin)].slice(0, 500));
+  }
+  /** Returns the stored phishguard verdicts with their distance scores, newest first. */
+  async getphishverdicts() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("phishverdicts") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Expires the phishguard verdicts past the user configured freshness window: the expired verdicts keep their records for the audit trail while the guard recomputes the next login step. */
+  async expirephishverdicts(freshness, now) {
+    const verdicts = await this.getphishverdicts();
+    if (freshness === void 0) return verdicts;
+    return verdicts.filter((verdict) => now - verdict.at < freshness);
+  }
+  /** Records one permdiff between two installed permission versions; the record of each installed update stays for the audit trail. */
+  async addpermdiff(diff) {
+    await this.adapter.set("permdiffs", [diff, ...await this.adapter.get("permdiffs") ?? []].slice(0, 500));
+  }
+  /** Returns the recorded permdiffs of each installed update, newest first. */
+  async getpermdiffs() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("permdiffs") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Stores the last installed permission set the permdiff of the next update compares against. */
+  async setlastpermissions(permissions, version) {
+    await this.adapter.set("lastpermissions", { permissions, version });
+  }
+  /** Returns the last installed permission set with its version; an absent record returns undefined. */
+  async getlastpermissions() {
+    return this.adapter.get("lastpermissions");
+  }
+  /** Records one safedefaults application with its first seen origin; the first visit of an unknown origin stays visible. */
+  async addsafedefaultapplication(application) {
+    const applications = await this.adapter.get("safedefaults") ?? [];
+    if (applications.some((candidate) => candidate.origin === application.origin)) return;
+    await this.adapter.set("safedefaults", [...applications, application]);
+  }
+  /** Returns the recorded safedefaults applications with their first seen origins, oldest first. */
+  async getsafedefaultapplications() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("safedefaults") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Records one deferred command event with the reset time it waits for. */
+  async adddeferredevent(event) {
+    await this.adapter.set("deferredevents", [event, ...await this.adapter.get("deferredevents") ?? []].slice(0, 500));
+  }
+  /** Returns the recorded deferred command events, newest first. */
+  async getdeferredevents() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("deferredevents") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Serves the transparency data of the transparencypage in one read: every active grant with its origin, scope and boundary, every consent window ever granted with its expiry, the connectallow entries with their senders, the permdiff records of each installed update, the safedefaults applications and the secretvault metadata with labels and scopes only. */
+  async gettransparencyview() {
+    return {
+      allowlist: await this.getautomationallowlist(),
+      profiles: await this.getoriginprofiles(),
+      windows: await this.getconsentwindows(),
+      connectallow: await this.getconnectallow(),
+      permdiffs: await this.getpermdiffs(),
+      safedefaults: await this.getsafedefaultapplications(),
+      vault: await this.getsecretvault(),
+      gates: await this.getgates(),
+      resolutions: await this.getgateresolutions(),
+      deferred: await this.getdeferredevents(),
+      phishverdicts: await this.getphishverdicts()
+    };
+  }
 };
 function mediakindof(record2) {
   if ("pages" in record2) return "pdf";
@@ -5477,6 +5640,87 @@ function tlsstateof(tls) {
   return { mode: tls.mode, certificaterequired: tls.mode === "required" || tls.certificatefingerprint !== void 0, verified: tls.verifiedat !== void 0 };
 }
 
+// confirmgates.ts
+function stepoptions(step) {
+  if (!step.options) return {};
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(step.options);
+    return Boolean(parsed) && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : {};
+  } catch {
+    return {};
+  }
+}
+function gatekindfor(classes) {
+  if (classes.includes("payment")) return "confirmpay";
+  if (classes.includes("delete")) return "confirmdelete";
+  if (classes.includes("credential")) return "confirmcreds";
+  return void 0;
+}
+function paypayload(input) {
+  const payload = { payeeorigin: input.payeeorigin };
+  if (input.amount !== void 0 && input.amount.trim() !== "") payload.amount = input.amount.trim();
+  if (input.target !== void 0 && input.target.trim() !== "") payload.target = input.target.trim();
+  return payload;
+}
+function deletepayload(input) {
+  const payload = { scope: input.scope, irreversibility: input.irreversibility };
+  if (input.target !== void 0 && input.target.trim() !== "") payload.target = input.target.trim();
+  return payload;
+}
+function credspayload(label) {
+  if (label.trim() === "") throw new Error("The confirmcreds gate names its credential label; the value never appears.");
+  return { label: label.trim() };
+}
+function opengate(input) {
+  if (input.stepid.trim() === "" || input.runid.trim() === "" || input.origin.trim() === "") throw new Error("The confirm gate needs its step, run and origin.");
+  if (Object.keys(input.payload).length === 0) throw new Error("The confirm gate carries the payload the human reviews.");
+  return { gateid: input.gateid ?? randomid(), kind: input.kind, stepid: input.stepid, runid: input.runid, origin: input.origin, payload: { ...input.payload }, state: "open", openedat: input.now };
+}
+function gatestateof(gates, stepid) {
+  const gate = [...gates].reverse().find((candidate) => candidate.stepid === stepid);
+  if (gate === void 0) return { state: "none" };
+  return { state: gate.state, gate };
+}
+function resolvegate(input) {
+  if (input.actor.trim() === "") throw new Error("The gate resolution names its acting user; only a human resolves a gate.");
+  const gate = input.gates.find((candidate) => candidate.gateid === input.gateid);
+  if (gate === void 0) return { gates: input.gates };
+  if (gate.state !== "open") return { gates: input.gates };
+  const resolution = { gateid: gate.gateid, kind: gate.kind, stepid: gate.stepid, decision: input.decision, actor: input.actor, at: input.now };
+  return { gates: input.gates.map((candidate) => candidate.gateid === input.gateid ? { ...candidate, state: input.decision, resolvedat: input.now, actor: input.actor } : candidate), resolution };
+}
+function nobatchresolution(gateids) {
+  if (gateids.length > 1) return { allowed: false, reason: `One human action resolves exactly one gate; the batch of ${gateids.length} gates refuses in full because no batch approval exists.` };
+  if (gateids.length === 0) return { allowed: false, reason: "A gate resolution names its single gate." };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: "The resolution names exactly one gate; the distinct human action resolves it alone." };
+}
+function gateprompttext(gate) {
+  if (gate.kind === "confirmpay") {
+    const amount = gate.payload.amount !== void 0 ? `the amount ${gate.payload.amount}` : "an amount the step options name";
+    const target = gate.payload.target !== void 0 ? ` on ${gate.payload.target}` : "";
+    return `Approve the payment of ${amount} to ${gate.payload.payeeorigin}${target}? The step dispatches only after this distinct human action.`;
+  }
+  if (gate.kind === "confirmdelete") {
+    const target = gate.payload.target !== void 0 ? ` on ${gate.payload.target}` : "";
+    return `Approve the destructive delete${target} scoped to ${gate.payload.scope}? ${gate.payload.irreversibility} The step dispatches only after this distinct human action.`;
+  }
+  return `Approve the use of the credential ${gate.payload.label} on ${gate.origin}? The value stays behind the vault; the label is everything this prompt shows.`;
+}
+function gateforstep(input) {
+  const kind = gatekindfor(input.classes);
+  if (kind === void 0) return void 0;
+  const options = stepoptions(input.step);
+  if (kind === "confirmpay") {
+    const amount = typeof options.amount === "string" ? options.amount : typeof options.value === "string" ? options.value : void 0;
+    return opengate({ kind, stepid: input.step.id, runid: input.runid, origin: input.origin, payload: paypayload({ ...amount !== void 0 && amount !== "" ? { amount } : {}, payeeorigin: String(options.payeeorigin ?? input.origin), ...input.step.target !== void 0 && input.step.target !== "" ? { target: input.step.target } : {} }), now: input.now });
+  }
+  if (kind === "confirmdelete") {
+    return opengate({ kind, stepid: input.step.id, runid: input.runid, origin: input.origin, payload: deletepayload({ ...input.step.target !== void 0 && input.step.target !== "" ? { target: input.step.target } : {}, scope: String(options.scope ?? input.origin), irreversibility: String(options.irreversibility ?? "A destructive delete destroys state the page cannot restore.") }), now: input.now });
+  }
+  if (input.credentiallabel === void 0 || input.credentiallabel.trim() === "") return void 0;
+  return opengate({ kind, stepid: input.step.id, runid: input.runid, origin: input.origin, payload: credspayload(input.credentiallabel), now: input.now });
+}
+
 // coordination.ts
 function lockkey(origin, selector) {
   return `${origin}|${selector}`;
@@ -6039,6 +6283,88 @@ async function callgraphql(input) {
   }
 }
 
+// inboundguard.ts
+function shapeof(value) {
+  if (typeof value === "string") return "string";
+  if (typeof value === "number") return "number";
+  if (typeof value === "boolean") return "boolean";
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return "array";
+  return "object";
+}
+function schemacheck(input) {
+  const errors = [];
+  for (const [field, value] of Object.entries(input.command)) {
+    const expected = input.schema[field];
+    if (expected === void 0) {
+      errors.push({ path: field, expected: "absent", found: shapeof(value), reason: `The ${field} field sits absent from the declared grammar of the command; schemastrict refuses unknown fields before dispatch.` });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (expected === "absent") {
+      errors.push({ path: field, expected: "absent", found: shapeof(value), reason: `The ${field} field carries no value under the declared grammar; schemastrict refuses it before dispatch.` });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (shapeof(value) !== expected) errors.push({ path: field, expected, found: shapeof(value), reason: `The ${field} field expects a ${expected} while the command carries a ${shapeof(value)}; schemastrict refuses the shape mismatch before dispatch.` });
+  }
+  for (const field of input.required ?? []) {
+    if (input.command[field] === void 0) errors.push({ path: field, expected: input.schema[field] ?? "string", found: "absent", reason: `The ${field} field is required by the declared grammar and the command carries no value; schemastrict refuses the incomplete command before dispatch.` });
+  }
+  return { valid: errors.length === 0, errors };
+}
+function envelopecheck(input) {
+  const kind = input.command.kind;
+  if (typeof kind !== "string" || kind.trim() === "") return { valid: false, errors: [{ path: "kind", expected: "string", found: shapeof(kind), reason: "Every inbound command names its kind as a non-empty string; a kindless command never dispatches." }] };
+  if (!input.knownkinds.includes(kind)) return { valid: false, errors: [{ path: "kind", expected: `one of ${input.knownkinds.length} declared command kinds`, found: kind, reason: `The ${kind} command kind sits absent from the dispatch registry; schemastrict refuses unknown commands before dispatch.` }] };
+  return { valid: true, errors: [] };
+}
+function origincheckof(input) {
+  const sender = input.senderid ?? "an unknown sender";
+  const origin = input.senderorigin ?? "";
+  if (input.senderid === input.extensionid) return { accepted: true, sender, origin, reason: "The sender is this extension itself; the internal surface accepts." };
+  if (input.senderid !== void 0 && input.connectallow.some((entry) => entry.senderid === input.senderid && (entry.origin === void 0 || entry.origin === origin))) {
+    return { accepted: true, sender, origin, reason: `The sender ${sender} sits in the connectallow list the user manages${origin !== "" ? ` for ${origin}` : ""}; the message accepts.` };
+  }
+  if (input.senderid === void 0) return { accepted: false, sender, origin, reason: "The message carries no sender identity; the guard drops it before any handler runs." };
+  return { accepted: false, sender, origin, reason: `The sender ${sender} sits absent from the connectallow list; the guard drops the message without handler execution.` };
+}
+function portaccept(input) {
+  const verdict = origincheckof(input);
+  if (!verdict.accepted) return { ...verdict, reason: `The port ${input.portname} closes at its handshake: ${verdict.reason}` };
+  return { ...verdict, reason: `The port ${input.portname} accepted its handshake: ${verdict.reason}` };
+}
+function connectallowentryof(input) {
+  if (input.senderid.trim() === "") throw new Error("The connectallow entry needs its sender id.");
+  if (input.displayname.trim() === "") throw new Error("The connectallow entry needs its display name.");
+  return { senderid: input.senderid.trim(), displayname: input.displayname.trim(), ...input.origin !== void 0 && input.origin.trim() !== "" ? { origin: input.origin.trim() } : {}, addedat: input.now };
+}
+var emptyconnectallow = [];
+function bucketboundsvalid(limit, window) {
+  if (!Number.isFinite(limit) || limit <= 0) return { valid: false, reason: "The ratelimit bucket limit stays a positive user value; no hidden ceiling exists." };
+  if (!Number.isFinite(window) || window <= 0) return { valid: false, reason: "The ratelimit bucket window stays a positive user value in milliseconds; the window reset stays the user's choice." };
+  return { valid: true, reason: `The bucket bound of ${limit} commands per ${window} milliseconds stays the user configured choice with no hidden ceiling.` };
+}
+function bucketof(input) {
+  const bounds = bucketboundsvalid(input.limit, input.window);
+  if (!bounds.valid) throw new Error(bounds.reason);
+  return { origin: input.origin, sessionid: input.sessionid, limit: input.limit, window: input.window, used: 0, windowstartedat: input.now, resetsat: input.now + input.window };
+}
+function bucketconsume(input) {
+  if (input.now >= input.bucket.resetsat) {
+    const fresh = { ...input.bucket, used: 0, windowstartedat: input.now, resetsat: input.now + input.bucket.window };
+    return { allowed: true, deferred: false, bucket: { ...fresh, used: 1 }, resetsat: fresh.resetsat, reason: `The bucket window of ${input.bucket.origin} reset and the command consumes the first slot of ${fresh.limit}.` };
+  }
+  if (input.bucket.used < input.bucket.limit) {
+    return { allowed: true, deferred: false, bucket: { ...input.bucket, used: input.bucket.used + 1 }, resetsat: input.bucket.resetsat, reason: `The command consumes slot ${input.bucket.used + 1} of ${input.bucket.limit} in the bucket of ${input.bucket.origin}.` };
+  }
+  return { allowed: false, deferred: true, bucket: input.bucket, resetsat: input.bucket.resetsat, reason: `The bucket of ${input.bucket.origin} holds its ${input.bucket.limit} command bound; the command defers until the window resets at ${input.bucket.resetsat}.` };
+}
+function deferredeventof(input) {
+  if (input.stepid.trim() === "" || input.kind.trim() === "") throw new Error("The deferred event needs its step and kind.");
+  return { id: input.id ?? randomid(), stepid: input.stepid, kind: input.kind, origin: input.origin, reason: input.reason, resetsat: input.resetsat, at: input.now };
+}
+function deferredready(deferred, now) {
+  return now >= deferred.resetsat;
+}
+
 // originpolicy.ts
 var denydefaultposture = "denydefault";
 function exactorigin(origin, entry) {
@@ -6076,7 +6402,7 @@ function profilegrade(input) {
   if (input.profile.grants.includes(input.kind)) return { allowed: true, consult: true, reason: `The origin profile of ${input.profile.origin} grants the ${input.kind} kind the user reviewed.` };
   return { allowed: true, consult: true, reason: `The origin profile of ${input.profile.origin} carries no ${input.kind} decision, so the fresh class consent gate alone routes the sensitive step.` };
 }
-function stepoptions(step) {
+function stepoptions2(step) {
   if (!step.options) return {};
   try {
     const parsed = JSON.parse(step.options);
@@ -6091,7 +6417,7 @@ var deletekinds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["discardtab", "closepattern", "clearc
 var publishkinds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["postform", "postfiles", "sendmessage", "submitform", "submitsearch", "writeclipboard"]);
 var defaultsensitivekinds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["attachfile", "uploadfile", "uploadfiles", "downloadfile", "downloadimages", "batchdownload", "pausedownload", "resumedownload", "quarantinedownload", "evaluate"]);
 function sensitiveclassesof(step) {
-  const options = stepoptions(step);
+  const options = stepoptions2(step);
   const fields = Array.isArray(options.fields) ? options.fields.filter((item) => Boolean(item) && typeof item === "object") : [];
   const names = [...fields.map((field) => typeof field.name === "string" ? field.name : ""), typeof options.field === "string" ? options.field : "", typeof options.target === "string" ? options.target : ""].map((name) => name.toLowerCase());
   const carries = (shape) => names.some((name) => name.includes(shape));
@@ -6176,6 +6502,18 @@ function profilesummary(profile) {
   if (profile === void 0) return "No origin profile exists for this origin yet; sensitive steps route through their fresh consent prompts.";
   return `The origin profile of ${profile.origin} grants ${profile.grants.length} kind${profile.grants.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} and denies ${profile.denials.length} kind${profile.denials.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} the user reviewed.`;
 }
+var safedefaultreadkinds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["observe", "readhtml", "readtext", "readlinks", "readtable", "readforms", "readvisible", "readselection", "readmeta", "readlang", "readoutline", "readstyle", "readimages", "readertree"]);
+function safedefaultprofile(input) {
+  if (input.origin.trim() === "") throw new Error("The safedefaults profile needs its exact origin.");
+  const denials = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([...paymentkinds, ...credentialkinds, ...deletekinds, ...publishkinds, ...defaultsensitivekinds]);
+  return { profileid: input.profileid ?? randomid(), origin: input.origin.trim(), grants: [...safedefaultreadkinds], denials: [...denials], createdat: input.now, updatedat: input.now };
+}
+function safedefaultreadkind(kind) {
+  return safedefaultreadkinds.has(kind);
+}
+function safedefaultnotice(origin) {
+  return `The safedefaults posture profiles ${origin} on its first visit: reads only, every sensitive class denied; open the originprofile editor to widen the profile.`;
+}
 
 // socketbus.ts
 var socketkinds = ["opensocket", "sendmessage", "waitmessage", "subscribesse", "longpoll"];
@@ -7474,6 +7812,87 @@ function consolediff(input) {
   return { base: input.baseid, target: input.targetid, lines, added: added.length, removed: removed.length, repeated: repeated.length, at: input.now };
 }
 
+// phishguard.ts
+function stepoptions3(step) {
+  if (!step.options) return {};
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(step.options);
+    return Boolean(parsed) && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : {};
+  } catch {
+    return {};
+  }
+}
+function credentialstep(step) {
+  const credentialkinds2 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["consentpassword", "saveapikey", "handleauth", "authflow", "fillcard", "fillcode"]);
+  if (credentialkinds2.has(step.kind)) return true;
+  const options = stepoptions3(step);
+  const fields = Array.isArray(options.fields) ? options.fields.filter((item) => Boolean(item) && typeof item === "object") : [];
+  const names = [...fields.map((field) => typeof field.name === "string" ? field.name : ""), typeof options.field === "string" ? options.field : "", step.target ?? ""].map((name) => name.toLowerCase());
+  return names.some((name) => name.includes("password") || name.includes("passwd") || name.includes("passphrase") || name.includes("token") || name.includes("secret") || name.includes("apikey"));
+}
+function originlabels(origin) {
+  const host = origin.trim().replace(/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i, "").split("/")[0] ?? "";
+  return host.split(".").filter((label) => label !== "").reverse();
+}
+function labeldistance(one, two) {
+  const rows = one.length + 1;
+  const columns = two.length + 1;
+  let previous = Array.from({ length: columns }, (_, index) => index);
+  for (let row = 1; row < rows; row += 1) {
+    const current = [row, ...Array.from({ length: columns - 1 }, () => 0)];
+    for (let column = 1; column < columns; column += 1) {
+      const substitution = (previous[column - 1] ?? 0) + (one[row - 1] === two[column - 1] ? 0 : 1);
+      current[column] = Math.min((previous[column] ?? 0) + 1, (current[column - 1] ?? 0) + 1, substitution);
+    }
+    previous = current;
+  }
+  return previous[columns - 1] ?? Math.max(one.length, two.length);
+}
+function lookalikedistance(one, two) {
+  if (one.trim() === "" || two.trim() === "") return 1;
+  if (one === two) return 0;
+  const first = originlabels(one);
+  const second = originlabels(two);
+  const edits = labeldistance(first, second);
+  const longest = Math.max(first.length, second.length);
+  if (longest === 0) return 1;
+  const distance = edits / longest;
+  return Math.min(1, Math.max(0, distance));
+}
+function phishthresholdvalid(threshold) {
+  if (!Number.isFinite(threshold) || threshold <= 0 || threshold >= 1) return { valid: false, reason: "The phishguard threshold stays a user choice between zero and one; the lookalike line never defaults." };
+  return { valid: true, reason: `The lookalike threshold ${threshold} stays the user configured line a login origin crosses at its own risk.` };
+}
+function phishverdictof(input) {
+  const threshold = phishthresholdvalid(input.threshold);
+  if (!threshold.valid) throw new Error(threshold.reason);
+  if (input.granted.includes(input.origin)) {
+    return { origin: input.origin, distance: 0, threshold: input.threshold, blocked: false, reason: `The login origin ${input.origin} sits among the granted origins; no lookalike watch applies.`, at: input.now };
+  }
+  let matchedorigin;
+  let distance = 1;
+  for (const granted of input.granted) {
+    const candidate = lookalikedistance(input.origin, granted);
+    if (candidate < distance) {
+      distance = candidate;
+      matchedorigin = granted;
+    }
+  }
+  if (matchedorigin !== void 0 && distance <= input.threshold) {
+    return { origin: input.origin, matchedorigin, distance, threshold: input.threshold, blocked: true, reason: `The login origin ${input.origin} sits ${distance} away from the granted origin ${matchedorigin} and crosses the user threshold ${input.threshold}; the credential step blocks and the deny event names ${matchedorigin}.`, at: input.now };
+  }
+  return { origin: input.origin, ...matchedorigin !== void 0 ? { matchedorigin } : {}, distance, threshold: input.threshold, blocked: false, reason: matchedorigin !== void 0 ? `The login origin ${input.origin} sits ${distance} away from its closest granted origin ${matchedorigin} and stays under the user threshold ${input.threshold}.` : `The login origin ${input.origin} carries no granted origin to resemble; the watch records the first visit.`, at: input.now };
+}
+function verdictfresh(verdict, now, freshness) {
+  if (freshness === void 0) return true;
+  return now - verdict.at < freshness;
+}
+function phishnotetext(verdict) {
+  if (verdict.blocked) return verdict.reason;
+  if (verdict.matchedorigin !== void 0) return `The login origin ${verdict.origin} sits ${verdict.distance} from the granted origin ${verdict.matchedorigin}, under the user threshold ${verdict.threshold}.`;
+  return `The login origin ${verdict.origin} has no granted lookalike under the user threshold ${verdict.threshold}.`;
+}
+
 // policy.ts
 var sensitiveactions = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["click", "type", "navigate", "select", "presskey", "drag", "drop", "upload", "clear", "check", "uncheck", "toggle", "submit", "reload", "back", "forward", "writestorage", "setattribute", "removeattribute", "evaluate", "tabcreate", "tabactivate", "tabclose", "tabreload", "windowcreate", "windowclose", "windowresize", "downloadfile", "clickpoint", "shiftclick", "dismissdialog", "enterframe", "typetime", "appendtext", "setvalue", "typeedit", "keyhold", "keyrelease", "submitsearch", "selectmulti", "chooseradio", "setslider", "setdate", "setcolor", "openlink", "openprivate", "reloadcache", "stopnav", "followlink", "spanav", "rewritequery", "setfragment", "navlist", "navprofile", "handleauth", "printpdf", "prefetch", "preconnect", "deeplink", "reopentab", "pausenav", "navrate", "openclipboard", "batchopen", "duplicatetab", "closepattern", "pintab", "mutetab", "movetab", "movetabwindow", "grouptabs", "colorgroup", "collapsegroup", "discardtab", "reloadtabs", "zoomin", "zoomout", "switchtab", "maximizewindow", "minimizewindow", "restorewindow", "focuswindow", "scratchwindow", "incognitowindow", "restoretab", "restorelayout", "reopenrun", "badgetab", "fillform", "filllabel", "fillplaceholder", "submitform", "retryform", "runwizard", "selectchain", "picktypeahead", "pickdate", "attachfile", "fillcard", "fillcode", "consentpassword", "exportcsv", "exportjson", "exportexcel", "copytable", "pushsheets", "streamdisk", "paginateextract", "resumeextract", "batchdownload", "pausedownload", "resumedownload", "interceptmime", "readclipboard", "writeclipboard", "copyscreen", "quarantinedownload", "scanvirus", "cleanupartifacts", "recordscreen", "captureaudio", "downloadimages", "callrest", "callgraphql", "sendmessage", "blockrequest", "mockresponse", "rewriteheaders", "setcookies", "clearcookies", "authflow", "saveapikey", "routeproxy", "postform", "postfiles", "attachcdp", "detachcdp", "cdpcmd", "overridescript", "heapshot", "profilecpu", "capturesourcemaps", "emulatedevice", "emulatenetwork", "emulatelocate", "setuseragent", "overridepermission", "restoresession", "exportsessions", "importsessions", "runworkflow", "visitrule", "urlrule", "menurule", "keyrule", "buttonrule", "cronrule", "intervalrule", "urllistrule", "webhookrule", "eventrule"]);
 var interactionactions = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["focus", "scroll", "hover", "clickdeep", "rightclick", "doubleclick", "scrollpage", "scrollby", "scrollend", "scrolltop", "fullscreen", "zoomset", "movepointer", "clicktext", "clickaria", "clickname", "expanddetails", "pierceshadow", "retryaction", "capturebodies", "setbreakpoint", "stepcode", "watchexpr", "loop", "repeatuntil", "whileloop", "foreach", "parallel", "trycatch"]);
@@ -10599,6 +11018,83 @@ function sensitivepipelingate(input) {
   if (!consentverdict.allowed) return { allowed: false, reason: `${classification.reason} ${consentverdict.reason}` };
   return { allowed: true, reason: `${classification.reason} ${consentverdict.reason}` };
 }
+function schemaguardgate(input) {
+  if (input.errors.length === 0) return { allowed: true, reason: "The inbound command matches its declared schemastrict grammar field by field." };
+  const first = input.errors[0];
+  return { allowed: false, reason: `${input.errors.length} schema error${input.errors.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} refuse the command before dispatch: ${input.errors.map((error) => error.reason).join(" ")}${first !== void 0 ? ` The first error sits at ${first.path} expecting ${first.expected}.` : ""}` };
+}
+function origincheckgate(input) {
+  if (!input.verdict.accepted) return { allowed: false, reason: input.verdict.reason };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: input.verdict.reason };
+}
+function connectallowgate(input) {
+  const verdict = origincheckof(input);
+  if (!verdict.accepted) return { allowed: false, reason: verdict.reason };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: verdict.reason };
+}
+function ratelimitboundsvalid(limit, window) {
+  const bounds = bucketboundsvalid(limit, window);
+  if (!bounds.valid) return { allowed: false, reason: bounds.reason };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: bounds.reason };
+}
+function ratelimitgate(input) {
+  if (input.bucket === void 0) return { allowed: true, reason: "No ratelimit bucket covers the origin of the command; the bounds stay user configured choices only." };
+  if (input.now >= input.bucket.resetsat) return { allowed: true, reason: `The bucket window of ${input.bucket.origin} reset at ${input.bucket.resetsat}; the command consumes the first slot of its fresh window.` };
+  if (input.bucket.used < input.bucket.limit) return { allowed: true, reason: `The command consumes slot ${input.bucket.used + 1} of ${input.bucket.limit} in the bucket of ${input.bucket.origin}.` };
+  return { allowed: false, reason: `The bucket of ${input.bucket.origin} holds its ${input.bucket.limit} command bound; the command defers until the window resets at ${input.bucket.resetsat}.` };
+}
+function confirmpaygate(input) {
+  const kind = gatekindfor(input.classes);
+  if (kind !== "confirmpay") return { allowed: true, reason: "The step carries no payment class and needs no confirmpay gate." };
+  if (input.state === "resolved") return { allowed: true, reason: "The human resolved the confirmpay gate of the payment step; the step dispatches with its reviewed amount, payee origin and target." };
+  if (input.state === "refused") return { allowed: false, reason: "The human refused the confirmpay gate of the payment step; the payment never dispatches." };
+  if (input.state === "open") return { allowed: false, reason: "The confirmpay gate of the payment step stays open with the amount, the payee origin and the target element; the executor pauses until the human resolves it and no timeout ever resolves a gate." };
+  return { allowed: false, reason: "The payment step opens its confirmpay gate with the amount, the payee origin and the target element; the executor pauses until one distinct human action resolves it." };
+}
+function confirmdeletegate(input) {
+  const kind = gatekindfor(input.classes);
+  if (kind !== "confirmdelete") return { allowed: true, reason: "The step carries no delete class and needs no confirmdelete gate." };
+  if (input.state === "resolved") return { allowed: true, reason: "The human resolved the confirmdelete gate of the destructive step; the step dispatches with its reviewed target, scope and irreversibility." };
+  if (input.state === "refused") return { allowed: false, reason: "The human refused the confirmdelete gate of the destructive step; the deletion never dispatches." };
+  if (input.state === "open") return { allowed: false, reason: "The confirmdelete gate of the destructive step stays open with the target, the scope and the irreversibility; the executor pauses until the human resolves it and no timeout ever resolves a gate." };
+  return { allowed: false, reason: "The destructive step opens its confirmdelete gate with the target, the scope and the irreversibility; the executor pauses until one distinct human action resolves it." };
+}
+function confirmcredsgate(input) {
+  const kind = gatekindfor(input.classes);
+  if (kind !== "confirmcreds") return { allowed: true, reason: "The step carries no credential class and needs no confirmcreds gate." };
+  if (input.state === "resolved") return { allowed: true, reason: "The human resolved the confirmcreds gate of the credential step; the step reads its value from the vault at the last possible moment and no log records it." };
+  if (input.state === "refused") return { allowed: false, reason: "The human refused the confirmcreds gate of the credential step; the credential never dispatches." };
+  if (input.state === "open") return { allowed: false, reason: "The confirmcreds gate of the credential step stays open with its credential label only; the executor pauses until the human resolves it and no timeout ever resolves a gate." };
+  return { allowed: false, reason: "The credential step opens its confirmcreds gate with its credential label only; the executor pauses until one distinct human action resolves it." };
+}
+function gatebatchgate(input) {
+  if (input.gateids.length === 0) return { allowed: false, reason: "A gate resolution names its single gate." };
+  if (input.gateids.length > 1) return { allowed: false, reason: `One human action resolves exactly one gate; the batch of ${input.gateids.length} gates refuses in full because no batch approval exists.` };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: "The resolution names exactly one gate; the distinct human action resolves it alone." };
+}
+function phishthresholdgate(threshold) {
+  const verdict = phishthresholdvalid(threshold);
+  if (!verdict.valid) return { allowed: false, reason: verdict.reason };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: verdict.reason };
+}
+function phishguardgate(input) {
+  if (input.verdict.blocked) return { allowed: false, reason: input.verdict.reason };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: input.verdict.reason };
+}
+function safedefaultsgate(input) {
+  if (input.profile !== void 0) return { allowed: true, reason: `The origin profile of ${input.profile.origin} exists; the safedefaults posture stays out of the decision.` };
+  if (!input.sensitive) return { allowed: true, reason: "The non-sensitive step rides the reads only baseline of the safedefaults posture; the first visit grants reads alone." };
+  return { allowed: false, reason: `No origin profile exists and the safedefaults posture denies the sensitive ${input.classes.length > 0 ? input.classes.join(" and ") : "by default"} step; open the originprofile editor to widen the profile the user controls.` };
+}
+function vaultsecretgate(input) {
+  if (input.leaks.length > 0) return { allowed: false, reason: `The plan carries ${input.leaks.length} plaintext secret value${input.leaks.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} that digest to vault records; secrets never ride step options, variables or plan texts, only the vault holds them.` };
+  if (input.carries) return { allowed: false, reason: "The step types a raw value into a masked field shape; credential steps read their value from the vault at the last possible moment and never carry it in the options." };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: "The step and the plan carry no secret outside the vault; the values stay behind the seam." };
+}
+function untrustedrendergate(input) {
+  if (input.environment === "sandboxframe") return { allowed: true, reason: "The extracted markup renders inside the sandboxframe under its nonce with scripts and handlers stripped; the untrusted content never reenters the page context." };
+  return { allowed: false, reason: `The extracted markup grades untrusted and refuses to render inside the ${input.environment}; every untrusted render routes through the sandboxframe.` };
+}
 
 // llm.ts
 var defaultrefusalmarkers = ["i cannot", "i can't", "i'm unable", "refusal:", "cannot comply"];
@@ -10959,7 +11455,7 @@ function budgetcheck(input) {
 }
 
 // version.ts
-var packageversion = "1.1.61";
+var packageversion = "1.1.62";
 
 // types.ts
 var protocolversion = packageversion;
@@ -11883,6 +12379,67 @@ function removetemplate(templates, name) {
   return templates.filter((template) => template.name !== name);
 }
 
+// redactshots.ts
+function regionof(input) {
+  if (input.origin.trim() === "" || input.template.trim() === "") throw new Error("The redact region needs its origin and its page template.");
+  for (const value of [input.x, input.y, input.width, input.height]) {
+    if (!Number.isFinite(value) || value < 0) throw new Error("The redact region needs finite, non-negative geometry in css pixels.");
+  }
+  if (input.width <= 0 || input.height <= 0) throw new Error("The redact region needs a positive width and height so the mask covers a real area.");
+  if (input.reason.trim() === "") throw new Error("The redact region names its reason in plain language.");
+  return { id: input.id ?? randomid(), origin: input.origin.trim(), template: input.template.trim(), x: input.x, y: input.y, width: input.width, height: input.height, reason: input.reason.trim(), source: input.source, createdat: input.now };
+}
+function regionvalid(region) {
+  return Number.isFinite(region.x) && Number.isFinite(region.y) && Number.isFinite(region.width) && Number.isFinite(region.height) && region.width > 0 && region.height > 0;
+}
+function regionsfor(regions, origin, template) {
+  return regions.filter((region) => region.origin === origin && region.template === template);
+}
+function fieldshaperegions(input) {
+  const regions = [];
+  for (const field of input.fields) {
+    if (!maskingfield(field.name, [])) continue;
+    regions.push(regionof({ origin: input.origin, template: input.template, x: field.rect.x, y: field.rect.y, width: field.rect.width, height: field.rect.height, reason: `The ${field.name} field carries a sensitive field shape the recognizer masks.`, source: "fieldshape", now: input.now }));
+  }
+  return regions;
+}
+function mergeregions(existing, added) {
+  const merged = [...existing];
+  for (const region of added) {
+    if (merged.some((candidate) => candidate.origin === region.origin && candidate.template === region.template && candidate.x === region.x && candidate.y === region.y && candidate.width === region.width && candidate.height === region.height)) continue;
+    merged.push(region);
+  }
+  return merged;
+}
+function capturesurfaceof(kind) {
+  if (kind === "element" || kind === "elementshot") return "element";
+  if (kind === "stitched" || kind === "fullpage" || kind === "shotfullpage" || kind === "stitch" || kind === "contactsheet" || kind === "timelapse" || kind === "recordscreen") return "stitched";
+  return "viewport";
+}
+function templateof(step) {
+  if (step.options) {
+    try {
+      const parsed = JSON.parse(step.options);
+      if (Boolean(parsed) && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+        const template = parsed.template;
+        if (typeof template === "string" && template.trim() !== "") return template.trim();
+      }
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  return step.kind;
+}
+function redactedshot(record2, regions) {
+  if (regions.length === 0) return record2;
+  return { ...record2, redacted: true, redactedregions: regions.length };
+}
+function redactionsummary(regions) {
+  if (regions.length === 0) return "No redact region covered the capture; the stored bytes carry everything the surface saw.";
+  const sources = { fieldshape: 0, userdrawn: 0 };
+  for (const region of regions) sources[region.source] += 1;
+  return `${regions.length} redact region${regions.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} covered the capture before storage: ${sources.fieldshape} derived from sensitive field shapes and ${sources.userdrawn} drawn by the user (${regions.map((region) => region.reason).join("; ")}).`;
+}
+
 // sandboxframe.ts
 function stripscripts(markup) {
   return markup.replace(/<script\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi, "").replace(/<script\b[^>]*\/>/gi, "").replace(/\son[a-z]+\s*=\s*"[^"]*"/gi, "").replace(/\son[a-z]+\s*=\s*'[^']*'/gi, "").replace(/\son[a-z]+\s*=\s*[^\s>]+/gi, "").replace(/javascript:/gi, "").trim();
@@ -11921,6 +12478,82 @@ function renderprovenance(render) {
   return { origin: render.sourceorigin, stepid: render.stepid, environment: "sandboxframe" };
 }
 
+// secretvault.ts
+var vaultdigestprefix = "sha256:";
+async function vaultdigestof(value) {
+  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(value));
+  return vaultdigestprefix + [...new Uint8Array(digest)].map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
+}
+function vaultentryof(input) {
+  if (input.label.trim() === "") throw new Error("The vault record needs its label; the surfaces show the label only.");
+  if (input.scope.trim() === "") throw new Error("The vault record needs its exact origin scope; a secret never rides every origin.");
+  if (!input.digest.startsWith(vaultdigestprefix)) throw new Error("The vault record carries its sha-256 digest, never its value.");
+  return { vaultid: input.vaultid ?? randomid(), label: input.label.trim(), scope: input.scope.trim(), profileid: input.profileid, provenance: input.provenance, algorithm: "sha-256", digest: input.digest, createdat: input.now };
+}
+function inmemoryvault() {
+  const values = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  return {
+    put: async (vaultid, value) => {
+      values.set(vaultid, value);
+    },
+    fetch: async (vaultid) => values.get(vaultid),
+    drop: async (vaultid) => {
+      values.delete(vaultid);
+    }
+  };
+}
+async function vaultstore(input) {
+  if (input.value === "") throw new Error("The vault stores a secret value the user supplied; an empty value stores nothing.");
+  const entry = vaultentryof({ label: input.label, scope: input.scope, profileid: input.profileid, provenance: input.provenance, digest: await vaultdigestof(input.value), now: input.now });
+  await input.seam.put(entry.vaultid, input.value);
+  return entry;
+}
+async function vaultvaluefor(input) {
+  const value = await input.seam.fetch(input.entry.vaultid);
+  if (value === void 0) return { ok: false, reason: `The vault holds no value behind the label ${input.entry.label}; add the secret again.` };
+  return { ok: true, value, reason: `The vault released the value behind the label ${input.entry.label} at the last possible moment; the value reaches the credential field only and no log records it.` };
+}
+async function vaultdelete(input) {
+  await input.seam.drop(input.entry.vaultid);
+  return { dropped: true, label: input.entry.label, reason: `The vault dropped the secret ${input.entry.label} of ${input.entry.scope}; no value and no copy remains behind the seam.` };
+}
+function vaultcovers(entry, origin) {
+  return entry.scope === origin;
+}
+async function secretleakscan(input) {
+  const leaks = [];
+  for (const candidate of input.candidates) {
+    if (candidate.trim() === "") continue;
+    const digest = await vaultdigestof(candidate);
+    if (input.entries.some((entry) => entry.digest === digest)) leaks.push(candidate);
+  }
+  if (leaks.length > 0) return { leaks, reason: `The plan carries ${leaks.length} plaintext value${leaks.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} that digest to vault records; secrets never ride step options, variables or plan texts, only the vault holds them.` };
+  return { leaks: [], reason: "No candidate value digests to a vault record; the plan carries no leaked secret." };
+}
+function stepoptions4(step) {
+  if (!step.options) return {};
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(step.options);
+    return Boolean(parsed) && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : {};
+  } catch {
+    return {};
+  }
+}
+function secretshapecarrying(step) {
+  const options = stepoptions4(step);
+  const fields = Array.isArray(options.fields) ? options.fields.filter((item) => Boolean(item) && typeof item === "object") : [];
+  const rawfield = fields.find((field) => typeof field.name === "string" && typeof field.value === "string" && field.value !== "" && maskingfield(field.name, []));
+  if (rawfield !== void 0) return { carries: true, reason: `The ${step.kind} step types a raw value into the ${String(rawfield.name)} field; credential steps read their value from the vault at the last possible moment and never carry it in the options.` };
+  if (typeof options.field === "string" && maskingfield(options.field, []) && step.value !== void 0 && step.value !== "") return { carries: true, reason: `The ${step.kind} step types a raw value into the ${options.field} field; credential steps read their value from the vault at the last possible moment and never carry it in the options.` };
+  return { carries: false, reason: "The step carries no raw value behind a masked field shape." };
+}
+function vaultview(entries) {
+  return entries.map((entry) => ({ vaultid: entry.vaultid, label: entry.label, scope: entry.scope, provenance: entry.provenance, createdat: entry.createdat, ...entry.lastusedat !== void 0 ? { lastusedat: entry.lastusedat } : {} }));
+}
+function vaultprompttext(entry, origin) {
+  return `Use the credential ${entry.label} of ${entry.scope} on ${origin}? The value stays behind the vault and no surface ever displays it.`;
+}
+
 // taskqueue.ts
 function emptyqueue(input = {}) {
   return { lanes: input.lanes ?? [], priorities: input.priorities ?? [], completionpolicy: input.completionpolicy ?? "all", items: [], claims: [] };
@@ -12016,6 +12649,40 @@ function taskcounts(queue) {
   };
 }
 
+// transparency.ts
+function permissiondiff(input) {
+  if (input.fromversion.trim() === "" || input.toversion.trim() === "") throw new Error("The permdiff names the two versions it compares.");
+  const added = [...new Set(input.to.filter((permission) => !input.from.includes(permission)))];
+  const removed = [...new Set(input.from.filter((permission) => !input.to.includes(permission)))];
+  return { fromversion: input.fromversion, toversion: input.toversion, added, removed, computedat: input.now };
+}
+function permdiffchanged(diff) {
+  return diff.added.length > 0 || diff.removed.length > 0;
+}
+function permdiffsummary(diff) {
+  if (!permdiffchanged(diff)) return `The update from ${diff.fromversion} to ${diff.toversion} changed no permission.`;
+  const parts = [];
+  if (diff.added.length > 0) parts.push(`added ${diff.added.join(", ")}`);
+  if (diff.removed.length > 0) parts.push(`removed ${diff.removed.join(", ")}`);
+  return `The update from ${diff.fromversion} to ${diff.toversion} ${parts.join(" and ")}.`;
+}
+function transparencygrants(input) {
+  const grants = input.allowlist.map((entry) => ({ origin: entry.origin, scope: `automation allowlist of the profile workspace ${entry.profileid}`, boundary: "the user revokes the entry or the profile workspace", grantedat: entry.grantedat }));
+  for (const profile of input.profiles) {
+    grants.push({ origin: profile.origin, scope: `origin profile with ${profile.grants.length} granted and ${profile.denials.length} denied kinds`, boundary: "the user edits or revokes the profile", grantedat: profile.createdat });
+  }
+  return grants;
+}
+function revokeaction(grant) {
+  return { action: "revoke", origin: grant.origin, scope: grant.scope };
+}
+function windowhistory(windows) {
+  return windows.map((window) => ({ id: window.id, origin: window.origin, state: window.state, boundary: window.boundary, startedat: window.startedat, expiresat: window.expiresat }));
+}
+function connectallowlist(entries) {
+  return entries.map((entry) => ({ senderid: entry.senderid, displayname: entry.displayname, ...entry.origin !== void 0 ? { origin: entry.origin } : {}, addedat: entry.addedat }));
+}
+
 // protocol.ts
 function record(value) {
   if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) throw new Error("Protocol message must be an object.");
@@ -12837,6 +13504,9 @@ function securityreport(input) {
 function logchainreport(input) {
   return { version: protocolversion, runid: input.runid, valid: input.valid, entries: input.entries, ...input.brokenat !== void 0 ? { brokenat: input.brokenat } : {}, reason: input.reason, ...input.sealhash !== void 0 ? { sealhash: input.sealhash } : {}, ...input.sealedat !== void 0 ? { sealedat: input.sealedat } : {} };
 }
+function transparencyreport(input) {
+  return { version: protocolversion, posture: "denydefault", grants: input.grants, windows: input.windows, connectallow: input.connectallow, permdiffs: input.permdiffs, safedefaults: input.safedefaults, vault: input.vault };
+}
 
 // workfloweditor.ts
 var palettecategories = ["actions", "controlflow", "waits", "variables", "triggers"];
@@ -13623,6 +14293,9 @@ export {
   breakpointinputof,
   broadcastrecipient,
   browserpermissions,
+  bucketboundsvalid,
+  bucketconsume,
+  bucketof,
   budgetcheck,
   buildname,
   buildpdf,
@@ -13656,6 +14329,7 @@ export {
   capturesourcemaps,
   capturestates,
   capturestitched,
+  capturesurfaceof,
   capturetargets,
   capturevisible,
   castvote,
@@ -13686,7 +14360,13 @@ export {
   complete,
   composeworkflow,
   conditionof,
+  confirmcredsgate,
+  confirmdeletegate,
   confirmmanualrun,
+  confirmpaygate,
+  connectallowentryof,
+  connectallowgate,
+  connectallowlist,
   connectclient,
   consensusstate,
   consentdurationvalid,
@@ -13713,6 +14393,8 @@ export {
   costbudgetvalid,
   cpusnap,
   crashinterrupted,
+  credentialstep,
+  credspayload,
   cronnext,
   cronparse,
   croprect,
@@ -13737,7 +14419,10 @@ export {
   defaultrefusalmarkers,
   defaulttokenlifetimems,
   defaulttriggercooldown,
+  deferredeventof,
+  deferredready,
   delayjitter,
+  deletepayload,
   deniedevidenceof,
   denydefaultnotice,
   denydefaultposture,
@@ -13764,6 +14449,7 @@ export {
   egressconsentgate,
   electleader,
   emptyboard,
+  emptyconnectallow,
   emptyqueue,
   emugate,
   emulationkinds,
@@ -13776,6 +14462,7 @@ export {
   enqueuerequest,
   entryfresh,
   entryhashof,
+  envelopecheck,
   environmentgrammar,
   environmentgrantgate,
   environmentreport,
@@ -13820,6 +14507,7 @@ export {
   fetchoptionsof,
   fetchrequestof,
   fieldshapekind,
+  fieldshaperegions,
   filteredsessions,
   filterentries,
   filterexchanges,
@@ -13832,6 +14520,11 @@ export {
   formreportresponse,
   framedlog,
   frameinterval,
+  gatebatchgate,
+  gateforstep,
+  gatekindfor,
+  gateprompttext,
+  gatestateof,
   generatedvalueallowed,
   grantallowlistentry,
   graphqlopenvelope,
@@ -13868,6 +14561,7 @@ export {
   inflightreport,
   inheritconsent,
   initialize,
+  inmemoryvault,
   interleavetimeline,
   iscdpkind,
   iscontrolflowkind,
@@ -13920,6 +14614,7 @@ export {
   loglevels,
   logreadgate,
   longtaskcapture,
+  lookalikedistance,
   loopof,
   mailboxof,
   manualpreview,
@@ -13947,6 +14642,7 @@ export {
   mediaentries,
   mediakinds,
   mediareport,
+  mergeregions,
   mergeresults,
   messageegressgrade,
   messagefilterof,
@@ -13979,6 +14675,7 @@ export {
   newsessionrecord,
   newworkflowrun,
   nextrequest,
+  nobatchresolution,
   nonceof,
   normalizeendpoint,
   oauthflowof,
@@ -13991,12 +14688,16 @@ export {
   openchannel,
   openconsensus,
   openconsentwindow,
+  opengate,
   openoffscreen,
   openrun,
   openrunlog,
   openseal,
   openstreamchannel,
   opentabagent,
+  origincheckgate,
+  origincheckof,
+  originlabels,
   originprofilegate,
   originprofileof,
   outcomeresponse,
@@ -14029,15 +14730,24 @@ export {
   payloadshapeof,
   payloadvalid,
   payloadwithdefaults,
+  paypayload,
   pdfoptionsof,
   pdfpagesize,
   pdfsegments,
   pdftextlayout,
+  permdiffchanged,
+  permdiffsummary,
+  permissiondiff,
   permissiongrade,
   permissiongrantof,
   permissionnamevalid,
   permissionstates,
   permissionstatevalid,
+  phishguardgate,
+  phishnotetext,
+  phishthresholdgate,
+  phishthresholdvalid,
+  phishverdictof,
   ping,
   planallowlist,
   plandraftreviewgate,
@@ -14048,6 +14758,7 @@ export {
   pollurl,
   poolplan,
   popscope,
+  portaccept,
   postentry,
   preparehandoff,
   privatemime,
@@ -14076,7 +14787,9 @@ export {
   queuelanesvalid,
   randomid,
   rankapis,
+  ratelimitboundsvalid,
   ratelimitbudgetallowed,
+  ratelimitgate,
   ratelimitreadof,
   ratelimitreport,
   ratelimitwait,
@@ -14097,6 +14810,8 @@ export {
   recoveryplan,
   redactconsoletext,
   redactedcookies,
+  redactedshot,
+  redactionsummary,
   redactparams,
   redeempairingcode,
   redoedit,
@@ -14104,7 +14819,10 @@ export {
   reflectstep,
   regexextract,
   regexruleof,
+  regionof,
+  regionsfor,
   regionsteps,
+  regionvalid,
   registeragent,
   rejectioncapture,
   relayframe,
@@ -14135,6 +14853,7 @@ export {
   resolveapproval,
   resolvedrisk,
   resolveescalation,
+  resolvegate,
   resolverecipients,
   resolveroute,
   resolvetool,
@@ -14159,6 +14878,7 @@ export {
   reviewedkinds,
   reviewframe,
   revocationruleof,
+  revokeaction,
   revokeclient,
   revokerun,
   revokerungate,
@@ -14190,6 +14910,10 @@ export {
   runurllist,
   runwhile,
   runworkflow,
+  safedefaultnotice,
+  safedefaultprofile,
+  safedefaultreadkind,
+  safedefaultsgate,
   safetyresponse,
   samplingframes,
   sandboxorigingate,
@@ -14201,6 +14925,8 @@ export {
   scanconflicts,
   schedulecron,
   scheduleinterval,
+  schemacheck,
+  schemaguardgate,
   scopecheck,
   scopegate,
   scopegrantof,
@@ -14212,6 +14938,8 @@ export {
   searchsessionrecords,
   searchsteps,
   searchtemplates,
+  secretleakscan,
+  secretshapecarrying,
   securityreport,
   seededrandom,
   selectorresponse,
@@ -14293,6 +15021,7 @@ export {
   taskstatevalid,
   teardowncdpsession,
   teardownplanof,
+  templateof,
   templateurl,
   templatevariables,
   thumbdirectiveof,
@@ -14332,6 +15061,8 @@ export {
   transferablekeys,
   transferhandoff,
   transformgrammar,
+  transparencygrants,
+  transparencyreport,
   triggereventcatalog,
   triggerfamilies,
   triggerfamilyof,
@@ -14345,6 +15076,7 @@ export {
   tryof,
   undoedit,
   unreadcount,
+  untrustedrendergate,
   unwrapgraphql,
   updaterule,
   urlencodeform,
@@ -14361,6 +15093,17 @@ export {
   validatetoolcatalog,
   validatevaluegen,
   validateworkflow,
+  vaultcovers,
+  vaultdelete,
+  vaultdigestof,
+  vaultdigestprefix,
+  vaultentryof,
+  vaultprompttext,
+  vaultsecretgate,
+  vaultstore,
+  vaultvaluefor,
+  vaultview,
+  verdictfresh,
   verifyauth,
   verifylogchain,
   verifytoken,
@@ -14377,6 +15120,7 @@ export {
   whileof,
   wildcardentry,
   windowgatesstep,
+  windowhistory,
   wireformat,
   wizardreport,
   workerpoolsizevalid,