@wenathlan/extension 1.1.60 → 1.1.61

package/dist/index.js

@@ -2178,6 +2178,73 @@ function exportrunstate(states, now) {
   };
 }
 
+// immutablelog.ts
+async function sha2562(payload) {
+  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(payload);
+  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", bytes);
+  return [...new Uint8Array(digest)].map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
+}
+function entrybody(entry) {
+  return JSON.stringify({ id: entry.id, runid: entry.runid, kind: entry.kind, summary: entry.summary, origin: entry.origin, ...entry.stepid !== void 0 ? { stepid: entry.stepid } : {}, at: entry.at });
+}
+async function entryhashof(input) {
+  return { previous: input.previous, current: await sha2562(`${input.previous}
+${entrybody(input.entry)}`), algorithm: "sha-256" };
+}
+async function logentryof(input) {
+  if (input.summary.trim() === "") throw new Error("The log entry needs its summary in plain language.");
+  if (input.origin.trim() === "") throw new Error("The log entry needs its origin provenance.");
+  const entry = { id: input.id ?? randomid(), runid: input.runid, kind: input.kind, summary: input.summary, origin: input.origin, ...input.stepid !== void 0 ? { stepid: input.stepid } : {}, at: input.at };
+  return { ...entry, hash: await entryhashof({ previous: input.previous, entry }) };
+}
+function openrunlog(input) {
+  if (input.runid.trim() === "" || input.sessionid.trim() === "") throw new Error("The run log needs its run and session ids.");
+  return { runid: input.runid, sessionid: input.sessionid, entries: [], updatedat: input.now };
+}
+function lasthashof(log) {
+  const entry = log.entries[log.entries.length - 1];
+  return entry === void 0 ? "0".repeat(64) : entry.hash.current;
+}
+async function appendlogentry(input) {
+  if (input.log.seal !== void 0) throw new Error(`The run log of ${input.log.runid} sealed at ${input.log.seal.sealedat} and accepts no append; the seal is terminal.`);
+  const entry = await logentryof({ ...input.id !== void 0 ? { id: input.id } : {}, runid: input.log.runid, kind: input.kind, summary: input.summary, origin: input.origin, ...input.stepid !== void 0 ? { stepid: input.stepid } : {}, at: input.at, previous: lasthashof(input.log) });
+  return { ...input.log, entries: [...input.log.entries, entry], updatedat: input.at };
+}
+async function sealrunlog(log, now) {
+  if (log.seal !== void 0) throw new Error(`The run log of ${log.runid} already sealed at ${log.seal.sealedat}; the seal is terminal.`);
+  if (log.entries.length === 0) throw new Error("The run log seals at completion with at least one entry.");
+  const sealhash = await entryhashof({ previous: lasthashof(log), entry: { id: `seal:${log.runid}`, runid: log.runid, kind: "seal", summary: `The run ${log.runid} completed and the log sealed with ${log.entries.length} entries.`, origin: log.entries[log.entries.length - 1]?.origin ?? log.runid, at: now } });
+  const seal = { runid: log.runid, entries: log.entries.length, sealhash, sealedat: now };
+  return { log: { ...log, seal, updatedat: now }, seal };
+}
+async function verifylogchain(entries) {
+  let previous = "0".repeat(64);
+  for (let index = 0; index < entries.length; index += 1) {
+    const entry = entries[index];
+    if (entry === void 0) continue;
+    if (entry.hash.previous !== previous) return { valid: false, brokenat: index, reason: `The chain link of entry ${index} carries the previous hash ${entry.hash.previous} while its predecessor hashes to ${previous}; the chain reports tamper evidence.` };
+    const expected = await entryhashof({ previous, entry: { id: entry.id, runid: entry.runid, kind: entry.kind, summary: entry.summary, origin: entry.origin, ...entry.stepid !== void 0 ? { stepid: entry.stepid } : {}, at: entry.at } });
+    if (entry.hash.current !== expected.current) return { valid: false, brokenat: index, reason: `The entry hash of entry ${index} matches neither its body nor its predecessor hash; the chain reports tamper evidence.` };
+    previous = entry.hash.current;
+  }
+  return { valid: true, reason: `The hash chain of ${entries.length} entr${entries.length === 1 ? "y" : "ies"} verifies from the genesis hash to the last entry.` };
+}
+async function readverifiedlog(log) {
+  const verification = await verifylogchain(log.entries);
+  if (!verification.valid) return { ok: false, entries: [], reason: verification.reason };
+  return { ok: true, entries: [...log.entries], reason: verification.reason };
+}
+async function chainreportof(log) {
+  const verification = await verifylogchain(log.entries);
+  if (!verification.valid) return { runid: log.runid, valid: false, entries: log.entries.length, ...verification.brokenat !== void 0 ? { brokenat: verification.brokenat } : {}, reason: verification.reason };
+  return { runid: log.runid, valid: true, entries: log.entries.length, reason: verification.reason, ...log.seal !== void 0 ? { sealhash: log.seal.sealhash.current, sealedat: log.seal.sealedat } : {} };
+}
+async function exportlogchain(log) {
+  const read = await readverifiedlog(log);
+  if (!read.ok) return { runid: log.runid, entries: 0, chainvalid: false, reason: read.reason, log: [] };
+  return { runid: log.runid, entries: read.entries.length, chainvalid: true, reason: read.reason, ...log.seal !== void 0 ? { sealhash: log.seal.sealhash.current, sealedat: log.seal.sealedat } : {}, log: read.entries };
+}
+
 // memory.ts
 var sessionmemory = class {
   constructor(adapter) {
@@ -4637,6 +4704,139 @@ var sessionmemory = class {
   async exportrunstates() {
     return exportrunstate(await this.listrunstates(), Date.now());
   }
+  /**
+   * Security part one persistence of the 1.1.61 family.
+   * The trust boundary records live here: the per origin automation allowlist scoped per profile workspace with one exact origin per entry, the per site originprofiles with their kind grants and denials, the active consentwindows with their expiry timestamps that expire closed past their boundary, the mid run revokerun events with the halted step ids that stay visible for later consent prompts, the fresh class consents per origin, the mask rules for field shapes per origin, and the sealed immutable run logs with their final hash.
+   * The run log store exposes no update or delete path: appends land whole, the seal closes a log with its final hash and the read path verifies the chain before returning a single entry so a broken link refuses the read.
+   * The adapter seam keeps every accessor a one line storage delegation so a future append only backend replaces the adapter only; the current storage areas offer no append only hardware, so the honest derivation is the hash chain that makes any rewrite detectable at read time.
+   */
+  /** Replaces the per origin automation allowlist of the profile workspaces; every entry carries one exact origin with no wildcard expansion. */
+  async setautomationallowlist(entries) {
+    return this.adapter.set("automationallowlist", entries);
+  }
+  /** Returns the per origin automation allowlist entries, oldest grant first. */
+  async getautomationallowlist() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("automationallowlist") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Adds one exact origin to the automation allowlist of a profile workspace; a duplicate origin keeps its first grant. */
+  async addallowlistorigin(entry) {
+    const entries = await this.getautomationallowlist();
+    if (entries.some((candidate) => candidate.origin === entry.origin && candidate.profileid === entry.profileid)) return;
+    await this.setautomationallowlist([...entries, entry]);
+  }
+  /** Removes one origin from the automation allowlist; the denydefault posture refuses the origin again after the removal. */
+  async removeallowlistorigin(origin, profileid) {
+    await this.setautomationallowlist((await this.getautomationallowlist()).filter((entry) => !(entry.origin === origin && entry.profileid === profileid)));
+  }
+  /** Replaces the per site origin profiles with their kind grants and denials; one profile per origin. */
+  async setoriginprofiles(profiles) {
+    return this.adapter.set("originprofiles", profiles);
+  }
+  /** Returns the stored per site origin profiles, oldest update first. */
+  async getoriginprofiles() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("originprofiles") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Upserts one origin profile: a profile of the same origin replaces its grants and denials while a new origin joins the list. */
+  async saveoriginprofile(profile) {
+    const profiles = await this.getoriginprofiles();
+    await this.setoriginprofiles(profiles.some((candidate) => candidate.origin === profile.origin) ? profiles.map((candidate) => candidate.origin === profile.origin ? profile : candidate) : [...profiles, profile]);
+  }
+  /** Replaces the consent windows; active windows keep their expiry timestamps and closed windows stay for the audit trail. */
+  async setconsentwindows(windows) {
+    return this.adapter.set("consentwindows", windows);
+  }
+  /** Returns the stored consent windows, newest start first. */
+  async getconsentwindows() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("consentwindows") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Expires every consent window past its duration boundary: the closed windows keep their records while their grants bind no step anymore. */
+  async expireconsentwindows(now) {
+    const windows = await this.getconsentwindows();
+    const expired = windows.map((window) => window.state === "active" && now >= window.expiresat ? { ...window, state: "closed", closedat: now } : window);
+    await this.setconsentwindows(expired);
+    return expired;
+  }
+  /** Records one mid run revocation with its halted step ids; the history stays visible for later consent prompts. */
+  async addrevocation(event) {
+    await this.adapter.set("revocations", [event, ...await this.adapter.get("revocations") ?? []].slice(0, 500));
+  }
+  /** Returns the recorded mid run revocations with their halted step ids, newest first. */
+  async getrevocations() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("revocations") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Replaces the fresh class consents per origin. */
+  async setclassconsents(consents) {
+    return this.adapter.set("classconsents", consents);
+  }
+  /** Returns the fresh class consents per origin, newest grant first. */
+  async getclassconsents() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("classconsents") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Records one fresh class consent per origin; the prompt of one class never widens another class. */
+  async addclassconsent(consent) {
+    const consents = (await this.getclassconsents()).filter((candidate) => !(candidate.origin === consent.origin && candidate.sensitiveclass === consent.sensitiveclass));
+    await this.setclassconsents([consent, ...consents]);
+  }
+  /** Replaces the mask rules for sensitive field shapes per origin. */
+  async setmaskrules(rules) {
+    return this.adapter.set("maskrules", rules);
+  }
+  /** Returns the stored mask rules for sensitive field shapes per origin, oldest rule first. */
+  async getmaskrules() {
+    return await this.adapter.get("maskrules") ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Adds one mask rule for field shapes, optionally scoped to one origin. */
+  async addmaskrule(rule) {
+    await this.setmaskrules([...await this.getmaskrules(), rule]);
+  }
+  /** Removes one mask rule by its id. */
+  async removemaskrule(id) {
+    await this.setmaskrules((await this.getmaskrules()).filter((rule) => rule.id !== id));
+  }
+  /** Stores the whole run log of one run: the append lands in one storage transaction so the entries and their chain links persist together. */
+  async setimmutablelog(log) {
+    return this.adapter.set(`immutablelog:${log.runid}`, log);
+  }
+  /** Returns the stored run log of one run; an absent log returns undefined. */
+  async getimmutablelog(runid) {
+    return this.adapter.get(`immutablelog:${runid}`);
+  }
+  /** Lists the stored run logs, oldest update first, with the sealed logs carrying their final hash. */
+  async listimmutablelogs() {
+    const index = await this.adapter.get("immutablelogindex") ?? [];
+    const logs = [];
+    for (const runid of index) {
+      const log = await this.getimmutablelog(runid);
+      if (log) logs.push(log);
+    }
+    return logs.sort((one, two) => one.updatedat - two.updatedat);
+  }
+  /** Stores the run log index entry of one run so the log listing reads every stored log. */
+  async trackimmutablelog(runid) {
+    const index = await this.adapter.get("immutablelogindex") ?? [];
+    if (!index.includes(runid)) await this.adapter.set("immutablelogindex", [...index, runid]);
+  }
+  /** Exports the verified log chain of one run for the audit file: the read path verifies the whole hash chain first and a broken link refuses the export with no entries served. */
+  async exportverifiedrunlog(runid) {
+    const log = await this.getimmutablelog(runid);
+    if (!log) throw new Error(`No run log exists for the run ${runid}.`);
+    return exportlogchain(log);
+  }
+  /** Expires the sealed run logs past the user configured retention: the entries reduce to their chain summaries while the seal hash always survives. */
+  async expireimmutablelogs(retention, now) {
+    const logs = await this.listimmutablelogs();
+    if (retention === void 0) return logs;
+    const kept = [];
+    for (const log of logs) {
+      if (log.seal !== void 0 && now - log.seal.sealedat > retention) {
+        const summary = { runid: log.runid, sessionid: log.sessionid, entries: [], seal: { ...log.seal, entries: log.seal.entries }, updatedat: now };
+        await this.setimmutablelog(summary);
+      } else {
+        kept.push(log);
+      }
+    }
+    return kept;
+  }
 };
 function mediakindof(record2) {
   if ("pages" in record2) return "pdf";
@@ -5839,6 +6039,144 @@ async function callgraphql(input) {
   }
 }
 
+// originpolicy.ts
+var denydefaultposture = "denydefault";
+function exactorigin(origin, entry) {
+  return origin.trim() !== "" && origin === entry;
+}
+function wildcardentry(entry) {
+  return entry.includes("*") || entry.includes("://*.") || entry.trim() === "" || entry.trim() === "https://" || entry.trim() === "http://";
+}
+function allowlistcheck(input) {
+  if (input.origin.trim() === "") return { allowed: false, reason: "The step needs the exact origin it targets." };
+  for (const entry of input.allowlist) {
+    if (wildcardentry(entry.origin)) return { allowed: false, reason: `The allowlist entry ${entry.origin} carries a wildcard; every grant binds to one exact origin with no wildcard expansion.` };
+  }
+  const scoped = input.profileid === void 0 ? input.allowlist : input.allowlist.filter((entry) => entry.profileid === input.profileid);
+  const granted = scoped.some((entry) => exactorigin(input.origin, entry.origin));
+  if (granted) return { allowed: true, reason: `The origin ${input.origin} sits inside the automation allowlist the user granted.` };
+  if (input.sessionorigin !== void 0 && exactorigin(input.origin, input.sessionorigin)) return { allowed: true, reason: `The active tab grant covers ${input.origin} as exactly one explicit single origin grant.` };
+  return { allowed: false, reason: `The denydefault posture refuses ${input.origin} because the origin sits absent from the automation allowlist; grant the origin first.` };
+}
+function originprofileof(input) {
+  if (input.origin.trim() === "") throw new Error("The origin profile needs its exact origin.");
+  return { profileid: input.profileid ?? randomid(), origin: input.origin, grants: [...input.grants ?? []], denials: [...input.denials ?? []], createdat: input.now, updatedat: input.now };
+}
+function profilekind(input) {
+  if (input.profile.grants.includes(input.kind) && input.decision === "grant") return input.profile;
+  if (input.profile.denials.includes(input.kind) && input.decision === "deny") return input.profile;
+  const grants = input.decision === "grant" ? [.../* @__PURE__ */ new Set([...input.profile.grants, input.kind])] : input.profile.grants.filter((kind) => kind !== input.kind);
+  const denials = input.decision === "deny" ? [.../* @__PURE__ */ new Set([...input.profile.denials, input.kind])] : input.profile.denials.filter((kind) => kind !== input.kind);
+  return { ...input.profile, grants, denials, updatedat: input.now };
+}
+function profilegrade(input) {
+  if (!input.sensitive) return { allowed: true, consult: false, reason: `The ${input.kind} kind grades non-sensitive and the origin profile needs no consult.` };
+  if (input.profile === void 0) return { allowed: true, consult: true, reason: `No origin profile exists for the ${input.kind} kind, so the fresh class consent gate alone routes the sensitive step.` };
+  if (input.profile.denials.includes(input.kind)) return { allowed: false, consult: true, reason: `The origin profile of ${input.profile.origin} denies the ${input.kind} kind; a denied kind never runs on that origin.` };
+  if (input.profile.grants.includes(input.kind)) return { allowed: true, consult: true, reason: `The origin profile of ${input.profile.origin} grants the ${input.kind} kind the user reviewed.` };
+  return { allowed: true, consult: true, reason: `The origin profile of ${input.profile.origin} carries no ${input.kind} decision, so the fresh class consent gate alone routes the sensitive step.` };
+}
+function stepoptions(step) {
+  if (!step.options) return {};
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(step.options);
+    return Boolean(parsed) && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : {};
+  } catch {
+    return {};
+  }
+}
+var paymentkinds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["fillcard", "fillcode"]);
+var credentialkinds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["consentpassword", "saveapikey", "handleauth", "authflow"]);
+var deletekinds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["discardtab", "closepattern", "clearcookies", "removeattribute", "cleanupartifacts"]);
+var publishkinds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["postform", "postfiles", "sendmessage", "submitform", "submitsearch", "writeclipboard"]);
+var defaultsensitivekinds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["attachfile", "uploadfile", "uploadfiles", "downloadfile", "downloadimages", "batchdownload", "pausedownload", "resumedownload", "quarantinedownload", "evaluate"]);
+function sensitiveclassesof(step) {
+  const options = stepoptions(step);
+  const fields = Array.isArray(options.fields) ? options.fields.filter((item) => Boolean(item) && typeof item === "object") : [];
+  const names = [...fields.map((field) => typeof field.name === "string" ? field.name : ""), typeof options.field === "string" ? options.field : "", typeof options.target === "string" ? options.target : ""].map((name) => name.toLowerCase());
+  const carries = (shape) => names.some((name) => name.includes(shape));
+  const classes = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  if (paymentkinds.has(step.kind) || carries("card") || carries("cvc") || carries("cvv")) classes.add("payment");
+  const credentialshape = carries("password") || carries("token") || carries("secret") || carries("apikey") || carries("passphrase");
+  const submits = step.kind === "submitform" || step.kind === "postform" || step.kind === "submitsearch" || step.kind === "fillform" || step.kind === "filllabel" || step.kind === "fillplaceholder";
+  if (credentialkinds.has(step.kind) || submits && credentialshape) classes.add("credential");
+  if (deletekinds.has(step.kind)) classes.add("delete");
+  if (publishkinds.has(step.kind) || step.kind === "callrest" || step.kind === "callgraphql") {
+    const verb = typeof options.method === "string" ? options.method.trim().toUpperCase() : typeof options.verb === "string" ? options.verb.trim().toUpperCase() : "";
+    if (step.kind === "callrest" || step.kind === "callgraphql") {
+      if (verb !== "" && !["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"].includes(verb)) classes.add("publish");
+    } else classes.add("publish");
+  }
+  const bydefault = defaultsensitivekinds.has(step.kind);
+  const list = [...classes];
+  if (list.length === 0 && !bydefault) return { classes: [], bydefault: false, sensitive: false, reason: `The ${step.kind} kind carries no sensitive class and no default sensitive grade.` };
+  return { classes: list, bydefault, sensitive: true, reason: `The ${step.kind} kind grades sensitive${list.length > 0 ? ` through the ${list.join(", ")} class${list.length === 1 ? "" : "es"}` : ""}${bydefault ? " by default" : ""}.` };
+}
+function classconsentcovers(consents, origin, sensitiveclass, now) {
+  return consents.some((consent) => consent.origin === origin && consent.sensitiveclass === sensitiveclass && consent.grantedat <= now && (consent.expiresat === void 0 || now < consent.expiresat));
+}
+function missingclassconsents(input) {
+  const missing = input.classes.filter((kind) => !classconsentcovers(input.consents, input.origin, kind, input.now));
+  if (missing.length > 0) return { needed: true, missing, reason: `The sensitive classes ${missing.join(", ")} need one fresh consent prompt each on ${input.origin}.` };
+  if (input.bydefault && input.classes.length === 0) return { needed: true, missing: [], reason: `The ${input.origin} step grades sensitive by default and needs its fresh consent window prompt.` };
+  return { needed: false, missing: [], reason: `The fresh class consents of ${input.origin} cover every class the step names.` };
+}
+function openconsentwindow(input) {
+  if (input.sessionid.trim() === "" || input.origin.trim() === "") throw new Error("The consent window needs its session and its exact origin.");
+  if (!Number.isFinite(input.duration) || input.duration <= 0) throw new Error("The consent window needs its duration as a positive user value; no window defaults to unlimited.");
+  return { id: input.id ?? randomid(), sessionid: input.sessionid, origin: input.origin, startedat: input.now, duration: input.duration, expiresat: input.now + input.duration, boundary: input.boundary?.trim() !== "" && input.boundary !== void 0 ? input.boundary : `${input.duration} milliseconds the user chose`, kinds: [...new Set(input.kinds)], state: "active" };
+}
+function consentwindowstate(window, now) {
+  if (window.state === "closed" || now >= window.expiresat) return { state: "expired", remaining: 0, reason: `The consent window of ${window.origin} closed at its ${window.boundary} boundary; the run suspends until a new explicit prompt renews it.` };
+  return { state: "active", remaining: window.expiresat - now, reason: `The consent window of ${window.origin} stays active with ${window.expiresat - now} milliseconds left of its ${window.boundary} boundary.` };
+}
+function windowgatesstep(input) {
+  if (input.window === void 0) return { allowed: false, suspended: false, reason: `No active consent window covers ${input.origin}; the consent prompt opens one before any step dispatches.` };
+  if (input.window.sessionid !== input.sessionid) return { allowed: false, suspended: false, reason: `The consent window scopes to the session ${input.window.sessionid} only and never widens to another session.` };
+  if (input.window.origin !== input.origin) return { allowed: false, suspended: false, reason: `The consent window scopes to the origin ${input.window.origin} only and never widens to another origin.` };
+  const state = consentwindowstate(input.window, input.now);
+  if (state.state === "expired") return { allowed: false, suspended: true, reason: state.reason };
+  return { allowed: true, suspended: false, reason: state.reason };
+}
+function expireconsentwindows(windows, now) {
+  return windows.map((window) => window.state === "active" && now >= window.expiresat ? { ...window, state: "closed", closedat: now } : window);
+}
+function renewconsentwindow(input) {
+  const closed = input.window.state === "active" ? { ...input.window, state: "closed", closedat: input.now } : input.window;
+  const renewed = openconsentwindow({ sessionid: input.window.sessionid, origin: input.window.origin, duration: input.duration, kinds: input.kinds.length > 0 ? input.kinds : input.window.kinds, now: input.now });
+  return { renewed, closed };
+}
+function revokerun(input) {
+  if (input.sessionid.trim() === "" || input.runid.trim() === "") throw new Error("The revocation needs its session and run ids.");
+  if (input.actor.trim() === "") throw new Error("The revocation names the acting user.");
+  const halted = [...input.pendingstepid !== void 0 ? [input.pendingstepid] : [], ...input.queuedstepids ?? []];
+  if (halted.length === 0) throw new Error("The revocation halts at least the pending step of the run.");
+  return { id: input.id ?? randomid(), sessionid: input.sessionid, runid: input.runid, haltedstepids: halted, actor: input.actor, reason: input.reason?.trim() !== "" && input.reason !== void 0 ? input.reason : "The user revoked the consent mid run.", at: input.now };
+}
+function haltedstepsof(revocation) {
+  return { ...revocation.haltedstepids.length > 0 ? { pending: revocation.haltedstepids[0] } : {}, queued: revocation.haltedstepids.slice(1) };
+}
+function scopegrantof(input) {
+  if (input.origin.trim() === "") throw new Error("The consent scope needs its exact origin.");
+  if (input.kinds.length === 0) throw new Error("The consent scope names the kinds it covers.");
+  if (input.boundary.trim() === "") throw new Error("The consent scope names its boundary; no grant defaults to unlimited.");
+  return { origin: input.origin, kinds: [...new Set(input.kinds)], boundary: input.boundary, grantedat: input.now };
+}
+function deniedevidenceof(input) {
+  return { origin: input.origin, kind: input.kind, reason: input.reason, at: input.now };
+}
+function consentprompttext(input) {
+  const label = input.classes.length > 0 ? `the ${input.classes.join(" and ")} class${input.classes.length === 1 ? "" : "es"}` : "a sensitive by default grade";
+  return `Allow the ${input.kind} step on ${input.origin} graded as ${label} for ${input.duration} milliseconds? The consent window closes at that boundary; no grant ever defaults to unlimited.`;
+}
+function denydefaultnotice(origin) {
+  return `The denydefault posture refuses ${origin} until the user adds the origin to the automation allowlist; no step dispatches without the grant.`;
+}
+function profilesummary(profile) {
+  if (profile === void 0) return "No origin profile exists for this origin yet; sensitive steps route through their fresh consent prompts.";
+  return `The origin profile of ${profile.origin} grants ${profile.grants.length} kind${profile.grants.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} and denies ${profile.denials.length} kind${profile.denials.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} the user reviewed.`;
+}
+
 // socketbus.ts
 var socketkinds = ["opensocket", "sendmessage", "waitmessage", "subscribesse", "longpoll"];
 function channelorigin(url) {
@@ -10217,6 +10555,50 @@ function sandboxorigingate(input) {
 function environmentrequirements() {
   return environmentrequirementsof([...allowedactions]);
 }
+function automationallowlistgate(input) {
+  const verdict = allowlistcheck({ origin: input.origin, allowlist: input.allowlist, ...input.session !== void 0 ? { sessionorigin: input.session.origin } : {} });
+  if (!verdict.allowed) return { allowed: false, reason: verdict.reason };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: verdict.reason };
+}
+function originprofilegate(input) {
+  const verdict = profilegrade(input);
+  if (!verdict.allowed) return { allowed: false, reason: verdict.reason };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: verdict.reason };
+}
+function consentwindowgate(input) {
+  if (!input.sensitive) return { allowed: true, reason: "The non-sensitive step rides the session origin grants and needs no consent window of its own." };
+  const verdict = windowgatesstep({ window: input.window, sessionid: input.sessionid, origin: input.origin, now: input.now });
+  if (!verdict.allowed) return { allowed: false, reason: verdict.reason };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: verdict.reason };
+}
+function revokerungate(input) {
+  if (input.revocation === void 0) return { allowed: true, reason: "No revocation halted the run; the steps keep their reviewed order." };
+  if (input.revocation.sessionid !== input.sessionid) return { allowed: true, reason: "The revocation belongs to another session and halts nothing here." };
+  if (input.revocation.runid !== input.runid) return { allowed: true, reason: "The revocation belongs to another run and halts nothing here." };
+  return { allowed: false, reason: `The revocation of ${input.revocation.actor} halted the pending step and ${Math.max(0, input.revocation.haltedstepids.length - 1)} queued step${Math.max(0, input.revocation.haltedstepids.length - 1) === 1 ? "" : "s"} without executing them: ${input.revocation.haltedstepids.join(", ")}.` };
+}
+function sensitiveclassgate(input) {
+  if (!input.sensitive) return { allowed: true, reason: "The step carries no sensitive class and needs no fresh consent prompt." };
+  const verdict = missingclassconsents({ origin: input.origin, classes: input.classes, bydefault: input.bydefault, consents: input.consents, now: input.now });
+  if (verdict.needed) return { allowed: false, reason: verdict.reason };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: verdict.reason };
+}
+function consentdurationvalid(duration) {
+  if (!Number.isFinite(duration) || duration <= 0) return { allowed: false, reason: "The consent window duration stays a positive user value in milliseconds; no grant ever defaults to unlimited." };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: `The consent window duration ${duration} milliseconds stays the user configured boundary the prompt names.` };
+}
+function logreadgate(input) {
+  if (!input.valid) return { allowed: false, reason: input.brokenat !== void 0 ? `The log chain breaks at entry ${input.brokenat}; the audit accessor refuses the read of a forged record.` : "The log chain fails its verification; the audit accessor refuses the read of a forged record." };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: "The log chain verifies from the genesis hash to the last entry; the audit accessor serves the entries." };
+}
+function sensitivepipelingate(input) {
+  const classification = sensitiveclassesof(input.step);
+  const profileverdict = originprofilegate({ profile: input.profile, kind: input.step.kind, sensitive: classification.sensitive });
+  if (!profileverdict.allowed) return { allowed: false, reason: profileverdict.reason ?? "" };
+  const consentverdict = sensitiveclassgate({ origin: input.origin, classes: classification.classes, bydefault: classification.bydefault, sensitive: classification.sensitive, consents: input.consents, now: input.now });
+  if (!consentverdict.allowed) return { allowed: false, reason: `${classification.reason} ${consentverdict.reason}` };
+  return { allowed: true, reason: `${classification.reason} ${consentverdict.reason}` };
+}
 
 // llm.ts
 var defaultrefusalmarkers = ["i cannot", "i can't", "i'm unable", "refusal:", "cannot comply"];
@@ -10577,7 +10959,7 @@ function budgetcheck(input) {
 }
 
 // version.ts
-var packageversion = "1.1.60";
+var packageversion = "1.1.61";
 
 // types.ts
 var protocolversion = packageversion;
@@ -11173,6 +11555,79 @@ function streamsummaries(raw) {
   });
 }
 
+// maskinputs.ts
+var defaultmaskshapes = ["password", "token", "card", "secret"];
+var maskmarker = "[redacted]";
+function fieldshapekind(name) {
+  const lowered = name.toLowerCase();
+  if (lowered.includes("password") || lowered.includes("passwd") || lowered.includes("pwd") || lowered.includes("passphrase")) return "password";
+  if (lowered.includes("token") || lowered.includes("apikey") || lowered.includes("api_key") || lowered.includes("auth") || lowered.includes("bearer")) return "token";
+  if (lowered.includes("card") || lowered.includes("cvc") || lowered.includes("cvv") || lowered.includes("expiry") || lowered.includes("pan")) return "card";
+  if (lowered.includes("secret")) return "secret";
+  return void 0;
+}
+function shapesof(input) {
+  const shapes = new Set(defaultmaskshapes);
+  for (const shape of input.settings?.maskshapes ?? []) if (shape.trim() !== "") shapes.add(shape.trim().toLowerCase());
+  for (const rule of input.rules) {
+    const scoped = rule.origin === void 0 || rule.origin === "" || input.origin !== void 0 && rule.origin === input.origin;
+    if (scoped) {
+      for (const shape of rule.shapes) if (shape.trim() !== "") shapes.add(shape.trim().toLowerCase());
+    }
+  }
+  return [...shapes];
+}
+function maskingfield(name, shapes) {
+  if (fieldshapekind(name) !== void 0) return true;
+  const lowered = name.toLowerCase();
+  return shapes.some((shape) => shape !== "" && lowered.includes(shape));
+}
+function maskvalue(value) {
+  return value === "" ? "" : maskmarker;
+}
+function maskfield(input) {
+  return maskingfield(input.name, input.shapes) ? maskvalue(input.value) : input.value;
+}
+function maskrecord(record2, shapes) {
+  const masked = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(record2)) {
+    if (typeof value === "string") {
+      const sibling = record2.name;
+      masked[key] = key === "value" && typeof sibling === "string" ? maskfield({ name: sibling, value, shapes }) : maskfield({ name: key, value, shapes });
+    } else if (Array.isArray(value)) masked[key] = value.map((item) => Boolean(item) && typeof item === "object" && !Array.isArray(item) ? maskrecord(item, shapes) : item);
+    else if (Boolean(value) && typeof value === "object") masked[key] = maskrecord(value, shapes);
+    else masked[key] = value;
+  }
+  return masked;
+}
+function masktypedvalues(input) {
+  const sensitive = maskingfield(input.step.target ?? "", input.shapes) || maskingfield(input.step.kind, input.shapes);
+  const maskedvalue = input.step.value !== void 0 && sensitive ? maskvalue(input.step.value) : input.step.value;
+  let maskedoptions = input.step.options;
+  if (input.step.options !== void 0) {
+    try {
+      const parsed = JSON.parse(input.step.options);
+      if (Boolean(parsed) && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed)) maskedoptions = JSON.stringify(maskrecord(parsed, input.shapes));
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  return { ...maskedvalue !== void 0 ? { value: maskedvalue } : {}, ...maskedoptions !== void 0 ? { options: maskedoptions } : {} };
+}
+function maskformstate(fields, shapes) {
+  return fields.map((field) => ({ ...field, value: maskfield({ name: field.name, value: field.value, shapes }) }));
+}
+function maskobservation(shot, shapes) {
+  return { ...shot, forms: shot.forms.map((form) => maskingfield(form.name, shapes) ? { ...form, options: [maskmarker] } : form) };
+}
+function maskstoredvalues(record2, shapes) {
+  const masked = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(record2)) masked[key] = maskfield({ name: key, value, shapes });
+  return masked;
+}
+function maskexport(record2, shapes) {
+  return maskrecord(record2, shapes);
+}
+
 // modelroute.ts
 function routevalid(route) {
   if (route.kind.trim() === "") return { allowed: false, reason: "The model route needs its task kind." };
@@ -12360,6 +12815,28 @@ function environmentreport(input) {
     ...input.keepalive !== void 0 ? { keepalive: input.keepalive } : {}
   };
 }
+function consentmodel() {
+  return {
+    version: protocolversion,
+    posture: "denydefault",
+    sensitiveclasses: ["payment", "credential", "delete", "publish"],
+    maskshapes: [...defaultmaskshapes],
+    notes: [
+      "The denydefault posture refuses every origin the user never granted; the per origin automation allowlist holds one exact origin per entry with no wildcard expansion and the active tab grant counts as exactly one explicit single origin grant.",
+      "The per site originprofiles grant and deny single action kinds; a denied kind never runs on that origin and a granted kind still routes its sensitive classes through the fresh consent prompts.",
+      "Every consent window scopes to one session and one origin, binds the duration the user chose and names its boundary; no grant ever defaults to unlimited, and a window past its boundary suspends the run mid step until a new explicit prompt renews it.",
+      "The revokerun is a terminal session event: the pending step and every queued step halt without executing and the immutable log records the user action.",
+      "The immutable run log appends only: every entry chains through its loghash to the hash of its predecessor, the completion seal writes the final hash, and the read path verifies the whole chain before serving a single entry.",
+      "maskinputs keeps typed values, form values and stored values out of every record behind the documented password, token, card and secret shapes the user extends; the observation schema keeps its field shapes while the values carry the redaction marker."
+    ]
+  };
+}
+function securityreport(input) {
+  return { version: protocolversion, posture: "denydefault", allowlist: input.allowlist, profiles: input.profiles, windows: input.windows, consents: input.consents, revocations: input.revocations, maskrules: input.maskrules, chain: input.chain };
+}
+function logchainreport(input) {
+  return { version: protocolversion, runid: input.runid, valid: input.valid, entries: input.entries, ...input.brokenat !== void 0 ? { brokenat: input.brokenat } : {}, reason: input.reason, ...input.sealhash !== void 0 ? { sealhash: input.sealhash } : {}, ...input.sealedat !== void 0 ? { sealedat: input.sealedat } : {} };
+}
 
 // workfloweditor.ts
 var palettecategories = ["actions", "controlflow", "waits", "variables", "triggers"];
@@ -13083,6 +13560,7 @@ export {
   agentpresetof,
   agentruncontext,
   agentscopevalid,
+  allowlistcheck,
   allowlistcovers,
   allowlistreport,
   alltools,
@@ -13092,6 +13570,7 @@ export {
   apientries,
   apikeyconsentgranted,
   apireplayspecof,
+  appendlogentry,
   applycooldown,
   applyheaderules,
   applylayer,
@@ -13116,6 +13595,7 @@ export {
   authrefusedmessage,
   authreport,
   autointervalof,
+  automationallowlistgate,
   backoffdelay,
   batchreport,
   beatrun,
@@ -13184,6 +13664,7 @@ export {
   cdpeventruleof,
   cdpkinds,
   cdpreport,
+  chainreportof,
   channellive,
   channeloptionsof,
   channelorigin,
@@ -13192,6 +13673,7 @@ export {
   choosebranch,
   claim,
   claimheartbeat,
+  classconsentcovers,
   classifyintent,
   closechannel,
   closeidlechannels,
@@ -13207,6 +13689,11 @@ export {
   confirmmanualrun,
   connectclient,
   consensusstate,
+  consentdurationvalid,
+  consentmodel,
+  consentprompttext,
+  consentwindowgate,
+  consentwindowstate,
   consolecapture,
   consoleconsentcovers,
   consolediff,
@@ -13243,6 +13730,7 @@ export {
   defaulthttpstream,
   defaultidlewindowms,
   defaultloopbound,
+  defaultmaskshapes,
   defaultmcpconfig,
   defaultmcpport,
   defaultpairinglifetimems,
@@ -13250,6 +13738,9 @@ export {
   defaulttokenlifetimems,
   defaulttriggercooldown,
   delayjitter,
+  deniedevidenceof,
+  denydefaultnotice,
+  denydefaultposture,
   actionrisk as deriveactionrisk,
   detachcdpsession,
   devicepresetof,
@@ -13284,6 +13775,7 @@ export {
   enqueue,
   enqueuerequest,
   entryfresh,
+  entryhashof,
   environmentgrammar,
   environmentgrantgate,
   environmentreport,
@@ -13298,11 +13790,13 @@ export {
   eventnotification,
   eventresponse,
   eventrulematches,
+  exactorigin,
   exchangesreport,
   executorregistry,
   expandblocks,
   expandtemplate,
   expireapprovals,
+  expireconsentwindows,
   expirelayers,
   expirelocks,
   expireprofilerecords,
@@ -13310,6 +13804,7 @@ export {
   expiresessions,
   expiretokens,
   exportcontentreview,
+  exportlogchain,
   exportpresetlibrary,
   exportrunstate,
   exportsessionfile,
@@ -13324,6 +13819,7 @@ export {
   familyofkind,
   fetchoptionsof,
   fetchrequestof,
+  fieldshapekind,
   filteredsessions,
   filterentries,
   filterexchanges,
@@ -13345,6 +13841,7 @@ export {
   growthtrend,
   guardoutput,
   guardverdictgate,
+  haltedstepsof,
   handleframe,
   handoffframe,
   headerfilterof,
@@ -13400,6 +13897,7 @@ export {
   lanereport,
   lapseframes,
   lapseplanof,
+  lasthashof,
   latesttemplate,
   launchbridge,
   layernames,
@@ -13417,7 +13915,10 @@ export {
   locationpresetof,
   locationrangevalid,
   lockkey,
+  logchainreport,
+  logentryof,
   loglevels,
+  logreadgate,
   longtaskcapture,
   loopof,
   mailboxof,
@@ -13429,6 +13930,16 @@ export {
   markpending,
   markprovider,
   markuprenderstep,
+  maskexport,
+  maskfield,
+  maskformstate,
+  maskingfield,
+  maskmarker,
+  maskobservation,
+  maskrecord,
+  maskstoredvalues,
+  masktypedvalues,
+  maskvalue,
   matchmessage,
   matchurl,
   matchurlpattern,
@@ -13441,6 +13952,7 @@ export {
   messagefilterof,
   methoddomain,
   minimapfocus,
+  missingclassconsents,
   mockfor,
   mockreport,
   mockspecof,
@@ -13478,11 +13990,15 @@ export {
   offscreencapabilitygate,
   openchannel,
   openconsensus,
+  openconsentwindow,
   openoffscreen,
   openrun,
+  openrunlog,
   openseal,
   openstreamchannel,
   opentabagent,
+  originprofilegate,
+  originprofileof,
   outcomeresponse,
   overrideinputof,
   overridematches,
@@ -13535,10 +14051,13 @@ export {
   postentry,
   preparehandoff,
   privatemime,
+  profilegrade,
   profilegrantgranted,
+  profilekind,
   profilereport,
   profileretentionwindow,
   profilerkinds,
+  profilesummary,
   progressnoticeframe,
   promptcallframe,
   promptreport,
@@ -13564,6 +14083,7 @@ export {
   readentries,
   readpath,
   readstream,
+  readverifiedlog,
   reattachrun,
   receivemessage,
   receivemessages,
@@ -13598,6 +14118,7 @@ export {
   renderprovenance,
   rendertemplate,
   rendertoolbriefs,
+  renewconsentwindow,
   reordersteps,
   repeatuntilof,
   replannonfail,
@@ -13639,6 +14160,8 @@ export {
   reviewframe,
   revocationruleof,
   revokeclient,
+  revokerun,
+  revokerungate,
   rewritesourcelocation,
   roleaddress,
   roledefaults,
@@ -13680,6 +14203,8 @@ export {
   scheduleinterval,
   scopecheck,
   scopegate,
+  scopegrantof,
+  sealrunlog,
   sealrunstate,
   seamweights,
   searchfields,
@@ -13687,11 +14212,15 @@ export {
   searchsessionrecords,
   searchsteps,
   searchtemplates,
+  securityreport,
   seededrandom,
   selectorresponse,
   sendcdpcommand,
   sendfetch,
   sendmessage,
+  sensitiveclassesof,
+  sensitiveclassgate,
+  sensitivepipelingate,
   sequenceintegrity,
   serializearg,
   serializecdpcommand,
@@ -13711,6 +14240,7 @@ export {
   sessionrestoregate,
   sessiontabof,
   setvariable,
+  shapesof,
   sharelesson,
   shareworkflow,
   shiftentryof,
@@ -13832,6 +14362,7 @@ export {
   validatevaluegen,
   validateworkflow,
   verifyauth,
+  verifylogchain,
   verifytoken,
   verifywebhook,
   visitmatch,
@@ -13844,6 +14375,8 @@ export {
   watchgate,
   webhooksecretok,
   whileof,
+  wildcardentry,
+  windowgatesstep,
   wireformat,
   wizardreport,
   workerpoolsizevalid,