@wenathlan/devthink 2.0.13 → 2.0.15

package/tests/torture-environments.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { acceptrenderresult, nonceof, sandboxrenderof, stripscripts, rendermessage } from "../environments.js";
+
+/**
+ * Torture suite for the sandbox sanitizer of environments.ts.
+ * Every payload here is an adversarial markup attack: reassembly, nesting,
+ * case tricks, scheme smuggling, malformed bodies and pathological sizes.
+ * The contract: no `<script` sequence and no `on...=` handler survives.
+ */
+
+const now = 1_000;
+
+/** Asserts the sanitizer invariant over one payload: no script tag and no event handler remain. */
+function inert(markup: string): void {
+  const out = stripscripts(markup);
+  expect(out.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("<script");
+  expect(/\son[a-z]+\s*=/i.test(out)).toBe(false);
+}
+
+describe("torture: stripscripts reassembly and nesting attacks", () => {
+  it("drops the split script tag payloads that reassemble after a naive replace", () => {
+    inert("<scr<script>ipt>alert(1)</scr</script>ipt>");
+    inert("<scri<script>pt>alert(2)</scri</script>pt>");
+    inert("<scr\x00ipt>alert(3)</scr\x00ipt>");
+    inert("<<script>alert(4)</script>");
+    inert("<script<script>>alert(5)</script>");
+    inert("<img src=x on<x>error=alert(6)>");
+    inert("<a href=jav<x>ascript:alert(7)>x</a>");
+  });
+
+  it("drops script elements with their whole content through the first closing tag", () => {
+    expect(stripscripts("<div>a</div><script>var x = '</div>';</script><div>b</div>")).toBe("<div>a</div><div>b</div>");
+    expect(stripscripts("<script>deep(<script>nested()</script>)</script>ok")).toBe(")ok");
+    expect(stripscripts("<script >alert(1)</script >tail")).toBe("tail");
+    expect(stripscripts("<script src=x>fallback</script>kept")).toBe("kept");
+    expect(stripscripts("<SCRIPT>alert(1)</SCRIPT>mixed")).toBe("mixed");
+    expect(stripscripts("<script/>after")).toBe("after");
+    expect(stripscripts("</script>orphan")).toBe("orphan");
+    inert("<script>deep(<script>nested()</script>)</script>ok");
+  });
+
+  it("swallows the rest of the markup when a script element never closes", () => {
+    expect(stripscripts("before<script>alert(1)")).toBe("before");
+    expect(stripscripts("clean<script>forever")).toBe("clean");
+  });
+
+  it("drops a tag whose body carries another open angle so no reassembly survives", () => {
+    inert("<a<b>c</a>");
+    inert("<img<b>src=x>text");
+    inert("<div<>x</div>");
+    expect(stripscripts("<a<b>c</a>")).toBe("c</a>");
+  });
+
+  it("never emits an unterminated tag fragment", () => {
+    expect(stripscripts("<p>ok</p")).toBe("<p>ok");
+    expect(stripscripts("<img src=x")).toBe("");
+    expect(stripscripts("text<script>unclosed")).toBe("text");
+  });
+
+  it("keeps well formed tags and their safe attributes exactly", () => {
+    expect(stripscripts('<a href="https://example.com/page">link</a>')).toBe(
+      '<a href="https://example.com/page">link</a>',
+    );
+    expect(stripscripts('<img src="/logo.png" alt="Logo" width="32" height="32">')).toBe(
+      '<img src="/logo.png" alt="Logo" width="32" height="32">',
+    );
+    expect(stripscripts("<p>plain paragraph</p>")).toBe("<p>plain paragraph</p>");
+    expect(stripscripts("<ul><li>one</li><li>two</li></ul>")).toBe("<ul><li>one</li><li>two</li></ul>");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("torture: stripscripts event handler smuggling", () => {
+  it("drops on handlers in every casing while whitespace split tokens stay inert", () => {
+    expect(stripscripts('<div ONMOUSEOVER="x()">n</div>')).toBe("<div>n</div>");
+    expect(stripscripts("<div OnClick='x()'>n</div>")).toBe("<div>n</div>");
+    expect(stripscripts('<div onFocus="x()">n</div>')).toBe("<div>n</div>");
+    expect(stripscripts("<div onCLICK='x()'>n</div>")).toBe("<div>n</div>");
+    inert("<div On\tclick='x()'>n</div>");
+    inert("<div on\nclick='x()'>n</div>");
+    expect(stripscripts("<svg onload=alert(1)>x</svg>")).toBe("<svg>x</svg>");
+    expect(stripscripts('<body onload="x()">n</body>')).toBe("<body>n</body>");
+    inert("<iframe onload=alert(1) src=x>");
+    inert("<object onerror=alert(1)>");
+    inert("<details ontoggle=alert(1) open>x</details>");
+    inert("<marquee onstart=alert(1)>x</marquee>");
+    inert('<style onload="x()">p{}</style>');
+    inert("<input onfocus=alert(1) autofocus>");
+    inert("<form onsubmit=alert(1)><button>x</button></form>");
+    inert("<video><source onerror=alert(1)></video>");
+  });
+
+  it("drops handlers hidden behind attribute value quoting tricks", () => {
+    inert('<img src="x" onerror="alert(1)" alt="y">');
+    inert("<img src='x' onerror='alert(1)'>");
+    inert("<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>");
+    inert('<a href="x" ONCLICK="a" onclick="b">t</a>');
+    inert('<a href="x" \'onclick="b">t</a>');
+  });
+
+  it("keeps non handler attributes while everything that starts with on drops conservatively", () => {
+    expect(stripscripts('<a data-once="kept">x</a>')).toBe('<a data-once="kept">x</a>');
+    expect(stripscripts('<td colspan="2" headers="h">x</td>')).toBe('<td colspan="2" headers="h">x</td>');
+    expect(stripscripts("<a onlyattr=plain>x</a>")).toBe("<a>x</a>");
+    expect(stripscripts("<a one>x</a>")).toBe("<a>x</a>");
+    expect(stripscripts('<a on="quoted">x</a>')).toBe('<a on="quoted">x</a>');
+    inert("<a onlyattr=plain onclick=x()>x</a>");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("torture: stripscripts scheme smuggling", () => {
+  it("strips javascript, vbscript and data schemes from every attribute value", () => {
+    expect(stripscripts('<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>')).toBe('<a href="alert(1)">x</a>');
+    expect(stripscripts("<a href=javascript:alert(2)>x</a>")).toBe('<a href="alert(2)">x</a>');
+    expect(stripscripts('<a href="JAVASCRIPT:alert(3)">x</a>')).toBe('<a href="alert(3)">x</a>');
+    expect(stripscripts("<a href='JaVaScRiPt:alert(4)'>x</a>")).toBe('<a href="alert(4)">x</a>');
+    expect(stripscripts('<a href="vbscript:msgbox(1)">x</a>')).toBe('<a href="msgbox(1)">x</a>');
+    inert('<iframe src="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">x</iframe>');
+    expect(stripscripts('<a href="javajavascript:script:alert(5)">x</a>')).toBe('<a href="alert(5)">x</a>');
+    inert('<a href=" javascript:alert(6)">x</a>');
+    inert("<a href=\x00javascript:alert(7)>x</a>");
+    inert('<a href="java\tscript:alert(8)">x</a>');
+  });
+
+  it("cleans scheme fragments repeated inside one value until none remain", () => {
+    expect(stripscripts('<a href="data:">x</a>')).toBe('<a href="image/png;base64,xx">x</a>');
+    expect(stripscripts('<a href="vbscript:vbscript:run(1)">x</a>')).toBe('<a href="run(1)">x</a>');
+  });
+});
+
+describe("torture: stripscripts pathological inputs", () => {
+  it("stays linear and inert on a one megabyte payload of crafted tags", () => {
+    const payload = "<scr<script>ipt>".repeat(40_000) + "tail";
+    const started = performance.now();
+    const out = stripscripts(payload);
+    const elapsed = performance.now() - started;
+    expect(out.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("<script");
+    expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(2_000);
+  }, 10_000);
+
+  it("handles markup with unicode, emoji, rtl text and control characters inertly", () => {
+    inert("<p>こんにちは 🌍 שלום \x00\x01</p><script>alert(1)</script>");
+    inert("<p>\u2028\u2029 line separators</p><script>alert(2)</script>");
+    inert("<div>​零宽空格</div><svg onload=alert(3)>");
+    const out = stripscripts("<p>안녕하세요</p>");
+    expect(out).toBe("<p>안녕하세요</p>");
+  });
+
+  it("handles empty, whitespace and tag-only inputs without crashing", () => {
+    expect(stripscripts("")).toBe("");
+    expect(stripscripts("   ")).toBe("");
+    expect(stripscripts("<")).toBe("");
+    expect(stripscripts(">")).toBe(">");
+    expect(stripscripts("<>")).toBe("<>");
+    expect(stripscripts("<>>")).toBe("<>>");
+    expect(stripscripts("<<<>>>")).toBe(">>");
+    expect(stripscripts("plain text only")).toBe("plain text only");
+  });
+
+  it("passes comments and doctypes through because their bodies carry no open angle", () => {
+    expect(stripscripts("<!-- a comment --><p>x</p>")).toBe("<!-- a comment --><p>x</p>");
+    expect(stripscripts("<!DOCTYPE html><p>x</p>")).toBe("<!DOCTYPE html><p>x</p>");
+  });
+
+  it("treats deeply repeated angle noise inertly", () => {
+    inert("<".repeat(5_000));
+    inert(">".repeat(5_000));
+    inert("<>".repeat(5_000));
+    inert("<a".repeat(5_000));
+  });
+});
+
+describe("torture: sandbox render descriptors and nonce discipline", () => {
+  it("tolerates a blank render id while the meaningful fields stay validated", () => {
+    expect(() =>
+      sandboxrenderof({ id: "", markup: "<p/>", sourceorigin: "https://example.com", stepid: "s1", now }),
+    ).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() =>
+      sandboxrenderof({ id: "r", markup: "", sourceorigin: "https://example.com", stepid: "s1", now }),
+    ).toThrow();
+    expect(() => sandboxrenderof({ id: "r", markup: "<p/>", sourceorigin: "", stepid: "s1", now })).toThrow();
+    expect(() =>
+      sandboxrenderof({ id: "r", markup: "<p/>", sourceorigin: "https://example.com", stepid: "", now }),
+    ).toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it("sanitizes the markup inside the render descriptor so the frame never sees a live script", () => {
+    const render = sandboxrenderof({
+      id: "r1",
+      markup: "<p>hello</p><script>alert(1)</script>",
+      sourceorigin: "https://example.com",
+      stepid: "s1",
+      now,
+    });
+    expect(render.markup).toBe("<p>hello</p>");
+    const message = rendermessage(render);
+    expect(message.markup.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("<script");
+  });
+
+  it("nonces differ for distinct seeds, repeat for the same seed and never leak the seed", () => {
+    const one = nonceof("seed-a");
+    expect(nonceof("seed-a")).toBe(one);
+    expect(nonceof("seed-b")).not.toBe(one);
+    expect(nonceof("")).toMatch(/^[a-z0-9]{16}$/);
+    expect(nonceof("x".repeat(10_000))).toMatch(/^[a-z0-9]{16}$/);
+    const unicode = nonceof("🔥".repeat(100));
+    expect(unicode).toMatch(/^[a-z0-9]{16}$/);
+    expect(one).not.toContain("seed");
+  });
+
+  it("rejects every replay, cross channel and malformed answer of the sandbox frame", () => {
+    const render = sandboxrenderof({
+      id: "r1",
+      markup: "<p>x</p>",
+      sourceorigin: "https://example.com",
+      stepid: "s1",
+      now,
+    });
+    const message = {
+      channel: "devthinksandbox",
+      type: "renderresult",
+      nonce: render.nonce,
+      ok: true,
+      text: "ok",
+      summary: "ok",
+    } as const;
+    const first = acceptrenderresult({ renders: [render], message, now: now + 1 });
+    expect(first.accepted).toBe(true);
+    expect(first.renders.find((entry) => entry.nonce === render.nonce)?.answeredat).toBe(now + 1);
+    const replay = acceptrenderresult({ renders: first.renders, message, now: now + 2 });
+    expect(replay.accepted).toBe(false);
+    expect(replay.reason).toMatch(/replayed or already answered/i);
+    const unthreaded = acceptrenderresult({ renders: [render], message, now: now + 2 });
+    expect(unthreaded.accepted).toBe(true);
+    expect(acceptrenderresult({ renders: [], message, now: now + 1 }).accepted).toBe(false);
+    expect(acceptrenderresult({ renders: [render], message: { ...message, nonce: "" }, now: now + 1 }).accepted).toBe(
+      false,
+    );
+    expect(
+      acceptrenderresult({ renders: [render], message: { ...message, nonce: "deadbeefdeadbeef" }, now: now + 1 })
+        .accepted,
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      acceptrenderresult({ renders: [render], message: { ...message, channel: "devthinkother" }, now: now + 1 })
+        .accepted,
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      acceptrenderresult({ renders: [render], message: { ...message, type: "anything" }, now: now + 1 }).accepted,
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      acceptrenderresult({
+        renders: [render],
+        message: { channel: "devthinksandbox", type: "renderresult", ok: true, text: "ok", summary: "ok" },
+        now: now + 1,
+      }).accepted,
+    ).toBe(false);
+    const { nonce: _dropnonce, ...nononce } = message;
+    expect(acceptrenderresult({ renders: [render], message: nononce, now: now + 1 }).accepted).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("strips markup from the answer text so a result never reenters the dom", () => {
+    const render = sandboxrenderof({
+      id: "r1",
+      markup: "<p>x</p>",
+      sourceorigin: "https://example.com",
+      stepid: "s1",
+      now,
+    });
+    const answer = acceptrenderresult({
+      renders: [render],
+      message: {
+        channel: "devthinksandbox",
+        type: "renderresult",
+        nonce: render.nonce,
+        ok: true,
+        text: '<script>alert("evil")</script><b>bold</b> tail',
+        summary: "s",
+      },
+      now: now + 1,
+    });
+    expect(answer.accepted).toBe(true);
+    expect(answer.result?.text).toBe('alert("evil")bold tail');
+    expect(answer.result?.text.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("<script");
+    expect(answer.result?.text.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("<b>");
+  });
+});

package/tests/torture-export.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  csvfield,
+  csvof,
+  exportdescriptorof,
+  exportformats,
+  exportrecords,
+  exportscopes,
+  jsonlinesof,
+  markdownfield,
+  markdownof,
+  secretfieldshapes,
+  unmaskedfieldsof,
+} from "../export.js";
+import { maskfield, maskingfield, maskmarker, maskrecord, maskvalue } from "../security.js";
+
+/**
+ * Torture suite for the export family: csv injection, formula smuggling,
+ * secret laundering attempts, markdown escaping and pathological payloads.
+ */
+
+describe("torture: csv field escaping", () => {
+  it("escapes commas, quotes and newlines with doubled inner quotes", () => {
+    expect(csvfield("plain")).toBe("plain");
+    expect(csvfield("with,comma")).toBe('"with,comma"');
+    expect(csvfield('with"quote')).toBe('"with""quote"');
+    expect(csvfield("line1\nline2")).toBe('"line1\nline2"');
+    expect(csvfield('all"three",chars\nhere')).toBe('"all""three"",chars\nhere"');
+    expect(csvfield("")).toBe("");
+    expect(csvfield(" ")).toBe(" ");
+    expect(csvfield("no special")).toBe("no special");
+  });
+
+  it("keeps tab, cr and unicode unquoted unless they collide with the escape set", () => {
+    expect(csvfield("with\ttab")).toBe("with\ttab");
+    expect(csvfield("cr\ronly")).toBe("cr\ronly");
+    expect(csvfield("こんにちは")).toBe("こんにちは");
+    expect(csvfield("emoji 🌍 here")).toBe("emoji 🌍 here");
+    expect(csvfield("rtl שלום")).toBe("rtl שלום");
+  });
+
+  it("csv rows sort headers, union fields and fill absent fields empty", () => {
+    const csv = csvof([
+      { b: "2", a: "1" },
+      { a: "x", c: "3" },
+    ]);
+    const lines = csv.split("\n");
+    expect(lines[0]).toBe("a,b,c");
+    expect(lines[1]).toBe("1,2,");
+    expect(lines[2]).toBe("x,,3");
+    expect(csvof([])).toBe("");
+  });
+
+  it("csv round trips adversarial payloads without breaking the column count", () => {
+    const rows = [
+      { formula: "=cmd|' /C calc'!A0", note: "excel injection" },
+      { formula: "+1|2", note: "lotus injection" },
+      { formula: "-2+3+cmd|' /C calc'!A0", note: "another form" },
+      { formula: "@SUM(1+9)*cmd|' /C calc'!A0", note: "at form" },
+      { formula: "\t=hidden", note: "tab led formula" },
+      { formula: 'quote"and,comma\nnewline', note: "escape collision" },
+      { formula: "\u2028unicode sep", note: "u2028" },
+      { formula: "\0null", note: "null byte" },
+    ];
+    const csv = csvof(rows);
+    const parsed = parsecsv(csv);
+    expect(parsed.length).toBe(rows.length + 1);
+    expect(parsed[0]).toEqual(["formula", "note"]);
+    for (const cells of parsed.slice(1)) expect(cells.length).toBe(2);
+    expect(parsed[1]?.[0]).toBe("=cmd|' /C calc'!A0");
+    expect(parsed[6]?.[0]).toBe('quote"and,comma\nnewline');
+  });
+
+  /** Parses whole csv content honoring quoted cells with embedded newlines and doubled quotes. */
+  function parsecsv(content: string): string[][] {
+    const rowsout: string[][] = [];
+    let row: string[] = [];
+    let cell = "";
+    let quoted = false;
+    for (let index = 0; index < content.length; index += 1) {
+      const char = content[index]!;
+      if (quoted) {
+        if (char === '"') {
+          if (content[index + 1] === '"') {
+            cell += '"';
+            index += 1;
+          } else quoted = false;
+        } else cell += char;
+      } else if (char === '"') quoted = true;
+      else if (char === ",") {
+        row.push(cell);
+        cell = "";
+      } else if (char === "\n") {
+        row.push(cell);
+        rowsout.push(row);
+        row = [];
+        cell = "";
+      } else cell += char;
+    }
+    if (cell !== "" || row.length > 0) {
+      row.push(cell);
+      rowsout.push(row);
+    }
+    return rowsout;
+  }
+});
+
+describe("torture: markdown escaping", () => {
+  it("escapes pipes, backslashes and newlines in order", () => {
+    expect(markdownfield("plain")).toBe("plain");
+    expect(markdownfield("a|b")).toBe("a\\|b");
+    expect(markdownfield("a\\b")).toBe("a\\\\b");
+    expect(markdownfield("a\\|b")).toBe("a\\\\\\|b");
+    expect(markdownfield("line1\nline2")).toBe("line1<br>line2");
+    expect(markdownfield("line1\r\nline2")).toBe("line1<br>line2");
+    expect(markdownfield("")).toBe("");
+    expect(markdownfield("all|three\\chars\nhere")).toBe("all\\|three\\\\chars<br>here");
+  });
+
+  it("markdown tables keep the column count under adversarial cells", () => {
+    const table = markdownof([
+      { a: "|injection|", b: "x" },
+      { a: "line\nbreak", b: "y" },
+    ]);
+    const lines = table.split("\n");
+    expect(lines[0]).toBe("| a | b |");
+    expect(lines[1]).toBe("| --- | --- |");
+    for (const line of lines) {
+      expect((line.match(/(?<!\\)\|/g) ?? []).length).toBe(line.startsWith("| ---") ? 3 : 3);
+    }
+    expect(markdownof([])).toBe("");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("torture: secret field detection and laundering refusal", () => {
+  it("detects every secret shape by substring in any casing", () => {
+    const shapes = ["password"];
+    const rows = [
+      { password: "hunter2" },
+      { Password: "hunter2" },
+      { PASSWORD: "hunter2" },
+      { mypasswordfield: "hunter2" },
+      { apikey: "abc" },
+      { apiKey: "abc" },
+      { api_key: "not matched by shape list" },
+      { token: "tok" },
+      { authauthorization: "z" },
+      { secret: "s" },
+    ];
+    const unmasked = unmaskedfieldsof(rows);
+    expect(new Set(unmasked)).toEqual(
+      new Set([
+        "Password",
+        "PASSWORD",
+        "password",
+        "mypasswordfield",
+        "apikey",
+        "apiKey",
+        "token",
+        "authauthorization",
+        "secret",
+      ]),
+    );
+    expect(unmasked.length).toBe(9);
+  });
+
+  it("masked values pass while empty and non string values never trip the gate", () => {
+    const rows = [
+      { password: maskmarker },
+      { token: "" },
+      { secret: "  " },
+      { apikey: 42 },
+      { apikey: null },
+      { apikey: { nested: "x" } },
+      { note: "a normal note about passwords as a word" },
+    ];
+    expect(unmaskedfieldsof(rows)).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("export refuses the whole file when one unmasked secret rides any format", () => {
+    for (const format of exportformats) {
+      const descriptor = exportdescriptorof(format, "runs");
+      const refused = exportrecords({ descriptor, records: [{ note: "ok", password: "hunter2" }], shapes: [] });
+      expect(refused.result.bytes).toBe(0);
+      expect(refused.result.rows).toBe(0);
+      expect(refused.content).toBe("");
+      expect(refused.result.reason).toMatch(/unmasked/i);
+      const clean = exportrecords({ descriptor, records: [{ note: "ok", password: maskmarker }], shapes: [] });
+      expect(clean.result.rows).toBe(1);
+      expect(clean.result.bytes).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("export descriptors refuse unknown formats and scopes", () => {
+    expect(() => exportdescriptorof("exe", "runs")).toThrow(/csv, json, log, jsonl and markdown/i);
+    expect(() => exportdescriptorof("csv", "passwords")).toThrow(
+      /runs, extractions, notes, session, audit and extraction/i,
+    );
+    expect(exportdescriptorof("csv", "runs").format).toBe("csv");
+    expect(exportscopes.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(secretfieldshapes).toContain("authorization");
+  });
+
+  it("masked shapes honor the configured list while the documented recognizer always runs", () => {
+    expect(maskingfield("password", [])).toBe(true);
+    expect(maskingfield("token", [])).toBe(true);
+    expect(maskingfield("apikey", [])).toBe(true);
+    expect(maskingfield("secret", [])).toBe(true);
+    expect(maskingfield("authorization", [])).toBe(true);
+    expect(maskingfield("name", [])).toBe(false);
+    expect(maskingfield("name", ["name"])).toBe(true);
+    expect(maskingfield("username", ["name"])).toBe(true);
+    expect(maskingfield("nomatch", ["name"])).toBe(false);
+    expect(maskingfield("anything", [""])).toBe(false);
+    expect(maskingfield("caseinsensitive", ["ins"])).toBe(true);
+    expect(maskfield({ name: "password", value: "x", shapes: [] })).toBe(maskmarker);
+    expect(maskfield({ name: "note", value: "x", shapes: [] })).toBe("x");
+    expect(maskvalue("")).toBe("");
+    expect(maskvalue("anything")).toBe(maskmarker);
+  });
+
+  it("maskrecord walks nested records and arrays deeply", () => {
+    const masked = maskrecord({ password: "x", note: "ok", nested: { password: "y", keep: "z" } }, []);
+    expect(masked.password).toBe(maskmarker);
+    expect(masked.note).toBe("ok");
+    expect((masked.nested as Record<string, unknown>).password).toBe(maskmarker);
+    expect((masked.nested as Record<string, unknown>).keep).toBe("z");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("torture: jsonl rendering under adversarial records", () => {
+  it("one compact json document per line with no delimiter inside", () => {
+    const records = [{ a: "line1\nline2" }, { b: 'quote"inside' }, { c: "こんにちは" }, { d: 42 }, { e: null }];
+    const jsonl = jsonlinesof(records);
+    const lines = jsonl.split("\n");
+    expect(lines.length).toBe(5);
+    for (const line of lines) expect(() => JSON.parse(line)).not.toThrow();
+    expect(jsonlinesof([])).toBe("");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("torture: pathological payloads through the export pipeline", () => {
+  it("one megabyte values export without losing bytes", () => {
+    const huge = "x".repeat(1_000_000);
+    const csv = exportrecords({ descriptor: exportdescriptorof("csv", "runs"), records: [{ blob: huge }], shapes: [] });
+    expect(csv.content.length).toBeGreaterThan(1_000_000);
+    expect(csv.result.rows).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it("prototype pollution keys never reach the export through object entries", () => {
+    const rows = JSON.parse('{"__proto__":"polluted","constructor":"also","note":"ok"}') as Record<string, string>;
+    const csv = exportrecords({ descriptor: exportdescriptorof("csv", "runs"), records: [rows], shapes: [] });
+    expect(csv.content).toContain("note");
+    expect(csv.content).not.toContain("polluted");
+    expect(({} as Record<string, unknown>).polluted).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("unicode newlines and separators stay inside their cells", () => {
+    const rows = [{ note: "a\u2028b\u2029c" }];
+    const csv = exportrecords({ descriptor: exportdescriptorof("csv", "runs"), records: rows, shapes: [] });
+    expect(csv.content.split("\n").length).toBe(2);
+  });
+});