@webpieces/mcp-server 0.4.863 → 0.4.864

package/README.md

@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ and output JSON Schema — the build extracts them from the contract source and
 `mcp-<ContractClass>-tools.json` per contract — invokes the normal Webpieces filter/controller path, and turns exceptions into safe model-visible
 MCP results.
 
-`@WpMcpTool` is an opt-in and every tool must also declare `@WpMcpAuthJwt`. MCP user
-authorization and endpoint transport authentication are deliberately separate. The MCP adapter
-never accepts trusted context values from tool arguments or unverified headers.
+`@WpMcpTool` opts an endpoint into the protocol. Every endpoint declares canonical
+`@WpAuth` credentials and common `@WpAuthorization` policy. The same policy governs tool visibility,
+schema lookup, dispatch and receiving endpoint execution. The MCP adapter never accepts trusted
+context from tool arguments or unverified headers.
 
 ```ts
 interface FindOrderRequest {
@@ -24,8 +25,8 @@ interface FindOrderResponse {
 @ApiType(SVC_TO_SVC, MCP)
 abstract class OrdersApi {
     /** Find one order owned by the signed-in user. */
-    @WpMcpAuthJwt({ allRolesAllowed: true })
-    @WpAuthJwt({ allRolesAllowed: true })
+    @WpAuth([jwt()])
+    @WpAuthorization({ authType: AuthorizationType.ALL_USERS })
     @Endpoint(POST, '/find', READ, RPC)
     @WpMcpTool('orders_find')
     find(request: FindOrderRequest): Promise<FindOrderResponse> {
@@ -101,13 +102,12 @@ settings can be swapped, and a future setting is an additive setter rather than
 change. Expect to supply the type arguments explicitly:
 
 ```ts
-const config = new WpMcpServerConfig<MyGrant, MyMintRequest>()
+const config = new WpMcpServerConfig<MyGrant>()
     .setName('my-server')
     .setVersion('1.0.0')
     .setResource('https://api.example.com/mcp')
     .setAccessTokenAuthority(authority)
-    .setEndpointJwtAuthority(jwtHook)
-    .setEndpointMintRequest((credential) => new MyMintRequest(credential.subject))
+    .setAuthorizationService(router.authorizationService())
     .setAuthorizationServers(['https://login.example.com'])
     .setRequiredScopes(['tools'])
     .setMaxAccountValidationAgeSeconds(15 * 60);
@@ -176,13 +176,13 @@ supplied `_meta.progressToken`) a `reportProgress(...)` callback. Progress remai
 one request and causes the official handler to select request-scoped SSE; closing that response
 aborts the same signal. The context key has no HTTP header and is never propagated as caller input.
 
-For a local binding the API method must combine `@WpMcpAuthJwt` with `@WpAuthJwt`. Before every tool
-authorized, schema-valid call the bridge asks the application `JwtHook` to mint a distinct short-lived endpoint JWT and invokes
-`ApiFactory.createInvocationApiClient`, preserving `JwtHook`, `LogApiFilter`, and `AuthFilter`. Literal MCP-token
-passthrough is rejected. For a remote binding the endpoint must use `@WpAuthOidc`; the generated Node
-client supplies its service credential and propagates only trusted delegated context established by
-the MCP access-token authority. Neither an external MCP bearer nor a browser session JWT is sent to
-the downstream endpoint.
+Local bindings require explicit tool exposure and valid common authorization. They pass a token-free
+`InvocationAuthentication` through `ApiFactory.createInvocationApiClient`, preserving the ordinary
+logging, authentication and authorization filters. The proof identifies the actual endpoint and
+original verified ingress scope. No endpoint JWT is minted or parsed and no GUI `JWT_HOOK` is required.
+Remote bindings declare `oidc(...)` or `sharedSecret(...)` network credentials. The generated Node
+client chooses its service mechanism before forwarding verified delegated facts; the MCP bearer never
+becomes a downstream credential.
 
 `McpDeployment.singleProcess()` uses an in-memory invalidation bus and makes that limit explicit.
 Distributed deployments must use `McpDeployment.distributed(sharedBus)`. List responses have a bounded
@@ -194,32 +194,35 @@ The authority verifies issuer, signature/token state, expiry, scopes, the exact
 current account state. Neither served era keeps a session here, so the bearer is verified once per POST
 at the `bind(...)` HTTP boundary, before the SDK is involved; tool handlers never re-verify it. A
 rejected token must be thrown as `ApiUnauthorizedError` (answered 401 + `WWW-Authenticate`); any
-other throw from the authority is an implementation failure (500). Endpoint JWTs are capped at one
-hour and MCP access tokens at 30 days.
+other throw from the authority is an implementation failure (500). MCP access tokens are capped at 30 days.
 
 ## Principal, policy and request context
 
 `VerifiedMcpCredential.caller` is the application's `AuthenticatedCaller` resolved from current account
 facts. `principalRoles` is derived from that caller, a public hard cut from the old listing-role field.
-Use the same application mapping for this caller and the endpoint JWT mint payload. Security metadata
+The framework publishes its canonical USER_ID and JSON-array USER_ROLES; custom trusted facts come from the verified caller entries. Security metadata
 (issuer, exact resource, scopes, issuance/expiry and account validation time) remains on the credential.
 
 The framework publishes the caller's trusted entries and `llm` surface immediately after verification,
 then reconciles inbound trusted headers using the same operation as ordinary HTTP. Contradictory or
-unvouched identity/surface headers are rejected. `JwtHook.authorizeJwt` governs the request's authorized
+unvouched identity/surface headers are rejected. The common `AuthorizationService` governs the request's authorized
 tool view before SDK processing; only explicit `ApiForbiddenError` denials hide tools. Policy/datastore
 failures propagate to the safe ingress boundary. Documentation, synchronous SDK schema lookup and call
 name resolution all use that view. The dispatcher independently checks the same policy before input
-validation and bridge issuance. A hidden tool is indistinguishable from an unknown name and triggers no
-schema validation, JWT issuance or binding invocation.
+validation and invocation. A hidden tool is indistinguishable from an unknown name and triggers no
+schema validation or binding invocation.
 
 Each HTTP POST has one transport-owned `RequestContext.run`, including malformed-body failures. Local
 invocation opens no detached/nested scope and retains the original transport request, request/action IDs,
 custom context and downstream response-header accumulation. Its immutable `InvocationAuthentication`
 is carried on that invocation's proxy/MethodMeta, never on a mutable ambient credential slot. Normal
-endpoint JWT parsing and policy still run, and parsed user/roles/trusted entries must match the ingress
-principal. GUI proxies continue reading the transport bearer. Remote bindings still use explicit OIDC
-clients and propagate the verified principal's trusted entries; another HTTP process has its own scope.
+receiving endpoint authorization runs against the same canonical trusted facts. A captured/restored
+snapshot cannot reuse the local proof. GUI HTTP requests verify their own bearer normally. Remote
+bindings authenticate their own hop before accepting delegated facts; another HTTP process has its
+own scope. `SERVICE_ONLY` requires actual current-hop machine evidence, even when the surface is `llm`.
+
+See [the authorization migration and release order](../../../docs/authorization-migration.md).
+
 
 ## Error boundary
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@webpieces/mcp-server",
-  "version": "0.4.863",
+  "version": "0.4.864",
   "description": "Secure MCP tool generation from annotated Webpieces API contracts",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "./src/index.js",
@@ -24,15 +24,15 @@
   "dependencies": {
     "@modelcontextprotocol/node": "2.0.0",
     "@modelcontextprotocol/server": "2.0.0",
-    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.863",
-    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.863",
-    "@webpieces/http-routing": "0.4.863",
-    "@webpieces/http-server": "0.4.863",
+    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.864",
+    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.864",
+    "@webpieces/http-routing": "0.4.864",
+    "@webpieces/http-server": "0.4.864",
     "express": "5.1.0",
     "reflect-metadata": "0.2.2",
     "tslib": "2.8.1"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@webpieces/http-client-node": "0.4.863"
+    "@webpieces/http-client-node": "0.4.864"
   }
 }

package/src/McpApiBinding.d.ts

@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
 import { DtoValue } from '@webpieces/core-util';
-import { ApiFactory, ClassType, InvocationAuthentication } from '@webpieces/http-routing';
+import { ApiFactory, AuthorizationService, ClassType, InvocationAuthentication } from '@webpieces/http-routing';
 export type McpBindingTopology = 'local' | 'remote';
 /** Explicit contract-to-invoker binding; MCP never discovers implementations from a router. */
 export declare class McpApiBinding<TApi extends object = object> {
     readonly api: ClassType<TApi>;
     readonly topology: McpBindingTopology;
     private readonly provider;
+    private readonly receivingPolicy?;
     private constructor();
     static local<TApi extends object>(api: ClassType<TApi>, apiFactory: ApiFactory): McpApiBinding<TApi>;
     static remote<TApi extends object>(api: ClassType<TApi>, provider: () => TApi): McpApiBinding<TApi>;
     invoke(methodName: string, request: DtoValue, authentication?: InvocationAuthentication): Promise<DtoValue>;
-    validateMethod(methodName: string): void;
+    validateMethod(methodName: string, policy: AuthorizationService): void;
 }

package/src/McpApiBinding.js

@@ -7,10 +7,12 @@ class McpApiBinding {
     api;
     topology;
     provider;
-    constructor(api, topology, provider) {
+    receivingPolicy;
+    constructor(api, topology, provider, receivingPolicy) {
         this.api = api;
         this.topology = topology;
         this.provider = provider;
+        this.receivingPolicy = receivingPolicy;
     }
     // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- explicit public factory mirrors the binding API
     static local(api, apiFactory) {
@@ -18,7 +20,7 @@ class McpApiBinding {
             if (!authentication)
                 throw new Error('Local MCP invocation requires explicit authentication.');
             return apiFactory.createInvocationApiClient(api, authentication);
-        });
+        }, apiFactory.authorizationService());
     }
     // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- explicit public factory mirrors the binding API
     static remote(api, provider) {
@@ -32,13 +34,14 @@ class McpApiBinding {
         }
         return method.call(client, request);
     }
-    validateMethod(methodName) {
-        const auth = (0, core_util_1.getAuthMeta)(this.api, methodName)?.mode;
-        const expected = this.topology === 'local' ? 'jwt' : 'oidc';
-        if (auth?.kind !== expected) {
-            throw new Error(`MCP ${this.topology} binding ${this.api.name}.${methodName} requires ` +
-                `@${expected === 'jwt' ? 'WpAuthJwt' : 'WpAuthOidc'}, but declares ` +
-                `${auth ? `'${auth.kind}'` : 'no HTTP auth'}.`);
+    validateMethod(methodName, policy) {
+        if (this.topology === 'local' && this.receivingPolicy !== policy) {
+            throw new Error('Local MCP visibility and invocation must use the receiving ApiFactory authorizationService().');
+        }
+        (0, core_util_1.assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode)(this.api);
+        const methods = (0, core_util_1.getAuthMeta)(this.api, methodName)?.methods;
+        if (this.topology === 'remote' && !methods?.some((method) => method.kind === 'oidc' || method.kind === 'shared-secret')) {
+            throw new Error(`MCP remote binding ${this.api.name}.${methodName} requires oidc(...) or sharedSecret(...) network ingress.`);
         }
     }
 }

package/src/McpApiBinding.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"McpApiBinding.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/mcp-server/src/McpApiBinding.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAAA,oDAAuG;AAWvG,+FAA+F;AAC/F,MAAa,aAAa;IAEF;IACA;IACC;IACA;IAJrB,YACoB,GAAoB,EACpB,QAA4B,EAC3B,QAA6D,EAC7D,eAAsC;QAHvC,QAAG,GAAH,GAAG,CAAiB;QACpB,aAAQ,GAAR,QAAQ,CAAoB;QAC3B,aAAQ,GAAR,QAAQ,CAAqD;QAC7D,oBAAe,GAAf,eAAe,CAAuB;IACxD,CAAC;IAEJ,iGAAiG;IACjG,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CACR,GAAoB,EACpB,UAAsB;QAEtB,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE;YACtD,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc;gBACf,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC,CAAC;YAC9E,OAAO,UAAU,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,GAAY,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9E,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,oBAAoB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1C,CAAC;IAED,iGAAiG;IACjG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CACT,GAAoB,EACpB,QAAoB;QAEpB,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IACtD,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,CACF,UAAkB,EAClB,OAAiB,EACjB,cAAyC;QAEzC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAc,CAAmB,CAAC;QAC/D,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;QAClC,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/B,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACX,4BAA4B,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,mBAAmB,UAAU,IAAI,CAC7E,CAAC;QACN,CAAC;QACD,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAsB,CAAC;IAC7D,CAAC;IAED,cAAc,CAAC,UAAkB,EAAE,MAA4B;QAC3D,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/D,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,+FAA+F,CAAC,CAAC;QACrH,CAAC;QACD,IAAA,0CAA8B,EAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QACzC,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAA,uBAAW,EAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QAC3D,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,MAAgB,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAChI,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,sBAAsB,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU,2DAA2D,CAAC,CAAC;QAClI,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;CACJ;AArDD,sCAqDC","sourcesContent":["import { AuthMode, DtoValue, getAuthMeta, assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport {\n    ApiClientProxy,\n    ApiFactory,\n    AuthorizationService,\n    ClassType,\n    InvocationAuthentication,\n} from '@webpieces/http-routing';\n\nexport type McpBindingTopology = 'local' | 'remote';\n\n/** Explicit contract-to-invoker binding; MCP never discovers implementations from a router. */\nexport class McpApiBinding<TApi extends object = object> {\n    private constructor(\n        public readonly api: ClassType<TApi>,\n        public readonly topology: McpBindingTopology,\n        private readonly provider: (authentication?: InvocationAuthentication) => TApi,\n        private readonly receivingPolicy?: AuthorizationService,\n    ) {}\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- explicit public factory mirrors the binding API\n    static local<TApi extends object>(\n        api: ClassType<TApi>,\n        apiFactory: ApiFactory,\n    ): McpApiBinding<TApi> {\n        return new McpApiBinding(api, 'local', (authentication) => {\n            if (!authentication)\n                throw new Error('Local MCP invocation requires explicit authentication.');\n            return apiFactory.createInvocationApiClient(api as never, authentication);\n        }, apiFactory.authorizationService());\n    }\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- explicit public factory mirrors the binding API\n    static remote<TApi extends object>(\n        api: ClassType<TApi>,\n        provider: () => TApi,\n    ): McpApiBinding<TApi> {\n        return new McpApiBinding(api, 'remote', provider);\n    }\n\n    invoke(\n        methodName: string,\n        request: DtoValue,\n        authentication?: InvocationAuthentication,\n    ): Promise<DtoValue> {\n        const client = this.provider(authentication) as ApiClientProxy;\n        const method = client[methodName];\n        if (typeof method !== 'function') {\n            throw new Error(\n                `MCP binding provider for ${this.api.name} has no method '${methodName}'.`,\n            );\n        }\n        return method.call(client, request) as Promise<DtoValue>;\n    }\n\n    validateMethod(methodName: string, policy: AuthorizationService): void {\n        if (this.topology === 'local' && this.receivingPolicy !== policy) {\n            throw new Error('Local MCP visibility and invocation must use the receiving ApiFactory authorizationService().');\n        }\n        assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode(this.api);\n        const methods = getAuthMeta(this.api, methodName)?.methods;\n        if (this.topology === 'remote' && !methods?.some((method: AuthMode) => method.kind === 'oidc' || method.kind === 'shared-secret')) {\n            throw new Error(`MCP remote binding ${this.api.name}.${methodName} requires oidc(...) or sharedSecret(...) network ingress.`);\n        }\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/McpApiDispatcher.d.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 import { DtoValue } from '@webpieces/core-util';
-import { JwtHook } from '@webpieces/http-routing';
+import { AuthorizationService } from '@webpieces/http-routing';
 import { RegisteredMcpTool } from './McpToolRegistry';
 import { VerifiedMcpCredential } from './McpAuth';
 import { McpInvocationContext } from './McpInvocationContext';
 /** Authorize, validate, then issue a local credential and invoke the ordinary filters. No scope or catch. */
 export declare class McpApiDispatcher {
     private readonly schemas;
-    call<T>(tool: RegisteredMcpTool, requestDto: DtoValue, credential: VerifiedMcpCredential, invocation: McpInvocationContext, policy: JwtHook<T>, mintEndpointToken: () => Promise<string>): Promise<DtoValue>;
+    call(tool: RegisteredMcpTool, requestDto: DtoValue, credential: VerifiedMcpCredential, invocation: McpInvocationContext, policy: AuthorizationService): Promise<DtoValue>;
 }

package/src/McpApiDispatcher.js

@@ -9,14 +9,14 @@ const McpInvocationContext_1 = require("./McpInvocationContext");
 /** Authorize, validate, then issue a local credential and invoke the ordinary filters. No scope or catch. */
 class McpApiDispatcher {
     schemas = new core_util_1.ApiJsonSchemaValidator();
-    async call(tool, requestDto, credential, invocation, policy, mintEndpointToken) {
-        await new McpToolPolicy_1.McpToolPolicy(policy).require(credential.caller, tool.mcpAuth.requirement, tool.name);
+    async call(tool, requestDto, credential, invocation, policy) {
+        await new McpToolPolicy_1.McpToolPolicy(policy).require(tool.authorization, tool.name);
         const inputFailure = this.schemas.validate(tool.inputSchema, requestDto);
         if (inputFailure) {
             throw new core_util_1.ApiBadRequestError(`MCP arguments for ${tool.name} did not match its published input schema: ${inputFailure.message}`, inputFailure.field, inputFailure.message);
         }
         const authentication = tool.binding.topology === 'local'
-            ? new http_routing_1.InvocationAuthentication(await mintEndpointToken(), credential.caller)
+            ? new http_routing_1.InvocationAuthentication(tool.apiClass, tool.methodName)
             : undefined;
         core_context_1.RequestContext.putTrusted(McpInvocationContext_1.MCP_INVOCATION_CONTEXT, invocation);
         return tool.binding.invoke(tool.methodName, requestDto, authentication);

package/src/McpApiDispatcher.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"McpApiDispatcher.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/mcp-server/src/McpApiDispatcher.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAAA,oDAA4F;AAC5F,0DAAyD;AACzD,0DAA4E;AAC5E,mDAAgD;AAGhD,iEAAsF;AAEtF,6GAA6G;AAC7G,MAAa,gBAAgB;IACR,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,kCAAsB,EAAE,CAAC;IAExD,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CACN,IAAuB,EACvB,UAAoB,EACpB,UAAiC,EACjC,UAAgC,EAChC,MAAkB,EAClB,iBAAwC;QAExC,MAAM,IAAI,6BAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CACnC,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,EACjB,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,EACxB,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CACZ,CAAC;QACF,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;QACzE,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;YACf,MAAM,IAAI,8BAAkB,CACxB,qBAAqB,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,8CAA8C,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAClG,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,EAClB,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CACvB,CAAC;QACN,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,cAAc,GAChB,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;YAC7B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,uCAAwB,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;YAC5E,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;QACpB,6BAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,6CAAsB,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9D,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5E,CAAC;CACJ;AA/BD,4CA+BC","sourcesContent":["import { ApiBadRequestError, ApiJsonSchemaValidator, DtoValue } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { RequestContext } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { InvocationAuthentication, JwtHook } from '@webpieces/http-routing';\nimport { McpToolPolicy } from './McpToolPolicy';\nimport { RegisteredMcpTool } from './McpToolRegistry';\nimport { VerifiedMcpCredential } from './McpAuth';\nimport { MCP_INVOCATION_CONTEXT, McpInvocationContext } from './McpInvocationContext';\n\n/** Authorize, validate, then issue a local credential and invoke the ordinary filters. No scope or catch. */\nexport class McpApiDispatcher {\n    private readonly schemas = new ApiJsonSchemaValidator();\n\n    async call<T>(\n        tool: RegisteredMcpTool,\n        requestDto: DtoValue,\n        credential: VerifiedMcpCredential,\n        invocation: McpInvocationContext,\n        policy: JwtHook<T>,\n        mintEndpointToken: () => Promise<string>,\n    ): Promise<DtoValue> {\n        await new McpToolPolicy(policy).require(\n            credential.caller,\n            tool.mcpAuth.requirement,\n            tool.name,\n        );\n        const inputFailure = this.schemas.validate(tool.inputSchema, requestDto);\n        if (inputFailure) {\n            throw new ApiBadRequestError(\n                `MCP arguments for ${tool.name} did not match its published input schema: ${inputFailure.message}`,\n                inputFailure.field,\n                inputFailure.message,\n            );\n        }\n        const authentication =\n            tool.binding.topology === 'local'\n                ? new InvocationAuthentication(await mintEndpointToken(), credential.caller)\n                : undefined;\n        RequestContext.putTrusted(MCP_INVOCATION_CONTEXT, invocation);\n        return tool.binding.invoke(tool.methodName, requestDto, authentication);\n    }\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"McpApiDispatcher.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/mcp-server/src/McpApiDispatcher.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAAA,oDAA4F;AAC5F,0DAAyD;AACzD,0DAAyF;AACzF,mDAAgD;AAGhD,iEAAsF;AAEtF,6GAA6G;AAC7G,MAAa,gBAAgB;IACR,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,kCAAsB,EAAE,CAAC;IAExD,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CACN,IAAuB,EACvB,UAAoB,EACpB,UAAiC,EACjC,UAAgC,EAChC,MAA4B;QAE5B,MAAM,IAAI,6BAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CACnC,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,EAClB,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CACZ,CAAC;QACF,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;QACzE,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;YACf,MAAM,IAAI,8BAAkB,CACxB,qBAAqB,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,8CAA8C,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAClG,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,EAClB,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CACvB,CAAC;QACN,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,cAAc,GAChB,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;YAC7B,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,uCAAwB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;YAC9D,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;QACpB,6BAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,6CAAsB,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9D,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5E,CAAC;CACJ;AA7BD,4CA6BC","sourcesContent":["import { ApiBadRequestError, ApiJsonSchemaValidator, DtoValue } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { RequestContext } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { InvocationAuthentication, AuthorizationService } from '@webpieces/http-routing';\nimport { McpToolPolicy } from './McpToolPolicy';\nimport { RegisteredMcpTool } from './McpToolRegistry';\nimport { VerifiedMcpCredential } from './McpAuth';\nimport { MCP_INVOCATION_CONTEXT, McpInvocationContext } from './McpInvocationContext';\n\n/** Authorize, validate, then issue a local credential and invoke the ordinary filters. No scope or catch. */\nexport class McpApiDispatcher {\n    private readonly schemas = new ApiJsonSchemaValidator();\n\n    async call(\n        tool: RegisteredMcpTool,\n        requestDto: DtoValue,\n        credential: VerifiedMcpCredential,\n        invocation: McpInvocationContext,\n        policy: AuthorizationService,\n    ): Promise<DtoValue> {\n        await new McpToolPolicy(policy).require(\n            tool.authorization,\n            tool.name,\n        );\n        const inputFailure = this.schemas.validate(tool.inputSchema, requestDto);\n        if (inputFailure) {\n            throw new ApiBadRequestError(\n                `MCP arguments for ${tool.name} did not match its published input schema: ${inputFailure.message}`,\n                inputFailure.field,\n                inputFailure.message,\n            );\n        }\n        const authentication =\n            tool.binding.topology === 'local'\n                ? new InvocationAuthentication(tool.apiClass, tool.methodName)\n                : undefined;\n        RequestContext.putTrusted(MCP_INVOCATION_CONTEXT, invocation);\n        return tool.binding.invoke(tool.methodName, requestDto, authentication);\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/McpAuth.d.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
-import { AuthenticatedCaller, JwtHook } from '@webpieces/http-routing';
+import { AuthenticatedCaller, AuthorizationService } from '@webpieces/http-routing';
 export declare const MAX_MCP_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_SECONDS: number;
 export declare const MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS: number;
-export declare const MAX_MCP_ENDPOINT_JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS: number;
 /** Framework-normalized access-token result. The token representation remains application-owned. */
 export declare class MintedMcpAccessToken {
     readonly token: string;
@@ -24,12 +23,12 @@ export declare class VerifiedMcpCredential {
     readonly scopes: readonly string[];
     /** When current enabled/revoked state and roles were read from the authoritative source. */
     readonly accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds: number;
-    /** Application mapping of freshly verified account facts, shared with endpoint JWT issuance. */
+    /** Application mapping of freshly verified account facts into canonical trusted context. */
     readonly caller: AuthenticatedCaller;
     constructor(subject: string, issuer: string, resource: string, issuedAtEpochSeconds: number, expiresAtEpochSeconds: number, scopes: readonly string[], 
     /** When current enabled/revoked state and roles were read from the authoritative source. */
     accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds: number, 
-    /** Application mapping of freshly verified account facts, shared with endpoint JWT issuance. */
+    /** Application mapping of freshly verified account facts into canonical trusted context. */
     caller: AuthenticatedCaller);
     /** The canonical application's roles; there is no independent listing-role snapshot. */
     get principalRoles(): readonly string[];
@@ -43,15 +42,6 @@ export interface McpAccessTokenAuthority<TGrant> {
     mintAccessToken(grant: TGrant): Promise<MintedMcpAccessToken>;
     verifyAccessToken(accessToken: string, expectedResource: string): Promise<VerifiedMcpCredential>;
 }
-/** Minimal tool identity supplied when the app creates its own endpoint-JWT mint request. */
-export declare class McpEndpointDescriptor {
-    readonly toolName: string;
-    readonly apiClassName: string;
-    readonly methodName: string;
-    constructor(toolName: string, apiClassName: string, methodName: string);
-}
-/** Application mapping from verified MCP identity to its unconstrained JwtHook mint request. */
-export type McpEndpointMintRequestFactory<TMintRequest> = (credential: VerifiedMcpCredential, endpoint: McpEndpointDescriptor) => TMintRequest;
 /** RFC 9728-style metadata exposed by the MCP protected resource. */
 export declare class McpProtectedResourceMetadata {
     readonly resource: string;
@@ -63,9 +53,8 @@ export declare class McpProtectedResourceMetadata {
 /**
  * Node MCP server configuration, built with fluent setters: every name sits next to its own value, so
  * no two settings can be swapped, and a future setting is an additive setter rather than a breaking
- * signature change. Pass the same concrete application authority to both
- * `setAccessTokenAuthority(...)` and `setEndpointJwtAuthority(...)` when it implements both security
- * seams.
+ * signature change. The access-token authority verifies MCP credentials; the authorization service
+ * is shared with receiving endpoints and document projection.
  *
  * SINGLE CANONICAL ORIGIN: one server serves exactly one protected resource. {@link setResource} is
  * fixed for the lifetime of the process, is the audience of every access token, and is never derived
@@ -79,13 +68,12 @@ export declare class McpProtectedResourceMetadata {
  * so the client's correct response is to re-authenticate and fail again, forever.
  *
  * ```ts
- * const config = new WpMcpServerConfig<MyGrant, MyMintRequest>()
+ * const config = new WpMcpServerConfig<MyGrant>()
  *     .setName('my-server')
  *     .setVersion('1.0.0')
  *     .setResource('https://api.example.com/mcp')
  *     .setAccessTokenAuthority(authority)
- *     .setEndpointJwtAuthority(jwtHook)
- *     .setEndpointMintRequest((credential) => new MyMintRequest(credential.subject))
+ *     .setAuthorizationService(router.authorizationService())
  *     .setAuthorizationServers(['https://login.example.com'])
  *     .setRequiredScopes(['tools']);
  *
@@ -93,17 +81,15 @@ export declare class McpProtectedResourceMetadata {
  * McpRegistry.setErrorTranslator(new MyMcpErrorTranslator());
  * ```
  */
-export declare class WpMcpServerConfig<TGrant, TMintRequest> {
+export declare class WpMcpServerConfig<TGrant> {
     private nameValue?;
     private versionValue?;
     private resourceValue?;
     private accessTokenAuthorityValue?;
-    private endpointJwtAuthorityValue?;
-    private endpointMintRequestValue?;
+    private authorizationServiceValue?;
     private authorizationServersValue?;
     private requiredScopesValue?;
     private maxAccountValidationAgeSecondsValue;
-    private maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSecondsValue;
     /** REQUIRED. The MCP server name reported by `initialize`. */
     setName(name: string): this;
     /** REQUIRED. The MCP server version; the registry revision is appended to it at bind time. */
@@ -124,10 +110,8 @@ export declare class WpMcpServerConfig<TGrant, TMintRequest> {
     setResource(resource: string): this;
     /** REQUIRED. Application-owned paired mint/verify authority for MCP access tokens. */
     setAccessTokenAuthority(authority: McpAccessTokenAuthority<TGrant>): this;
-    /** REQUIRED. The application policy for MCP tools and short-lived endpoint JWT issuer. */
-    setEndpointJwtAuthority(authority: JwtHook<TMintRequest>): this;
-    /** REQUIRED. Maps a verified MCP identity plus tool identity to that JwtHook's mint request. */
-    setEndpointMintRequest(factory: McpEndpointMintRequestFactory<TMintRequest>): this;
+    /** REQUIRED. The common authorization service for tool projection and invocation. */
+    setAuthorizationService(authority: AuthorizationService): this;
     /**
      * REQUIRED. The trusted token issuers. Every entry must be an absolute URL, because each is
      * compared against a token's `issuer` claim and published as an `authorization_servers` entry —
@@ -141,8 +125,6 @@ export declare class WpMcpServerConfig<TGrant, TMintRequest> {
     setRequiredScopes(requiredScopes: readonly string[]): this;
     /** OPTIONAL ceiling, 1 second to 1 hour. Defaults to 1 hour. */
     setMaxAccountValidationAgeSeconds(seconds: number): this;
-    /** OPTIONAL ceiling, 1 second to 1 hour. Defaults to 1 hour. */
-    setMaxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds(seconds: number): this;
     /**
      * Called by `WpMcpServer.bind(...)`. Throws naming EVERY missing required setter at once, so a
      * half-built config is repaired in one pass rather than one boot failure at a time.
@@ -152,12 +134,10 @@ export declare class WpMcpServerConfig<TGrant, TMintRequest> {
     get version(): string;
     get resource(): string;
     get accessTokenAuthority(): McpAccessTokenAuthority<TGrant>;
-    get endpointJwtAuthority(): JwtHook<TMintRequest>;
-    get endpointMintRequest(): McpEndpointMintRequestFactory<TMintRequest>;
+    get authorizationService(): AuthorizationService;
     get authorizationServers(): readonly string[];
     get requiredScopes(): readonly string[];
     get maxAccountValidationAgeSeconds(): number;
-    get maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds(): number;
     /**
      * RFC 9728 §3.1: the URL of this resource's protected-resource METADATA DOCUMENT, derived from
      * {@link resource} by inserting `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` between origin and path

package/src/McpAuth.js

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.WpMcpServerConfig = exports.McpProtectedResourceMetadata = exports.McpEndpointDescriptor = exports.VerifiedMcpCredential = exports.MintedMcpAccessToken = exports.MAX_MCP_ENDPOINT_JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS = exports.MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS = exports.MAX_MCP_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_SECONDS = void 0;
+exports.WpMcpServerConfig = exports.McpProtectedResourceMetadata = exports.VerifiedMcpCredential = exports.MintedMcpAccessToken = exports.MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS = exports.MAX_MCP_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_SECONDS = void 0;
 exports.MAX_MCP_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60;
 exports.MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS = 60 * 60;
-exports.MAX_MCP_ENDPOINT_JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 60 * 60;
 /** Framework-normalized access-token result. The token representation remains application-owned. */
 class MintedMcpAccessToken {
     token;
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ class VerifiedMcpCredential {
     constructor(subject, issuer, resource, issuedAtEpochSeconds, expiresAtEpochSeconds, scopes, 
     /** When current enabled/revoked state and roles were read from the authoritative source. */
     accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds, 
-    /** Application mapping of freshly verified account facts, shared with endpoint JWT issuance. */
+    /** Application mapping of freshly verified account facts into canonical trusted context. */
     caller) {
         this.subject = subject;
         this.issuer = issuer;
@@ -64,18 +63,6 @@ class VerifiedMcpCredential {
     }
 }
 exports.VerifiedMcpCredential = VerifiedMcpCredential;
-/** Minimal tool identity supplied when the app creates its own endpoint-JWT mint request. */
-class McpEndpointDescriptor {
-    toolName;
-    apiClassName;
-    methodName;
-    constructor(toolName, apiClassName, methodName) {
-        this.toolName = toolName;
-        this.apiClassName = apiClassName;
-        this.methodName = methodName;
-    }
-}
-exports.McpEndpointDescriptor = McpEndpointDescriptor;
 /** RFC 9728-style metadata exposed by the MCP protected resource. */
 class McpProtectedResourceMetadata {
     resource;
@@ -92,9 +79,8 @@ exports.McpProtectedResourceMetadata = McpProtectedResourceMetadata;
 /**
  * Node MCP server configuration, built with fluent setters: every name sits next to its own value, so
  * no two settings can be swapped, and a future setting is an additive setter rather than a breaking
- * signature change. Pass the same concrete application authority to both
- * `setAccessTokenAuthority(...)` and `setEndpointJwtAuthority(...)` when it implements both security
- * seams.
+ * signature change. The access-token authority verifies MCP credentials; the authorization service
+ * is shared with receiving endpoints and document projection.
  *
  * SINGLE CANONICAL ORIGIN: one server serves exactly one protected resource. {@link setResource} is
  * fixed for the lifetime of the process, is the audience of every access token, and is never derived
@@ -108,13 +94,12 @@ exports.McpProtectedResourceMetadata = McpProtectedResourceMetadata;
  * so the client's correct response is to re-authenticate and fail again, forever.
  *
  * ```ts
- * const config = new WpMcpServerConfig<MyGrant, MyMintRequest>()
+ * const config = new WpMcpServerConfig<MyGrant>()
  *     .setName('my-server')
  *     .setVersion('1.0.0')
  *     .setResource('https://api.example.com/mcp')
  *     .setAccessTokenAuthority(authority)
- *     .setEndpointJwtAuthority(jwtHook)
- *     .setEndpointMintRequest((credential) => new MyMintRequest(credential.subject))
+ *     .setAuthorizationService(router.authorizationService())
  *     .setAuthorizationServers(['https://login.example.com'])
  *     .setRequiredScopes(['tools']);
  *
@@ -127,12 +112,10 @@ class WpMcpServerConfig {
     versionValue;
     resourceValue;
     accessTokenAuthorityValue;
-    endpointJwtAuthorityValue;
-    endpointMintRequestValue;
+    authorizationServiceValue;
     authorizationServersValue;
     requiredScopesValue;
     maxAccountValidationAgeSecondsValue = exports.MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS;
-    maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSecondsValue = exports.MAX_MCP_ENDPOINT_JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS;
     /** REQUIRED. The MCP server name reported by `initialize`. */
     setName(name) {
         this.nameValue = this.requireText(name, 'setName');
@@ -165,17 +148,9 @@ class WpMcpServerConfig {
         this.accessTokenAuthorityValue = this.requirePresent(authority, 'setAccessTokenAuthority');
         return this;
     }
-    /** REQUIRED. The application policy for MCP tools and short-lived endpoint JWT issuer. */
-    setEndpointJwtAuthority(authority) {
-        this.endpointJwtAuthorityValue = this.requirePresent(authority, 'setEndpointJwtAuthority');
-        return this;
-    }
-    /** REQUIRED. Maps a verified MCP identity plus tool identity to that JwtHook's mint request. */
-    setEndpointMintRequest(factory) {
-        if (typeof factory !== 'function') {
-            throw new Error('WpMcpServerConfig.setEndpointMintRequest(...) requires a function.');
-        }
-        this.endpointMintRequestValue = factory;
+    /** REQUIRED. The common authorization service for tool projection and invocation. */
+    setAuthorizationService(authority) {
+        this.authorizationServiceValue = this.requirePresent(authority, 'setAuthorizationService');
         return this;
     }
     /**
@@ -209,11 +184,6 @@ class WpMcpServerConfig {
         this.maxAccountValidationAgeSecondsValue = this.requireSeconds(seconds, exports.MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS, 'setMaxAccountValidationAgeSeconds');
         return this;
     }
-    /** OPTIONAL ceiling, 1 second to 1 hour. Defaults to 1 hour. */
-    setMaxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds(seconds) {
-        this.maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSecondsValue = this.requireSeconds(seconds, exports.MAX_MCP_ENDPOINT_JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS, 'setMaxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds');
-        return this;
-    }
     /**
      * Called by `WpMcpServer.bind(...)`. Throws naming EVERY missing required setter at once, so a
      * half-built config is repaired in one pass rather than one boot failure at a time.
@@ -229,11 +199,8 @@ class WpMcpServerConfig {
         if (this.accessTokenAuthorityValue === undefined) {
             missing.push('setAccessTokenAuthority(...)');
         }
-        if (this.endpointJwtAuthorityValue === undefined) {
-            missing.push('setEndpointJwtAuthority(...)');
-        }
-        if (this.endpointMintRequestValue === undefined) {
-            missing.push('setEndpointMintRequest(...)');
+        if (this.authorizationServiceValue === undefined) {
+            missing.push('setAuthorizationService(...)');
         }
         if (this.authorizationServersValue === undefined) {
             missing.push('setAuthorizationServers(...)');
@@ -256,11 +223,8 @@ class WpMcpServerConfig {
     get accessTokenAuthority() {
         return this.read(this.accessTokenAuthorityValue, 'setAccessTokenAuthority');
     }
-    get endpointJwtAuthority() {
-        return this.read(this.endpointJwtAuthorityValue, 'setEndpointJwtAuthority');
-    }
-    get endpointMintRequest() {
-        return this.read(this.endpointMintRequestValue, 'setEndpointMintRequest');
+    get authorizationService() {
+        return this.read(this.authorizationServiceValue, 'setAuthorizationService');
     }
     get authorizationServers() {
         return this.read(this.authorizationServersValue, 'setAuthorizationServers');
@@ -271,9 +235,6 @@ class WpMcpServerConfig {
     get maxAccountValidationAgeSeconds() {
         return this.maxAccountValidationAgeSecondsValue;
     }
-    get maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds() {
-        return this.maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSecondsValue;
-    }
     /**
      * RFC 9728 §3.1: the URL of this resource's protected-resource METADATA DOCUMENT, derived from
      * {@link resource} by inserting `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` between origin and path