@webpieces/mcp-server 0.4.772 → 0.4.774

package/README.md

@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@ Publishes explicitly annotated Webpieces RPC endpoints as MCP tools. The bridge
 output JSON Schema from DTO metadata, invokes the normal Webpieces filter/controller path, and turns
 exceptions into safe model-visible MCP results.
 
-`@WpMcpTool` is an opt-in. Existing endpoint authentication remains authoritative on every call.
-The MCP adapter never accepts trusted context values from tool arguments or headers.
+`@WpMcpTool` is an opt-in and every tool must also declare `@WpMcpAuthJwt`. MCP user
+authorization and endpoint transport authentication are deliberately separate. The MCP adapter
+never accepts trusted context values from tool arguments or unverified headers.
 
 ```ts
 @WpDto()
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ class FindOrderResponse {
 
 @ApiPath('/orders')
 abstract class OrdersApi {
+    @WpMcpAuthJwt({ allRolesAllowed: true })
     @WpAuthJwt({ allRolesAllowed: true })
     @Endpoint('/find', 'rpc')
     @WpResponseDto(() => FindOrderResponse)
@@ -42,12 +44,116 @@ The `@WpMcpTool.description` becomes the tool description returned by `tools/lis
 response classes generate `inputSchema` and `outputSchema`; `@WpDtoField` supplies property
 descriptions and the facts TypeScript erases, such as optionality and array element types.
 
-Applications construct `WpMcpServer` with their built `ApiFactory`, the API classes they want scanned,
-a paired `McpAccessTokenAuthority`, and their application `JwtHook`. The authority verifies issuer,
-signature/token state, expiry, scopes, the exact resource URI, and current account state on every MCP
-operation. Before every tool call the bridge asks the same application `JwtHook` to mint a distinct,
-short-lived endpoint JWT, then invokes the ordinary `AuthFilter`. Literal MCP-token passthrough is
-rejected, endpoint JWTs are capped at one hour, and MCP access tokens are capped at 30 days.
+### Typed maps
+
+A `Record<string, V>` reflects as plain `Object`, so its value type must be declared — the same reason
+`arrayItems` exists for arrays. Use `WpDtoMapFieldOptions(description, required, mapValues)`, where
+`mapValues` is `'string' | 'number' | 'integer' | 'boolean'` or a `@WpDto` class:
+
+```ts
+@WpDto()
+class PassageSentenceItem {
+    @WpDtoField(new WpDtoFieldOptions('Sentence text', true))
+    text!: string;
+
+    @WpDtoField(new WpDtoMapFieldOptions('ISO 639-1 -> sentence', false, 'string'))
+    translations?: Record<string, string>;
+}
+
+@WpDto()
+class PassageResponse {
+    @WpDtoField(new WpDtoMapFieldOptions('Sentences by locale', true, PassageSentenceItem))
+    sentencesByLocale!: Record<string, PassageSentenceItem>;
+}
+```
+
+The field emits `{ type: 'object', additionalProperties: <value schema> }`, and validation checks every
+value (`$.translations.es must be string`). An `Object`-typed field without map options — an interface or
+an undeclared `Record` — fails at startup, because an interface can never carry `@WpDto`.
+
+A map is still a closed schema: no key can carry an unspecified value. Check closure with
+`new DtoSchemaBuilder().isClosedSchema(schema)`, not `schema.additionalProperties === false`, which wrongly
+rejects typed maps.
+
+Applications supply the endpoint path, explicit bindings, and deployment topology. There is no
+framework-owned `/mcp` path:
+
+```ts
+const mcp = new WpMcpServer(config);
+mcp.bind(expressApp, new McpBindOptions(
+    connectorConfig.endpointPath,
+    [
+        McpApiBinding.local(OrdersApi, apiFactory),
+        McpApiBinding.remote(RemoteOrdersApi, () => remoteOrdersClient),
+    ],
+    McpDeployment.singleProcess(),
+));
+```
+
+The official MCP v2 server and Node adapter own MCP 2026-07-28 JSON-RPC validation, JSON versus
+request-scoped SSE responses, backpressure, cancellation, keepalives, and subscriptions. Webpieces
+owns the Express path, root `RequestContext`, authentication boundary, schema-derived tool registry,
+and dispatch through the normal API proxy.
+
+During a tool invocation, `RequestContext.getTrusted(MCP_INVOCATION_CONTEXT)` exposes the verified
+JSON-RPC ID, tool/user/role facts, the official SDK cancellation `AbortSignal`, and (when the client
+supplied `_meta.progressToken`) a `reportProgress(...)` callback. Progress remains related to that
+one request and causes the official handler to select request-scoped SSE; closing that response
+aborts the same signal. The context key has no HTTP header and is never propagated as caller input.
+
+For a local binding the API method must combine `@WpMcpAuthJwt` with `@WpAuthJwt`. Before every tool
+call the bridge asks the application `JwtHook` to mint a distinct short-lived endpoint JWT and invokes
+`ApiFactory.createApiClient`, preserving `JwtHook`, `LogApiFilter`, and `AuthFilter`. Literal MCP-token
+passthrough is rejected. For a remote binding the endpoint must use `@WpAuthOidc`; the generated Node
+client supplies its service credential and propagates only trusted delegated context established by
+the MCP access-token authority. Neither an external MCP bearer nor a browser session JWT is sent to
+the downstream endpoint.
+
+`McpDeployment.singleProcess()` uses an in-memory invalidation bus and makes that limit explicit.
+Distributed deployments must use `McpDeployment.distributed(sharedBus)`. List responses have a bounded
+TTL, registry metadata contains a surface-derived revision, `toolsChanged()` publishes a
+level-triggered invalidation, and `close()` drains active response streams. A reconnecting client must
+re-listen and refresh its authoritative lists; notifications are not a durable or replayable event log.
+
+The authority verifies issuer, signature/token state, expiry, scopes, the exact resource URI, and
+current account state. MCP 2026-07-28 has no sessions, so the bearer is verified exactly once per POST
+at the `bind(...)` HTTP boundary, before the SDK is involved; tool handlers never re-verify it. A
+rejected token must be thrown as `ApiUnauthorizedError` (answered 401 + `WWW-Authenticate`); any
+other throw from the authority is an implementation failure (500). Endpoint JWTs are capped at one
+hour and MCP access tokens at 30 days.
+
+## Error boundary
+
+`WpMcpErrorTranslator` is the one place a failure becomes an MCP reply, mirroring
+`ApiErrorHttpMapper`. Each entry point has exactly one catch that only delegates to it; the dispatcher
+and the local/remote invokers have none. Normalization is the shared `ApiErrorBoundary` rule (a
+non-`ApiError`, or an `ApiConnectionError`, becomes `ApiImplementationError`), and each failure is
+logged once at the same per-kind level as HTTP, with `requestId`, JSON-RPC id and tool name.
+
+| Where | Reply |
+|---|---|
+| `tools/call`, tool found: bad arguments, `@WpMcpAuthJwt` denial, JWT/OIDC mint failure, any local or remote failure, output-schema or serialization failure | `isError: true` result |
+| `tools/call`, unknown tool name | JSON-RPC `-32602` `Unknown tool: <name>` |
+| `tools/list` | JSON-RPC `-32602` (bad request) or `-32603` `Internal Error` |
+| before the SDK: bearer, `Origin`, malformed body | HTTP 401 + `WWW-Authenticate` / 403 / 400, anything else 500 |
+
+`subscriptions/listen` is served entirely by the SDK's listen router, so Webpieces has no handler there.
+
+What the model reads inside an `isError` result: an `ApiEndUserError` message verbatim plus
+`errorCode` (it survives the remote hop byte-for-byte); an `ApiBadRequestError`'s `callerMessage` and
+`field`, never its operator `message`; for an implementation failure, generic text naming the tool and
+requestId and saying it is a bug in the tool, not in the arguments; for every other kind, that kind's
+generic message plus `retryAfterSeconds` where present.
+
+Every reply carries the requestId so a user can quote it: `_meta["webpieces/requestId"]` on every
+`tools/call` result (success or `isError`), `requestId` in the `isError` payload, and
+`error.data.requestId` on JSON-RPC and HTTP-boundary errors.
+
+A remote binding's generated Node client turns a dependency's 4xx into the gateway's own
+`ApiImplementationError` (see `NodeProxyClient.adaptDownstreamFailure`). A gateway that wants the model
+to see the peer's typed 4xx instead registers an `ErrorTranslators` via
+`ClientRegistry.setErrorTranslators(...)` whose `fromWire` relays decoded Webpieces payloads; with it,
+local and remote bindings produce identical tool results.
 
 The verifier's `accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds` must represent an authoritative enabled/revoked and
 role/scope read. The bridge enforces a maximum one-hour decision age; per-request reads are preferred so

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@webpieces/mcp-server",
-  "version": "0.4.772",
+  "version": "0.4.774",
   "description": "Secure MCP tool generation from annotated Webpieces API contracts",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "./src/index.js",
@@ -22,11 +22,17 @@
     "access": "public"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "1.29.0",
-    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.772",
-    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.772",
-    "@webpieces/http-routing": "0.4.772",
+    "@modelcontextprotocol/node": "2.0.0",
+    "@modelcontextprotocol/server": "2.0.0",
+    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.774",
+    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.774",
+    "@webpieces/http-routing": "0.4.774",
+    "express": "5.1.0",
     "reflect-metadata": "0.2.2",
     "tslib": "2.8.1"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@webpieces/http-client-node": "0.4.774",
+    "@webpieces/http-server": "0.4.774"
   }
 }

package/src/McpApiBinding.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+import { DtoValue } from '@webpieces/core-util';
+import { ApiFactory, ClassType } from '@webpieces/http-routing';
+export type McpBindingTopology = 'local' | 'remote';
+/** Explicit contract-to-invoker binding; MCP never discovers implementations from a router. */
+export declare class McpApiBinding<TApi extends object = object> {
+    readonly api: ClassType<TApi>;
+    readonly topology: McpBindingTopology;
+    private readonly provider;
+    private constructor();
+    static local<TApi extends object>(api: ClassType<TApi>, apiFactory: ApiFactory): McpApiBinding<TApi>;
+    static remote<TApi extends object>(api: ClassType<TApi>, provider: () => TApi): McpApiBinding<TApi>;
+    invoke(methodName: string, request: DtoValue): Promise<DtoValue>;
+    validateMethod(methodName: string): void;
+}

package/src/McpApiBinding.js

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.McpApiBinding = void 0;
+const core_util_1 = require("@webpieces/core-util");
+/** Explicit contract-to-invoker binding; MCP never discovers implementations from a router. */
+class McpApiBinding {
+    api;
+    topology;
+    provider;
+    constructor(api, topology, provider) {
+        this.api = api;
+        this.topology = topology;
+        this.provider = provider;
+    }
+    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- explicit public factory mirrors the binding API
+    static local(api, apiFactory) {
+        return new McpApiBinding(api, 'local', () => apiFactory.createApiClient(api));
+    }
+    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- explicit public factory mirrors the binding API
+    static remote(api, provider) {
+        return new McpApiBinding(api, 'remote', provider);
+    }
+    invoke(methodName, request) {
+        const client = this.provider();
+        const method = client[methodName];
+        if (typeof method !== 'function') {
+            throw new Error(`MCP binding provider for ${this.api.name} has no method '${methodName}'.`);
+        }
+        return method.call(client, request);
+    }
+    validateMethod(methodName) {
+        const auth = (0, core_util_1.getAuthMeta)(this.api, methodName)?.mode;
+        const expected = this.topology === 'local' ? 'jwt' : 'oidc';
+        if (auth?.kind !== expected) {
+            throw new Error(`MCP ${this.topology} binding ${this.api.name}.${methodName} requires ` +
+                `@${expected === 'jwt' ? 'WpAuthJwt' : 'WpAuthOidc'}, but declares ` +
+                `${auth ? `'${auth.kind}'` : 'no HTTP auth'}.`);
+        }
+    }
+}
+exports.McpApiBinding = McpApiBinding;
+//# sourceMappingURL=McpApiBinding.js.map

package/src/McpApiBinding.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/src/McpApiDispatcher.d.ts

@@ -1,23 +1,14 @@
-import { ApiErrorPayload, DtoValue } from '@webpieces/core-util';
-import { ApiFactory } from '@webpieces/http-routing';
+import { DtoValue } from '@webpieces/core-util';
 import { RegisteredMcpTool } from './McpToolRegistry';
-export declare class McpDispatchSuccess {
-    readonly value: DtoValue;
-    readonly requestId: string;
-    readonly success = true;
-    constructor(value: DtoValue, requestId: string);
-}
-export declare class McpDispatchFailure {
-    readonly error: ApiErrorPayload;
-    readonly requestId: string;
-    readonly success = false;
-    constructor(error: ApiErrorPayload, requestId: string);
-}
-export type McpDispatchResult = McpDispatchSuccess | McpDispatchFailure;
-/** Executes one tool through the same ApiFactory proxy/filter/controller path as HTTP. */
+import { VerifiedMcpCredential } from './McpAuth';
+import { McpInvocationContext } from './McpInvocationContext';
+/**
+ * Executes one tool call through the explicit local or remote Webpieces client, never a controller
+ * reference. It has NO try/catch: every failure (bad arguments, MCP authorization, anything the local
+ * proxy or the remote generated client throws) propagates as a typed error to the single tools/call
+ * boundary in `WpMcpServer`, so local and remote bindings are translated identically.
+ */
 export declare class McpApiDispatcher {
-    private readonly apiFactory;
     private readonly schemaBuilder;
-    constructor(apiFactory: ApiFactory);
-    call(tool: RegisteredMcpTool, requestDto: DtoValue, endpointBearerToken: string): Promise<McpDispatchResult>;
+    call(tool: RegisteredMcpTool, requestDto: DtoValue, credential: VerifiedMcpCredential, invocation: McpInvocationContext, endpointBearerToken?: string): Promise<DtoValue>;
 }

package/src/McpApiDispatcher.js

@@ -1,56 +1,47 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.McpApiDispatcher = exports.McpDispatchFailure = exports.McpDispatchSuccess = void 0;
+exports.McpApiDispatcher = void 0;
 const core_util_1 = require("@webpieces/core-util");
 const core_context_1 = require("@webpieces/core-context");
-class McpDispatchSuccess {
-    value;
-    requestId;
-    success = true;
-    constructor(value, requestId) {
-        this.value = value;
-        this.requestId = requestId;
-    }
-}
-exports.McpDispatchSuccess = McpDispatchSuccess;
-class McpDispatchFailure {
-    error;
-    requestId;
-    success = false;
-    constructor(error, requestId) {
-        this.error = error;
-        this.requestId = requestId;
-    }
-}
-exports.McpDispatchFailure = McpDispatchFailure;
-/** Executes one tool through the same ApiFactory proxy/filter/controller path as HTTP. */
+const McpInvocationContext_1 = require("./McpInvocationContext");
+/**
+ * Executes one tool call through the explicit local or remote Webpieces client, never a controller
+ * reference. It has NO try/catch: every failure (bad arguments, MCP authorization, anything the local
+ * proxy or the remote generated client throws) propagates as a typed error to the single tools/call
+ * boundary in `WpMcpServer`, so local and remote bindings are translated identically.
+ */
 class McpApiDispatcher {
-    apiFactory;
     schemaBuilder = new core_util_1.DtoSchemaBuilder();
-    constructor(apiFactory) {
-        this.apiFactory = apiFactory;
-    }
-    async call(tool, requestDto, endpointBearerToken) {
-        const headers = new Map();
-        headers.set('authorization', [`Bearer ${endpointBearerToken}`]);
-        const request = new core_context_1.HttpRequest('POST', `/__webpieces/mcp/${tool.name}`, headers);
-        return core_context_1.RequestContext.run(async () => {
-            new core_context_1.RequestContextHeaders().fillFromRequest(request);
-            const requestId = core_context_1.RequestContext.getUntrusted(core_util_1.WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID) ?? 'missing-request-id';
-            const inputFailure = this.schemaBuilder.validate(tool.requestClass, requestDto);
-            if (inputFailure) {
-                return new McpDispatchFailure(core_util_1.ApiErrorCodec.encode(new core_util_1.ApiBadRequestError('MCP request DTO did not match its declared schema.', undefined, inputFailure.message)), requestId);
+    async call(tool, requestDto, credential, invocation, endpointBearerToken) {
+        const inputFailure = this.schemaBuilder.validate(tool.requestClass, requestDto);
+        if (inputFailure) {
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiBadRequestError(`MCP arguments for ${tool.name} did not match ${tool.requestClass.name}: ${inputFailure.message}`, inputFailure.field, inputFailure.message);
+        }
+        const required = (0, core_util_1.rolesRequired)(tool.mcpAuth.requirement);
+        if (required.length > 0 &&
+            !required.some((role) => credential.listingRoles.includes(role))) {
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiForbiddenError(`MCP principal ${credential.subject} lacks a role required by @WpMcpAuthJwt on ${tool.name}.`);
+        }
+        const parentRequestId = core_context_1.RequestContext.getUntrusted(core_util_1.WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID);
+        return core_context_1.RequestContext.runDetachedScope(async () => {
+            if (parentRequestId) {
+                core_context_1.RequestContext.putUntrusted(core_util_1.WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID, parentRequestId);
             }
-            // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- transport boundary sanitizes endpoint throws
-            try {
-                const client = this.apiFactory.createApiClient(tool.apiClass);
-                const value = (await client[tool.methodName](requestDto));
-                return new McpDispatchSuccess(value, requestId);
+            const headers = new Map();
+            if (tool.binding.topology === 'local') {
+                if (!endpointBearerToken) {
+                    throw new core_util_1.ApiImplementationError(`Local MCP tool ${tool.name} has no endpoint JWT.`);
+                }
+                headers.set('authorization', [`Bearer ${endpointBearerToken}`]);
             }
-            catch (err) {
-                const error = (0, core_util_1.toError)(err);
-                return new McpDispatchFailure(core_util_1.ApiErrorCodec.encode(error), requestId);
+            const request = new core_context_1.HttpRequest('POST', `/__webpieces/mcp/${tool.name}`, headers);
+            new core_context_1.RequestContextHeaders().fillFromRequest(request);
+            core_context_1.RequestContext.putTrusted(McpInvocationContext_1.MCP_INVOCATION_CONTEXT, invocation);
+            if (tool.binding.topology === 'remote') {
+                for (const tuple of credential.trustedContext)
+                    core_context_1.RequestContext.putTrusted(tuple.key, tuple.value);
             }
+            return tool.binding.invoke(tool.methodName, requestDto);
         });
     }
 }

package/src/McpApiDispatcher.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"McpApiDispatcher.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/mcp-server/src/McpApiDispatcher.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAAA,oDAQ8B;AAC9B,0DAA6F;AAG7F,iEAAsF;AAEtF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAa,gBAAgB;IACR,aAAa,GAAG,IAAI,4BAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;IAExD,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CACN,IAAuB,EACvB,UAAoB,EACpB,UAAiC,EACjC,UAAgC,EAChC,mBAA4B;QAE5B,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;QAChF,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;YACf,MAAM,IAAI,8BAAkB,CACxB,qBAAqB,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,kBAAkB,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EACjG,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,EAClB,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CACvB,CAAC;QACN,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAA,yBAAa,EAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;QACzD,IACI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC;YACnB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,IAAY,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,EAC1E,CAAC;YACC,MAAM,IAAI,6BAAiB,CACvB,iBAAiB,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,8CAA8C,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,CAChG,CAAC;QACN,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,6BAAc,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,gCAAoB,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;QACrF,OAAO,6BAAc,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;YAC9C,IAAI,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;gBAClB,6BAAc,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,gCAAoB,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;YAClF,CAAC;YACD,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,EAAoB,CAAC;YAC5C,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;gBACpC,IAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;oBACvB,MAAM,IAAI,kCAAsB,CAC5B,kBAAkB,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,uBAAuB,CACrD,CAAC;gBACN,CAAC;gBACD,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,UAAU,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YACpE,CAAC;YACD,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,0BAAW,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,oBAAoB,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YAClF,IAAI,oCAAqB,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YACrD,6BAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,6CAAsB,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;YAC9D,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;gBACrC,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc;oBACzC,6BAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YAC1D,CAAC;YACD,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5D,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACP,CAAC;CACJ;AAnDD,4CAmDC","sourcesContent":["import {\n    ApiBadRequestError,\n    ApiForbiddenError,\n    ApiImplementationError,\n    DtoSchemaBuilder,\n    DtoValue,\n    rolesRequired,\n    WebpiecesCoreHeaders,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { HttpRequest, RequestContext, RequestContextHeaders } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { RegisteredMcpTool } from './McpToolRegistry';\nimport { VerifiedMcpCredential } from './McpAuth';\nimport { MCP_INVOCATION_CONTEXT, McpInvocationContext } from './McpInvocationContext';\n\n/**\n * Executes one tool call through the explicit local or remote Webpieces client, never a controller\n * reference. It has NO try/catch: every failure (bad arguments, MCP authorization, anything the local\n * proxy or the remote generated client throws) propagates as a typed error to the single tools/call\n * boundary in `WpMcpServer`, so local and remote bindings are translated identically.\n */\nexport class McpApiDispatcher {\n    private readonly schemaBuilder = new DtoSchemaBuilder();\n\n    async call(\n        tool: RegisteredMcpTool,\n        requestDto: DtoValue,\n        credential: VerifiedMcpCredential,\n        invocation: McpInvocationContext,\n        endpointBearerToken?: string,\n    ): Promise<DtoValue> {\n        const inputFailure = this.schemaBuilder.validate(tool.requestClass, requestDto);\n        if (inputFailure) {\n            throw new ApiBadRequestError(\n                `MCP arguments for ${tool.name} did not match ${tool.requestClass.name}: ${inputFailure.message}`,\n                inputFailure.field,\n                inputFailure.message,\n            );\n        }\n        const required = rolesRequired(tool.mcpAuth.requirement);\n        if (\n            required.length > 0 &&\n            !required.some((role: string) => credential.listingRoles.includes(role))\n        ) {\n            throw new ApiForbiddenError(\n                `MCP principal ${credential.subject} lacks a role required by @WpMcpAuthJwt on ${tool.name}.`,\n            );\n        }\n        const parentRequestId = RequestContext.getUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID);\n        return RequestContext.runDetachedScope(async () => {\n            if (parentRequestId) {\n                RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID, parentRequestId);\n            }\n            const headers = new Map<string, string[]>();\n            if (tool.binding.topology === 'local') {\n                if (!endpointBearerToken) {\n                    throw new ApiImplementationError(\n                        `Local MCP tool ${tool.name} has no endpoint JWT.`,\n                    );\n                }\n                headers.set('authorization', [`Bearer ${endpointBearerToken}`]);\n            }\n            const request = new HttpRequest('POST', `/__webpieces/mcp/${tool.name}`, headers);\n            new RequestContextHeaders().fillFromRequest(request);\n            RequestContext.putTrusted(MCP_INVOCATION_CONTEXT, invocation);\n            if (tool.binding.topology === 'remote') {\n                for (const tuple of credential.trustedContext)\n                    RequestContext.putTrusted(tuple.key, tuple.value);\n            }\n            return tool.binding.invoke(tool.methodName, requestDto);\n        });\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/McpAuth.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { JwtHook } from '@webpieces/http-routing';
+import { ContextTuple } from '@webpieces/core-util';
 export declare const MAX_MCP_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_SECONDS: number;
 export declare const MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS: number;
 export declare const MAX_MCP_ENDPOINT_JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS: number;
@@ -26,13 +27,21 @@ export declare class VerifiedMcpCredential {
     readonly accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds: number;
     /** Advisory tools/list filtering only. Endpoint authorization always runs again. */
     readonly listingRoles: readonly string[];
+    /** Trusted delegated identity derived only by the access-token authority. */
+    readonly trustedContext: readonly ContextTuple[];
     constructor(subject: string, issuer: string, resource: string, issuedAtEpochSeconds: number, expiresAtEpochSeconds: number, scopes: readonly string[], 
     /** When current enabled/revoked state and roles were read from the authoritative source. */
     accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds: number, 
     /** Advisory tools/list filtering only. Endpoint authorization always runs again. */
-    listingRoles?: readonly string[]);
+    listingRoles?: readonly string[], 
+    /** Trusted delegated identity derived only by the access-token authority. */
+    trustedContext?: readonly ContextTuple[]);
 }
-/** Application-owned paired mint/verify authority for resource-bound MCP access tokens. */
+/**
+ * Application-owned paired mint/verify authority for resource-bound MCP access tokens.
+ * `verifyAccessToken` must throw `ApiUnauthorizedError` for a token it rejects (the bind boundary
+ * answers 401 + `WWW-Authenticate`); any other throw is treated as an implementation failure (500).
+ */
 export interface McpAccessTokenAuthority<TGrant> {
     mintAccessToken(grant: TGrant): Promise<MintedMcpAccessToken>;
     verifyAccessToken(accessToken: string, expectedResource: string): Promise<VerifiedMcpCredential>;

package/src/McpAuth.js

@@ -44,11 +44,14 @@ class VerifiedMcpCredential {
     scopes;
     accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds;
     listingRoles;
+    trustedContext;
     constructor(subject, issuer, resource, issuedAtEpochSeconds, expiresAtEpochSeconds, scopes, 
     /** When current enabled/revoked state and roles were read from the authoritative source. */
     accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds, 
     /** Advisory tools/list filtering only. Endpoint authorization always runs again. */
-    listingRoles = []) {
+    listingRoles = [], 
+    /** Trusted delegated identity derived only by the access-token authority. */
+    trustedContext = []) {
         this.subject = subject;
         this.issuer = issuer;
         this.resource = resource;
@@ -57,6 +60,7 @@ class VerifiedMcpCredential {
         this.scopes = scopes;
         this.accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds = accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds;
         this.listingRoles = listingRoles;
+        this.trustedContext = trustedContext;
     }
 }
 exports.VerifiedMcpCredential = VerifiedMcpCredential;

package/src/McpAuth.js.map

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The token representation remains application-owned. */\nexport class MintedMcpAccessToken {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly token: string,\n        public readonly resource: string,\n        public readonly issuedAtEpochSeconds: number,\n        public readonly expiresAtEpochSeconds: number,\n    ) {\n        if (token.trim() === '' || resource.trim() === '') {\n            throw new Error('Minted MCP access token and resource must be non-empty.');\n        }\n        if (!Number.isFinite(issuedAtEpochSeconds) || !Number.isFinite(expiresAtEpochSeconds)) {\n            throw new Error('Minted MCP access token timestamps must be finite epoch-second values.');\n        }\n        if (expiresAtEpochSeconds <= issuedAtEpochSeconds) {\n            throw new Error('MCP access token expiry must be after issuance.');\n        }\n        if (expiresAtEpochSeconds - issuedAtEpochSeconds > MAX_MCP_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_SECONDS) {\n            throw new Error('MCP access token lifetime must not exceed 30 days.');\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * Fresh, authoritative security facts resolved at the MCP resource boundary. Implementations must\n * verify issuer, exact resource/audience, expiry, token type/version, key/algorithm policy, and\n * current account state. Opaque access tokens are fully supported.\n */\nexport class VerifiedMcpCredential {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly subject: string,\n        public readonly issuer: string,\n        public readonly resource: string,\n        public readonly issuedAtEpochSeconds: number,\n        public readonly expiresAtEpochSeconds: number,\n        public readonly scopes: readonly string[],\n        /** When current enabled/revoked state and roles were read from the authoritative source. */\n        public readonly accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds: number,\n        /** Advisory tools/list filtering only. Endpoint authorization always runs again. */\n        public readonly listingRoles: readonly string[] = [],\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/** Application-owned paired mint/verify authority for resource-bound MCP access tokens. */\nexport interface McpAccessTokenAuthority<TGrant> {\n    mintAccessToken(grant: TGrant): Promise<MintedMcpAccessToken>;\n    verifyAccessToken(\n        accessToken: string,\n        expectedResource: string,\n    ): Promise<VerifiedMcpCredential>;\n}\n\n/** Minimal tool identity supplied when the app creates its own endpoint-JWT mint request. */\nexport class McpEndpointDescriptor {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly toolName: string,\n        public readonly apiClassName: string,\n        public readonly methodName: string,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/** Application mapping from verified MCP identity to its unconstrained JwtHook mint request. */\nexport type McpEndpointMintRequestFactory<TMintRequest> = (\n    credential: VerifiedMcpCredential,\n    endpoint: McpEndpointDescriptor,\n) => TMintRequest;\n\n/** RFC 9728-style metadata exposed by the MCP protected resource. */\nexport class McpProtectedResourceMetadata {\n    readonly resource: string;\n    readonly authorization_servers: readonly string[];\n    readonly bearer_methods_supported = ['header'];\n    readonly scopes_supported?: readonly string[];\n\n    constructor(\n        resource: string,\n        authorizationServers: readonly string[],\n        scopesSupported?: readonly string[],\n    ) {\n        this.resource = resource;\n        this.authorization_servers = authorizationServers;\n        this.scopes_supported = scopesSupported;\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * Node MCP server configuration. Pass the same concrete application authority as both\n * accessTokenAuthority and endpointJwtAuthority when it implements both security seams.\n */\nexport class WpMcpServerConfig<TGrant, TMintRequest> {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly name: string,\n        public readonly version: string,\n        public readonly resource: string,\n        public readonly accessTokenAuthority: McpAccessTokenAuthority<TGrant>,\n        public readonly endpointJwtAuthority: JwtHook<TMintRequest>,\n        public readonly endpointMintRequest: McpEndpointMintRequestFactory<TMintRequest>,\n        public readonly authorizationServers: readonly string[],\n        public readonly requiredScopes: readonly string[],\n        public readonly maxAccountValidationAgeSeconds = MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS,\n        public readonly maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds = MAX_MCP_ENDPOINT_JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS,\n    ) {\n        if (name.trim() === '' || version.trim() === '' || resource.trim() === '') {\n            throw new Error('MCP name, version, and resource must be non-empty.');\n        }\n        if (\n            maxAccountValidationAgeSeconds <= 0 ||\n            maxAccountValidationAgeSeconds > MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS\n        ) {\n            throw new Error('MCP account validation cache ceiling must be between 1 second and 1 hour.');\n        }\n        if (\n            maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds <= 0 ||\n            maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds > MAX_MCP_ENDPOINT_JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS\n        ) {\n            throw new Error('MCP endpoint JWT lifetime must be between 1 second and 1 hour.');\n        }\n    }\n\n    protectedResourceMetadata(): McpProtectedResourceMetadata {\n        return new McpProtectedResourceMetadata(\n            this.resource,\n            this.authorizationServers,\n            this.requiredScopes,\n        );\n    }\n}\n"]}
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The token representation remains application-owned. */\nexport class MintedMcpAccessToken {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly token: string,\n        public readonly resource: string,\n        public readonly issuedAtEpochSeconds: number,\n        public readonly expiresAtEpochSeconds: number,\n    ) {\n        if (token.trim() === '' || resource.trim() === '') {\n            throw new Error('Minted MCP access token and resource must be non-empty.');\n        }\n        if (!Number.isFinite(issuedAtEpochSeconds) || !Number.isFinite(expiresAtEpochSeconds)) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'Minted MCP access token timestamps must be finite epoch-second values.',\n            );\n        }\n        if (expiresAtEpochSeconds <= issuedAtEpochSeconds) {\n            throw new Error('MCP access token expiry must be after issuance.');\n        }\n        if (expiresAtEpochSeconds - issuedAtEpochSeconds > MAX_MCP_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_SECONDS) {\n            throw new Error('MCP access token lifetime must not exceed 30 days.');\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * Fresh, authoritative security facts resolved at the MCP resource boundary. Implementations must\n * verify issuer, exact resource/audience, expiry, token type/version, key/algorithm policy, and\n * current account state. Opaque access tokens are fully supported.\n */\nexport class VerifiedMcpCredential {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly subject: string,\n        public readonly issuer: string,\n        public readonly resource: string,\n        public readonly issuedAtEpochSeconds: number,\n        public readonly expiresAtEpochSeconds: number,\n        public readonly scopes: readonly string[],\n        /** When current enabled/revoked state and roles were read from the authoritative source. */\n        public readonly accountValidatedAtEpochSeconds: number,\n        /** Advisory tools/list filtering only. Endpoint authorization always runs again. */\n        public readonly listingRoles: readonly string[] = [],\n        /** Trusted delegated identity derived only by the access-token authority. */\n        public readonly trustedContext: readonly ContextTuple[] = [],\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/**\n * Application-owned paired mint/verify authority for resource-bound MCP access tokens.\n * `verifyAccessToken` must throw `ApiUnauthorizedError` for a token it rejects (the bind boundary\n * answers 401 + `WWW-Authenticate`); any other throw is treated as an implementation failure (500).\n */\nexport interface McpAccessTokenAuthority<TGrant> {\n    mintAccessToken(grant: TGrant): Promise<MintedMcpAccessToken>;\n    verifyAccessToken(\n        accessToken: string,\n        expectedResource: string,\n    ): Promise<VerifiedMcpCredential>;\n}\n\n/** Minimal tool identity supplied when the app creates its own endpoint-JWT mint request. */\nexport class McpEndpointDescriptor {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly toolName: string,\n        public readonly apiClassName: string,\n        public readonly methodName: string,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/** Application mapping from verified MCP identity to its unconstrained JwtHook mint request. */\nexport type McpEndpointMintRequestFactory<TMintRequest> = (\n    credential: VerifiedMcpCredential,\n    endpoint: McpEndpointDescriptor,\n) => TMintRequest;\n\n/** RFC 9728-style metadata exposed by the MCP protected resource. */\nexport class McpProtectedResourceMetadata {\n    readonly resource: string;\n    readonly authorization_servers: readonly string[];\n    readonly bearer_methods_supported = ['header'];\n    readonly scopes_supported?: readonly string[];\n\n    constructor(\n        resource: string,\n        authorizationServers: readonly string[],\n        scopesSupported?: readonly string[],\n    ) {\n        this.resource = resource;\n        this.authorization_servers = authorizationServers;\n        this.scopes_supported = scopesSupported;\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * Node MCP server configuration. Pass the same concrete application authority as both\n * accessTokenAuthority and endpointJwtAuthority when it implements both security seams.\n */\nexport class WpMcpServerConfig<TGrant, TMintRequest> {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly name: string,\n        public readonly version: string,\n        public readonly resource: string,\n        public readonly accessTokenAuthority: McpAccessTokenAuthority<TGrant>,\n        public readonly endpointJwtAuthority: JwtHook<TMintRequest>,\n        public readonly endpointMintRequest: McpEndpointMintRequestFactory<TMintRequest>,\n        public readonly authorizationServers: readonly string[],\n        public readonly requiredScopes: readonly string[],\n        public readonly maxAccountValidationAgeSeconds = MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS,\n        public readonly maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds = MAX_MCP_ENDPOINT_JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS,\n    ) {\n        if (name.trim() === '' || version.trim() === '' || resource.trim() === '') {\n            throw new Error('MCP name, version, and resource must be non-empty.');\n        }\n        if (\n            maxAccountValidationAgeSeconds <= 0 ||\n            maxAccountValidationAgeSeconds > MAX_MCP_ACCOUNT_VALIDATION_AGE_SECONDS\n        ) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'MCP account validation cache ceiling must be between 1 second and 1 hour.',\n            );\n        }\n        if (\n            maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds <= 0 ||\n            maxEndpointJwtLifetimeSeconds > MAX_MCP_ENDPOINT_JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS\n        ) {\n            throw new Error('MCP endpoint JWT lifetime must be between 1 second and 1 hour.');\n        }\n    }\n\n    protectedResourceMetadata(): McpProtectedResourceMetadata {\n        return new McpProtectedResourceMetadata(\n            this.resource,\n            this.authorizationServers,\n            this.requiredScopes,\n        );\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/McpAuthorityCompileAssertions.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"McpAuthorityCompileAssertions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/mcp-server/src/McpAuthorityCompileAssertions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAAA,0DAAkF;AAClF,uCAAiG;AAEjG,MAAM,qBAAqB;IACK;IAA5B,YAA4B,OAAe;QAAf,YAAO,GAAP,OAAO,CAAQ;IAAG,CAAC;CAClD;AAED,MAAM,eAAe;IAEG;IACA;IAFpB,YACoB,OAAe,EACf,QAAgB;QADhB,YAAO,GAAP,OAAO,CAAQ;QACf,aAAQ,GAAR,QAAQ,CAAQ;IACjC,CAAC;CACP;AAED,uGAAuG;AACvG,MAAa,6BACT,SAAQ,sBAA8B;IAG7B,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAA8B;QAC9C,OAAO,IAAI,wBAAS,CAAC,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAChF,CAAC;IAEQ,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAa;QACjC,OAAO,IAAI,kCAAmB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1C,CAAC;IAED,KAAK,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,KAAsB;QACxC,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,OAAO,IAAI,8BAAoB,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3F,CAAC;IAED,KAAK,CAAC,iBAAiB,CACnB,YAAoB,EACpB,gBAAwB;QAExB,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,OAAO,IAAI,+BAAqB,CAC5B,cAAc,EACd,6BAA6B,EAC7B,gBAAgB,EAChB,GAAG,EACH,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,EACR,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EACT,GAAG,CACN,CAAC;IACN,CAAC;CACJ;AAhCD,sEAgCC","sourcesContent":["import { AuthenticatedCaller, JwtHook, MintedJwt } from '@webpieces/http-routing';\nimport { McpAccessTokenAuthority, MintedMcpAccessToken, VerifiedMcpCredential } from './McpAuth';\n\nclass ExampleJwtMintRequest {\n    constructor(public readonly subject: string) {}\n}\n\nclass ExampleMcpGrant {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly subject: string,\n        public readonly resource: string,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/** Compile assertion: one application authority can own both endpoint JWT and MCP token lifecycles. */\nexport class McpAuthorityCompileAssertions\n    extends JwtHook<ExampleJwtMintRequest>\n    implements McpAccessTokenAuthority<ExampleMcpGrant>\n{\n    override async mint(request: ExampleJwtMintRequest): Promise<MintedJwt> {\n        return new MintedJwt(`endpoint:${request.subject}`, Date.now() / 1000 + 60);\n    }\n\n    override async parseJwt(token: string): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller> {\n        return new AuthenticatedCaller(token);\n    }\n\n    async mintAccessToken(grant: ExampleMcpGrant): Promise<MintedMcpAccessToken> {\n        const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n        return new MintedMcpAccessToken(`mcp:${grant.subject}`, grant.resource, now, now + 60);\n    }\n\n    async verifyAccessToken(\n        _accessToken: string,\n        expectedResource: string,\n    ): Promise<VerifiedMcpCredential> {\n        const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n        return new VerifiedMcpCredential(\n            'example-user',\n            'https://issuer.example.test',\n            expectedResource,\n            now,\n            now + 60,\n            ['tools'],\n            now,\n        );\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/McpBindOptions.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+import { McpApiBinding } from './McpApiBinding';
+import { McpDeployment } from './McpDeployment';
+export declare class McpBindOptions {
+    /** Supplied by the application/discovery config; Webpieces never assumes `/mcp`. */
+    readonly endpointPath: string;
+    readonly bindings: readonly McpApiBinding[];
+    readonly deployment: McpDeployment;
+    /** Requests without Origin remain valid for non-browser MCP clients. */
+    readonly allowedOrigins: readonly string[];
+    readonly maxSubscriptions: number;
+    readonly keepAliveMs: number;
+    constructor(
+    /** Supplied by the application/discovery config; Webpieces never assumes `/mcp`. */
+    endpointPath: string, bindings: readonly McpApiBinding[], deployment: McpDeployment, 
+    /** Requests without Origin remain valid for non-browser MCP clients. */
+    allowedOrigins?: readonly string[], maxSubscriptions?: number, keepAliveMs?: number);
+}

package/src/McpBindOptions.js

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.McpBindOptions = void 0;
+class McpBindOptions {
+    endpointPath;
+    bindings;
+    deployment;
+    allowedOrigins;
+    maxSubscriptions;
+    keepAliveMs;
+    constructor(
+    /** Supplied by the application/discovery config; Webpieces never assumes `/mcp`. */
+    endpointPath, bindings, deployment, 
+    /** Requests without Origin remain valid for non-browser MCP clients. */
+    allowedOrigins = [], maxSubscriptions = 1024, keepAliveMs = 15_000) {
+        this.endpointPath = endpointPath;
+        this.bindings = bindings;
+        this.deployment = deployment;
+        this.allowedOrigins = allowedOrigins;
+        this.maxSubscriptions = maxSubscriptions;
+        this.keepAliveMs = keepAliveMs;
+        if (!endpointPath.startsWith('/') || endpointPath.includes('?')) {
+            throw new Error('MCP endpointPath must be an absolute path without a query string.');
+        }
+        if (bindings.length === 0)
+            throw new Error('MCP binding requires at least one API contract.');
+        if (!Number.isInteger(maxSubscriptions) || maxSubscriptions <= 0) {
+            throw new Error('MCP maxSubscriptions must be a positive integer.');
+        }
+        if (!Number.isFinite(keepAliveMs) || keepAliveMs < 0) {
+            throw new Error('MCP keepAliveMs must be zero or a positive number.');
+        }
+    }
+}
+exports.McpBindOptions = McpBindOptions;
+//# sourceMappingURL=McpBindOptions.js.map

package/src/McpBindOptions.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"McpBindOptions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/mcp-server/src/McpBindOptions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAGA,MAAa,cAAc;IAGH;IACA;IACA;IAEA;IACA;IACA;IARpB;IACI,oFAAoF;IACpE,YAAoB,EACpB,QAAkC,EAClC,UAAyB;IACzC,wEAAwE;IACxD,iBAAoC,EAAE,EACtC,mBAAmB,IAAI,EACvB,cAAc,MAAM;QANpB,iBAAY,GAAZ,YAAY,CAAQ;QACpB,aAAQ,GAAR,QAAQ,CAA0B;QAClC,eAAU,GAAV,UAAU,CAAe;QAEzB,mBAAc,GAAd,cAAc,CAAwB;QACtC,qBAAgB,GAAhB,gBAAgB,CAAO;QACvB,gBAAW,GAAX,WAAW,CAAS;QAEpC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9D,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,mEAAmE,CAAC,CAAC;QACzF,CAAC;QACD,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;YACrB,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC,CAAC;QACvE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/D,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,kDAAkD,CAAC,CAAC;QACxE,CAAC;QACD,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACnD,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,oDAAoD,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1E,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;CACJ;AAvBD,wCAuBC","sourcesContent":["import { McpApiBinding } from './McpApiBinding';\nimport { McpDeployment } from './McpDeployment';\n\nexport class McpBindOptions {\n    constructor(\n        /** Supplied by the application/discovery config; Webpieces never assumes `/mcp`. */\n        public readonly endpointPath: string,\n        public readonly bindings: readonly McpApiBinding[],\n        public readonly deployment: McpDeployment,\n        /** Requests without Origin remain valid for non-browser MCP clients. */\n        public readonly allowedOrigins: readonly string[] = [],\n        public readonly maxSubscriptions = 1024,\n        public readonly keepAliveMs = 15_000,\n    ) {\n        if (!endpointPath.startsWith('/') || endpointPath.includes('?')) {\n            throw new Error('MCP endpointPath must be an absolute path without a query string.');\n        }\n        if (bindings.length === 0)\n            throw new Error('MCP binding requires at least one API contract.');\n        if (!Number.isInteger(maxSubscriptions) || maxSubscriptions <= 0) {\n            throw new Error('MCP maxSubscriptions must be a positive integer.');\n        }\n        if (!Number.isFinite(keepAliveMs) || keepAliveMs < 0) {\n            throw new Error('MCP keepAliveMs must be zero or a positive number.');\n        }\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/McpDeployment.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import { ServerEventBus } from '@modelcontextprotocol/server';
+export type McpDeploymentMode = 'single-process' | 'distributed';
+/** Makes process topology and bounded list-cache behavior explicit at construction. */
+export declare class McpDeployment {
+    readonly mode: McpDeploymentMode;
+    readonly bus: ServerEventBus;
+    readonly ttlMs: number;
+    private constructor();
+    static singleProcess(ttlMs?: number): McpDeployment;
+    static distributed(bus: ServerEventBus, ttlMs?: number): McpDeployment;
+}