@webpieces/http-routing 0.4.966 → 0.4.968

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@webpieces/http-routing",
-  "version": "0.4.966",
+  "version": "0.4.968",
   "description": "Decorator-based routing with auto-wiring for WebPieces",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "./src/index.js",
@@ -22,14 +22,14 @@
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@inversifyjs/binding-decorators": "1.1.5",
-    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.966",
-    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.966",
-    "@webpieces/gcp-identity": "0.4.966",
+    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.968",
+    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.968",
+    "@webpieces/gcp-identity": "0.4.968",
     "inversify": "7.10.4",
     "jsonwebtoken": "9.0.2",
     "minimatch": "10.0.1",
-    "@webpieces/http-client-core": "0.4.966",
-    "@webpieces/http-client-node": "0.4.966",
-    "@webpieces/cloudtasks-client": "0.4.966"
+    "@webpieces/http-client-core": "0.4.968",
+    "@webpieces/http-client-node": "0.4.968",
+    "@webpieces/cloudtasks-client": "0.4.968"
   }
 }

package/src/AuthConfig.d.ts

@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ export declare const AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY: ContextKey<AuthenticatedCaller, "
  *
  * So a zero-wiring server accepts service-to-service OIDC out of the box, and an app only binds the
  * pieces it actually uses. This class is injected `@optional` into AuthFilter (rebindable in tests);
- * when unbound, shared-secret endpoints simply have no accepted secret and fail fast (401).
+ * a server SERVING a `sharedSecret(key)` endpoint with no AuthConfig, or one not holding `key`, refuses
+ * to boot (#1362, `AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`).
  */
 export declare class AuthConfig {
     /** Accepted shared-secret values keyed by `sharedSecret(name)`. DEFAULT empty — pass to enable. */

package/src/AuthConfig.js

@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ exports.AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY = core_util_1.ContextKey.trusted('authenticated
  *
  * So a zero-wiring server accepts service-to-service OIDC out of the box, and an app only binds the
  * pieces it actually uses. This class is injected `@optional` into AuthFilter (rebindable in tests);
- * when unbound, shared-secret endpoints simply have no accepted secret and fail fast (401).
+ * a server SERVING a `sharedSecret(key)` endpoint with no AuthConfig, or one not holding `key`, refuses
+ * to boot (#1362, `AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`).
  */
 class AuthConfig {
     /** Accepted shared-secret values keyed by `sharedSecret(name)`. DEFAULT empty — pass to enable. */

package/src/AuthConfig.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"AuthConfig.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/AuthConfig.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAAA,oDAAkD;AAGlD,sGAAsG;AACtG,qGAAqG;AACrG,0DAA0D;AAC1D,wDAA4F;AAAnF,mHAAA,mBAAmB,OAAA;AAAE,4HAAA,4BAA4B,OAAA;AAE1D;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAa,aAAa;IAEF;IACA;IAFpB,YACoB,OAAe,EACf,OAAe;QADf,YAAO,GAAP,OAAO,CAAQ;QACf,YAAO,GAAP,OAAO,CAAQ;IAChC,CAAC;CACP;AALD,sCAKC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACU,QAAA,wBAAwB,GAAG,sBAAU,CAAC,OAAO,CACtD,qBAAqB,EACrB,wHAAwH;AACxH,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS;AACxB,cAAc,CAAC,KAAK;AACpB,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CACrB,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,MAAa,UAAU;IACnB,mGAAmG;IAC1F,aAAa,CAAgC;IAEtD,YAAY,gBAA+C,EAAE;QACzD,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC;IACvC,CAAC;CACJ;AAPD,gCAOC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,WAAW,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { ContextKey } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { AuthenticatedCaller } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\n// Defined in @webpieces/core-context (beside HttpRequest, which http-routing re-exports the same way)\n// so VendorAuthVerifier (defined there beside its outbound twin VendorAuthMinter) can name it from a\n// package both the node client and this router depend on.\nexport { AuthenticatedCaller, AuthenticatedMachineIdentity } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\n/**\n * SharedSecrets - the accepted values for ONE `sharedSecret(name)`. BOTH secret1 AND secret2\n * are accepted — this is what makes zero-downtime ROTATION possible:\n *\n *   to rotate: shift secret2 → secret1, and put the NEW secret in secret2. Callers cut over from\n *   the old value to the new during the window; once every caller sends the new one, the stale\n *   value falls out on the next shift. At all times EITHER key works, so no request is dropped.\n *\n * Data-only structure (a class, per the guidelines). Leave secret2 empty for a single secret.\n */\nexport class SharedSecrets {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly secret1: string,\n        public readonly secret2: string,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/**\n * The context slot holding the {@link AuthenticatedCaller} the framework {@link AuthFilter} resolved\n * for this request. A real TRUSTED {@link ContextKey}, written with `RequestContext.putTrusted` and\n * read with `RequestContext.getTrusted` — it replaces a raw `'__webpieces_principal__'` string that\n * was the one place in the codebase bypassing the typed context layer.\n *\n * `httpHeader` is deliberately UNDEFINED, so the key is context-only and NEVER travels. Two reasons,\n * and either alone is decisive: the value is an OBJECT, which no HTTP header can carry; and a\n * principal is proof THIS hop's authenticator produced, so forwarding it would hand the next service\n * a \"proven\" caller nothing on that hop verified. The individual facts a downstream service needs\n * (userId, orgId, roles) already propagate as their own transferred keys in\n * {@link WebpiecesCoreHeaders}, gated by the caller-verified rule.\n *\n * `isLogged` is FALSE: it is an object carrying the raw credential claims, which has no business\n * being serialized into a log line.\n */\nexport const AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY = ContextKey.trusted<AuthenticatedCaller>(\n    'authenticatedCaller',\n    'resolved by the framework AuthFilter from a credential an app-bound JwtHook, ApiKeyHook or VendorAuthVerifier verified',\n    /*httpHeader*/ undefined,\n    /*maskInLogs*/ false,\n    /*isLogged*/ false,\n);\n\n/**\n * AuthConfig - the app-provided SHARED-SECRET state the framework {@link AuthFilter} reads to\n * enforce `sharedSecret(name)` endpoints. It holds ONLY the accepted secret values (STATE) —\n * there is no verification code here. The verification MECHANISMS are separate optional hooks the\n * app binds when it needs them:\n *\n *  - user JWT  → bind a {@link JwtHook} (async parseJwt).\n *  - api key   → bind an {@link ApiKeyHook} (async verifyApiKey over the request's headers).\n *  - OIDC      → bind an {@link OidcHook} to override the framework's default verifier; a server that\n *                binds nothing still verifies Google OIDC via the built-in {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}.\n *\n * So a zero-wiring server accepts service-to-service OIDC out of the box, and an app only binds the\n * pieces it actually uses. This class is injected `@optional` into AuthFilter (rebindable in tests);\n * when unbound, shared-secret endpoints simply have no accepted secret and fail fast (401).\n */\nexport class AuthConfig {\n    /** Accepted shared-secret values keyed by `sharedSecret(name)`. DEFAULT empty — pass to enable. */\n    readonly sharedSecrets: Record<string, SharedSecrets>;\n\n    constructor(sharedSecrets: Record<string, SharedSecrets> = {}) {\n        this.sharedSecrets = sharedSecrets;\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link AuthConfig} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(AUTH_CONFIG)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The AuthConfig class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const AUTH_CONFIG = Symbol.for('AuthConfig');\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"AuthConfig.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/AuthConfig.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAAA,oDAAkD;AAGlD,sGAAsG;AACtG,qGAAqG;AACrG,0DAA0D;AAC1D,wDAA4F;AAAnF,mHAAA,mBAAmB,OAAA;AAAE,4HAAA,4BAA4B,OAAA;AAE1D;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAa,aAAa;IAEF;IACA;IAFpB,YACoB,OAAe,EACf,OAAe;QADf,YAAO,GAAP,OAAO,CAAQ;QACf,YAAO,GAAP,OAAO,CAAQ;IAChC,CAAC;CACP;AALD,sCAKC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACU,QAAA,wBAAwB,GAAG,sBAAU,CAAC,OAAO,CACtD,qBAAqB,EACrB,wHAAwH;AACxH,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS;AACxB,cAAc,CAAC,KAAK;AACpB,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CACrB,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,MAAa,UAAU;IACnB,mGAAmG;IAC1F,aAAa,CAAgC;IAEtD,YAAY,gBAA+C,EAAE;QACzD,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC;IACvC,CAAC;CACJ;AAPD,gCAOC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,WAAW,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { ContextKey } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { AuthenticatedCaller } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\n// Defined in @webpieces/core-context (beside HttpRequest, which http-routing re-exports the same way)\n// so VendorAuthVerifier (defined there beside its outbound twin VendorAuthMinter) can name it from a\n// package both the node client and this router depend on.\nexport { AuthenticatedCaller, AuthenticatedMachineIdentity } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\n/**\n * SharedSecrets - the accepted values for ONE `sharedSecret(name)`. BOTH secret1 AND secret2\n * are accepted — this is what makes zero-downtime ROTATION possible:\n *\n *   to rotate: shift secret2 → secret1, and put the NEW secret in secret2. Callers cut over from\n *   the old value to the new during the window; once every caller sends the new one, the stale\n *   value falls out on the next shift. At all times EITHER key works, so no request is dropped.\n *\n * Data-only structure (a class, per the guidelines). Leave secret2 empty for a single secret.\n */\nexport class SharedSecrets {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly secret1: string,\n        public readonly secret2: string,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/**\n * The context slot holding the {@link AuthenticatedCaller} the framework {@link AuthFilter} resolved\n * for this request. A real TRUSTED {@link ContextKey}, written with `RequestContext.putTrusted` and\n * read with `RequestContext.getTrusted` — it replaces a raw `'__webpieces_principal__'` string that\n * was the one place in the codebase bypassing the typed context layer.\n *\n * `httpHeader` is deliberately UNDEFINED, so the key is context-only and NEVER travels. Two reasons,\n * and either alone is decisive: the value is an OBJECT, which no HTTP header can carry; and a\n * principal is proof THIS hop's authenticator produced, so forwarding it would hand the next service\n * a \"proven\" caller nothing on that hop verified. The individual facts a downstream service needs\n * (userId, orgId, roles) already propagate as their own transferred keys in\n * {@link WebpiecesCoreHeaders}, gated by the caller-verified rule.\n *\n * `isLogged` is FALSE: it is an object carrying the raw credential claims, which has no business\n * being serialized into a log line.\n */\nexport const AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY = ContextKey.trusted<AuthenticatedCaller>(\n    'authenticatedCaller',\n    'resolved by the framework AuthFilter from a credential an app-bound JwtHook, ApiKeyHook or VendorAuthVerifier verified',\n    /*httpHeader*/ undefined,\n    /*maskInLogs*/ false,\n    /*isLogged*/ false,\n);\n\n/**\n * AuthConfig - the app-provided SHARED-SECRET state the framework {@link AuthFilter} reads to\n * enforce `sharedSecret(name)` endpoints. It holds ONLY the accepted secret values (STATE) —\n * there is no verification code here. The verification MECHANISMS are separate optional hooks the\n * app binds when it needs them:\n *\n *  - user JWT  → bind a {@link JwtHook} (async parseJwt).\n *  - api key   → bind an {@link ApiKeyHook} (async verifyApiKey over the request's headers).\n *  - OIDC      → bind an {@link OidcHook} to override the framework's default verifier; a server that\n *                binds nothing still verifies Google OIDC via the built-in {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}.\n *\n * So a zero-wiring server accepts service-to-service OIDC out of the box, and an app only binds the\n * pieces it actually uses. This class is injected `@optional` into AuthFilter (rebindable in tests);\n * a server SERVING a `sharedSecret(key)` endpoint with no AuthConfig, or one not holding `key`, refuses\n * to boot (#1362, `AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`).\n */\nexport class AuthConfig {\n    /** Accepted shared-secret values keyed by `sharedSecret(name)`. DEFAULT empty — pass to enable. */\n    readonly sharedSecrets: Record<string, SharedSecrets>;\n\n    constructor(sharedSecrets: Record<string, SharedSecrets> = {}) {\n        this.sharedSecrets = sharedSecrets;\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link AuthConfig} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(AUTH_CONFIG)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The AuthConfig class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const AUTH_CONFIG = Symbol.for('AuthConfig');\n"]}

package/src/AuthHooks.d.ts

@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ export declare const OIDC_HOOK: unique symbol;
  * options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(OneTabletApiKeyHook);
  * ```
  *
- * When NO ApiKeyHook is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} 401s every `apiKey(...)` endpoint,
- * exactly as it does for an unbound JwtHook. There is no framework default and there never will be
+ * When NO ApiKeyHook is bound, a server SERVING an `apiKey(...)` endpoint refuses to boot (#1362,
+ * `AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`), exactly as it does for an unbound JwtHook. There is no framework default and there never will be
  * one: the key regime lives in the app's datastore, under the app's hashing scheme, behind the app's
  * choice of header names.
  *

package/src/AuthHooks.js

@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ exports.OIDC_HOOK = Symbol.for('OidcHook');
  * options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(OneTabletApiKeyHook);
  * ```
  *
- * When NO ApiKeyHook is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} 401s every `apiKey(...)` endpoint,
- * exactly as it does for an unbound JwtHook. There is no framework default and there never will be
+ * When NO ApiKeyHook is bound, a server SERVING an `apiKey(...)` endpoint refuses to boot (#1362,
+ * `AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`), exactly as it does for an unbound JwtHook. There is no framework default and there never will be
  * one: the key regime lives in the app's datastore, under the app's hashing scheme, behind the app's
  * choice of header names.
  *

package/src/AuthHooks.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"AuthHooks.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/AuthHooks.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAIA,gFAAgF;AAChF,MAAa,SAAS;IAEE;IACA;IAFpB,YACoB,KAAa,EACb,qBAA6B;QAD7B,UAAK,GAAL,KAAK,CAAQ;QACb,0BAAqB,GAArB,qBAAqB,CAAQ;QAE7C,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE;YAAE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC,CAAC;QAChF,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1C,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9E,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;CACJ;AAVD,8BAUC;AAED,+FAA+F;AAC/F,MAAsB,OAAO;CAG5B;AAHD,0BAGC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;AAE9C;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAsB,QAAQ;CAE7B;AAFD,4BAEC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;AAEhD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8BG;AACH,MAAsB,UAAU;CAiB/B;AAjBD,gCAiBC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,YAAY,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { HttpRequest, RawHttpRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { OidcAuthMethods } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { AuthenticatedCaller, AuthenticatedMachineIdentity } from './AuthConfig';\n\n/** Framework-normalized result from an application-owned JWT mint operation. */\nexport class MintedJwt {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly token: string,\n        public readonly expiresAtEpochSeconds: number,\n    ) {\n        if (token.trim() === '') throw new Error('Minted JWT token must be non-empty.');\n        if (!Number.isFinite(expiresAtEpochSeconds)) {\n            throw new Error('Minted JWT expiry must be a finite epoch-second value.');\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n/** Optional application JWT credential authority. Authorization lives in AuthorizationHook. */\nexport abstract class JwtHook<TMintRequest> {\n    abstract mint(request: TMintRequest): Promise<MintedJwt>;\n    abstract parseJwt(token: string): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link JwtHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(JWT_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The JwtHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const JWT_HOOK = Symbol.for('JwtHook');\n\n/**\n * OidcHook - the OPTIONAL override for Google OIDC service-to-service verification. Its DI token is the\n * {@link OIDC_HOOK} Symbol injected via `@inject(OIDC_HOOK)` (a Symbol, because the app container uses\n * autobind; rebindable in tests). Bind one ONLY to customize the caller policy — e.g. an app that reads an\n * `ALLOWED_OIDC_CALLERS` env var at its composition root and enforces that allow-list. When NO\n * OidcHook is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} runs the built-in {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}\n * directly, so a server that wires nothing still verifies Google OIDC against the endpoint's caller\n * scopes. `verifyOidc` receives EVERY OIDC method the endpoint declares ({@link OidcAuthMethods}: one,\n * or one `oidcSameProject()` (`callerScope: 'same-project'`) plus one `oidcSvcs([...])`\n * (`callerScope: 'services'` with its `callers`)), because they are one bearer credential: verify\n * the token once, admit the call when ANY of them admits the caller, and throw otherwise.\n */\nexport abstract class OidcHook {\n    abstract verifyOidc(token: string, methods: OidcAuthMethods): Promise<AuthenticatedMachineIdentity>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link OidcHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(OIDC_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The OidcHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const OIDC_HOOK = Symbol.for('OidcHook');\n\n/**\n * ApiKeyHook - the OPTIONAL mechanism behind `apiKey(regime, credentials)`: authenticate a\n * CUSTOMER-held api key\n * against the app's own datastore and return the context to seed. Its DI token is the\n * {@link API_KEY_HOOK} Symbol injected via `@inject(API_KEY_HOOK)` (a Symbol, because the app container\n * uses autobind; rebindable in tests). The fourth hook, symmetric with {@link JwtHook} /\n * {@link OidcHook} / `VendorAuthVerifier` (@webpieces/core-context):\n *\n * ```typescript\n * // AppModule.ts, beside the CompanyJwtHook binding\n * options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(OneTabletApiKeyHook);\n * ```\n *\n * When NO ApiKeyHook is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} 401s every `apiKey(...)` endpoint,\n * exactly as it does for an unbound JwtHook. There is no framework default and there never will be\n * one: the key regime lives in the app's datastore, under the app's hashing scheme, behind the app's\n * choice of header names.\n *\n * THE ONE THING THIS HAS THAT `JwtHook.parseJwt` DOES NOT: it receives the whole {@link HttpRequest},\n * not one pre-extracted token. A real key regime validates the key TOGETHER WITH a second header — the\n * organization the caller is acting for — and a hook handed one header's value physically cannot do\n * that cross-check. The framework therefore EXTRACTS no api-key header: which headers carry the\n * credential is the app's business, and `getHeader` / `getHeaderValues` read as many as the regime\n * needs. The contract's `credentials` list DECLARES those header names for readers and spec\n * generators — it is documentation of the regime, never an instruction to this hook, so the hook\n * stays the single place the pair is actually validated. (Being ASYNC is no longer a difference — every hook here is, and for the same reason: an\n * app's strategy reaches the network.)\n *\n * ONE hook serves EVERY regime: `regime` selects which, so a server with a partner-api regime and an\n * internal-tooling regime switches on it rather than binding a token per regime.\n */\nexport abstract class ApiKeyHook {\n    /**\n     * AUTHENTICATE one inbound request. Return who the caller is plus the {@link AuthenticatedCaller.entries}\n     * the framework seeds into `RequestContext` via `putTrusted`, or throw\n     * {@link ApiUnauthorizedError} to deny.\n     *\n     * NOTE the seeded entries are TRUSTED context keys, so return only what THIS hook proved from the\n     * credential it just verified. Anything the caller merely asserted on the wire is not admitted by\n     * `apiKey(...)` — the mode is deliberately caller-NOT-verified (see `AuthFilter.verifiesCaller`),\n     * because a customer is not an internal service.\n     *\n     * @param regime  the first argument of the contract's `apiKey(regime, credentials)` — which key\n     *                regime this route belongs to.\n     * @param request the inbound request; read as many headers as the regime needs with\n     *                `getHeader` / `getHeaderValues`, either by raw name or by {@link ContextKey}.\n     */\n    abstract verifyApiKey(regime: string, request: HttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link ApiKeyHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(API_KEY_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The ApiKeyHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const API_KEY_HOOK = Symbol.for('ApiKeyHook');\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"AuthHooks.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/AuthHooks.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAIA,gFAAgF;AAChF,MAAa,SAAS;IAEE;IACA;IAFpB,YACoB,KAAa,EACb,qBAA6B;QAD7B,UAAK,GAAL,KAAK,CAAQ;QACb,0BAAqB,GAArB,qBAAqB,CAAQ;QAE7C,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE;YAAE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC,CAAC;QAChF,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1C,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,wDAAwD,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9E,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;CACJ;AAVD,8BAUC;AAED,+FAA+F;AAC/F,MAAsB,OAAO;CAG5B;AAHD,0BAGC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;AAE9C;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAsB,QAAQ;CAE7B;AAFD,4BAEC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;AAEhD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8BG;AACH,MAAsB,UAAU;CAiB/B;AAjBD,gCAiBC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,YAAY,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { HttpRequest, RawHttpRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { OidcAuthMethods } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { AuthenticatedCaller, AuthenticatedMachineIdentity } from './AuthConfig';\n\n/** Framework-normalized result from an application-owned JWT mint operation. */\nexport class MintedJwt {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly token: string,\n        public readonly expiresAtEpochSeconds: number,\n    ) {\n        if (token.trim() === '') throw new Error('Minted JWT token must be non-empty.');\n        if (!Number.isFinite(expiresAtEpochSeconds)) {\n            throw new Error('Minted JWT expiry must be a finite epoch-second value.');\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n/** Optional application JWT credential authority. Authorization lives in AuthorizationHook. */\nexport abstract class JwtHook<TMintRequest> {\n    abstract mint(request: TMintRequest): Promise<MintedJwt>;\n    abstract parseJwt(token: string): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link JwtHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(JWT_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The JwtHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const JWT_HOOK = Symbol.for('JwtHook');\n\n/**\n * OidcHook - the OPTIONAL override for Google OIDC service-to-service verification. Its DI token is the\n * {@link OIDC_HOOK} Symbol injected via `@inject(OIDC_HOOK)` (a Symbol, because the app container uses\n * autobind; rebindable in tests). Bind one ONLY to customize the caller policy — e.g. an app that reads an\n * `ALLOWED_OIDC_CALLERS` env var at its composition root and enforces that allow-list. When NO\n * OidcHook is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} runs the built-in {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}\n * directly, so a server that wires nothing still verifies Google OIDC against the endpoint's caller\n * scopes. `verifyOidc` receives EVERY OIDC method the endpoint declares ({@link OidcAuthMethods}: one,\n * or one `oidcSameProject()` (`callerScope: 'same-project'`) plus one `oidcSvcs([...])`\n * (`callerScope: 'services'` with its `callers`)), because they are one bearer credential: verify\n * the token once, admit the call when ANY of them admits the caller, and throw otherwise.\n */\nexport abstract class OidcHook {\n    abstract verifyOidc(token: string, methods: OidcAuthMethods): Promise<AuthenticatedMachineIdentity>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link OidcHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(OIDC_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The OidcHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const OIDC_HOOK = Symbol.for('OidcHook');\n\n/**\n * ApiKeyHook - the OPTIONAL mechanism behind `apiKey(regime, credentials)`: authenticate a\n * CUSTOMER-held api key\n * against the app's own datastore and return the context to seed. Its DI token is the\n * {@link API_KEY_HOOK} Symbol injected via `@inject(API_KEY_HOOK)` (a Symbol, because the app container\n * uses autobind; rebindable in tests). The fourth hook, symmetric with {@link JwtHook} /\n * {@link OidcHook} / `VendorAuthVerifier` (@webpieces/core-context):\n *\n * ```typescript\n * // AppModule.ts, beside the CompanyJwtHook binding\n * options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(OneTabletApiKeyHook);\n * ```\n *\n * When NO ApiKeyHook is bound, a server SERVING an `apiKey(...)` endpoint refuses to boot (#1362,\n * `AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`), exactly as it does for an unbound JwtHook. There is no framework default and there never will be\n * one: the key regime lives in the app's datastore, under the app's hashing scheme, behind the app's\n * choice of header names.\n *\n * THE ONE THING THIS HAS THAT `JwtHook.parseJwt` DOES NOT: it receives the whole {@link HttpRequest},\n * not one pre-extracted token. A real key regime validates the key TOGETHER WITH a second header — the\n * organization the caller is acting for — and a hook handed one header's value physically cannot do\n * that cross-check. The framework therefore EXTRACTS no api-key header: which headers carry the\n * credential is the app's business, and `getHeader` / `getHeaderValues` read as many as the regime\n * needs. The contract's `credentials` list DECLARES those header names for readers and spec\n * generators — it is documentation of the regime, never an instruction to this hook, so the hook\n * stays the single place the pair is actually validated. (Being ASYNC is no longer a difference — every hook here is, and for the same reason: an\n * app's strategy reaches the network.)\n *\n * ONE hook serves EVERY regime: `regime` selects which, so a server with a partner-api regime and an\n * internal-tooling regime switches on it rather than binding a token per regime.\n */\nexport abstract class ApiKeyHook {\n    /**\n     * AUTHENTICATE one inbound request. Return who the caller is plus the {@link AuthenticatedCaller.entries}\n     * the framework seeds into `RequestContext` via `putTrusted`, or throw\n     * {@link ApiUnauthorizedError} to deny.\n     *\n     * NOTE the seeded entries are TRUSTED context keys, so return only what THIS hook proved from the\n     * credential it just verified. Anything the caller merely asserted on the wire is not admitted by\n     * `apiKey(...)` — the mode is deliberately caller-NOT-verified (see `AuthFilter.verifiesCaller`),\n     * because a customer is not an internal service.\n     *\n     * @param regime  the first argument of the contract's `apiKey(regime, credentials)` — which key\n     *                regime this route belongs to.\n     * @param request the inbound request; read as many headers as the regime needs with\n     *                `getHeader` / `getHeaderValues`, either by raw name or by {@link ContextKey}.\n     */\n    abstract verifyApiKey(regime: string, request: HttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link ApiKeyHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(API_KEY_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The ApiKeyHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const API_KEY_HOOK = Symbol.for('ApiKeyHook');\n"]}

package/src/AuthHooksCompileAssertions.js

@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ class AuthHooksCompileAssertions {
     /** The ALIGNED spellings must keep compiling; asserted by the ABSENCE of an error. */
     legitimate() {
         void class extends core_context_2.VendorAuthVerifier {
+            // The vendors it handles, read at route registration so an unhandled name fails boot (#1362).
+            supportedVendorNames() {
+                return ['sentry'];
+            }
             // No meaningless mint()/refresh(): a server-only verifier implements verify and nothing else.
             async verify(_name, request) {
                 // No `raw!`, no `if (!raw) throw`: AuthFilter checked once and the TYPE carries it.
@@ -76,12 +80,18 @@ class AuthHooksCompileAssertions {
     /** Every spelling this change deleted must now be UNWRITABLE. */
     rejected() {
         void class extends core_context_2.VendorAuthVerifier {
+            supportedVendorNames() {
+                return ['sentry'];
+            }
             // @ts-expect-error verify takes (name, RawHttpRequest): the three-parameter spelling is gone
             async verify(_name, _request, _raw) {
                 return new AuthConfig_1.AuthenticatedCaller('u1');
             }
         };
         void class extends core_context_2.VendorAuthVerifier {
+            supportedVendorNames() {
+                return ['sentry'];
+            }
             // @ts-expect-error verify returns the caller it proved: a void override must not compile
             async verify(_name, _request) {
                 // a hook that verifies and then has no way to say what it proved

package/src/AuthHooksCompileAssertions.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Each `@ts-expect-error` FAILS THE BUILD (TS2578,\n * \"unused '@ts-expect-error' directive\") the moment the thing it guards starts compiling again.\n *\n * WHY THIS IS NOT A `.spec.ts` FILE — the same reason as {@link JwtHookCompileAssertions}:\n * tsconfig.lib.json EXCLUDES specs and vitest strips types with esbuild, so a `@ts-expect-error` in a\n * spec is inert and the suite passes either way. A type-level guarantee has to be asserted in a file\n * the type-checker actually compiles.\n *\n * WHY IT MATTERS HERE. This repo ships no backwards-compatibility shims: the compile error IS the\n * migration. An implementor that kept `verify(name, request, raw)` or a `HeaderReader` parameter\n * would otherwise sit there compiling, and an accepted shape is never migrated.\n */\nexport class AuthHooksCompileAssertions {\n    /**\n     * The DELETED type names, kept referenced so the two `@ts-expect-error`s above are load-bearing\n     * rather than decorative. Both resolve to `any` under the suppressed error; the assertion is the\n     * IMPORT failing, not what these aliases denote.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- a suppressed import of a deleted symbol resolves to any; the assertion is the import error itself\n    deletedNames(): void {\n        const headerReaderIsGone: HeaderReader | undefined = undefined;\n        const authValuesIsGone: AuthValues | undefined = undefined;\n        const webhookAuthCallbackIsGone: WebhookAuthCallback | undefined = undefined;\n        void headerReaderIsGone;\n        void authValuesIsGone;\n        void webhookAuthCallbackIsGone;\n        void WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK;\n        // @ts-expect-error VendorAuthHook is DELETED (#1358): this server binds the INBOUND role VendorAuthVerifier\n        void Routing.VendorAuthHook;\n        // @ts-expect-error VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK is DELETED (#1358): bind VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER\n        void Routing.VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK;\n        // @ts-expect-error the OUTBOUND role is the client's (http-client-node); the router never exports it\n        void Routing.VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The server's AuthFilter takes the INBOUND role only. Handing it an outbound minter must not\n     * compile: a minter cannot verify, and an AuthFilter depending on one would construct a client's\n     * credential source just to receive a call (#1358).\n     */\n    authFilterRefusesTheMinter(oidc: DefaultOidcVerifier, minter: VendorAuthMinter): void {\n        // @ts-expect-error a VendorAuthMinter cannot verify: AuthFilter takes a VendorAuthVerifier\n        void new AuthFilter(oidc, undefined, undefined, undefined, minter);\n    }\n\n    /** The ALIGNED spellings must keep compiling; asserted by the ABSENCE of an error. */\n    legitimate(): void {\n        void class extends VendorAuthVerifier {\n            // No meaningless mint()/refresh(): a server-only verifier implements verify and nothing else.\n            override async verify(_name: string, request: RawHttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller> {\n                // No `raw!`, no `if (!raw) throw`: AuthFilter checked once and the TYPE carries it.\n                const bytes: Buffer = request.raw.rawBody;\n                return new AuthenticatedCaller(`sentry:${bytes.length}`);\n            }\n        };\n        void class extends ApiKeyHook {\n            override async verifyApiKey(_name: string, request: HttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller> {\n                // Both of these were UNREACHABLE through the deleted one-method HeaderReader.\n                const all: string[] | undefined = request.getHeaderValues('x-api-key');\n                return new AuthenticatedCaller(all?.[0] ?? 'anonymous');\n            }\n        };\n    }\n\n    /** Every spelling this change deleted must now be UNWRITABLE. */\n    rejected(): void {\n        void class extends VendorAuthVerifier {\n            // @ts-expect-error verify takes (name, RawHttpRequest): the three-parameter spelling is gone\n            override async verify(_name: string, _request: HttpRequest, _raw: RawRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller> {\n                return new AuthenticatedCaller('u1');\n            }\n        };\n        void class extends VendorAuthVerifier {\n            // @ts-expect-error verify returns the caller it proved: a void override must not compile\n            override async verify(_name: string, _request: RawHttpRequest): Promise<void> {\n                // a hook that verifies and then has no way to say what it proved\n            }\n        };\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * {@link OidcHook.verifyOidc} receives EVERY OIDC method the endpoint declares ({@link OidcAuthMethods}),\n     * so a hook verifies the token once and can tell `oidcSameProject()` from `oidcSvcs([...])`. The\n     * caller-list override this change deletes (`callers: string[]`, where an EMPTY list meant \"any\n     * Google-signed caller\") and a one-method override, which could not see the other scope of a pair,\n     * must not compile.\n     */\n    oidcHookTakesTheMethods(): void {\n        void class extends OidcHook {\n            override async verifyOidc(_token: string, methods: OidcAuthMethods): Promise<AuthenticatedMachineIdentity> {\n                const first = methods[0];\n                const named = first.callerScope === 'services' ? first.callers[0] : 'same-project';\n                return new AuthenticatedMachineIdentity('oidc', named);\n            }\n        };\n        void class extends OidcHook {\n            // @ts-expect-error verifyOidc takes the endpoint's OidcAuthMethods; the deleted caller-list override must not compile\n            override async verifyOidc(_token: string, _callers: string[]): Promise<AuthenticatedMachineIdentity> {\n                return new AuthenticatedMachineIdentity('oidc', 'caller@example.test');\n            }\n        };\n        void class extends OidcHook {\n            // @ts-expect-error verifyOidc takes every OIDC method of the endpoint, not one, so a pair is verified once\n            override async verifyOidc(_token: string, _method: OidcAuthMethod): Promise<AuthenticatedMachineIdentity> {\n                return new AuthenticatedMachineIdentity('oidc', 'caller@example.test');\n            }\n        };\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * An {@link HttpRequest} whose `raw` is merely OPTIONAL is NOT a {@link RawHttpRequest}. This is\n     * the assignment that makes the narrowing real: without it, `RawHttpRequest` would be a comment.\n     */\n    rawIsNotOptional(): void {\n        const maybeRaw = new HttpRequest('POST', '/hook/sentry/issue', new Map<string, string[]>());\n        // @ts-expect-error HttpRequest.raw is optional, so it is not assignable to RawHttpRequest\n        const narrowed: RawHttpRequest = maybeRaw;\n        void narrowed;\n\n        // The other direction is free: a RawHttpRequest IS an HttpRequest everywhere one is wanted.\n        const proven = new HttpRequest(\n            'POST',\n            '/hook/sentry/issue',\n            new Map<string, string[]>(),\n            new RawRequest('https://example.com/hook', Buffer.from('{}', 'utf8'), '1.2.3.4'),\n        ) as RawHttpRequest;\n        const widened: HttpRequest = proven;\n        void widened;\n    }\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"AuthHooksCompileAssertions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/AuthHooksCompileAssertions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;AAAA,0DAAkF;AAOlF,0DAA+E;AAG/E,8EAA8E;AAC9E,2CAAoD;AACpD,yDAAmC;AACnC,qDAAkD;AAElD,2CAAmD;AACnD,6CAAiF;AAEjF;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAa,0BAA0B;IACnC;;;;OAIG;IACH,wIAAwI;IACxI,YAAY;QACR,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAA6B,SAAS,CAAC;QAC/D,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAA2B,SAAS,CAAC;QAC3D,MAAM,yBAAyB,GAAoC,SAAS,CAAC;QAC7E,KAAK,kBAAkB,CAAC;QACxB,KAAK,gBAAgB,CAAC;QACtB,KAAK,yBAAyB,CAAC;QAC/B,KAAK,iCAAqB,CAAC;QAC3B,4GAA4G;QAC5G,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;QAC5B,kFAAkF;QAClF,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC;QAC9B,qGAAqG;QACrG,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC;IACpC,CAAC;IAED;;;;OAIG;IACH,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAyB,EAAE,MAAwB;QAC1E,2FAA2F;QAC3F,KAAK,IAAI,uBAAU,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IACvE,CAAC;IAED,sFAAsF;IACtF,UAAU;QACN,KAAK,KAAM,SAAQ,iCAAkB;YACjC,8FAA8F;YACrF,oBAAoB;gBACzB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;YACtB,CAAC;YAED,8FAA8F;YACrF,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,OAAuB;gBACxD,oFAAoF;gBACpF,MAAM,KAAK,GAAW,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;gBAC1C,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAmB,CAAC,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YAC7D,CAAC;SACJ,CAAC;QACF,KAAK,KAAM,SAAQ,sBAAU;YAChB,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,OAAoB;gBAC3D,8EAA8E;gBAC9E,MAAM,GAAG,GAAyB,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;gBACvE,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAmB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;YAC5D,CAAC;SACJ,CAAC;IACN,CAAC;IAED,iEAAiE;IACjE,QAAQ;QACJ,KAAK,KAAM,SAAQ,iCAAkB;YACxB,oBAAoB;gBACzB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;YACtB,CAAC;YACD,6FAA6F;YACpF,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,QAAqB,EAAE,IAAgB;gBACxE,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAmB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;YACzC,CAAC;SACJ,CAAC;QACF,KAAK,KAAM,SAAQ,iCAAkB;YACxB,oBAAoB;gBACzB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;YACtB,CAAC;YACD,yFAAyF;YAChF,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,QAAwB;gBACzD,iEAAiE;YACrE,CAAC;SACJ,CAAC;IACN,CAAC;IAED;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,uBAAuB;QACnB,KAAK,KAAM,SAAQ,oBAAQ;YACd,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,MAAc,EAAE,OAAwB;gBAC9D,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;gBACzB,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;gBACnF,OAAO,IAAI,yCAA4B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YAC3D,CAAC;SACJ,CAAC;QACF,KAAK,KAAM,SAAQ,oBAAQ;YACvB,sHAAsH;YAC7G,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,MAAc,EAAE,QAAkB;gBACxD,OAAO,IAAI,yCAA4B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;YAC3E,CAAC;SACJ,CAAC;QACF,KAAK,KAAM,SAAQ,oBAAQ;YACvB,2GAA2G;YAClG,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,MAAc,EAAE,OAAuB;gBAC7D,OAAO,IAAI,yCAA4B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;YAC3E,CAAC;SACJ,CAAC;IACN,CAAC;IAED;;;OAGG;IACH,gBAAgB;QACZ,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,0BAAW,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,EAAoB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5F,0FAA0F;QAC1F,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAmB,QAAQ,CAAC;QAC1C,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;QAEd,4FAA4F;QAC5F,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,0BAAW,CAC1B,MAAM,EACN,oBAAoB,EACpB,IAAI,GAAG,EAAoB,EAC3B,IAAI,yBAAU,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CACjE,CAAC;QACpB,MAAM,OAAO,GAAgB,MAAM,CAAC;QACpC,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;IACjB,CAAC;CACJ;AAhID,gEAgIC","sourcesContent":["import { HttpRequest, RawHttpRequest, RawRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n// @ts-expect-error HeaderReader is DELETED — an ApiKeyHook now receives the whole HttpRequest, so it\n// reaches getHeaderValues and the ContextKey overload of getHeader that the narrow reader hid.\nimport type { HeaderReader } from './AuthHooks';\n// @ts-expect-error AuthValues is RENAMED to AuthenticatedCaller — there is no alias, by policy.\nimport type { AuthValues } from './AuthConfig';\nimport { OidcAuthMethod, OidcAuthMethods } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { VendorAuthMinter, VendorAuthVerifier } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n// @ts-expect-error WebhookAuthCallback is REPLACED by VendorAuthVerifier (the inbound role) — no alias, by policy.\nimport type { WebhookAuthCallback } from './AuthHooks';\n// @ts-expect-error WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK is REPLACED by VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER.\nimport { WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK } from './AuthHooks';\nimport * as Routing from './index';\nimport { AuthFilter } from './filters/AuthFilter';\nimport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from './DefaultOidcVerifier';\nimport { ApiKeyHook, OidcHook } from './AuthHooks';\nimport { AuthenticatedCaller, AuthenticatedMachineIdentity } from './AuthConfig';\n\n/**\n * COMPILE-TIME assertions that the four auth hooks share ONE shape, and that every spelling this\n * change deleted has actually stopped compiling. Each `@ts-expect-error` FAILS THE BUILD (TS2578,\n * \"unused '@ts-expect-error' directive\") the moment the thing it guards starts compiling again.\n *\n * WHY THIS IS NOT A `.spec.ts` FILE — the same reason as {@link JwtHookCompileAssertions}:\n * tsconfig.lib.json EXCLUDES specs and vitest strips types with esbuild, so a `@ts-expect-error` in a\n * spec is inert and the suite passes either way. A type-level guarantee has to be asserted in a file\n * the type-checker actually compiles.\n *\n * WHY IT MATTERS HERE. This repo ships no backwards-compatibility shims: the compile error IS the\n * migration. An implementor that kept `verify(name, request, raw)` or a `HeaderReader` parameter\n * would otherwise sit there compiling, and an accepted shape is never migrated.\n */\nexport class AuthHooksCompileAssertions {\n    /**\n     * The DELETED type names, kept referenced so the two `@ts-expect-error`s above are load-bearing\n     * rather than decorative. Both resolve to `any` under the suppressed error; the assertion is the\n     * IMPORT failing, not what these aliases denote.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- a suppressed import of a deleted symbol resolves to any; the assertion is the import error itself\n    deletedNames(): void {\n        const headerReaderIsGone: HeaderReader | undefined = undefined;\n        const authValuesIsGone: AuthValues | undefined = undefined;\n        const webhookAuthCallbackIsGone: WebhookAuthCallback | undefined = undefined;\n        void headerReaderIsGone;\n        void authValuesIsGone;\n        void webhookAuthCallbackIsGone;\n        void WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK;\n        // @ts-expect-error VendorAuthHook is DELETED (#1358): this server binds the INBOUND role VendorAuthVerifier\n        void Routing.VendorAuthHook;\n        // @ts-expect-error VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK is DELETED (#1358): bind VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER\n        void Routing.VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK;\n        // @ts-expect-error the OUTBOUND role is the client's (http-client-node); the router never exports it\n        void Routing.VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The server's AuthFilter takes the INBOUND role only. Handing it an outbound minter must not\n     * compile: a minter cannot verify, and an AuthFilter depending on one would construct a client's\n     * credential source just to receive a call (#1358).\n     */\n    authFilterRefusesTheMinter(oidc: DefaultOidcVerifier, minter: VendorAuthMinter): void {\n        // @ts-expect-error a VendorAuthMinter cannot verify: AuthFilter takes a VendorAuthVerifier\n        void new AuthFilter(oidc, undefined, undefined, undefined, minter);\n    }\n\n    /** The ALIGNED spellings must keep compiling; asserted by the ABSENCE of an error. */\n    legitimate(): void {\n        void class extends VendorAuthVerifier {\n            // The vendors it handles, read at route registration so an unhandled name fails boot (#1362).\n            override supportedVendorNames(): readonly string[] {\n                return ['sentry'];\n            }\n\n            // No meaningless mint()/refresh(): a server-only verifier implements verify and nothing else.\n            override async verify(_name: string, request: RawHttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller> {\n                // No `raw!`, no `if (!raw) throw`: AuthFilter checked once and the TYPE carries it.\n                const bytes: Buffer = request.raw.rawBody;\n                return new AuthenticatedCaller(`sentry:${bytes.length}`);\n            }\n        };\n        void class extends ApiKeyHook {\n            override async verifyApiKey(_name: string, request: HttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller> {\n                // Both of these were UNREACHABLE through the deleted one-method HeaderReader.\n                const all: string[] | undefined = request.getHeaderValues('x-api-key');\n                return new AuthenticatedCaller(all?.[0] ?? 'anonymous');\n            }\n        };\n    }\n\n    /** Every spelling this change deleted must now be UNWRITABLE. */\n    rejected(): void {\n        void class extends VendorAuthVerifier {\n            override supportedVendorNames(): readonly string[] {\n                return ['sentry'];\n            }\n            // @ts-expect-error verify takes (name, RawHttpRequest): the three-parameter spelling is gone\n            override async verify(_name: string, _request: HttpRequest, _raw: RawRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller> {\n                return new AuthenticatedCaller('u1');\n            }\n        };\n        void class extends VendorAuthVerifier {\n            override supportedVendorNames(): readonly string[] {\n                return ['sentry'];\n            }\n            // @ts-expect-error verify returns the caller it proved: a void override must not compile\n            override async verify(_name: string, _request: RawHttpRequest): Promise<void> {\n                // a hook that verifies and then has no way to say what it proved\n            }\n        };\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * {@link OidcHook.verifyOidc} receives EVERY OIDC method the endpoint declares ({@link OidcAuthMethods}),\n     * so a hook verifies the token once and can tell `oidcSameProject()` from `oidcSvcs([...])`. The\n     * caller-list override this change deletes (`callers: string[]`, where an EMPTY list meant \"any\n     * Google-signed caller\") and a one-method override, which could not see the other scope of a pair,\n     * must not compile.\n     */\n    oidcHookTakesTheMethods(): void {\n        void class extends OidcHook {\n            override async verifyOidc(_token: string, methods: OidcAuthMethods): Promise<AuthenticatedMachineIdentity> {\n                const first = methods[0];\n                const named = first.callerScope === 'services' ? first.callers[0] : 'same-project';\n                return new AuthenticatedMachineIdentity('oidc', named);\n            }\n        };\n        void class extends OidcHook {\n            // @ts-expect-error verifyOidc takes the endpoint's OidcAuthMethods; the deleted caller-list override must not compile\n            override async verifyOidc(_token: string, _callers: string[]): Promise<AuthenticatedMachineIdentity> {\n                return new AuthenticatedMachineIdentity('oidc', 'caller@example.test');\n            }\n        };\n        void class extends OidcHook {\n            // @ts-expect-error verifyOidc takes every OIDC method of the endpoint, not one, so a pair is verified once\n            override async verifyOidc(_token: string, _method: OidcAuthMethod): Promise<AuthenticatedMachineIdentity> {\n                return new AuthenticatedMachineIdentity('oidc', 'caller@example.test');\n            }\n        };\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * An {@link HttpRequest} whose `raw` is merely OPTIONAL is NOT a {@link RawHttpRequest}. This is\n     * the assignment that makes the narrowing real: without it, `RawHttpRequest` would be a comment.\n     */\n    rawIsNotOptional(): void {\n        const maybeRaw = new HttpRequest('POST', '/hook/sentry/issue', new Map<string, string[]>());\n        // @ts-expect-error HttpRequest.raw is optional, so it is not assignable to RawHttpRequest\n        const narrowed: RawHttpRequest = maybeRaw;\n        void narrowed;\n\n        // The other direction is free: a RawHttpRequest IS an HttpRequest everywhere one is wanted.\n        const proven = new HttpRequest(\n            'POST',\n            '/hook/sentry/issue',\n            new Map<string, string[]>(),\n            new RawRequest('https://example.com/hook', Buffer.from('{}', 'utf8'), '1.2.3.4'),\n        ) as RawHttpRequest;\n        const widened: HttpRequest = proven;\n        void widened;\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/RouteBuilderImpl.d.ts

@@ -80,9 +80,21 @@ export declare class RouteBuilderImpl implements RouteBuilder {
      * Uses createRouteHandlerWithMeta() to create the handler, then stores it
      * in both the routes array and the routeMap for O(1) lookup.
      *
+     * Two STARTUP checks run first, so a wiring mistake refuses to boot instead of 401ing / 403ing
+     * the first real request: the authorization policy must be enforceable, and every auth mode the
+     * route declares must be verifiable by what is bound (`AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`, #1362).
+     *
      * @param route - Route definition with controller class and method name
      */
     addRoute(route: RouteDefinition): void;
+    /**
+     * The AuthFilter that will actually enforce routes — the instance `WebpiecesRouter` installed as a
+     * fixed filter BEFORE any route is added, so it already holds every app binding. Asking IT (not a
+     * fresh `container.get`) means the startup check judges exactly the bindings the request path
+     * will use. A hand-assembled builder that installed no AuthFilter enforces no auth mode, so there
+     * is nothing to verify.
+     */
+    private installedAuthFilter;
     /**
      * Create RouteHandlerWithMeta from a RouteDefinition.
      *

package/src/RouteBuilderImpl.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const WpResponse_1 = require("./WpResponse");
 const FilterMatcher_1 = require("./FilterMatcher");
 const core_util_1 = require("@webpieces/core-util");
 const AuthorizationHook_1 = require("./AuthorizationHook");
+const AuthFilter_1 = require("./filters/AuthFilter");
 const log = core_util_1.LogManager.getLogger('RouteBuilder');
 /**
  * FilterWithMeta - Pairs a resolved filter instance with its definition.
@@ -105,6 +106,10 @@ let RouteBuilderImpl = class RouteBuilderImpl {
      * Uses createRouteHandlerWithMeta() to create the handler, then stores it
      * in both the routes array and the routeMap for O(1) lookup.
      *
+     * Two STARTUP checks run first, so a wiring mistake refuses to boot instead of 401ing / 403ing
+     * the first real request: the authorization policy must be enforceable, and every auth mode the
+     * route declares must be verifiable by what is bound (`AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`, #1362).
+     *
      * @param route - Route definition with controller class and method name
      */
     addRoute(route) {
@@ -114,12 +119,27 @@ let RouteBuilderImpl = class RouteBuilderImpl {
         if (!this.container)
             throw new Error('Set the route container before registering endpoints.');
         this.container.get(AuthorizationHook_1.AuthorizationService).validate(policy);
+        this.installedAuthFilter()?.assertRouteVerifiable(route.routeMeta);
         const routeWithMeta = this.createRouteHandlerWithMeta(route);
         this.routes.push(routeWithMeta);
         // Also add to map for O(1) lookup by method:path
         const key = this.createRouteKey(route.routeMeta.httpMethod, route.routeMeta.path);
         this.routeMap.set(key, routeWithMeta);
     }
+    /**
+     * The AuthFilter that will actually enforce routes — the instance `WebpiecesRouter` installed as a
+     * fixed filter BEFORE any route is added, so it already holds every app binding. Asking IT (not a
+     * fresh `container.get`) means the startup check judges exactly the bindings the request path
+     * will use. A hand-assembled builder that installed no AuthFilter enforces no auth mode, so there
+     * is nothing to verify.
+     */
+    installedAuthFilter() {
+        for (const entry of this.filterRegistry) {
+            if (entry.filter instanceof AuthFilter_1.AuthFilter)
+                return entry.filter;
+        }
+        return undefined;
+    }
     /**
      * Create RouteHandlerWithMeta from a RouteDefinition.
      *

package/src/RouteBuilderImpl.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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{ Container } from 'inversify';\nimport { RouteBuilder, RouteDefinition, FilterDefinition } from './WebAppMeta';\nimport { provideFrameworkSingleton } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { RouteHandler } from './RouteHandler';\nimport { MethodMeta } from './MethodMeta';\nimport { RouteMetadata, DocumentDesign } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { Service } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { WpResponse } from './WpResponse';\nimport { FilterMatcher, HttpFilter } from './FilterMatcher';\nimport { LogManager } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { AuthorizationService } from './AuthorizationHook';\n\nconst log = LogManager.getLogger('RouteBuilder');\n\ninterface NamedClass {\n    name?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * FilterWithMeta - Pairs a resolved filter instance with its definition.\n * Stores both the DI-resolved filter and the metadata needed for matching.\n */\nexport class FilterWithMeta {\n    constructor(\n        public filter: HttpFilter,\n        public definition: FilterDefinition,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/**\n * RouteHandlerImpl - Concrete implementation of RouteHandler.\n * Wraps a resolved controller and method to invoke on each request.\n */\nexport class RouteHandlerImpl<TResult> implements RouteHandler<TResult> {\n    constructor(\n        private controller: Record<string, unknown>,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- route handlers invoke arbitrary API argument shapes\n        private method: (this: unknown, ...args: unknown[]) => Promise<TResult>,\n    ) {}\n\n    async execute(meta: MethodMeta): Promise<TResult> {\n        // Invoke the method with requestDto from meta\n        // The controller is already resolved - no DI lookup on every request!\n        const result: TResult = await this.method.apply(this.controller, [...meta.requestArgs]);\n        return result;\n    }\n}\n/**\n * RouteHandlerWithMeta - Pairs a route handler with its definition.\n * Stores both the handler (which wraps the DI-resolved controller) and the route metadata.\n *\n * We use unknown for the generic type since we store different TResult types in the same Map.\n * Type safety is maintained through the generic on RouteDefinition at registration time.\n */\nexport class RouteHandlerWithMeta {\n    constructor(\n        public invokeControllerHandler: RouteHandler<unknown>,\n        public definition: RouteDefinition,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/**\n * RouteBuilderImpl - Concrete implementation of RouteBuilder interface.\n *\n * Similar to Java WebPieces RouteBuilder, this class is responsible for:\n * 1. Registering routes with their handlers\n * 2. Registering filters with priority\n *\n * This class is explicit (not anonymous) to:\n * - Improve traceability and debugging\n * - Make the code easier to understand\n * - Enable better IDE navigation (Cmd+Click on addRoute works!)\n *\n * DI Pattern: This class is registered in webpiecesContainer via @provideFrameworkSingleton()\n * but needs appContainer to resolve filters/controllers. The container is set via\n * setContainer() after appContainer is created (late binding pattern).\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\nexport class RouteBuilderImpl implements RouteBuilder {\n    private routes: RouteHandlerWithMeta[] = [];\n    private filterRegistry: Array<FilterWithMeta> = [];\n    private container?: Container;\n\n    /**\n     * Map for O(1) route lookup by method:path.\n     * Used by both addRoute() and createRouteInvoker() for fast route access.\n     */\n    private routeMap: Map<string, RouteHandlerWithMeta> = new Map();\n\n    /**\n     * Create route key for consistent lookup.\n     * Key format: \"${METHOD}:${path}\" (e.g., \"POST:/search/item\")\n     */\n    private createRouteKey(method: string, path: string): string {\n        return `${method.toUpperCase()}:${path}`;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Set the DI container used for resolving filters and controllers.\n     * Called by WebpiecesCoreServer after appContainer is created.\n     *\n     * @param container - The application DI container (appContainer)\n     */\n    setContainer(container: Container): void {\n        this.container = container;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Register a route with the router.\n     *\n     * Uses createRouteHandlerWithMeta() to create the handler, then stores it\n     * in both the routes array and the routeMap for O(1) lookup.\n     *\n     * @param route - Route definition with controller class and method name\n     */\n    addRoute(route: RouteDefinition): void {\n        const policy = route.routeMeta.authorization;\n        if (!route.routeMeta.authMeta || !policy) throw new Error(`Endpoint ${route.routeMeta.path} requires @WpAuth/@WpAuthPublic and @WpAuthorization.`);\n        if (!this.container) throw new Error('Set the route container before registering endpoints.');\n        this.container.get(AuthorizationService).validate(policy);\n        const routeWithMeta = this.createRouteHandlerWithMeta(route);\n        this.routes.push(routeWithMeta);\n\n        // Also add to map for O(1) lookup by method:path\n        const key = this.createRouteKey(route.routeMeta.httpMethod, route.routeMeta.path);\n        this.routeMap.set(key, routeWithMeta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Create RouteHandlerWithMeta from a RouteDefinition.\n     *\n     * Resolves controller from DI container ONCE and creates a handler that\n     * invokes the controller method with the request DTO.\n     *\n     * This method is used by:\n     * - addRoute() for production route registration\n     * - createRouteInvoker() for test clients (via createApiClient)\n     *\n     * @param route - Route definition with controller class and method name\n     * @returns RouteHandlerWithMeta containing the handler and route definition\n     */\n    private createRouteHandlerWithMeta<TResult = unknown>(\n        route: RouteDefinition,\n    ): RouteHandlerWithMeta {\n        if (!this.container) {\n            throw new Error('Container not set. Call setContainer() before registering routes.');\n        }\n\n        const routeMeta = route.routeMeta;\n\n        // Resolve controller instance from DI container ONCE (not on every request!)\n        const controller = this.container.get(route.controllerClass) as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n        // Get the controller method\n        const method = controller[routeMeta.methodName];\n        if (typeof method !== 'function') {\n            const controllerName = (route.controllerClass as NamedClass).name || 'Unknown';\n            throw new Error(\n                `Method ${routeMeta.methodName} not found on controller ${controllerName}`,\n            );\n        }\n\n        const handler = new RouteHandlerImpl<TResult>(\n            controller,\n            // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- resolved controller method has the registered API's arguments\n            method as (this: unknown, ...args: unknown[]) => Promise<TResult>,\n        );\n\n        // Return handler with route definition\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- heterogeneous handlers share one registration collection\n        return new RouteHandlerWithMeta(handler as RouteHandler<unknown>, route);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Register a filter with the filter chain.\n     *\n     * Resolves the filter from DI container and pairs it with the filter definition.\n     * The definition includes pattern information used for route-specific filtering.\n     *\n     * @param filterDef - Filter definition with priority, filter class, and optional filepath pattern\n     */\n    addFilter(filterDef: FilterDefinition): void {\n        if (!this.container) {\n            throw new Error('Container not set. Call setContainer() before registering filters.');\n        }\n\n        // Resolve filter instance from DI container\n        const filter = this.container.get<HttpFilter>(filterDef.filterClass);\n\n        // Store filter with its definition\n        const filterWithMeta = new FilterWithMeta(filter, filterDef);\n        this.filterRegistry.push(filterWithMeta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Get all registered routes.\n     *\n     * @returns Map of routes with handlers and definitions, keyed by \"METHOD:path\"\n     */\n    getRoutes(): RouteHandlerWithMeta[] {\n        return this.routes;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Get all filters sorted by priority (highest priority first).\n     *\n     * @returns Array of FilterWithMeta sorted by priority\n     */\n    getSortedFilters(): Array<FilterWithMeta> {\n        return [...this.filterRegistry].sort(\n            (a, b) => b.definition.priority - a.definition.priority,\n        );\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Cached filter definitions for lazy route setup.\n     */\n    private cachedFilterDefinitions?: FilterDefinition[];\n\n    /**\n     * Get filter definitions, computing once and caching.\n     */\n    private getFilterDefinitions(): FilterDefinition[] {\n        if (!this.cachedFilterDefinitions) {\n            const sortedFilters = this.getSortedFilters();\n            this.cachedFilterDefinitions = sortedFilters.map((fwm) => {\n                const def = fwm.definition;\n                def.filter = fwm.filter;\n                return def;\n            });\n        }\n        return this.cachedFilterDefinitions;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Setup a single route by creating its filter chain.\n     * This is called lazily by createHandler() and getRouteService().\n     *\n     * Creates a Service that wraps the filter chain and controller invocation.\n     * The service is DTO-only and has no Express dependency.\n     *\n     * @param key - Route key in format \"METHOD:path\"\n     * @param routeWithMeta - Route handler with metadata\n     * @returns The service for this route\n     */\n    public createRouteHandler(\n        routeWithMeta: RouteHandlerWithMeta,\n    ): Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        const route = routeWithMeta.definition;\n        const routeMeta = route.routeMeta;\n\n        log.info(`Setting up route: ${routeMeta.httpMethod} ${routeMeta.path}`);\n\n        // ONE chain for both HTTP and in-process — no transport tier. The fixed framework\n        // filters (LogApiFilter, AuthFilter) are auto-installed and read the transport-neutral\n        // HttpRequest, so they run identically in both.\n        const filterDefinitions = this.getFilterDefinitions();\n\n        // Find matching filters for this route\n        const matchingFilters = FilterMatcher.findMatchingFilters(\n            route.controllerFilepath,\n            filterDefinitions,\n        );\n\n        // Create service that wraps the controller execution\n        const controllerService: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> = {\n            invoke: async (meta: MethodMeta): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>> => {\n                const result = await routeWithMeta.invokeControllerHandler.execute(meta);\n                // A `responseBody: NONE` endpoint (Promise<void>) has NO response: every transport\n                // sends 0 bytes (HTTP 204) and every client resolves undefined, so the in-process\n                // client must too. LogApiCall logs an undefined response as `response=undefined`.\n                if (routeMeta.noResponseBody) return new WpResponse(undefined);\n                // Any other route that yields undefined/null still answers a JSON body: coerce to {}.\n                return new WpResponse(result ?? {});\n            },\n        };\n\n        if (matchingFilters.length === 0) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No filters found for route — the framework auto-installs LogApiFilter + AuthFilter, so this indicates a wiring problem.',\n            );\n        }\n\n        // Chain filters: highest priority (first in array) should run first (be outermost)\n        // Build from innermost (lowest priority) to outermost (highest priority)\n        // Start with controller, then wrap with filters in reverse priority order\n        let service: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> = controllerService;\n        for (let i = matchingFilters.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n            service = matchingFilters[i].chainService(service);\n        }\n\n        return service;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Create an invoker function for a route (for testing via createApiClient).\n     * Uses routeMap for O(1) lookup, sets up the filter chain ONCE,\n     * and returns a Service that can be called multiple times without\n     * recreating the filter chain.\n     *\n     * This method is called by WebpiecesServer.createApiClient() during proxy setup.\n     * The returned Service is stored as the proxy method and invoked on each call.\n     *\n     * @param method - HTTP method (GET, POST, etc.)\n     * @param path - URL path\n     * @returns A Service that invokes the route\n     */\n    createRouteInvoker(method: string, path: string): Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        // Use routeMap for O(1) lookup (not linear search!)\n        const key = this.createRouteKey(method, path);\n        const routeWithMeta = this.routeMap.get(key);\n\n        if (!routeWithMeta) {\n            throw new Error(`Route not found: ${method} ${path}`);\n        }\n\n        // Setup filter chain ONCE (not on every invocation!). Same chain as HTTP — auth included.\n        return this.createRouteHandler(routeWithMeta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Look up the RouteMetadata (incl. authMeta) for a registered route by method+path.\n     * Used to build a MethodMeta for an in-process dispatch (e.g. a delivered cloud\n     * task) so the filter chain sees the same routeMeta production HTTP would.\n     *\n     * @returns the route's RouteMetadata, or undefined if no route is registered.\n     */\n    getRouteMeta(method: string, path: string): RouteMetadata | undefined {\n        const key = this.createRouteKey(method, path);\n        return this.routeMap.get(key)?.definition.routeMeta;\n    }\n}\n"]}
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{ Container } from 'inversify';\nimport { RouteBuilder, RouteDefinition, FilterDefinition } from './WebAppMeta';\nimport { provideFrameworkSingleton } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { RouteHandler } from './RouteHandler';\nimport { MethodMeta } from './MethodMeta';\nimport { RouteMetadata, DocumentDesign } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { Service } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { WpResponse } from './WpResponse';\nimport { FilterMatcher, HttpFilter } from './FilterMatcher';\nimport { LogManager } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { AuthorizationService } from './AuthorizationHook';\nimport { AuthFilter } from './filters/AuthFilter';\n\nconst log = LogManager.getLogger('RouteBuilder');\n\ninterface NamedClass {\n    name?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * FilterWithMeta - Pairs a resolved filter instance with its definition.\n * Stores both the DI-resolved filter and the metadata needed for matching.\n */\nexport class FilterWithMeta {\n    constructor(\n        public filter: HttpFilter,\n        public definition: FilterDefinition,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/**\n * RouteHandlerImpl - Concrete implementation of RouteHandler.\n * Wraps a resolved controller and method to invoke on each request.\n */\nexport class RouteHandlerImpl<TResult> implements RouteHandler<TResult> {\n    constructor(\n        private controller: Record<string, unknown>,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- route handlers invoke arbitrary API argument shapes\n        private method: (this: unknown, ...args: unknown[]) => Promise<TResult>,\n    ) {}\n\n    async execute(meta: MethodMeta): Promise<TResult> {\n        // Invoke the method with requestDto from meta\n        // The controller is already resolved - no DI lookup on every request!\n        const result: TResult = await this.method.apply(this.controller, [...meta.requestArgs]);\n        return result;\n    }\n}\n/**\n * RouteHandlerWithMeta - Pairs a route handler with its definition.\n * Stores both the handler (which wraps the DI-resolved controller) and the route metadata.\n *\n * We use unknown for the generic type since we store different TResult types in the same Map.\n * Type safety is maintained through the generic on RouteDefinition at registration time.\n */\nexport class RouteHandlerWithMeta {\n    constructor(\n        public invokeControllerHandler: RouteHandler<unknown>,\n        public definition: RouteDefinition,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/**\n * RouteBuilderImpl - Concrete implementation of RouteBuilder interface.\n *\n * Similar to Java WebPieces RouteBuilder, this class is responsible for:\n * 1. Registering routes with their handlers\n * 2. Registering filters with priority\n *\n * This class is explicit (not anonymous) to:\n * - Improve traceability and debugging\n * - Make the code easier to understand\n * - Enable better IDE navigation (Cmd+Click on addRoute works!)\n *\n * DI Pattern: This class is registered in webpiecesContainer via @provideFrameworkSingleton()\n * but needs appContainer to resolve filters/controllers. The container is set via\n * setContainer() after appContainer is created (late binding pattern).\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\nexport class RouteBuilderImpl implements RouteBuilder {\n    private routes: RouteHandlerWithMeta[] = [];\n    private filterRegistry: Array<FilterWithMeta> = [];\n    private container?: Container;\n\n    /**\n     * Map for O(1) route lookup by method:path.\n     * Used by both addRoute() and createRouteInvoker() for fast route access.\n     */\n    private routeMap: Map<string, RouteHandlerWithMeta> = new Map();\n\n    /**\n     * Create route key for consistent lookup.\n     * Key format: \"${METHOD}:${path}\" (e.g., \"POST:/search/item\")\n     */\n    private createRouteKey(method: string, path: string): string {\n        return `${method.toUpperCase()}:${path}`;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Set the DI container used for resolving filters and controllers.\n     * Called by WebpiecesCoreServer after appContainer is created.\n     *\n     * @param container - The application DI container (appContainer)\n     */\n    setContainer(container: Container): void {\n        this.container = container;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Register a route with the router.\n     *\n     * Uses createRouteHandlerWithMeta() to create the handler, then stores it\n     * in both the routes array and the routeMap for O(1) lookup.\n     *\n     * Two STARTUP checks run first, so a wiring mistake refuses to boot instead of 401ing / 403ing\n     * the first real request: the authorization policy must be enforceable, and every auth mode the\n     * route declares must be verifiable by what is bound (`AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`, #1362).\n     *\n     * @param route - Route definition with controller class and method name\n     */\n    addRoute(route: RouteDefinition): void {\n        const policy = route.routeMeta.authorization;\n        if (!route.routeMeta.authMeta || !policy) throw new Error(`Endpoint ${route.routeMeta.path} requires @WpAuth/@WpAuthPublic and @WpAuthorization.`);\n        if (!this.container) throw new Error('Set the route container before registering endpoints.');\n        this.container.get(AuthorizationService).validate(policy);\n        this.installedAuthFilter()?.assertRouteVerifiable(route.routeMeta);\n        const routeWithMeta = this.createRouteHandlerWithMeta(route);\n        this.routes.push(routeWithMeta);\n\n        // Also add to map for O(1) lookup by method:path\n        const key = this.createRouteKey(route.routeMeta.httpMethod, route.routeMeta.path);\n        this.routeMap.set(key, routeWithMeta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The AuthFilter that will actually enforce routes — the instance `WebpiecesRouter` installed as a\n     * fixed filter BEFORE any route is added, so it already holds every app binding. Asking IT (not a\n     * fresh `container.get`) means the startup check judges exactly the bindings the request path\n     * will use. A hand-assembled builder that installed no AuthFilter enforces no auth mode, so there\n     * is nothing to verify.\n     */\n    private installedAuthFilter(): AuthFilter | undefined {\n        for (const entry of this.filterRegistry) {\n            if (entry.filter instanceof AuthFilter) return entry.filter;\n        }\n        return undefined;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Create RouteHandlerWithMeta from a RouteDefinition.\n     *\n     * Resolves controller from DI container ONCE and creates a handler that\n     * invokes the controller method with the request DTO.\n     *\n     * This method is used by:\n     * - addRoute() for production route registration\n     * - createRouteInvoker() for test clients (via createApiClient)\n     *\n     * @param route - Route definition with controller class and method name\n     * @returns RouteHandlerWithMeta containing the handler and route definition\n     */\n    private createRouteHandlerWithMeta<TResult = unknown>(\n        route: RouteDefinition,\n    ): RouteHandlerWithMeta {\n        if (!this.container) {\n            throw new Error('Container not set. Call setContainer() before registering routes.');\n        }\n\n        const routeMeta = route.routeMeta;\n\n        // Resolve controller instance from DI container ONCE (not on every request!)\n        const controller = this.container.get(route.controllerClass) as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n        // Get the controller method\n        const method = controller[routeMeta.methodName];\n        if (typeof method !== 'function') {\n            const controllerName = (route.controllerClass as NamedClass).name || 'Unknown';\n            throw new Error(\n                `Method ${routeMeta.methodName} not found on controller ${controllerName}`,\n            );\n        }\n\n        const handler = new RouteHandlerImpl<TResult>(\n            controller,\n            // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- resolved controller method has the registered API's arguments\n            method as (this: unknown, ...args: unknown[]) => Promise<TResult>,\n        );\n\n        // Return handler with route definition\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- heterogeneous handlers share one registration collection\n        return new RouteHandlerWithMeta(handler as RouteHandler<unknown>, route);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Register a filter with the filter chain.\n     *\n     * Resolves the filter from DI container and pairs it with the filter definition.\n     * The definition includes pattern information used for route-specific filtering.\n     *\n     * @param filterDef - Filter definition with priority, filter class, and optional filepath pattern\n     */\n    addFilter(filterDef: FilterDefinition): void {\n        if (!this.container) {\n            throw new Error('Container not set. Call setContainer() before registering filters.');\n        }\n\n        // Resolve filter instance from DI container\n        const filter = this.container.get<HttpFilter>(filterDef.filterClass);\n\n        // Store filter with its definition\n        const filterWithMeta = new FilterWithMeta(filter, filterDef);\n        this.filterRegistry.push(filterWithMeta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Get all registered routes.\n     *\n     * @returns Map of routes with handlers and definitions, keyed by \"METHOD:path\"\n     */\n    getRoutes(): RouteHandlerWithMeta[] {\n        return this.routes;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Get all filters sorted by priority (highest priority first).\n     *\n     * @returns Array of FilterWithMeta sorted by priority\n     */\n    getSortedFilters(): Array<FilterWithMeta> {\n        return [...this.filterRegistry].sort(\n            (a, b) => b.definition.priority - a.definition.priority,\n        );\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Cached filter definitions for lazy route setup.\n     */\n    private cachedFilterDefinitions?: FilterDefinition[];\n\n    /**\n     * Get filter definitions, computing once and caching.\n     */\n    private getFilterDefinitions(): FilterDefinition[] {\n        if (!this.cachedFilterDefinitions) {\n            const sortedFilters = this.getSortedFilters();\n            this.cachedFilterDefinitions = sortedFilters.map((fwm) => {\n                const def = fwm.definition;\n                def.filter = fwm.filter;\n                return def;\n            });\n        }\n        return this.cachedFilterDefinitions;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Setup a single route by creating its filter chain.\n     * This is called lazily by createHandler() and getRouteService().\n     *\n     * Creates a Service that wraps the filter chain and controller invocation.\n     * The service is DTO-only and has no Express dependency.\n     *\n     * @param key - Route key in format \"METHOD:path\"\n     * @param routeWithMeta - Route handler with metadata\n     * @returns The service for this route\n     */\n    public createRouteHandler(\n        routeWithMeta: RouteHandlerWithMeta,\n    ): Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        const route = routeWithMeta.definition;\n        const routeMeta = route.routeMeta;\n\n        log.info(`Setting up route: ${routeMeta.httpMethod} ${routeMeta.path}`);\n\n        // ONE chain for both HTTP and in-process — no transport tier. The fixed framework\n        // filters (LogApiFilter, AuthFilter) are auto-installed and read the transport-neutral\n        // HttpRequest, so they run identically in both.\n        const filterDefinitions = this.getFilterDefinitions();\n\n        // Find matching filters for this route\n        const matchingFilters = FilterMatcher.findMatchingFilters(\n            route.controllerFilepath,\n            filterDefinitions,\n        );\n\n        // Create service that wraps the controller execution\n        const controllerService: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> = {\n            invoke: async (meta: MethodMeta): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>> => {\n                const result = await routeWithMeta.invokeControllerHandler.execute(meta);\n                // A `responseBody: NONE` endpoint (Promise<void>) has NO response: every transport\n                // sends 0 bytes (HTTP 204) and every client resolves undefined, so the in-process\n                // client must too. LogApiCall logs an undefined response as `response=undefined`.\n                if (routeMeta.noResponseBody) return new WpResponse(undefined);\n                // Any other route that yields undefined/null still answers a JSON body: coerce to {}.\n                return new WpResponse(result ?? {});\n            },\n        };\n\n        if (matchingFilters.length === 0) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No filters found for route — the framework auto-installs LogApiFilter + AuthFilter, so this indicates a wiring problem.',\n            );\n        }\n\n        // Chain filters: highest priority (first in array) should run first (be outermost)\n        // Build from innermost (lowest priority) to outermost (highest priority)\n        // Start with controller, then wrap with filters in reverse priority order\n        let service: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> = controllerService;\n        for (let i = matchingFilters.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n            service = matchingFilters[i].chainService(service);\n        }\n\n        return service;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Create an invoker function for a route (for testing via createApiClient).\n     * Uses routeMap for O(1) lookup, sets up the filter chain ONCE,\n     * and returns a Service that can be called multiple times without\n     * recreating the filter chain.\n     *\n     * This method is called by WebpiecesServer.createApiClient() during proxy setup.\n     * The returned Service is stored as the proxy method and invoked on each call.\n     *\n     * @param method - HTTP method (GET, POST, etc.)\n     * @param path - URL path\n     * @returns A Service that invokes the route\n     */\n    createRouteInvoker(method: string, path: string): Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        // Use routeMap for O(1) lookup (not linear search!)\n        const key = this.createRouteKey(method, path);\n        const routeWithMeta = this.routeMap.get(key);\n\n        if (!routeWithMeta) {\n            throw new Error(`Route not found: ${method} ${path}`);\n        }\n\n        // Setup filter chain ONCE (not on every invocation!). Same chain as HTTP — auth included.\n        return this.createRouteHandler(routeWithMeta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Look up the RouteMetadata (incl. authMeta) for a registered route by method+path.\n     * Used to build a MethodMeta for an in-process dispatch (e.g. a delivered cloud\n     * task) so the filter chain sees the same routeMeta production HTTP would.\n     *\n     * @returns the route's RouteMetadata, or undefined if no route is registered.\n     */\n    getRouteMeta(method: string, path: string): RouteMetadata | undefined {\n        const key = this.createRouteKey(method, path);\n        return this.routeMap.get(key)?.definition.routeMeta;\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/UnverifiableAuthModeError.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/**
+ * A SERVED endpoint declares an auth mode this server cannot verify, because the binding that mode
+ * needs is absent (#1362). Thrown at STARTUP, from route registration (`RouteBuilderImpl.addRoute` ->
+ * `AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`), so the process refuses to boot instead of answering the first
+ * vendor / partner / user request with a 401 that reads as an outage on their side.
+ *
+ * Its own type, carrying the facts as fields, so a boot log or a spec names the endpoint and the mode
+ * without parsing the message. The message itself carries the exact binding line to add.
+ */
+export declare class UnverifiableAuthModeError extends Error {
+    /** `Contract.method (VERB /path)` — which served endpoint cannot be verified. */
+    readonly endpoint: string;
+    /** The declared mode nobody can verify, e.g. `vendorAuth('bugfixer-sentry')`, `jwt()`. */
+    readonly mode: string;
+    constructor(message: string, 
+    /** `Contract.method (VERB /path)` — which served endpoint cannot be verified. */
+    endpoint: string, 
+    /** The declared mode nobody can verify, e.g. `vendorAuth('bugfixer-sentry')`, `jwt()`. */
+    mode: string);
+}

package/src/UnverifiableAuthModeError.js

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.UnverifiableAuthModeError = void 0;
+/**
+ * A SERVED endpoint declares an auth mode this server cannot verify, because the binding that mode
+ * needs is absent (#1362). Thrown at STARTUP, from route registration (`RouteBuilderImpl.addRoute` ->
+ * `AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`), so the process refuses to boot instead of answering the first
+ * vendor / partner / user request with a 401 that reads as an outage on their side.
+ *
+ * Its own type, carrying the facts as fields, so a boot log or a spec names the endpoint and the mode
+ * without parsing the message. The message itself carries the exact binding line to add.
+ */
+class UnverifiableAuthModeError extends Error {
+    endpoint;
+    mode;
+    constructor(message, 
+    /** `Contract.method (VERB /path)` — which served endpoint cannot be verified. */
+    endpoint, 
+    /** The declared mode nobody can verify, e.g. `vendorAuth('bugfixer-sentry')`, `jwt()`. */
+    mode) {
+        super(message);
+        this.endpoint = endpoint;
+        this.mode = mode;
+        this.name = 'UnverifiableAuthModeError';
+    }
+}
+exports.UnverifiableAuthModeError = UnverifiableAuthModeError;
+//# sourceMappingURL=UnverifiableAuthModeError.js.map

package/src/UnverifiableAuthModeError.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"UnverifiableAuthModeError.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/UnverifiableAuthModeError.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAAA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAa,yBAA0B,SAAQ,KAAK;IAI5B;IAEA;IALpB,YACI,OAAe;IACf,iFAAiF;IACjE,QAAgB;IAChC,0FAA0F;IAC1E,IAAY;QAE5B,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAJC,aAAQ,GAAR,QAAQ,CAAQ;QAEhB,SAAI,GAAJ,IAAI,CAAQ;QAG5B,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,2BAA2B,CAAC;IAC5C,CAAC;CACJ;AAXD,8DAWC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * A SERVED endpoint declares an auth mode this server cannot verify, because the binding that mode\n * needs is absent (#1362). Thrown at STARTUP, from route registration (`RouteBuilderImpl.addRoute` ->\n * `AuthFilter.assertRouteVerifiable`), so the process refuses to boot instead of answering the first\n * vendor / partner / user request with a 401 that reads as an outage on their side.\n *\n * Its own type, carrying the facts as fields, so a boot log or a spec names the endpoint and the mode\n * without parsing the message. The message itself carries the exact binding line to add.\n */\nexport class UnverifiableAuthModeError extends Error {\n    constructor(\n        message: string,\n        /** `Contract.method (VERB /path)` — which served endpoint cannot be verified. */\n        public readonly endpoint: string,\n        /** The declared mode nobody can verify, e.g. `vendorAuth('bugfixer-sentry')`, `jwt()`. */\n        public readonly mode: string,\n    ) {\n        super(message);\n        this.name = 'UnverifiableAuthModeError';\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/filters/AuthFilter.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { VendorAuthVerifier } from '@webpieces/core-context';
+import { RouteMetadata } from '@webpieces/core-util';
 import { Filter, Service } from '@webpieces/core-util';
 import { WpResponse } from '../WpResponse';
 import { MethodMeta } from '../MethodMeta';
@@ -11,21 +12,24 @@ import { DefaultOidcVerifier } from '../DefaultOidcVerifier';
  * RequestContext (never express), so the SAME check runs over HTTP and via createApiClient.
  *
  * It enforces the endpoint's AuthMode from separately-bound pieces, each OPTIONAL except the OIDC
- * default:
- *  - shared-secret → constant-time compare vs the {@link AuthConfig} secret VALUE (state). No
- *                    AuthConfig bound → no accepted secret → fail fast (401).
+ * default. An app binds only the pieces its SERVED routes declare — and a served route that declares
+ * a mode whose piece is absent FAILS STARTUP ({@link assertRouteVerifiable}, #1362), so none of the
+ * rows below is ever "not enabled" at request time:
+ *  - shared-secret → constant-time compare vs the {@link AuthConfig} secret VALUE (state). Startup
+ *                    requires an AuthConfig holding the route's key.
  *  - jwt           → the bound {@link JwtHook} (`parseJwt`, awaited — an app's
- *                    strategy may reach a JWKS or a datastore). No JwtHook bound → "not enabled"
- *                    (401): JWT needs an app secret + payload shape.
+ *                    strategy may reach a JWKS or a datastore). Startup requires a JwtHook: JWT needs
+ *                    an app secret + payload shape.
  *  - oidc          → the bound {@link OidcHook} if any, else the framework {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}
  *                    run DIRECTLY — so a server that wires NOTHING still verifies Google OIDC against
  *                    the endpoint's caller scope (`oidcSameProject()` or `oidcSvcs([...])`).
  *  - vendorAuth    → the bound {@link VendorAuthVerifier} `verify`s the VENDOR's credential over the
- *                    retained raw request. No VendorAuthVerifier bound → 401, like jwt: an unverified
- *                    vendor call is never waved through because wiring was forgotten. The INBOUND role
- *                    only — this filter never depends on the outbound VendorAuthMinter (#1358).
+ *                    retained raw request. Startup requires a verifier whose `supportedVendorNames()` lists the
+ *                    route's name: an unverified vendor call is never waved through because wiring was
+ *                    forgotten. The INBOUND role only — this filter never depends on the outbound
+ *                    VendorAuthMinter (#1358).
  *  - apikey        → the bound {@link ApiKeyHook} looks the CUSTOMER's key up (async, over the whole
- *                    header set) and returns the context to seed. No ApiKeyHook bound → 401, like jwt.
+ *                    header set) and returns the context to seed. Startup requires an ApiKeyHook.
  *  - public        → BEST-EFFORT jwt parse (only if a JwtHook is bound): stamp the user's context so
  *                    a logged-out page still knows who is logged in; never fails.
  *  - local-only    → serve only when {@link RuntimeLocality} says this process is a developer's
@@ -43,6 +47,29 @@ export declare class AuthFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>
     private readonly apiKeyHook?;
     private readonly callerContext;
     constructor(oidcVerifier: DefaultOidcVerifier, authConfig?: AuthConfig | undefined, jwtHook?: JwtHook<never> | undefined, oidcHook?: OidcHook | undefined, vendorAuthVerifier?: VendorAuthVerifier | undefined, apiKeyHook?: ApiKeyHook | undefined);
+    /**
+     * STARTUP check (#1362), called by route registration for EVERY served route: each auth mode the
+     * route declares must be verifiable by what is bound, or boot fails naming the endpoint, the mode
+     * and the exact binding line. STRICT — a multi-method route (`[oidcSameProject(), vendorAuth('x')]`)
+     * with no verifier fails too: a declared alternative nobody can verify is dead, and is almost
+     * always a wiring mistake. OIDC needs no app binding (the framework verifier) and a public route
+     * none.
+     *
+     * Reads bindings this filter already holds and nothing else: it never calls `verify`, `parseJwt`
+     * or `verifyApiKey`, touches no network, and constructs nothing (#1358's cycle stays closed).
+     * The request path resolves each piece through the SAME `require*` methods, so there is one
+     * decision, made at boot. The one boot-only check is a verifier's `supportedVendorNames()`: at request time
+     * the verifier's OWN dispatch stays the backstop for a name it does not know, and refuses (401).
+     */
+    assertRouteVerifiable(routeMeta: RouteMetadata): void;
+    private static endpointOf;
+    private unverifiable;
+    private requireJwtHook;
+    private requireSharedSecrets;
+    private requireVendorVerifier;
+    /** Boot only: the bound verifier must DECLARE the route's vendor (#1362). Never calls verify. */
+    private assertVendorDeclared;
+    private requireApiKeyHook;
     filter(meta: MethodMeta, nextFilter: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>>;
     /**
      * Try each declared credential in order. The endpoint's OIDC methods (one `oidcSameProject()` and
@@ -88,17 +115,18 @@ export declare class AuthFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>
     private static surfaceFor;
     /**
      * `vendorAuth(name)`: hand the app's {@link VendorAuthVerifier} the verbatim request and let it call the
-     * VENDOR's own validator. Three ways to fail, all 401, all before the controller is entered:
+     * VENDOR's own validator. A missing verifier, or one not declaring `name`, is not a case here: it
+     * failed STARTUP ({@link assertRouteVerifiable}). Two ways to fail, both 401, both before the
+     * controller is entered:
      *
-     * 1. NO verifier bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior;
-     *    an unverified vendor call must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.
-     * 2. NO raw request — the transport kept no bytes. `assertEveryVendorAuthEndpointRetainsRawBody`
+     * 1. NO raw request — the transport kept no bytes. `assertEveryVendorAuthEndpointRetainsRawBody`
      *    normally makes this a startup error, so reaching it means either a hand-registered route or
      *    an in-process caller (a spec) that published an HttpRequest with no {@link RawRequest}. The
      *    message says which fix applies rather than leaving a bare 401.
-     * 3. The verifier threw — the credential did not verify.
+     * 2. The verifier threw — the credential did not verify (including a name its own dispatch does
+     *    not know: that stays the request-time backstop).
      *
-     * Case 2 is checked HERE and nowhere else. {@link hasRawBytes} narrows the request to
+     * Case 1 is checked HERE and nowhere else. {@link hasRawBytes} narrows the request to
      * {@link RawHttpRequest} at this one gate, so the verifier's signature promises `raw` is present and
      * no vendor implementation ever writes `raw!` or a guard of its own.
      */
@@ -113,15 +141,14 @@ export declare class AuthFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>
     /**
      * `apiKey(regime, credentials)`: hand the app's {@link ApiKeyHook} the regime name and the inbound
      * headers and let it look the CUSTOMER's key up. The declared `credentials` are NOT read here — they
-     * describe the contract for generators; the hook owns extraction. Three ways to fail, all 401, all
-     * before the controller:
+     * describe the contract for generators; the hook owns extraction. A missing hook is not a case here:
+     * it failed STARTUP ({@link assertRouteVerifiable}). Two ways to fail, both 401, both before the
+     * controller:
      *
-     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior; an
-     *    unverified partner request must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.
-     * 2. NO inbound request in scope — there are no headers to read, so there is nothing to verify. That
+     * 1. NO inbound request in scope — there are no headers to read, so there is nothing to verify. That
      *    means a caller drove this route without publishing an HttpRequest; the message says so rather
      *    than leaving a bare 401.
-     * 3. The hook threw — the key, or the key/organization pair, did not check out.
+     * 2. The hook threw — the key, or the key/organization pair, did not check out.
      *
      * On success the hook's {@link AuthenticatedCaller} is stamped exactly as a jwt parse's is, which is
      * what puts the resolved organization into `RequestContext` for every downstream repository call.

package/src/filters/AuthFilter.js

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ const AuthHooks_1 = require("../AuthHooks");
 const AuthenticatedCallerContext_1 = require("../AuthenticatedCallerContext");
 const AuthorizationHook_1 = require("../AuthorizationHook");
 const DefaultOidcVerifier_1 = require("../DefaultOidcVerifier");
+const UnverifiableAuthModeError_1 = require("../UnverifiableAuthModeError");
 const log = core_util_1.LogManager.getLogger('AuthFilter');
 /**
  * The ONE credential header, read straight off the inbound HttpRequest.
@@ -39,21 +40,24 @@ const SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME = 'Webpieces';
  * RequestContext (never express), so the SAME check runs over HTTP and via createApiClient.
  *
  * It enforces the endpoint's AuthMode from separately-bound pieces, each OPTIONAL except the OIDC
- * default:
- *  - shared-secret → constant-time compare vs the {@link AuthConfig} secret VALUE (state). No
- *                    AuthConfig bound → no accepted secret → fail fast (401).
+ * default. An app binds only the pieces its SERVED routes declare — and a served route that declares
+ * a mode whose piece is absent FAILS STARTUP ({@link assertRouteVerifiable}, #1362), so none of the
+ * rows below is ever "not enabled" at request time:
+ *  - shared-secret → constant-time compare vs the {@link AuthConfig} secret VALUE (state). Startup
+ *                    requires an AuthConfig holding the route's key.
  *  - jwt           → the bound {@link JwtHook} (`parseJwt`, awaited — an app's
- *                    strategy may reach a JWKS or a datastore). No JwtHook bound → "not enabled"
- *                    (401): JWT needs an app secret + payload shape.
+ *                    strategy may reach a JWKS or a datastore). Startup requires a JwtHook: JWT needs
+ *                    an app secret + payload shape.
  *  - oidc          → the bound {@link OidcHook} if any, else the framework {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}
  *                    run DIRECTLY — so a server that wires NOTHING still verifies Google OIDC against
  *                    the endpoint's caller scope (`oidcSameProject()` or `oidcSvcs([...])`).
  *  - vendorAuth    → the bound {@link VendorAuthVerifier} `verify`s the VENDOR's credential over the
- *                    retained raw request. No VendorAuthVerifier bound → 401, like jwt: an unverified
- *                    vendor call is never waved through because wiring was forgotten. The INBOUND role
- *                    only — this filter never depends on the outbound VendorAuthMinter (#1358).
+ *                    retained raw request. Startup requires a verifier whose `supportedVendorNames()` lists the
+ *                    route's name: an unverified vendor call is never waved through because wiring was
+ *                    forgotten. The INBOUND role only — this filter never depends on the outbound
+ *                    VendorAuthMinter (#1358).
  *  - apikey        → the bound {@link ApiKeyHook} looks the CUSTOMER's key up (async, over the whole
- *                    header set) and returns the context to seed. No ApiKeyHook bound → 401, like jwt.
+ *                    header set) and returns the context to seed. Startup requires an ApiKeyHook.
  *  - public        → BEST-EFFORT jwt parse (only if a JwtHook is bound): stamp the user's context so
  *                    a logged-out page still knows who is logged in; never fails.
  *  - local-only    → serve only when {@link RuntimeLocality} says this process is a developer's
@@ -79,6 +83,92 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
         this.vendorAuthVerifier = vendorAuthVerifier;
         this.apiKeyHook = apiKeyHook;
     }
+    /**
+     * STARTUP check (#1362), called by route registration for EVERY served route: each auth mode the
+     * route declares must be verifiable by what is bound, or boot fails naming the endpoint, the mode
+     * and the exact binding line. STRICT — a multi-method route (`[oidcSameProject(), vendorAuth('x')]`)
+     * with no verifier fails too: a declared alternative nobody can verify is dead, and is almost
+     * always a wiring mistake. OIDC needs no app binding (the framework verifier) and a public route
+     * none.
+     *
+     * Reads bindings this filter already holds and nothing else: it never calls `verify`, `parseJwt`
+     * or `verifyApiKey`, touches no network, and constructs nothing (#1358's cycle stays closed).
+     * The request path resolves each piece through the SAME `require*` methods, so there is one
+     * decision, made at boot. The one boot-only check is a verifier's `supportedVendorNames()`: at request time
+     * the verifier's OWN dispatch stays the backstop for a name it does not know, and refuses (401).
+     */
+    assertRouteVerifiable(routeMeta) {
+        const auth = routeMeta.authMeta;
+        if (!auth)
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiImplementationError('Every endpoint requires @WpAuth or @WpAuthPublic.');
+        for (const method of auth.methods) {
+            switch (method.kind) {
+                case 'jwt':
+                    this.requireJwtHook(routeMeta);
+                    break;
+                case 'shared-secret':
+                    this.requireSharedSecrets(method.secretKey, routeMeta);
+                    break;
+                case 'vendorAuth':
+                    this.assertVendorDeclared(this.requireVendorVerifier(method.name, routeMeta), method.name, routeMeta);
+                    break;
+                case 'apikey':
+                    this.requireApiKeyHook(method.regime, routeMeta);
+                    break;
+                case 'oidc':
+                case 'public':
+                    break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure formatter of the route identity, kept beside its only callers
+    static endpointOf(routeMeta) {
+        return `${routeMeta.apiName ?? routeMeta.controllerClassName ?? 'UnknownApi'}.${routeMeta.methodName} (${routeMeta.httpMethod} ${routeMeta.path})`;
+    }
+    unverifiable(routeMeta, mode, problem, bindLine) {
+        const endpoint = AuthFilter_1.endpointOf(routeMeta);
+        return new UnverifiableAuthModeError_1.UnverifiableAuthModeError(`Endpoint ${endpoint} declares ${mode}, but ${problem}, so this server cannot verify it and ` +
+            `refuses to start. Add:\n    ${bindLine}\n` +
+            `(Or remove ${mode} from the endpoint's @WpAuth if this server should not accept it.)`, endpoint, mode);
+    }
+    requireJwtHook(routeMeta) {
+        if (this.jwtHook)
+            return this.jwtHook;
+        throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, 'jwt()', 'no JwtHook is bound', 'binder.bind(JWT_HOOK).to(YourJwtHook).inSingletonScope();');
+    }
+    requireSharedSecrets(secretKey, routeMeta) {
+        const config = this.authConfig;
+        const mode = `sharedSecret('${secretKey}')`;
+        if (!config) {
+            throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, mode, 'no AuthConfig is bound', `binder.bind(AUTH_CONFIG).to(YourAuthConfig).inSingletonScope();   // YourAuthConfig extends AuthConfig and passes { '${secretKey}': new SharedSecrets(secret1, secret2) }`);
+        }
+        const accepted = config.sharedSecrets[secretKey];
+        if (accepted)
+            return accepted;
+        throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, mode, `the bound AuthConfig (${config.constructor.name}) holds no SharedSecrets for '${secretKey}'`, `'${secretKey}': new SharedSecrets(secret1, secret2),   // add to the sharedSecrets ${config.constructor.name} passes to AuthConfig, which AUTH_CONFIG is bound to`);
+    }
+    requireVendorVerifier(name, routeMeta) {
+        const verifier = this.vendorAuthVerifier;
+        const mode = `vendorAuth('${name}')`;
+        if (!verifier) {
+            throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, mode, 'no VendorAuthVerifier is bound (a VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER binding only signs OUTBOUND calls)', 'binder.bind(VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER).to(YourVendorAuthVerifier).inSingletonScope();');
+        }
+        return verifier;
+    }
+    /** Boot only: the bound verifier must DECLARE the route's vendor (#1362). Never calls verify. */
+    assertVendorDeclared(verifier, name, routeMeta) {
+        const supported = verifier.supportedVendorNames();
+        if (supported.includes(name))
+            return;
+        const mode = `vendorAuth('${name}')`;
+        const declared = supported.map((n) => `'${n}'`).join(', ');
+        throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, mode, `the bound VendorAuthVerifier (${verifier.constructor.name}) returns [${declared}] from supportedVendorNames(), which does not include '${name}'`, `'${name}' to ${verifier.constructor.name}.supportedVendorNames() (return [${declared}, '${name}']) AND handle '${name}' in its verify()`);
+    }
+    requireApiKeyHook(regime, routeMeta) {
+        if (this.apiKeyHook)
+            return this.apiKeyHook;
+        throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, `apiKey('${regime}', credentials)`, 'no ApiKeyHook is bound', 'binder.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(YourApiKeyHook).inSingletonScope();');
+    }
     // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility
     async filter(meta, nextFilter) {
         const auth = meta.routeMeta.authMeta;
@@ -133,13 +223,13 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
     async authenticateMethod(mode, header, meta, oidc) {
         switch (mode.kind) {
             case 'jwt':
-                await this.enforceJwt(header);
+                await this.enforceJwt(header, meta.routeMeta);
                 return;
             case 'oidc':
                 await this.enforceOidc(header, oidc ?? [mode]);
                 return;
             case 'shared-secret':
-                this.enforceSharedSecret(this.credential(header, SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME), mode.secretKey);
+                this.enforceSharedSecret(this.credential(header, SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME), mode.secretKey, meta.routeMeta);
                 core_context_1.RequestContext.putTrusted(AuthorizationHook_1.VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER, new AuthorizationHook_1.VerifiedMachineCaller('shared-secret', mode.secretKey));
                 return;
             case 'vendorAuth':
@@ -207,27 +297,23 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
     }
     /**
      * `vendorAuth(name)`: hand the app's {@link VendorAuthVerifier} the verbatim request and let it call the
-     * VENDOR's own validator. Three ways to fail, all 401, all before the controller is entered:
+     * VENDOR's own validator. A missing verifier, or one not declaring `name`, is not a case here: it
+     * failed STARTUP ({@link assertRouteVerifiable}). Two ways to fail, both 401, both before the
+     * controller is entered:
      *
-     * 1. NO verifier bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior;
-     *    an unverified vendor call must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.
-     * 2. NO raw request — the transport kept no bytes. `assertEveryVendorAuthEndpointRetainsRawBody`
+     * 1. NO raw request — the transport kept no bytes. `assertEveryVendorAuthEndpointRetainsRawBody`
      *    normally makes this a startup error, so reaching it means either a hand-registered route or
      *    an in-process caller (a spec) that published an HttpRequest with no {@link RawRequest}. The
      *    message says which fix applies rather than leaving a bare 401.
-     * 3. The verifier threw — the credential did not verify.
+     * 2. The verifier threw — the credential did not verify (including a name its own dispatch does
+     *    not know: that stays the request-time backstop).
      *
-     * Case 2 is checked HERE and nowhere else. {@link hasRawBytes} narrows the request to
+     * Case 1 is checked HERE and nowhere else. {@link hasRawBytes} narrows the request to
      * {@link RawHttpRequest} at this one gate, so the verifier's signature promises `raw` is present and
      * no vendor implementation ever writes `raw!` or a guard of its own.
      */
     async enforceVendorAuth(name, meta) {
-        if (!this.vendorAuthVerifier) {
-            log.warn(`Refusing vendorAuth('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no VendorAuthVerifier is bound. ` +
-                `Bind the INBOUND role (binder.bind(VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER).to(YourVendorAuthVerifier).inSingletonScope()) ` +
-                `to enable vendor verification; a VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER binding only signs outbound calls.`);
-            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('Vendor auth is not enabled on this server');
-        }
+        const verifier = this.requireVendorVerifier(name, meta.routeMeta);
         const request = core_context_1.RequestContext.getRequest();
         if (!this.hasRawBytes(request)) {
             log.warn(`Refusing vendorAuth('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: the inbound request carries ` +
@@ -237,7 +323,7 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
         }
         // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. On success the vendor account the signature proved is
         // stamped through the SAME path a jwt or api-key caller takes.
-        const caller = await this.vendorAuthVerifier.verify(name, request);
+        const caller = await verifier.verify(name, request);
         this.callerContext.publish(caller);
     }
     /**
@@ -252,25 +338,20 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
     /**
      * `apiKey(regime, credentials)`: hand the app's {@link ApiKeyHook} the regime name and the inbound
      * headers and let it look the CUSTOMER's key up. The declared `credentials` are NOT read here — they
-     * describe the contract for generators; the hook owns extraction. Three ways to fail, all 401, all
-     * before the controller:
+     * describe the contract for generators; the hook owns extraction. A missing hook is not a case here:
+     * it failed STARTUP ({@link assertRouteVerifiable}). Two ways to fail, both 401, both before the
+     * controller:
      *
-     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior; an
-     *    unverified partner request must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.
-     * 2. NO inbound request in scope — there are no headers to read, so there is nothing to verify. That
+     * 1. NO inbound request in scope — there are no headers to read, so there is nothing to verify. That
      *    means a caller drove this route without publishing an HttpRequest; the message says so rather
      *    than leaving a bare 401.
-     * 3. The hook threw — the key, or the key/organization pair, did not check out.
+     * 2. The hook threw — the key, or the key/organization pair, did not check out.
      *
      * On success the hook's {@link AuthenticatedCaller} is stamped exactly as a jwt parse's is, which is
      * what puts the resolved organization into `RequestContext` for every downstream repository call.
      */
     async enforceApiKey(regime, meta) {
-        if (!this.apiKeyHook) {
-            log.warn(`Refusing apiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no ApiKeyHook is bound. ` +
-                `Bind one (options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(YourApiKeyHook)) to enable api-key verification.`);
-            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('API-key auth is not enabled on this server');
-        }
+        const hook = this.requireApiKeyHook(regime, meta.routeMeta);
         const request = core_context_1.RequestContext.getRequest();
         if (!request) {
             log.warn(`Refusing apiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no inbound HttpRequest is ` +
@@ -280,7 +361,7 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
         }
         // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. The hook gets the WHOLE request so it can cross-check
         // the key against a second header (the organization the customer is acting for).
-        const caller = await this.apiKeyHook.verifyApiKey(regime, request);
+        const caller = await hook.verifyApiKey(regime, request);
         this.callerContext.publish(caller);
     }
     /**
@@ -357,13 +438,12 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
         // Same shape as an unregistered route — see the method doc for why this is not a 403.
         throw new core_util_1.ApiEndpointNotFoundError(`No endpoint at ${meta.routeMeta.path}`);
     }
-    async enforceJwt(header) {
+    async enforceJwt(header, routeMeta) {
+        const hook = this.requireJwtHook(routeMeta);
         const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);
         if (!token)
             throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('Authentication required');
-        if (!this.jwtHook)
-            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('User-JWT auth is not enabled on this server');
-        this.callerContext.publish(await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token));
+        this.callerContext.publish(await hook.parseJwt(token));
     }
     async enforceOidc(header, methods) {
         const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);
@@ -377,9 +457,9 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
         core_context_1.RequestContext.putTrusted(AuthorizationHook_1.VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER, new AuthorizationHook_1.VerifiedMachineCaller(identity.mechanism, identity.identity));
     }
     /** `provided` is the Authorization bearer value — the secret itself, same header as a JWT. */
-    enforceSharedSecret(provided, secretKey) {
-        const accepted = this.authConfig?.sharedSecrets[secretKey];
-        if (!accepted || !provided || !this.matchesEither(provided, accepted)) {
+    enforceSharedSecret(provided, secretKey, routeMeta) {
+        const accepted = this.requireSharedSecrets(secretKey, routeMeta);
+        if (!provided || !this.matchesEither(provided, accepted)) {
             throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('Invalid shared secret for sharedSecret(...) endpoint');
         }
     }

package/src/filters/AuthFilter.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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{ inject, optional } from 'inversify';\nimport { timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';\nimport {\n    provideFrameworkSingleton,\n    HttpRequest,\n    RawHttpRequest,\n    RequestContext,\n    VendorAuthVerifier,\n    VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport {\n    AuthMode,\n    OidcAuthMethod,\n    OidcAuthMethods,\n    ApiEndpointNotFoundError,\n    ApiUnauthorizedError,\n    ApiImplementationError,\n    LogManager,\n    RuntimeLocality,\n    Surface,\n    toError,\n    WebpiecesCoreHeaders,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { Filter, Service } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { WpResponse } from '../WpResponse';\nimport { MethodMeta } from '../MethodMeta';\nimport { AuthConfig, AUTH_CONFIG, SharedSecrets } from '../AuthConfig';\nimport {\n    ApiKeyHook,\n    API_KEY_HOOK,\n    JwtHook,\n    JWT_HOOK,\n    OidcHook,\n    OIDC_HOOK,\n} from '../AuthHooks';\nimport { AuthenticatedCallerContext } from '../AuthenticatedCallerContext';\nimport { VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER, VerifiedMachineCaller } from '../AuthorizationHook';\nimport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from '../DefaultOidcVerifier';\n\nconst log = LogManager.getLogger('AuthFilter');\n\n/**\n * The ONE credential header, read straight off the inbound HttpRequest.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a ContextKey: a ContextKey with an httpHeader is a TRANSFERRED key, which would\n * put the caller's credential into RequestContext and hence onto every outbound call this service\n * makes, and onto every Cloud Task it enqueues. A credential belongs to ONE request hop.\n */\nconst AUTHORIZATION_HEADER = 'authorization';\n\n/**\n * The scheme (first word of the Authorization value) names WHICH credential follows, so a secret\n * can never be mistaken for a token, nor accepted where the other was expected:\n *\n *   Authorization: Bearer <user JWT | service OIDC token>\n *   Authorization: Webpieces <sharedSecret(...) value>\n *\n * The scheme is REQUIRED. A bare value with no scheme is rejected.\n */\nconst BEARER_SCHEME = 'Bearer';\nconst SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME = 'Webpieces';\n\n/**\n * AuthFilter - the ONE framework auth filter, auto-installed just below the error filter on every\n * route. It is TRANSPORT-NEUTRAL: it reads the raw credential from the {@link HttpRequest} in\n * RequestContext (never express), so the SAME check runs over HTTP and via createApiClient.\n *\n * It enforces the endpoint's AuthMode from separately-bound pieces, each OPTIONAL except the OIDC\n * default:\n *  - shared-secret → constant-time compare vs the {@link AuthConfig} secret VALUE (state). No\n *                    AuthConfig bound → no accepted secret → fail fast (401).\n *  - jwt           → the bound {@link JwtHook} (`parseJwt`, awaited — an app's\n *                    strategy may reach a JWKS or a datastore). No JwtHook bound → \"not enabled\"\n *                    (401): JWT needs an app secret + payload shape.\n *  - oidc          → the bound {@link OidcHook} if any, else the framework {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}\n *                    run DIRECTLY — so a server that wires NOTHING still verifies Google OIDC against\n *                    the endpoint's caller scope (`oidcSameProject()` or `oidcSvcs([...])`).\n *  - vendorAuth    → the bound {@link VendorAuthVerifier} `verify`s the VENDOR's credential over the\n *                    retained raw request. No VendorAuthVerifier bound → 401, like jwt: an unverified\n *                    vendor call is never waved through because wiring was forgotten. The INBOUND role\n *                    only — this filter never depends on the outbound VendorAuthMinter (#1358).\n *  - apikey        → the bound {@link ApiKeyHook} looks the CUSTOMER's key up (async, over the whole\n *                    header set) and returns the context to seed. No ApiKeyHook bound → 401, like jwt.\n *  - public        → BEST-EFFORT jwt parse (only if a JwtHook is bound): stamp the user's context so\n *                    a logged-out page still knows who is logged in; never fails.\n *  - local-only    → serve only when {@link RuntimeLocality} says this process is a developer's\n *                    machine; otherwise 404, indistinguishable from the route not existing (which,\n *                    off-local, it does not — `ApiRoutingFactory` never registered it).\n *\n * Zero wiring = OIDC just works; an app only binds the hooks it actually uses.\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\n// webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\nexport class AuthFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n    private readonly callerContext = new AuthenticatedCallerContext();\n\n    constructor(\n        // Framework default, always available — verifies Google OIDC with zero app wiring.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- AuthFilter is DI-resolved via the esbuild/vitest path, which elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so every param needs its explicit token\n        @inject(DefaultOidcVerifier) private readonly oidcVerifier: DefaultOidcVerifier,\n        // @optional: only bind an AuthConfig to enable sharedSecret(...) endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(AUTH_CONFIG) private readonly authConfig?: AuthConfig,\n        // @optional: only bind a JwtHook to enable jwt() endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(JWT_HOOK) private readonly jwtHook?: JwtHook<never>,\n        // @optional: only bind an OidcHook to OVERRIDE the DefaultOidcVerifier caller policy.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(OIDC_HOOK) private readonly oidcHook?: OidcHook,\n        // @optional: only bind a VendorAuthVerifier to enable vendorAuth(...) endpoints. Unbound = every\n        // such endpoint 401s, which is the ONE default that must not be the other way round.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional()\n        @inject(VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER)\n        private readonly vendorAuthVerifier?: VendorAuthVerifier,\n        // @optional: only bind an ApiKeyHook to enable apiKey(...) endpoints. Unbound = every such\n        // endpoint 401s, for the same reason as the vendor hook above.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(API_KEY_HOOK) private readonly apiKeyHook?: ApiKeyHook,\n    ) {\n        super();\n    }\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\n    override async filter(\n        meta: MethodMeta,\n        nextFilter: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>,\n    ): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        const auth = meta.routeMeta.authMeta;\n        if (!auth) throw new ApiImplementationError('Every endpoint requires @WpAuth or @WpAuthPublic.');\n        if (meta.routeMeta.localOnly) this.enforceLocalOnly(meta);\n        if (meta.invocationAuthentication) {\n            meta.invocationAuthentication.assertTarget(meta.routeMeta);\n            return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n        }\n        const header = RequestContext.getRequest()?.getHeader(AUTHORIZATION_HEADER);\n        if (auth.methods[0].kind === 'public') {\n            await this.bestEffortJwt(header);\n            this.callerContext.reconcileWireTrust(false);\n            return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n        }\n        const selected = await this.authenticateAlternatives(auth.methods, header, meta);\n        this.applySurface(selected);\n        this.callerContext.reconcileWireTrust(AuthFilter.verifiesCaller(selected));\n        return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Try each declared credential in order. The endpoint's OIDC methods (one `oidcSameProject()` and\n     * one `oidcSvcs([...])` may pair) are ONE bearer credential, so they are ONE alternative, tried at\n     * the position of the first: the token is verified once against all of them.\n     */\n    private async authenticateAlternatives(methods: readonly AuthMode[], header: string | undefined, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<AuthMode> {\n        const oidc = AuthFilter.oidcMethodsOf(methods);\n        const alternatives = methods.filter((method: AuthMode) => method.kind !== 'oidc' || method === oidc?.[0]);\n        for (const method of alternatives) {\n            // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- failed credentials may try another declared authenticator; invariants propagate\n            try {\n                await this.authenticateMethod(method, header, meta, oidc);\n                return method;\n            } catch (err: unknown) { // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- structured credential rejection at the boundary\n                const error = toError(err);\n                if (!(error instanceof ApiUnauthorizedError) || alternatives.length === 1) throw error;\n            }\n        }\n        throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('No declared credential mechanism authenticated this request.');\n    }\n\n    /** The endpoint's OIDC methods in declaration order, or undefined when it declares none. */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure reader of the AuthMode list, kept beside its only caller\n    private static oidcMethodsOf(methods: readonly AuthMode[]): OidcAuthMethods | undefined {\n        const oidc = methods.filter((method: AuthMode): method is OidcAuthMethod => method.kind === 'oidc');\n        const first = oidc[0];\n        return first === undefined ? undefined : [first, ...oidc.slice(1)];\n    }\n\n    private async authenticateMethod(mode: AuthMode, header: string | undefined, meta: MethodMeta, oidc: OidcAuthMethods | undefined): Promise<void> {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'jwt': await this.enforceJwt(header); return;\n            case 'oidc': await this.enforceOidc(header, oidc ?? [mode]); return;\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                this.enforceSharedSecret(this.credential(header, SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME), mode.secretKey);\n                RequestContext.putTrusted(VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER, new VerifiedMachineCaller('shared-secret', mode.secretKey));\n                return;\n            case 'vendorAuth': await this.enforceVendorAuth(mode.name, meta); return;\n            case 'apikey': await this.enforceApiKey(mode.regime, meta); return;\n            case 'public': throw new ApiImplementationError('Public is not a protected auth alternative.');\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Stamp WHICH KIND OF CALLER this is, from the auth mode that matched — `jwt()` is a browser\n     * GUI, `apiKey(...)` is an external partner. See {@link Surface}.\n     *\n     * SET AT THE EDGE ONLY. The surface belongs to the ORIGINAL caller, so a hop that already has one\n     * INHERITS it unchanged and this returns immediately. Two different callers put a value there\n     * before this runs, and neither may be overwritten:\n     *\n     * - the MCP bridge, which stamps `llm` before invoking a `@WpAuthorization` tool through `ApiFactory`\n     *   — that in-process hop still runs this filter, and its HTTP auth mode says nothing about the\n     *   model on the other end;\n     * - an OIDC (`oidcSameProject()` / `oidcSvcs(...)`) service-to-service hop, whose caller's surface arrived on the wire. OIDC is an\n     *   internal hop, NOT a surface of its own, so it deliberately maps to `undefined` below and the\n     *   propagated value survives.\n     *\n     * Running BEFORE {@link reconcileWireTrust} is what makes the trusted-header rule work for this\n     * key: on a `jwt()` edge a caller who also SENDS `x-wp-surface` must match the value the\n     * framework just derived, and on a public route nothing vouches for it at all, so it is a 401.\n     */\n    private applySurface(mode: AuthMode): void {\n        if (RequestContext.getTrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.SURFACE) !== undefined) {\n            return;\n        }\n        const surface = AuthFilter.surfaceFor(mode);\n        if (surface !== undefined) {\n            RequestContext.putTrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.SURFACE, surface);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The auth mode -> {@link Surface} table, and the ONE place it is written down.\n     *\n     * `undefined` means \"this mode is not a surface\", which is a different statement from \"unknown\":\n     * `oidc` and `shared-secret` are internal hops that RELAY somebody else's surface, `vendorAuth`'s\n     * sender is a vendor with no webpieces surface at all, and `local-only` is a developer's own box.\n     *\n     * An exhaustive switch with NO `default`, like {@link verifiesCaller} and\n     * `DestinationTrust.forAuthMode`: a new AuthMode kind must fail to compile here rather than\n     * silently landing on `gui` (which would publish 266 to a partner) or on `public-api` (which would\n     * publish a real 4xx to a GUI).\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure mapping from the AuthMode union, kept beside its only caller (mirrors verifiesCaller)\n    private static surfaceFor(mode: AuthMode): Surface | undefined {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'jwt':\n                return 'gui';\n            case 'apikey':\n                return 'public-api';\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n            case 'vendorAuth':\n            case 'public':\n                return undefined;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `vendorAuth(name)`: hand the app's {@link VendorAuthVerifier} the verbatim request and let it call the\n     * VENDOR's own validator. Three ways to fail, all 401, all before the controller is entered:\n     *\n     * 1. NO verifier bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior;\n     *    an unverified vendor call must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n     * 2. NO raw request — the transport kept no bytes. `assertEveryVendorAuthEndpointRetainsRawBody`\n     *    normally makes this a startup error, so reaching it means either a hand-registered route or\n     *    an in-process caller (a spec) that published an HttpRequest with no {@link RawRequest}. The\n     *    message says which fix applies rather than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 3. The verifier threw — the credential did not verify.\n     *\n     * Case 2 is checked HERE and nowhere else. {@link hasRawBytes} narrows the request to\n     * {@link RawHttpRequest} at this one gate, so the verifier's signature promises `raw` is present and\n     * no vendor implementation ever writes `raw!` or a guard of its own.\n     */\n    private async enforceVendorAuth(name: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        if (!this.vendorAuthVerifier) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing vendorAuth('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no VendorAuthVerifier is bound. ` +\n                    `Bind the INBOUND role (binder.bind(VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER).to(YourVendorAuthVerifier).inSingletonScope()) ` +\n                    `to enable vendor verification; a VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER binding only signs outbound calls.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Vendor auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!this.hasRawBytes(request)) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing vendorAuth('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: the inbound request carries ` +\n                    `no raw bytes. Declare @Endpoint(POST, path, WRITE, EXTERNAL_INBOUND, { calledBy: '${name}', rawBody: true }); a ` +\n                    `spec driving this route in-process must publish an HttpRequest built with a RawRequest.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'Vendor credential cannot be verified: no raw request was retained',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. On success the vendor account the signature proved is\n        // stamped through the SAME path a jwt or api-key caller takes.\n        const caller = await this.vendorAuthVerifier.verify(name, request);\n        this.callerContext.publish(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The ONE place the framework decides a request carries the verbatim bytes. A TYPE PREDICATE, so\n     * the `true` branch hands {@link enforceVendorAuth} a {@link RawHttpRequest} with no cast and no\n     * non-null assertion — the bad state stops being representable past this line rather than being\n     * re-thrown about by every hook.\n     */\n    private hasRawBytes(request: HttpRequest | undefined): request is RawHttpRequest {\n        return request?.raw !== undefined;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `apiKey(regime, credentials)`: hand the app's {@link ApiKeyHook} the regime name and the inbound\n     * headers and let it look the CUSTOMER's key up. The declared `credentials` are NOT read here — they\n     * describe the contract for generators; the hook owns extraction. Three ways to fail, all 401, all\n     * before the controller:\n     *\n     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior; an\n     *    unverified partner request must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n     * 2. NO inbound request in scope — there are no headers to read, so there is nothing to verify. That\n     *    means a caller drove this route without publishing an HttpRequest; the message says so rather\n     *    than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 3. The hook threw — the key, or the key/organization pair, did not check out.\n     *\n     * On success the hook's {@link AuthenticatedCaller} is stamped exactly as a jwt parse's is, which is\n     * what puts the resolved organization into `RequestContext` for every downstream repository call.\n     */\n    private async enforceApiKey(regime: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        if (!this.apiKeyHook) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing apiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no ApiKeyHook is bound. ` +\n                    `Bind one (options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(YourApiKeyHook)) to enable api-key verification.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('API-key auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!request) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing apiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no inbound HttpRequest is ` +\n                    `in scope, so the hook has no headers to read. A spec driving this route in-process must ` +\n                    `publish an HttpRequest carrying the api-key headers.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'API key cannot be verified: no inbound request was published',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. The hook gets the WHOLE request so it can cross-check\n        // the key against a second header (the organization the customer is acting for).\n        const caller = await this.apiKeyHook.verifyApiKey(regime, request);\n        this.callerContext.publish(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Does this mode authenticate the CALLER ITSELF (as opposed to a user, or nobody)? The INBOUND\n     * twin of {@link DestinationTrust.forAuthMode}, and deliberately the same question: the client\n     * omits trusted keys for a destination that cannot verify it, and the server rejects trusted keys\n     * on a route that cannot verify the sender. One rule, two ends — if they disagreed, every call\n     * would fail with a 401 that looks like a framework bug.\n     *\n     * - `oidc` / `shared-secret` → TRUE. An internal service is on the other end and the trusted\n     *   context it forwarded may be believed. This is what makes cross-service identity propagation\n     *   work.\n     * - `jwt` / `public` → FALSE. A user JWT proves who the USER is; the SENDER is still whoever\n     *   holds the token, i.e. a browser.\n     * - `local-only` → FALSE. It verifies WHERE WE ARE RUNNING, not who is calling — anything on\n     *   localhost reaches it, and it has no authenticator, so nothing can ever vouch for an inbound\n     *   trusted header. Any such header therefore rejects the request, which is exactly right.\n     *\n     * - `apikey` → FALSE. See the comment on that branch: the sender is a CUSTOMER.\n     *\n     * An exhaustive switch with NO `default`, returning on every branch: a new AuthMode kind is a\n     * COMPILE error here (TS7030, no ending return) rather than silently landing on one posture. The\n     * boolean expression this replaced defaulted every future mode to \"not verified\" — the safe\n     * answer, but arrived at by accident rather than by decision.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure mapping from the AuthMode union, kept beside its only caller (mirrors DestinationTrust.forAuthMode)\n    private static verifiesCaller(mode: AuthMode): boolean {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                return true;\n            case 'jwt':\n            case 'public':\n            // `vendorAuth` DOES authenticate its sender — but the sender is an outside VENDOR, not a\n            // peer in this repo, and a vendor neither speaks nor forwards webpieces context headers.\n            // So there is no forwarded identity to believe, and admitting one would mean trusting a\n            // key a vendor's payload could carry. Same answer as the OUTBOUND half\n            // (DestinationTrust.forAuthMode), which is the invariant that keeps the two ends agreeing.\n            case 'vendorAuth':\n            // `apikey` authenticates the SENDER — but the sender is a CUSTOMER's codebase, not a peer\n            // service in this repo, so its forwarded trusted context is exactly what must NOT be\n            // believed: admitting it would let a partner assert another customer's org id on the wire.\n            // The hook's OWN derived entries still land (applyAuthenticatedCaller), and reconcileWireTrust then\n            // admits an inbound trusted header only when the hook independently derived the same value.\n            case 'apikey':\n                return false;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpLocalOnly`: serve only on a developer's machine, and off-local behave EXACTLY as if the\n     * endpoint did not exist.\n     *\n     * WHY 404 AND NOT THE 403 APPS HAND-ROLLED. Off-local the route is not registered at all\n     * (`ApiRoutingFactory` skips it), so the ordinary way to reach this path already answers 404. A\n     * 403 from here would be a DIFFERENT answer from the same framework for the same endpoint, and\n     * the difference is itself the leak: 403 confirms \"this path exists in production, you merely\n     * lack permission\", which is a map of the dev-only surface for anyone probing. A local-only\n     * endpoint should not admit it exists. Both gates therefore return the same 404, and this one is\n     * the backstop for routes registered by hand through `RouteBuilder` rather than by\n     * `ApiRoutingFactory`.\n     *\n     * The log line names WHICH reason applies, because \"you are deployed\" and \"nobody declared a\n     * locality\" have completely different fixes and both look like a bare 404 from outside.\n     */\n    private enforceLocalOnly(meta: MethodMeta): void {\n        if (RuntimeLocality.isLocalDevelopment()) {\n            return;\n        }\n        log.warn(\n            `Refusing @WpLocalOnly endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: ` +\n                (RuntimeLocality.isDeclared()\n                    ? 'this process declared itself DEPLOYED.'\n                    : 'no startup declared a RuntimeLocality, so this process is treated as DEPLOYED. ' +\n                      'Pass the locality into RuntimeSetupOptions if this really is a developer machine.'),\n        );\n        // Same shape as an unregistered route — see the method doc for why this is not a 403.\n        throw new ApiEndpointNotFoundError(`No endpoint at ${meta.routeMeta.path}`);\n    }\n\n    private async enforceJwt(header: string | undefined): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Authentication required');\n        if (!this.jwtHook) throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('User-JWT auth is not enabled on this server');\n        this.callerContext.publish(await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token));\n    }\n\n    private async enforceOidc(header: string | undefined, methods: OidcAuthMethods): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Missing OIDC bearer token');\n        const identity = this.oidcHook\n            ? await this.oidcHook.verifyOidc(token, methods)\n            : await this.oidcVerifier.verify(token, methods);\n        if (!identity) throw new ApiImplementationError('OIDC verifier must return its verified machine identity.');\n        RequestContext.putTrusted(VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER, new VerifiedMachineCaller(identity.mechanism, identity.identity));\n    }\n\n    /** `provided` is the Authorization bearer value — the secret itself, same header as a JWT. */\n    private enforceSharedSecret(provided: string | undefined, secretKey: string): void {\n        const accepted = this.authConfig?.sharedSecrets[secretKey];\n        if (!accepted || !provided || !this.matchesEither(provided, accepted)) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'Invalid shared secret for sharedSecret(...) endpoint',\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** EITHER secret1 or secret2 passes — the rotation window. Constant-time on each non-empty slot. */\n    private matchesEither(provided: string, accepted: SharedSecrets): boolean {\n        return (\n            (accepted.secret1 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret1)) ||\n            (accepted.secret2 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret2))\n        );\n    }\n\n    /** Parse a JWT if one is present, else do nothing — used on public routes; never throws. */\n    private async bestEffortJwt(header: string | undefined): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!this.jwtHook || !token) {\n            return;\n        }\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- best-effort on a public route: a bad/absent token just means \"not logged in\", must not fail the request\n        try {\n            this.callerContext.publish(await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token));\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            if (!(error instanceof ApiUnauthorizedError)) throw error;\n            log.debug(\n                'Best-effort JWT parse on a public endpoint failed (treating as anonymous): ',\n                error,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The credential value IF the header carries the expected scheme, else undefined.\n     *\n     * Strict: a bare value with no scheme, or a value under the WRONG scheme (a shared secret sent\n     * where a JWT is expected), yields undefined and the caller 401s.\n     */\n    private credential(header: string | undefined, scheme: string): string | undefined {\n        if (!header) {\n            return undefined;\n        }\n        const prefix = `${scheme} `;\n        return header.startsWith(prefix) ? header.substring(prefix.length) : undefined;\n    }\n\n    private constantTimeEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n        const bufA = Buffer.from(a, 'utf8');\n        const bufB = Buffer.from(b, 'utf8');\n        if (bufA.length !== bufB.length) {\n            return false;\n        }\n        return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);\n    }\n}\n"]}
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{ inject, optional } from 'inversify';\nimport { timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';\nimport {\n    provideFrameworkSingleton,\n    HttpRequest,\n    RawHttpRequest,\n    RequestContext,\n    VendorAuthVerifier,\n    VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport {\n    AuthMode,\n    OidcAuthMethod,\n    OidcAuthMethods,\n    ApiEndpointNotFoundError,\n    ApiUnauthorizedError,\n    ApiImplementationError,\n    LogManager,\n    RouteMetadata,\n    RuntimeLocality,\n    Surface,\n    toError,\n    WebpiecesCoreHeaders,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { Filter, Service } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { WpResponse } from '../WpResponse';\nimport { MethodMeta } from '../MethodMeta';\nimport { AuthConfig, AUTH_CONFIG, SharedSecrets } from '../AuthConfig';\nimport {\n    ApiKeyHook,\n    API_KEY_HOOK,\n    JwtHook,\n    JWT_HOOK,\n    OidcHook,\n    OIDC_HOOK,\n} from '../AuthHooks';\nimport { AuthenticatedCallerContext } from '../AuthenticatedCallerContext';\nimport { VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER, VerifiedMachineCaller } from '../AuthorizationHook';\nimport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from '../DefaultOidcVerifier';\nimport { UnverifiableAuthModeError } from '../UnverifiableAuthModeError';\n\nconst log = LogManager.getLogger('AuthFilter');\n\n/**\n * The ONE credential header, read straight off the inbound HttpRequest.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a ContextKey: a ContextKey with an httpHeader is a TRANSFERRED key, which would\n * put the caller's credential into RequestContext and hence onto every outbound call this service\n * makes, and onto every Cloud Task it enqueues. A credential belongs to ONE request hop.\n */\nconst AUTHORIZATION_HEADER = 'authorization';\n\n/**\n * The scheme (first word of the Authorization value) names WHICH credential follows, so a secret\n * can never be mistaken for a token, nor accepted where the other was expected:\n *\n *   Authorization: Bearer <user JWT | service OIDC token>\n *   Authorization: Webpieces <sharedSecret(...) value>\n *\n * The scheme is REQUIRED. A bare value with no scheme is rejected.\n */\nconst BEARER_SCHEME = 'Bearer';\nconst SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME = 'Webpieces';\n\n/**\n * AuthFilter - the ONE framework auth filter, auto-installed just below the error filter on every\n * route. It is TRANSPORT-NEUTRAL: it reads the raw credential from the {@link HttpRequest} in\n * RequestContext (never express), so the SAME check runs over HTTP and via createApiClient.\n *\n * It enforces the endpoint's AuthMode from separately-bound pieces, each OPTIONAL except the OIDC\n * default. An app binds only the pieces its SERVED routes declare — and a served route that declares\n * a mode whose piece is absent FAILS STARTUP ({@link assertRouteVerifiable}, #1362), so none of the\n * rows below is ever \"not enabled\" at request time:\n *  - shared-secret → constant-time compare vs the {@link AuthConfig} secret VALUE (state). Startup\n *                    requires an AuthConfig holding the route's key.\n *  - jwt           → the bound {@link JwtHook} (`parseJwt`, awaited — an app's\n *                    strategy may reach a JWKS or a datastore). Startup requires a JwtHook: JWT needs\n *                    an app secret + payload shape.\n *  - oidc          → the bound {@link OidcHook} if any, else the framework {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}\n *                    run DIRECTLY — so a server that wires NOTHING still verifies Google OIDC against\n *                    the endpoint's caller scope (`oidcSameProject()` or `oidcSvcs([...])`).\n *  - vendorAuth    → the bound {@link VendorAuthVerifier} `verify`s the VENDOR's credential over the\n *                    retained raw request. Startup requires a verifier whose `supportedVendorNames()` lists the\n *                    route's name: an unverified vendor call is never waved through because wiring was\n *                    forgotten. The INBOUND role only — this filter never depends on the outbound\n *                    VendorAuthMinter (#1358).\n *  - apikey        → the bound {@link ApiKeyHook} looks the CUSTOMER's key up (async, over the whole\n *                    header set) and returns the context to seed. Startup requires an ApiKeyHook.\n *  - public        → BEST-EFFORT jwt parse (only if a JwtHook is bound): stamp the user's context so\n *                    a logged-out page still knows who is logged in; never fails.\n *  - local-only    → serve only when {@link RuntimeLocality} says this process is a developer's\n *                    machine; otherwise 404, indistinguishable from the route not existing (which,\n *                    off-local, it does not — `ApiRoutingFactory` never registered it).\n *\n * Zero wiring = OIDC just works; an app only binds the hooks it actually uses.\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\n// webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\nexport class AuthFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n    private readonly callerContext = new AuthenticatedCallerContext();\n\n    constructor(\n        // Framework default, always available — verifies Google OIDC with zero app wiring.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- AuthFilter is DI-resolved via the esbuild/vitest path, which elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so every param needs its explicit token\n        @inject(DefaultOidcVerifier) private readonly oidcVerifier: DefaultOidcVerifier,\n        // @optional: only bind an AuthConfig to enable sharedSecret(...) endpoints (startup refuses a\n        // served one without it — see assertRouteVerifiable).\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(AUTH_CONFIG) private readonly authConfig?: AuthConfig,\n        // @optional: only bind a JwtHook to enable jwt() endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(JWT_HOOK) private readonly jwtHook?: JwtHook<never>,\n        // @optional: only bind an OidcHook to OVERRIDE the DefaultOidcVerifier caller policy.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(OIDC_HOOK) private readonly oidcHook?: OidcHook,\n        // @optional: only bind a VendorAuthVerifier to enable vendorAuth(...) endpoints. Unbound = a\n        // server serving one refuses to boot (assertRouteVerifiable), never an allow-all.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional()\n        @inject(VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER)\n        private readonly vendorAuthVerifier?: VendorAuthVerifier,\n        // @optional: only bind an ApiKeyHook to enable apiKey(...) endpoints. Unbound = a server serving\n        // one refuses to boot, for the same reason as the vendor verifier above.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(API_KEY_HOOK) private readonly apiKeyHook?: ApiKeyHook,\n    ) {\n        super();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * STARTUP check (#1362), called by route registration for EVERY served route: each auth mode the\n     * route declares must be verifiable by what is bound, or boot fails naming the endpoint, the mode\n     * and the exact binding line. STRICT — a multi-method route (`[oidcSameProject(), vendorAuth('x')]`)\n     * with no verifier fails too: a declared alternative nobody can verify is dead, and is almost\n     * always a wiring mistake. OIDC needs no app binding (the framework verifier) and a public route\n     * none.\n     *\n     * Reads bindings this filter already holds and nothing else: it never calls `verify`, `parseJwt`\n     * or `verifyApiKey`, touches no network, and constructs nothing (#1358's cycle stays closed).\n     * The request path resolves each piece through the SAME `require*` methods, so there is one\n     * decision, made at boot. The one boot-only check is a verifier's `supportedVendorNames()`: at request time\n     * the verifier's OWN dispatch stays the backstop for a name it does not know, and refuses (401).\n     */\n    assertRouteVerifiable(routeMeta: RouteMetadata): void {\n        const auth = routeMeta.authMeta;\n        if (!auth) throw new ApiImplementationError('Every endpoint requires @WpAuth or @WpAuthPublic.');\n        for (const method of auth.methods) {\n            switch (method.kind) {\n                case 'jwt': this.requireJwtHook(routeMeta); break;\n                case 'shared-secret': this.requireSharedSecrets(method.secretKey, routeMeta); break;\n                case 'vendorAuth': this.assertVendorDeclared(this.requireVendorVerifier(method.name, routeMeta), method.name, routeMeta); break;\n                case 'apikey': this.requireApiKeyHook(method.regime, routeMeta); break;\n                case 'oidc':\n                case 'public':\n                    break;\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure formatter of the route identity, kept beside its only callers\n    private static endpointOf(routeMeta: RouteMetadata): string {\n        return `${routeMeta.apiName ?? routeMeta.controllerClassName ?? 'UnknownApi'}.${routeMeta.methodName} (${routeMeta.httpMethod} ${routeMeta.path})`;\n    }\n\n    private unverifiable(routeMeta: RouteMetadata, mode: string, problem: string, bindLine: string): UnverifiableAuthModeError {\n        const endpoint = AuthFilter.endpointOf(routeMeta);\n        return new UnverifiableAuthModeError(\n            `Endpoint ${endpoint} declares ${mode}, but ${problem}, so this server cannot verify it and ` +\n                `refuses to start. Add:\\n    ${bindLine}\\n` +\n                `(Or remove ${mode} from the endpoint's @WpAuth if this server should not accept it.)`,\n            endpoint,\n            mode,\n        );\n    }\n\n    private requireJwtHook(routeMeta: RouteMetadata): JwtHook<never> {\n        if (this.jwtHook) return this.jwtHook;\n        throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, 'jwt()', 'no JwtHook is bound',\n            'binder.bind(JWT_HOOK).to(YourJwtHook).inSingletonScope();');\n    }\n\n    private requireSharedSecrets(secretKey: string, routeMeta: RouteMetadata): SharedSecrets {\n        const config = this.authConfig;\n        const mode = `sharedSecret('${secretKey}')`;\n        if (!config) {\n            throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, mode, 'no AuthConfig is bound',\n                `binder.bind(AUTH_CONFIG).to(YourAuthConfig).inSingletonScope();   // YourAuthConfig extends AuthConfig and passes { '${secretKey}': new SharedSecrets(secret1, secret2) }`);\n        }\n        const accepted = config.sharedSecrets[secretKey];\n        if (accepted) return accepted;\n        throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, mode,\n            `the bound AuthConfig (${config.constructor.name}) holds no SharedSecrets for '${secretKey}'`,\n            `'${secretKey}': new SharedSecrets(secret1, secret2),   // add to the sharedSecrets ${config.constructor.name} passes to AuthConfig, which AUTH_CONFIG is bound to`);\n    }\n\n    private requireVendorVerifier(name: string, routeMeta: RouteMetadata): VendorAuthVerifier {\n        const verifier = this.vendorAuthVerifier;\n        const mode = `vendorAuth('${name}')`;\n        if (!verifier) {\n            throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, mode,\n                'no VendorAuthVerifier is bound (a VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER binding only signs OUTBOUND calls)',\n                'binder.bind(VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER).to(YourVendorAuthVerifier).inSingletonScope();');\n        }\n        return verifier;\n    }\n\n    /** Boot only: the bound verifier must DECLARE the route's vendor (#1362). Never calls verify. */\n    private assertVendorDeclared(verifier: VendorAuthVerifier, name: string, routeMeta: RouteMetadata): void {\n        const supported = verifier.supportedVendorNames();\n        if (supported.includes(name)) return;\n        const mode = `vendorAuth('${name}')`;\n        const declared = supported.map((n: string) => `'${n}'`).join(', ');\n        throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, mode,\n            `the bound VendorAuthVerifier (${verifier.constructor.name}) returns [${declared}] from supportedVendorNames(), which does not include '${name}'`,\n            `'${name}' to ${verifier.constructor.name}.supportedVendorNames() (return [${declared}, '${name}']) AND handle '${name}' in its verify()`);\n    }\n\n    private requireApiKeyHook(regime: string, routeMeta: RouteMetadata): ApiKeyHook {\n        if (this.apiKeyHook) return this.apiKeyHook;\n        throw this.unverifiable(routeMeta, `apiKey('${regime}', credentials)`, 'no ApiKeyHook is bound',\n            'binder.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(YourApiKeyHook).inSingletonScope();');\n    }\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\n    override async filter(\n        meta: MethodMeta,\n        nextFilter: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>,\n    ): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        const auth = meta.routeMeta.authMeta;\n        if (!auth) throw new ApiImplementationError('Every endpoint requires @WpAuth or @WpAuthPublic.');\n        if (meta.routeMeta.localOnly) this.enforceLocalOnly(meta);\n        if (meta.invocationAuthentication) {\n            meta.invocationAuthentication.assertTarget(meta.routeMeta);\n            return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n        }\n        const header = RequestContext.getRequest()?.getHeader(AUTHORIZATION_HEADER);\n        if (auth.methods[0].kind === 'public') {\n            await this.bestEffortJwt(header);\n            this.callerContext.reconcileWireTrust(false);\n            return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n        }\n        const selected = await this.authenticateAlternatives(auth.methods, header, meta);\n        this.applySurface(selected);\n        this.callerContext.reconcileWireTrust(AuthFilter.verifiesCaller(selected));\n        return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Try each declared credential in order. The endpoint's OIDC methods (one `oidcSameProject()` and\n     * one `oidcSvcs([...])` may pair) are ONE bearer credential, so they are ONE alternative, tried at\n     * the position of the first: the token is verified once against all of them.\n     */\n    private async authenticateAlternatives(methods: readonly AuthMode[], header: string | undefined, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<AuthMode> {\n        const oidc = AuthFilter.oidcMethodsOf(methods);\n        const alternatives = methods.filter((method: AuthMode) => method.kind !== 'oidc' || method === oidc?.[0]);\n        for (const method of alternatives) {\n            // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- failed credentials may try another declared authenticator; invariants propagate\n            try {\n                await this.authenticateMethod(method, header, meta, oidc);\n                return method;\n            } catch (err: unknown) { // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- structured credential rejection at the boundary\n                const error = toError(err);\n                if (!(error instanceof ApiUnauthorizedError) || alternatives.length === 1) throw error;\n            }\n        }\n        throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('No declared credential mechanism authenticated this request.');\n    }\n\n    /** The endpoint's OIDC methods in declaration order, or undefined when it declares none. */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure reader of the AuthMode list, kept beside its only caller\n    private static oidcMethodsOf(methods: readonly AuthMode[]): OidcAuthMethods | undefined {\n        const oidc = methods.filter((method: AuthMode): method is OidcAuthMethod => method.kind === 'oidc');\n        const first = oidc[0];\n        return first === undefined ? undefined : [first, ...oidc.slice(1)];\n    }\n\n    private async authenticateMethod(mode: AuthMode, header: string | undefined, meta: MethodMeta, oidc: OidcAuthMethods | undefined): Promise<void> {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'jwt': await this.enforceJwt(header, meta.routeMeta); return;\n            case 'oidc': await this.enforceOidc(header, oidc ?? [mode]); return;\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                this.enforceSharedSecret(this.credential(header, SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME), mode.secretKey, meta.routeMeta);\n                RequestContext.putTrusted(VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER, new VerifiedMachineCaller('shared-secret', mode.secretKey));\n                return;\n            case 'vendorAuth': await this.enforceVendorAuth(mode.name, meta); return;\n            case 'apikey': await this.enforceApiKey(mode.regime, meta); return;\n            case 'public': throw new ApiImplementationError('Public is not a protected auth alternative.');\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Stamp WHICH KIND OF CALLER this is, from the auth mode that matched — `jwt()` is a browser\n     * GUI, `apiKey(...)` is an external partner. See {@link Surface}.\n     *\n     * SET AT THE EDGE ONLY. The surface belongs to the ORIGINAL caller, so a hop that already has one\n     * INHERITS it unchanged and this returns immediately. Two different callers put a value there\n     * before this runs, and neither may be overwritten:\n     *\n     * - the MCP bridge, which stamps `llm` before invoking a `@WpAuthorization` tool through `ApiFactory`\n     *   — that in-process hop still runs this filter, and its HTTP auth mode says nothing about the\n     *   model on the other end;\n     * - an OIDC (`oidcSameProject()` / `oidcSvcs(...)`) service-to-service hop, whose caller's surface arrived on the wire. OIDC is an\n     *   internal hop, NOT a surface of its own, so it deliberately maps to `undefined` below and the\n     *   propagated value survives.\n     *\n     * Running BEFORE {@link reconcileWireTrust} is what makes the trusted-header rule work for this\n     * key: on a `jwt()` edge a caller who also SENDS `x-wp-surface` must match the value the\n     * framework just derived, and on a public route nothing vouches for it at all, so it is a 401.\n     */\n    private applySurface(mode: AuthMode): void {\n        if (RequestContext.getTrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.SURFACE) !== undefined) {\n            return;\n        }\n        const surface = AuthFilter.surfaceFor(mode);\n        if (surface !== undefined) {\n            RequestContext.putTrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.SURFACE, surface);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The auth mode -> {@link Surface} table, and the ONE place it is written down.\n     *\n     * `undefined` means \"this mode is not a surface\", which is a different statement from \"unknown\":\n     * `oidc` and `shared-secret` are internal hops that RELAY somebody else's surface, `vendorAuth`'s\n     * sender is a vendor with no webpieces surface at all, and `local-only` is a developer's own box.\n     *\n     * An exhaustive switch with NO `default`, like {@link verifiesCaller} and\n     * `DestinationTrust.forAuthMode`: a new AuthMode kind must fail to compile here rather than\n     * silently landing on `gui` (which would publish 266 to a partner) or on `public-api` (which would\n     * publish a real 4xx to a GUI).\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure mapping from the AuthMode union, kept beside its only caller (mirrors verifiesCaller)\n    private static surfaceFor(mode: AuthMode): Surface | undefined {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'jwt':\n                return 'gui';\n            case 'apikey':\n                return 'public-api';\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n            case 'vendorAuth':\n            case 'public':\n                return undefined;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `vendorAuth(name)`: hand the app's {@link VendorAuthVerifier} the verbatim request and let it call the\n     * VENDOR's own validator. A missing verifier, or one not declaring `name`, is not a case here: it\n     * failed STARTUP ({@link assertRouteVerifiable}). Two ways to fail, both 401, both before the\n     * controller is entered:\n     *\n     * 1. NO raw request — the transport kept no bytes. `assertEveryVendorAuthEndpointRetainsRawBody`\n     *    normally makes this a startup error, so reaching it means either a hand-registered route or\n     *    an in-process caller (a spec) that published an HttpRequest with no {@link RawRequest}. The\n     *    message says which fix applies rather than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 2. The verifier threw — the credential did not verify (including a name its own dispatch does\n     *    not know: that stays the request-time backstop).\n     *\n     * Case 1 is checked HERE and nowhere else. {@link hasRawBytes} narrows the request to\n     * {@link RawHttpRequest} at this one gate, so the verifier's signature promises `raw` is present and\n     * no vendor implementation ever writes `raw!` or a guard of its own.\n     */\n    private async enforceVendorAuth(name: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        const verifier = this.requireVendorVerifier(name, meta.routeMeta);\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!this.hasRawBytes(request)) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing vendorAuth('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: the inbound request carries ` +\n                    `no raw bytes. Declare @Endpoint(POST, path, WRITE, EXTERNAL_INBOUND, { calledBy: '${name}', rawBody: true }); a ` +\n                    `spec driving this route in-process must publish an HttpRequest built with a RawRequest.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'Vendor credential cannot be verified: no raw request was retained',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. On success the vendor account the signature proved is\n        // stamped through the SAME path a jwt or api-key caller takes.\n        const caller = await verifier.verify(name, request);\n        this.callerContext.publish(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The ONE place the framework decides a request carries the verbatim bytes. A TYPE PREDICATE, so\n     * the `true` branch hands {@link enforceVendorAuth} a {@link RawHttpRequest} with no cast and no\n     * non-null assertion — the bad state stops being representable past this line rather than being\n     * re-thrown about by every hook.\n     */\n    private hasRawBytes(request: HttpRequest | undefined): request is RawHttpRequest {\n        return request?.raw !== undefined;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `apiKey(regime, credentials)`: hand the app's {@link ApiKeyHook} the regime name and the inbound\n     * headers and let it look the CUSTOMER's key up. The declared `credentials` are NOT read here — they\n     * describe the contract for generators; the hook owns extraction. A missing hook is not a case here:\n     * it failed STARTUP ({@link assertRouteVerifiable}). Two ways to fail, both 401, both before the\n     * controller:\n     *\n     * 1. NO inbound request in scope — there are no headers to read, so there is nothing to verify. That\n     *    means a caller drove this route without publishing an HttpRequest; the message says so rather\n     *    than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 2. The hook threw — the key, or the key/organization pair, did not check out.\n     *\n     * On success the hook's {@link AuthenticatedCaller} is stamped exactly as a jwt parse's is, which is\n     * what puts the resolved organization into `RequestContext` for every downstream repository call.\n     */\n    private async enforceApiKey(regime: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        const hook = this.requireApiKeyHook(regime, meta.routeMeta);\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!request) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing apiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no inbound HttpRequest is ` +\n                    `in scope, so the hook has no headers to read. A spec driving this route in-process must ` +\n                    `publish an HttpRequest carrying the api-key headers.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'API key cannot be verified: no inbound request was published',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. The hook gets the WHOLE request so it can cross-check\n        // the key against a second header (the organization the customer is acting for).\n        const caller = await hook.verifyApiKey(regime, request);\n        this.callerContext.publish(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Does this mode authenticate the CALLER ITSELF (as opposed to a user, or nobody)? The INBOUND\n     * twin of {@link DestinationTrust.forAuthMode}, and deliberately the same question: the client\n     * omits trusted keys for a destination that cannot verify it, and the server rejects trusted keys\n     * on a route that cannot verify the sender. One rule, two ends — if they disagreed, every call\n     * would fail with a 401 that looks like a framework bug.\n     *\n     * - `oidc` / `shared-secret` → TRUE. An internal service is on the other end and the trusted\n     *   context it forwarded may be believed. This is what makes cross-service identity propagation\n     *   work.\n     * - `jwt` / `public` → FALSE. A user JWT proves who the USER is; the SENDER is still whoever\n     *   holds the token, i.e. a browser.\n     * - `local-only` → FALSE. It verifies WHERE WE ARE RUNNING, not who is calling — anything on\n     *   localhost reaches it, and it has no authenticator, so nothing can ever vouch for an inbound\n     *   trusted header. Any such header therefore rejects the request, which is exactly right.\n     *\n     * - `apikey` → FALSE. See the comment on that branch: the sender is a CUSTOMER.\n     *\n     * An exhaustive switch with NO `default`, returning on every branch: a new AuthMode kind is a\n     * COMPILE error here (TS7030, no ending return) rather than silently landing on one posture. The\n     * boolean expression this replaced defaulted every future mode to \"not verified\" — the safe\n     * answer, but arrived at by accident rather than by decision.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure mapping from the AuthMode union, kept beside its only caller (mirrors DestinationTrust.forAuthMode)\n    private static verifiesCaller(mode: AuthMode): boolean {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                return true;\n            case 'jwt':\n            case 'public':\n            // `vendorAuth` DOES authenticate its sender — but the sender is an outside VENDOR, not a\n            // peer in this repo, and a vendor neither speaks nor forwards webpieces context headers.\n            // So there is no forwarded identity to believe, and admitting one would mean trusting a\n            // key a vendor's payload could carry. Same answer as the OUTBOUND half\n            // (DestinationTrust.forAuthMode), which is the invariant that keeps the two ends agreeing.\n            case 'vendorAuth':\n            // `apikey` authenticates the SENDER — but the sender is a CUSTOMER's codebase, not a peer\n            // service in this repo, so its forwarded trusted context is exactly what must NOT be\n            // believed: admitting it would let a partner assert another customer's org id on the wire.\n            // The hook's OWN derived entries still land (applyAuthenticatedCaller), and reconcileWireTrust then\n            // admits an inbound trusted header only when the hook independently derived the same value.\n            case 'apikey':\n                return false;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpLocalOnly`: serve only on a developer's machine, and off-local behave EXACTLY as if the\n     * endpoint did not exist.\n     *\n     * WHY 404 AND NOT THE 403 APPS HAND-ROLLED. Off-local the route is not registered at all\n     * (`ApiRoutingFactory` skips it), so the ordinary way to reach this path already answers 404. A\n     * 403 from here would be a DIFFERENT answer from the same framework for the same endpoint, and\n     * the difference is itself the leak: 403 confirms \"this path exists in production, you merely\n     * lack permission\", which is a map of the dev-only surface for anyone probing. A local-only\n     * endpoint should not admit it exists. Both gates therefore return the same 404, and this one is\n     * the backstop for routes registered by hand through `RouteBuilder` rather than by\n     * `ApiRoutingFactory`.\n     *\n     * The log line names WHICH reason applies, because \"you are deployed\" and \"nobody declared a\n     * locality\" have completely different fixes and both look like a bare 404 from outside.\n     */\n    private enforceLocalOnly(meta: MethodMeta): void {\n        if (RuntimeLocality.isLocalDevelopment()) {\n            return;\n        }\n        log.warn(\n            `Refusing @WpLocalOnly endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: ` +\n                (RuntimeLocality.isDeclared()\n                    ? 'this process declared itself DEPLOYED.'\n                    : 'no startup declared a RuntimeLocality, so this process is treated as DEPLOYED. ' +\n                      'Pass the locality into RuntimeSetupOptions if this really is a developer machine.'),\n        );\n        // Same shape as an unregistered route — see the method doc for why this is not a 403.\n        throw new ApiEndpointNotFoundError(`No endpoint at ${meta.routeMeta.path}`);\n    }\n\n    private async enforceJwt(header: string | undefined, routeMeta: RouteMetadata): Promise<void> {\n        const hook = this.requireJwtHook(routeMeta);\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Authentication required');\n        this.callerContext.publish(await hook.parseJwt(token));\n    }\n\n    private async enforceOidc(header: string | undefined, methods: OidcAuthMethods): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Missing OIDC bearer token');\n        const identity = this.oidcHook\n            ? await this.oidcHook.verifyOidc(token, methods)\n            : await this.oidcVerifier.verify(token, methods);\n        if (!identity) throw new ApiImplementationError('OIDC verifier must return its verified machine identity.');\n        RequestContext.putTrusted(VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER, new VerifiedMachineCaller(identity.mechanism, identity.identity));\n    }\n\n    /** `provided` is the Authorization bearer value — the secret itself, same header as a JWT. */\n    private enforceSharedSecret(provided: string | undefined, secretKey: string, routeMeta: RouteMetadata): void {\n        const accepted = this.requireSharedSecrets(secretKey, routeMeta);\n        if (!provided || !this.matchesEither(provided, accepted)) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'Invalid shared secret for sharedSecret(...) endpoint',\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** EITHER secret1 or secret2 passes — the rotation window. Constant-time on each non-empty slot. */\n    private matchesEither(provided: string, accepted: SharedSecrets): boolean {\n        return (\n            (accepted.secret1 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret1)) ||\n            (accepted.secret2 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret2))\n        );\n    }\n\n    /** Parse a JWT if one is present, else do nothing — used on public routes; never throws. */\n    private async bestEffortJwt(header: string | undefined): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!this.jwtHook || !token) {\n            return;\n        }\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- best-effort on a public route: a bad/absent token just means \"not logged in\", must not fail the request\n        try {\n            this.callerContext.publish(await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token));\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            if (!(error instanceof ApiUnauthorizedError)) throw error;\n            log.debug(\n                'Best-effort JWT parse on a public endpoint failed (treating as anonymous): ',\n                error,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The credential value IF the header carries the expected scheme, else undefined.\n     *\n     * Strict: a bare value with no scheme, or a value under the WRONG scheme (a shared secret sent\n     * where a JWT is expected), yields undefined and the caller 401s.\n     */\n    private credential(header: string | undefined, scheme: string): string | undefined {\n        if (!header) {\n            return undefined;\n        }\n        const prefix = `${scheme} `;\n        return header.startsWith(prefix) ? header.substring(prefix.length) : undefined;\n    }\n\n    private constantTimeEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n        const bufA = Buffer.from(a, 'utf8');\n        const bufB = Buffer.from(b, 'utf8');\n        if (bufA.length !== bufB.length) {\n            return false;\n        }\n        return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/index.d.ts

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ export { ApiClient, ApiClientProxy } from './ApiClient';
 export { AuthConfig, AUTH_CONFIG, AuthenticatedCaller, AuthenticatedMachineIdentity, AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY, SharedSecrets, } from './AuthConfig';
 export { JwtHook, MintedJwt, JWT_HOOK, OidcHook, OIDC_HOOK, ApiKeyHook, API_KEY_HOOK, } from './AuthHooks';
 export { VendorAuthVerifier, VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER } from '@webpieces/core-context';
+export { UnverifiableAuthModeError } from './UnverifiableAuthModeError';
 export { DefaultOidcVerifier } from './DefaultOidcVerifier';
 export { DefaultJwtHook, DefaultJwtMintRequest } from './DefaultJwtHook';
 export { WebpiecesRouter, WebpiecesRouterFactory, WebpiecesRouterOptions } from './WebpiecesRouter';

package/src/index.js

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.WRITE_IDEMPOTENT = exports.READ = exports.verbCarriesBody = exports.DELETE = exports.PATCH = exports.PUT = exports.POST = exports.GET = exports.METADATA_KEYS = exports.HttpContractMapper = exports.RouteMetadataFactory = exports.RouteMetadata = exports.AuthMeta = exports.getQueueName = exports.assertPubSubConventions = exports.assertApiKind = exports.getApiKind = exports.assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode = exports.getAuthMeta = exports.isApiPath = exports.isRawBody = exports.isFormPost = exports.getHttpParameterDeclarations = exports.getEndpointOperation = exports.getEndpointHttpMethod = exports.getEndpointOptions = exports.getEndpoints = exports.getApiPath = exports.Queue = exports.PubSub = exports.Rpc = exports.getAuthorization = exports.AuthorizationType = exports.WpAuthorization = exports.apiKey = exports.vendorAuth = exports.sharedSecret = exports.oidcSvcs = exports.oidcSameProject = exports.jwt = exports.isLocalOnly = exports.WpLocalOnly = exports.WpAuth = exports.WpAuthPublic = exports.QueryParams = exports.QueryString = exports.QueryParam = exports.PathParam = exports.Endpoint = exports.ApiPath = void 0;
-exports.DefaultJwtHook = exports.DefaultOidcVerifier = exports.VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER = exports.VendorAuthVerifier = exports.API_KEY_HOOK = exports.ApiKeyHook = exports.OIDC_HOOK = exports.OidcHook = exports.JWT_HOOK = exports.MintedJwt = exports.JwtHook = exports.SharedSecrets = exports.AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY = exports.AuthenticatedMachineIdentity = exports.AuthenticatedCaller = exports.AUTH_CONFIG = exports.AuthConfig = exports.ApiClient = exports.PubSubBindOptions = exports.ClientBindOptions = exports.ContainerBinder = exports.NodeWiringModules = exports.FilterMatcher = exports.LogApiFilter = exports.RouteHandler = exports.MethodMeta = exports.InvocationAuthentication = exports.AuthenticatedCallerContext = exports.WpResponse = exports.RawRequest = exports.HttpRequest = exports.FilterDefinition = exports.RouteDefinition = exports.ApiRoutingFactory = exports.buildFrameworkModule = exports.provideFrameworkSingletonDefaultForApi = exports.provideFrameworkSingleton = exports.provideSingletonDefaultForApi = exports.ROUTING_METADATA_KEYS = exports.SourceFile = exports.isDocumentDesign = exports.DocumentDesign = exports.ExternalContextKeys = exports.EXTERNAL_OUTBOUND = exports.EXTERNAL_INBOUND = exports.CRON = exports.CLOUDTASKS = exports.RPC = exports.NONE = exports.WRITE = void 0;
-exports.WiringPolicy = exports.AuthorizedApiDocument = exports.VerifiedMachineCaller = exports.VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER = exports.AUTHORIZATION_HOOK = exports.CanonicalUserRoles = exports.AuthorizationService = exports.AuthorizationHook = exports.WEBPIECES_CONFIG_TOKEN = exports.WebpiecesConfig = exports.RuntimeSetupOptions = exports.setupRuntime = exports.WebpiecesRouterFactory = exports.WebpiecesRouter = exports.DefaultJwtMintRequest = void 0;
+exports.DefaultOidcVerifier = exports.UnverifiableAuthModeError = exports.VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER = exports.VendorAuthVerifier = exports.API_KEY_HOOK = exports.ApiKeyHook = exports.OIDC_HOOK = exports.OidcHook = exports.JWT_HOOK = exports.MintedJwt = exports.JwtHook = exports.SharedSecrets = exports.AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY = exports.AuthenticatedMachineIdentity = exports.AuthenticatedCaller = exports.AUTH_CONFIG = exports.AuthConfig = exports.ApiClient = exports.PubSubBindOptions = exports.ClientBindOptions = exports.ContainerBinder = exports.NodeWiringModules = exports.FilterMatcher = exports.LogApiFilter = exports.RouteHandler = exports.MethodMeta = exports.InvocationAuthentication = exports.AuthenticatedCallerContext = exports.WpResponse = exports.RawRequest = exports.HttpRequest = exports.FilterDefinition = exports.RouteDefinition = exports.ApiRoutingFactory = exports.buildFrameworkModule = exports.provideFrameworkSingletonDefaultForApi = exports.provideFrameworkSingleton = exports.provideSingletonDefaultForApi = exports.ROUTING_METADATA_KEYS = exports.SourceFile = exports.isDocumentDesign = exports.DocumentDesign = exports.ExternalContextKeys = exports.EXTERNAL_OUTBOUND = exports.EXTERNAL_INBOUND = exports.CRON = exports.CLOUDTASKS = exports.RPC = exports.NONE = exports.WRITE = void 0;
+exports.WiringPolicy = exports.AuthorizedApiDocument = exports.VerifiedMachineCaller = exports.VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER = exports.AUTHORIZATION_HOOK = exports.CanonicalUserRoles = exports.AuthorizationService = exports.AuthorizationHook = exports.WEBPIECES_CONFIG_TOKEN = exports.WebpiecesConfig = exports.RuntimeSetupOptions = exports.setupRuntime = exports.WebpiecesRouterFactory = exports.WebpiecesRouter = exports.DefaultJwtMintRequest = exports.DefaultJwtHook = void 0;
 // Re-export API decorators from core-util for convenience
 var core_util_1 = require("@webpieces/core-util");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "ApiPath", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.ApiPath; } });
@@ -123,7 +123,8 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "ApiClient", { enumerable: true, get: function ()
 // Auth: the app-provided, container-bound pieces the framework AuthFilter injects.
 //  - AuthConfig: shared-secret STATE (sharedSecret(...) values).
 //  - JwtHook / OidcHook / VendorAuthVerifier / ApiKeyHook: OPTIONAL verification mechanisms
-//    (bind only what you use; unbound means the matching endpoints 401, never open).
+//    (bind only what your served routes declare; a served route declaring a mode whose piece is
+//    unbound FAILS STARTUP with UnverifiableAuthModeError naming the binding, never open — #1362).
 //  - DefaultOidcVerifier: the built-in Google OIDC verifier used when no OidcHook is bound.
 var AuthConfig_1 = require("./AuthConfig");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "AuthConfig", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return AuthConfig_1.AuthConfig; } });
@@ -146,6 +147,8 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "API_KEY_HOOK", { enumerable: true, get: function
 var core_context_4 = require("@webpieces/core-context");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "VendorAuthVerifier", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_context_4.VendorAuthVerifier; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_context_4.VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER; } });
+var UnverifiableAuthModeError_1 = require("./UnverifiableAuthModeError");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "UnverifiableAuthModeError", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return UnverifiableAuthModeError_1.UnverifiableAuthModeError; } });
 var DefaultOidcVerifier_1 = require("./DefaultOidcVerifier");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "DefaultOidcVerifier", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return DefaultOidcVerifier_1.DefaultOidcVerifier; } });
 // DefaultJwtHook: batteries-included HS256 JwtHook — `new DefaultJwtHook(secret)` and go.

package/src/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Re-export API decorators from core-util for convenience\nexport {\n    ApiPath,\n    Endpoint,\n    PathParam,\n    QueryParam,\n    QueryString,\n    QueryParams,\n    WpAuthPublic,\n    WpAuth, WpLocalOnly, isLocalOnly, jwt, oidcSameProject, oidcSvcs, sharedSecret, vendorAuth, apiKey,\n    WpAuthorization, AuthorizationType, getAuthorization,\n    Rpc,\n    PubSub,\n    Queue,\n    getApiPath,\n    getEndpoints,\n    getEndpointOptions,\n    getEndpointHttpMethod,\n    getEndpointOperation,\n    getHttpParameterDeclarations,\n    isFormPost,\n    isRawBody,\n    isApiPath,\n    getAuthMeta,\n    assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode,\n    getApiKind,\n    assertApiKind,\n    assertPubSubConventions,\n    getQueueName,\n    AuthMeta,\n    RouteMetadata,\n    RouteMetadataFactory,\n    HttpContractMapper,\n    METADATA_KEYS,\n    ValidateImplementation,\n    GET,\n    POST,\n    PUT,\n    PATCH,\n    DELETE,\n    verbCarriesBody,\n    READ,\n    WRITE_IDEMPOTENT,\n    WRITE,\n    NONE,\n    RPC,\n    CLOUDTASKS,\n    CRON,\n    EXTERNAL_INBOUND,\n    EXTERNAL_OUTBOUND,\n    ExternalContextKeys,\n    // @DocumentDesign moved to core-util (design-root marker, browser + Node);\n    // re-exported here for back-compat.\n    DocumentDesign,\n    isDocumentDesign,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nexport type {\n    AuthMode,\n    ApiKind,\n    HttpMethod,\n    EndpointOperation,\n    EndpointKind,\n    EndpointOptions,\n    EndpointResponseType,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\n\n// Server-side routing decorators and utilities\nexport { SourceFile, ROUTING_METADATA_KEYS } from './decorators';\n\n// DI provider decorators moved to core-context; re-exported here for back-compat\nexport { provideSingletonDefaultForApi } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n// Framework-only DI registry (packages/** framework classes use these; see frameworkProvide.ts)\nexport {\n    provideFrameworkSingleton,\n    provideFrameworkSingletonDefaultForApi,\n    buildFrameworkModule,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\nexport { ApiRoutingFactory, ClassType } from './ApiRoutingFactory';\n\n// Core routing types\nexport { Routes, RouteBuilder, RouteDefinition, FilterDefinition } from './WebAppMeta';\n\n// The transport-neutral request type (defined in core-context; this is http-routing's\n// public request — a transport adapter builds one and the chain reads it from RequestContext).\nexport { HttpRequest, RawHttpRequest, RawRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\n// The INBOUND chain's response type. `Filter`, `Service` and `FilterChain` are NOT re-exported\n// here: they moved to @webpieces/core-util so the outbound client chain is the SAME abstraction\n// rather than a second spelling of it. Import them from '@webpieces/core-util'.\nexport { WpResponse } from './WpResponse';\nexport { AuthenticatedCallerContext } from './AuthenticatedCallerContext';\nexport { InvocationAuthentication } from './InvocationAuthentication';\nexport { MethodMeta } from './MethodMeta';\nexport { RouteHandler } from './RouteHandler';\n\n// LogApiFilter: the fixed OUTERMOST framework filter (auto-installed at 1,000,000 above\n// AuthFilter). Exported for reference/testing only — apps must NOT install it themselves.\nexport { LogApiFilter } from './filters/LogApiFilter';\n\n// RouteBuilderImpl (the route table + chain composer) is now INTERNAL — it is never\n// handed to upper layers. The express layer consumes ApiFactory.apiClients() instead.\n\n// Filter matching\nexport { FilterMatcher, HttpFilter } from './FilterMatcher';\n\n// The app's server-surface declaration: DI bind modules + route groups + headers.\nexport type { Wiring, AppWiring, BindModule, RouteModule } from './Wiring';\nexport { NodeWiringModules } from './Wiring';\n// The Node binder every BindModule.configure receives.\nexport type { Binder } from './Binder';\nexport { ContainerBinder, ClientBindOptions, PubSubBindOptions } from './Binder';\n\n// The public API-surface abstraction: declare routes/filters, get them back as ApiClient[].\nexport { ApiFactory } from './ApiFactory';\nexport { ApiClient, ApiClientProxy } from './ApiClient';\n\n// Auth: the app-provided, container-bound pieces the framework AuthFilter injects.\n//  - AuthConfig: shared-secret STATE (sharedSecret(...) values).\n//  - JwtHook / OidcHook / VendorAuthVerifier / ApiKeyHook: OPTIONAL verification mechanisms\n//    (bind only what you use; unbound means the matching endpoints 401, never open).\n//  - DefaultOidcVerifier: the built-in Google OIDC verifier used when no OidcHook is bound.\nexport {\n    AuthConfig,\n    AUTH_CONFIG,\n    AuthenticatedCaller,\n    AuthenticatedMachineIdentity,\n    AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY,\n    SharedSecrets,\n} from './AuthConfig';\nexport {\n    JwtHook,\n    MintedJwt,\n    JWT_HOOK,\n    OidcHook,\n    OIDC_HOOK,\n    ApiKeyHook,\n    API_KEY_HOOK,\n} from './AuthHooks';\n// vendorAuth(name), INBOUND role: the verifier this server's AuthFilter calls. Defined in\n// @webpieces/core-context beside its OUTBOUND twin VendorAuthMinter (re-exported by\n// @webpieces/http-client-node); the two are independent DI roles, never one binding (#1358).\nexport { VendorAuthVerifier, VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nexport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from './DefaultOidcVerifier';\n// DefaultJwtHook: batteries-included HS256 JwtHook — `new DefaultJwtHook(secret)` and go.\nexport { DefaultJwtHook, DefaultJwtMintRequest } from './DefaultJwtHook';\n\n// Above-boundary context setup shared by every transport adapter.\n\n// Node-only router (the express-free heart: container + filter chain + in-process client)\nexport { WebpiecesRouter, WebpiecesRouterFactory, WebpiecesRouterOptions } from './WebpiecesRouter';\n\n// The ONE transport-free startup sequence (headers → logging → router → routes) → ApiFactory.\n// Reusable by any company/app and any framework adapter; a company wraps it with its own headers.\nexport { setupRuntime, RuntimeSetupOptions } from './setupRuntime';\n\n// Server configuration\nexport { WebpiecesConfig, WEBPIECES_CONFIG_TOKEN } from './WebpiecesConfig';\n\n\nexport { AuthorizationHook, AuthorizationService, CanonicalUserRoles, AUTHORIZATION_HOOK, VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER, VerifiedMachineCaller } from './AuthorizationHook';\nexport { AuthorizedApiDocument } from './AuthorizedApiDocument';\nexport type { ApiDocumentObject, ApiDocumentValue } from './AuthorizedApiDocument';\n\nexport { WiringPolicy } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\n"]}
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Re-export API decorators from core-util for convenience\nexport {\n    ApiPath,\n    Endpoint,\n    PathParam,\n    QueryParam,\n    QueryString,\n    QueryParams,\n    WpAuthPublic,\n    WpAuth, WpLocalOnly, isLocalOnly, jwt, oidcSameProject, oidcSvcs, sharedSecret, vendorAuth, apiKey,\n    WpAuthorization, AuthorizationType, getAuthorization,\n    Rpc,\n    PubSub,\n    Queue,\n    getApiPath,\n    getEndpoints,\n    getEndpointOptions,\n    getEndpointHttpMethod,\n    getEndpointOperation,\n    getHttpParameterDeclarations,\n    isFormPost,\n    isRawBody,\n    isApiPath,\n    getAuthMeta,\n    assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode,\n    getApiKind,\n    assertApiKind,\n    assertPubSubConventions,\n    getQueueName,\n    AuthMeta,\n    RouteMetadata,\n    RouteMetadataFactory,\n    HttpContractMapper,\n    METADATA_KEYS,\n    ValidateImplementation,\n    GET,\n    POST,\n    PUT,\n    PATCH,\n    DELETE,\n    verbCarriesBody,\n    READ,\n    WRITE_IDEMPOTENT,\n    WRITE,\n    NONE,\n    RPC,\n    CLOUDTASKS,\n    CRON,\n    EXTERNAL_INBOUND,\n    EXTERNAL_OUTBOUND,\n    ExternalContextKeys,\n    // @DocumentDesign moved to core-util (design-root marker, browser + Node);\n    // re-exported here for back-compat.\n    DocumentDesign,\n    isDocumentDesign,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nexport type {\n    AuthMode,\n    ApiKind,\n    HttpMethod,\n    EndpointOperation,\n    EndpointKind,\n    EndpointOptions,\n    EndpointResponseType,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\n\n// Server-side routing decorators and utilities\nexport { SourceFile, ROUTING_METADATA_KEYS } from './decorators';\n\n// DI provider decorators moved to core-context; re-exported here for back-compat\nexport { provideSingletonDefaultForApi } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n// Framework-only DI registry (packages/** framework classes use these; see frameworkProvide.ts)\nexport {\n    provideFrameworkSingleton,\n    provideFrameworkSingletonDefaultForApi,\n    buildFrameworkModule,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\nexport { ApiRoutingFactory, ClassType } from './ApiRoutingFactory';\n\n// Core routing types\nexport { Routes, RouteBuilder, RouteDefinition, FilterDefinition } from './WebAppMeta';\n\n// The transport-neutral request type (defined in core-context; this is http-routing's\n// public request — a transport adapter builds one and the chain reads it from RequestContext).\nexport { HttpRequest, RawHttpRequest, RawRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\n// The INBOUND chain's response type. `Filter`, `Service` and `FilterChain` are NOT re-exported\n// here: they moved to @webpieces/core-util so the outbound client chain is the SAME abstraction\n// rather than a second spelling of it. Import them from '@webpieces/core-util'.\nexport { WpResponse } from './WpResponse';\nexport { AuthenticatedCallerContext } from './AuthenticatedCallerContext';\nexport { InvocationAuthentication } from './InvocationAuthentication';\nexport { MethodMeta } from './MethodMeta';\nexport { RouteHandler } from './RouteHandler';\n\n// LogApiFilter: the fixed OUTERMOST framework filter (auto-installed at 1,000,000 above\n// AuthFilter). Exported for reference/testing only — apps must NOT install it themselves.\nexport { LogApiFilter } from './filters/LogApiFilter';\n\n// RouteBuilderImpl (the route table + chain composer) is now INTERNAL — it is never\n// handed to upper layers. The express layer consumes ApiFactory.apiClients() instead.\n\n// Filter matching\nexport { FilterMatcher, HttpFilter } from './FilterMatcher';\n\n// The app's server-surface declaration: DI bind modules + route groups + headers.\nexport type { Wiring, AppWiring, BindModule, RouteModule } from './Wiring';\nexport { NodeWiringModules } from './Wiring';\n// The Node binder every BindModule.configure receives.\nexport type { Binder } from './Binder';\nexport { ContainerBinder, ClientBindOptions, PubSubBindOptions } from './Binder';\n\n// The public API-surface abstraction: declare routes/filters, get them back as ApiClient[].\nexport { ApiFactory } from './ApiFactory';\nexport { ApiClient, ApiClientProxy } from './ApiClient';\n\n// Auth: the app-provided, container-bound pieces the framework AuthFilter injects.\n//  - AuthConfig: shared-secret STATE (sharedSecret(...) values).\n//  - JwtHook / OidcHook / VendorAuthVerifier / ApiKeyHook: OPTIONAL verification mechanisms\n//    (bind only what your served routes declare; a served route declaring a mode whose piece is\n//    unbound FAILS STARTUP with UnverifiableAuthModeError naming the binding, never open — #1362).\n//  - DefaultOidcVerifier: the built-in Google OIDC verifier used when no OidcHook is bound.\nexport {\n    AuthConfig,\n    AUTH_CONFIG,\n    AuthenticatedCaller,\n    AuthenticatedMachineIdentity,\n    AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY,\n    SharedSecrets,\n} from './AuthConfig';\nexport {\n    JwtHook,\n    MintedJwt,\n    JWT_HOOK,\n    OidcHook,\n    OIDC_HOOK,\n    ApiKeyHook,\n    API_KEY_HOOK,\n} from './AuthHooks';\n// vendorAuth(name), INBOUND role: the verifier this server's AuthFilter calls. Defined in\n// @webpieces/core-context beside its OUTBOUND twin VendorAuthMinter (re-exported by\n// @webpieces/http-client-node); the two are independent DI roles, never one binding (#1358).\nexport { VendorAuthVerifier, VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nexport { UnverifiableAuthModeError } from './UnverifiableAuthModeError';\nexport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from './DefaultOidcVerifier';\n// DefaultJwtHook: batteries-included HS256 JwtHook — `new DefaultJwtHook(secret)` and go.\nexport { DefaultJwtHook, DefaultJwtMintRequest } from './DefaultJwtHook';\n\n// Above-boundary context setup shared by every transport adapter.\n\n// Node-only router (the express-free heart: container + filter chain + in-process client)\nexport { WebpiecesRouter, WebpiecesRouterFactory, WebpiecesRouterOptions } from './WebpiecesRouter';\n\n// The ONE transport-free startup sequence (headers → logging → router → routes) → ApiFactory.\n// Reusable by any company/app and any framework adapter; a company wraps it with its own headers.\nexport { setupRuntime, RuntimeSetupOptions } from './setupRuntime';\n\n// Server configuration\nexport { WebpiecesConfig, WEBPIECES_CONFIG_TOKEN } from './WebpiecesConfig';\n\n\nexport { AuthorizationHook, AuthorizationService, CanonicalUserRoles, AUTHORIZATION_HOOK, VERIFIED_MACHINE_CALLER, VerifiedMachineCaller } from './AuthorizationHook';\nexport { AuthorizedApiDocument } from './AuthorizedApiDocument';\nexport type { ApiDocumentObject, ApiDocumentValue } from './AuthorizedApiDocument';\n\nexport { WiringPolicy } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\n"]}