@webpieces/http-routing 0.4.795 → 0.4.796

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@webpieces/http-routing",
-  "version": "0.4.795",
+  "version": "0.4.796",
   "description": "Decorator-based routing with auto-wiring for WebPieces",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "./src/index.js",
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@inversifyjs/binding-decorators": "1.1.5",
-    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.795",
-    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.795",
-    "@webpieces/gcp-identity": "0.4.795",
+    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.796",
+    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.796",
+    "@webpieces/gcp-identity": "0.4.796",
     "inversify": "7.10.4",
     "jsonwebtoken": "9.0.2",
     "minimatch": "10.0.1"

package/src/filters/AuthFilter.js

@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
         const request = core_context_1.RequestContext.getRequest();
         if (!this.hasRawBytes(request)) {
             log.warn(`Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: the inbound request carries ` +
-                `no raw bytes. Declare @Endpoint(path, 'external', { calledBy: '${name}', rawBody: true }); a ` +
+                `no raw bytes. Declare @Endpoint(POST, path, WRITE, EXTERNAL, { calledBy: '${name}', rawBody: true }); a ` +
                 `spec driving this route in-process must publish an HttpRequest built with a RawRequest.`);
             throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('Webhook signature cannot be verified: no raw request was retained');
         }

package/src/filters/AuthFilter.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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{ inject, optional } from 'inversify';\nimport { timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';\nimport {\n    provideFrameworkSingleton,\n    HttpRequest,\n    PendingWireTrust,\n    PendingTrustedValue,\n    RawHttpRequest,\n    RequestContext,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport {\n    AuthMode,\n    ApiEndpointNotFoundError,\n    ApiBadRequestError,\n    ApiUnauthorizedError,\n    JwtRequirement,\n    LogManager,\n    RuntimeLocality,\n    Surface,\n    toError,\n    WebpiecesCoreHeaders,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { Filter, Service } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { WpResponse } from '../WpResponse';\nimport { MethodMeta } from '../MethodMeta';\nimport {\n    AuthConfig,\n    AUTH_CONFIG,\n    AuthenticatedCaller,\n    AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY,\n    SharedSecrets,\n} from '../AuthConfig';\nimport {\n    ApiKeyHook,\n    API_KEY_HOOK,\n    JwtHook,\n    JWT_HOOK,\n    OidcHook,\n    OIDC_HOOK,\n    WebhookAuthCallback,\n    WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK,\n} from '../AuthHooks';\nimport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from '../DefaultOidcVerifier';\n\nconst log = LogManager.getLogger('AuthFilter');\n\n/**\n * The ONE credential header, read straight off the inbound HttpRequest.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a ContextKey: a ContextKey with an httpHeader is a TRANSFERRED key, which would\n * put the caller's credential into RequestContext and hence onto every outbound call this service\n * makes, and onto every Cloud Task it enqueues. A credential belongs to ONE request hop.\n */\nconst AUTHORIZATION_HEADER = 'authorization';\n\n/**\n * The scheme (first word of the Authorization value) names WHICH credential follows, so a secret\n * can never be mistaken for a token, nor accepted where the other was expected:\n *\n *   Authorization: Bearer <user JWT | service OIDC token>\n *   Authorization: Webpieces <@WpAuthSharedSecret value>\n *\n * The scheme is REQUIRED. A bare value with no scheme is rejected.\n */\nconst BEARER_SCHEME = 'Bearer';\nconst SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME = 'Webpieces';\n\n/**\n * AuthFilter - the ONE framework auth filter, auto-installed just below the error filter on every\n * route. It is TRANSPORT-NEUTRAL: it reads the raw credential from the {@link HttpRequest} in\n * RequestContext (never express), so the SAME check runs over HTTP and via createApiClient.\n *\n * It enforces the endpoint's AuthMode from separately-bound pieces, each OPTIONAL except the OIDC\n * default:\n *  - shared-secret → constant-time compare vs the {@link AuthConfig} secret VALUE (state). No\n *                    AuthConfig bound → no accepted secret → fail fast (401).\n *  - jwt           → the bound {@link JwtHook} (`parseJwt` + `authorizeJwt`, both awaited — an app's\n *                    strategy may reach a JWKS or a datastore). No JwtHook bound → \"not enabled\"\n *                    (401): JWT needs an app secret + payload shape.\n *  - oidc          → the bound {@link OidcHook} if any, else the framework {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}\n *                    run DIRECTLY — so a server that wires NOTHING still verifies Google OIDC.\n *  - webhook       → the bound {@link WebhookAuthCallback} verifies the VENDOR's signature over the retained\n *                    raw request. No WebhookAuthCallback bound → 401, like jwt: an unverified webhook is\n *                    never waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n *  - apikey        → the bound {@link ApiKeyHook} looks the CUSTOMER's key up (async, over the whole\n *                    header set) and returns the context to seed. No ApiKeyHook bound → 401, like jwt.\n *  - public        → BEST-EFFORT jwt parse (only if a JwtHook is bound): stamp the user's context so\n *                    a logged-out page still knows who is logged in; never fails.\n *  - local-only    → serve only when {@link RuntimeLocality} says this process is a developer's\n *                    machine; otherwise 404, indistinguishable from the route not existing (which,\n *                    off-local, it does not — `ApiRoutingFactory` never registered it).\n *\n * Zero wiring = OIDC just works; an app only binds the hooks it actually uses.\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\n// webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\nexport class AuthFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n    constructor(\n        // Framework default, always available — verifies Google OIDC with zero app wiring.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- AuthFilter is DI-resolved via the esbuild/vitest path, which elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so every param needs its explicit token\n        @inject(DefaultOidcVerifier) private readonly oidcVerifier: DefaultOidcVerifier,\n        // @optional: only bind an AuthConfig to enable @WpAuthSharedSecret endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(AUTH_CONFIG) private readonly authConfig?: AuthConfig,\n        // @optional: only bind a JwtHook to enable @WpAuthJwt endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(JWT_HOOK) private readonly jwtHook?: JwtHook<never>,\n        // @optional: only bind an OidcHook to OVERRIDE the DefaultOidcVerifier caller policy.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(OIDC_HOOK) private readonly oidcHook?: OidcHook,\n        // @optional: only bind a WebhookAuthCallback to enable @WpAuthWebhook endpoints. Unbound = every such\n        // endpoint 401s, which is the ONE default that must not be the other way round.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional()\n        @inject(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK)\n        private readonly webhookAuthCallback?: WebhookAuthCallback,\n        // @optional: only bind an ApiKeyHook to enable @WpAuthApiKey endpoints. Unbound = every such\n        // endpoint 401s, for the same reason as the webhook hook above.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(API_KEY_HOOK) private readonly apiKeyHook?: ApiKeyHook,\n    ) {\n        super();\n    }\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\n    override async filter(\n        meta: MethodMeta,\n        nextFilter: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>,\n    ): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        const mode = meta.routeMeta.authMeta?.mode;\n        const authHeader = RequestContext.getRequest()?.getHeader(AUTHORIZATION_HEADER);\n\n        if (!mode || mode.kind === 'public') {\n            // Public: best-effort parse so a logged-out page can still know the logged-in user.\n            await this.bestEffortJwt(authHeader);\n            this.reconcileWireTrust(/*callerVerified*/ false);\n            this.rethrowDeferredBodyError();\n            return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n        }\n\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'jwt':\n                await this.enforceJwt(authHeader, mode.requirement);\n                break;\n            case 'oidc':\n                await this.enforceOidc(authHeader, mode.callers);\n                break;\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                this.enforceSharedSecret(\n                    this.credential(authHeader, SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME),\n                    mode.secretKey,\n                );\n                break;\n            case 'webhook':\n                await this.enforceWebhook(mode.name, meta);\n                break;\n            case 'apikey':\n                await this.enforceApiKey(mode.regime, meta);\n                break;\n            case 'local-only':\n                this.enforceLocalOnly(meta);\n                break;\n        }\n        this.applySurface(mode);\n        this.reconcileWireTrust(AuthFilter.verifiesCaller(mode));\n        this.rethrowDeferredBodyError();\n        return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Stamp WHICH KIND OF CALLER this is, from the auth mode that matched — `@WpAuthJwt` is a browser\n     * GUI, `@WpAuthApiKey` is an external partner. See {@link Surface}.\n     *\n     * SET AT THE EDGE ONLY. The surface belongs to the ORIGINAL caller, so a hop that already has one\n     * INHERITS it unchanged and this returns immediately. Two different callers put a value there\n     * before this runs, and neither may be overwritten:\n     *\n     * - the MCP bridge, which stamps `llm` before invoking a `@WpMcpAuthJwt` tool through `ApiFactory`\n     *   — that in-process hop still runs this filter, and its HTTP auth mode says nothing about the\n     *   model on the other end;\n     * - a `@WpAuthOidc` service-to-service hop, whose caller's surface arrived on the wire. OIDC is an\n     *   internal hop, NOT a surface of its own, so it deliberately maps to `undefined` below and the\n     *   propagated value survives.\n     *\n     * Running BEFORE {@link reconcileWireTrust} is what makes the trusted-header rule work for this\n     * key: on a `@WpAuthJwt` edge a caller who also SENDS `x-wp-surface` must match the value the\n     * framework just derived, and on a public route nothing vouches for it at all, so it is a 401.\n     */\n    private applySurface(mode: AuthMode): void {\n        if (RequestContext.getTrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.SURFACE) !== undefined) {\n            return;\n        }\n        const surface = AuthFilter.surfaceFor(mode);\n        if (surface !== undefined) {\n            RequestContext.putTrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.SURFACE, surface);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The auth mode -> {@link Surface} table, and the ONE place it is written down.\n     *\n     * `undefined` means \"this mode is not a surface\", which is a different statement from \"unknown\":\n     * `oidc` and `shared-secret` are internal hops that RELAY somebody else's surface, `webhook`'s\n     * sender is a vendor with no webpieces surface at all, and `local-only` is a developer's own box.\n     *\n     * An exhaustive switch with NO `default`, like {@link verifiesCaller} and\n     * `DestinationTrust.forAuthMode`: a new AuthMode kind must fail to compile here rather than\n     * silently landing on `gui` (which would publish 266 to a partner) or on `public-api` (which would\n     * publish a real 4xx to a GUI).\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure mapping from the AuthMode union, kept beside its only caller (mirrors verifiesCaller)\n    private static surfaceFor(mode: AuthMode): Surface | undefined {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'jwt':\n                return 'gui';\n            case 'apikey':\n                return 'public-api';\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n            case 'webhook':\n            case 'local-only':\n            case 'public':\n                return undefined;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthWebhook(name)`: hand the app's {@link WebhookAuthCallback} the verbatim request and let it call the\n     * VENDOR's own validator. Three ways to fail, all 401, all before the controller is entered:\n     *\n     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior;\n     *    an unverified webhook must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n     * 2. NO raw request — the transport kept no bytes. `assertEveryWebhookEndpointRetainsRawBody`\n     *    normally makes this a startup error, so reaching it means either a hand-registered route or\n     *    an in-process caller (a spec) that published an HttpRequest with no {@link RawRequest}. The\n     *    message says which fix applies rather than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 3. The hook threw — the signature did not verify.\n     *\n     * Case 2 is checked HERE and nowhere else. {@link hasRawBytes} narrows the request to\n     * {@link RawHttpRequest} at this one gate, so the hook's signature promises `raw` is present and\n     * no vendor implementation ever writes `raw!` or a guard of its own.\n     */\n    private async enforceWebhook(name: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        if (!this.webhookAuthCallback) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no WebhookAuthCallback is bound. ` +\n                    `Bind one (options.bind(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK).to(YourWebhookAuthCallback)) to enable webhook verification.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Webhook auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!this.hasRawBytes(request)) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: the inbound request carries ` +\n                    `no raw bytes. Declare @Endpoint(path, 'external', { calledBy: '${name}', rawBody: true }); a ` +\n                    `spec driving this route in-process must publish an HttpRequest built with a RawRequest.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'Webhook signature cannot be verified: no raw request was retained',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. On success the vendor account the signature proved is\n        // stamped through the SAME path a jwt or api-key caller takes.\n        const caller = await this.webhookAuthCallback.verifyWebhook(name, request);\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The ONE place the framework decides a request carries the verbatim bytes. A TYPE PREDICATE, so\n     * the `true` branch hands {@link enforceWebhook} a {@link RawHttpRequest} with no cast and no\n     * non-null assertion — the bad state stops being representable past this line rather than being\n     * re-thrown about by every hook.\n     */\n    private hasRawBytes(request: HttpRequest | undefined): request is RawHttpRequest {\n        return request?.raw !== undefined;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthApiKey(regime, credentials)`: hand the app's {@link ApiKeyHook} the regime name and the inbound\n     * headers and let it look the CUSTOMER's key up. The declared `credentials` are NOT read here — they\n     * describe the contract for generators; the hook owns extraction. Three ways to fail, all 401, all\n     * before the controller:\n     *\n     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior; an\n     *    unverified partner request must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n     * 2. NO inbound request in scope — there are no headers to read, so there is nothing to verify. That\n     *    means a caller drove this route without publishing an HttpRequest; the message says so rather\n     *    than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 3. The hook threw — the key, or the key/organization pair, did not check out.\n     *\n     * On success the hook's {@link AuthenticatedCaller} is stamped exactly as a jwt parse's is, which is\n     * what puts the resolved organization into `RequestContext` for every downstream repository call.\n     */\n    private async enforceApiKey(regime: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        if (!this.apiKeyHook) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthApiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no ApiKeyHook is bound. ` +\n                    `Bind one (options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(YourApiKeyHook)) to enable api-key verification.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('API-key auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!request) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthApiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no inbound HttpRequest is ` +\n                    `in scope, so the hook has no headers to read. A spec driving this route in-process must ` +\n                    `publish an HttpRequest carrying the api-key headers.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'API key cannot be verified: no inbound request was published',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. The hook gets the WHOLE request so it can cross-check\n        // the key against a second header (the organization the customer is acting for).\n        const caller = await this.apiKeyHook.verifyApiKey(regime, request);\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * A body that failed to parse is held on the {@link RawRequest} and surfaces HERE, after auth, as\n     * the 400 it always was — never before it.\n     *\n     * The order is the whole point. A malformed body from an unauthenticated caller must answer 401,\n     * because \"your JSON was bad\" also says \"I got past auth\", and on a webhook endpoint — whose url\n     * is public by construction — that is a free oracle for anyone probing. Parsing first made the\n     * framework hand that out for nothing.\n     *\n     * Only routes that retain raw bytes can defer at all; every other route still fails at parse time\n     * in the transport, exactly as before.\n     */\n    private rethrowDeferredBodyError(): void {\n        const parseError = RequestContext.getRequest()?.raw?.bodyParseError;\n        if (parseError) {\n            throw new ApiBadRequestError(\n                'Request body is not valid JSON',\n                undefined,\n                undefined,\n                parseError,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Does this mode authenticate the CALLER ITSELF (as opposed to a user, or nobody)? The INBOUND\n     * twin of {@link DestinationTrust.forAuthMode}, and deliberately the same question: the client\n     * omits trusted keys for a destination that cannot verify it, and the server rejects trusted keys\n     * on a route that cannot verify the sender. One rule, two ends — if they disagreed, every call\n     * would fail with a 401 that looks like a framework bug.\n     *\n     * - `oidc` / `shared-secret` → TRUE. An internal service is on the other end and the trusted\n     *   context it forwarded may be believed. This is what makes cross-service identity propagation\n     *   work.\n     * - `jwt` / `public` → FALSE. A user JWT proves who the USER is; the SENDER is still whoever\n     *   holds the token, i.e. a browser.\n     * - `local-only` → FALSE. It verifies WHERE WE ARE RUNNING, not who is calling — anything on\n     *   localhost reaches it, and it has no authenticator, so nothing can ever vouch for an inbound\n     *   trusted header. Any such header therefore rejects the request, which is exactly right.\n     *\n     * - `apikey` → FALSE. See the comment on that branch: the sender is a CUSTOMER.\n     *\n     * An exhaustive switch with NO `default`, returning on every branch: a new AuthMode kind is a\n     * COMPILE error here (TS7030, no ending return) rather than silently landing on one posture. The\n     * boolean expression this replaced defaulted every future mode to \"not verified\" — the safe\n     * answer, but arrived at by accident rather than by decision.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure mapping from the AuthMode union, kept beside its only caller (mirrors DestinationTrust.forAuthMode)\n    private static verifiesCaller(mode: AuthMode): boolean {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                return true;\n            case 'jwt':\n            case 'public':\n            // `webhook` DOES authenticate its sender — but the sender is an outside VENDOR, not a\n            // peer in this repo, and a vendor neither speaks nor forwards webpieces context headers.\n            // So there is no forwarded identity to believe, and admitting one would mean trusting a\n            // key a vendor's payload could carry. Same answer as the OUTBOUND half\n            // (DestinationTrust.forAuthMode), which is the invariant that keeps the two ends agreeing.\n            case 'webhook':\n            // `apikey` authenticates the SENDER — but the sender is a CUSTOMER's codebase, not a peer\n            // service in this repo, so its forwarded trusted context is exactly what must NOT be\n            // believed: admitting it would let a partner assert another customer's org id on the wire.\n            // The hook's OWN derived entries still land (applyAuthenticatedCaller), and reconcileWireTrust then\n            // admits an inbound trusted header only when the hook independently derived the same value.\n            case 'apikey':\n            case 'local-only':\n                return false;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Decide what happens to the trusted keys that arrived on the WIRE and were held back by\n     * {@link PendingWireTrust} (read that class for why they are held rather than written).\n     *\n     * `callerVerified` — the endpoint authenticated the SENDER **as a peer service** (`@WpAuthOidc`,\n     * `@WpAuthSharedSecret`).\n     * The sender is a service we trust, this is the service-to-service hop, and its forwarded\n     * identity is admitted as-is. This is the case that makes propagating a verified userId across\n     * internal services work.\n     *\n     * Otherwise the sender is a browser or anyone else with curl, and the ONLY acceptable inbound\n     * trusted value is one the authenticator independently derived to the same value. Everything\n     * else is rejected — see {@link requireVouched}.\n     *\n     * Runs AFTER the mode enforcement above, because that is what stamps the authenticator's own\n     * values (`applyAuthenticatedCaller`); comparing before it ran would compare against nothing.\n     */\n    private reconcileWireTrust(callerVerified: boolean): void {\n        const pending = PendingWireTrust.takeAll();\n        for (const item of pending) {\n            if (callerVerified) {\n                RequestContext.putTrusted(item.key, item.value);\n            } else {\n                this.requireVouched(item);\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * On a browser-reachable route, an inbound trusted header must match what the authenticator\n     * itself derived, or the request dies. Both failure shapes are rejections, not repairs:\n     *\n     * - DIFFERENT value — the caller said `alice`, the credential says `bob`. Silently letting the\n     *   credential win is not safe, because upstream rate limiters commonly bucket on the header\n     *   rather than the token: the request was already counted against the wrong principal, so\n     *   every forged header would be a free rate-limit bypass. No honest caller contradicts its own\n     *   credential.\n     * - NOTHING vouched for it — nobody derived this key at all, so there is no evidence behind a\n     *   value a stranger typed. This is the common case, not the exotic one: the framework's\n     *   {@link DefaultJwtHook} stamps NO entries, and an app hook (jwt or api-key) only stamps the keys it can prove,\n     *   so any other trusted key a caller sends lands here.\n     *\n     * The pending value is discarded either way — the throw is what leaves the request.\n     */\n    private requireVouched(item: PendingTrustedValue): void {\n        const vouched = RequestContext.getTrusted(item.key);\n        if (vouched === item.value) {\n            return;\n        }\n        log.error(\n            `Rejecting inbound '${item.key.httpHeader}': it is a TRUSTED context key, this route does ` +\n                `not authenticate its caller, and the credential ` +\n                (vouched === undefined\n                    ? 'vouched for no such value'\n                    : 'derived a different value') +\n                '.',\n        );\n        throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n            `Header '${item.key.httpHeader}' cannot be supplied by the caller on this endpoint`,\n        );\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthLocalOnly`: serve only on a developer's machine, and off-local behave EXACTLY as if the\n     * endpoint did not exist.\n     *\n     * WHY 404 AND NOT THE 403 APPS HAND-ROLLED. Off-local the route is not registered at all\n     * (`ApiRoutingFactory` skips it), so the ordinary way to reach this path already answers 404. A\n     * 403 from here would be a DIFFERENT answer from the same framework for the same endpoint, and\n     * the difference is itself the leak: 403 confirms \"this path exists in production, you merely\n     * lack permission\", which is a map of the dev-only surface for anyone probing. A local-only\n     * endpoint should not admit it exists. Both gates therefore return the same 404, and this one is\n     * the backstop for routes registered by hand through `RouteBuilder` rather than by\n     * `ApiRoutingFactory`.\n     *\n     * The log line names WHICH reason applies, because \"you are deployed\" and \"nobody declared a\n     * locality\" have completely different fixes and both look like a bare 404 from outside.\n     */\n    private enforceLocalOnly(meta: MethodMeta): void {\n        if (RuntimeLocality.isLocalDevelopment()) {\n            return;\n        }\n        log.warn(\n            `Refusing @WpAuthLocalOnly endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: ` +\n                (RuntimeLocality.isDeclared()\n                    ? 'this process declared itself DEPLOYED.'\n                    : 'no startup declared a RuntimeLocality, so this process is treated as DEPLOYED. ' +\n                      'Pass the locality into RuntimeSetupOptions if this really is a developer machine.'),\n        );\n        // Same shape as an unregistered route — see the method doc for why this is not a 403.\n        throw new ApiEndpointNotFoundError(`No endpoint at ${meta.routeMeta.path}`);\n    }\n\n    private async enforceJwt(\n        header: string | undefined,\n        requirement: JwtRequirement,\n    ): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Authentication required');\n        }\n        if (!this.jwtHook) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('User-JWT auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const caller = await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token); // AUTHENTICATE — throws ApiUnauthorizedError if invalid\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n        await this.jwtHook.authorizeJwt(caller, requirement); // AUTHORIZE — app policy; throws ApiForbiddenError to deny\n    }\n\n    private async enforceOidc(header: string | undefined, callers: string[]): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Missing OIDC bearer token for @WpAuthOidc endpoint');\n        }\n        // App-bound OidcHook overrides the caller policy; otherwise the framework default runs directly.\n        if (this.oidcHook) {\n            await this.oidcHook.verifyOidc(token, callers);\n        } else {\n            await this.oidcVerifier.verify(token, callers);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** `provided` is the Authorization bearer value — the secret itself, same header as a JWT. */\n    private enforceSharedSecret(provided: string | undefined, secretKey: string): void {\n        const accepted = this.authConfig?.sharedSecrets[secretKey];\n        if (!accepted || !provided || !this.matchesEither(provided, accepted)) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'Invalid shared secret for @WpAuthSharedSecret endpoint',\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** EITHER secret1 or secret2 passes — the rotation window. Constant-time on each non-empty slot. */\n    private matchesEither(provided: string, accepted: SharedSecrets): boolean {\n        return (\n            (accepted.secret1 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret1)) ||\n            (accepted.secret2 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret2))\n        );\n    }\n\n    /** Parse a JWT if one is present, else do nothing — used on public routes; never throws. */\n    private async bestEffortJwt(header: string | undefined): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!this.jwtHook || !token) {\n            return;\n        }\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- best-effort on a public route: a bad/absent token just means \"not logged in\", must not fail the request\n        try {\n            this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token));\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            log.debug(\n                'Best-effort JWT parse on a public endpoint failed (treating as anonymous): ',\n                error,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Stamp the authenticated caller's context entries + the caller itself into the RequestContext.\n     * ONE path for all three authenticating hooks — jwt, api-key and webhook — so a vendor hook that\n     * proved which account a payload belongs to seeds context exactly as a JwtHook does.\n     */\n    private applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller: AuthenticatedCaller): void {\n        for (const entry of caller.entries) {\n            // ContextTuple.key is a TRUSTED key by type, so this is the one sanctioned write of a\n            // proven identity: the app's hook derived it from a credential we just verified.\n            RequestContext.putTrusted(entry.key, entry.value);\n        }\n        // A real TRUSTED ContextKey, not a raw string slot: the caller IS the framework's own proof,\n        // so it is written with the same typed verb every other proven value goes through.\n        RequestContext.putTrusted(AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY, caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The credential value IF the header carries the expected scheme, else undefined.\n     *\n     * Strict: a bare value with no scheme, or a value under the WRONG scheme (a shared secret sent\n     * where a JWT is expected), yields undefined and the caller 401s.\n     */\n    private credential(header: string | undefined, scheme: string): string | undefined {\n        if (!header) {\n            return undefined;\n        }\n        const prefix = `${scheme} `;\n        return header.startsWith(prefix) ? header.substring(prefix.length) : undefined;\n    }\n\n    private constantTimeEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n        const bufA = Buffer.from(a, 'utf8');\n        const bufB = Buffer.from(b, 'utf8');\n        if (bufA.length !== bufB.length) {\n            return false;\n        }\n        return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);\n    }\n}\n"]}
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{ inject, optional } from 'inversify';\nimport { timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';\nimport {\n    provideFrameworkSingleton,\n    HttpRequest,\n    PendingWireTrust,\n    PendingTrustedValue,\n    RawHttpRequest,\n    RequestContext,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport {\n    AuthMode,\n    ApiEndpointNotFoundError,\n    ApiBadRequestError,\n    ApiUnauthorizedError,\n    JwtRequirement,\n    LogManager,\n    RuntimeLocality,\n    Surface,\n    toError,\n    WebpiecesCoreHeaders,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { Filter, Service } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { WpResponse } from '../WpResponse';\nimport { MethodMeta } from '../MethodMeta';\nimport {\n    AuthConfig,\n    AUTH_CONFIG,\n    AuthenticatedCaller,\n    AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY,\n    SharedSecrets,\n} from '../AuthConfig';\nimport {\n    ApiKeyHook,\n    API_KEY_HOOK,\n    JwtHook,\n    JWT_HOOK,\n    OidcHook,\n    OIDC_HOOK,\n    WebhookAuthCallback,\n    WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK,\n} from '../AuthHooks';\nimport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from '../DefaultOidcVerifier';\n\nconst log = LogManager.getLogger('AuthFilter');\n\n/**\n * The ONE credential header, read straight off the inbound HttpRequest.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a ContextKey: a ContextKey with an httpHeader is a TRANSFERRED key, which would\n * put the caller's credential into RequestContext and hence onto every outbound call this service\n * makes, and onto every Cloud Task it enqueues. A credential belongs to ONE request hop.\n */\nconst AUTHORIZATION_HEADER = 'authorization';\n\n/**\n * The scheme (first word of the Authorization value) names WHICH credential follows, so a secret\n * can never be mistaken for a token, nor accepted where the other was expected:\n *\n *   Authorization: Bearer <user JWT | service OIDC token>\n *   Authorization: Webpieces <@WpAuthSharedSecret value>\n *\n * The scheme is REQUIRED. A bare value with no scheme is rejected.\n */\nconst BEARER_SCHEME = 'Bearer';\nconst SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME = 'Webpieces';\n\n/**\n * AuthFilter - the ONE framework auth filter, auto-installed just below the error filter on every\n * route. It is TRANSPORT-NEUTRAL: it reads the raw credential from the {@link HttpRequest} in\n * RequestContext (never express), so the SAME check runs over HTTP and via createApiClient.\n *\n * It enforces the endpoint's AuthMode from separately-bound pieces, each OPTIONAL except the OIDC\n * default:\n *  - shared-secret → constant-time compare vs the {@link AuthConfig} secret VALUE (state). No\n *                    AuthConfig bound → no accepted secret → fail fast (401).\n *  - jwt           → the bound {@link JwtHook} (`parseJwt` + `authorizeJwt`, both awaited — an app's\n *                    strategy may reach a JWKS or a datastore). No JwtHook bound → \"not enabled\"\n *                    (401): JWT needs an app secret + payload shape.\n *  - oidc          → the bound {@link OidcHook} if any, else the framework {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}\n *                    run DIRECTLY — so a server that wires NOTHING still verifies Google OIDC.\n *  - webhook       → the bound {@link WebhookAuthCallback} verifies the VENDOR's signature over the retained\n *                    raw request. No WebhookAuthCallback bound → 401, like jwt: an unverified webhook is\n *                    never waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n *  - apikey        → the bound {@link ApiKeyHook} looks the CUSTOMER's key up (async, over the whole\n *                    header set) and returns the context to seed. No ApiKeyHook bound → 401, like jwt.\n *  - public        → BEST-EFFORT jwt parse (only if a JwtHook is bound): stamp the user's context so\n *                    a logged-out page still knows who is logged in; never fails.\n *  - local-only    → serve only when {@link RuntimeLocality} says this process is a developer's\n *                    machine; otherwise 404, indistinguishable from the route not existing (which,\n *                    off-local, it does not — `ApiRoutingFactory` never registered it).\n *\n * Zero wiring = OIDC just works; an app only binds the hooks it actually uses.\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\n// webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\nexport class AuthFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n    constructor(\n        // Framework default, always available — verifies Google OIDC with zero app wiring.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- AuthFilter is DI-resolved via the esbuild/vitest path, which elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so every param needs its explicit token\n        @inject(DefaultOidcVerifier) private readonly oidcVerifier: DefaultOidcVerifier,\n        // @optional: only bind an AuthConfig to enable @WpAuthSharedSecret endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(AUTH_CONFIG) private readonly authConfig?: AuthConfig,\n        // @optional: only bind a JwtHook to enable @WpAuthJwt endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(JWT_HOOK) private readonly jwtHook?: JwtHook<never>,\n        // @optional: only bind an OidcHook to OVERRIDE the DefaultOidcVerifier caller policy.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(OIDC_HOOK) private readonly oidcHook?: OidcHook,\n        // @optional: only bind a WebhookAuthCallback to enable @WpAuthWebhook endpoints. Unbound = every such\n        // endpoint 401s, which is the ONE default that must not be the other way round.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional()\n        @inject(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK)\n        private readonly webhookAuthCallback?: WebhookAuthCallback,\n        // @optional: only bind an ApiKeyHook to enable @WpAuthApiKey endpoints. Unbound = every such\n        // endpoint 401s, for the same reason as the webhook hook above.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(API_KEY_HOOK) private readonly apiKeyHook?: ApiKeyHook,\n    ) {\n        super();\n    }\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\n    override async filter(\n        meta: MethodMeta,\n        nextFilter: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>,\n    ): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        const mode = meta.routeMeta.authMeta?.mode;\n        const authHeader = RequestContext.getRequest()?.getHeader(AUTHORIZATION_HEADER);\n\n        if (!mode || mode.kind === 'public') {\n            // Public: best-effort parse so a logged-out page can still know the logged-in user.\n            await this.bestEffortJwt(authHeader);\n            this.reconcileWireTrust(/*callerVerified*/ false);\n            this.rethrowDeferredBodyError();\n            return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n        }\n\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'jwt':\n                await this.enforceJwt(authHeader, mode.requirement);\n                break;\n            case 'oidc':\n                await this.enforceOidc(authHeader, mode.callers);\n                break;\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                this.enforceSharedSecret(\n                    this.credential(authHeader, SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME),\n                    mode.secretKey,\n                );\n                break;\n            case 'webhook':\n                await this.enforceWebhook(mode.name, meta);\n                break;\n            case 'apikey':\n                await this.enforceApiKey(mode.regime, meta);\n                break;\n            case 'local-only':\n                this.enforceLocalOnly(meta);\n                break;\n        }\n        this.applySurface(mode);\n        this.reconcileWireTrust(AuthFilter.verifiesCaller(mode));\n        this.rethrowDeferredBodyError();\n        return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Stamp WHICH KIND OF CALLER this is, from the auth mode that matched — `@WpAuthJwt` is a browser\n     * GUI, `@WpAuthApiKey` is an external partner. See {@link Surface}.\n     *\n     * SET AT THE EDGE ONLY. The surface belongs to the ORIGINAL caller, so a hop that already has one\n     * INHERITS it unchanged and this returns immediately. Two different callers put a value there\n     * before this runs, and neither may be overwritten:\n     *\n     * - the MCP bridge, which stamps `llm` before invoking a `@WpMcpAuthJwt` tool through `ApiFactory`\n     *   — that in-process hop still runs this filter, and its HTTP auth mode says nothing about the\n     *   model on the other end;\n     * - a `@WpAuthOidc` service-to-service hop, whose caller's surface arrived on the wire. OIDC is an\n     *   internal hop, NOT a surface of its own, so it deliberately maps to `undefined` below and the\n     *   propagated value survives.\n     *\n     * Running BEFORE {@link reconcileWireTrust} is what makes the trusted-header rule work for this\n     * key: on a `@WpAuthJwt` edge a caller who also SENDS `x-wp-surface` must match the value the\n     * framework just derived, and on a public route nothing vouches for it at all, so it is a 401.\n     */\n    private applySurface(mode: AuthMode): void {\n        if (RequestContext.getTrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.SURFACE) !== undefined) {\n            return;\n        }\n        const surface = AuthFilter.surfaceFor(mode);\n        if (surface !== undefined) {\n            RequestContext.putTrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.SURFACE, surface);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The auth mode -> {@link Surface} table, and the ONE place it is written down.\n     *\n     * `undefined` means \"this mode is not a surface\", which is a different statement from \"unknown\":\n     * `oidc` and `shared-secret` are internal hops that RELAY somebody else's surface, `webhook`'s\n     * sender is a vendor with no webpieces surface at all, and `local-only` is a developer's own box.\n     *\n     * An exhaustive switch with NO `default`, like {@link verifiesCaller} and\n     * `DestinationTrust.forAuthMode`: a new AuthMode kind must fail to compile here rather than\n     * silently landing on `gui` (which would publish 266 to a partner) or on `public-api` (which would\n     * publish a real 4xx to a GUI).\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure mapping from the AuthMode union, kept beside its only caller (mirrors verifiesCaller)\n    private static surfaceFor(mode: AuthMode): Surface | undefined {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'jwt':\n                return 'gui';\n            case 'apikey':\n                return 'public-api';\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n            case 'webhook':\n            case 'local-only':\n            case 'public':\n                return undefined;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthWebhook(name)`: hand the app's {@link WebhookAuthCallback} the verbatim request and let it call the\n     * VENDOR's own validator. Three ways to fail, all 401, all before the controller is entered:\n     *\n     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior;\n     *    an unverified webhook must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n     * 2. NO raw request — the transport kept no bytes. `assertEveryWebhookEndpointRetainsRawBody`\n     *    normally makes this a startup error, so reaching it means either a hand-registered route or\n     *    an in-process caller (a spec) that published an HttpRequest with no {@link RawRequest}. The\n     *    message says which fix applies rather than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 3. The hook threw — the signature did not verify.\n     *\n     * Case 2 is checked HERE and nowhere else. {@link hasRawBytes} narrows the request to\n     * {@link RawHttpRequest} at this one gate, so the hook's signature promises `raw` is present and\n     * no vendor implementation ever writes `raw!` or a guard of its own.\n     */\n    private async enforceWebhook(name: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        if (!this.webhookAuthCallback) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no WebhookAuthCallback is bound. ` +\n                    `Bind one (options.bind(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK).to(YourWebhookAuthCallback)) to enable webhook verification.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Webhook auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!this.hasRawBytes(request)) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: the inbound request carries ` +\n                    `no raw bytes. Declare @Endpoint(POST, path, WRITE, EXTERNAL, { calledBy: '${name}', rawBody: true }); a ` +\n                    `spec driving this route in-process must publish an HttpRequest built with a RawRequest.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'Webhook signature cannot be verified: no raw request was retained',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. On success the vendor account the signature proved is\n        // stamped through the SAME path a jwt or api-key caller takes.\n        const caller = await this.webhookAuthCallback.verifyWebhook(name, request);\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The ONE place the framework decides a request carries the verbatim bytes. A TYPE PREDICATE, so\n     * the `true` branch hands {@link enforceWebhook} a {@link RawHttpRequest} with no cast and no\n     * non-null assertion — the bad state stops being representable past this line rather than being\n     * re-thrown about by every hook.\n     */\n    private hasRawBytes(request: HttpRequest | undefined): request is RawHttpRequest {\n        return request?.raw !== undefined;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthApiKey(regime, credentials)`: hand the app's {@link ApiKeyHook} the regime name and the inbound\n     * headers and let it look the CUSTOMER's key up. The declared `credentials` are NOT read here — they\n     * describe the contract for generators; the hook owns extraction. Three ways to fail, all 401, all\n     * before the controller:\n     *\n     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior; an\n     *    unverified partner request must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n     * 2. NO inbound request in scope — there are no headers to read, so there is nothing to verify. That\n     *    means a caller drove this route without publishing an HttpRequest; the message says so rather\n     *    than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 3. The hook threw — the key, or the key/organization pair, did not check out.\n     *\n     * On success the hook's {@link AuthenticatedCaller} is stamped exactly as a jwt parse's is, which is\n     * what puts the resolved organization into `RequestContext` for every downstream repository call.\n     */\n    private async enforceApiKey(regime: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        if (!this.apiKeyHook) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthApiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no ApiKeyHook is bound. ` +\n                    `Bind one (options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(YourApiKeyHook)) to enable api-key verification.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('API-key auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!request) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthApiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no inbound HttpRequest is ` +\n                    `in scope, so the hook has no headers to read. A spec driving this route in-process must ` +\n                    `publish an HttpRequest carrying the api-key headers.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'API key cannot be verified: no inbound request was published',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. The hook gets the WHOLE request so it can cross-check\n        // the key against a second header (the organization the customer is acting for).\n        const caller = await this.apiKeyHook.verifyApiKey(regime, request);\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * A body that failed to parse is held on the {@link RawRequest} and surfaces HERE, after auth, as\n     * the 400 it always was — never before it.\n     *\n     * The order is the whole point. A malformed body from an unauthenticated caller must answer 401,\n     * because \"your JSON was bad\" also says \"I got past auth\", and on a webhook endpoint — whose url\n     * is public by construction — that is a free oracle for anyone probing. Parsing first made the\n     * framework hand that out for nothing.\n     *\n     * Only routes that retain raw bytes can defer at all; every other route still fails at parse time\n     * in the transport, exactly as before.\n     */\n    private rethrowDeferredBodyError(): void {\n        const parseError = RequestContext.getRequest()?.raw?.bodyParseError;\n        if (parseError) {\n            throw new ApiBadRequestError(\n                'Request body is not valid JSON',\n                undefined,\n                undefined,\n                parseError,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Does this mode authenticate the CALLER ITSELF (as opposed to a user, or nobody)? The INBOUND\n     * twin of {@link DestinationTrust.forAuthMode}, and deliberately the same question: the client\n     * omits trusted keys for a destination that cannot verify it, and the server rejects trusted keys\n     * on a route that cannot verify the sender. One rule, two ends — if they disagreed, every call\n     * would fail with a 401 that looks like a framework bug.\n     *\n     * - `oidc` / `shared-secret` → TRUE. An internal service is on the other end and the trusted\n     *   context it forwarded may be believed. This is what makes cross-service identity propagation\n     *   work.\n     * - `jwt` / `public` → FALSE. A user JWT proves who the USER is; the SENDER is still whoever\n     *   holds the token, i.e. a browser.\n     * - `local-only` → FALSE. It verifies WHERE WE ARE RUNNING, not who is calling — anything on\n     *   localhost reaches it, and it has no authenticator, so nothing can ever vouch for an inbound\n     *   trusted header. Any such header therefore rejects the request, which is exactly right.\n     *\n     * - `apikey` → FALSE. See the comment on that branch: the sender is a CUSTOMER.\n     *\n     * An exhaustive switch with NO `default`, returning on every branch: a new AuthMode kind is a\n     * COMPILE error here (TS7030, no ending return) rather than silently landing on one posture. The\n     * boolean expression this replaced defaulted every future mode to \"not verified\" — the safe\n     * answer, but arrived at by accident rather than by decision.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure mapping from the AuthMode union, kept beside its only caller (mirrors DestinationTrust.forAuthMode)\n    private static verifiesCaller(mode: AuthMode): boolean {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                return true;\n            case 'jwt':\n            case 'public':\n            // `webhook` DOES authenticate its sender — but the sender is an outside VENDOR, not a\n            // peer in this repo, and a vendor neither speaks nor forwards webpieces context headers.\n            // So there is no forwarded identity to believe, and admitting one would mean trusting a\n            // key a vendor's payload could carry. Same answer as the OUTBOUND half\n            // (DestinationTrust.forAuthMode), which is the invariant that keeps the two ends agreeing.\n            case 'webhook':\n            // `apikey` authenticates the SENDER — but the sender is a CUSTOMER's codebase, not a peer\n            // service in this repo, so its forwarded trusted context is exactly what must NOT be\n            // believed: admitting it would let a partner assert another customer's org id on the wire.\n            // The hook's OWN derived entries still land (applyAuthenticatedCaller), and reconcileWireTrust then\n            // admits an inbound trusted header only when the hook independently derived the same value.\n            case 'apikey':\n            case 'local-only':\n                return false;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Decide what happens to the trusted keys that arrived on the WIRE and were held back by\n     * {@link PendingWireTrust} (read that class for why they are held rather than written).\n     *\n     * `callerVerified` — the endpoint authenticated the SENDER **as a peer service** (`@WpAuthOidc`,\n     * `@WpAuthSharedSecret`).\n     * The sender is a service we trust, this is the service-to-service hop, and its forwarded\n     * identity is admitted as-is. This is the case that makes propagating a verified userId across\n     * internal services work.\n     *\n     * Otherwise the sender is a browser or anyone else with curl, and the ONLY acceptable inbound\n     * trusted value is one the authenticator independently derived to the same value. Everything\n     * else is rejected — see {@link requireVouched}.\n     *\n     * Runs AFTER the mode enforcement above, because that is what stamps the authenticator's own\n     * values (`applyAuthenticatedCaller`); comparing before it ran would compare against nothing.\n     */\n    private reconcileWireTrust(callerVerified: boolean): void {\n        const pending = PendingWireTrust.takeAll();\n        for (const item of pending) {\n            if (callerVerified) {\n                RequestContext.putTrusted(item.key, item.value);\n            } else {\n                this.requireVouched(item);\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * On a browser-reachable route, an inbound trusted header must match what the authenticator\n     * itself derived, or the request dies. Both failure shapes are rejections, not repairs:\n     *\n     * - DIFFERENT value — the caller said `alice`, the credential says `bob`. Silently letting the\n     *   credential win is not safe, because upstream rate limiters commonly bucket on the header\n     *   rather than the token: the request was already counted against the wrong principal, so\n     *   every forged header would be a free rate-limit bypass. No honest caller contradicts its own\n     *   credential.\n     * - NOTHING vouched for it — nobody derived this key at all, so there is no evidence behind a\n     *   value a stranger typed. This is the common case, not the exotic one: the framework's\n     *   {@link DefaultJwtHook} stamps NO entries, and an app hook (jwt or api-key) only stamps the keys it can prove,\n     *   so any other trusted key a caller sends lands here.\n     *\n     * The pending value is discarded either way — the throw is what leaves the request.\n     */\n    private requireVouched(item: PendingTrustedValue): void {\n        const vouched = RequestContext.getTrusted(item.key);\n        if (vouched === item.value) {\n            return;\n        }\n        log.error(\n            `Rejecting inbound '${item.key.httpHeader}': it is a TRUSTED context key, this route does ` +\n                `not authenticate its caller, and the credential ` +\n                (vouched === undefined\n                    ? 'vouched for no such value'\n                    : 'derived a different value') +\n                '.',\n        );\n        throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n            `Header '${item.key.httpHeader}' cannot be supplied by the caller on this endpoint`,\n        );\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthLocalOnly`: serve only on a developer's machine, and off-local behave EXACTLY as if the\n     * endpoint did not exist.\n     *\n     * WHY 404 AND NOT THE 403 APPS HAND-ROLLED. Off-local the route is not registered at all\n     * (`ApiRoutingFactory` skips it), so the ordinary way to reach this path already answers 404. A\n     * 403 from here would be a DIFFERENT answer from the same framework for the same endpoint, and\n     * the difference is itself the leak: 403 confirms \"this path exists in production, you merely\n     * lack permission\", which is a map of the dev-only surface for anyone probing. A local-only\n     * endpoint should not admit it exists. Both gates therefore return the same 404, and this one is\n     * the backstop for routes registered by hand through `RouteBuilder` rather than by\n     * `ApiRoutingFactory`.\n     *\n     * The log line names WHICH reason applies, because \"you are deployed\" and \"nobody declared a\n     * locality\" have completely different fixes and both look like a bare 404 from outside.\n     */\n    private enforceLocalOnly(meta: MethodMeta): void {\n        if (RuntimeLocality.isLocalDevelopment()) {\n            return;\n        }\n        log.warn(\n            `Refusing @WpAuthLocalOnly endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: ` +\n                (RuntimeLocality.isDeclared()\n                    ? 'this process declared itself DEPLOYED.'\n                    : 'no startup declared a RuntimeLocality, so this process is treated as DEPLOYED. ' +\n                      'Pass the locality into RuntimeSetupOptions if this really is a developer machine.'),\n        );\n        // Same shape as an unregistered route — see the method doc for why this is not a 403.\n        throw new ApiEndpointNotFoundError(`No endpoint at ${meta.routeMeta.path}`);\n    }\n\n    private async enforceJwt(\n        header: string | undefined,\n        requirement: JwtRequirement,\n    ): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Authentication required');\n        }\n        if (!this.jwtHook) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('User-JWT auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const caller = await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token); // AUTHENTICATE — throws ApiUnauthorizedError if invalid\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n        await this.jwtHook.authorizeJwt(caller, requirement); // AUTHORIZE — app policy; throws ApiForbiddenError to deny\n    }\n\n    private async enforceOidc(header: string | undefined, callers: string[]): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Missing OIDC bearer token for @WpAuthOidc endpoint');\n        }\n        // App-bound OidcHook overrides the caller policy; otherwise the framework default runs directly.\n        if (this.oidcHook) {\n            await this.oidcHook.verifyOidc(token, callers);\n        } else {\n            await this.oidcVerifier.verify(token, callers);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** `provided` is the Authorization bearer value — the secret itself, same header as a JWT. */\n    private enforceSharedSecret(provided: string | undefined, secretKey: string): void {\n        const accepted = this.authConfig?.sharedSecrets[secretKey];\n        if (!accepted || !provided || !this.matchesEither(provided, accepted)) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'Invalid shared secret for @WpAuthSharedSecret endpoint',\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** EITHER secret1 or secret2 passes — the rotation window. Constant-time on each non-empty slot. */\n    private matchesEither(provided: string, accepted: SharedSecrets): boolean {\n        return (\n            (accepted.secret1 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret1)) ||\n            (accepted.secret2 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret2))\n        );\n    }\n\n    /** Parse a JWT if one is present, else do nothing — used on public routes; never throws. */\n    private async bestEffortJwt(header: string | undefined): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!this.jwtHook || !token) {\n            return;\n        }\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- best-effort on a public route: a bad/absent token just means \"not logged in\", must not fail the request\n        try {\n            this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token));\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            log.debug(\n                'Best-effort JWT parse on a public endpoint failed (treating as anonymous): ',\n                error,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Stamp the authenticated caller's context entries + the caller itself into the RequestContext.\n     * ONE path for all three authenticating hooks — jwt, api-key and webhook — so a vendor hook that\n     * proved which account a payload belongs to seeds context exactly as a JwtHook does.\n     */\n    private applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller: AuthenticatedCaller): void {\n        for (const entry of caller.entries) {\n            // ContextTuple.key is a TRUSTED key by type, so this is the one sanctioned write of a\n            // proven identity: the app's hook derived it from a credential we just verified.\n            RequestContext.putTrusted(entry.key, entry.value);\n        }\n        // A real TRUSTED ContextKey, not a raw string slot: the caller IS the framework's own proof,\n        // so it is written with the same typed verb every other proven value goes through.\n        RequestContext.putTrusted(AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY, caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The credential value IF the header carries the expected scheme, else undefined.\n     *\n     * Strict: a bare value with no scheme, or a value under the WRONG scheme (a shared secret sent\n     * where a JWT is expected), yields undefined and the caller 401s.\n     */\n    private credential(header: string | undefined, scheme: string): string | undefined {\n        if (!header) {\n            return undefined;\n        }\n        const prefix = `${scheme} `;\n        return header.startsWith(prefix) ? header.substring(prefix.length) : undefined;\n    }\n\n    private constantTimeEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n        const bufA = Buffer.from(a, 'utf8');\n        const bufB = Buffer.from(b, 'utf8');\n        if (bufA.length !== bufB.length) {\n            return false;\n        }\n        return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/index.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-export { ApiPath, Endpoint, PathParam, QueryParam, WpAuthPublic, WpAuthJwt, rolesRequired, WpAuthOidc, WpAuthSharedSecret, WpAuthWebhook, WpAuthLocalOnly, Rpc, PubSub, Queue, getApiPath, getEndpoints, getEndpointOptions, getHttpParameterDeclarations, isFormPost, isRawBody, isApiPath, getAuthMeta, getAuthMode, assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode, getApiKind, assertApiKind, assertPubSubConventions, getQueueName, AuthMeta, RouteMetadata, RouteMetadataFactory, HttpContractMapper, METADATA_KEYS, ValidateImplementation, DocumentDesign, isDocumentDesign, } from '@webpieces/core-util';
-export type { AuthMode, ApiKind, EndpointOptions, ContractHttpMethod, EndpointResponseType, } from '@webpieces/core-util';
+export { ApiPath, Endpoint, PathParam, QueryParam, WpAuthPublic, WpAuthJwt, rolesRequired, WpAuthOidc, WpAuthSharedSecret, WpAuthWebhook, WpAuthLocalOnly, Rpc, PubSub, Queue, getApiPath, getEndpoints, getEndpointOptions, getEndpointHttpMethod, getEndpointOperation, getHttpParameterDeclarations, isFormPost, isRawBody, isApiPath, getAuthMeta, getAuthMode, assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode, getApiKind, assertApiKind, assertPubSubConventions, getQueueName, AuthMeta, RouteMetadata, RouteMetadataFactory, HttpContractMapper, METADATA_KEYS, ValidateImplementation, GET, POST, READ, WRITE_IDEMPOTENT, WRITE, RPC, CLOUDTASKS, CRON, EXTERNAL, DocumentDesign, isDocumentDesign, } from '@webpieces/core-util';
+export type { AuthMode, ApiKind, HttpMethod, EndpointOperation, EndpointKind, EndpointOptions, EndpointResponseType, } from '@webpieces/core-util';
 export { SourceFile, ROUTING_METADATA_KEYS } from './decorators';
 export { provideSingletonDefaultForApi } from '@webpieces/core-context';
 export { provideFrameworkSingleton, provideFrameworkSingletonDefaultForApi, buildFrameworkModule, } from '@webpieces/core-context';

package/src/index.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.LogApiFilter = exports.RouteHandler = exports.MethodMeta = exports.WpResponse = exports.RawRequest = exports.HttpRequest = exports.FilterDefinition = exports.RouteDefinition = exports.ApiRoutingFactory = exports.buildFrameworkModule = exports.provideFrameworkSingletonDefaultForApi = exports.provideFrameworkSingleton = exports.provideSingletonDefaultForApi = exports.ROUTING_METADATA_KEYS = exports.SourceFile = exports.isDocumentDesign = exports.DocumentDesign = exports.METADATA_KEYS = exports.HttpContractMapper = exports.RouteMetadataFactory = exports.RouteMetadata = exports.AuthMeta = exports.getQueueName = exports.assertPubSubConventions = exports.assertApiKind = exports.getApiKind = exports.assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode = exports.getAuthMode = exports.getAuthMeta = exports.isApiPath = exports.isRawBody = exports.isFormPost = exports.getHttpParameterDeclarations = exports.getEndpointOptions = exports.getEndpoints = exports.getApiPath = exports.Queue = exports.PubSub = exports.Rpc = exports.WpAuthLocalOnly = exports.WpAuthWebhook = exports.WpAuthSharedSecret = exports.WpAuthOidc = exports.rolesRequired = exports.WpAuthJwt = exports.WpAuthPublic = exports.QueryParam = exports.PathParam = exports.Endpoint = exports.ApiPath = void 0;
-exports.WEBPIECES_CONFIG_TOKEN = exports.WebpiecesConfig = exports.RuntimeSetupOptions = exports.setupRuntime = exports.WebpiecesRouterFactory = exports.WebpiecesRouter = exports.DefaultJwtMintRequest = exports.DefaultJwtHook = exports.DefaultOidcVerifier = exports.API_KEY_HOOK = exports.ApiKeyHook = exports.WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK = exports.WebhookAuthCallback = exports.OIDC_HOOK = exports.OidcHook = exports.JWT_HOOK = exports.MintedJwt = exports.JwtHook = exports.SharedSecrets = exports.AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY = exports.AuthenticatedCaller = exports.AUTH_CONFIG = exports.AuthConfig = exports.ApiClient = exports.FilterMatcher = void 0;
+exports.provideFrameworkSingleton = exports.provideSingletonDefaultForApi = exports.ROUTING_METADATA_KEYS = exports.SourceFile = exports.isDocumentDesign = exports.DocumentDesign = exports.EXTERNAL = exports.CRON = exports.CLOUDTASKS = exports.RPC = exports.WRITE = exports.WRITE_IDEMPOTENT = exports.READ = exports.POST = exports.GET = exports.METADATA_KEYS = exports.HttpContractMapper = exports.RouteMetadataFactory = exports.RouteMetadata = exports.AuthMeta = exports.getQueueName = exports.assertPubSubConventions = exports.assertApiKind = exports.getApiKind = exports.assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode = exports.getAuthMode = exports.getAuthMeta = exports.isApiPath = exports.isRawBody = exports.isFormPost = exports.getHttpParameterDeclarations = exports.getEndpointOperation = exports.getEndpointHttpMethod = exports.getEndpointOptions = exports.getEndpoints = exports.getApiPath = exports.Queue = exports.PubSub = exports.Rpc = exports.WpAuthLocalOnly = exports.WpAuthWebhook = exports.WpAuthSharedSecret = exports.WpAuthOidc = exports.rolesRequired = exports.WpAuthJwt = exports.WpAuthPublic = exports.QueryParam = exports.PathParam = exports.Endpoint = exports.ApiPath = void 0;
+exports.WEBPIECES_CONFIG_TOKEN = exports.WebpiecesConfig = exports.RuntimeSetupOptions = exports.setupRuntime = exports.WebpiecesRouterFactory = exports.WebpiecesRouter = exports.DefaultJwtMintRequest = exports.DefaultJwtHook = exports.DefaultOidcVerifier = exports.API_KEY_HOOK = exports.ApiKeyHook = exports.WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK = exports.WebhookAuthCallback = exports.OIDC_HOOK = exports.OidcHook = exports.JWT_HOOK = exports.MintedJwt = exports.JwtHook = exports.SharedSecrets = exports.AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY = exports.AuthenticatedCaller = exports.AUTH_CONFIG = exports.AuthConfig = exports.ApiClient = exports.FilterMatcher = exports.LogApiFilter = exports.RouteHandler = exports.MethodMeta = exports.WpResponse = exports.RawRequest = exports.HttpRequest = exports.FilterDefinition = exports.RouteDefinition = exports.ApiRoutingFactory = exports.buildFrameworkModule = exports.provideFrameworkSingletonDefaultForApi = void 0;
 // Re-export API decorators from core-util for convenience
 var core_util_1 = require("@webpieces/core-util");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "ApiPath", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.ApiPath; } });
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "Queue", { enumerable: true, get: function () { r
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "getApiPath", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.getApiPath; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "getEndpoints", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.getEndpoints; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "getEndpointOptions", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.getEndpointOptions; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "getEndpointHttpMethod", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.getEndpointHttpMethod; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "getEndpointOperation", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.getEndpointOperation; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "getHttpParameterDeclarations", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.getHttpParameterDeclarations; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "isFormPost", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.isFormPost; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "isRawBody", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.isRawBody; } });
@@ -37,6 +39,15 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "RouteMetadata", { enumerable: true, get: functio
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "RouteMetadataFactory", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.RouteMetadataFactory; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "HttpContractMapper", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.HttpContractMapper; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "METADATA_KEYS", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.METADATA_KEYS; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "GET", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.GET; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "POST", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.POST; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "READ", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.READ; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "WRITE_IDEMPOTENT", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.WRITE_IDEMPOTENT; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "WRITE", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.WRITE; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "RPC", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.RPC; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "CLOUDTASKS", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.CLOUDTASKS; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "CRON", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.CRON; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "EXTERNAL", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.EXTERNAL; } });
 // @DocumentDesign moved to core-util (design-root marker, browser + Node);
 // re-exported here for back-compat.
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "DocumentDesign", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_util_1.DocumentDesign; } });

package/src/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Import them from '@webpieces/core-util'.\nexport { WpResponse } from './WpResponse';\nexport { MethodMeta } from './MethodMeta';\nexport { RouteHandler } from './RouteHandler';\n\n// LogApiFilter: the fixed OUTERMOST framework filter (auto-installed at 1,000,000 above\n// AuthFilter). Exported for reference/testing only — apps must NOT install it themselves.\nexport { LogApiFilter } from './filters/LogApiFilter';\n\n// RouteBuilderImpl (the route table + chain composer) is now INTERNAL — it is never\n// handed to upper layers. The express layer consumes ApiFactory.apiClients() instead.\n\n// Filter matching\nexport { FilterMatcher, HttpFilter } from './FilterMatcher';\n\n// The app's server-surface declaration: DI binding modules + route groups + headers.\nexport { AppModules, RouteModule } from './AppModules';\n\n// The public API-surface abstraction: declare routes/filters, get them back as ApiClient[].\nexport { ApiFactory } from './ApiFactory';\nexport { ApiClient, ApiClientProxy } from './ApiClient';\n\n// Auth: the app-provided, container-bound pieces the framework AuthFilter injects.\n//  - AuthConfig: shared-secret STATE (@WpAuthSharedSecret values).\n//  - JwtHook / OidcHook / WebhookAuthCallback / ApiKeyHook: OPTIONAL verification mechanisms\n//    (bind only what you use; unbound means the matching endpoints 401, never open).\n//  - DefaultOidcVerifier: the built-in Google OIDC verifier used when no OidcHook is bound.\nexport {\n    AuthConfig,\n    AUTH_CONFIG,\n    AuthenticatedCaller,\n    AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY,\n    SharedSecrets,\n} from './AuthConfig';\nexport {\n    JwtHook,\n    MintedJwt,\n    JWT_HOOK,\n    OidcHook,\n    OIDC_HOOK,\n    WebhookAuthCallback,\n    WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK,\n    ApiKeyHook,\n    API_KEY_HOOK,\n} from './AuthHooks';\nexport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from './DefaultOidcVerifier';\n// DefaultJwtHook: batteries-included HS256 JwtHook — `new DefaultJwtHook(secret)` and go.\nexport { DefaultJwtHook, DefaultJwtMintRequest } from './DefaultJwtHook';\n\n// Above-boundary context setup shared by every transport adapter.\n\n// Node-only router (the express-free heart: container + filter chain + in-process client)\nexport { WebpiecesRouter, WebpiecesRouterFactory, WebpiecesRouterOptions } from './WebpiecesRouter';\n\n// The ONE transport-free startup sequence (headers → logging → router → routes) → ApiFactory.\n// Reusable by any company/app and any framework adapter; a company wraps it with its own headers.\nexport { setupRuntime, RuntimeSetupOptions } from './setupRuntime';\n\n// Server configuration\nexport { WebpiecesConfig, WEBPIECES_CONFIG_TOKEN } from './WebpiecesConfig';\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;AAAA,0DAA0D;AAC1D,kDAkD8B;AAjD1B,oGAAA,OAAO,OAAA;AACP,qGAAA,QAAQ,OAAA;AACR,sGAAA,SAAS,OAAA;AACT,uGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AACV,yGAAA,YAAY,OAAA;AACZ,sGAAA,SAAS,OAAA;AACT,0GAAA,aAAa,OAAA;AACb,uGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AACV,+GAAA,kBAAkB,OAAA;AAClB,0GAAA,aAAa,OAAA;AACb,4GAAA,eAAe,OAAA;AACf,gGAAA,GAAG,OAAA;AACH,mGAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AACN,kGAAA,KAAK,OAAA;AACL,uGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AACV,yGAAA,YAAY,OAAA;AACZ,+GAAA,kBAAkB,OAAA;AAClB,kHAAA,qBAAqB,OAAA;AACrB,iHAAA,oBAAoB,OAAA;AACpB,yHAAA,4BAA4B,OAAA;AAC5B,uGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AACV,sGAAA,SAAS,OAAA;AACT,sGAAA,SAAS,OAAA;AACT,wGAAA,WAAW,OAAA;AACX,wGAAA,WAAW,OAAA;AACX,2HAAA,8BAA8B,OAAA;AAC9B,uGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AACV,0GAAA,aAAa,OAAA;AACb,oHAAA,uBAAuB,OAAA;AACvB,yGAAA,YAAY,OAAA;AACZ,qGAAA,QAAQ,OAAA;AACR,0GAAA,aAAa,OAAA;AACb,iHAAA,oBAAoB,OAAA;AACpB,+GAAA,kBAAkB,OAAA;AAClB,0GAAA,aAAa,OAAA;AAEb,gGAAA,GAAG,OAAA;AACH,iGAAA,IAAI,OAAA;AACJ,iGAAA,IAAI,OAAA;AACJ,6GAAA,gBAAgB,OAAA;AAChB,kGAAA,KAAK,OAAA;AACL,gGAAA,GAAG,OAAA;AACH,uGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AACV,iGAAA,IAAI,OAAA;AACJ,qGAAA,QAAQ,OAAA;AACR,2EAA2E;AAC3E,oCAAoC;AACpC,2GAAA,cAAc,OAAA;AACd,6GAAA,gBAAgB,OAAA;AAYpB,+CAA+C;AAC/C,2CAAiE;AAAxD,wGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AAAE,mHAAA,qBAAqB,OAAA;AAE1C,iFAAiF;AACjF,wDAAwE;AAA/D,6HAAA,6BAA6B,OAAA;AACtC,gGAAgG;AAChG,wDAIiC;AAH7B,yHAAA,yBAAyB,OAAA;AACzB,sIAAA,sCAAsC,OAAA;AACtC,oHAAA,oBAAoB,OAAA;AAGxB,yDAAmE;AAA1D,sHAAA,iBAAiB,OAAA;AAE1B,qBAAqB;AACrB,2CAAuF;AAAxD,6GAAA,eAAe,OAAA;AAAE,8GAAA,gBAAgB,OAAA;AAEhE,sFAAsF;AACtF,+FAA+F;AAC/F,wDAAkF;AAAzE,2GAAA,WAAW,OAAA;AAAkB,0GAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AAEhD,+FAA+F;AAC/F,gGAAgG;AAChG,gFAAgF;AAChF,2CAA0C;AAAjC,wGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AACnB,2CAA0C;AAAjC,wGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AACnB,+CAA8C;AAArC,4GAAA,YAAY,OAAA;AAErB,wFAAwF;AACxF,0FAA0F;AAC1F,uDAAsD;AAA7C,4GAAA,YAAY,OAAA;AAErB,oFAAoF;AACpF,sFAAsF;AAEtF,kBAAkB;AAClB,iDAA4D;AAAnD,8GAAA,aAAa,OAAA;AAOtB,yCAAwD;AAA/C,sGAAA,SAAS,OAAA;AAElB,mFAAmF;AACnF,mEAAmE;AACnE,6FAA6F;AAC7F,qFAAqF;AACrF,4FAA4F;AAC5F,2CAMsB;AALlB,wGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AACV,yGAAA,WAAW,OAAA;AACX,iHAAA,mBAAmB,OAAA;AACnB,sHAAA,wBAAwB,OAAA;AACxB,2GAAA,aAAa,OAAA;AAEjB,yCAUqB;AATjB,oGAAA,OAAO,OAAA;AACP,sGAAA,SAAS,OAAA;AACT,qGAAA,QAAQ,OAAA;AACR,qGAAA,QAAQ,OAAA;AACR,sGAAA,SAAS,OAAA;AACT,gHAAA,mBAAmB,OAAA;AACnB,kHAAA,qBAAqB,OAAA;AACrB,uGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AACV,yGAAA,YAAY,OAAA;AAEhB,6DAA4D;AAAnD,0HAAA,mBAAmB,OAAA;AAC5B,0FAA0F;AAC1F,mDAAyE;AAAhE,gHAAA,cAAc,OAAA;AAAE,uHAAA,qBAAqB,OAAA;AAE9C,kEAAkE;AAElE,0FAA0F;AAC1F,qDAAoG;AAA3F,kHAAA,eAAe,OAAA;AAAE,yHAAA,sBAAsB,OAAA;AAEhD,8FAA8F;AAC9F,kGAAkG;AAClG,+CAAmE;AAA1D,4GAAA,YAAY,OAAA;AAAE,mHAAA,mBAAmB,OAAA;AAE1C,uBAAuB;AACvB,qDAA4E;AAAnE,kHAAA,eAAe,OAAA;AAAE,yHAAA,sBAAsB,OAAA","sourcesContent":["// Re-export API decorators from core-util for convenience\nexport {\n    ApiPath,\n    Endpoint,\n    PathParam,\n    QueryParam,\n    WpAuthPublic,\n    WpAuthJwt,\n    rolesRequired,\n    WpAuthOidc,\n    WpAuthSharedSecret,\n    WpAuthWebhook,\n    WpAuthLocalOnly,\n    Rpc,\n    PubSub,\n    Queue,\n    getApiPath,\n    getEndpoints,\n    getEndpointOptions,\n    getEndpointHttpMethod,\n    getEndpointOperation,\n    getHttpParameterDeclarations,\n    isFormPost,\n    isRawBody,\n    isApiPath,\n    getAuthMeta,\n    getAuthMode,\n    assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode,\n    getApiKind,\n    assertApiKind,\n    assertPubSubConventions,\n    getQueueName,\n    AuthMeta,\n    RouteMetadata,\n    RouteMetadataFactory,\n    HttpContractMapper,\n    METADATA_KEYS,\n    ValidateImplementation,\n    GET,\n    POST,\n    READ,\n    WRITE_IDEMPOTENT,\n    WRITE,\n    RPC,\n    CLOUDTASKS,\n    CRON,\n    EXTERNAL,\n    // @DocumentDesign moved to core-util (design-root marker, browser + Node);\n    // re-exported here for back-compat.\n    DocumentDesign,\n    isDocumentDesign,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nexport type {\n    AuthMode,\n    ApiKind,\n    HttpMethod,\n    EndpointOperation,\n    EndpointKind,\n    EndpointOptions,\n    EndpointResponseType,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\n\n// Server-side routing decorators and utilities\nexport { SourceFile, ROUTING_METADATA_KEYS } from './decorators';\n\n// DI provider decorators moved to core-context; re-exported here for back-compat\nexport { provideSingletonDefaultForApi } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n// Framework-only DI registry (packages/** framework classes use these; see frameworkProvide.ts)\nexport {\n    provideFrameworkSingleton,\n    provideFrameworkSingletonDefaultForApi,\n    buildFrameworkModule,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\nexport { ApiRoutingFactory, ClassType } from './ApiRoutingFactory';\n\n// Core routing types\nexport { Routes, RouteBuilder, RouteDefinition, FilterDefinition } from './WebAppMeta';\n\n// The transport-neutral request type (defined in core-context; this is http-routing's\n// public request — a transport adapter builds one and the chain reads it from RequestContext).\nexport { HttpRequest, RawHttpRequest, RawRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\n// The INBOUND chain's response type. `Filter`, `Service` and `FilterChain` are NOT re-exported\n// here: they moved to @webpieces/core-util so the outbound client chain is the SAME abstraction\n// rather than a second spelling of it. Import them from '@webpieces/core-util'.\nexport { WpResponse } from './WpResponse';\nexport { MethodMeta } from './MethodMeta';\nexport { RouteHandler } from './RouteHandler';\n\n// LogApiFilter: the fixed OUTERMOST framework filter (auto-installed at 1,000,000 above\n// AuthFilter). Exported for reference/testing only — apps must NOT install it themselves.\nexport { LogApiFilter } from './filters/LogApiFilter';\n\n// RouteBuilderImpl (the route table + chain composer) is now INTERNAL — it is never\n// handed to upper layers. The express layer consumes ApiFactory.apiClients() instead.\n\n// Filter matching\nexport { FilterMatcher, HttpFilter } from './FilterMatcher';\n\n// The app's server-surface declaration: DI binding modules + route groups + headers.\nexport { AppModules, RouteModule } from './AppModules';\n\n// The public API-surface abstraction: declare routes/filters, get them back as ApiClient[].\nexport { ApiFactory } from './ApiFactory';\nexport { ApiClient, ApiClientProxy } from './ApiClient';\n\n// Auth: the app-provided, container-bound pieces the framework AuthFilter injects.\n//  - AuthConfig: shared-secret STATE (@WpAuthSharedSecret values).\n//  - JwtHook / OidcHook / WebhookAuthCallback / ApiKeyHook: OPTIONAL verification mechanisms\n//    (bind only what you use; unbound means the matching endpoints 401, never open).\n//  - DefaultOidcVerifier: the built-in Google OIDC verifier used when no OidcHook is bound.\nexport {\n    AuthConfig,\n    AUTH_CONFIG,\n    AuthenticatedCaller,\n    AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY,\n    SharedSecrets,\n} from './AuthConfig';\nexport {\n    JwtHook,\n    MintedJwt,\n    JWT_HOOK,\n    OidcHook,\n    OIDC_HOOK,\n    WebhookAuthCallback,\n    WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK,\n    ApiKeyHook,\n    API_KEY_HOOK,\n} from './AuthHooks';\nexport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from './DefaultOidcVerifier';\n// DefaultJwtHook: batteries-included HS256 JwtHook — `new DefaultJwtHook(secret)` and go.\nexport { DefaultJwtHook, DefaultJwtMintRequest } from './DefaultJwtHook';\n\n// Above-boundary context setup shared by every transport adapter.\n\n// Node-only router (the express-free heart: container + filter chain + in-process client)\nexport { WebpiecesRouter, WebpiecesRouterFactory, WebpiecesRouterOptions } from './WebpiecesRouter';\n\n// The ONE transport-free startup sequence (headers → logging → router → routes) → ApiFactory.\n// Reusable by any company/app and any framework adapter; a company wraps it with its own headers.\nexport { setupRuntime, RuntimeSetupOptions } from './setupRuntime';\n\n// Server configuration\nexport { WebpiecesConfig, WEBPIECES_CONFIG_TOKEN } from './WebpiecesConfig';\n"]}